Taiwan Identity

Re-positioning amidst multi-layered realities

Gudrun Seiler-Holmer

Abstract

The question to be dealt with in this study is to what extent the emergence of a distinct Taiwan identity has influenced people's self-perception, with respect to the profound economic and political changes in Taiwan since the 1980s, such as the lifting of martial law, democratisation and Taiwanisation (*bentuhua*). Assuming an existing interconnectedness between identity, politics, ethnicity and nationalism, it will be examined how the people of Taiwan, i.e. the Hoklo, the Hakka, the Mainlanders and the Aborigines (*yuanzhumin*), construct their identities in a multicultural society amidst an intensifying nation-building process. By applying Barth's (1969) theory of ethnic groups and boundaries, Taylor's (1994) notion of multiculturalism as politics of recognition and reviewing Taiwan's nation-building process since the 1990s in the frame of Anderson's (2006) idea of the nation as *imagined community*, I look into how discourses on different levels have had a bearing on where and how ethnic boundaries are drawn or have become blurred. In conclusion, I suggest that with regard to the issue of identity, while there appears to be an ethnification process taking place on an individual level, simultaneously, there are cohesive tendencies perceptible on a national level.

Keywords: Taiwan identity, Taiwanisation (*bentuhua*), ethnic identity, multiculturalism, imagined community

Abbreviations

ATA	Alliance of Taiwanese Aborigines
	Taiwan yuanzhumin quanli cujinhui 台灣原住民權力促進會
DPP	The Democratic Progressive Party, *Minzhu jinbu dang* 民主進步黨
KMT	The Chinese Nationalist Party, *Kuomintang* 國民黨
PCT	The Presbyterian Church of Taiwan
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China (refers to Taiwan)

Figure 1. Map of Taiwan. Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm

Figure 2. Map of Taiwan in the World
Source: http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/tw.htm

Contents

1   Introduction[1]

The Taiwan visitor of today who arrives at Taipei's Taoyuan International Airport is greeted by large colourful billboards on his way to immigration, and is welcomed by images of happy-looking Austronesian Aborigines of Taiwan with a friendly *Naruwan!* This is but one of many different aspects of the apparent paradigm shift which has taken place in Taiwan, with evident support from the administration. Taiwan has moved from a once strongly emphasised Chinese self-image towards a stronger accentuation of its multicultural and diverse cultural heritage.

The island of Taiwan[2] was reportedly termed "Ilha Formosa" (*Beautiful Island*) by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. In the West it has been known as *Formosa*, or, since Chiang Kai-shek's move to the island in the late 1940s, also under its official name of "Republic of China" (ROC). Throughout this thesis I will use the name *Taiwan* when referring to the island, to indicate and do justice to the ethnic diversity of the country and in order not to accentuate the political debate on whether Taiwan is Chinese or not[3].

1.1   Research topic and scope of this thesis

The small island of Taiwan, approximately the size of the Netherlands, is geographically located, at its closest point, about one hundred and twenty kilometers from the South-eastern coast of China across the Taiwan Strait. It has not only been the object of interest of seafaring Western nations, such as the Portuguese, the Dutch or the Spanish some four hundred years ago. Taiwan has also been the subject of scholarly research, not least due to its specific historical and political circumstances, be it within anthropology, linguistics or political

---

[1] A note regarding the Romanisation system used in this study. Unless personal or place names have been adopted or individually chosen under a certain spelling (i.e. Chiang Kai-shek), I will use standard *Hanyu Pinyin* system.

[2] Taiwan, officially known as The Republic of China, consists of the main island of Taiwan, as well as of a number of small surrounding islands (Kinmen, Orchid Island, Pescadores, Matsu and others).

[3] The political dimensions and ambiguities involved regarding the fact that Taiwan is not a *de jure* sovereign state, but regarded as part of the PRC by the Communist government of the People's Republic of China, is not the subject of this thesis.

sciences, as well as other sciences. During the past few decades the question of a particular Taiwan identity has arisen and turned into the focus of debate within academia from both the West and Taiwan.

The research topic and scope of this study is to determine to what extent Taiwan identity has had a bearing on how people in Taiwan perceive themselves as belonging to a particular ethnic group. In what way have ethnic boundaries been maintained or new ones been drawn up between the groups? Have some of these boundaries been dissolved? Is ethnicity still of importance to individuals or has it faded into the background in favour of other relevant factors? How has political discourse within the realm of nation-building influenced or shaped these processes? These are some of the questions this study attempts to answers.

The starting point is Barth's (1969) theory of ethnic groups and boundaries and Anderson's (2006: 6) notion of the nation-state as an imagined[4] community, in order to illuminate nation-building strategies and national identity issues in Taiwan. In a multicultural and pluralistic society such as Taiwan, it also seems worthwhile to study in what way Taylor's (1994) idea of multiculturalism as politics of recognition is valid in the ongoing identity discourses. This appears to be interesting in particular, as Taiwanese society is made up of several ethnic groups whose struggle for recognition is perceptible in various ways.

Generally, one speaks of four main ethnic groups in Taiwan (*si da zuqun*): The Hoklo, the Hakka, the Mainlanders and the Aborigines (*yuanzhumin*)[5].

In the present text the term *Taiwanese* refers to the local Taiwanese population, i.e. the Hoklo and Hakka groups, the settlers to the island who during the 16th century came from the mainland Chinese South-eastern coastal provinces Fujian and Guangdong.

The term *Hoklo* will be used with reference to the largest population group in Taiwan, whose members speak the language *Taiwanese*, a Fujianese dialect of Chinese aka *Hokkien*.

The term *Taiwan identity* refers to the national identity of all citizens of Taiwan, regardless of their ethnicity and is deliberately chosen instead of *Taiwanese identity* in order not to confuse it with the identity of the Taiwanese, i.e. the Hoklo and the Hakka.

1.2   Methodology and sources

Due to time constraints, I have decided on a survey of the relevant literature with regard to the content of the study, instead of conducting fieldwork. Using an anthropological approach throughout the thesis, I have based my theoretical

---

[4] The word *imagined* is used here, and throughout this text, in Anderson's sense only, it does not mean *fictitious*.
[5] *Aborigines* and *yuanzhumin* (Mandarin translation of "Aborigines") are terms of identical meaning and will here be used interchangeably.

framework on three theories, which I found most useful for the scope of this study. There is an extensive literature on Taiwan identity, written during the last two to three decades by scholars from both the West and from Taiwan, within different disciplines, such as political science, history, social anthropology, sociology, literary studies, educational science and psychology.

The literature about Taiwan, selected also, whenever possible, under the aspect of current relevance, consists of books and peer-reviewed articles, and is written in English, German or Chinese by reputable Western or Taiwanese scholars. A few internet resources were used to complement printed sources or for statistical references.

The issue of identity, not least in the case of Taiwan, is often part of political discourses which tend to shift during the course of time, and sometimes serve the pragmatic needs of decision-makers rather than expressing a personal or collective consciousness. Therefore, I have tried to remain attentive to the fact that much of what has been written on Taiwan identity, especially by scholars from Taiwan, most likely has been influenced by the date of its publication, by the author's personal and political position, and by the fact that the Taiwan identity itself is being defined, influenced and factually created[6] whenever someone is writing about it.

1.3   Historical background

To gain an understanding of the Taiwan of today one has to turn to its past. I will therefore give here a brief account of Taiwan's historical development as a necessary backdrop in order to provide a more general introduction to the topic of research.

During its long history, Taiwan has for several periods been under colonial rule by the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Spanish and, most recently, by the Japanese. From the seventeenth century onward until 1895[7] Taiwan had been formally under Chinese jurisdiction (Cauquelin, 2004: 6). It should be noted, though, that before any external powers ruled the island, Taiwan was populated by aborigines (*yuanzhumin*, literally: original dweller). Based on archaeological and linguistic evidence, Aborigines have been living on the island for six thousand years (The Republic of China Yearbook 2010/People & Language: 33; Cauquelin,

---

[6] For a nuanced discussion of the academic discourse regarding the implications of the emergence of a Taiwan identity, cf. Harrison, 2006.
[7] Due to the defeat of the Chinese empire in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan became a colony of Japan, based on the terms of the treaty of Shimonoseki. For the following half of a century, between 1895-1945, the island was under Japanese rule (Cauquelin, 2004: 8-9). It is noteworthy that through these historical developments which involved a significant change of the social order, a common consciousness of a distinct Taiwanese identity took shape (ibid.; Brown, 2004: 7-9).

2004:1). The indigenous Malayo-Polynesian population consists of several different tribes[8] whose languages are part of the Austronesian linguistic family.

16th century - 1945

A first wave of Chinese migrants reached the island during the 16th century. Originally from the South-eastern coastal provinces of China, the Hoklo or Hokkien (aka *minnan ren* "Southern Min people") and the Hakka (*kejia ren* "guest people") spoke mutually unintelligible dialects of Chinese. The descendants of these early Han Chinese[9] migrants are known today as *Benshengren* (literally: people of this province).

Major historical events of the 20th century, such as the outcome of World War II, left their evident marks on the island. Japan, as one of the defeated nations[10], was forced to cede Taiwan to the Allies, who subsequently handed it over to the Chinese Nationalists (KMT[11]) in 1945, the governing power of the Republic of China at that time. The Taiwanese population, who primarily had felt that they were distinctly non-Japanese during the colonial rule, were now subjected to a rigorous Sinicisation (Cauquelin, 2004: 9).

1945-1987

Taiwan experienced a second wave of Han Chinese migration after 1945, when the Nationalist party under Chiang Kai-shek, together with approximately one to two million officials, as well as Civil War refugees, with their families, relocated to Taiwan[12]. The Han Chinese migrants who came to Taiwan after 1945, and their Taiwan-born offspring, are the so-called Mainlanders *(dalu ren)* or *Waishengren* (literally: people from outside the province).

