

Coalition of the Hired

-Privatizing Peacekeeping in Africa, a Different Solution?

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Abstract

In Sierra Leone, civil war has affected the civilian population and the development of the country for long periods of time. In order to end the violence a number of military operations were conducted. This essay, dealing with internal and external regulatory instruments is used to put a case study of two operations in a larger context.

By developing efficient parameters and applying these to the case studies, a comparison of two of the operations, one conducted by Executive Outcomes, which is a private military company, and one conducted by a united nations peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL a discussion whether PMC operations should be used in future conflicts or even by the UN in its peacekeeping operations by answering my key question:

When compared, which is the most effective security provider, and peacekeeper, Private Military Companies or UN peacekeeping forces?

Abbreviations

EO – Executive Outcomes

UN – The United Nations

PMC – Private Military Companies

IPOA – International Peace Operations Association

IHL – International Humanitarian Law

IL – International Law

ICL – International Customary Law

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG - Military Observer Group

UNOMSIL - United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNIOSIL – United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

Mil - Military

ILO –International Labour Organization

GB – The Conference Board

ICRC – The International Committee of the Red Cross

GC AP I – Geneva Convention Additional Protocol 1

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1. Introduction

Sub-Saharan African countries have since the decolonization, been affected by conflicts either directly¹ or indirectly², which has led to a development setback in the region. International peacekeeping missions, partaken for example by the United Nations (UN) and NATO, have in some cases shown to be ineffective as traditional western methods of warfare, where two opposing parties dispute, have been used in Africa where a different cultural context where tribes and cultural differences being “new” disputes facing European soldiers.³

The international community has also postponed operations, prolonging response times, due to numerous reasons, therefore worsening conflicts, and even when observing obvious signs of a forthcoming genocide. In Rwanda, the United Nations was unable to take any action as the killings of Belgium Peacekeepers made many countries unwilling to intervene.⁴ Furthermore, many African states have weak governments with widespread corruption, large domestic security problems which has led to that security management has been taken over by companies that protect those who can afford it. In some countries the security sector is even considered a “second economy”, which not only provides work opportunities, but also provides a relatively stable economical zone.⁵

In this environment, private military companies (PMC) have increased their operations. PMC has been utilized when government control over the governmental territory is literary non-existing. Armed internal struggles for natural recourses and political power are also commonplace. Some companies provide “military-level” protection to governments and companies that hire them, therefore creating, in some cases relatively stable zones for commerce and development to continue. ⁶

¹ An oversight map of different ongoing African conflicts:

http://www.cfr.org/publication/14543/africas_conflict_zones.html (2010-11-15)

² Kenya has received over 300,000 Somali refugees for over two decades.

<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/17/how-kenya-welcomes-refugees> (2010-11-15)

³ For example in Somalia where the problems with peacekeeping were obvious. Wulf, H. (2005). *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*. P.P. (10-11) Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillian.

⁴ <http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/responsibility.shtml> (2011-01-06)

⁵ Wulf, H. (2005). *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*. P.P. (4-7) Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillian.

⁶ For example in Sierra Leone, see 4.0

In Sierra Leone and Angola, private military companies were contracted to operate in domestic conflicts after being hired by the governments to eradicate armed rebel groups trying to seize control. Using highly trained military personnel, armed with modern weaponry, the companies successfully completed their assignments, with few losses and minimal impact on civil society, allowing the countries to start rebuilding the countries.⁷ While legal implications and responsibility dilemmas have been debated by academics in the western world, PMC continue to operate in Africa.

Considering privatized peacekeeping as an alternative to international interventions, this essay tries to define whether PMC operations can fill a gap in peacekeeping. By using efficiency as the criteria for a successful operation instead of analysing the lack of regulation in international laws and discussed fictional scenarios, a different framework for analysis. One part is on the subject on regulation, showing the lack of corporate regulation in an international environment, while contracts can be formed regardless of this problem. Finally a discussion whether PMC should be allowed to partake in future UN operations will take place in the last chapter of this essay.

Sam Norma, Deputy Minister of defence, asked a question, which interested me in the Sierra Leonan problems and the difficulties with utilizing PMC services.

“Our people have died, lost their limbs, lost their eyes and their properties for these elections. If we employ a service to protect our hard-won democracy, why should it be viewed negatively?”⁸

⁷ For example see 5.2

⁸ - Sam Norma April 2006, Sierra Leonean Deputy Minister of Defence

2 Framework of This Study

Contracting PMC for peacekeeping in Africa is not recognized by the UN to be a valid option today.⁹ The authors of the literature brought together in this essay, have reached a consensus that PMC are too unregulated by international law to allow them to partake. Using other criteria than the necessity of being regulated by international law and the theoretical risk that usage of privatized military companies may threaten public democracy. This essay will foremost deal with the issues concerning internal and external regulation in order to re-define the discussion about PMC operations.¹⁰

By conducting two case studies of two military operations, one made by Executive Outcomes, and one by the United Nations comparable information is gathered. It will then be possible to compare, by using my definition of efficiency, the operations by evaluating this comparison and contrasting it against external and internal regulatory instruments I intend to answer the following key question:

When compared, which is the most effective security provider, and peacekeeper, Private Military Companies or UN peacekeeping forces?

The following sub questions will be used to answer the key question:

If found that PMC are more effective, can efficiency motivate subcontracting UN peacekeeping to a PMC?

To what extent do internal and external regulatory instruments, thereby limiting the usage of either one, affect PMC and UN peacekeepers?

Where outsourcing and privatization seen as threats to democracy and the legal issues of PMC operations is considered the primary issue, PMC are excluded even if they are found to be more effective. The usage of PMC in interventions becomes impossible because of the non-existing possibilities of holding a corporation accountable for any human rights abuses"¹¹.

⁹ See for an example the UN "non paper" New Horizons:
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf> (2011-01-03)

¹⁰ Debated by for example by Verkuil

¹¹ See Singer part III for a discussion about legal issues., furthermore, if an individual commits an international humanitarian law violation, they can always be subject of the international court in Hauge.

2.1. Theory

The theoretical framework, which this essay is based on, is foremost a definition of efficiency created from measurable and comparable parameters relevant for this essay. The efficiency parameters used in this essay have been drawn from analysis of the literature. The Internal and external regulators chapter has been deducted from Verkuils' theories on outsourcing, where monitoring differences account for a large problem in contracting.¹² By clarifying the differences between PMC regulation and regulation of the UN, this clarification will be used in the results chapter in order to contrast the comparison of efficiency.

Singer, Wulf, and Verkuil discuss accountability and responsibility from similar points of view, that PMC today cannot be held, due to the lack of legal regulation, responsible or accountable. Therefore making outsourcing military capabilities a threat to democracy as the public cannot affect the corporations, but also problematic as the corporations could, without considering legal issues, commit international humanitarian law (IHL) violations.¹³

Verkuil continues to further discuss the loss of public democratic control when outsourcing military means. He therefore concludes that all kinds of privatization of governmental functions should be prevented. Wulf and Singer instead, suggest that IL regulations towards PMC may allow PMC to continue to be an actor providing services for governments.¹³

In this essay the definitions of efficiency will be applied when comparing a Private Military Companies Operation, and UN Peacekeeping Mission.

By creating four measurable main parameters to define efficiency, it is possible to derive similarities from each operation, which in turn, can be compared to identify problems and advantages with each operation. I have defined the four main parameters as economical efficiency, time efficiency, military efficiency, and efficiency of operations according to human rights. My definition of efficiency will consist of criteria that will extract, from the text, comparable data. Providing this data a comparison of the efficiency will take place using the criteria stated below:

¹² Verkuil, P. R. (2007). *Outsourcing Sovereignty*. P.P (121-132)Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹³ See singer chapter 14 and 15, Verkuil chapter 2, Wulf chapter 2

Economical efficiency:

The first most economical criteria to be compared are the all-over costs of the operations. The costs, being covered, in the case of Executive Outcomes, by the government of Sierra Leone, and, the United Nations mission, by the parties participating in the operation therefore not further weakening the economical situation of the affected country.

