Democratic State-Building in Pakistan and Taiwan

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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to marry the democracy focus of the study of democratization to the long-term examination of state-formation from the study of the state. The overarching purpose of this marriage is to begin to sketch an answer to how successful democratic states are formed. 'Third wave' Pakistan and Taiwan are compared using a common foundations paired comparison with the research question *what could explain the divergent outcome of democratic state-building in Pakistan and Taiwan.*

The narrow answer would be that Taiwan built a highly capable state while Pakistan did not. A broader answer would seem to be that in its pursuit of infrastructural power Pakistan created more problems than it solved, especially as it tackled the inherently value-rational aspects of nation-building. Willing and able to brutally assert itself the Guomindang was able to accomplish the sort of state- and nation-building that Pakistan aspired to. The centrifugal forces unleashed by Pakistan's attempts at nation-building have gone from creating political gridlock to becoming destructive.

Keywords: Democratization, State Formation, State-Building, Democratic State-Building, State Capacity, Pakistan, Taiwan.
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1. Introduction

In a 1991 paper Samuel Huntington described how the world's sixty democracies had been created in three waves, with the third wave alone creating thirty new democracies since 1974.[1] Although more measured than Francis Fukuyama who two years earlier had declared the end of history,[2] Huntington echoed the basic optimism of Fukuyama - mankind was on a trajectory that made global liberal democracy seem inevitable.

By 2000 Fukuyama and Huntington seemed justified in their optimism as the number of democracies had doubled over the 1990s.[3] However, many of the new democracies were consolidating slowly, if at all.[4] After 2000 scholars began to question whether the optimism of Fukuyama and Huntington were, at least in the short run, justified.[5] What had been overlooked in the heady days of the early 1990s was that the state was often weak in the new democracies, and as Fukuyama wrote in 2005, "[B]efore you can have a democracy, you must have a state."[6]

The study of democratization, the movement from authoritarianism to democracy,[7] in recent decades have focused primarily on the transition from non-democratic regimes to a democratic regime, examining the *how* and *why* of democratization and the roles of various actors in the transition.[8] As such the preponderance of democratization literature overlooks post-transition sustainability and is limited in time. By contrast, the study of state-formation, the study of how states are formed, has tended to be broad and historicist,[9] exemplified perhaps by Charles Tilly's work.[10] Studies on state-formation tend to be somewhat less detailed because of the time ranges covered,[11] and are often regime agnostic.

This paper is an attempt to marry the democracy focus of the study of democratization to the long-term examination of state-formation from the study of the state. The overarching purpose of this marriage is to begin to sketch an answer to how successful democratic states are formed or built.[12] To accomplish this the 'third wave' failure Pakistan,[13] is compared with so far successful Taiwan.[14] Both

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[1] Huntington 1991, 12.
[2] Fukuyama 1989.
[3] Carothers 2002, 9.
[4] Diamond 2000, 97.
[5] Carothers 2002.
[6] Fukuyama 2005, 88.
[7] Welzel 2009, 75.
[8] Haerpfer et al. 2009, 4.
[9] Tilly 1992, 6-9; Vu 2010.
[10] Ibid. 1992. Tilly's book describes the changes in European international system over a 1000-year period.
[11] Ibid. 1992, 33-37.
[12] State-formation and state-building mean the same thing, the creation of a viable state, but formation tends to imply a longer time-scale. Given the intermediate-length period covered here state-building and state-formation will be used interchangeably.
[13] Diamond 2000, 92-94; Fund for Peace 2010. Diamond points to institutional weaknesses as the source of Pakistan's then-return to stratocracy. Ten years on Pakistan has once more reverted to democracy, but the institutional weaknesses are if anything worse.
[14] Carothers 2002, 9. The Taiwanese regime-type has not changed since Carothers' article was written, cf. section 4.2.4.

countries were created *ex nihilo* near-simultaneously, and share many similarities both in origin and starting position. The narrow research question is *what could explain the divergent outcome of democratic state-building in Pakistan and Taiwan.*

This paper is divided into 5 sections including this first introduction. Section 2 treats the design and methodology of this paper, explains the choice of countries, and underlying theoretical perspectives. State, regime, governance and democracy are key concepts and will be defined and discussed in section 3. Section 4 outlines the history of Pakistan and Taiwan from their founding until today, with a focus on state-building. The complexity of the countries' histories and the brevity of this paper means that focus is on the development of state capacity, dealing with "...historical facts like rock skipping water."[15] This section ends with a comparison of Pakistani and Taiwanese state-building. Section 5 is a concluding discussion.

2. Design and Methodology, and Underlying Theoretical Perspectives

2.1. Design and Methodology

To make "valid causal inferences"[16] of how successful democratic states are formed or built a paired comparison[17] is used with the "common foundation" method, as described by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly [18] and then developed by Tarrow.[19] A paired comparison adds to the in-depth analysis of a case study the ability to "...examine how the common mechanisms are influenced by the particular features of each case...,"[20] allowing for "...hypothesis-generating comparative study…"[21]. The cases, Pakistan and Taiwan, were chosen for their similarity, allowing the variations in outcome to be "...analyzed in the context of underlying common foundations, using the common features of their cases to close in on differences that make a difference."[22] This design is common in comparative literature, and has been used effectively by scholars focused on the state, such as Theda Skocpol and Victoria Tin-bor Hui.[23]

Pakistan and Taiwan were chosen for comparison as they share age,[24] origin as breakaway administrative units of a larger nation, and had a similar material starting point.[25] Neither Pakistan nor Taiwan was clearly richer than the other per capita (inflation-adjusted GDP per capita in Pakistan was USD832 to Taiwan's USD978 in 1950),[26] which is relevant for democratization.[27] Geographical

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[15] Tilly 1992, 35.
[16] King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 45.
[17] McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 81.
[18] McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001.
[19] Tarrow 2010.
[20] Tarrow 2010, 246.
[21] Ibid.
[22] McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 82.
[23] Tarrow 2010, 230ff. Although not cited by by Tarrow, Hui also makes a paired comparison, cf. Hui 2005, 8.
[24] The administration of Taiwan became independent of China in 1949, while Pakistan became independent of India 1947.
[25] Among other similarities, the rupture from the larger nation was accompanied by an influx of a well-educated linguistic minority, giving both countries a pool of able administrators while at the same time creating potential social conflict.
[26] Gleditsch 2002.
[27] Fish and Wittenberg 2009, 252.

features might suggest higher amenability to a democratic regime for either country but democracy correlates more highly with state capacity than with than geography or population size.[28] Pakistan refers to post-1971 Pakistan. As the starting point is modern-day Pakistan, the history covers Eastern Pakistan, current-day Bangladesh, only for the period before its independence.

Both Pakistan and Taiwan have counterfactuals that neutralize some of the obvious differences. Sharing origins and regime-type, India and China[29] are Pakistan and Taiwan's counterfactuals. For example, democratic state-building outcome might seem related to the initial regime, but India and China would disqualify that as a causal variable. Although Pakistan and Taiwan are not a commonly compared, this paper is not first to do so.[30]

This paper covers large swathes of theory and history; material selection is biased towards academic texts, either by scholars who have published several books or articles on their subject, such as Christophe Jaffrelot, or from university publishing companies. While it is perhaps inevitable that all texts have some bias, this choice was made to limit that bias. Texts were read against each other to ensure that when only one text is referenced on a particular topic, that text is in overall agreement with other texts when similar topics are covered.

Similar to historical sociology whose focus is on how states and societies develop over time,[31] this paper uses a historical approach. Exemplified by Tilly[32] and Hui,[33] this approach is common in state-formation studies.[34] This paper is largely qualitative, with some quantitative elements. State-formation studies have traditionally been Eurocentric,[35] and this comparison is meant to add to the literature on non-European state-building.

2.2 Underlying Theoretical Perspectives

Though not a focus of this paper, one of the differences between Pakistan and Taiwan is their cultural context, and that needs to be addressed. In political science two major models explain human behavior, culturalism and rationalism.[36] Culturalism treats culture as the determinant of human behavior.[37] Rationalism treats short-term objective self-interest maximization as the determinant of human behavior.[38] Both theories have central weaknesses,[39] and in their place Bo Rothstein of Gothenburg University suggests a synthesis,[40] consisting of subjective rationality, positing that individuals maximize subjective rather than objective self-interest,[41] and culture-as-a-toolkit, positing that culture is an

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[28] Wang 2007.
[29] China refers to the People's Republic of China unless otherwise specified. Taiwan is a reference to the *de facto* autonomous polity which has a Weberian monopoly on violence on the island.
[30] Noman 1997; Mahbubani 2009.
[31] Smith and Owens 2008, 179-181.
[32] Tilly 1992.
[33] Hui 2005.
[34] Vu 2010, 150.
[35] Ibid., 151.
[36] Rothstein 2003, 42.
[37] Ibid., 47.
[38] Ostrom 1998, 2.
[39] Rothstein 2003, 73, 13, 44, 50-51.
[40] Ibid., 71.
[41] Ibid., 52-55.

intellectual framework used to interpret the world and provides a repertoire of actions that can be used in the promotion of one's self-interest.[42] In other words, culture might predispose but it does not predestine.