Mandarin Chinese[13] became the official language and Chinese culture, customs and traditions were heavily promoted. Wide-spread corruption amongst the new rulers and the massive Sinicisation of the island initiated by the Nationalists were met by heavy protests from the Taiwanese population.

---

[8] The word *tribe* is used here to denote a category used by the state for classification. Each tribe is characterized by its own distinctive language, customs and traditions. The following tribes are recognised by the Taiwanese government (2010): Amis, Atayal, Bunun, Kavalan, Paiwan, Puyuma, Rukai, Saisiyat, Sakizaya, Sediq, Thao, Truku, Tsou, Yami (Republic of China Yearbook 2010/People and Language: 33).

[9] The Chinese define themselves as the descendents of the people of the ancient Han dynasty (206 BC - 220 AD). The Chinese language makes a clear distinction between denoting a person of Chinese ethnicity (*Hanzu ren*) and a person with Chinese national identity (*Zhongguo ren*). While the English term *Chinese* normally refers to either meaning, the ethnic meaning can be specified in English by saying *Han Chinese.*

[10] cf. footnote 7.

[11] KMT, Kuomintang, i.e. the Chinese Nationalist Party

[12] In the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) the governing Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party. In 1949, as a consequence thereof, Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist party leader and Chinese president, decided to retreat with his military and administrative personnel to Taiwan, where he re-established the Republic of China (Cauquelin, 2004: 9).

[13] *Mandarin* or *Mandarin Chinese* is the Northern Chinese dialect spoken around Beijing, the official language in both China (PRC) and Taiwan.

Furthermore, these protests were suppressed by force, which resulted in the implementation of martial law, which was not lifted until 1987 (Cauquelin, 2004: 9; Wachman, 1994a: 7-8, 105).

One of the most important incidents is the "2-28 Incident" (*er-er-ba shijian)*, which occurred on 28 February 1947 (Kerr, 1966: 254-258). In the course of this week-long Taiwanese uprising against the KMT, several thousands of native Taiwanese died at the hands of the Chinese military, which left the country bereft of nearly all of its former Taiwanese intellectual elite. The incident and the following period, which became known as the era of "White Terror" aimed against the local population (cf. for example Ku, 2005:105) remained politically taboo until late into the 1980s. It led to heavy grievances amongst the Taiwanese population and is seen by many scholars as a kind of a watermark for the emergence of a distinct Taiwan identity (Harrison, 2006: 38-40; Wachman, 1994a: 98-101, Brown, 2004: 9, 237).

After 1949, the main political milestones in Taiwan's history are the following. Chiang Kai-shek, whose political aspiration after his flight to Taiwan had always been to regain the presidency over all of China[14], governed the island in a clearly authoritarian way. He was succeeded by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who not only lifted martial law in 1987, thus leading Taiwan towards a more democratic path, but also ended the predominance of Mainlanders within government and among civil servants, by making it possible for Taiwanese to take office (Harrison, 2006: 43; Wachman, 1994a: 8; 223-224).

1987 - present
Chiang Ching-kuo's successor, and the first ever democratically elected president of Taiwan, was Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui[15]. In 2000, he was succeded by Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the opposition party DPP[16]. Chen's presidency lasted for two terms of office and meant that the KMT rule of nearly fifty years in Taiwan had been interrupted. In the year 2008, however, the KMT regained political power, under its candidate Ma Ying-jeou.

Many scholars are in agreement that without the infrastructure and educational system which Japan established in Taiwan[17] in its efforts to modernise its colony, the country would never have been able to go through such a rapid socioeconomic development later on.

The economic development of Taiwan, commonly referred to as *The Taiwan miracle* (Rubinstein, 1994: 3-14), as well as the subsequent democratisation and introduction of a pluralistic political system, have played an important role and

---

[14] This meant the territory of the Republic of China, as constituted after the Revolution of 1911 in the course of which the last Chinese empire had been overthrown.
[15] Lee was president of the ROC during 1988-2000. He won the first ever democratic presidential election in Taiwan in 1996.
[16] During the democratisation process, in the post-authoritarian era, in 1986, the opposition party DPP (The Democratic Progressive Party) was established (Chang & Wang, 2005: 33).
[17] Japan invested heavily in infrastructure projects, such as dams and irrigation programmes, health care and education, as well as industrialisation projects (Brown, 2010: 465).

have in many ways been a precondition for the emergence of a distinct Taiwan identity.

1.4   Previous research

Without any claim of comprehensiveness, I will try to give an overview about studies on Taiwan identity, placed in the wider context of the academic field of *Taiwan Studies.*

Which of the existing names[18] for Taiwan one chooses to use implies a choice of accentuating or deemphasising (deliberately or unwittingly) parts of the island's history, political position or cultural particularities. However, as the name *Taiwan* by now has become a meaningful denomination of the geography, polity, history and culture of the island[19], it has also become possible to link it to a distinct Taiwan identity (Harrison, 2006: 4).

Several political and historical events have proved to be essential prerequisites in the development leading toward Taiwan Studies. The democratisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s[20], the implementation of a democratic electoral system and the fact that in 1991 the ROC officially renounced the claim to be the government of all of China, have contributed decisively to the emergence of an academic interest in Taiwan and to the implementation of Taiwan Studies as an academic field in its own right. As a consequence, academic interest in Taiwan economics, politics, as well as Taiwan's culture, has been on the rise during the last few decades. This development has prompted a growing amount of academic research by both Western and Taiwanese scholars. The paradigmatic change from the former cultural accentuation of Taiwan's *Chineseness*[21], towards a Taiwan-centred construction of knowledge, has been inplemented into political discourses about national identity in Taiwan.

Obviously, the emergence of a Taiwan identity, and the academic and political discourses it entailed in Taiwan, have not gone unnoticed in China. Although there are some Taiwan Studies Research Centers in China (He, 2010: 3-4), scholars there tend to treat questions regarding Taiwan cautiously and academics

---

[18] Without being able to go into each of these names more in detail at this point, (cf. Harrison, 2006: 2-14, who provides a detailed discussion about the background of Taiwan's naming), it should be mentioned, that the island has been termed during time as *Ilha Formosa* (Beautiful Island); *Formosa*; *Taiwan fu* (Taiwan prefecture); *Republic of China*; *Free China* or *Taiwan, Republic of China*.

[19] e.g., since 2003 the English word *Taiwan* is printed on passports of the ROC (Kaeding, 2009: 25).

[20] Martial law ended in 1987, hence this development made possible the research of previously prohibited issues and sensitive historical events, such as the 2-28 Incident.

[21] e.g. the anthropologist Margery Wolf, who wrote *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan* (1972), was still clearly influenced by the prevailing paradigm of China-centrism in Taiwan.

across the Taiwan Straits differ in their assessment of social processes or phenomena[22].

The establishment of Taiwan Studies as an academic discipline has been greatly enhanced by the process of Taiwanisation, which set in after democratisation, but most notably by the fact that many of the historical archives in Taiwan have been digitised, thus providing valuable databases and online resources for academic research (Chang, 2004: 40).

Traditionally, scholarly research about Taiwan has been embedded in the academic field of *Chinese Studies* or *Asian Studies.* However, since the early 1990s, Taiwan Studies as a discipline has been established in different locations[23] around the world.

Much of what has been written about cultural, national, or ethnic identity formation in Taiwan, focuses in one way or another on the relation between national discourses and individual or group identities. Identity debates are present in Taiwan, and are not only manifested in political discourse, but also in popular culture, such as film, literature, art and language policies, as several authors (e.g. Storm & Harrison, 2007 and other references cited therein) give evidence to.

There is an abundant academic literature about the issue of national identity and nation-building in Taiwan. One good introduction and balanced assessment of this literature is given by Schubert (2006).

Scholars from Taiwan often deal with issues such as language and identity (Huang, 2000), Taiwan consciousness (*Taiwan yishi*) or Taiwanese subjectivity (*Taiwan zhutixing*) (Makeham & Hsiau, 2005: 1). *Ethnic relation Studies* deal mainly with socio-economic comparisons of Taiwan's ethnic groups (Yang & Chang, 2010: 112-113).

Initially, the issue of a Taiwan identity was characterised by a dichotomy of Chinese versus Taiwanese, or Sinicisation versus Indigenisation/ Taiwanisation. Most recent contributions (e.g. Yang & Chang, 2010), however, argue that to regard the Mainlanders, who originally came from all regions of China, or the Hoklo, the Hakka or the Aborigines in Taiwan as homogeneous groups would be

---

[22] For a most recent example of a Cross-Taiwan Straits comparative approach regarding narratives and identity, see He (2010).

[23] For example, the North American Taiwan Studies Association was established in 1994. Five years later, in 1999, the Taiwan Studies Programme of the School of Oriental and African Studies was established, and has become one of the leading centres for Taiwan Studies in Europe. In 2010, the *European Association of Taiwan Studies* was founded, whose aim is to "foster a community of interest among specialists on Taiwan working in European universities and research institutions on Taiwan-related topics in areas of the social sciences, humanities, language and culture" (http://eats-taiwan.eu/). Taiwan Studies in Australia so far have been part of the *Chinese Studies* programmes, but there are a number of outstanding Australian scholars knowledgeable about Taiwan issues, whose publications cover a wide variety of different topics. (http://coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/NLA/EALRGA/newsletter.html#JAN#2010). In Japan, which due to its history has retained close ties to its former colony, the Japan Association for Taiwan Studies (JATS) is based at Osaka International University. It was established in 2001 (http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jats/index.shtml).

unjust to the wide variety of personal backgrounds and life histories existent within each of the groups. Therefore, in their analysis of the situation of the *Waishengren*, they suggest that ethnicity studies would benefit from a more nuanced approach to each of the four ethnic groups in Taiwan, as this would facilitate a differentiated perspective on the great diversity in individuals' or sub-groups' identity formation (ibid.).

Likewise, anthropologists and ethnologists in Taiwan play a central role in shaping the common discourse on the indigenous population (Rudolph, 2003: 253-280). Their fieldwork and research provide data which can later be utilised by the Aborigines themselves, as well as by political and social decision makers.