By dividing the total costs of the operation over both, the total number of soldiers deployed during the operation, and, the duration of the operation, two easily comparable factors can be discerned.

However, Not taken into account, are the economical losses or gains by the states subjected to the intervention, or, by the states participating in the operation. For example by destruction of infrastructure or by foreign states gaining access to natural resources.

Time Efficiency:

A fast response time, being of the essence of every peacekeeping operation in order to prevent human rights abuses and end the conflict before it escalates further. By comparing both the length of the operations and the response time, being defined as the time between the operation was requested to troops deployment, comparable time efficiency parameters has been created.¹⁴

Military Efficiency:

By comparing the number of military personnel being deployed to fulfil the mission/contract and the number of deaths among the deployed personnel gives an indication whether the operation is military terms is efficient.

However, there is a clear connection between the operation response times and the number of personnel being deployed as the violence in Sierra Leone escalated over time. Requiring an operation with slow response time to deploy more soldiers in order to achieve the mission. Furthermore, ceasefire efficiency is measured, in percentage, of the time a ceasefire was in effect compared to the overall time the peacekeeping/PMC forces was deployed in the country.

¹⁴ The importance of a quick response to conflicts is shown for example in Rwanda where the international community's unwillingness to act, and therefore allowing a slow response, led to genocide

This comparison gives an indication of the general success of the mission as peace and stability should be considered the uttermost goals of a peacekeeping mission.

It would also be interesting to also measure the number of casualties inflicted among hostiles, but due to problems with finding reliable data, no such comparison is done in this essay.

Efficiency of operations according to human rights:

Measuring Humanitarian efficiency is problematic due to the difficulties how to measure human suffering, number of casualties, effects of the war with starvation and insecurity as consequences. However the humanitarian efficiency theory in this essay is based on the paragraphs of the Geneva Convention applicable to civilians in wartime, reported human rights abuses, and International Humanitarian Law Violations.

Efficiency and legitimacy does not always correlate, which is something this essay tries to debate. Today there is no room for PMC operations to be conducted as they are considered to difficult to regulate. But if this comparison shows PMC operations to be more effective than UN operations, even when comparing IHL violations, efficiency as a factor, should be considered a criteria, for the fulfilment of the human rights of persons subjected to abuses.

2.2 Literature

Below, the three books used to create the framework for this essay are discussed with regard to their general concepts. P.W Singer is considered as one of the foremost authors on Private Military Companies. His book, *Corporate Warriors*, gives a general identity to PMC that explains the historical usage, and how the mercenary concept has changed and cannot be applied to a PMC. Singer also describes the PMC implications of their usage on the public military services.

Interesting for this essay, in Singers book, is the discussion about Executive Outcomes history and its contracts, as many of these took part in sub-Saharan Africa. Singers implications on the usage of PMC (part III) is used in order to conceptualize the theoretical framework of this essay, because Singer, in this chapter, flags for the

possibilities to use PMC to conduct a peacekeeping mission when no other actor is willing.¹⁵

Whilst discussing the problematic implications of using PMC, according to Singer, in a state or a peacekeeping mission, through a globalized market perspective, and discussing the problematic usage through a moral concept. , This book only briefly mentions the lack of international law that makes accountability and regulation of the companies difficult. Singer instead emphasises morality and its influence on PMC and international legality issues even though morality concepts are not legally binding. Having a liberal point of view, Singer argues that PMC might, in the future, take a role in peacekeeping, but with the lack of regulation in today's international law, Singer concludes that more research is necessary before PMC's should be allowed to participate in future peacekeeping operations.

In *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*, Wulf discusses, through a liberal view, internationalization and privatization of armed forces and its effects on the democratic control of states. Wulf, Being a former UN consultant, considers this trend to be negative and dedicates a large part of the book, to how privatization can be prevented.

While discussing PMC from a broad range of military branches, the book examines, from a couple of case studies, the negative and positive impacts internationalization and privatization has had on states and democracy. Interesting is also the chapter where Wulf discusses privatizing humanitarian interventions, whilst remaining negative towards privatization. Wulf suggests that if new methods of screening PMC are developed, perhaps the companies have a place in future interventions.¹⁶

Verkuil discusses in his book, *Outsourcing Sovereignty*, his opinion with the dangers of outsourcing and privatization of government functions. Arguing from a conservative aspect, Verkuils tries to show how the democratic structure of the US government is

¹⁵ see part III in Singers book, mainly chapters eleven.

¹⁶ Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P.P (139-140) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

shifting from public to private governing. Therefore privatization is perceived as a threat by both researchers and the public, according to Verkuil, that perceives privatization as a tool to prevent accountability and insight into previous public matters.

Focus in Verkuil's book lies on the American government's rapid privatization, and how this trend affects the US government and the American people. But the book also discusses some examples from other states. While remaining critical to privatization, Verkuil's discussion about effects on the state can in some examples be applied in an African context, where security, already in many countries, is mostly privatized.

Taking into account that no African state can be compared to the very developed American democracy and industry, it is important to understand the differences between African countries and USA. In African countries privatization has been the only method of granting some form of security. As government functions have been weak compared to USA where outsourcing and privatization have been considered the next step of increasing the American government's efficiency.

A critical problem with this literature is the fact that the facts found, can be difficult to verify. The Executive Outcomes webpage for example, has been closed since 2005 making any rechecking of their information impossible. However, as this data in some instances can be found in numerous books, I consider this to be the most accurate information on executive outcomes available to this essay at this moment.

The neutrality of the authors, on the literature used, approach to the subject of privatization should a reader also be aware of. Wulf has been working for the United Nations and is critical in his approach on PMC and outsourcing of governmental functions.¹⁷ Verkuil also argues from this position, and also considers privatization of governmental functions to threaten democracy. Singer, tries to remain neutral, which, according to me, is a position mostly upheld. The political views of the authors also reflect their views stated in the books, while all Wulf and Singer authors, should be considered, in a Swedish context, to be liberal. Verkuil's views reflect a more conservative view where the state should constitute large parts of society functions, while allowing private companies to freely trade, with the exception of allowing outsourcing of

¹⁷ Can be found in the preface of Wulf's book *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*, P.P (xiv-xv)

government functions. Despite the negativism towards PMC, I consider most of the data in the books being the most reliable to use in this essay as all three have research based material a foundations, and a pollicisation of their arguments shows an interesting debate on both PMC and outsourcing in both domestic, and international, arenas.

Other articles on the subject of PMC military interventions also show a multifaceted discussion, Damian Lilly, who is a programme manager of the Privatisation of Security advocacy programme at International Alert, expresses the need to consider future usage PMC to a part of a new, more effective United Nations Peacekeeping programme when some issues has been dealt with. ¹⁸David Shearer, on the other hand, argues that the issues with legitimacy and accountability make PMC usage highly problematic. As states contract away their military power, they therefore risk, in instable times, to further amplify any problems.¹⁹

Keeping the wide span of viewpoints in mind, and how political standings affect the authors, I try to maintain, throughout this essay, an objective point of view, and read beyond subjective statements.

2.3 Method and material

In this essay, a comparative study between two military operations conducted in Sierra Leone by two different types of military forces, one operation was conducted by Executive Outcomes which is a PMC, the other operation being conducted by the United Nations forces, by countries having the will and means to be a part of the operation. By comparing the efficiency of these interventions in terms of four factors (Time, Economy, Military, and Human Rights) I aim at contributing to the understanding of the debate concerning legitimizing the use of private military forces in international peacekeeping operations.

