

The Pandemic Threat

Descriptive Textual Analysis of West' Preparedness on
Pandemic Influenza

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Abstract

With a broad definition of 'security' new areas of study has opened up; health being one of them. The Copenhagen School's concept of securitization originates from this broadening. New and innovative methods of studying security can lead to the discovery of new issues considered potential security threats. The purpose of this thesis is to gain an understanding for how pandemic influenza is articulated as a threat by three major leaders in world politics on different levels of governance. To achieve an answer to this question a descriptive textual analysis is carried out on the core strategic documents on pandemic preparedness by these three actors. By using ideal types of national and human security, articulations were identified to what extent they resembled these extremes within IR.

In the three documents, pandemic influenza is articulated as destructive with potential of killing millions of people; its uncertain nature and unique circumstances intensify the scare of pandemic influenza. Based on the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, it is understood as an existential threat which enables extraordinary measures to be taken.

Key words: pandemic influenza, Copenhagen School, textual analysis, national security, human security

Words: 9916

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Abbreviations

CS	Copenhagen School
CSCT	Critical Security Complex Theory
EU	European Union
IHR	International Health Regulations
LDC	Less Developed Countries
WHO	World Health Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States

1 Introduction

It has been suggested that pandemic flu is the greatest security threat in our time. It is not a question of *if* a new pandemic will sweep the world again; it is a question of *when* (Influenzaguiden, WHO1). The ‘Spanish Flu’ is the first known influenza pandemic of *influenza A* – currently known as the greatest pandemic disease threat to humankind. About 40 million people were killed worldwide in 1918-1920 by influenza A. The H1N1 Spanish Flu was first detected in military bases and prisons, believed to have spread globally by troop movements during the First World War. Influenza A is not as lethal as HIV-1, Ebola, SARS or pneumonic plague; however, according to Gatherer, it could potentially infect 30% of the world’s population within a few months. Even though the mortality rate is as low as 2%, that percentage would translate into 135 million deaths of a new pandemic outbreak because of its rapid inter-personal transmission (Gatherer 2009, Payne 2007:356).

Rethinking security arose in the wake of the changing world order after the Cold War, leading to a ‘widening’ of the security concept. However, it was not until May 2001 an idea of health security was brought to the current security agenda. The WHO resolution “Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response”, was a reaction to the issue of globalization of infectious diseases. Through increased population movements, by tourism, migration or disaster, alteration in climate change as well as changes linked to urbanization – infectious diseases in one country are a concern for the entire world (Elbe 2010b:3, WHO1, Smith 258:2010, Human Security Now 2003, McDonald 61:2010).

Historical fact indicates that the world is overdue for an influenza pandemic (Enemark 2009). Stopping antigenically shifted pandemic influenzas is not yet possible; however, methods of detecting an imminent pandemic and consequently act preventively exist (Gatherer 2009). Globalization is proven to increase the rapid spread; still, advantages are found in information sharing among public health authorities and other experts. These facts are not alone explanations for why some specific public health issues are considered to be security threats. According to Smith, “we need to take a closer look at the politics of threat perception in this domain” (Smith 2010:258).

1.1 Purpose and Research Question

My interest is based on exploring how the *security concept* has come to be broadened in recent years in IR. In 1994 the UNDP released the report “New Dimensions of Human Security”, in which security was defined to include seven

new areas – health being one of them (UNDP). By widening the concept of security, a debate opened up on the security agenda. Proponents argue for the benefit of including health aspects, since people are more threatened by diseases than war; while opponents highlight the risk that broadening the concept leads to security being everything and nothing (Kerr 2007:92, Paris 2001).

Based on the aforementioned, the purpose of this thesis is to thoroughly scrutinize a health issue on the security agenda. I will go into depth on how pandemics can be understood as a security threat and how it is expressed as a security threat on global, regional and state level by policymakers, more specifically:

- How do the World Health Organization, the European Union and the United States articulate pandemic influenza as a security threat in their core documents on pandemic influenza preparedness?

1.2 Material and Limitations

My research question and the purpose of scrutinizing different levels of governance, have determined my choice of documents, which are: *Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response* by the WHO, *Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Planning in the European Community* and the U.S.' *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza*.

There are additional reasons for these three main documents being chosen. Firstly, they are accessible, i.e., they are written in English and available for public scrutiny. Furthermore, the documents are created around the same time, in 2005 (some alterations retrospectively). The content affects us a great deal since the WHO, the EU and the US are important actors for determining the world's security agenda and their classifications and recommendations have consequences for people's thoughts and actions.

The interesting part lies in getting a broader understanding of how pandemics are understood as a security threat on different levels of governance. Aware that vital information might be lost by the selection of these three documents. A certain pre-understanding might affect the research process, i.e., my selection of material to review and actors I consider of value to scrutinize (Beckman 2005:21f). I have no intention to evaluate these documents or to make a generalization based on my findings (Teorell and Svensson 2007:68f). Analyzing how well they have fulfilled their purposes is suggested future research.

1.3 The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School of security studies offers a useful theoretical framework on security studies with the 'securitization' process. It includes non-military

security concerns and yet it still encapsulates a coherent understanding of the concept of security (Emmers 2007:123). My framework will focus on the *1st part of the securitization process*; where the articulation of the threat is of importance. Therefore this is better understood as a study of a *securitization move* – not the full process of securitization (Buzan *et al.* 1998:25). Hence, this thesis will *not* examine how the message is received by an audience or how actions are further taken. Nor will it explain influential factors leading up to the documents.

An answer to my research question will be achieved through a *descriptive textual analysis*. Bearing my research question, theoretical framework and material for observation in mind a textual analysis seems suitable. I will go into depth on what is considered as the *1st part of the securitization process*, in which an actor articulates a threat. The Copenhagen School opens up for innovative ways of studying security and a textual analysis can provide an explanation for how pandemic influenza is articulated as a threat in the documents analyzed.

1.3.1 Epistemological Basis

Using the CS's framework means taking on a hermeneutic worldview, in which security is *intersubjective* and *socially constructed*. Security is determined by actors and has to be accepted by an audience in order to become a security issue. An objective view on security is not able to replace securitization; this assumption relates to the fact that security arguments are hypothetical future outcomes. Investigating a security issue scientifically is therefore not an option and analyzing what constitutes a “real security” issue requires another ontological approach (Buzan *et al.* 1998:31-32,35). The ideal types used as analytical tools are subjective constructions of reality (Teorell and Svensson 2007:43).