The national research academy in Taiwan, Academia Sinica, deserves to be mentioned at this point, since it is the most important and influential research institution in Taiwan, widely renowned for its outstanding academic results and journal publications within sciences, humanities and social sciences. As such, it is an invaluable resource for many scholars, from Taiwan and overseas alike.

2 Theoretical framework

Within anthropology the question of identity is in various ways related to the question of boundaries, as it determines not only where boundaries are drawn, but also how persons and groups distinguish themselves from others, be it in terms of ethnicity, social relations or national perception. In this section I will therefore first outline the concept of ethnic identity and inter-group boundaries as defined by Barth (1969, 1996), followed by a section about Taylor's (1994) concept of multiculturalism. The starting point of the concept of multiculturalism is the coexistence of ethnically different groups, which, according to Taylor, enjoy the right of mutual recognition. Further, Anderson's (2006) notion of the nation-state as an *imagined community* may be helpful in understanding how the perception of national identities in Taiwan is influenced and shaped by processes occurring on the national level (the macro-level).

My aim is to use Barth's, Taylor's and Anderson's concepts and theories as the theoretical framework for this study, as they help shed some light on the multi-layered realities which define identity construction in present-day Taiwan, as a constantly ongoing process taking place simultaneously on different levels. On the basis of this framework I will try to find answers to questions such as: How has the emergence of a Taiwan identity been influential in the way that people in Taiwan, regardless of their ethnical background, perceive themselves as belonging to the same nation? What strategies and mechanisms are influential in this continuous process? How do people in Taiwan construct and maintain their ethnic identities under the given settings, which are characterised by multicultural realities?

2.1 The concept of ethnicity and boundaries

One of the central questions social sciences deal with is the study of ethnicity. It is a widely accepted principle that ethnicity is a universal property of humans which serves to make a systematic distinction between "we" and "the others". Barth (1969), in his seminal essay on ethnic groups and boundaries, applies a constructionist approach. Such an approach is rooted in the subject/object dichotomies and emphasises ethnicity as being something fluid and situational. Further, it refers to a continually ongoing process of social creation, where subjective experience influences how humans actively construct their realities (Barnard & Spencer, 1998: 192).

Following Barth's (1969) work, there have been a number of other scholars who have investigated ethnicity as a concept. Regardless of the kind of theoretical framework each of them used[24], what is common to them is that ethnic identities no longer are regarded as primordial[25] (Eriksen, 1993/1996).

According to Barth (1969; 1996), ethnicity is a matter of general and inclusive identity and depends on ascription and self-ascription. Further, ethnic groups are regarded as a form of social organisation. Barth proposes that the aspect of sharing a common culture, commonly regarded as a definitional feature of an ethnic group, rather should be seen as a result or an implication of the ethnic grouping itself (Barth 1969: 12-13). The conceptualisation of ethnicity by Barth can thus be helpful in understanding the current situation in Taiwan, as it pays special attention to the boundary mechanisms which are at work between different ethnic groups, which Barth often found to be the very foundations on which social systems are built (Barth, 1969: 10).

Taiwan's population of 23 million people consists of four different groups: The early settlers to the island the Hoklo and the Hakka, commonly known as Taiwanese[26], the Mandarin-speaking Chinese Mainlanders[27] who came to Taiwan during the late 1940s, and their offspring, as well as a number of different indigenous groups of Austronesian origin (*yuanzhumin*[28]), who were the very first inhabitants of the island[29]. These indigenous tribes (*mountain Aborigines*) have been able to retain their ethnicity during various periods of colonisation of Taiwan. The so-called *plains Aborigines*[30], also of Austronesian descent, have at an early juncture been assimilated into the group of Hoklo, by adopting their language and customs. They define themselves as Hoklo (Brown, 2010: 462).

Barth's model, as outlined in the following, appears to be advantageous for the analysis of ethnicity in Taiwan, as it can illuminate ethnic boundary mechanisms and intra-group interactions.

---

[24] Apart from Barth's constructionist view, other scholars have used different approaches when investigating the issue of ethnicity, such as structural-functionalist, (Cohen, 1974), social pychological (Epstein, 1978), social constructionist (Roosens, 1989) or historical (cf. Comaroff & Comaroff, 1992). (All authors cited in Eriksen, 1993/1996)

[25] Primordialists regard ethnicity as something essential and as a non-negotiable property which is connected to a person's bloodties, assumed at birth. Ethnicity is therefore based on deep and primordial attachments to a group or culture (Barnard & Spencer, 1998: 190).

[26] The Taiwanese comprise the Hoklo, who speak Taiwanese, a dialect of Fujianese and the Hakka who speak their own distinct dialect.

[27] Regardless of which parts of China the Mainlanders came from, or what regional dialects they spoke, they all used Mandarin Chinese as their common language.

[28] cf. section 3.2.2., *Taiwan's indigenous population*

[29] The current population ratio of the different ethnic groups is approximately: Hoklo: (70-73%), Hakka: (12-14%), Mainlanders and their offspring: (10-13%), Indigenous population (as of 2010 there are 14 recognised tribes, cf also footnote 8): (approximately 2%) (Brown, 2010: 461). The Hoklo, the Hakka and the Mainlanders are, strictly speaking, Han Chinese, (a total of 98% of Taiwan's population), whereas the indigenous groups are Malayo-Polynesians (Republic of China Yearbook 2010/People and Language: 33).

[30] The Aborigines were categorised by the Japanese during their colonial rule in two types of tribes, depending on their relationship to Han culture: the *cooked* (or 'civilised') Aborigines, who were living in the plains and had assimilated to the Hoklo identity; and the *raw* ('uncivilised') Aborigines or *mountain Aborigines* (Brown, 2004: 8-9)

Ethnic boundaries

In 1996, Barth evaluated his essay from 1969, which originally was built on corporate group theory and theories of Goffman. He summed up the specific parts of his initial approach to the concept of ethnicity which proved to be still valid. Barth confirms a) that ethnic groups, which are highly situational, are produced under certain historical, economic and political conditions; b) that ethnic group membership depends on how one sees oneself and how one is seen by others and c) that the cultural differences of principal significance are those with which boundaries are maintained (Barth, 1996: 12).

One of the earlier findings was that ethnic boundaries, although they were permeable, persisted, and that social relations were maintained despite ethnic distinctions. In other words, ethnic distinctions exist even where social interactions between ethnic groups occur. Another of Barth's findings was that social systems rather often were built on the basis of these inter-ethnic junctures (Barth, 1969: 9-10; 21).

Ethnic identity was considered a question of the social organisation of cultural difference. As such, Barth attributed more importance to the ethnic boundaries than to the "cultural stuff that it encloses" (ibid.: 15). In his follow-up essay from 1996, the concept of culture is definitively adapted to fit the contemporary theories.

> We now realise that global empirical variation in culture is continuous, it does not partition neatly into separable, integrated wholes. [...] These features arise from the very way in which culture is reproduced: though we learn it largely from others [...], it accumulates in each of us as a precipitate of our own experience. This is certainly true of our sense of identity: though we do not invent it ourselves, we can only develop it by acting in the world and interacting with others. So to grasp what a particular ethnic identity is about, the anthropologist must attend to the *experiences* through which it is formed - it is not enough, as one thought with a simpler concept of culture, to make a homogenising inventory of its manifestations (ibid.: 14, emphasis in original).

Here, Barth emphasises once more that culture is a complex and ever changing concept, in which the feature of ethnic identity is influenced and formed not only by experiences, but by social interactions with others as well. These experiences entail a constant reconstruction of one's identity. Barth suggests that the basis for ethnic identity may be found by observing the existing variation of culture of whole populations and by identifying processes that evoke cultural discontinuities (Barth, 1996: 15).

Ethnic identity

Ethnic identities are regarded as pragmatic choices or even calculated constructions, which may be considered only within their social or political context. Likewise, they are built on the feeling and understanding of sameness within the group, a sense of sharing similar beliefs and attitudes. It is therefore not

only a question of looking at individuals, but at members of groups as well. Central institutions in an ethnic group may also take part in the boundary maintenance by setting internal processes into motion (ibid.: 18).

If one considers the micro level, namely the family unit where the identity formation actually takes place, it is possible to say that due to the experiences individuals of different generations make, it is likely that both the boundaries and the content of a certain ethnic identity may be challenged. This is a possible modern day scenario whenever new circumstances arise, such as migration, refugee flows or nation-building, which involve a close encounter of different ethnicities. Events which take place on the median level, i.e. in the field of rhetoric and ideology, and on the macro level, i.e. within state politics, are likely to affect ongoing individual and social processes taking place on the micro level (ibid.: 21-23).

In the setting of a modern state, however, the picture becomes a more complex one. A centrally governed state, as an actor on the national and international arena, exerts power by regulations and control, imposing constraints on its (ethnic) subjects, thus defining the field of politics and initiating cultural processes (ibid.: 19-20).

2.2   The concept of multiculturalism and equal recognition

Considering that one of the key issues in anthropology is the dichotomy between "oneself" and "the other(s)", identity in the anthropological sense is usually understood as *ethnic* identity. It has to do with how others, based on distinct features, categorise a person as member of a group, or how the person identifies himself as a member of such a group. The anthropological use of the term 'identity' may refer both to the uniqueness of an individual, and to a property of a group sharing sameness "in that persons may associate themselves, or be associated by others, with groups or categories on the basis of some salient common feature" (Barnard & Spencer, 1998: 292). Therefore, the term *identity* is frequently applied to families, nations, groups and other communities.