The material is gathered from the literature describe in the previous chapter, the official webpage of the united nations, and in chapter 3 and 4 also included in information from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and from the Governance board, (GB) which is a research and lobbying group for global enterprises. Most of the empirical data on Sierra Leone will be drawn

¹⁸ Lilly, D. (2000). The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities. *Disarmment Forum Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction?* , 3, pp. 53-62.

¹⁹ Shearer, D. (1998). Outsourcing War. *Foreign Policy* , 112, ss. 68-81.

from the vast databanks of Keesing's Records of World Events, as Keesing's is considered to provide objective information on numerous subjects.²⁰

While the information from ILO, and GB web pages is mainly consisting of their own information on how to read and create a code of conduct, is relatively non-disputable in the context of this essay. The same is for The ICRC webpage from which I have gathered the Geneva Convention texts.

The facts from the UN website and especially their account of how their operations has been conducted can be disputed. While the UN webpage specifically created for UNAMSIL²¹, claims that the operation has more or less been an exemplary peacekeeping operation, other sources within the UN website itself claims that the operation has been very successful in terms of the peacekeeping acts, but at the same time, the operation has been suffering from a constant lack of funding, materials and unwillingness from the involved countries. Furthermore, being considered unwanted by the UN, the Executive Outcomes operation before the ECOMOG mission is not mentioned at all.²²

However, therefore while the exact historical account can be disputed, the empirical data extracted from the UN website, is according to me considered to be accurate making it a valid source for this essay.

In order to conduct the comparative study on the military operations in Sierra Leone, I will first conduct two case studies on the two operations conducted in Sierra Leone in order to get empirical data. By using, the four criteria of efficiency as the foundation for the comparison on the empirical data, and the theories discussed in the previous chapter will be utilized together with the quantifiable data extracted from the previous case studies in order to answer the research question.²³

My definition of efficiency, which constitutes the main framework for the comparison conducted in this essay, has been created eclectically out of my understandings of what

²⁰ http://resources.library.yale.edu/online/dbsbysubjecthxml_info.asp?searchfor=scidb&lookfor=YUL03524 (2011-03-16)

²¹ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/> (2011-01-06)

²² For an example of this, see: <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/142peack.htm> (2011-01-06)

²³ Denk Thomas, (2002) Komparativ Metod – förståelse genom jämförelse P.P (38-42) Malmö: Studentlitteratur

is relevant to theorize in a study such as this one. This understanding has been developed through collecting information from various PMC standards and instruments of international warfare.

The two cases of military operations conducted in Sierra Leone compared in this study, is conducted by comparing the Variables derived from the two case studies. Even though the operations were conducted in the same country and overlying similarities in the social milieu and peacekeeping operations can be found. Whilst the overlying similarities, being interesting from an historical aspect, are not necessarily interesting for a study of efficiency parameters.

Therefore I will use a “most different similarities” comparative method, in order to compare the operation variables.²⁴ Using this method with a variable oriented strategy, it is possible to derive a generally acceptable theory of deciding which kind of operation, a PMC or UN, is most efficient. However, the predicament with using this strategy lies in risks of creating generalisation and finding that abstractions can be more effective. Implying that this methodology utilizes comparisons of large factors where small, and sometimes-important variables are excluded I therefore present and discuss the regulatory instruments affecting PMC and UN operations, and thereby minimizing the risks of abstractization.²⁵

Furthermore, some could consider choosing operations from two different countries interesting, but due to the nature of the operations such a study would not produce comparable data as struggles, contracts and culture varies. Also, the scale of some UN interventions is still not reachable for PMC, for example Congo, where the sheer number of peacekeepers involved would make to operation too large for a PMC to contract.²⁶

²⁴ Badersten, B., & Gustavsson, J. (2010). *Vad är statsvetenskap, om undran inför politiken*. P.P (104-108) Uppsala: Studentlitteratur.

²⁵ <http://poli.haifa.ac.il/~levi/res/weberc.html> (2011-03-10)

²⁶ Lilly, D. (2000). The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities. *Disarmament Forum Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction?*, 3, pp. 53-62.

2.4 Outline of study

The study begins with the legal obstacles of using PMC in Peacekeeping operations, using both global and regional legal instruments, discussing whether PMC personnel, taking an active part in armed conflict should be considered mercenaries is included due to the historical use of mercenaries. It moves on to analysis of two military operations, one conducted by a PMC and one conducted by the UN lead multinational force, Efficiency is discussed, but also differences in the operations in order to be able to derive comparable efficiency factors.

In part 4 a discussion about regulating legal instruments on a global, regional, and corporate level is made in order to show shortcomings and possibilities. Describing, mainly by discussing Singers, Avants, Verkuils and views on the shortcomings of global instruments, views, how global international documents, such as the Geneva Convention and the UN mercenary convention cannot define PMC.

In the regional Chapter, focus lies on the *AU convention on mercenaries* and how the conventions limits the usage of African-indigenous mercenaries. The convention is unable, as this was not the primary objective of the convention, to prevent international companies to accept military contracts. Also included in this chapter, is a brief discussion concerning the unwillingness of utilizing PMC in Africa due to the historical usage of mercenaries.

On Corporate level, a chapter describes PMC code of conducts and the implementation, importance, and shortcomings of corporate codes of conducts and how these could be used to define a PMC. A discussion, finalizing this chapter, concerns the validity these corporate code of conducts and how other organizations, IPOA and others, can influence and standardise PMC behaviour. Thereby opening for PMC to take part in an eventual intervention in the future.

A case study of United Nations (UNAMSIL) and PMC operations in Sierra Leone follows. Using the definition of Efficiency²⁷ the chapter is structured into three sections. The two

²⁷ See 2.1 for definition

operations are first described with a short historical background, and then each operation is divided into the “efficiency categories” put forth in chapter 2.1.

In the last chapter a comparison between the operations is conducted, where the differences, and similarities, between the two operations are compared using the efficiency criteria in order to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using either United Nations forces or a PMC contractor in a situation requiring similar responses. By integrating a discussion about the problems with the lack of regulation in a wider concept on the usage of PMC, and how this limits the efficiency of them, the research question will be answered.

2.5 Delimitations

As PMC operations has been conducted throughout the world, including the two operations in this paper, comparing all the operations, is not possible, in order to make a qualitative study. Limiting the research to sub-Saharan Africa, as this is an interesting region, with many possibilities for PMC operations, as many western states have little interest in intervening.

In this Essay, two military operations, with armed soldier, with the aim of ending the violence in Sierra Leone are studied. Other kinds of humanitarian operations, such as observance missions, humanitarian assistance and development programs are not included as these operations are not military operations.