Related to this is the nature of rationality. Max Weber has described four kinds of rational (social) action: *zweckrational* (instrumental-rational), *wertrational* (value-rational), *affektuell* (affectual) and *traditional* (traditional).[43] *Zweckrationalität* "...entails a strict cost-benefit calculus with respect to goals, necessitating the abandonment or adjustment of goals if the costs of realizing them are too high."[44] *Wertrational* action by contrast is the pursuit of some goal (e.g. ethical or religious) that is considered intrinsically good independent of outcome.[45] *Affektuell* and *traditional* behavior are comparatively straightforward, meaning what they sound like.[46] Value-rational conflicts, like all arguments that derive from personal ethics which can not be resolved by observation of facts, can probably be solved only in one of three ways, force, propaganda, or their absence/ removal from the political process.[47] If two parties in a political system disagree on a value-rational issue and one cannot force the other to its views then to agree to disagree is probably the only way to avoid political gridlock.

Finally, lack of a single definition of democracy means that a number of different ways to measure it have been put forth by different scholars.[48] Largely, these measurements, and the definitions upon which they rely, can be divided into two categories, sortal and scalar.[49] A sortal definition of democracy is binary, whereas a scalar definition allows for varying levels.[50] The sortal conceptualization is more manageable in a study such as this where the focus is on the success and not the quality of a democratic regime. Democratic success here is therefore the ability to sustain a democratic regime.

3. State and Democracy Theory

Examining democratic state-formation in Pakistan and Taiwan requires an unpacking of the terminology. The end goal of democratic state-formation is democratic government, and this consists of five related but distinct concepts that need to be clarified. Democracy is a form of government derived from a particular ideal. The term government can describe the distinct concepts state, regime (form of government), or governance. The state is the foundation, the entity which has a monopoly of force in a community,[51] the regime is "...the central institutions by which a state exercises its authority..."[52], and governance is how those institutions relate to the citizens of a state.[53]

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[42] Ibid., 55-58.
[43] Weber 1922.
[44] Varshney 2003, 86; Weber 1922.
[45] Weber 1922.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Cf. Russell 1945, 117.
[48] Rose 2009, 12-13; Bernhagen 2009.
[49] Bernhagen 2009, 26.
[50] Ibid, 26-28.
[51] Weber 1946, 78.
[52] Rose 2009, 11.
[53] Ibid.

3.1 The State

There exists in the Western tradition two competing views of the state. Classical and Enlightenment thinkers did not differentiate between state, regime, or society (*politeia* is best translated as regime),[54] conceptualizing it as the product of individuals gathering for mutual support.[55] As such, the *politeia* "...refers to the form or structure of the whole society and to its way of life as embodied in that structure."[56] Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau retained the Classical conception of the state as the product of the voluntary association of men,[57] but also suggested that this Social Contract created something beyond any individual man, a sovereign, "...the community in its collective and legislative capacity",[58] or, in the words of Hobbes, an "Immortal God".[59]

Set against the Classical tradition is the 19th century Germanic which conceives of the state as autonomous from society.[60] Most famous from this tradition is perhaps Max Weber.[61] It is Weber's definition of the state as "...a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory..."[62] that has become the standard.[63]

Most modern scholars of the state take their departure from Weber's definition.[64] Notable of these was Charles Tilly[65] who made physical force the center of the state when he wrote "[W]ar made the state, and the state made war."[66] His theory, which was further developed in the book *Coercion, Capital, and European States,*[67] describes the modern state as the result of European rulers mobilizing resources for the internecine warfare that wracked Europe between the 10th and 21st century.[68] In that period European states expanded their activities to include a comprehensive regulation of society,[69] penetrating it fully. This power to penetrate society, allowing the state "...to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" is called *infrastructural power* by Michael Mann in a 1984 paper.[70] Mann complements this type of power with *despotic power,* which is the "...range of actions which the elite is empowered to take without

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[54] Mansfield 1983, 850; Mann 1984, 110. Mann makes a similar argument in his essay but does not extend the idea of the state and society as one to Classical thought and instead limits himself to Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment thought in which Rousseau's General Will is important. In doing so he arguably overlooks Hobbes' Leviathan which appears in one shape or another in the Social Contract theorists; sprung out of society this "Soveraigne" is nevertheless separate from and above the society of man and is thus a link to the Germanic School, cf. Hague & Harrop 2007, 16.
[55] Plato, Book II; Aristotle, Book I, Ch. 2-3.
[56] Mansfield 1983, 850.
[57] Russell 1945, 550-551, 623, 695-701.
[58] Ibid., 696.
[59] Hobbes 1651, Part 2, Ch. 17.
[60] Mann 1984, 110.
[61] Ibid, 110.
[62] Weber 1946, 78.
[63] Hague & Harrop 2007, 13.
[64] Mann 1984, 111; Vu 2010, 165.
[65] Tilly 1992, 6, 34, 130.
[66] Ibid., 42.
[67] Tilly 1992.
[68] Ibid, 25-26, 42-43.
[69] Ibid., 96-99.
[70] Mann 1984, 113.

routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups."[71] Crucial to the definition of the state is then society or civil society, which is commonly defined as "...that space which (1) exists between the family, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, (2) makes interconnections between individuals or families possible, and (3) is independent of the state."[72]

Tilly's description of state-formation largely forms the basis for its study today.[73] Victoria Tin-bor Hui in her comparison of state-formation in Europe after the 16th century and China leading up to the Qin dynasty has both validated and complicated it.[74] Hui found that state strategies for mobilizing resources, self-strengthening, fell into two categories, those that formed the state and those that deformed the state.[75] State formative were those that built infrastructural power, i.e. state penetration of society, regulating and controlling it, and the economy, through an effective bureaucracy in order to mobilize resources.[76] State deformative were the strategies that might best be described by Mann's terminology as despotic, e.g. the state elite used private tax farmers and mercenary armies to make war and neglected to build up a competent administrative apparatus.[77] These strategies were often pursued by European states before 18th century Prussian self-strengthening.[78] So deformative were these strategies that 16th century superpowers France and Spain were bankrupted by war;[79] the states made war and war unmade those states.[80]

Deformed states largely insulated themselves from bargains with civil society but exposed themselves to elite bargaining, e.g. 16th century French kings had to bargain with the economic and military elite.[81] By contrast, the Qin state penetrated society completely,[82] in effect removing all other loci of power.[83] This infrastructural power was built on a state-society bargain[84] where the state offered 1) material welfare, 2) legal protection and 3) freedom of expression in return for

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[71] Mann 1984, 113. Mann places infrastructural and despotic power on the same spectrum as democracy and authoritarianism. States with a high infrastructural power are liberal/capitalist- or socialist-democratic and states with a high despotic power are (fascist) authoritarian. As an example of highly despotic power he gives Imperial China. However, the Chinese emperor was in the long run not independent of civil society in the manner that Mann suggests. From the first to the last the Chinese emperor had to uphold a state-society bargain which offered society material welfare for its consent, cf. Wu 1959, 78. The Chinese emperor that could not hold his end of the bargain lost his mandate, and eventually his dynasty lost control of the state. Despotic power as it is used in this paper is the power that is wielded without the need for a state-society bargain. 16th century European kings wielded despotic power as they could wage war by paying mercenaries with borrowed money. The Qin emperors by contrast had infrastructural powers as they mobilized society for war according to a state-society bargain; the state-society bargain might be democratic, but it is not necessarily so, cf. Hui 2005, 170-171.
[72] Varshney 2001, 366. The definition of civil society is somewhat fuzzy, but the gist of what Varshney argues is the commonly accepted definition seems intact in other definitions, cf. Letki 2009.
[73] Hui 2005, 39; Vu 2010. Although Vu says that war is not the only route to state-formation, noting that war can also be deformative, he nevertheless concludes that newer works do not "...refute Tilly's thesis completely but only suggest[s] the limits of its scope." , cf. Vu 2010, 153.
[74] Hui 2005.
[75] Ibid., 30-52.
[76] Ibid., 42-50.
[77] Ibid., 49-52.
[78] Ibid., 49.
[79] Ibid., 114-115.
[80] Ibid., 49.
[81] Ibid., 119.
[82] Ibid., 83.
[83] This was much easier in a Chinese context which never had anything like the Catholic church claiming *auktoritas* over its *potestas*.
[84] Hui 2005, 170-177.

consent to its intrusive rule.[85] In Europe in the 19th century, as European states started building infrastructural power along the lines of Qin China,[86] a similar bargain was struck as states offered citizens (legal) rights and democratic representation for consent.[87]

The state's resource mobilization is not only material, it is also immaterial. As the state bargains with civil society for consent it is influenced by the bargain it can make. On the other hand, a state that has penetrated society can also influence it immaterially in two ways, first by cultural identity promotion and second by its institutions. Eugen Weber in *Peasants into Frenchmen* showed how the state in promoting one language and culture created the French nation and then modern French nation-state of today.[88] Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* showed the reverse, how Europe without the unifying force of first the temporal Roman Empire and then a universal church splintered into several nations as a common identity was lost.[89] More generally, it seems that the performance of state institutions shape if not determine social capital; honest administration promotes social capital building, with all its benefits, while the reverse destroys it.[90] Both are however slow processes and require a highly capable state.

3.2 Democracy, Ideal and Regime Types[91]

If the classical view of society and the state has been overturned in the modern study of state-formation, it is still very much alive in the idea of democracy. Democracy as an ideal springs from Enlightenment philosophers[92] who, inspired by Classical thinkers, held man's[93] reason to be supreme.[94] Immanuel Kant argued that the "...final goal, or 'telos' of human progress, … was the full flowering of human rationality and moral capacity, conceivable only on the basis of republican legislation...".[95] According to Kant the state was "...a union of an aggregate of men under rightful laws".[96] Like classical conceptions of the *politeia*, the state plays a limited role here. This has in some ways carried forward to democratic regime theory with its tendency to emphasize limitations on state autonomy.