Taylor (1994: 31-33), in describing plural and multicultural states, stresses that a person's identity is shaped in relation with others and is therefore socially defined. By means of social interaction, one is able to learn something about one's own identity, and in the reflection of oneself against others' expectations and social recognition, the personal identity takes form. The dialogue with, and the recognition by, others become significant for the socially derived identity (ibid.: 34). This idea, which considers both the coexistence of different ethnical groups and their mutual recognition, becomes important also in the case of Taiwan. Here, several groups with distinct characteristics in terms of culture and ethnic background have lived next to each other ever since the first migrants from the

Chinese mainland moved to the island during the sixteenth century, where they encountered various indigenous groups who had already been living there for several thousands of years[31]. Taylor's concept of multiculturalism as politics of equal recognition is therefore helpful in understanding the present situation in Taiwan, especially with regard to the emergent endeavours for recognition by Taiwan's Aborigines on a national arena. Politics of equal recognition also come into play in simultaneously ongoing efforts by others, such as for example the Hakka, in positioning themselves in this mosaic-like net of relations.

Taylor's (ibid.: 26, 29-32) main point is that one owes all human cultures with a duration as a society over some length of time the recognition of their culture and the acknowledgement of their worth. Based on modern liberalism, which rests solidly on philosophical thoughts by Augustine, Rousseau, Hegel, Herder and Kant, Taylor contends that wherever there is a lack of recognition of anyone's culture, this poses serious harm to both the individual and the group represented by that culture (ibid.: 37, 64-68, 71). This, he observes, is one of the problems of the politics of multiculturalism of equal recognition.

Taylor's essay has received wide attention and many comments. Baumann (1999), for instance, questions, in some parts critically, Taylor's concept of multiculturalism. Baumann's main critique lies in his claim that Taylor's concept of culture is too narrow, insofar as it treats culture as "if it were the same as society" and cultural identities, as if they were fixed entities (Baumann, 1999: 115, 118). One may bear in mind that a multicultural society consists of "an elastic web of crosscutting and always mutually situational, identifications" (ibid: 118). This fits neatly with Barth's concept of ethnicity and applies to Taiwan society. In a multicultural and poly-ethnic society such as Taiwan, rituals of various kinds[32] sometimes serve as the arena on which identities are displayed and at the same time asserted.

Appiah, in his (1994) essay, written as a comment on Taylor's article, notes that Taylor mainly discusses the recognition of collective social identities, of which ethnicity is but one amongst others, such as gender, religion, sexuality and race. According to Appiah, identity has two dimensions - the individual and the collective (Appiah, 1994: 150-152). Recognition, although it should be about acknowledging individuals and their identities, is often discussed in terms of the recognition of groups (ibid.: 149). Appiah emphasises that a person's identity, in addition to being shaped through dialogue, is also displayed as concepts and practices via the surrounding social environment, such as family, school, religion and society (ibid.: 154). Everyone's life has a certain narrative, which in turn fits into a larger picture of the narrative of one's ethnic group or into the narrative of one's national identity (ibid.: 160). This may be clearly seen in the case of Taiwan, where the national identity is consciously reinforced by national narratives such as historical textbooks, politics and official rhetoric. It remains to be seen to what extent the construction and recognition of collective identities, which Taylor

---

[31] cf. section 1.3., *Historical background.*
[32] For an in-depth analysis Rudolph (2008) may serve as an example.

favours, does not actually turn into a question of compulsion, as Appiah cautiously assumes to be possible (ibid.: 162-163).

2.3 The nation-state, nationalism and imagined communities

How to define a nation
One of the most influential concepts of the nation is the one drawn by Anderson (2006) of an imagined political community. According to his definition the nation is imagined as *limited*, i.e. having finite, if elastic, boundaries. It is imagined as *sovereign*, as the concept came about during the age of Enlightenment, when the idea of a universal religious or dynastic community was discarded, and as a *community*, as it is conceived by all of its members as a "deep horizontal comradeship" (Anderson, 2006: 6-7). His modernist view of the nation clearly departs from a primordial notion. Different actors of diverse cultural backgrounds are enveloped by this abstract, imagined community, which binds them together along a timeline, by their imagination and perception of being part of the same community. The actors within this imagined community, though unaware of each other, still feel somehow connected. The state, by using institutions of power[33] and arguments of historicism, creates a sense of community among its subjects. As for Taiwan, this process of nation-building is visible in the construction of the imagined community of a Taiwan which encompasses all of the distinct groups living within the boundaries of its territory. Anderson takes the view that nothing has been more vital for the rise of the nation-state than the development of the print-media, which "made it possible for growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways" (ibid.: 36, 182). It can certainly be argued that, especially since the introduction of visual and digital media next to the traditional print media, these platforms have been exploited to the fullest extent in the course of modern nation-building, Taiwan being no exception in this respect.

When defining a nation, Gellner (1983) adds another, equally important, aspect by pointing out that it is only under given social circumstances that the kind of unity develops with which everyone "willingly and ardently" identifies. The situation in which this occurs is when *all* of the populations, and not only some elite minorities, create homogeneous, centrally sustained high (i.e. literate) cultures. Further, he contends that nationalism creates nations and not the other way round (ibid.: 55). The state becomes the political frame of a nation which is understood as a natural social unit (ibid.: 143).

Nationalism, then, as a political movement, is usually started by the political elite which aims to disseminate its ideology among the population. Quite often,

---

[33] cf. section 3.1.3., *Institutions of power*

during this process and in order to succeed, collective memories, historical events or other national narratives are invented or rewritten. For a long time, in post-war Taiwan, this elite was made up by the KMT, led and constituted by Mainlanders. When the Taiwanese, as members of the DPP, came to political power during the last decade, a different picture in terms of nationalism emerged. However, both KMT and DPP applied similar methods and political strategies in their respective endeavours to build a nation (ibid.: 56).

Gellner suggests that, although the connection between communication and nationalism seems to benefit from print media, it is not so much the word, i.e. *what* is said, which is the most important. Rather, it is "the language and style of the transmissions" which tells us more about who is part of the community and who is not, as it presupposes that there is someone who understands *the mode* in which it is expressed (ibid.: 126-127).

3   Analysis - Identity discourses in Taiwan

This section will begin with a brief introduction to the processes immediately after World War II, processes which are relevant and significant for the subsequent developments as related to the emergence of a Taiwan identity. Then I will look more closely at the way in which the salient Taiwan identity, especially during the 1980s, but more clearly from the 1990s onwards, has had an impact on the manner in which different groups of people perceive their own identity, with regard to both ethnicity and nationality.

I will show that despite an existing interrelatedness between people's ethnic, cultural and national identities, a predefined overall structure doesn't appear to be a necessity, but rather, that there seems to be some space for individual choices.

3.1   Nation-building and national identity

Late 1940s - 1970s
During the early decades following the Second World War, the ruling KMT regarded Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the Republic of China, as established in 1911 on the mainland[34]. The nationalist government's main efforts directly after the relocation to Taiwan were to erase any possible traces left by war-time enemy Japan. The aim was to evoke a Chinese identity and a sense of cultural loyalty towards China[35] amongst the Taiwanese local population.

A broad campaign of Sinicisation started with the introduction of Mandarin Chinese as the official language, and a re-writing of Taiwan's history[36]. Identity issues during this period related to propagating loyalty towards a nationalist mainland China, which included an intense socialisation of the public, through curriculum changes, media and literature (Wachman, 1994a: 119). Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwanese people had practically no way of expressing their own identity freely, for example, the use of the Taiwanese language in schools or in public was prohibited as a punishable offence, Taiwanese folk arts were treated with contempt by the influential elite, whereas

---

[34] The Republic of China was established after the overthrow of the Qing empire in 1911.
[35] i.e. China before the founding of the PRC by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.
[36] During this time, influential positions within government and administration were only accessible to Mainlanders and not to local Taiwanese (Brown, 2010: 468).

Chinese culture was regarded as sophisticated (Chang, 2004: 34). In other contexts, they were equally disproportionally disadvantaged, as the Taiwanese, who in fact constituted a majority of Taiwan's population, didn't have access to any influential posts within politics, education or administration. Any calls for reforms and more local autonomy by the Taiwanese (Hoklo and Hakka) during this period were violently suppressed[37] by the authoritarian KMT government, which led to open conflicts and the formation of a distinct boundary perception between local Taiwanese (*Benshengren*) and the Mainlanders (*Waishengren*) (Chun, 2009: 341; Brown, 2010: 468).

3.1.1 Taiwanisation (*bentuhua)* - Shifts in national discourses

1980s - 1990s
The subsequent dramatic economic development of the 1960s and 1970s, however, led to a situation in which mainly the Taiwanese businessmen, formerly disadvantaged by society, benefitted from the country's rapid economic development. Taiwan's simultaneously increasing isolation in international politics during the 1970s[38] resulted in the government's introduction of a number of policies promoting democracy[39].

This induced a paradigm shift in national discourse from an accentuation of Taiwan's Chinese past, towards a more pronounced Taiwanisation[40] or Indigenisation, a process which extended over both the political and the cultural realm[41].

In the course of the Taiwanisation process, local Taiwanese people demanded to be granted equal civil and political rights as those conceded to the Mainlanders. Built on the basis of a collective Taiwanese memory and identity construction, the foundation was laid for the subsequent overarching nation-building project (Makeham & Hsiau, 2005: 262). The dynamics behind the Taiwanisation process were initially based on perceptions of ethnic inequalities between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, but later came to be seen by many as a form of resistance towards possible claims of an internationally more powerful China (ibid.: 263).