The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Sierra Leone could however be defined as a military operation, but due to the many inconsistencies in the operation, with large-scale human rights abuses and other violations and problems with finding reliable information, making a study of the ECOMOG not possible to use in this essay.²⁸

Not included in this essay is protective contract companies, and support companies (such as logistics, food-providing) as these already are commonplace, and under precise scrutiny. As these companies do not participate in direct combat they are easier to regulate. However, as support companies are more often integrated into national

²⁸ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country_USCIS_SLE_456d621e2.3df0dba62.0.html (2011-01-06)

armies, making their importance to the functionality and efficiency of the armies greater. As stated by Singer:

The second Danger with outsourcing is that the principal/client may become to dependent on the private military agent, risking what is know in economics as “ex-post holdup.” That is, reliance on a private firm puts an integral part of one’s strategic plan at the mercy of a private agent. This agent, however, is also affected by potential changes in market costs and incentives.²⁹

Also not included in this essay, is a more detailed study of the legal instruments or a morality study, such as the one conducted by Singer, as this would broaden the essay too much.³⁰ Also the morality discussion is problematic as, both, Singer and Wulf, when discussing morality, they use western conceptions, and when put into an African context this morality reasoning could be less valid as discussed. Josiah A.M. Cobbah, argues that western understandings of African morality and cultural views on Human Rights as a concept is nonexistent, and therefore a new cross-cultural definition of “western” human rights should be developed.³¹

3. External and Internal Instruments

This chapter describes regulations on PMC. However as few such instruments exist, a discussion about how companies should be able to self-regulate (3.4), thereby limiting the arguments of not using PMC due to the lack of accountability in international law. This chapter also clarifies the differences between PMC and the United Nations, showing how these, while having different statuses on the international arena, are incorporated in the same international legal framework that does not provide enough frameworks for a PMC to be accountable. By creating Internal regulatory instruments, the PMC strives after achieving recognition, making outsourcing a realistic option.

²⁹ Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P.P (158-159) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

³⁰ Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P.P. (216-230) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

³¹ Cobbah, J. A. (August 1987). African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective. *Human Rights Quarterly* , 9 (3), ss. 309-331.

At the present, there is no international regulating legal instrument that specifically concerns PMC activity. Compared to a state's military forces, which are subjected to in numerous laws and regulations, amongst those are international laws concerning warfare and international treaties that prevent states to use military forces both against other states and against the states own civilian population.³²

The International instruments closest to regulating PMC activities are either mercenary conventions, or the "laws of the market" where companies breaching their contracts will not get more contracts. Therefore most PMC try to prevent criticism as this has the "Law of the market" has however shown in a PMC context to be dysfunctional as companies that has made repeated violations on IHL continues to get new and renewed contracts. Defining PMC as mercenary activity is problematic, as the standard definitions of mercenary, found in IHL³³, targets individuals, whom work in small groups or alone, and for a monetary cause only. In order for someone to be defined as a mercenary, all the criteria's found in the convention must be met.³⁴

2. A mercenary is any person who:

- (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
- (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
- (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
- (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
- (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.³⁵

³² Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P.P. (220-221) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

³³ Read as the Geneva convention, and the UN convention on mercenarism

³⁴ Definitions found in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 article 47. <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument> (2010-12-03)

³⁵ The Geneva Conventions' definition of mercenary found in AP 1, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079> (2010-12-07)

PMC are however registered corporations, which employs thousands of personnel, and can inaugurate, if necessary even more.³⁶

A good example of PMC not being mercenaries is when Executive Outcomes was contracted by the government of Sierra Leone and therefore, being inaugurated by the Sierra Leone government, cannot be considered as a mercenary army, and therefore not being mercenaries under International Humanitarian Law (GC AP I, ART 47).³⁷

More recent attempts to regulate PMC activity on an international level have been problematic, but one of the best attempts is found in the *"Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts"* Made by the International Law Commission of the United Nations it is stated that:

"States are directly responsible for violations of international humanitarian law that are attributable to them."³⁸

Which is being stated in the Geneva convention, clarifying that states are responsible for their army and its actions, however, this draft also includes in article 5 that:

The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.³⁹

The draft document further defines that states could be held considered responsible for acts committed by PMC registered in the country, and or under control of the state. The above paragraph, would further implicate that the contracting state do have judicial

³⁶ Singer P.W (2003) *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P (75) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

³⁷ ICRC. (8 June 1977). *International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents*. Hämtat från Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument> den 16 03 2011

³⁸ Faite, A. (den 25 01 2008). *ICRC*. Hämtat från *Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under International Humanitarian Law*: P (5) <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/pmc-article-a-faite.pdf> den 04 12 2010

³⁹ http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf P.P. (42-43) (2010-12-04)

powers to exercise upon the PMC, as the responsibility of controlling the PMC actions lies within the states jurisdiction.⁴⁰

As the document still is a draft and hasn't been adopted as an instrument, it should only be considered as guidance. Faite also states that, even if the draft was adopted, it is arguable if the document would be able to attribute responsibility to states for contracted PMC and its Personnel. However if adopted, it should still be considered as one of the major international documents regulating PMC activity defining state responsibility⁴¹

Today, no steps towards regulating PMC activity has been taken on an international level, even after expressed interest⁴² by the United Nations. Therefore many PMC continue to operate without regulations and with no need to consider IHL as no legal measures can be taken.⁴² Africa as a region has for long periods been troubled by mercenary activities beginning in the colonization era, and therefore regional instruments has been adopted to prevent such activates.

3.1 Regional External Instruments

Mercenaries have for long periods troubled Sub-Saharan African Countries. During the colonial era a few companies even controlled whole countries, such as Rhodesia, and large parts of Mozambique. The Companies hired both international and national mercenaries and used them to exploit large parts of the native populations and commit humanitarian violations.

The Decolonization led to further instabilities and war as groups struggled to gain power, combined with western interests in natural resources destabilized many countries and nourished the mercenary activities. Up to this day mercenaries has continuously been used in African conflicts. Some examples, in civil wars, (Sierra Leone,

⁴⁰ Faite, A. (den 25 01 2008). *ICRC*. Hämtat från *Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under International Humanitarian Law*: P (5) <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/pmc-article-a-faite.pdf> den 04 12 2010

⁴¹ http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf P.P. (42-43) (2010-12-04) Faite, A. (2008-25-01). *ICRC*. Retrieved 2010-04-12 from *Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under International Humanitarian Law* (P.P. (<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/pmc-article-a-faite.pdf>

⁴² Leander, A. (2009). *New Roles for External Actors?* In K. Aggestam, A. Björkdahl, K. Aggestam, & A. Björkdahl (Eds.), *War and Peace in Transition - Changing Roles of External Actors* (pp. 32-52). Lund: Nordic Academic Press.

and The Democratic Republic Of Congo) and in international wars, (Ethiopia / Eritrea) mercenaries were employed and used mainly to attack the civilian population with mass murder and rape as consequences.⁴³

3.1.1 The Organisation of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa

Due to the horrendous consequences of Mercenary use in Africa, the African union, being the main forum for African treaties, created the “*OAU CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF MERCENARISM IN AFRICA*” which specifically targets the problems with African mercenaries and includes training and harbouring mercenaries as criminal acts.⁴⁴

The OAU convention, like the Geneva Convention and the UN convention, doesn't specifically target PMC activity, and therefore its jurisdiction over PMC activities is arguable. While criminalizing training and protection of mercenaries in countries that has signed the convention, it doesn't limit the usage of international PMC as these in most cases use international personnel.⁴⁵

3.1.2 The Foreign Military Assistance Act, South Africa

South Africa passed in 1998, The Foreign military Assistance act, which states that any person, being an South African citizen may not recruit, train, deploy, or finance mercenaries, or become a mercenary.⁴⁶

While expanding the OAU conventions grasp, the convention also significantly restricts PMC activities, to an extent that all PMC activity is forbidden except those getting government authorization. Executive Outcomes ended its business in January 1999 claiming that South African Legislation made it impossible for the company to continue as EO was forced to seek government authorization, which according to the company

⁴³ Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P.P (37-38) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁴⁴ Specifically article 1, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/485> (2010-12-07)

⁴⁵ ICRC. (1977 8-June). *International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents*. Retrieved 2011-16-03 from Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument>

⁴⁶ Wulf, H. (2005). *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*. P (55) Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillian.

was not worth the trouble. However, Singer also means that EO ties to its apartheid past combined with internal problems made the company to break up.⁴⁷

3.2 Internal Instruments, Corporate code of conduct and Corporate Social responsibility

Not being legally binding, corporate code of conducts (code) can still affect and regulate PMC activities. While being dependent on credibility, a code of conduct can only be effective as long as proper monitoring, enforcement and transparency is enacted.