The liberal democratic regime, the product of the Enlightenment ideal, is at its core characterized by two elements: 1) the rule of law and 2) accountability of government to itself and to the populace/electorate.[97] The rule of law and the accountability of government comes from a framework of laws which can be

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[85] Ibid., 171.

[86] Hui 2005, 148.

[87] Tilly 1992, 99-103; Hui 2005, 170. The modern history of Prussia and Germany illustrates this very well. Prussian military reforms after 1807 were intimately connected, at least in intent, with the political enfranchisement of its citizenry, cf. Goerlitz 1960, and Dupuy 1977.

[88] Weber 1976. Another good example is Egypt which over the course of its history has gone from speaking native languages, to Greek, to Latin and finally Arabic as various invaders have promoted their cultures and languages; these invaders, and their states, have over the course of time completely shifted the basis of Egyptian culture and identity.

[89] Anderson 2006.

[90] Rothstein & Stolle, 2008.

[91] Some of this section has been adapted from Ottervik 2010.

[92] Berg-Schlosser 2009, 45.

[93] In this context man is a translation of the *homo* in *homo sapiens*, meaning humans of either sex, as opposed to *vir* and *femina* which are gender-specific.

[94] Israel 2010, 19.

[95] Ibid, 7.

[96] Kant 2002, 138.

[97] Rose 2009, 12.

amended but not circumvented.[98] Accountability of the government to the populace/electorate comes from elections,[99] the peaceful transfer of power as a citizenry elects governors. In most liberal democratic states rule of law preceded the introduction of election-based accountability of government.[100]

Centered around these two aspects of the democratic regime, rule of law and elections, scholars tend to create similar topologies.[101] Though the terminology differs, various combinations of rule of law and elections produce four regime types: liberal democracy (full franchise and rule of law), plebiscitarian autocracy (full franchise without rule of law), constitutional oligarchy (limited franchise and rule of law), unaccountable autocracy (limited franchise without rule of law).[102]

Almost two thirds of all countries today are either plebiscitarian or unaccountable autocracies,[103] including the majority of third wave democracies as will be discussed below. One third are liberal democracies and seven percent are constitutional oligarchies.[104] Singapore and Hong Kong belong to this last group of countries which often outperforms liberal democracies on governance.[105]

Modern European states were often constitutional oligarchies before the franchise was extended to all citizens and the liberal democratic regime is built on constitutional oligarchy.[106] Constitutional oligarchy has deep roots in East Asia. During Qin state-building a school called Legalism developed which promoted rule by law[107] and state penetration of society to mobilize resources.[108] Laws were strict, and, in theory, applied to all,[109] and the honest, effective bureaucracy necessary for state-building was emphasized.[110] These principles were captured by the phrase *fuguo qiangbing* (rich-country, strong-military).[111] When Japan modernized in the 19th century as a constitutional oligarchic state one of the central slogans was *fuguo qiangbing*.[112] The bureaucracy of Imperial Japan would leave a deep imprint on its colonies. In South Korea post-liberalization bureaucracy showed great continuity with colonial administration,[113] and on Taiwan the initial competence gap between the Japanese and Chinese administration was a source for social unrest.[114] Constitutional oligarchic regimes

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[98] Lundquist 2001, 95-100.
[99] While not uncontested, for the purpose of this paper, elections are a proxy for Schumpeter's minimalist democratic requirement: free competition for a free vote, cf. Rose 2009, 12.
[100] Lundquist 2001, 95; Rose 2009, 18.
[101] Rose 2009; Lundquist 2001, 103-109; Carothers 2002.
[102] Rose 2009, 14.
[103] Ibid., 16. Given the introductory caveat that these numbers are directional, this is the result of Rose's method which (reasonably) combines Freedom House and Transparency International survey results.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid., 17.
[106] Lundquist 2001, 95.
[107] While the distinction between rule of and rule by law is important, rule by law places government (the regime) above the law, they are functionally similar as systems "...in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone," cf. Carothers 1998. In the Qin system of rule by law, everything below the Emperor was formally subject to the law, including his administration and bureaucrats, cf. Hui 2005, 181-182.
[108] Bodde 2008. 72ff; Hui 2005, 180-185. cf. Wong 2009.
[109] Hui 2005, 188-189.
[110] Ibid., 180-190.
[111] Ibid., 29. 富国強兵.
[112] Jansen 2002, 457. 富国強兵 is read *fukoku kyouhei* in Japanese.
[113] Kohli 1994.
[114] Hung 2000, 248-249.

have in both Europe and East Asia produced states with significant infrastructural power.

3.3 Democratization, Governance, and the State

Traditionally studied somewhat apart, the study of the state and democracy began to meet in the early 2000s. Ten years after the 'third wave' of democratization was described by Huntington it became clear that it did not always produce liberal democracy.[115] The drop in state capacity that accompanies democratization[116] often struck countries outside of Central Europe hard, leaving them as dysfunctional, if not more, than they had been before.[117]

While state-formation is often conceptually related to war, the resources mobilized by the regulation of civil society and the economy through an effective bureaucracy can be applied to the production of anything. Robert Rotberg defines state strength as the production of a number of political goods,[118] e.g. physical security, conflict resolution, education and health care, and infrastructure.[119] Strong states produce those goods, weak states are limited in their production, and failed state are unable to produce any political goods.[120] Many of the democratizing states in the 'third wave,' especially after 1990, were driven to regime change because of state and economic weakness.[121]

Implicit in the rule of law is a state limited by itself, and foreign aid to newly democratized states often focused on diffusing state power,[122] further weakening already weak states. If left unresolved that weakness leaves democratic regimes vulnerable to a reverse wave. The ideals of democracy might be natural for those raised in an Enlightenment tradition but as a regime it has to work; a weak state that is unable to produce the political goods expected by a citizenry discredits any regime including democracy.

Among the first scholars to turn their attention to the weak states of the 'third wave' democracies was Larry Diamond who in 2000 suggested that Pakistan was a prototypical 'third wave' failure; he blamed Pakistan's 1999 return to stratocracy on state weakness and poor governance.[123] Two years later Thomas Carothers wrote an article arguing that a new framework was needed to understand democratization, based on "...the landscape of today, not the lingering hopes of an earlier era." [124] Far from producing liberal democracies Carothers found that the 'third wave' in many cases merely produced variants of plebiscitarian autocracy[125] and unaccountable autocracy.[126]

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[115] Carothers 2002, 5-21.
[116] Hadenius and Bäck 2008.
[117] Wang 2003.
[118] If not directly then through private enterprise.
[119] Rotberg 2003a, 3-6. While some of the political goods that Rotberg suggest might not be universally accepted as being a state responsibility, most would probably that agree that there are some political goods that only the state can provide, most important of which are physical security and adjudication.
[120] Rotberg 2003a, 4.
[121] Markoff and White 2009, 64-65, 68; Welzel 2009, 82. Weak or weak relative to a strong group of democracies promoting democratization.
[122] Carothers 2002, 17.
[123] Diamond 2000, 99.
[124] Carothers 2002, 20.
[125] Ibid., 10-11. Carothers calls this feckless pluralism, but it amounts to the same thing.
[126] Ibid., 11-12. Carothers calls this dominant-power politics, in which the franchise is not *de jure* eliminated but limited *de facto*.

Central to the new approach proposed by Carothers was the importance of functioning state institutions.[127] In the wake of Diamond and Carothers' articles scholars such as Jason Brownlee, Axel Hadenius and Wang Shaoguang have turned their attention to state capacity and democracy. Although the definition of state strength, capacity or capability might differ slightly depending on the scholar it is generally "...the degree of control state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government's territorial jurisdiction."[128] Rotberg's strong, weak and failing states could just as well be called high-capacity, low-capacity and failing states.

Most clearly connecting state capacity with democracy is Wang who in a 2007 paper showed how different elements of state capacity generally correlates positively with four elements of democracy.[129] Using the democracy and governance indices of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index' (BTI), "a global ranking which evaluates transformation processes," Wang found the correlation between democracy and state capacity to be 0.8107.[130] This echoes the work of Axel Hadenius and Hanna Bäck who found a similar relationship with a different operationalization.[131] Like democracy, however, widespread agreement on the importance of the state has not produced a universal definition of state capacity. One alternative is Wang's which was first presented in a 2003 article in the Journal of Democracy.[132]

3.4 State Capacity

Wang breaks the state down into six functions: coercion, extraction of resources, assimilation, regulation of society and the economy, institutional steering, and redistribution.[133] All six functions echo state-formation studies which emphasize the modern centralized bureaucracy, "...perhaps the most important institution in the structure of any state."[134]

3.4.1 Coercion

The monopoly of legitimate violence, the *condicio sine qua non* of the state, is upheld through coercion. For any law or rule to have writ it must be enforceable, and coercion is ultimately the mechanism by which a state enforces its laws.[135]

3.4.2 Extraction of Resources

Most definitions of state capacity reference the state's mobilization or control of resources, and next to coercion the extraction of resources from society defines

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127 Ibid., 16.
128 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 78.
129 Wang 2007, 159-160. Interestingly enough higher murder rates correlated positively with democracy, for which Wang offers two explanations, the first that democratic regimes can survive higher violence levels than authoritarian states, and the second that murder might be a suboptimal operationalization of Weber's monopoly of force.
130 Wang 2007, 141.
131 Hadenius and Bäck 2008.
132 Wang 2003.
133 Wang 2003; Wang 2007.
134 Vu 2010, 151.
135 Wang 2003, 37; Wang 2007, 146-147. In common usage coercion has negative associations, but in this context coercion means simply to restrain or preserve for good or evil. The state must be able to ward off foreign aggression as well as maintain civil order. As such it needs to either build up its military force or in some other way limit external threats. It also needs to "...develop a professional, resourceful, dedicated, disciplined and uniformed police." An honest, effective, and trusted police force is critical for a modern state; repressive police states generally have a lower ratio of police to population than liberal democratic countries.

state capacity.[136] Integral to extraction is also growth; *ceteris paribus* a strong economy creates more resources for the state to mobilize.