The notion of Taiwan as an imagined community is closely linked with former president Lee Teng-hui's efforts to evoke a sense of belonging amongst all of the

---

[37] This was the so called period of *White terror*, see also section 1.3., *Historical background.*
[38] Due to the fact that Taiwan lost its seat at the UN to the People's Republic of China in 1971, internationally, it became increasingly diplomatically isolated.
[39] Several social movements, such as labour, women's, environmental or indigenous movements sprang up in Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s (Rubinstein, 1994; Hsiao 1990).
[40] I prefer the English translation *Taiwanisation* over *Indigenisation*, as it is less confusing than the latter. Both refer to the Chinese term *bentuhua* 本土化. The Chinese term implies no connotations with regard to the indigenous population of Taiwan, whereas the translation as "Indigenisation" confusingly might convey such an impression (Makeham & Hsiau, 2005: 11). Other translations possible are *Nativisation* or *Localisation* (ibid.: 18)
[41] For an elaborate analysis of the political events in post-war Taiwan until the early 1990s, cf. Wachman (1994a)

citizens of Taiwan, by drawing on the image of a *New Taiwanese*[42] identity. Evidently, people in Taiwan distinguish between a cultural and a national identity, as different surveys and sociological empirical research on the question of self-identification suggest. By self-ascription, apart from statements of "Taiwanese" or "Chinese", dual identity classifications are possible, such as "Taiwanese and Chinese, too" or "Chinese and Taiwanese, too".

Contrary to expectations[43], the outcome of a survey[44] (Li, 2003) among 720 people in Taiwan concerning the issue of identity, showed an interesting pattern. The categories one could choose from were: pure Taiwanese; pure Chinese; Taiwanese/Chinese; Chinese/Taiwanese; "New Taiwanese"[45] and general Chinese (*han ren*), the latter meaning people of Chinese descent who already have become citizens of other, non-Chinese, countries (ibid.: 231). The answers of the survey's respondents were as follows: 28.7% chose the category Taiwanese, Chinese identities amounted to 11.9%. 39,2% defined themselves as Taiwanese/Chinese, whereas 11.0% defined themselves as Chinese/Taiwanese, New Taiwanese amounted to 7.3% of participants and only 1.9% chose general Chinese (ibid.: 233). Naturally, when it comes to quantitative research methodology, such as surveys and questionnaires, one always has to bear in mind that the wording or the way questions are put could influence the answers.

That said, an overall trend still is recognisable, as the following chart by the National Cheng Chi University in Taiwan shows. It covers a time period of nearly two decades (from 1992 to 2010). In the latest results from 2010, the group of people who defined themselves as either Taiwanese or having a dual identity (Taiwanese/Chinese or vice versa) amounted to 52,6% and 39,9% respectively, whereas only 3,7% considered themselves as Chinese only. This suggests a strong identification with Taiwan by a majority of people.

---

[42] Originally, this had been a concept of the opposition party DPP from the early 1990s. The KMT, under Lee, were quick at that time to recognise it as a concept which would gain them a broad support by voters, which is why it was adopted and promoted in several election campaigns (Kaeding, 2009: 24) in order to create a "community of destiny" (Wang, 2004: 307).
[43] One could have expected that most people would either have chosen Taiwanese or Chinese as a self-ascripted identity category along dichotomised lines.
[44] This survey, naturally, is but one example out of a number of similar surveys conducted.
[45] *New Taiwanese* is a category created by politicians for people who identify with Taiwan, regardless the point of time of their ancestors' immigration to Taiwan, and it excludes Chinese in mainland China as in-group members (Li, 2003: 231).

Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992～2010.12)

Sources: *Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., Important political attitude trend distribution.* Taiwanese / Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06~2010/12) (http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm).

In the context of identity debates and party politics, it was widely held that Mainlanders would take up a stance for unification with the Chinese mainland, and Taiwanese are assumed to be pro-independence[46]. As the following chart shows, neither are hastily made conclusions necessarily true, nor is it possible to directly make a connection between people's ethnic identity and their opinion on these matters, as there are many more complexities involved than simple dichotomies would have one believe[47].

---

[46] Pro-independence proponents favour international recognition for Taiwan as a sovereign state.
[47] Given the ratio for Taiwanese or Mainlanders (cf. footnote 29) the figures aren't congruent with the figures of pro-independence or pro-unification respondents of the survey.

Changes in the Unification - Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU（1994～2010.12）

Legend:
- Unification as soon as possible
- Maintain status quo indefinitely
- Non response
- Maintain status quo, move toward unification
- Maintain status quo, move toward independence
- Maintain status quo, decide at later date
- Independence as soon as possible

Sources: *Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., Important political attitude trend distribution. Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1994~2010/12)* (http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm).

3.1.2 Curriculum changes as identity politics

As Anderson (2006: 182) points out, schoolbooks, postcards, general "logoization" and all forms of print capitalism, are ways to establish the idea of the nation. In this respect, history schoolbooks play an important role in developing people's perception of a shared past and a common future. Thus, identities, both national and ethnic, can be shaped and systems of knowledge created (Korostelina, 2008).

In 1997, as part of its ongoing efforts towards putting more of Taiwan's own cultural heritage in the centre and moving away from the formerly China-centred historiography, a reform of the history and geography junior high school textbooks under the name of "Getting to know Taiwan" (*Renshi Taiwan*) was conducted in Taiwan[48]. As Corcuff (2005) describes, this was also a way in which

---

[48] This was introduced during Lee Teng-hui's (KMT) presidency.

it was possible to reinforce notions of what was distinct about Taiwan's national identity. These changes in history curriculum had several important goals, such as separating political ideology from educational content and re-evaluating the period of Japanese colonial rule, which until then had only highlighted the negative aspects of that era. In addition, it also presented a possibility to emphasise the plurality and ethnic diversity of Taiwan (ibid.: 134). After initial debates and controversies about some of the wording, the new textbooks were finally introduced with subsequent slight modifications. History education thus became crucially important in the nation's endeavour to show that the plurality of Taiwan implied that to have strong sentiments of affiliation towards Taiwan didn't automatically mean to reject one's Chinese cultural identity, but that a plurality of identities was possible (ibid.: 156). Corcuff assesses that this Taiwanese consciousness naturally didn't evolve all of a sudden, but rather should be seen as part of a maturation process of a Taiwan identity, which was closely linked to experiences made thanks to the democratisation process of the previous years[49].

If one understands national identity only in terms of a political ideology, and doesn't take into account the significant meanings many attribute to their nationalistic position, then one overlooks the fact that people form their identity also in terms of narrations about themselves. This is pointed out by Chang (2003: 24). He argues that a Taiwan identity emerged as early as the 1920s, but that it has matured and fully come to bearing only from the 1980s onwards (ibid.: 25).

3.1.3 Institutions of power

Anderson (2006: 163-186) identifies three institutions of power which help the state to create its imagined communities: the census, the map and the museum. Colonial states used the census in particular to create ethnic-racial classifications, and, more importantly, to systematically quantify people (ibid.: 168).

The census
During the fifty years of its colonial rule in Taiwan, the Japanese administration made systematic use of the census and maps, established schools and communication networks, and effectively erected "supra-tribal governmental structures" in its efforts to unify different socio-cultural groups, in the sense in which Anderson (ibid.: 177) describes the use of these instruments. The Japanese administration made use of the census and classified the Taiwan Aborigines into nine or ten different tribes, a classification which has been extended only during the last decade[50]. The system of taxation and land tenure was linked to the ethnic group one belonged to (Brown, 2010: 465). Aborigines were disadvantaged on grounds of this system, as their land rights were erased (ibid.). Much later, when

---

[49] See also Chang (2004)
[50] There exist 14 recognised indigenous tribes in Taiwan today, five of which only received their legal status during the years 2000 - 2008 (Simon, 2010: 728).

the indigenous movement took hold during the 1980s and 1990s[51], the Aborigines fought for several rights, some of which they hadn't been granted before for the historical reasons just mentioned. Due to census regulations during the authoritarian era, for instance, indigenous people were given Chinese patronyms, which exclusively were stated on their identification cards, i.e. their individual ethnic names were not displayed. In their quest for identity[52] they demanded the right to use their individual, ethnic names and that discriminating rules regarding census categorisation should be abolished. The following is an example of such a rule: In the case of intermarriage between a Taiwanese man and an aboriginal woman, the wife and any children would automatically become Taiwanese and lose their aboriginal identity. If an aboriginal man married a Taiwanese woman, the wife would retain her Taiwanese status, their children would be Aborigines by default, but might become Taiwanese upon the parents' wishes (Cauquelin, 2004: 230).

The *map*

Governments, regardless of whether colonial or modern, commonly utilise these "institutions of power". After the opposition party DPP had won the presidential elections in 2000, and the following two terms of office during which they remained in power, the Taiwanisation process, which had been initiated earlier, during Lee Teng-hui's (KMT) presidency, gained momentum. One of several projects to promote Taiwan subjectivity (*Taiwan zhutixing*) that the state administration initiated, was "remapping Taiwan" (Chang, 2004: 41). In 2003, two new series of maps of Taiwan were launched, which questioned the prevalent way of viewing Taiwan. The first series (seven new maps) presented the ethnic, oceanic, cultural and linguistic dimensions of Taiwan. The second series were old, historical maps from Taiwan's former colonial past (ibid.). In these maps Taiwan was placed in the centre instead of at the periphery of mainland China and international relations were re-assessed in an effort to assert a distinct identity.

The museum

Museums and museumising imagination, as Anderson (2006: 178) notices, are "profoundly political". This applies to Taiwan rather well, as Vickers (2009) observes.

Museums in Taiwan are a platform on which political and nationalistic tendencies are reified, as museums play a role in political and social discourses (Vickers, 2009: 73). In displaying either *Chineseness*[53] or a multicultural

---

[51] See also section 3.2.2., *Taiwan's indigenous population*

[52] This claim has been successful and Aborigines are now granted the right to add their ethnic names on identification cards (Cauquelin, 2004: 232).

[53] e.g. Taipei's National Palace Museum which displays some of the finest collections of Chinese cultural artefacts. The importance of the museum for the government is reflected in the fact that the director of the museum had the status of a cabinet minister (Vickers, 2009: 77).