1.4 Definition of Concepts

Clarity of concepts used throughout the thesis is essential in order to avoid misconceptions and self-interpretations and thus gain higher validity (Teorell and Svensson 2007:56ff). A general discussion of *pandemic influenza* will now be carried out, because the purpose of the analysis is partly clarifying how pandemics are defined in the various documents. A pandemic is a worldwide epidemic of a contagious disease. ”An influenza pandemic occurs when an animal influenza virus to which most humans have no immunity acquires the ability to cause sustained chains of human-to-human transmission leading to community-wide outbreaks” (World Health Organization 2009:14). The influenza virus is transmitted through the air, meaning that close contact is not a requirement. It is difficult to identify and quarantine infected people and therefore difficult to mitigate the spread of the virus (Payne 2007:356).

The definition of the three *levels of governance* I will scrutinize is executed with reference to ‘securitization’. The levels can be understood as “locations

where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located (Buzan *et al.* 1998:5)”. They are ontological references, i.e., referents for where things happen and they should therefore not be interpreted as a source of explanation themselves. The UN operates on the *international system* level, meaning it is the highest level without any other system level above it; whereas the European Union is on the *international subsystem* level, since it is a group of member states distinguished from the rest of the international system. And the US is found on the *unit* level, independent from others (*ibid.* 1998:5-6). Note: this type of classification reinforces state-centric thinking (*ibid.* 1998:7).

Security will further be discussed in section 4.3; since *national security* and *human security* demonstrate ideal types in this thesis. Defining security in a wider context also means that ‘conceptual stretching’ is a risk; overstretching it might weaken the concept because important components are missing. This problem reconnects to the question: what is my case a case of? (Teorell and Svensson 2007:237). It is crucial to separate the concept’s intension and extension because of coherence between the components. The operational equivalent ‘conceptual travelling’ is likewise something to be aware of (Badersten 2006:86f,92).

1.5 Outline of the Study

After the introduction, the chapter which follows will put pandemic influenza in a security context. My theoretical framework is presented in chapter three, being basis for my methodological choices that will subsequently follow in chapter four. The analysis is carried out in chapter five, in which my findings are presented and discussed. The thesis is summed up in chapter six with a conclusion.

2 Pandemics in a Security Context

Greater international involvement in public health today is partly a result of regular outbreaks of infectious diseases on national, regional, and global scale. Also, progress in developing new technologies and medicines has contributed to increased cooperation (Smith 2010:257). Adding global health challenges to human security recognizes that localized health emergencies quickly can become global issues (McDonald 2010:54f). Health security today is not only an issue for undeveloped countries, infectious diseases with a high level of lethal ‘rogue’ viruses are a security threat for the whole world (Elbe 2010b:1).

Pandemics can be framed as a security threat based on its destructiveness, i.e., its direct human costs in statistics. Beneath is a list of major deadly influenza pandemics of the 20th century:

Pandemic	Estimated number of deaths
‘Spanish’ influenza (1918)	40-50 million +
Asian influenza (1957-8)	2 million
Hong Kong Influenza (1968-70)	1million

(Smith 2010:258).

So, why is it that the threshold is set higher for some diseases to become subject for the security agenda whereas some is being regarded as just health issues? By way of illustration, pandemic influenza is a threat of which intolerable burden on society will be imposed (Enemark 2009), and the risk of rapid high levels of illness and morbidity are such burdens which make pandemic influenza classified as a national security issue by some nations. Further factors that may impinge are economic disruption with losses that come with a pandemic because of its dread and speed. An Australian study has compiled a worst-case scenario in which the global economy will encounter an estimated loss of \$44 trillion (Enemark 2009, McKibbin and Sidorenko 2006).

With the ‘securitization’(see Elbe 2010a for details) of the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 followed questions the international community need to peruse, in order to avoid similar mistakes being made yet again. The fear, of a H5N1 pandemic, pushed governments to secure their own interests by stocking up with pharmacological counter-measures to mitigate a rapid spread. In the midst of insufficient global supplies, conflicts between developed and LDC’s became evident, as well as complications of international health cooperation. The West tried to maintain a high defense; simultaneously they set demands on developing countries where human cases of H5N1 already existed (Elbe 2010a). However, not only downsides with the securitization of H5N1 are evident, in the aftermath approximately 140 countries have developed national pandemic preparedness plans, resources have been pledged globally and cross discipline sectors are working together (*ibid.*, World Bank 2008).

3 Theory

This chapter will discuss the thesis' theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School and how threats are identified by 'securitization'. I will start by briefly explain the theories which underpin the CS for a deeper understanding of securitization (and the ideal types presented in next chapter).

3.1 Underpinning Theories of the Copenhagen school

To begin with, the Copenhagen School was founded at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute of Copenhagen by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jan de Wilde. It was a response to the changing post-Cold War world order and the inability to explain new security threats with the traditional approach on security (Emmers 2007:110). Together they have written, inter alia, the renowned book *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*; which redefines the post-Cold War security agenda. Despite a social constructivist approach de Wilde had to, as they say: “[restrain] the other two from taking a too unquestioning position toward realist assumptions” (*ibid.*1998:viii). As a result, a new framework to identify threats became established as well as the concept of securitization.

Realism is a recognized theory in international relations and it is a powerful construction for analyzing security. The theory states that there is an absence of ultimate power and authority over states. States are always worried about their survival, they govern without interference and sovereignty is not violated (Morgan 2007:16-17, Sheehan 2005:4). However, the narrow concept of the traditional approach is insufficient explaining new security threats; commencing from this debate, the CS emerged. It provides a subjective worldview with a social constructivism approach in which society is understood as constructed. Social constructivism differentiates from realism since it is not understood to have a state-centric worldview; it provides a more nuanced picture of international relations where norms and non-state actors also are in focus (Ruggie 2004).

3.2 Securitization

The concept of securitization is thus associated with the CS. The theory provides an explanation for *how* an issue is *articulated* rather than how an issue becomes a security issue in IR (Collins 2007:6). Securitization is a radical view of traditional security studies, in which both military and non-military threats are potential

threats to securitize (Buzan *et al.* 1998:4). The CS says that any specific matter can go from being non-politicized, politicized to being securitized (Emmers 2007:111f), put differently, securitization is an extreme version of politicization which takes politics beyond standard measures to either a special kind of politics or above normal that would not be legitimate otherwise (Buzan *et al.* 1998:23). But, securitization is not supposed to be seen as a positive act, some issues are better solved in the political realm (Emmers 2007:115).