3.4.3 Assimilation

To produce societal consent that reduces the cost of coercion some level of nation-building, "...the replacement of traditional familial, local, religious and ethnic authorities by a single, secular, national authority...", is necessary.[137] Without a national identity states are "...unlikely to be effective, because a great deal more resources and energy would have to be diverted to fighting against centrifugal forces."[138]

3.4.4 Regulation of Society and the Economy

The regulation of society and the economy is the modification of "...the behavior of individuals and groups away their from own inclination and in favor of the behavior prescribed by the state." Regulations protect society from both deviant social activities, e.g. murder and assault, and harmful economic behavior, e.g. negative externalities, and through standards promote the material welfare of society.[139]

3.4.5 Institutional Steering

Central to the above four functions is a centralized administration, a bureaucracy that needs to be effective and meritocratic to function. It also needs to be internally coherent. A poorly functioning bureaucratic apparatus creates intrastate and state-society conflict, undercutting the system,[140] and undermining social trust.[141]

3.4.6 Redistribution

A basic redistribution of scarce resources promotes social order and enhances legitimacy.[142] Furthermore, equal access to education makes society meritocratic, giving the state, society and the economy access to a deep and wide pool of talent.

3.4.7 Summary

A state that is effective across all its functions is highly capable, and should in theory be more capable of sustaining a democracy. It is marked by internal and

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[136] Wang 2003, 37; Wang 2007, 147. The terminology, extraction of resource, might bring to mind rapacious taxmen bleeding the populace, but, like coercion, it is intrinsically value-neutral. Coercive mechanisms, publicly funded infrastructure, health-care and education are all financed by taxes levied on society; "an effective government must be able to extract sufficient resources from the society … and use them for national purposes."

[137] Wang 2003, 37; Wang 2007, 147-147. While state-building in Western Europe has been associated with secularization this is not universal; the Caliphate and later Ottoman empire used religion to great effect in assimilating conquered areas and peoples.

[138] Wang 2007, 148. Group identities are plastic in the long run and can be molded by state policy as suggested by Eugen Weber's scholarship and the history of e.g. the Middle East which over two millennia has seen profound shifts in culture, language, and religion as a result of state action. Weber is complemented by David Brown's study of ethnic conflict and ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia which suggests that ethnic separatism is the product of weakened states, not its cause, cf. Brown 2002.

[139] Wang 2003, 38; Wang 2007, 148-149. The society and economy of "…all reasonably well-ordered modern societies, whether democratic or not, are highly regulated."

[140] Wang 2007, 149-150. Departmentalism, particularism and corruption of individual civil servants or groups of civil servants will seriously undercut the effectiveness of a state's bureaucratic apparatus. To maintain the internal coherence of state institutions and bureaucracies, a state needs effective institutional steering.

[141] Rothstein & Stolle, 2008.

[142] Wang 2007, 150-151. It also limits the risk of state capture by wealthy individuals such as that experienced by the late Roman Empire when its wealthiest individuals could independently finance the expenses of the state.

external security, high capacity to mobilize society's resources, a shared national identity with a basic value consensus, effective regulation, effective bureaucracies, and social mobility and order.

3.5 Summary

The democratic state is one possible product of a state-society bargain which gives society rights in return for consent to the state's infrastructural power. The high correlation between state capacity and democracy suggests that it is a determinant of the long-term success of democracy; a functioning democratic regime and society, Kant's union of individuals, requires a capable state with infrastructural power. Successful democratic state-formation should thus not only be the formation of democratic institutions, but also strong the formation of a capable state.

4. State-Building in Pakistan and Taiwan

Pakistan and Taiwan in 1949 had a similar GDP per capita and similar access to competent bureaucrats, the backbone of a strong state:

> *Soon after independence there were many similarities between Eastern Asia and Pakistan, as far as development strategy was concerned. A modernizing elite was in command, with a technocratic bureaucracy which was as, if not more, competent than those existing in Eastern Asia at the time. The state was intervening extensively in markets and resource allocation, but within parameters of private sector led strategy.*[143]

After the first twenty years the paths of Pakistan and Taiwan diverged as Pakistan became stuck in a cycle of plebiscitarian autocracy and unaccountable autocracy while Taiwan built an constitutional oligarchy that then transitioned to democracy. Linguistic-religious value-rational political gridlock stymied Pakistan's democratic state-formation, while the regime in Taiwan pursued a brutal state-formative strategy.

The histories below are thematically structured around Wang's six functions of the state to qualitatively track the development of state capacity over time.

4.1 Pakistan

Pakistan (which included Bangladesh until 1971) was created on the 14th of August 1947 from the British Raj. Through the 19th century the British Crown had pursued state-building activities in the Raj through "...the creation of citizens, through regulated conduct, language and eduction, and through improved internal communications."[144] British administrators combined a respect for a tradition of diversity and administrative decentralization[145] with modernizing and centralizing ambitions.[146] Over time the centralizing ambition would have a great effect, making modern government "...the most important unifying factor in India after about 1850."[147] The British created two important institutions, representative

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[143] Noman 1997, 33.
[144] Robb 2002, 150.
[145] Ibid., 115, 130-134, 151.
[146] Ibid., 134-139.
[147] Ibid., 153.

councils,[148] and a modern bureaucracy staffed by non-British.[149] Even those who argue that the British administration had no effect on future democratization agree that British ideas on government and rule of law had an impact.[150]

4.1.1 Founding

The reason for the Partition of the Raj in 1947 into Pakistan and India was communal[151] conflict which devolved to violence as independence drew near.[152] One reason for the communal conflict was the implications of democracy; Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces, overrepresented among the intelligentsia and the civil administration,[153] began to worry about their place in a democracy.[154] The Muslim League was organized to protect their interests.[155]

The League pushed for a communal autonomy bordering on independence.[156] Specific demands included "…safeguards for protection and promotion of Muslim education, languages, law, and charities." [157] The Indian National Congress, a more inclusive product of Indian nationalism,[158] by contrast envisioned a more secular state.[159] Communal particularism produced counter movements,[160] which produced political gridlock and violent conflict.[161] In the end Partition, physically separating Muslims and Non-Muslims into separate states, was chosen as the only alternative.[162] Muslim-majority areas became Pakistan, derived from the names of its provinces,[163] and the rest became modern India. Partition precipitated a bloody ethnic cleansing as 12.5 million people migrated internally, poisoning relations to this day.[164] Like Taiwan and China, a historical enmity was created as both nations would from a common heritage create similar states mobilized against each other.

4.1.2 Sowing the Wind: 1947-1969

Pakistan was founded as a democracy on the principle of 'one nation, one culture, one language'.[165] It would spend the first twenty years of its existence trying to decide what that meant. Value-rational conflicts caused political gridlock, which in turn obstructed institution- and infrastructural power-building. Powerful elites prevented the economic policies which would produce economic growth and social capital formation in East Asia.[166]

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[148] Robb 2002, 151, 153-154; Varshney 1998, 38-39.
[149] Robb 2002, 155-157.
[150] Ganguly 2005, 183, 163-164.
[151] Politics or conflict based on religious groupings in an Indian context is most commonly referred to as "communal," rather than "ethnic," cf. Varshney 2001, 364.
[152] Khan 2007, 18-19; Jaffrelot 2004a, 10.
[153] Jaffrelot 2004a, 10.
[154] Ibid., 10-11.
[155] Ibid., 10-12.
[156] Jaffrelot 2004a, 12; Robb 2002, 200-202; Khan 2007, 18.
[157] Robb 2002, 201.
[158] Ibid., 183-187. Although Khan (cf. Khan 2007, 18) questions the narrative of the Congress Party as universalistic, with good cause, it appears more pluralistic than the narrowly nationalistic Muslim League.
[159] Ibid., 201.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Khan 2007, 40-85.
[162] Robb 2002, 202-204; Khan 2007, 85-103.
[163] Jaffrelot 2004a, 13.
[164] Khan 2007, 209-210.
[165] Jaffrelot 2004a, 10.
[166] Noman 1997.