Taiwan[54], they shape, and are part of, identity politics (ibid.). Museums are of symbolic significance and sometimes intended to evoke in the visitor strong sentiments of belonging by showcasing the nation's cultural heritage (ibid.: 77). Both public and private museums displaying Taiwanese culture and arts have actively contributed in furthering the *bentuhua* movement in Taiwan (ibid.: 78). Some museums, however, such as the National Museum for History, for example, have been subjected, behind the scenes, to intense political schemes between the different political camps, as Vickers (ibid.: 79-83) notes. Lately, different tribal museums, established by indigenous groups, have also shaped discourses in politics and society, in both visible and subtle ways (ibid.: 90-91). During the course of Taiwanisation a museum devoted to the 2-28 incident[55] (Kaeding, 2009: 25) was opened, which indicates a political intent of coming to terms with the past.

In this context it is important to note that museum exhibitions sometimes are primordialist in character and that the display, as well as any omission of historical events, contributes greatly to the process of national identity building (Vickers, 2009: 87-88).

3.2   Multiculturalism in Taiwan

3.2.1   Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism (*duoyuan zhuyi*) in Taiwan recognises ethnic diversity and stands firmly on pluralistic grounds. It has been adopted as a national policy[56], and been used in support of the creation of a national identity, and is thus mainly concerned with the equal recognition of ethnic differences and identities. Based on a strong conviction about Taiwan as a civil society[57] and the idea of the "Four Ethnic Groups" in Taiwan (i.e. Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders and Aborigines), multiculturalism has become an important principle, pursued regardless of party lines (Wang, 2004: 305). According to Wang (ibid.: 305-306), multiculturalism was initially understood as a hierarchical or concentrical system of different cultures, but later has come to resemble more of a "mosaic" model of equally

---

[54] e.g. Shung Ye-Museum of Formosan Aborigines, strategically located just opposite the National Palace Museum in Taipei.
[55] President Lee Teng-hui's public apology for the 2-28 incident was of a highly symbolic significance for the Taiwanese population (Kaeding, 2009: 24).
[56] Multiculturalism was acknowledged in 2001 by the DPP government as a "national policy" (Wang, 2004: 301).
[57] In an interesting article, Schak (2009), analyses Taiwan's development towards a civil society.

recognised ethnic groups[58]. In an effort to distance itself from an exclusively Chinese identity, Taiwan made use of multiculturalism in common discourse. For example, the indigenisation curriculum, introduced in the early 1990s, emphasised cultural diversity. Initially, the school materials were criticised for most prominently promoting Hoklo culture. This could have led to conflicts between the ethnic groups or to inter-group boundaries becoming more opaque. Therefore, multiculturalism was made the all-encompassing concept, which highlighted cultural difference (Mao, 2008: 591).

Hakka and Aborigines, with their distinct cultures, frequently serve as reference for the multicultural status of Taiwan. Consequently, aboriginal dance and music performances are often used in national contexts in order to substantiate the multicultural picture of Taiwan. The notion of "community" is symbolically enforced, for instance in rituals with the participation of indigenous groups (Simon, 2010: 734). Other examples include when in 2002 then-president Chen Shui-bian assigned A-mei, an indigenous female singer to perform the national anthem in a public flag-raising ritual (Ku, 2005: 115); when high-ranking politicians speak Taiwanese in public (Brown, 2010: 463) or when the current KMT president Ma Ying-jeou accentuates his "Taiwaneseness" in order to gain confidence and support among the voters (Kaeding, 2009: 20).

It may be concluded that, contrary to Anderson's (2006) idea that a nation consists of an imagined homogeneous socio-cultural community, in the case of Taiwan, multi-cultural realities not only are recognised within the realm of the nation but also made use of in the process of creating an imagined community, characterised by cohesion.

3.2.2 Taiwan's indigenous population[59]

After a period of predominantly dichotomised discourse about Chinese versus Taiwanese identity, the overall debate in both politics and academia since the 1980s and 1990s has been extended insofar as it came to include Taiwan's aboriginal population[60] and their gradually intensifying claims for recognition. Based on constitutional amendments in the early 1990s, the Aborigines were granted rights of self-determination and rights of political participation (Stainton, 1999: 429-430). The establishment in 1996 of the Council of Indigenous Peoples (*yuanzhuminzu weiyuanhui*)[61], in charge of indigenous cultural matters, is

---

[58] In the understanding of DPP president Chen Shui-bian (presidency 2000-2008), apart from the four ethnic groups, other cultural groups, such as Western culture or the culture of South-eastern Asian immigrants in Taiwan was also included (Wang, 2004: 305).
[59] For the scope of this paper the *yuanzhumin* will be considered as one group, albeit not a homogeneous one. Without question they consist of different ethnic groups, with distinctive traits.
[60] Taiwan's indigenous population is similar in demographics and status to Canada's *First Nations* and Australia's *Aborigines*.
[61] It is also known as the *Committee of Aboriginal Affairs* (Wang, 2004: 305)

commonly seen as a first step by the state administration to incorporate the indigenous population into the national framework (Rudolph, 2003: 99; 152).

Multiculturalism in Taiwan entailed further that individual groups, such as Hakka or indigenous groups, were able to actively participate in the common discourse and legitimise their demands for rights. As Taylor (1994: 38) put it: multiculturalism is about "politics of difference", in other words equal recognition also means special rights for groups which previously lacked recognition. Before multiculturalism became a political value, however, due to the assimilation policy of the state administration of that time, the indigenous population in Taiwan had consistently been denied recognition, and was considered to be part of the Chinese culture (Wang, 2004: 306; Rudolph, 2003: 79).

From the 1980s on, several aboriginal movements were established[62], whose main objective was to promote indigenous people's rights. The first movement which emerged was the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA). Ku (2005: 103) contends that this can be seen as part of a larger oppositional movement, which had started in the 1970s. Initially, with support from church organisations[63] and other oppositional groups, the movement's representatives looked for a name for their new organisation. Eventually they decided to refer to themselves as *yuanzhumin*[64] (original dwellers), which affirmed both their status as original inhabitants and simultaneously expressed their objection to the official name then in use, *shandi tongbao*[65] (mountain compatriot) (ibid.). Rudolph (2003: 48) argues that this movement in fact is to be seen as an identity movement as it combines both cultural-ethnic, nationalist, religious and civil rights interests. Apart from the ATA, there were also other groups[66] participating in the indigenous movement in the early 1980s.

It is an important point that this early social movement was pan-ethnic in character (Rudolph, 2003: 82). The formerly existing ethnic boundaries between the different tribes proved to be permeable in the Barthian sense, as members of distinct indigenous tribes jointly identified as *yuanzhumin* (i.e. members of all of

---

[62] Indigenous elites, mainly young university educated activists, played a vital role in the struggle for recognition of the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, both in disseminating information in society about the *yuanzhumin's* obvious lack of rights for self-determination and in the organisation of demonstrations, petitions and other ways of getting attention from policymakers (Rudolph, 2003: 83-86).

[63] e.g. the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan (PCT) provided *yuanzhumin* with both means and possibilities to establish social movements, whose main objective was to improve the Aborigines' situation. For an elaborate discussion on the influence of the PCT, the opposition party and Taiwan's ethnologists with respect to the emergence of political movements of the Indigenous groups, see Rudolph (2003). Many Aborigines in Taiwan had converted to Christianity after 1947, a period when foreign missionaries in increasing numbers arrived on the island. One possible explanation for this is that the church presented them with the possibility to enhance their self-esteem, since they were treated as equals by the church community (Rubinstein 1991, cited in: Rudolph, 2003: 125).

[64] Later this term was expanded to *yuanzhu minzu* ("original ethnic group").

[65] Often abbreviated as *shanbao*.

[66] Hsieh (1994: 409) mentions the magazine *Mountain Blue* (*gaoshanqing*, this is sometimes translated as "Mountain Green", cf. for example Ku, 2005: 102) and *the Committee of Minority of the Conference of Editing among Non-KMT Writers* (sic).

the nine or ten recognised tribes of that time were participating in the movement, pursuing the same goals (Hsieh, 1994: 409)). Initially, the ATA-movement was mostly concerned with individual rights, but gradually shifted focus towards collective rights.

Indigenous tribes in Taiwan appear to identify mainly with their local small communities, but it is apparent that they identify with Taiwan on a national level as well (Simon, 2010: 728). Additionally, many of them have come to accept and adopt a *yuanzhumin* identity. The consciousness of belonging to an indigenous group thus "overrides" one's own ethnic identity, i.e. that of the individual tribe. The recognition which indigenous groups receive from within society, the process of Taiwanisation and, in particular, the success of the indigenous people's movement of the 1990s, seem to have yielded a sense of stronger ethnic self-esteem[67] (Hsieh, 1994: 415). This recognition, while still being under negotiation, further implies that indigenous groups are no longer regarded as backward mountain people, but as worthy participants within an encompassing national discourse (Simon, 2007: 239).

Indigenous culture, such as music and dance, has been successfully incorporated into Taiwan's multiculturalism, as Wilson (2009: 422) points out by citing musicologist Nancy Guy. Song lyrics in Taiwan's different languages Hakka, Taiwanese, Mandarin Chinese and Aboriginal languages, have successfully contributed to Taiwan's multicultural image. Wilson mentions also the case of a song, performed by the European Pop group Enigma at the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics. Enigma had appropriated some lyrics and the melody of an aboriginal performer Difang Duana (Chinese name: Kuo Ying-nan) of the Amis tribe in Taiwan, and used them in their world-wide hit *Return to innocence*. The outrage this violation of aboriginal property rights sparked in Taiwan ran across ethnic boundaries, as Aboriginals, Hoklo, Hakka and Mainlanders were united in their criticism of Enigma's performance, which was seen as a direct assault on Taiwan as a national unity (ibid.).

3.2.3 Brief comments on Hakka discourse

The recent efforts of Hakka people for recognition as a distinct sub-ethnic group is a question for research in its own right, and therefore will not be elaborated any further at this point other than just in some brief remarks.