Therefore, a code of conduct necessarily doesn't only affect the corporation singularly, but also to subcontractors. Being developed after numerous scandals in the American defence industry, a new business philosophy including business ethics, code of conducts and responsibility towards customers, employees, the community and stockholders.

The main goal with codes are to promote self-regulation and deter government interventions and regulations and by taking other actions limiting corporations possibilities.⁴⁹

Monitoring of the codes enactment can be done both by internal corporate structures, such as committees, ombudsman, while NGOs and consultants are the main outside monitoring agents. The responses to violations can be varying depending on the violation and by whom the offence was committed, all from cancelation of contracts, to education. The governance board⁵⁰, has made three categories of defining a corporate code of conduct. The first definition of a code is a "Compliance code" which gives directives and defines rules to be followed, which in turn limits conducts partaken by corporate personnel. The Second definition is a "Corporate credo" which gives a wide general statement of a company's values and objectives. The third definition is management philosophy statements, which specifically targets a company's CEO and Corporation board actions.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P.P (117-118) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁴⁹ <http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm> (2010-12-13)

⁵⁰ The Conference Board is a global, independent business membership and research association working in the public interest. Our mission is unique: To provide the world's leading organizations with the practical knowledge they need to improve their performance and better serve society.

(<http://www.conference-board.org/about/index.cfm?id=1980>)

⁵¹ <http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm> (2011-01-07)

Private Military Corporations had not, until the 90'ths, due to their activities developed code of conducts, and therefore whilst not being regulated by international law, not been regulated at all. But recent PMC activities⁵² has put the corporations in the public spotlight, and due to pressures put forward by congressional hearings and mass media critique; most PMC's today have their own Code of Conduct, or are a member of associations that have a common code of conduct and ethic values which member corporations are subjected to follow⁵³.

3.3 Executive Outcomes “Four Interlocking Principles”

Executive Outcomes (EO) established “four interlocking principles” which, while not being formal, was used as a credo in all EO operations.

“No Ground operations without Air Support”, was the key factor in all EO undertakings, and made troop deployments quickly enforceable with large, and accurate force. This allowed Executive Outcomes to overwhelm enemy forces with superior military force while preventing enemy retaliation as the guerrilla in Sierra Leone lacked the necessary armament to defend itself against air warfare.

Using “Initiative and good common sense” was the second principle established by EO. According to Venter, good common sense was not often found in African military forces, making EO a favourable force amongst the civilian population, and in extent, the leaders of the country. The initiative factor allowed executive outcome forces to make quick decision in combat.

“Discipline,” and efficient logistics chains was the last two credos being notoriously enforced by the EO forces, therefore allowing troops to rapidly advance, therefore preventing effective enemy withdrawal.⁵⁴

The EO Principles could be considered a corporate credo, defining the company's aims and targets, while not specifically covering all the company's actions. While not defining aims to follow human rights and IHL specifically it defines good common sense as a principles, which can be compared to the UN first following the *Principles and Spirit of* general International Humanitarian law.

⁵² Read as Blackwater in Iraq, Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, Sandline and so forth.

⁵³ Wulf, H. (2005). *Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace*. P.P (198-202) Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillian.

⁵⁴ Venter, Al J. (2006) War Dog. P.P (390-393) Newbury: Casemate

3.4 International Peace operations Association.

The IPOA Code of Conduct, has been created in order to guarantee a certain standard of contractors, and puts forth a number of paragraphs that are supposed to regulate PMC activities. The Code states in the preamble that: "it (the code of conduct) seeks to ensure the ethical standards of IPOA member companies operating in conflict and post-conflict environments so that they may contribute their valuable services for the benefit of international peace and human security." Further, all signatories must follow the basic international and humanitarian laws, including UDHR, the Geneva conventions of 1949, including Additional Protocols of 1979 and also the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies (2008). However, as shown above in 3.1 and 3.2, these documents should regulate PMC activities in combat situations and other contracts, but the problem still is accountability, where these documents are unable to force the companies into any legal actions.⁵⁵

Furthermore in the Code of conduct, it states that signatories shall follow all international humanitarian and human rights law, the companies shall have a set standard of accountability, as long as the companies doesn't risk, as stated in paragraph 2.3:

"Nothing contained in this Code of Conduct shall require Signatories to disclose information in violation of: applicable law; contractually required confidentiality; or any legally recognized privilege. Further, nothing in this Code of Conduct shall require Signatories to violate domestic law."⁵⁶

Because of the above paragraph, the IPOA code of conduct shouldn't be considered as a "compliance type" code of conduct as the first purpose of such a document is, as mentioned before, to self regulate the company. As no mentioning of internal or external review groups is made, the code of conduct shouldn't be considered to regulate member corporations, and so forth requires more development in order to be considered a Compliance code.

⁵⁵ Leander, A. (2009). New Roles for External Actors? In K. Aggestam, A. Björkdahl, K. Aggestam, & A. Björkdahl (Eds.), *War and Peace in Transition - Changing Roles of External Actors* (pp. 32-52). Lund: Nordic Academic Press.

⁵⁶ <http://ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconduct/87-codecodeofconductv12enghtml.html> (2011-03-16)

However, IPOA also mentions, on its website, that the organisation has created an “enforcement Mechanism” and a complaint system where persons or organisations can report any violations committed by corporations being members.⁵⁷

“11.2. The enforcement of the IPOA Code of Conduct is guided by the IPOA Enforcement Mechanism, the complaint system available to the public at-large. Signatories who fail to uphold any provision contained in this Code may be subject to dismissal from IPOA.⁵⁸”

However, Information on the purpose of the enforcement mechanism and information’s on the effects of the complaint system couldn’t be accessed on IPOAs homepage during the time this essay was written.⁵⁹

3.5 UN peacekeeping operations code of conduct:

Before the bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian law, adopted in 1999, no singular document can be stated to give a general perception on a “code of conduct” in UN operations. International Humanitarian Law and valid UN conventions still binds the peacekeepers and their actions. However, before 1993, the UN didn’t recognize itself as an actor being forced to follow international humanitarian law and International Customary Law, and UN peacekeepers therefore not being charged for eventual crimes committed during wartime.⁶⁰

In 1993 the UN first stated that it will follow the *Principles and Spirit* of general International Humanitarian law, and furthermore, to educate its troops on the principles of the laws. Therefore clarifying the status of the UN peacekeeper as a soldier and not civilian, and therefore having the right to POW status under the Geneva Convention.⁶¹

Because of the problems with UNOSOM where UN soldiers was accused with committing war crimes, but being unable to be held responsible, ICRC formed, in cooperation with the UN a committee to formulate an applicable practical solution to the UN

⁵⁷ <http://ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconduct/87-codecodeofconductv12enghtml.html> (2011-03-16)

⁵⁸ <http://ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconduct.html> (2010-12-14)

⁵⁹ <http://ipoaworld.org/eng/enforcementv01eng.html> (supposed enforcement mechanism)
<http://ipoaworld.org/eng/submitcomplaint.html> (the Complaint form available to report violations of the code of conduct) (both: 2010-12-14)

⁶⁰ <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icty/icty.html> (2011-01-07)

⁶¹ <http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm> (2011-01-07)

predicaments to recognize peacekeepers bound by IHL.⁶² Therefore on the 12th of august 1999 the Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian law was adopted as the core regulations for UN peacekeepers. Developed from the Geneva conventions, UN conventions concerning protection of cultural objects, and international customary law. The bulletin concerns United Nation Forces, being controlled by the UN, but it does not include missions authorized by the UN with forces submitted National or regional control. The bulletin is split into 10 parts, covering most of the traditional methods of combat and IHL applications. In order to be able to conduct operations according to International law, the Secretary General also included the undertaking to educate the UN forces on the principles of IHL, therefore making it easier to grasp the previous definition of following "*Principles and Spirit*" of international law. In case of an IHL violation, the bulletin also defines that his national court prosecutes an individual, not by a UN tribunal or by the court existing in the country of the operation. This could however be problematic to an operation, as national laws on conflicts, can sometimes differ and therefore not allow all soldiers to execute similar operations or risk prosecution in their country.⁶⁵

A second aspect to incorporate in a UN peacekeeping mission "Code of Conduct" is the mandate given to the peacekeepers, which definitely limits the actions partaken by UN forces. Depending on the mandate, the soldiers are allowed to conduct different types of military actions, contrasting for example in Sierra Leone and Rwanda, where the mandate given to the forces, gave two different outcomes of operations⁶⁶.