The first week of Pakistan's existence saw the firing of the government of the North West Frontier Province, the 'A' in Pakistan,[167] for promoting provincial independence.[168] A year later the governor of Sind, the 'S' in Pakistan,[169] was fired for a similar offense.[170] While the Muslim League had created one state, it was far from having one culture and one language. Urdu-speaking Muslims from the Muslim-minority provinces of the Raj were heavily invested in Muslim nationalism. Those living in the Muslim-majority provinces that became Pakistan were by contrast more invested in their ethnolinguistic identity.[171] Emblematic of the democratic period is perhaps the constitution which took eight years to produce,[172] versus three in India,[173] and then lasted only two.[174] The tensions between Muslim League nationalists, regional nationalists, and Islamists produced political gridlock until 1958 when the military intervened.[175] The military coup was organized by a general whose experience with the dysfunctional politics of Pakistan "...convinced him that Pakistan's survival depended on the army."[176] The military regime started economic reform programs that were largely financed by the United States.[177] By 1969 the military regime collapsed because of internal unrest, rampant corruption, a sluggish economy, and a disastrous military loss against India in 1965.[178] Not having built a high-performing coercive apparatus Pakistan was wracked by social unrest and unable to prevail in war.

The Muslim League showed little interest in the economy.[179] Western Pakistan had little industry, growing cotton for processing in Indian factories. After Partition the agricultural production stagnated to the point where Pakistan, whose provinces had been the breadbasket of the British Raj, had to import wheat in 1953-1954. The 1958 coup produced a focus on economic development, producing a 'Pakistani Miracle' by 1961,[180] but this fizzled by the end of the 1960s. Like Taiwan the military budget regularly made up a majority of the national budget because of security concerns. GDP per capita decreased from USD835 in 1950 to USD800 in 1960, and increased to USD1239 in 1970.[181] Pakistan was largely unable to grow its economy in the first ten years, and the foreign aid-finance economic miracle fizzled.

After Partition around 20% of the 34 million in Western Pakistan were *mujahir*, Urdu-speaking migrants.[182] The *mujahir*-dominated Muslim League saw Islam as a unifying force in a strongly centralized state.[183] It set about promoting

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[167] Jaffrelot 2004a, 13.
[168] Jaffrelot 2004b, 62.
[169] Jaffrelot 2004a, 13.
[170] Jaffrelot 2004b, 62.
[171] Jaffrelot 2004a, 14-16.
[172] Gaborieau 2004, 242.
[173] Robb 2002, 208-215.
[174] Jaffrelot 2004b, 70.
[175] Jaffrelot 2004b, 64-67; Gaborieau 2004, 235-246.
[176] Jaffrelot 2004b, 70.
[177] Etienne 2004, 164; Noman 1997, 137-144.
[178] Etienne 2004, 164.
[179] Etienne 2004b, 163; Noman 1997, 34-36.
[180] Etienne 2004b, 163.
[181] Gleditsch 2002.
[182] Jaffrelot 2004a, 17-18.
[183] Ibid., 16-17

Urdu as a national language,[184] seeing it as "...a mark of Pakistani identity and a force for national integration in a country with five major ethnic groups, each with its own language and literary tradition."[185] The military, along with national government, became an Urdu-speaking institution.[186] However, this push also promoted ethnolinguistic separatism[187] especially in Eastern Pakistan.[188] Religion has been a powerful assimilative tool through history but it was not for Pakistan. One reason might be that, unlike e.g. the Ottoman Empire and the 19th century Pashtun-Afghan state,[189] the *ulema*[190] in Pakistan were not regulated.[191] The result was value-rational conflicts between various sects and between sectarians and secularists.[192] Emblematic of this is the anti-Ahmadi movement which between 1953-1974 obstructed the political system and fermented violent conflicts as it sought to have a small sect declared non-Muslim through a constitutional amendment.[193] The state's efforts to create one nation met with limited success, often creating rather than defusing tension.

The state was beholden to two forces, the civil elite (large feudal landowners and a couple of dozen families that controlled two thirds of industry and 87% of banking by 1968),[194] and the military.[195] Rather than penetrating civil society, the state became beholden to these twin elites which would take turns controlling it, the moneyed elite through democracy and the military elite through stratocracy.

Pakistan unlike Taiwan never pursued a land reform, the large democratic parties were dominated by large landowners, but rather a policy called functional inequality. Essentially trickle-down economics, the idea was that inequality would raise savings and economic growth.[196] Education was not a priority in Pakistan as social investments, important for both economic development as well as a form of redistribution, were under-resourced.[197] In 1960 the average 15-year old girl received only 0.2 years of schooling while the average boy received only 1.2. Ten years later those numbers were 0.6 and 2.4 respectively.[198] The resultant low female participation in the workforce persists to this day.[199] Underinvestment in women in these two decades is a leading cause for the population explosion that would follow.[200]

Pakistan was founded as a democracy, but unlike India ended the first two decades as a stratocracy. The *mujahir* Muslim League's centralizing tendencies

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[184] Ibid., 18.
[185] Rahman 2004, 257.
[186] Ibid., 253.
[187] Ibid., 257.
[188] Ibid., 252.
[189] Quataert 2000, 4; Ghani 1978.
[190] Mohammad-Arif 2004, 233. Religious doctors of law which during the Ottoman empire ran the judiciary, cf. Quataert 2000, 4.
[191] Gaborieau 2004, 242-243.
[192] Mohammad-Arif 2004, 223-232.
[193] Ibid. 2004, 232. The anti-Ahmadi campaign was one of the reasons that the constitution took 8 years to write.
[194] Jaffrelot 2004b, 68-70; Etienne 2004b, 163; Noman 1997, 34-36.
[195] Jaffrelot 2004b, 69.
[196] Noman 1997, 34-36.
[197] Ibid., 177.
[198] Barro & Lee 2000. These numbers most likely hide a great inequality; in 1999 only half of children in Pakistan were in primary education, cf. Etienne 2004a, 162.
[199] Hausmann et al. 2010, 242-243.
[200] Noman 1997, 177.

left little room for religious and linguistic communities,[201] which countered with obstructionism and separatism.[202] Having precipitated separatism and value-rational conflict the state was then unable to overcome it. The democratic regime's inability to govern effectively delegitimized it, paving the way for a military takeover in 1958. Little of the high-capacity state needed to sustain a democracy was built in this period; having begun as a plebiscitarian autocracy Pakistan ended 1969 as an unaccountable autocracy.[203]

4.1.3 The Third Wave: 1970-1989

The second twenty-year period in Pakistan's history was largely a repeat of the first; it saw the completion of another democracy-stratocracy cycle, more ethnolinguistic and religious tensions, and further state-deformation. Lacking a clear state-society bargain this period saw the emergence of both democratic and military regimes Islamizing the state for legitimacy.

1970 saw the return to democracy,[204] but in the first election the Bangladeshi independence party gained an outright majority in parliament (the Muslim League almost disappeared).[205] In an effort to prevent decentralization of the Pakistani state the army conducted a terror campaign in Eastern Pakistan, which forced the Indian military to intervene as 10 million refugees fled into India. The war, lasting two weeks "...during which the Pakistani forces lost half their fleet, a third of their army and a quarter of their air force...,"[206] produced an independent Bangladesh.[207] Democracy lasted until 1977 when the reelected coalition called on the army to put down protests after a tainted election. The army concluded that the fractious politicians were not competent to govern and seized power.[208] This time unaccountable autocracy lasted until 1988.[209] The state's coercive function proved itself unable to protect the state from internal and external enemies.

Average GDP per capita in 1972 was USD1295, 8 years later it was USD1593, ultimately reaching USD2202 by 1990.[210] Aid continued to make up a large part of GNP, reaching 10.5% in 1977,[211] but origin shifted from the US to the Soviet Union and back to the US at the start of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.[212] Inept economic management and erratic policies produced poor results, as "...[N]ationalization and half-baked land reforms intensified ethnic tensions and increased insecurity without any substantive compensatory gains.[213] Unable to extract adequate resources from society, the state remained dependent on foreign aid, debtors and remittances.[214]

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[201] Jaffrelot 2004b, 62.
[202] Jaffrelot 2004b, 63-67; Gaborieau 2004, 237-246.
[203] A democracy without a constitution, which Pakistan lacked for the first eight years of its existence, is most similar to a plebiscitarian autocracy while a military regime without a strong civil administration is if anything an unaccountable autocracy. The legal foundation of the country, the India Act, was often ignored.
[204] Jaffrelot 2004b, 73.
[205] Ibid., 74-75.
[206] Jaffrelot 2004b, 75.
[207] Ibid., 75.
[208] Ibid., 78.
[209] Ibid., 83.
[210] Gleditsch 2002.
[211] Noman 1997, 149.
[212] Ibid., 144-153.
[213] Ibid., 148.
[214] Ibid., 148-162.

The second partition[215] and subsequent ethnolinguistic[216] and religious[217] violence showed that the successive regimes, and the state as a whole, were unable to assimilate the populace to build one nation. During this time society was formally divided into two, comprising Muslim citizens and non-Muslim second-class citizens.[218] In particular, populist state Islamization fanned tensions between Shia and Sunni.[219] Assimilation was creating centrifugal forces.

Both the democratic and military regimes reduced the state's ability to autonomously regulate society as it devolved more power to the ulema.[220] The military regime effectively created parallel legal systems, Anglo-Indian law remained the law of the land but it was complemented by *sharia*.[221] The state's ability to regulate society was weakening.

The democratic regime sought to liberate itself from the army through the creation of a new military force, which proved ultimately useless.[222] Both the democratic regime and the military regime made far-going changes to the civil administration of Pakistan with unclear effects.[223] If state steering did not deteriorate it seems at the least to not have improved, especially considering the democratic regime's inability to control the coercive functions of the state.