---

[67] e.g. for a long time, the image of Aborigines in school textbooks was stigmatising and disdainful. In the Wu-feng legend, which could be found in schoolbooks, Aborigines were depicted as savages and head-hunting barbarians in contrast to the civilised and sophisticated Chinese. The legend, which had been part of history schoolbooks in Taiwan since the Japanese era, tells the story of Wu-feng, a Han Chinese Confucian scholar, who had devoted his life to "civilising" aboriginal savages, but in return is killed by aboriginal head-hunters instead, thus dying a heroic death. This legend is seen by some to have been one of the main reasons for the inferiority feelings of Aborigines. The removal of the Wu-feng legend from textbooks in 1988 was one of several successes which the indigenous movement attained and which subsequently contributed to bolster the self-esteem of Aborigines (Rudolph, 2003: 125-127).

Within the discourse of multiculturalism, in which the government has appropriated the Hakka discourse as one part of the essential evidence of Taiwan's multicultural composition, the Hakka themselves have simultaneously been pursuing their own endeavours of recognition within the nation. In the past, no distinction was made between Hakka and Hoklo, who were jointly categorised as *Taiwanese*. Traditionally, ethnic boundaries were drawn between *Benshengren* and *Waishengren*, as well as between Han Chinese and the Indigenous population.

Based on their particular historical situation[68], however, the Hakka have always been a distinct population group with their own language, customs and traditions.

It should be noted that the Hakka during the late 1980s actively advocated the preservation of their mother tongue (Rudolph, 2003: 135). The overall language discourse has been reflected in the fact that, apart from the introduction of native language tuition in schools (Republic of China Yearbook 2010/Education: 222), TV channels and radio programmes in Hakka (as well as in Taiwanese and indigenous languages) have been introduced. Equally, in Taipei's subway announcements are nowadays made in Mandarin, Taiwanese, Hakka and English.

With the founding of the Council of Hakka Affairs, a cabinet-level institution under the Executive Yuan[69] in the year 2001 and the establishment of several Hakka colleges and research centers throughout Taiwan, research on the Hakka has constantly been on the increase (cf. Wilson, 2009; Lin, 2007; Chuang, 2010). Promotion of Hakka culture and history, as well as of activities involving Hakka customs and traditions, has become more evident.

3.3   Ethnic boundaries - maintenance and blurring

According to Barth, ethnic boundaries are drawn as a consequence of cultural differences between "insiders" and "outsiders" and the interaction that takes place between the different groups not only is decisive for the maintenance of these boundaries, but also appears to be the basis for them. That implies that there is a certain understanding of cultural sharedness within the group, and the identification is a matter of both the individual and the group.

By Chinese tradition, people's ethnic identity was determined according to their patrilineal descent and their place of origin, i.e. for a long time this was either the Chinese mainland or Taiwan (Wachman, 1994b: 23; Yang & Chang, 2010: 112; Wang, 2005). This system gradually became obsolete, as it lacked

---

[68] Researchers are still uncertain where the Hakka originally came from. Some scholars suggest that it was Northern China and it is assumed that the Hakka have migrated southwards in several moves. Due to recurring experiences based on their status as immigrants and the maintenance of a strong tradition of family narration, they were able to develop a strong ethnic identity (Wang, 2004: 307).

[69] The Executive Yuan is the executive branch of the government of the ROC.

accuracy, and in the early 1990s patrilineal descent and place of origin finally stopped being recorded in a person's identity card (Wachman, 1994a: 57; Li, 2003: 233). However, the ethnic identity of Taiwan's indigenous population is recorded in their ID cards (Simon, 2010: 727), as this gives them access to some affirmative action policies in education and employment (ibid.; Rudolph, 2003: 80).

Brown (2010: 462-464), following Barth's (1969, 1996) analysis of ethnic identity formation, argues that in addition to shared cultural traditions and ancestry, (which admittedly are important, but not the most determinant factors for the construction of one's identity), social interaction and experience between individuals or groups also play important roles. Social experiences are not absolute, they may be influenced and shaped by political, economical or historical factors. In this respect the government has both the power and the means to influence people's self-perception (Brown, 2010: 459). This argument is supported by the example of the plains Aborigines in Taiwan, who ethnically became Hoklo, not primarily by sharing the Hoklo's cultural customs and traditions, but rather when the Hoklo and plains Aborigines came to share the same social experiences due to colonial development during the early 20th century[70] (ibid.).

Intermarriage between Mainlanders and Taiwanese became common during the second half of the last century, thus blurring ethnic boundaries between these two groups. The most distinct ethnic boundaries still existing today are between *yuanzhumin* and Hoklo. These boundaries are manifested in deepgrown antipathies between these ethnic groups, expressed for example in pejorative denominations for the Hoklo by different tribes (Simon, 2010: 727) and vice versa, as for example the invective used by Taiwanese for Aborigines, *hoanna*, which denotes "uncivilised", "barbarian" (Ku, 2005: 117). Hsieh (1994: 408) notes that the ethnic identity of Taiwan's Aborigines initially had been a positively connotated consciousness. However, due to the contact with Han migrants, their ethnic identity had been transformed towards a more stigmatised[71] identity.

Further, ethnic boundaries have also been blurred through cultural, economic and military contacts between the mountain tribes and the early settlers to the island (Rubinstein, 1994: 355). Frequent intermarriages have led to ethnic crossings (Simon, 2010: 727).

In Taiwan, until the 1980s, no ethnic classificatory distinction was made between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, as both groups are Han people. However, they do have their own distinct dialects, as well as different customs and traditions. Due to these kinds of ethnic markers, and given the specific historical

---

[70] For example, the Japanese colonial rulers abolished the Chinese custom of women's foot binding in 1915, which traditionally had been practiced by the Hoklo. After a restructuring of taxation regulations, the Hoklo, the Hakka and the Plains Aborigines were subjected to equal taxation. Therefore it became more advantageous for plains Aborigines to adopt a Hoklo identity.
Distinction continued to be made between Taiwanese, Japanese and mountain Aborigines (Brown, 2010: 464-465)
[71] As a reason for this, Hsieh (1994: 408) mentions that Aborigines were subjected to "hostile staring", "name calling", "enduring rejection [by others]" resulting in Aborigines "negating themselves".

and social circumstances in Taiwan, it became apparent that based on the notion of the "four great ethnic groups" (*si da zuqun*) [72] people started to perceive themselves as being distinct ethnical groups [73] (Chun, 2009: 341-342; Makeham & Hsiau, 2005: 5).

The dichotomy of "We" and "They" between Taiwanese and Chinese has manifested itself for a long time in politics, and one's party affiliation was closely connected to whether one belonged to the in-group (Taiwanese - DPP/the opposition party) or the out-group (Mainlanders - KMT/the Nationalist Party) (Wachman, 1994a: 58-60). Nowadays, however, some of these ethnic boundaries are no longer maintained, as many Taiwanese are party members of the KMT, for instance (Wachman, 1994b: 24). Likewise, there are some Mainlanders who are members of the DPP (ibid.: 27). The crossing of boundaries results in the creation of new identities, and multiple groups are involved in this process. Ethnic boundaries have been blurred, and other factors, such as class, gender and education nowadays play a much more vital role than before, while the importance of a person's ethnical identity has faded somewhat into the background [74]. Given that most of the party members of the KMT nowadays are Taiwanese (ibid.: 24), these kinds of former boundary markers are neither generally applicable, nor valid any longer.

Language, too, no longer is a clear marker of a person's ethnic or political affiliation, as most people in Taiwan now speak both Mandarin and Taiwanese (Huang, 2000: 144). There are also Hakka people who don't speak their mother tongue any more (Wang, 2004: 311) and assimilated Aborigines, who don't speak their ethnic group's language at all.

Sociological surveys and questionnaires over time reveal that the younger generations of Mainlanders are moving away from a single (Chinese) identity and favour a dual identity (Taiwanese/Chinese or Chinese/Taiwanese) (Chang & Wang, 2005: 29).

---

[72] This idea was initially conceived as a political framework in order to move away from the paradigm of Taiwanese vs. Mainlanders.

[73] During the 1980s, political and public discourse changed and Mainlanders and Taiwanese began to be considered as distinct sub-ethnic groups (Yang & Chang, 2010: 110)

[74] Overall changes in society, in terms of the emerging trend towards Taiwanisation or a growing consciousness and accentuation of Taiwan's multicultural composition, are reflected in individual life narratives, as Simon (2003) gives evidence to.

4 Summary and concluding remarks

Taiwan identity is characterised by large complexities and cannot be understood in terms of simple juxtapositions, though it may seem so at first sight, when considered in terms of the relationship of Taiwanese - Chinese, *Benshengren* - *Waishengren* or KMT - DPP. The people of Taiwan had to deal with the longterm Chinese nationalism prevailing in post-war Taiwan, just as much as they had to relate to the growing Taiwanese consciousness over the past three decades.

Discussing identity in Taiwan, whether one considers ethnic identity, national identity or cultural identity, one may conclude that identities, both of individuals and of groups, are fluid, situational and overlapping in the Barthian sense (1996), something that the case of Taiwan affirms. Parallel ongoing discourses in both politics and the public about ethnic and national identities are the arena on which ethnic boundaries either are emphasised or dissolved. Individual and group identities very much depend on the interaction with others.

As I have shown, and as sociological surveys suggest, in Taiwan ethnic line crossing is ubiquitous. It appears that, depending on the historical circumstances and social experiences, ethnic identity sometimes becomes less prominent in favour of the national or cultural identity or vice versa. National discourses, such as Taiwanisation or Taiwan's multiculturalism, prove to be crucial to the extent that they may impinge on people's self-perception. Although, at first glance, it appears that ethnic labels such as *Waishengren* and *Benshengren* determine people's identity, this is by no means categorically fixed. In addition to ethnicity, other factors such as class, gender, age or education have proven to be decisive in identity formation. New categories have emerged, for instance *New Taiwanese*. Mainlanders who define themselves as New Taiwanese have come to feel a stronger affinity towards Taiwan, the place they were born in and where they live, than towards the place of origin of their parents or grandparents. Their ethnic identity may be "Han", their cultural identity Chinese and their national identification *New Taiwanese*. Likewise there might be Hakka, who define themselves ethnically as Hakka, whose cultural identity is Chinese and their national identity Taiwanese, or Aboriginals who identify themselves as ethnically belonging to their individual ethnic group, culturally as *yuanzhumin* and nationally as natives of Taiwan.