The Mandate in Sierra Leone stated, by drawing a few key points, that the forces was deployed in order to assist the implementation of a peace agreement, assist in demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of refugees and to assist in confidence building. In 2000 the mandate was revised in 2002 by the security council, and the

⁶² Bouvier, A. (den 31 12 1995). *ICRC*. Hämtat från "Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel": Presentation and analysis: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmtj.htm> den 07 01 2011

⁶⁵ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/unobservance1999.pdf> (2011-01-07)

⁶⁶ Even though the mandate doesn't suffice to explain the lack of response to the genocide in Rwanda, it can explain, in some cases why the soldiers didn't act upon seeing the killings.

Council, U. N. (den 5 October 1993). *UNAMIR*. Hämtat från Resolution 827 (1993): [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/872%20\(1993\)&Lang=E](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/872%20(1993)&Lang=E) den 10 03 2011

United Nations Security Council. (2005 йил 30-June). *UNAMSIL UN documents*. From S/RES/1610, 30 June 2005: [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20\(2005\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)

revised mandate gave the forces further responsibilities in defending important key zones and strengthens the disarming efforts.⁶⁷

As the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was established 22nd of October 1999, the bulletin could be considered a “Code of Conduct” for the Mission.

4. Two Military Operations in Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone originates from 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) tried to overthrow the government by a number of attacks, following a number of international enforcement, with international groups such as ECOWAS and ECOMOG, of the national army trying to fight RUF, a military coup committed by the National army was successful and military leaders took over the country. RUF continued to make attacks in the country and therefore a special envoy, in collaboration with the AU tried to negotiate a ceasefire, and having some success with the army agreeing to hand over the power to a democratically elected person. However, not participating in the elections, RUF did not recognize the winner, and continued its attacks.⁶⁹

Trying to retake Diamond mines and gaining important economical advantages, the Sierra Leone government hired Sandline and Executive Outcomes to retake the sites, and also to purge the areas of rebels. Being successful Operations and forcing rebels from the area in less than three months, the PMC completed their contracts in 1997.⁷¹

Another military coup took place in 1998, and this time the military forces joined RUF, forming an alliance and seizing the power and forcing the sitting president to go into exile. Sierra Leone, having large Diamond mines, and the guerrilla forces using slave labour, continued to fuel the conflict.⁷²

An international embargo, stopping all deliveries of Oil and weapons was imposed, and the Security Council authorized an ECOWAS peacekeeper force consisting of ECOMOG troops mainly from Nigeria to support the embargo. Following the Embargo, peace talks

⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council. (2005 йил 30-June). *UNAMSIL UN documents*. From S/RES/1610, 30 June 2005: [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20\(2005\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)

⁶⁹ Keesing's Record of World Events. (2000). *May 2000 - SIERRA LEONE* (Vol. 46). Cambridge: Keesing's Worldwide, LLC.

⁷¹ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 113-115 Ithaca: Cornell University Press

⁷² www.hrw.org/legacy/report/s98/sierra/Sier988-01.htm#P88_2258 (2011-03-10)

were continued, but being unsuccessful, due to the junta's unwillingness to follow the agreements.⁷³

After an ECOMOG attack on Freetown, the military Junta was expelled and the exiled president was returned to office. The UN and ECOMOG then strengthen its position, and lifted the oil and arms embargo and also establishing UNOMSIL. Fighting intensified in the country when the Junta and RUF tried to win back lost ground and committing large-scale human rights abuses with rape and mass murder and mutilation among the crimes. The intensified conflict led to the withdrawal of UNOMSIL, and ECOMOG was forced to retake Freetown. After reinstating the president and the Cabinet, and continuing peace agreement talks, the UN was asked to take a greater roll in the conflict, and therefore, UNOMSIL was terminated and UNAMSIL was created. Consisting of 6000 military personnel UNAMSIL was instated to assist the government and to enforce the newly formed peace agreement.⁷⁴

In February 2000, the military operation was expanded with to 11.100 personnel and given a revised mandate to include civilian affairs, including police and administration.⁷⁵ The operations expanded further in 2000 and then in March 2001, to consist of 17.500 military personnel and a new revised mandate that incorporated more tasks into UNAMSIL duties.⁷⁶ 2004 the disarming process was considered complete and the evacuation of UNAMSIL forces started the mission was terminated in December 2005 when the country was considered free of rebels and relatively stable. However, in 2007 UNIOSIL was created to help the government and solidify the peace process and stability created by UNAMSIL.⁷⁷

⁷³ Keensing's Record of World Events. (September 1997). Sep 1997 - SIERRA LEONE. *Keensing's Record of World Events*, 43, s. 41803.

⁷⁴ United Nations Security Council. (22-October-1999). *UNAMSIL DOCUMENTS*. From S/RES/1270 (1999), 22 October 1999: [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1270\(1999\)&Lang=E](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1270(1999)&Lang=E) den 16 03 2011

⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council. (den 19 May 2000). *UNAMSIL DOCUMENTS*. Hämtat från S/RES/1299 (2000),: [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1299\(2000\)&Lang=E](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1299(2000)&Lang=E) den 17 March 2011

⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council. (den 30 March 2001). *UNAMSIL DOCUMENTS*. Hämtat från S/RES/1346 (2001): [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1346%20\(2001\)&Lang=E](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1346%20(2001)&Lang=E) den 16 March 2011

⁷⁷ United Nations Security Council. (2005-30-June). *UNAMSIL UN documents*. From S/RES/1610, 30 June 2005: [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20\(2005\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)

4.2 Executive Outcomes operation in Sierra Leone

After a waning situation in Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes was offered a 15 million dollar contract in 1995 for a one year contract, employing 160 EO military personnel. The Sierra Leone government having troubles with paying the EO costs, allowed a mining company, in exchange for mining concessions to pay a “start up fee”.⁷⁸

The first contract was however expanded to incorporate further manpower and materials, including helicopters and airplanes, bringing the total costs up to about 35 million US dollars.⁷⁹

Executive Outcomes, now being established in the country, started retraining parts of the original army and with the help of superior technology, despite being numerously in disadvantage, EO forces pushed the RUF rebels back and the elections could be held and a peace agreement was signed by RUF, with the condition that EO withdraws from the country.⁸⁰

The EO operation allowed over a million people to return to their homes while at the same time keeping EO forces deaths low, losing only two persons⁸¹. Also no human rights abuses were found committed by the executive outcome forces, as this was a strict part of policy. In Sierra Leone, two EO troops were found dealing with blood diamonds, and were summarily sent home.⁸²

Being certain of victory and that a UN force was soon to be placed in the country, the sitting Sierra Leonean president terminated the Executive Outcome Contract, and EO therefore left in January 1997. The UN aid didn't arrive however, as the 47 million USD start-up fee for the UN operation was unpaid and the Sierra Leone military was soon about to stage a military coup which led to the deployment of ECOMOG troops.⁸³

⁷⁸ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 113-117 Ithaca: Cornell University Press

⁷⁹ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 113-115 Ithaca: Cornell University Press; For a detailed account on EO warfare in Sierra Leone, Al J. Venter's book *War Dog* gives a good description.