While the first military regime had protected women's rights,[224] the democratic regime opened a door to religious fundamentalism that the military regime would walk through.[225] Islamization "aggravated inequality between sexes",[226] as e.g. the testimony of one man became equal to that of two women in court. A botched land reform of the democratic regime, which was led by a feudal land lord,[227] had little impact on inequality.[228] By 1990 the average 15-year old girl received 2.8 years of schooling, and the average 15-year old boy received 5.4 years of schooling.[229] Economic inequalities were not corrected, and gender inequality worsened considerably.

By the end of the 1988 Pakistan had completed its second democracy-stratocracy cycle. The stratocracy phase of the cycle ended in time to make Pakistan part of Huntington's 'third wave', but as Carothers would point out, the weakness of the state did not bode well for the prospects of democratic consolidation.

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[215] Jaffrelot 2004b, 75.
[216] Ibid., 76.
[217] Mohammad-Arif 2004, 233.
[218] Gaborieau 2004, 246.
[219] Jaffrelot 2004b, 81.
[220] Gaborieau 2004, 247-248.
[221] Gaborieau 2004, 248; Jaffrelot 2004b, 80.
[222] Jaffrelot 2004b, 76.
[223] Ibid., 76-77, 79-80.
[224] Gaborieau 2004, 246.
[225] Gaborieau 2004, 247-248, 250.
[226] Jaffrelot 2004b, 80.
[227] Ibid., 76.
[228] Jaffrelot 2004b, 77.
[229] Barro & Lee 2000. These numbers most likely hide a great inequality; in 1999 only half of children in Pakistan were in primary education, cf. Etienne 2004a, 162.

4.1.4 Reaping the Whirlwind: 1990-2009

The third twenty-year period in Pakistan's history repeated the second. Ethnolinguistic and religious tensions increased and the state deformed further through another democracy-stratocracy cycle.

All four democratic governments between 1988 and 1999 fell before their term ended through politically motivated judicial action. Governing oscillated between two coalitions of regional parties with violent regional demonstrations prominent in the falls of both.[230] Government dysfunction made the military once more step in, governing from 1999-2008.[231] Elections in 2008 saw a return to democracy, led by a famously corrupt prime minister.[232]

The state's coercive function continued to deteriorate through the 20-year period, especially its internal coercion. The police did not enforce the state's monopoly on violence as hundreds died in Shia-Sunni unrest over the course of the 1990s.[233] The military has been unable to prevent *de facto* secession of areas of Pashtunistan in the 2000s.[234]

The country saw poor economic growth through "[F]requent changes of government, domestic problems, pressure from lobbies which blocked tax reforms, corruption, several bad monsoons and all kinds of other misuses of power...".[235] By 2004 the inflation-adjusted GDP per capita was USD2686, barely higher than 20 years earlier. In 2010 the state is unable to extract more than 10% of GNP in taxes,[236] less than a third of the OECD average.[237] Tax extraction is weak at the same time as the state is unable to grow the economy.

The promotion of Sunni over Shia Islam, and Islam over other religions, has institutionalized sectarian conflict.[238] Similarly, party politics is institutionalizing ethnolinguistic tension.[239] Nation-building and assimilation is failing.

The civil administration was so dysfunctional in 1998 that the army was called in to perform basic administrative tasks.[240] The Pakistani response to the 2010 floods would suggest that civil administration has if not deteriorated then not improved. Meaningful regulation of economy and society is not possible, and bureaucratic steering seems to have broken down.

As the Islamization of Pakistan has continued so has the place of women continued to deteriorate;[241] today Pakistan has the third highest gender gap out of 134 countries.[242] Average schooling has decreased since 1990 for both boys and girls, and schooling is often through religious schools that offer no skills, neither to the students nor to the country.[243]

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[230] Jaffrelot 2004b, 83-91.
[231] New York Times, 2010.
[232] Jaffrelot 2004b, 87.
[233] Mohammad-Arif 2004, 235; Gaborieau 2004, 250.
[234] Khan 2009.
[235] Etienne 2004b, 174-174.
[236] Heritage Foundation 2010.
[237] OECD 2010.
[238] Gaborieau 2010, 249-250.
[239] Jaffrelot 2004b, 83-90.
[240] Ibid., 90.
[241] Gaborieau 2004, 250.
[242] Hausmann et al. 2010, 242-243.
[243] Gaborieau 2004, 250; Etienne 2004a, 189.

Although Pakistan ends the decade with a democratic regime, little would suggest that the democracy-stratocracy cycle will not repeat. The fundamental weakness of state institutions pointed out by Diamond in 2000 is if anything worse. The Fund for Peace which tracks state capacity rated Pakistan as the 11th weakest state in the world in 2010.[244] Of the five state institutions tracked by the Fund, only the military rates better than weak. The BTI rates Pakistan's state capacity as 112th of 128 countries, with a score of 3.18 (out of 10). Its democracy status is according to BTI 3.97 (out of 10), 106th of 128 countries.[245] In its current democratic incarnation Pakistan is rated as 'Not Free' by Freedom House, giving it a Political Rights score of 4 and Civil Liberties score of 5.[246] Given the correlation between state capacity and democracy, a stable liberal democratic regime will most likely be elusive.

4.2. Taiwan

Taiwan was integrated into China in the early seventeenth century during the Ming dynasty, and then became the base of Ming loyalists when the Qing dynasty was established.[247] Qing China in 1683 reincorporated the island into the empire.[248] By and against government orders migration over the centuries swelled the Chinese population of the island.[249] In 1895 Taiwan was ceded to Japan,[250] who occupied it.[251]

Japan invested in infrastructure,[252] conducted a land reform,[253] built an uncorrupt government,[254] and promoted assimilation mainly through schools (raising literacy levels considerably).[255] To co-opt the local elite the colonial administration held (limited) elections of seats to administrative bodies,[256] and offered special business privileges.[257] Through fifty years of Japanese administration Taiwan doubled its population, tripled agricultural output and raised the standard of living above that of the mainland.[258]

4.2.1 Founding

Mao's declaration on October 1st of 1949 that the Chinese people had stood up[259] ended almost 25 years of fighting between Mao's Communist Party (CCP) and the *Guomindang*.[260] Like the Congress Party and Muslim League in India, the CCP and the Guomindang, had a common history. They were both organized along Leninist lines by Soviet technical advisors,[261] and spent years allied against

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[244] Fund for Peace 2010a.
[245] Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a.
[246] Freedom House 2010a. The Freedom House scale goes from 1-7, where 1 is free and 7 is unfree.
[247] Spence 1990, 54-55; Roy 2003, 17-19.
[248] Spence 1990, 56; Roy 2003, 19-20.
[249] Spence 1990, 79, 94, 210; Roy 2003, 22-25.
[250] Spence 1990, 223; Roy 2003, 33.
[251] Roy 2003, 33.
[252] Ibid., 39.
[253] Ibid.
[254] Ibid., 54.
[255] Ibid., 41-43.
[256] Ibid., 37.
[257] Ibid., 45.
[258] Ibid., 54.
[259] Spence 1990, 512.
[260] 国民党, *Guomindang* or *Kuomintang*, literally the Nationalist Party.
[261] Spence 1990, 334-338.

Japan.[262] A factor in the Guomindang defeat was its poor governance, with corruption and financial chaos being prominent features.[263]

Like the Ming loyalists before them the Guomindang retreated to Taiwan in 1949,[264] which had been prepared as a last retreat.[265] The Guomindang had taken control of Taiwan in 1945, but corruption and government mismanagement had generated discontent ending in a brutally suppressed public uprising in 1947.[266] The Guomindang did not provide the competent administration of the Japanese colonial government,[267] and seemed to treat the "...island as a defeated enemy territory rather than a victim of Japanese imperialism."[268]

4.2.2 Laying the Foundation: 1949-1969

The brutally suppressed 1947 uprising would have a profound effect on Taiwan as a lightning rod for Taiwanese nationalism for decades to come,[269] but in its wake the Guomindang improved its governance.[270] It brutally exercised its monopoly on violence, secured state finances and grew the economy, sought to assimilate the native population, tightly regulated society and the economy, improved institutions, and through land reform sought to limit social tension.

As it became increasingly clear that the Mainland was lost to the CCP the Guomindang focused attention on Taiwan. Through campaigns in 1947 and then in 1949-1951 critics of and potential competitors to the new regime, along with many innocents, were purged, crushing the potential leadership of a nationalist movement.[271] However, the Guomindang realized that while it might be able to neutralize dissent through force, it needed support to survive in the long run.[272] The influx of refugees from the Mainland in the closing days of 1949, about 2 million or about 20% of the island's population,[273] along with discrimination of Taiwanese[274] had created social unrest.[275] Having neutralized some of its opposition, the Guomindang needed to co-opt the majority Taiwanese. Limited self rule through elections to local administrative bodies,[276] similar to the Japanese system, was offered. The Guomindang was reformed making it more open to new (Taiwanese) members.[277] Also, the Guomindang set about "...creating a prosperous and contented society..." to "...raise its prestige and weaken CCP rule on the mainland."[278]

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[262] Ibid., 323,336-338, 460-466, 487-498.
[263] Ibid., 485, 498-499.
[264] Ibid., 525.
[265] Ibid., 510.
[266] Chao and Myers 1998, 22-23; Roy 2003, 60-75.
[267] Roy 2003, 75; Hung 2000, 249.
[268] Roy 2003, 75.
[269] Chu and Lin 2001, 112.
[270] Roy 2003, 76.
[271] Ibid., 72.
[272] Ibid., 77.
[273] Roy 2003, 76.
[274] The Taiwanese-Mainlander cleavage comes from this period where Taiwanese are aborigines and Chinese who arrived before 1949, and Mainlanders are those who arrived after 1949, and their descendants.
[275] Roy 2003, 67.
[276] Gold 1986, 61; Chu and Lin 2001, 114.
[277] Gold 1986, 59.
[278] Roy 2003, 69.