That is why I suggest that, despite an existing interrelatedness between people's ethnic, cultural and national identities, a predefined overall structure doesn't appear to be a necessity, but rather, that there seems to be some space for individual choices when it comes to people's self-identification.

The nation-building process of Taiwan, in creating an imagined community in the sense defined by Anderson (2006), has come to include all of the ethnic groups living on the island. Interrelations between the different ethnic groups, as

well as politics, seen as manifestations of boundaries, have obviously had an impact on where and how ethnic boundaries are drawn.

As Barth (1996) argued, there exists a close link between identity and politics, as well as between rhetoric and ideology, something which affects ongoing individual and social processes in present-day Taiwan.

The field of research on the identity issue in Taiwan is constantly in a state of flux, which is why, from an anthropological point of view, it would seem to be of greatest interest to broaden this study with extensive fieldwork in Taiwan, during which relevant data could be gathered by means of applying a methodology of participant observation, qualitative in-depth interviews, as well as evaluation of the ongoing political debate, in order to gain a first-hand understanding about how and under what circumstances people in Taiwan build their systems of knowledge and perceptions of identification. Another field of interest worth researching would be to investigate what kind of boundaries are drawn between or around different groups and under what circumstances this occurs.

5 Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict (2006). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Rev. ed. London: Verso

Appiah, Anthony K. (1994). "Identity, authenticity, survival. Multicultural societies and social reproduction". In Taylor, Charles. *Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 149-163.

Barnard, Alan & Jonathan Spencer (eds.) (1998). *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*. London - New York: Routledge.

Baumann, Gerd (1999). *The multicultural riddle: rethinking national, ethnic, and religious identities*. New York: Routledge

Barth, Fredrik (1969). "Introduction." In Barth, Fredrik (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Bergen; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. 9-38.

Barth, Fredrik (1996). "Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity". In Vermeulen, Hans & Cora Govers (eds.) *The anthropology of ethnicity: Beyond 'Ethnic groups and boundaries'*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 11-32.

Brown, Melissa J. (2004). *Is Taiwan Chinese? The impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Brown, Melissa J. (2010). "Changing authentic identities: evidence from Taiwan and China". *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 16(3): 459-479.

Cauquelin, Josiane. (2004). *Aborigines of Taiwan: the Puyuma: from headhunting to the modern world*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon

Chang, Andy G. & T.Y. Wang (2005). "Taiwanese or Chinese? Independence or Unification? An Analysis of Generational Differences in Taiwan". *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 40(1/2): 29-49.

Chang, Bi-yu (2004). "From Taiwanisation to De-sinification, Culture Construction in Taiwan since the 1990s". *China Perspectives*, 56: 34-44. URL: http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/438

Chang, Mau-Kuei (2003). "On the Origins and Transformations of Taiwanese National Identity". In Katz, Paul. R. & Murray A. Rubinstein (eds.) *Religion and the Formation of Taiwanese Identities*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 23-58.

Chuang, Ya-Chung (2010). "You (meng) zui mei: Zuqun rentong yu chengren zhengzhi." [Dreaming Ethnicity in the Politics of Recognition]. *Taiwan Journal of Anthropology* [serial online], 8(2): 3-35. 莊雅仲. (2010) 有「夢」最美： 族群認同與承認政治. 台灣人類學刊. 8(2): 3-35.

Chun, Allen (2009). "On the Geopolitics of Identity". *Anthropological Theory*, 9(3): 331-339.

Corcuff, Stéphane (2005). "History Textbooks, Identity Politics, and Ethnic Introspection in Taiwan: The June 1997 Knowing Taiwan Textbooks Controversy and the Questions it Raised on the Various Approaches to 'Han' Identity". In Vickers, Edward & Alisa Jones (eds.) *History education and national identity in East Asia*. New York: Routledge. 133-170.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1993/1996) "The epistemological status of the concept of ethnicity". Conference paper, Amsterdam ("The Anthropology of Ethnicity"), December 1993. Published in *Anthropological Notebooks* (Ljubljana, Slovenia) in 1996.
URL: http://folk.uio.no/geirthe/Status_of_ethnicity.html

Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell

Harrison, Mark (2006). *Legitimacy, meaning and knowledge in the making of Taiwanese identity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

He, Yinan (2010). *Competing Narratives, Identity Politics, and Cross-Taiwan Strait Reconciliation*. Abridged version forthcoming in *Asian Perspective*, 34(4). URL: http://works.bepress.com/yinan_he/6/

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael (1990). "Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan". *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 24: 163-180.

Hsieh, Shi-Chung (1994). "From Shanbao to Yuanzhumin: Taiwan Aborigines in Transition". In Rubinstein, Murray A. (ed.) *The other Taiwan: 1945 to the present*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 404-420.

Huang, Shuanfan (2000). "Language, identity and conflict: a Taiwanese study". *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 143: 139-149.

Kerr, George H. (1966). *Formosa betrayed*. [New ed.] London: Eyre & Spottiswoode

Kaeding, Malte Philipp (2009). "Taiwanized 'New Taiwanese': The Effect of Taiwanization on the 2008 Presidential Election Campaign of Ma Ying-jeou". *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review*. 9(2): 19-34.

Korostelina, Karina. (2008). "History Education and Social Identity". *Identity*, 8(1): 25-45.

Ku, Kun-hui (2005). "Rights to Recognition: Minority/Indigenous Politics in the Emerging Taiwanese Nationalism". *Social Analysis*, 49(2): 99-121.

Li, Mei-chih (2003). "Basis of ethnic identification in Taiwan". *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 6(3): 229-237.

Lin, Hsiu-hsin (2007) "Jiexian, rentong he zhongshixing: Jinxiang, yi ge kejia difang shehuiqun lijie he renzhi tazhe de shehui guocheng".
[Boundaries, Identities and Authenticity: Pilgrimage of a Hakka Local Community as Social Process of Understanding and Cognition of Others]. *Taiwan Journal of Anthropology* [serial online]. 5(1): 109-153. 林秀辛 (2007). 界線，認同和忠實性：進香，　一個客家地方社會群理解和認知他者的社會過程. 台灣人類學刊. 5(1): 109-153.

Makeham, John & A-Chin Hsiau (eds.) (2005). *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Mao, Chin-Ju (2008). "Fashioning curriculum reform as identity politics—Taiwan's dilemma of curriculum reform in new millennium". *International Journal of Educational Development,* 28(5): 585-595.

Republic of China Yearbook 2010. URL: http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/

Rubinstein, Murray A. (ed.) (1994). *The other Taiwan: 1945 to the present.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe

Rudolph, Michael (2003). *Taiwans multi-ethnische Gesellschaft und die Bewegung der Ureinwohner: Assimilation oder kulturelle Revitalisierung?* Münster, Hamburg, London: Lit

Rudolph, Michael (2008). *Ritual Performances as Authenticating Practices: Cultural Representations of Taiwan's Aborigines in Times of Political Change.* Berlin; Münster: Lit

Schak, David C. (2009). "The Development of Civility in Taiwan". *Pacific Affairs*, 82(3): 447-465.

Schubert, Gunter (2006). "Towards the End of a Long Journey: Assessing the Debate on Taiwanese Nationalism and National Identity in the Democratic Era". *Asien,* (98): 26-44.

Simon, Scott (2003). *Sweet and sour: life worlds of Taipei women entrepreneurs.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

Simon, Scott (2007). "Paths to Autonomy: Aboriginality and the Nation in Taiwan". In Storm, Carsten & Mark Harrison (eds.) *The margins of becoming: identity and culture in Taiwan.* Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 221-240.

Simon, Scott (2010). "Negotiating power: Elections and the constitution of indigenous Taiwan". *American Ethnologist*, 37(4): 726–740

Stainton, Michael (1999). "Aboriginal Self-Government. Taiwan's Uncompleted Agenda". In Rubinstein, Murray A. (ed.) *Taiwan: a new history.* Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 419-435.

Storm, Carsten & Mark Harrison (eds.) (2007). *The margins of becoming: identity and culture in Taiwan.* Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz

Taylor, Charles (1994). "The politics of recognition". In Taylor, Charles. *Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 25-73.

Vickers Edward (2009). "Re-writing museums in Taiwan". In Shih, Fang-Long, Stuart Thompson & Paul-François Tremlett (eds.) *Re-writing culture in Taiwan*. London: Routledge. 69-101.

Wachman, Alan M. (1994a). *Taiwan: national identity and democratization.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe

Wachman, Alan M. (1994b). "Competing Identities in Taiwan". In Rubinstein, Murray A. (ed.) *The other Taiwan: 1945 to the present.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 17-81.

Wang, Fu-chang (2005). "You 'Zhongguo shengji' dao 'Taiwan zuqun': hukou pucha jibie leishu zhuanbian zhi fenxi". [From Chinese original domicile to Taiwanese ethnicity: An analysis of census category transformation in Taiwan]. *Taiwanese Sociology*, (9), 100-115. 王甫昌 (2005). 由「中國省籍

」到「台灣族群」：戶口普查籍別類屬轉變之分析. 台灣社會學 (9): 100-115.

Wang, Li-jung (2004). "Multiculturalism in Taiwan. Contradictions and challenges in cultural policy". *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 10(3): 301-318

Wilson, R. Scott (2009). "Making Hakka Spaces: Resisting Multicultural Nationalism in Taiwan". *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 16(4): 414-437.

Wolf, Margery (1972). *Women and the family in rural Taiwan*. Stanford, California: University Press.

Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan & Mau-Kuei Chang (2010). "Understanding the Nuances of Waishengren." *China Perspectives*, (3): 108-122.