The Copenhagen School moves beyond CSCT and its focus on the military sector, by taking on a social constructivist view to comprehend the process of securitization. Security is constructed, based on the assumption that it is a ‘*speech act*’; through the speech act *alone* an issue can potentially become a security question, regardless of an existential threat in material terms or not – “by saying the words, something is done” (Buzan 1998:19,26, Emmers 2007:110,113). Actors implementing a speech act are typically state leaders or actors benefitting from privileged positions (Buzan 1998:40, Emmers 2007:112).

In order to abandon the traditional view that security is locked into specific sectors I will apply a *heterogeneous* approach (Buzan *et al.* 1998:16). This will maintain a more general picture in which a cross sector link is possible to identify and the possibility of mixing levels and by that identifying global causes and local effects, or vice versa (*ibid.* 1998:16f). As mentioned, the central question is “for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom (*ibid.* 1998:18)”. Securitization at the global level, does not necessarily mean effects will be shown globally; regional efforts are sometimes more likely to succeed (*ibid.* 1998:18).

3.2.1 The 1st stage in the Securitization Process

As mentioned earlier, the speech act is the core of securitization and also the starting point of the process. While a certain issue is portrayed as an existential threat and a consensual establishment is evident, an issue can transform into a security question; however, the threat should be prominent. Thereafter, a security actor uses language to articulate a problem in order to convince an audience about immediate danger and thereby enable extraordinary measures to be taken. By this procedure, the actor wishes to legitimate mobilization of power beyond standard political actions (Emmers 2007:111f).

Some criterions need to be fulfilled in the 1st stage of the process. As stated, it must be an *existential threat*. This criterion enables the CS to link the issue to the broader definition of security which means that it is considered to be a question of survival and consequently a traditional approach to security can be taken (Emmers 2007:113). The existential threat is best understood in relation to the character of the referent object; and it is in relation to an existential threat that security means survival, depending on the nature of the sector in question (Buzan *et al.* 1998:21ff,27), in this case, understood as either the state, associated with national security; or survival of individuals, related to human security – *without* degrees of importance since that would mean undermining the idea of widening the security agenda (*ibid.* 1998:25f). These are further outlined as ideal types in section 4.3.

3.2.2 Criticism on Securitization

Criticism directed from the traditional view on security studies are based on the risk of intellectual incoherence, however, for the Copenhagen School a retreat back into the military core is not a solution. Instead, future research will continue exploring the logic of security as well as the differences between that and securitization of political issues (Buzan *et al.* 1998:4f).

Securitization is manifested differently in different sectors (Emmers 2007:110), and is sometimes insufficient when striving to understand something empirically, being a theoretical approach with much attention put to language. It is also criticized for being Eurocentric; in some parts of the world where realism provides an unchallenged perspective. The theory is derived from European experiences where society rather than the state is the referent object (*ibid.* 115f, 124:2007). Securitization has also being criticized for legitimating military forces in civilian activities, by striving to apply extraordinary measures securitization can be abused by leaders (*ibid.* 2007:115).

4 Methodology

The following chapter will draw attention to methodological choices in my research process. Based on my research question and theoretical framework; a textual analysis is suitable given that it provides tools to analyze how a threat is articulated in the documents. From the two extreme security approaches found within the CS; ideal types are constructed to contribute with an angle to what extent pandemics can be understood to resemble the traditional approach of national security and the new broader approach of human security.

4.1 Descriptive Analysis of Ideas

A textual analysis in this case is relevant for several reasons. In our contemporary global society a great deal of texts are produced by actors with purpose of disseminate information. It is therefore of value to more closely scrutinize these texts since they are read and referenced by others which in turn leads to influence people's thoughts and actions (Bergström and Boréus 2005:13). A descriptive analysis cannot provide an exhaustive explanation by means of *why* something has occurred, been said or done. However, it brings explanation regarding *what* the phenomenon in focus is (Backman 2007:48), which is appropriate in this thesis. The purpose is to *infer* and draw conclusions based on the material, i.e., I aim to say something new about the material. At this point, it should be clear that my intention is not to take stand in messages stated (Backman 2007:49f).

Moreover, this tool for analysis seems to imply a comparison. For future feasibility, I would like to point out that the ideal types are based on my estimation of the content in the documents; therefore based on certain dimensions I find of significance. While the possibility exist that there are more points of comparison than what this thesis have the opportunity to engage in (Backman 2007:51). Specific information on the tools for my analysis is now to follow.

4.2 Ideal Types

Ideal types can be used directly to analyze texts, understood as an artificial construction based on ideas and notions regarding our society; i.e., they are non-contested basis for reasoning of values or scientific and ethical postulates (Bergström and Boreús 2005:58f). Since they are not an exact representation of reality it means that they cannot be rejected by empirical data; meaning, the ideal

type's status is not dependent on empirical data (Esaiasson *et al.* 2007:159, Teorell and Svensson 2007:42). This sort of conceptual constructions is a tool for describing reality, to streamline things and reconstruct systems of ideas. In this thesis, they are suitable to use as a *grid* to overlay the documents (Bergström and Boreús 2005:159), i.e., the empirical material for analysis. My intention is not to classify to which ideal type a phenomenon belongs to; rather examine *to what extent* it resembles the stereotypes based on national security and human security and thereby capture features of reality (Esaiasson *et al.* 2005:159).

A key feature of ideal types is the fact that they are extreme images of the area in focus (*ibid.* 2007:158). The grids for my theoretical framework are created by selected relevant ideas in relation to that. By creating a typology of essential dimension of the documents and from these referent points, various formulations will fall into different categories (Bergström and Boreús 2005:160), that is to say, either human security or national security.

4.2.1 Criticism on Ideal Types as a Methodological Tool

When explaining texts with a classification scheme, such as ideal types, it is questionable whether the framework is predetermined or a result of the analysis (Bergström and Boreús 2005:171). Therefore, precise and well defined ideal types are crucial in order to some extent avoid the question of what was created first. Additionally, I am aware of the risk of imposing documents on my framework and thus lose information that would have been obtained using a different method by letting the text 'speak for itself' (*ibid.* 2005:171f).