⁸⁰ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 114-115 Ithaca: Cornell University Press

⁸¹ Howe, H. M. (1998). Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes. *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 36 (2), ss. 307-331.

⁸² Al J. Venter. (2008) *War Dog, Fighting Other People's wars*. P. 392 Newbury: Casemate

⁸³ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 114-115 Ithaca: Cornell University Press

4.3 UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone

On the 22 October, 1999, the Security Council established UNAMSIL, due to ECOMOG's failure to stabilize Sierra Leone, and gave it the mandate to cooperate with the Sierra Leonean government and other affected parties, and to ensure DDR in the country by establishing a presence at important locations in Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL's objectives further included, protecting the civilians and UN personnel and deliver humanitarian assistance. All with the overlying objective to, in the future, allow free elections.⁸⁴

The first UNAMSIL force was first consisting of 6000 troops, but after two changes in the mandate, the force consisted at most of 17,368 troops in 31 March 2002. UNAMSIL, being considered one of the most successful peacekeeping missions, with over 75 000 disarmed combatants with an effective and successful method of DDR.

The Civil war was declared over on January 18th 2002 after by the sitting president following over 75 000 soldiers being disarmed. The reintegration plan used a system where small cash stipends were given in combination with tools and materials needed for setting up workplaces, that allowed many (55,000) of the disarmed combatants to be back either in work, or placed in schools, depending on age of the person and personal wishes.⁸⁵

Due to the scale of the operation conducted by the UN the cost of the operation was large, (sum) and also the mission extended from 2000 until 2007. The number of casualties, being 169 can be put in context towards both the length and extent of the operation showing the UN operation to be very effective, when preventing own casualties, while fulfilling one of the objectives in UNAMSIL mandate.⁸⁶

Human rights and International Humanitarian law issues, where peacekeepers was allegedly involved, has however occurred, where several cases of Sexual exploitation has

⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council. (den 30 June 2005). *UNAMSIL UN documents*. Hämtat från S/RES/1610, 30 June 2005: [http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20\(2005\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1610%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)

⁸⁵ Common in the domestic war in Sierra Leone, was the use of child soldiers, being abducted from their parents and forced, and sub missed by usage of drugs and threats to become soldiers, and committing human rights abuses, with dismembering and rape being common weapons against the civilian population.

⁸⁶ UN Peacekeeping. (den 2011 February 28). *Fatalities*. Hämtat från Fatalities by mission and appointment type : <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/StatsByMissionAppointmentType%203.pdf> den 16 March 2011

been put to light, and due to large number of allegations, the security council hired investigators to conduct a survey and found that many misconducts had been committed and few cases had been tried.⁸⁷

To further investigate the scale of the problems of peacekeepers exploiting the civilian population, a survey was conducted by Yale university and New York City college and answered by 900 Sierra Leoneans in 2005. The survey showed that 50% of the Sierra Leoneans had experienced some kind of problem with the UN forces, where sexual exploitation being the most common problem. Ambivalence in the survey also occurred when the question whether the local population was treated with respect was presented. 50% of the Sierra Leoneans were very satisfied and answered that they were always treated with respect by the peacekeepers. 45% stated "sometimes" and 5% that the UN forces had failed.

Despite the above mentioned problems, nearly 100% of the participants in the survey agreed that the security situation in Sierra Leone had improved, and over 76% found that disarming and reconciliation have been proven successful and that the UN has helped in both processes but also in "nation Building" and re-establishing a foundation of values for Sierra Leone.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Office of Internal Oversight Services. (den 11 October 2002). *Security Council Report*. Hämtat från A/57/465: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SE%20A%2057%20465.pdf> den 01 January 2011

⁸⁹ Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information. (December 2005). *Sierra Leone UNAMSIL*. Hämtat från DPI/2412F: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/factsheet5_survey.pdf den 16 March 2011

4.4 Comparison of efficiency:

Taking into account that the purposes of the EO mission and the UN intervention was very different in their extent and purpose, just a total cost comparison wouldn't suffice. Even so, the difference between the costs of the soldiers is large, the EO operation being more expensive per person, while being very small scale compared to the UN operation.

Factor (USD)	Executive Outcomes (February 1995- January 1997) ⁹¹	UNAMSIL (1 July 1999 – 30 June 2002) ⁹²
Total Cost	35 Million USD	1377 Million USD
Average Cost per Month	1.59 Million USD	38.25 Million USD
Max Personnel Deployed	285	17 500
Average Cost per Person	218750 USD	78285,7 USD ⁹³

4.4.2 Time Efficiency

The Executive Outcomes Contract was terminated after 21 months of EO deployment in Sierra Leone, and the initial UN operation, placed to end the civil war operation was in place for 27 months, while the total mission stretched to 31 December 2006.

However the time needed for the EO to allow an election to be held after stabilizing the country was only eight months contrasted to 27 months necessary for UNAMSIL.⁹⁴

Comparing response times is interesting as this clearly shows a difference, while the EO was effectively in place the same month, it took the UN longer.

A UN operation was to be instated after the EO left in 1997, but due to the International community's unwillingness to pay the necessary costs, the operation was not deployed and ECOMOG forces were the first to enter Sierra Leone after the governments fall. After the situation in Sierra Leone became too severe for ECOMOG, and later ECOWAS troops to handle, the UN intervened after letting the civil-war continue for two years after the

⁹¹ All the EO numbers in this table can be found in: Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P (112-115) Ithaca: Cornell University Press

⁹² <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/facts.html>

⁹³ A rough estimate, calculated by dividing the Total Cost over the maximum number employed.

⁹⁴ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 112-113 Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Sierra Leone government once again was run over by rebels about 95 days after Executive Outcomes left.⁹⁵

Factor	Executive Outcome ⁹⁶	UNAMSIL ⁹⁷
Response time	1 month	2 years ⁹⁸
Length of operation	21 Months	27 months ⁹⁹
Time until new Elections	8 months	27 months

4.4.3 Military Efficiency

The Executive Outcomes mission required at most 285 soldiers and material to fulfil the contract while the UN mission required 17 386 at most in 2002. While the core goal, allowing stability in the country, of the missions was the same, the UN mission mandate also incorporated rebuilding and disarming, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) , which in their very nature are enormous tasks. However, considering the time and economical efficiency of the EO operation, the long response time of the international community, made the situation far more problematic than the one, facing Executive Outcomes.

During the extent Executive Outcomes contract, two EO employees was killed, making the operation death ratio low. In the UN operation, while being large scale, compared to the EO operation, 169 military personnel lost their lives due to numerous reasons. The ratio between the two operations (see Chart below) does however not differentiate very much, making the two operations seemingly efficient when keeping their troops alive. In November 96, after 19 months of fighting, the RUF signed a peace treaty to create a peace that lasted 95 days after the EO contract was terminated. However, between

⁹⁵ Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P 112-113 Ithaca: Cornell University Press

⁹⁶ All the EO numbers in this table can be found in: Singer P.W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry*. P.P (112-113) Ithaca: Cornell University Press

⁹⁷ All UN data in this table can be found in:

United Nations Security Council. (den 19 June 2002). *UNAMSIL DOCUMENTS*. Hämtat från S/2002/679: <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2002/679&Lang=E> den 16 March 2011

⁹⁸ Drawn from the fact that a UN assistance operation was requested but failed to occur in 1997.