Created along Leninist lines the Guomindang had in its early days placed about 90% of the economy under its control.[279] Through the 1950s the state dominated the economy, owning all banks and large industrial concerns,[280] but in 1963 Taiwan created the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD) to coordinate private economic growth and promote investments,[281] in a manner not dissimilar from Japan's MITI. Eager to wean itself off American aid,[282] the regime aggressively pursued export-led development through the 1960s.[283] It also invested heavily in education, "opening up opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility," as well as creating a large pool of skilled labor.[284] Through government policies inflation-adjusted GDP per capita almost tripled between 1950 and 1970, from USD978 to USD2846.[285] For girls average schooling went from 2.8 years in 1960 to 3.9 in 1970, while for boys it increased from 4.9 to 5.6 years.[286]

Similar to Europe in the 19th century the military became a nation-building tool in Taiwan as the Guomindang regime needed to recruit Taiwanese for its large army.[287] Military service offered the regime an opportunity to indoctrinate young men, but designating Mandarin as a national language met with some resistance.[288] Initially some Taiwanese used Japanese to nettle Mainlanders, and saw the promotion of Mandarin as cultural imperialism.[289] Intermarriage between Mainlanders and Taiwanese were rare.[290] However, at the heels of economic growth regional origin began to lose its importance.[291] Guomindang willingness to ally with the Taiwanese elite, the bourgeoisie fear of instability, and worker and peasant willingness to invest in Taiwan's economic growth limited societal conflict.[292]

The Guomindang was largely successful in its regulation of society and the economy. The public accepted the regime's mass of regulations, accepting a state that seemed to act in their interest if not according to their will.[293] The brutal security apparatus raised the cost of dissent to the point where most were unwilling to pay it.

True to its Leninist roots the Guomindang created a party-state,[294] but reflecting on its failures on the mainland it set about making the administration of that state as honest and competent as possible.[295] The obviously corrupt were fired or forced out.[296] Recruitment expanded the size of the party considerably, raising

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[279] Hung 2001, 247.
[280] Gold 1986, 73.
[281] Ibid., 78.
[282] Ibid., 77.
[283] Ibid., 98.
[284] Ibid., 97.
[285] Gleditsch 2002.
[286] Barro & Lee 2000.
[287] Roy 2003, 94-95.
[288] Ibid.
[289] Ibid.
[290] Ibid.
[291] Gold 1986, 90.
[292] Ibid., 90.
[293] Ibid.
[294] Chu and Lin 2001, 115; Roy 2003, 81.
[295] Roy 2003, 80-81.
[296] Ibid.

the number of Taiwanese party members to 50%.[297] The imposition of martial law in 1949 meant that the party leadership was above the law,[298] but the administration of the island through the effective bureaucracy seems to have been by the law.[299] Administration was fairly uncorrupt.

One of the most important actions of the regime was its land reforms,[300] which saw land redistributed from a land-owning elite to the tenant-farmers who worked it.[301] From 1949 to 1953 the percentage of land cultivated by owners went from 51% to 79%, increasing agricultural output by 50% and doubling farmer income.[302] Large Taiwanese land-owners had no influence in the Guomindang and were unable to resist these reforms.[303] Same as in Meiji[304] and postwar Japan,[305] and unlike China,[306] land-owners were not only allowed to keep their lives but were also remunerated. Land reforms produced an investment-ready monied class which benefitted by later privatizations of some state-owned companies.[307] Regime policies made Taiwan's income inequality among the lowest in the world by the 1980s.[308] Perhaps the second most important action of the regime was improving access to eduction.

Although the Guomindang's Leninist conception of democracy as possible only after a period of party-state tutelage limited it in the short run, it did plant a seed for the future.[309] The use of local elections to neutralize government critics,[310] as well as elections to farmers' associations,[311] meant that the Taiwanese people were at an early state given access to an orderly democracy that might not be ideal but was at least functional.[312]

The Guomindang pursued a strong state-formative strategy, offering civil society a bargain similar to that of the Qin: material welfare for consent. By 1969 Taiwan had the traits of a constitutional oligarchy.[313]

4.2.3 The Third Wave: 1970-1989

The period between 1970 and 1990 was a difficult one for the regime. It had built a party-state, but over the course of the decades that integration broke down and the party became separated from the state. Leading factors were Taiwan's loss

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[297] Ibid.
[298] Chu and Lin 2001, 114.
[299] The administration of the Guomindang seems to have become more competent and less capriciously corrupt with time, or leastways the negative comparisons to the Japanese administration disappear from the literature after the early 1950s, cf. Roy 2003, 90.
[300] Roy 2003, 99-100. This reform was not wholly altruistic; the Guomindang was concerned that peasant unrest would be could be exploited by communist agitators as it had been on the mainland. Land reform was a way to forestall that unrest.
[301] Ibid., 101.
[302] Ibid., 100-102.
[303] Ibid., 100.
[304] Jansen 2002, 368.
[305] Ibid., 682-683.
[306] Spence 1990, 516-517.
[307] Gold 1986, 71.
[308] Roy 2003, 102.
[309] Ibid., 79-80.
[310] Roy 2003, 84-86. Chu and Lin 2001, 114.
[311] Roy 2003, 102.
[312] Chao and Myers 1998, 59-63.
[313] Chu and Shin 2005, 198. If Taiwan was not already then it was on good way of becoming one as it, like South Korea, by the 1980s had "...modern, rational-legal, competent bureaucracies before they were democratized." Even if it was not rule of law, Taiwan was certainly ruled by law.

of standing in the international system and the consequent breakdown of the previous state-society bargain.

At the end of the 1960s Taiwanese society was largely apolitical,[314] but this changed in 1971. First the United States sided with Japan in a territorial dispute, leading to nationalist protests. At the same time more states began to recognize the CCP as the legitimate government of China, until Taiwan had to yield its seat in the UN. The Shanghai Communique in 1972 was a further blow to a regime that seemed to lose its *raison d'etre*.[315] Like the Ming-loyalists before them the Guomindang had retreated to Taiwan to prepare for a reconquest of the mainland.[316] Taiwan's democratic constitution had been set aside by Martial Law for the duration of the "Communist Rebellion",[317] which was the justification for the brutal suppression of political dissent after 1949.[318] China's first nuclear test in 1964,[319] and then the loss of recognition by the international community raised questions about the feasibility of retaking China, and consequently Martial Law.[320] In 1972 the economy began to sputter, cutting to the heart of the state-society bargain.[321]

The state's coercive functions were challenged by several popular protests over the years,[322] but none of these led to a major destabilization of society or the state. A combination of internal coercion, co-optation of protest leaders, and eventual political reform and democratization eased political pressures.[323] By early 1980 a spate of murders raised questions of who was controlling the security police, which lead to high-level resignations and judicial prosecutions of top security officials.[324] Even if done under duress, the prosecutions of extra-legal acts suggests that the state's coercive functions were functioning.

The Guomindang regime tackled the economic challenges by canvassing experts,[325] executing a Four-Year Plan in 1972 and a Six-Year Plan in 1976.[326] The plans called for government investment in infrastructure, and a movement of private industry to technology-intensive industrial production.[327] In the period between 1970 and 1990 inflation-adjusted GPD per capita quadrupled from USD2846 to USD11248.[328]

Stressing a common heritage, enforcing Mandarin-use in schools and media produced a population with dramatically decreased linguistic and cultural differences.[329] Increasing rates of intermarriage between Taiwanese and

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[314] Gold 1986, 90-91.
[315] Ibid., 93.
[316] Roy 2003, 78-81.
[317] Ibid., 83.
[318] Ibid., 88-94.
[319] Gold 1986, 92.
[320] Ibid., 93-94.
[321] Ibid., 94.
[322] Gold 1986, 93, 115; Roy 2003, 158-179.
[323] Roy 2003, 158-179; Chao and Myers 1998, 72-149.
[324] Gold 1986, 120.
[325] Ibid., 94.
[326] Ibid., 94, 100.
[327] Gold 1986, 94, 100-106.
[328] Gleditsch 2002.
[329] Gold 1986, 94, 112-113.

Mainlanders slowly eradicated the major cleavage in Taiwanese society.[330] While the cleavage remained relevant, with some opposition party members making their speeches in the Taiwanese dialect rather than Mandarin,[331] nobody seemed willing to kill or die for ethnolinguistic differences. Assimilation seems to have continued apace in a difficult environment.

Although the regime's autonomy from society decreased,[332] the state's ability to regulate society, for good and bad, remained considerable. This ability was challenged but not undermined as evidenced by both the continued assimilation as well as the state's ability to execute long-term economic plans which required significant private sector compliance; the state's regulatory function remained strong.

An ever closer relationship between the local Guomindang political machines and members of the community, including businesses, made corruption more common.[333] In response, the national government increasingly prosecuted corruption.[334] The steering capacity of the state, though challenged, was not undermined.