4.3 Analytical Framework

The Copenhagen School's foundation is traditional state-centered thinking alike national security; whereas widening the security concept leads to human security representing the other end of the spectrum (see Appendix 1 for detailed matrix of security studies). On this basis, I aim to make the analysis distinguishable and interesting by using two ideal types illustrating how pandemic influenza can be seen as a narrow national security issue or a broader human security issue; thereby providing a more nuanced explanation of the pandemic threat (Smith 2010:256).

The struggle between national security and human security is at the heart for how IR is perceived from two different outlooks on the world (Chandler 2010:114). I will conduct ideal types of key words of each concept. Some of the dimensions might be hard to distinguish from one another. My choice of dimensions is hence a judgment call.

Several definitions will collectively provide a comprehensible ideal type; i.e., up to date in reference to literature on this area. The definition carried out in the UNDP report of humans security is too vast and needs to be narrowed down. In this thesis it is appropriate to consider the taxonomical role 'human security'

plays, with purpose of classifying different ideas (Paris 2001). Both stereotypes notice the possibility of a catastrophic future, yet these two paradigms are opposites, supplementing each other and contribute with insights for a more comprehensive security agenda in our contemporary context (Kerr 2007:101, Elbe 2010b:130).

In order to narrow down the concepts and to make the ideal types more manageable, I have distinguished *three* contrary -dimensions, (Esaiasson *et al.* 2007:160, Beckman 2007:17), which is operationalized at the end of each ideal type and further clarified in Figure 1.

4.3.1 National Security

Within national security paradigm the state is *who* to be secured, also *how* this should be done; i.e., by defending core national values, forcibly if necessary, and the enemy is from *whom* security is needed (Dunne and Wheeler 14f:2010). National security is a realist perspective in which the state is the highest priority and the state's core duty to protect; still, supportive citizens are desirable; e.g., in order to justify defense budgets, interventions and military conscription. Furthermore, a certain loyalty to the state is prevalent in times of emergency given that states are unique concentrations of power to which people's sense of identity is attached (Kennedy-Pipe 2007:76, Morgan 2007:14f).

For the purpose of this thesis, it is helpful to put national security in a more contemporary context, relatable to the issue of pandemics. Material power is still of importance however the meanings states attach to power and security are also of importance when seeking to explain national security and the constructed identity of actors (Katzenstein 1996:2ff). Translating this into the health sector; Smith argues that major outbreaks of infectious diseases should be interpreted as a direct threat to international security, and that indirect threats rather should be framed in the human security agenda (further discussed in 4.3.2)(Smith 2010:256). Infectious diseases should be seen as urgent issues were political framing and responses are needed (*ibid.* 2010:256). Difficulties with national security are linked to the problem of LDC's relationship to the rest of the world. For example, health-related security threats can spread from LDC to developed states as a result of inferior sanitation practices. Developed states can therefore decide to adopt security precautions with more restrictive immigration policies and impose travel restrictions (*ibid.* 2007:256f).

Lastly, Enemark argues that two risks emerge by governments framing pandemic influenza as a security threat. It might do more harm than good implementing emergency response and also the risk of emphasizing states to take on security precautions might diminish future international cooperation (Enemark 2009).

Dimensions: *state-centric, state loyalty, protect state borders*

4.3.2 Human Security

Initially, within human security two schools are found, focus here will be on the broad school. The human-centric idea is central in both and they agree on people being the referent object; however, they differentiate over what they consider to be a threat which potentially could be *securitized*. The broad school originates from the previously mentioned UNDP report (Kerr 2007:95, Shani 56f:2010), including life-threatening dangers without making a difference on them being within or outside the state (Kerr 2007:95).

A holistic and indivisible approach characterizes human security, with both military and non-military threats recognized. Threats which are transnational and unintentional, exemplify the plurality of threats that can be found in this concept (Dunne and Wheeler 2010:21f, 24, Kerr 2007:92). A crucial contribution of the concept is to *shift* the referent object from states to *individuals*; as individuals constitute humanity as a whole (Dunne and Wheeler 2010:13, Payne 2007:353). Also, proponents of human security argue for our moral horizon to be extended to view ourselves “beyond national-based conceptions of citizenship” (Dunne and Wheeler 2010:13). Human security addresses ongoing problems that cause deaths on a daily basis which makes more diseases considered a security threat (Elbe 2010:130), also preventive measures are of importance for human security, contrasting from reactive efforts (McDonald 2010:54).

At the very heart of human security lies good health. It is both instrumental and essential in order to obtain human security. In *Human Security Now*, it is pointed out that human security is about protecting lives. Consequently, illness, avoidable death and disability are included (2003, Alkire 2003). Furthermore, the same report stresses the importance of calming public fears with visible and demonstrable capacity for successful health action in times of crisis (*ibid.*). Four criteria can illustrate the link between global infectious diseases and human security, first: the scale of the disease burden now and into the future, also the urgency for action. Another potential link is the depth and extent of the impact on society; finally, that interdependencies or “externalities” that can exert ripple effects beyond particular diseases, persons or locations (Human Security Now 2003).

A quote encapsulating human security say: “[t]he objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment” (Alkire 2003).

Dimensions: *human-centric, beyond national loyalty, protect individuals*

Figure 1.

Ideal types	National Security	Human Security
Standpoint	State-centric	Human-centric
Loyalty	National loyalty	Beyond national loyalty
Strategy	Protect state borders	Protect individuals

5 Analysis

I will commence the analysis by observing how pandemics are being expressed as security threats in the three documents. Uttering the word ‘security’ does not define the speech act; I will start by observing whether “designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures” (Buzan *et al.* 1998:27), is expressed in the documents. To mitigate imposing the framework on the documents and thereby produce an unrewarding discussion, I will commence by analyzing the documents separately. In my opinion, the most distinctive articulations are presented, being aware of the fact that this could have been done differently. Lastly, there will be a discussion in which a comparison will be conducted.

5.1 *Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response*

This document by the WHO is an update of the previously published guidance from 2005. It was created after the spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) that started in 2003; nevertheless it had positive effects on strengthening national and global capacities in the health sector. A new understanding for, and a greater attention to health security affected this product and the reality of stockpiles of anti-viral drugs (World Health Organization 2009:3,8). It is a guide for both national and international preparedness. WHO encourage countries to update plans in consistency with this guide; although, not replace them.