⁹⁹ 1999-2002, not taking into account the continued process necessary for DDR and stabilization efforts stretching from 2002-2007.

February and October 1996, a peace treaty was also in effect but broken after the election results wasn't accepted by RUF.¹⁰⁰

The UN on the contrary, successfully established a period of peace first in July 1999, when RUF and the government signed the Lome Peace Agreement, which in turn transformed UNOMSIL to UNAMSIL. The Agreement was practically in effect until may 2000 when RUF kidnapped hundreds of UN peacekeepers and renounced the peace treaty and once again destabilizing the Sierra Leonean government functions and UNAMSIL efforts, the civil war was first declared over in the beginning of 2002.¹⁰¹

Factor	Executive Outcomes	UNAMSIL ¹⁰²
Number of Mil Employees	285	17 386
Dead	2	169
Ratio (%)	0,7 %	0,9%
Periods of Ceasefire	2	1
Length of Ceasefire (Total)	11 months	10 months
Ceasefire Efficiency (%)	52.3 %	33 %

4.4.4 Human Rights Efficiency

Sierra Leone has since the formation of RUF been subjected to enormous human rights abuses from both RUF, Sierra Leonean national troops and later ECOMOG troops.

Both EO troops and UN troops had, even though both committed human rights abuses, their presence significantly improved the situation in Sierra Leone during the duration of their operations. There were few reported incidents concerning EO abuses or mistreatments of the civilian population except one case. It was found that the pilots, when conducting air raids complained of problems with distinguishing military

¹⁰⁰ Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry*. P. (114) Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

¹⁰¹ Keesing's Record of World Events. (January 2002). Jan 2002 - SIERRA LEONE. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, 48, s. 44544.

¹⁰² From July 1999 until the civil war was declared over on the 18'th January 2002

personnel from civilian, as many RUF rebels wore civilian clothes, and were ordered to summarily “kill them all”, which is forbidden according to the Geneva convention.¹⁰³

The human rights abuses conducted by UNAMSIL forces were however more frequent, with several cases of abuses and cases of prostitution, and in survey, many Sierra Leoneans were aware of similar abuses. Even when being aware of the exploitation, few cases have been tried. Also some Sierra Leoneans expressed being mistreated by UNAMSIL troops. Despite these problems, most Sierra Leoneans found the UNAMSIL troops important and in most cases the troops has been well conducting, and there are many examples of acting outside the mandate in order to improve the situation for Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁴

5. Results and conclusions

In Sierra Leone, the operation conducted by Executive Outcomes, and the United Nations, could be considered successful, as they achieved their goals in a relatively short timeframe, while effectively stabilizing the country while minimizing losses. Showing how both corporations and the United Nations intervention could be used in order to re-stabilize a government, and to prevent further human rights abuses.

The comparison between the two interventions gave however interesting results. Executive Outcomes, being a corporate actor and acting on a contractual basis, had a remarkably fast response time, and compared to the UN intervention, there was an enormous difference. Furthermore the comparison shows that while the EO operation required 160 persons compared to the UN mission of 17 386, the cost for the EO troops was more than the double per individual soldier making a corporate mission. If the same numbers of soldiers are required as in an UN operation will a PMC operation be extremely expensive.

¹⁰³ Venter, A. J. (2008). *War Dog*. P.P (4 Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information. (December 2005). *Sierra Leone UNAMSIL*. Hämtat från DPI/2412F: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/factsheet5_survey.pdf den 16 March 2011 98-512) Newbury: Casemate.

¹⁰⁴ Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information. (2005 йил December). *Sierra Leone UNAMSIL*. Retrieved 2011 - 16-March from DPI/2412F: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/factsheet5_survey.pdf

Response time efficiency was shown, in this conflict to be critical. As the civil war escalated after Executive Outcomes left the country and the national and, ECOMOG and ECOWAS forces was unable to contain the situation. Which allowed RUF to conduct human rights abuses of enormous proportions that left 10 000s dead and at least 100 000 dismembered¹⁰⁵, as one of the RUF “rituals” was to chop of arms. While the abuses escalated and the civil war came to affect the whole country, the international community didn’t intervene despite requests for assistance. Unwillingness to pay the operation expenses and problems with supplying materials were the main reasons stated from member countries with the abilities to assist.

Intervention costs are so forth an important factor of intervention efficiency as these clearly affect the intervention response times. The difference between contracting a PMC and requesting assistance by the UN is that contract is paid by the contractor, and the UN operation is paid by the member states, but mostly by the states participating in the operation.

The comparison of human rights showed that Executive Outcomes committed offences, not taking into account the distinction principle of the Geneva conventions, when not only trying to target military objectives. The UNAMSIL operation also had some problems with violations, with sexual exploitation of the civilian population as the most common problem. Whereas comparing these two violations, it is highly problematic as no statistics could be found, making a comparison impossible and debating whether killing civilians or sexually exploiting them has no room in this essay.

5.1 Conclusions

The Efficiency comparison showed that the Executive Outcomes Mission, while having a significantly less costs and having a more rapid response time was more much more expensive per soldier while not including rebuilding and reconciliation which is costly and was incorporated in the costs of the UNAMSIL mission.

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html> (2011-01-07)

While a the efficiency comparison would show that the EO operation was more efficient on total costs, response time and securing stability, making a PMC the prime choice for a country, with the ability to pay for the contract, while not requiring rebuilding or reconciliation. But this kind of scenario would probably be difficult to find.

Even though Executive Outcomes did not commit numerous IHL violations, there is no guarantee that new PMC will have following the same path, making the need for regulation high. Therefore Internal and external regulatory instruments must be taken into account in order to answer the research question.

Internal and external regulatory instruments, applicable to the operations, was not limiting the use of violence, or making either UNAMSIL forces or EO responsible for any IHL violations. While the authors of the literature used in this essay, claims that Executive Outcomes, and PMC in general is too unregulated to take part in military operations, especially of a peacekeeping nature, I found that the UNAMSIL operation was not very well regulated either. While the UNAMSIL operation took place, the UN had just recently adopted the General Secretaries Bulletin, which in theory should prevent any violations, but did in fact not prevent the abuses of the civilian population made by some individual peacekeepers.

Today, the non-existing external regulations on PMC remain, while the UN has implemented new directives for peacekeeping mission, making peacekeepers more easily held accountable for any violations. While IPOA, is the newest attempt to internally regulate the PMC industry, I found that their code of conduct is lacking in many points, essentially not binding the corporations to any legal actions except IPOAs own "enforcement mechanism". But information on this mechanism could not be accessed through the IPOA website or through other channels at the time of this essay.

Therefore I conclude that today, if a similar scenario to the Sierra Leone conflict was to occur and a company being exactly like Executive Outcomes existed, I would recommend using this PMC. This is based on the fact that EO in Sierra Leone was more efficient in most ways. The PMC provided stability when contracted, without risking that

the operation would not occur as the UN operation did due to unwillingness to intervene amongst member states.

But in any other scenario, due to the fact that no real regulations exist, according to me, for PMC operations, the UN remains the best choice for a peacekeeping mission, where states being subjected to war, has little access to income, and needs the rebuilding and other projects implemented by the UN. But is sub-contracting a possibility for the UN? The essential subject concerning inability to act remains the same, if the member states are willing to pay for the operation, and here PMC might, with subjected to better regulation become a tool for the UN to use in the future, But reading the study done in this essay, I agree with Ex. UN general secretary Kofi Annan when he stated¹⁰⁶, in 98 following the Rwandan genocide that:

“The world may not be ready to privatize peace”

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/pmc-article-310804.htm> (2011-01-07)

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