By the 1980s "...Taiwan's rate of income inequality was one of the lowest in the world, besting both the United States and Japan."[335] The average schooling for 15 year olds increased from 5.3 years in 1970 to 8 in 1990. For girls average schooling increased to 7 years, while for boys it increased to 9.[336]

In 1969 the regime allowed national elections, rather than just local, bringing more non-party politicians onto the national stage.[337] Over the following decades non-party candidates would increasingly win races in elections that the Guomindang could not tamper with,[338] as in e.g. 1977.[339] Voices of protest against the Martial Law continued to be raised, leading to popular unrest and riots.[340] However, the Guomindang did not maintain itself solely through force, a large percentage of voters trusted the party for its ability to improve the material welfare, giving it around 70% of voter support in elections.[341] At the same time the party realized it could not resist the political pressures indefinitely. In 1986 the opposition illegally founded a new party, the Democratic Progressive Party. After some vacillation the Guomindang leadership allowed the new, technically illegal, party to participate in elections.[342] At the same time the party leader and president, who had received his offices from his father, declared that the next president "...'could not and would not' be a be a member of the Chiang family."[343] As the 1980s drew to a close the family relinquished control of the party and state.[344]

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[330] Roy 2003, 162, 240.
[331] Ibid., 173.
[332] Gold 1986, 119.
[333] Roy 2003, 161-162.
[334] Ibid., 156-158.
[335] Ibid., 92.
[336] Barro & Lee 2000.
[337] Gold 1986, 92; Chao and Myers 1998, 63-64.
[338] Chao and Myers 1998, 75.
[339] Gold 1986, 114-115.
[340] Roy 2003, 152-172.
[341] Ibid., 162.
[342] Roy 2003, 172-173.
[343] Ibid., 179.
[344] Roy 2003, 180-181; Chao and Myers 1998, 154-156.

Martial Law was abolished,[345] and Taiwan held its first truly democratic elections.[346] The Guomindang became the first democratically elected government in the new regime with around 60% of the vote.[347]

4.2.4 Democratic Consolidation 1990-2009

The third 20-year period in Taiwan's history has largely been a continuation of the second. State capacity continues to be high across the board and democracy has been consolidating.

According to BTI's Management Index Taiwan's state capacity is the 6th highest in the world, with a score of 7.12.[348] Economic growth continued apace with inflation-adjusted GPD per capita reaching almost USD19200 in 2000.[349] Average length of schooling continued to increase, with 15-year old girls receiving 7.9 years and boys 9.6 in 2000.

Taiwan is 'Free' according to the Freedom House with a Political Rights score of 1, increased from 2 "...due to enforcement of anticorruption laws", and a Civil Liberties rating of 2.[350] BTI's Democracy Index ranks Taiwan 5th of 128 countries, with a score of 9.5.[351]

4.3. State-Building Compared

At the outset both Pakistan and Taiwan pursued a state-formative strategy. The economy was managed by the state, they had embryonic high-capacity bureaucracies, and there was a highly assimilative push around one language and culture, Urdu and Islamic in Pakistan and Mandarin and Chinese in Taiwan. This push was initiated by the regimes of the newly arrived, *mujahir* in Pakistan and Mainlanders on Taiwan, both making up 20% of their respective populations. From a theoretical standpoint these polities should have seen similar state-formation. They should have built similar infrastructural power, with the state penetrating and regulating society, leading eventually to some state-society bargain that might produce democracy. While this happened in Taiwan, Pakistan diverged from the path.

Taiwan could be a state-formation textbook case, with all that it entails both good and bad. The Guomindang regime produced a highly capable state, a high material welfare, and, following the logic of the HDI with its focus on education and income, a highly developed society.[352] Taiwan then smoothly transitioned from a constitutional oligarchy to a liberal democracy, scoring well on both Freedom House and BTI indices. The state-building was accomplished through the regime's autonomy from society and supported by a "pervasive internal security system".[353] It was able to push through policies, such as land reform, to

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[345] Chao and Myers 1998, 149.
[346] Ibid., 171-175.
[347] Ibid., 172-173.
[348] Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009b.
[349] Gleditsch 2002.
[350] Freedom House 2010b.
[351] Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009b.
[352] The UN Human Development Index ratings are composed of data on life expectancy, education and per capita income, cf. UNDP 2010. Taiwan is not tracked separately from China, but as has been shown, both have increased significantly through the polity's 60 year history, especially when compared to Pakistan.
[353] Gold 1986, 123.

the apparent detriment of an entrenched elite, and restructure society. This autonomy backed by force had a high human cost, though.

Pakistan, Diamond's prototypical failed 'third wave' democracy, by contrast is becoming a textbook case of a failed state. Not backed by force the vision of 'one nation, one culture, one language' foundered as a heterogenous society could not agree on what that 'one' should be. Regional nationalists in Bangladesh, Pashtunistan, and elsewhere wanted autonomy if not independence. Islamists wanted one kind of Islamic state or another, leading to sectarian conflicts and violence. Cleavages worsened as the state sought to assimilate various groups. Emblematic of these problems is the constitutional assembly which because of value-rational identity conflicts spent eight years to produce a constitution that lasted only two. Important state-building was left undone as elite interests were protected, e.g. through a lack of land reform and functional inequality policies, and voices of intolerance were pandered to rather than regulated, e.g. Ahmadi were declared non-Muslim by the state. Pakistan chose a state-formative strategy that was then executed in a state-deformative manner.

Government dysfunction led to stratocracy replacing democracy; in the words of J.F.C. Fuller, "…[a]narchy … led directly to the establishment of a stratocracy - that is government by military power in contrast with government based on military power. In other words, the foundations became the superstructure."[354] However, to lay the blame on democracy itself for its continued failure in Pakistan misses the mark. The military regimes would prove as unable as the democratic to sustain themselves. Also, Pakistan's counterfactual, India, with a population even more diverse than Pakistan's has avoided its vicissitudes.

Faced by the same conditions, heterogenous communities and entrenched local elites, India allowed regions and communities an autonomy that is almost consociational,[355] arguably reducing conflict in a heterogenous society.[356] It did not pursue the same level of infrastructural power as Taiwan or Pakistan, producing a weaker state than Taiwan with a BTI score of 6.6,[357] but it also avoided many of the conflicts such a strategy would create.

On Taiwan the Mainlander regime's autonomy from and independence of elites and civil society made it possible to regulate and restructure both. Pakistan's *mujahir* regime pursued similar nation-building, but unwilling or unable to overcome elite and civil society resistance it created the inevitable conflicts of infrastructural power-building without resolving them. The state rather than consolidating its autonomy from society was weakened by the conflicts it caused, leading ultimately to it becoming so weak that it can sustain neither democracy nor stratocracy.

5. Conclusion

The experience of Taiwan and Pakistan adds another dimension to the formative and deformative strategies discussed by Hui, namely that of time or

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[354] Fuller 1965, 24.
[355] O'Leary 2005, 32; Tremblay 2005, 207-208.
[356] O'Leary 2005, 8ff.
[357] Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009c.

short-term capacity. Highly autonomous from society and not shy to brutally enforce its authority the Guomindang built a highly capable state that could regulate and restructure society and the economy - the regime had the capacity to pursue its strategy to the end. Pakistan chose the same highly invasive strategy but did not or could not resolve the conflicts that arose. The example of India would suggest a different, less aggressive approach might have produced a better result, although at a cost to potential state capacity. With less short-term capacity and less able to act independently from elites and civil society, India chose a less ambitious state-building strategy which yielded less capacity than Taiwan but more than Pakistan.

The narrow answer to the question of what could explain the divergent outcome of democratic state-building in Pakistan and Taiwan would seem to be that Taiwan built a highly capable state while Pakistan did not. A broader answer would be that in its pursuit of infrastructural power the Muslim League created more problems than it solved, especially as it tackled the inherently value-rational aspects of nation-building. Willing and able to brutally assert itself the Guomindang was able to accomplish the sort of nation- and state-building that Pakistan seems to have aspired to. The centrifugal forces unleashed by Pakistan's attempts at nation-building have gone from creating political gridlock to becoming destructive. India, given similar conditions as Pakistan, chose a different, ultimately more effective model.

The implication of the results of democratic state-formation in Pakistan and Taiwan is two-fold. First, it supports the importance of state capacity for democratic consolidation. Second, state-building should perhaps be conceptualized not as binary but in terms of weak and strong. Taiwan chose a strong state-formative strategy which produced a highly capable state with enormous infrastructural power. Pakistan chose the same strategy as Taiwan, but without the capacity or willingness to overcome elite and society resistance it failed, producing a state that is weaker than India's according to BTI, near-failing according to the Fund for Peace, and unable to sustain any regime.

These results suggest three paths for future research. First, to verify the results the comparison should be extended to include both counterfactuals, India and China. It would also benefit from deepening, both in terms of non-English material but also the examined variables. In particular, given the role of women in producing economic prosperity their role is under-theorized in state-formation. Second, the literature seems to be in agreement that building infrastructural power produces a state-society bargain that need not be democratic. What conditions would produce what sort of state-society bargain deserves further study, especially when it seems to change as in the case of Taiwan. Third, most literature in English on democratization in East Asia mentions Confucianism but ignores Legalism. Japan chose a Legalist motto for its Meij-era state-building. Taiwan first produced a state-society bargain similar to that of the Legalist Qin. Furthermore, the Chinese Cultural Revolution was laudatory of the Legalist (anti-Confucianist) Qin dynasty. There is very little material in English on Legalism, or even material separating Legalism from Confucianism. Its role in East Asian state-building needs further study.

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