5.1.1 Existential Threat and Extraordinary Measures

The WHO does *not explicitly* articulate pandemic influenza as a security *threat*. At the beginning of the document statistics are presented to illustrate influenza pandemics’ destructiveness. Furthermore, the nature of pandemic is unpredictable and history tells us that they are recurring events leading to severe consequences worldwide. Previous influenza pandemics of the 20th century and their severe consequences are further outlined. WHO also raise a concern considering the fact that since the 16th century influenza pandemics are proven to occur in an interval ranging between 10 and 50 years, with varying severity and impact, i.e., varying levels of illness and death (*ibid.* 2009:13,22). In the writing of this document, H5N1 was considered the most probable influenza virus with pandemic potential. With an “unusually high percentage of human H5N1 infectious result in severe illness or death”, compared to the H1N1 virus for example or the Spanish flu, it

goes beyond in “proportion of deaths caused” (*ibid.* 2009:14). By articulating pandemics as destructive, WHO gives pandemics a status of an existential threat and a question about survival (cf. Copenhagen School).

In order to mitigate the severe consequences of a pandemic WHO’s responsibility is to reduce the spread of the pandemic virus, as well as its “attendant morbidity and mortality” (World Health Organization 2009:10). A number of worst-case-scenarios might become reality since most countries have insufficient preparedness; for example, a rapid spread leading to difficulties “[...] implementing ad hoc mitigating measures” (*ibid.* 2009:13). Securitization of an issue enables extraordinary measures to be taken and the WHO clarifies the importance of meeting challenges effectively by being well prepared (*ibid.* 2009:11). They stress the importance of national authorities’ ability for a rapid containment in the initial emergence of pandemic influenza, being an “[...] extraordinary public health action, which build upon, but goes beyond, routine outbreak response and disease control measures” (*ibid.* 2009:21).

5.1.2 National / Human Security

The WHO’s pandemic preparedness plan represent a human-centric approach on many points. Essential to bear in mind is that the human security approach has been a “[...] useful diplomatic framing tool for practitioners in the UN” (Kerr 104:2007). WHO put emphasis on pandemic preparedness as a “whole-of-society responsibility”, meaning all sectors and individuals have responsibility to mitigate the impact of pandemic influenza (World Health Organization 2009:16); exemplifying values found within the human security strategy to protect individuals and where loyalty lies beyond national borders. As mentioned, at the heart of human security lies good health. To protect others, individuals need to help reduce the spread of influenza virus; it might even be appropriate with isolation of persons with respiratory illness as a voluntary measure taken (*ibid.* 2009:10). The individual’s role in mitigating the consequences by understanding the severity of a pandemic situation is of importance (*ibid.* 2009:18). The six phases WHO has compiled of pandemic influenza, will be applicable globally in order to provide a useful framework to aid people all over the world (*ibid.* 2009:10) which again is reminiscent of the human security strategy. WHO’s responsibility to identify changes of the global phase of pandemic influenza is basis for careful consideration of information provided from states around the world, ensuring criteria for the new phase have been met (*ibid.* 2009:10).

Additional reasoning associated with human security, is WHO ensuring ethical pandemic preparedness and response; meaning “[...] balancing potentially conflicting individual interests with community interest”; and guarantees that measures taken that might “[...] limit individual rights and civil liberties must be necessary, reasonable, proportional, equitable, non-discriminatory, and not in violation of national and international laws”(*ibid.* 2009:15).

Further stated is the fact that the national government is the natural leader for all coordination (*ibid.* 2009:17), which lies within the national security paradigm.

Global cooperation is not adequate; states need to protect their safety independently too and incorporate international preparedness plans in their own national priorities (*ibid.* 2009:15). This is supported by a framework set up by the International Health Regulations (2005), an international legal instrument in accordance with WHO's guidelines. It is a legally binding institution for 194 states, with purpose of providing a global framework for preventing, controlling and respond to public health risks. States are by this required to respond to WHO (World Health Organization 2009:19).

5.2 *Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Planning in the European Community*

This document was published by the EU in 2005. The need for EU-level action is based on the fact that within the EU there are no internal borders and no country alone can face the consequences resulting from a pandemic. This document was set up because a preparedness and response plan for an imminent influenza pandemic was needed. While pandemic security is a complex area, impossible to predict, preparedness plans are based upon planning assumptions in order to mitigate excess deaths and social disruption (Commission of the European Communities 2005:5).

5.2.1 Pandemic Threat and Extraordinary Measures

As in the WHO document, pandemic influenza is articulated as an existential threat illustrated by statistics on previous pandemics, such as the Spanish Flu. The first paragraph ends with expressed: “[...] concerns that an influenza virus might arise [from China or Southeast Asia], fully adapted human-to-human transmission and capable of causing millions of deaths and huge economic damage” (*ibid.* 2005:4). The EU fears that a pandemic influenza will cause disruption on several areas, such as social and economic. While high levels of public, political and media concern are anticipated, within and subsequent to the pandemic period, also: “[a]nxiety, movement restrictions, constraint on public gatherings, distribution difficulties, great number of excess deaths are all likely to add pressure and disruption to the society”(*ibid.* 2005:4.). Articulating pandemics as a daunting existential threat, with potential millions of deaths, makes it a matter of survival and therefore extraordinary measures beyond traditional can be taken.

Difficulties in preparing for something uncertain as a pandemic influenza are evident, pandemic preparedness is based on planning assumptions, such as potential fatality rate and rate of intensive care (*ibid.* 2005:4). Key priority should be providing citizens of the Union with reliable information, also in order to mitigate media interest concerning the “perceived threat of a pandemic”; by providing authoritative information and ready to use briefings (*ibid.* 2005:13).

The existential threat enables extraordinary measures to be taken. Fast action in the event of pandemic influenza is crucial. The EU uses and follows the recommendations by WHO before and during a pandemic. Member states may be differently vulnerable and move through the phases at different pace, and therefore different measures require to be taken accordingly (*ibid.* 2005:14). With inadequate vaccine resources in the EU; it is up to each Member state to plan for vaccination (*ibid.* 2005:10). Further measures should be “[...] placed on systematic surveillance of the impact of vaccine programmes [sic] on morbidity and mortality and on good information on the immunization status in the EU” (*ibid.* 2005:9).

5.2.2 National / Human Security

The EU is on the *international subsystem* level, as a group of member states without internal borders. Yet, they have an interest in protecting the union to mitigate the consequences of a pandemic influenza. International cooperation is believed to be of importance since they are aware of the fact that no country alone can “face the consequences of a pandemic” (Commission of the European Communities 2005:5). Therefore it is of weight to strengthen national and international levels of preparedness (*ibid.* 2005:16). In this context, mutual exchange of expertise is of core value. As mentioned in the previous section, the EU follows the recognition issued by the WHO (*ibid.* 2005:5), the union also prepares by recognizing measures for each phase of pandemic influenza on their level of governance, “due to specific circumstances of the European Union, which is characterised [sic] by the absence of internal borders and the free circulation of persons and goods [...]” (*ibid.* 2005:14).

To protect nation borders and individuals within them, so far, only half of the member states have “covered measures on international travel, contact tracing and quarantine and limitations of movement” (*ibid.* 2005:6). On the issue of vaccine, it is up to “Member States authorities to provide maximum protection to their own population” (*ibid.* 2005:12). Also, with focus on individuals: “Member States need to consider their neighbours’ [sic] quality of services to be ready to respond to citizens seeking assistance over the national borders” (*ibid.* 2005:13). This is something which the EU wants to avoid. The Union is additionally aware of major post-pandemic consequences; e.g., many citizens may remain affected, by means of indirect costs such as losing friends and relatives (*ibid.* 2005:27).

The EU looks beyond its borders and declares that “[s]uch is the nature of the threat that it is obvious that providing protection for Member States implies increasing protective and preventive measures globally” (*ibid.* 2005:6). Pandemic influenza will have consequences on society as well as the economic sector, resulting from work absenteeism for instance. Yet, state of preparedness in the EU at this point is narrow and only the health sector has a preparedness and response plan, the other sectors need to be developed and made more operational (*ibid.* 2005:6).

5.3 *National Strategy for pandemic influenza*

The US published the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza* as a response to the daunting challenge of pandemic influenza. The document was published in 2005 with, at the time, the threat from the H5N1 strain of influenza A becoming a new pandemic sweeping the world. The document presents the US' outlined preparations, detection and response to a pandemic influenza (The White House 2005).

5.3.1 Pandemic Threat & Extraordinary Measures

In the document several articulations suggest that pandemic influenza is a security threat to the U.S. The foreword of the document was written by former President George W. Bush, who states that this document is a product to address “the threat of pandemic influenza” (Bush, The White House 2005). Pandemics are presented as threats in relation to their destructiveness and the potential of causing millions of illnesses. The last sentence of the foreword states that “[t]ogether we will confront this emerging threat and together, as Americans, we will be prepared to protect our families, our communities, this great Nation, and our world” (*ibid.*), which evokes a feeling of state-loyalty.

Statistics on potential deaths, hospitalizations and economic loss contribute to intensify the impact pandemics potentially will have on the American society. Previous pandemics are being referred to, such as the ‘Spanish Flu’ and the other two major pandemics of the 20th century and the millions of lives that were lost. Linked to that, predictions based on history and science reads that: “[...] we will face one or more pandemics in this century” (The White House 2005:1). Also, the predicted H5N1-pandemic in 2003 has its marks in this text. E.g., it is stated that the “widespread nature of H5N1 [...] raised our concern that the virus will become transmissible between humans, with potentially *catastrophic consequences*” (*ibid.* 2005:2, my emphasis). Another recurrent concern is the risk that one person who is infected can transmit the virus to “tens or hundreds of others”(*ibid.* 2005:11). For faster action the US will take on measures such as: “[...] rapidly employ resources to contain the spread of the virus. An effective surveillance and detection system will save lives by allowing us to activate our response plans before the arrival of a pandemic virus to the U.S [...]” (*ibid.* 2005:7), associated with the discussion carried out in 5.3.2.

With purpose to ensure that extraordinary measures can be taken; “[a] critical element of pandemic planning is ensuring that people and entities not accustomed to responding to health crises understand the actions and priorities required to prepare for and respond to a pandemic” (*ibid.* 2005:4). Communication is essential and spokespersons are identified in order to mitigate panic and provide effective risk communication to the American people (The White House 2005:4,9). Also, the US declares that traditional control measures are insufficient and the U.S. federal government will use all “instruments of national power to

address the pandemic threat” (*ibid.* 2005:2). In the event of a pandemic, and its unique circumstances; necessitate a strategy “that extends well beyond health and medical boundaries [...]”(*ibid.* 2005:2). Further developments of detection tools for onsite diagnosis of pandemic strains of influenza, is stressed to be of importance (*ibid.* 2005:7). Last, but by no means least, extraordinary measures are facilitated by education and preparedness of the population before a pandemic, success of measurements taken will be evident on individual level (*ibid.* 2005:10,11).

5.3.2 National / Human Security

On scrutinizing the US’s strategy on pandemic influenza preparedness and response it is of value to bear in mind that states are considered to have the main material assets to deliver human security (Kerr 2007:96), as in this case. Yet, essential to notice is the difference between a state-centric approach and a state-dominated field, even though the state is the ideal security actor security is not only about the state (Buzan *et al.* 1998:37). The actions of the US are considered a guiding principle, since “[...] the character and quality of the U.S. response and that of our international partners may play a determining role in the severity of a pandemic” (The White House 2005:12).

Initially, the most recurring phrase throughout the document is akin to the human security paradigm, we “[...] all share the responsibility to limit the spread of infection in order to protect populations *beyond their borders*”(*ibid.* 2005:4, my emphasis); expressing not only loyalty to the U.S but also to population beyond U.S’ borders. Moreover, the population needs to understand its weight in the process of mitigating an impact; not only concerning U.S citizens but also population beyond their borders (*ibid.* 2005:4). The U.S. lays an emphasis on working with multilateral health organizations like the WHO, and they strive for the “[g]lobal partnership [to] be leveraged to address the pandemic threat” (*ibid.* 2005:2,4). A central component in the strategy is their international efforts to contain and mitigate consequences of a pandemic influenza (*ibid.* 2005:12). Rapid reporting of influenza cases and international cooperation, by political and diplomatic channels, is of value. In the document it is clarified that:

We recognize that a virus with pandemic potential anywhere represent a risk to populations everywhere. Once health authorities have signaled sustained and efficient human-to-human spread of the virus has occurred, a cascade of response mechanisms will be initiated, from the site of the documented transmission to locations around the globe (*ibid.* 2005:8.)

To sustain the US’ protection, governmental authorities will work to diminish non-essential movement of people were an outbreak occurs. Meaning that travel restrictions are insufficient since influenza does not respect geographical borders, instead the U.S. suggests tracing travelers by: “[...] entry to and egress from affected areas [since they] represent opportunities to control or at the very least

slow the spread of infection” (The White House 2005:7), by striving to protect their borders. For increased protection, quarantine authority is a suggested appropriate public health intervention, as well as providing measures for preventing severe disruption of American communities (*ibid.* 2005:8f). Individuals are suggested to potentially get self-isolated, in order to protect others but also themselves from contracting influenza (*ibid.* 2005:5).

The US does *not only* fear pandemic influenza to have serious impact on the health sector, they are also worrying about economic impact as a result of persistent worker absenteeism (*ibid.* 2005:5), having affect on the state. Also, American communities will presumably be on the front line of a pandemic and with purpose to protect national borders the US will ensure that “all reasonable measures are taken to limit the spread of an outbreak within and beyond the community’s borders” (*ibid.* 2005:10). A feature which the U.S. is considering before an outbreak is allocating countermeasures. Vaccines only exist in limited supply and will therefore be allocated gradually based on the at-risk populations (*ibid.* 2005:5-6).

5.4 Discussion

Common for the three documents, is inferred to be that they articulate pandemic influenza to be of destructive nature, mainly based on historical facts but also on planning assumptions. In the documents a greater understanding for preparedness and response is evident in more than just the health sector; not only associated with positive effects, since it might increase the scare of pandemics as an existential threat instead. Bear in mind that securitization of an issue, lifting it above normal politics, is not always a good thing. The changing nature of what constitutes a threat is somehow at the center of this discussion.

These three documents can all be seen as a security move in the 1st stage of securitization. By using language, the actors behind the documents, articulate pandemic influenza as an existential threat; aware of the fact that these documents will be the core documents for different sectors, citizens and media to turn to in the event of an emerging pandemic influenza. With this basis extraordinary measures are mobilized and thereby easier to implement in consensus with the relevant audience in question. This is one example which shows that pandemics can go from being politicized to being securitized.

As stated in the U.S’ document, traditional control measures are insufficient in unique circumstances as pandemic influenza. In unity with the Copenhagen School, this also illustrates how pandemics can go from being a politicized question into being securitized; requiring a strategy that extends beyond traditional boundaries. By some means, all these documents lay a foundation for measures, which are beyond traditional politics to be taken. Moreover, this is a transnational issue requiring international collaboration. As articulated in the document by the EU; in order to protect Member States, collaboration with e.g., WHO is essential since the nature of the threat requires measures to be taken

globally. Measures taken at a global level will increase regional and national security by mitigating the spread and diminish its impact and consequences on societies. With this in mind, partially the answer to how pandemics can be understood as a security threat is by some means found within the different levels of governance analyzed.

The unique nature of pandemic influenza is, at each level of analysis, understood as a threat which no actor alone can mitigate the effects of. The interpretation of how threats are understood can be explained by different thresholds for defining a threat based on different actor's perceptions of what constitutes a threat. These are difficult to measure based on the CS's assumption that threats are socially constructed (Buzan *et al.* 1998:30). Another explanation is highlighted in the document by the WHO, that it is not possible to link "severity assessment at a global level to actions at the national level" (WHO2:22). Pandemic influenza does not follow the same pattern globally and circumstances vary. Normally threats are identified within a region and thereby fought within a region; however, pandemic influenza is a global threat. A securitization move at a global level might encounter problems, not only is it hard to establish a shared understanding of what constitutes a threat globally and applying similar measures simultaneously, but Buzan and Weaver say that there is a greater success on securitizing on the middle level because it is easier to create a feeling of 'us' (Buzan and Weaver 2009). The WHO is trying to change that mindset and as stated in the WHO document, they aspire for a 'whole-of-society' approach, meaning they are moving away from the thinking of 'us and them' towards a human security approach of 'we the peoples' (Dunne and Wheeler 13:2010).

National and human security, illustrating ideal types in this thesis, are not exact representations of reality and cannot either provide sufficient explanations for our contemporary security context alone (Kerr 2007:102), this suggests that nor can the documents analyzed be explained with only one concept. In the context of pandemic influenza: as pointed out in the analysis, the ideas range within these two extreme stereotypes. At all three levels of governance articulations, to some extent, resembling both national and human security were identified. A discussion on whether these concepts, and the dimensions which have been the basis for the analysis, are distinguishable and how they differentiate in relation to pandemic influenza preparedness and response will now follow.

First, the three actor's *standpoint*, as interpreted in the documents, differentiates fairly. As previously shown in the analysis, interpreted from the documents is that a human-centric approach is palpable in the question of the pandemic threat. Nevertheless, rather naturally the U.S. takes on a more state-centric approach, compared to the two other documents. However, to clarify (as shown in section 5.3.2), in the document the U.S. has arguments in accordance with human security. The WHO provides the least unambiguous human-centric approach, focusing on individuals all over the world. The EU is found somewhere in between, focusing primarily on the union. The EU and the U.S. stress that they will assist third countries as well; by that, mitigating effects on their own borders. Secondly, regarding the dimension of *loyalty*, the WHO's loyalty spans over the citizens of the world and in the document by the EU a loyalty to the union is

deduced. The U.S is willing to participate in a global cooperation yet a strong feeling of national loyalty is palpable, e.g., the forewords written by the President addressing “My fellow Americans”(Bush, USA). And lastly, a common *strategy* for the actors is to protect people. The WHO does not only focus on individual security, equally they mark the importance of nations individually being prepared to respond to a pandemic influenza. It is often easier to see actions taken at regional and state level and to establish a sense of what is perceived as an existential threat. The EU’s strategy does not concern protecting national borders but the borders of union. Also here, the U.S tends to resemble national security to a greater extent than the two other actors. Throughout the documents signs of importance to protect the borders of America were found. Even though both the EU and the U.S has strategies resembling human security, with the individual in focus does not necessarily mean that action will be implemented in accordance with that.

Nevertheless, human security is a concept which has been abused. Even though the human security agenda is used to justify extraordinary measures to be taken it is sometimes perceived as a “hot air balloon”(Paris 2001), i.e., empty rhetoric and little or no implementation of human security (Kerr 2007:103). Moreover, Buzan *et al.* states that national security should not be idealized. History tells us that it has given power holders ability to legitimize something by exploiting “threats” and take advantage of the situation. Based on these assumptions security should be seen as a failure of keeping an issue on the normal political agenda (1998:29). However, it is inevitable not to approach some issues as security questions and thus ignore them to be greater existential threats than military conflicts.

In accordance with national security, pandemic influenza is understood as an urgent issue, and all three documents articulate that political framing and response are necessary on this issue. While other public health issues are ignored and marginalized by the international community even though they also have a negative impact on millions of people (Smith 2010:256), pandemic influenza is considered to be a threat lifted above traditional measures. In the documents, a concern is raised that pandemic influenza is a security threat which can spread from LDC’s and therefore it is of importance to provide assistance to those countries to mitigate the spread of the influenza virus. In the documents pandemic influenza is also understood as a threat which requires security precaution e.g., restrictions on travel, quarantine and self-isolation (cf. Smith 2007:256f).

To recapture to the *Human Security Now* report, which states that human security is about protecting lives, and also absence of illness and avoidable death are highlighted. By looking at the core of what pandemic influenza is, i.e., a non-military threat affecting individuals, it should be considered as a human security threat. But as we have seen it is a threat not only affecting individuals bearing in mind that it also will cause society disruption and economic loss. Therefore it could also be considered as a national security threat, requiring measure to keep the threat from crossing national borders. Neither human security nor national security can alone be sufficient explanations for pandemic influenza as a security threat on a global, regional or state level.

Some limitations of securitization are evident when scrutinizing these documents. One flaw of the Copenhagen School – its Eurocentric tradition, is linked to the problem of difficulties to securitize something on the global level. It is probably easier to establish a shared understanding in the West of pandemic influenza as a security threat; than to securitize this issue at a global level. This is based on the fact that other countries, e.g., in Africa or Asia, have other existential threats prioritized such as military conflicts and HIV/AIDS which are more palpable (cf. Emmers 2007:116).

Worth noticing is that a pandemic influenza is not an issue which is in-secure otherwise; securitization does not mean inventing new security issues in that sense. However, the efficiency of securitizing pandemics is questionable and if the positive affects exceeds the negative effects, with potential abuse of legitimating extraordinary measures. This thesis has not provided an answer of the implications of these three documents in the full process of securitization, but hopefully it will contribute to an understanding of how pandemics are articulated as a security threat by the WHO, the EU and the US in their core strategic documents on this issue.

6 Conclusions

Before I make an attempt to draw any conclusions based on my analysis I would like to recall my research question:

- How do the WHO, the European Union and the United States articulate pandemic influenza as a security threat in their documents on pandemic preparedness?

The purpose of this thesis is to understand how pandemic can be understood as a security threat. My choice of documents to scrutinize fell on the core strategic documents of three major players in world politics. Based on the Copenhagen Schools' social constructivist framework and my subjectively constructed ideal types an analysis has been carried out.

The WHO is the leading actor of the health sector and provides guidance for international as well as national actors. According to the WHO we have a new climate in which pandemic influenza has gained greater attention. Pandemic influenza is not explicitly expressed as a security threat; however, the WHO articulates it as an existential threat thereby making it a question of survival. As learned from the Copenhagen School this way of securitizing an issue opens up for extraordinary measures to be taken in accordance with a traditional approach on security. Human security is of great importance to the WHO, and their loyalty spans beyond national borders. They also take on an ethical approach on preparedness and response to pandemic influenza. The WHO points out the national government to be the natural leader for cooperation.

As for the European Union, an actor on the subsystem level, pandemic influenza is viewed as a threat to the union. Like in the document by WHO, previous major pandemics are referred to as major consequences of millions of deaths and huge economic damage. The EU has no internal borders and need regional cooperation since they state that no country alone can face the consequences of a pandemic influenza given its unique circumstances and uncertainty. The EU has developed guidelines in accordance with the WHO with some adaptations to fit the union's requirements better. Preventive measures taken globally would benefit the EU since that would mitigate the spread of influenza virus. Yet, Member states have the potential to provide maximum protection of their citizens. The union's loyalty extends beyond national borders, yet, their main priority is with focus on the region.

On the unit level, the U.S' document was subject for analysis. At the beginning of the document pandemic influenza is articulated as a security threat, it is further said to be an emerging threat. A strong feeling of state-loyalty is noticeable however; they stress the importance of helping population beyond national borders – which also can be seen as a strategy to mitigate the spread of

influenza virus before reaching the US. The pandemic threat is put in a historical context and the risk that we will encounter a new pandemic soon, i.e., in this century, these factors contribute to intensify the scare of pandemic influenza. Within the nation and globally, good communication is essential to mitigate panic and also education of the populations so they know how to handle in case of a pandemic. The US will deal with the threat by using all instruments of national power and measures beyond traditional health and medical boundaries will be taken, since the threat will not only strike the health sector. The US acknowledges the fact that they cannot face this issue themselves and therefore they have a positive approach to international cooperation.

I would like to draw the conclusion that all three documents have a similar way of articulating pandemic influenza as a security threat. There seems to be a shared assumption in the West on what makes pandemic influenza constitute a security threat. The Copenhagen School, perhaps because it is Eurocentric, provides a useful framework for the purpose of studying the ideas being expressed by actors of the West.

It is interesting why pandemic influenza has gained so much political attention; potentially as a result of prominent actors intensifying the threat, intentionally or unintentionally. Historical facts, the unique circumstances and the uncertainty all contribute to the threat being lifted above traditional measures in the public health sector. With comprehensive preparedness and response plans paving the way for extraordinary measures to be taken in the event of a pandemic influenza, this can be said to be the 1st stage in convincing an audience. To recall, since security is intersubjective, issues become established security question first when accepted as such. While these documents can be understood as basis for faster action, and as a start of a securitization process in which issues move from being politicized to be securitized, it is equally interesting questioning if securitization has ever happened.

As the Copenhagen School argues, if security is defined to be about survival, then pandemic influenza should be understood as a security threat.

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Appendix 1

Matrix of Security Studies

What is the Source of the Security Threat?

Military

Military, non-
military or both

States

Security for Whom?

Societies, Groups
and Individuals

<p>National Security (conventional realist approach to security studies)</p>	<p>Redefined Security (e.g., environmental and economic [cooperative or comprehensive] security)</p>
<p>Intrastate Security (e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)</p>	<p>Human Security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)</p>

(Paris 2001, Alkire 2003)