

# A Legitimate Form of Governance?

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Examining Public-Private Partnerships in  
International Environmental Politics

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# Abstract

What role does multilateral public-private partnerships (PPPs) play in international policymaking? Different forms of public-private interaction are today frequent on the international arena, and environmental politics is one of the policy fields where PPPs are most common. PPPs bring hopes of effective implementation and inclusion of affected stakeholders; while at the same time raise concerns about their democratic credentials.

The overarching aim of this study is to nuance the scholarly debate on PPPs in international politics.

This will be done in two ways. By a quantitative study of UN's partnerships for sustainable development and by case studies of three especially interesting PPPs. The quantitative and the qualitative approaches will also be used to evaluate the legitimacy of this form of governance.

This study shows that many PPPs are not the effective implementers we have hoped for. We do also find that actors from the industrialised world dominate many PPPs, while at the same time a large majority of them are active in the developing world. This makes us question whether they include affected stakeholders in a satisfactory way. However, we find that many PPPs do a valuable contribution by being deliberative arenas where a wide variety of actors can meet.

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# 1 PPPs in International Environmental Politics - Framing the Problem

## 1.1 Introduction

Public-private partnerships. For some people it is just a bureaucratic term representing some technicality in public administration, for others it stands as a symbol for fundamental changes in the functioning of international policymaking and global governance. Interaction between public and private actors has always been a part of both domestic and international politics and sometimes it can even be hard to separate the two spheres from each other. Non the less, the division of society in a public and a private sphere is a fundamental element of Western political thinking. The two spheres are associated with different values and are expected to fill different roles in society.

So what happens when public and private actors engage in close collaboration to either make or implement public policy? Are partnerships that bridge the public-private divide a golden third way that can provide us with flexible problem solving capacity, or do they undermine the possibilities for democratic accountability?

Public-private partnerships are becoming a more frequent policy mechanism in international politics and can be found in a large number of policy areas. UN are one of the strongest proponents of this form of governance and supports the formation of partnerships with the belief that they are effective policy instruments and at the same time inclusive to all affected stakeholders.

Public-private partnerships whose activities cross national borders are today one important piece of the great jigsaw puzzle that the global political system constitutes and that is one of the reasons why they are interesting and worthwhile to study.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the universe of partnerships within international environmental politics and evaluate their legitimacy. Environmental politics is a suitable issue area since there are many partnerships in this field and since environmental politics have internal dynamics that highlights important questions about different values associated to legitimacy, an example is the conflict between rightful decision-making processes and substantial results to reverse the climate change. By conducting this study we can also provide well-needed empirical knowledge about this field, which will make us more able to pose interesting questions and refine our understanding of public-private partnerships in international policymaking.

## 1.2 Public-Private Partnerships – A Short Presentation

The attention of this study is focused on multilateral public-private partnerships<sup>1</sup>. A PPP imply a far-reaching cooperation between public and private actors, often in an institutionalized way. This is a form of governance that has grown rapidly in number during the last decade (for an example see Buhr, 2006, 59-65) and has received increasingly more attention from political scientists, but also from scholars within disciplines such as business administration and organizational studies. It is though important to bear in mind that institutionalized cooperation between the public and the private sphere is nothing new. We have seen it in many forms before, both at domestic and international levels. The large influence of interest organizations in Swedish policymaking is often used as an example of intense public-private interaction (Petersson, 2004, 69-72).

However, the way PPPs are framed in international relations and multilateral institutions is something new. Within the field of international relations they have been portrayed in many ways; as effective problem-solvers, as a channel for the voices of civil society and other marginalized stakeholders, and as a threat towards democratic accountability (for a general discussion see Bexell and Mörth, 2010b; Schäferhoff et al., 2009).

I argue that the question whether PPPs is a new phenomenon or not is of secondary interest. The question of legitimacy is primary and the role of PPPs in international environmental politics is a suiting case for studying this phenomenon. To study PPPs can also give us insights that can be applicable when studying other multilateral governing modes.

PPPs bring hopes of effective implementation where it is most needed: in issues like climate change and the fight against HIV/Aids actual results on the ground is of critical importance. Are rightful processes really worth something if PPPs do not perform or deliver results? At the same time PPPs raise concerns about their democratic credentials? What will the effects be of allowing private actors to take part in public policymaking?

Before one is getting too concerned about these challenges for global democracy I think that one should regard two circumstances that nuances the picture of multilateral PPPs. Firstly, despite the gloomy picture presented by some scholars, PPPs could be seen as a potential way to strengthen democratic values like inclusion and deliberation (see for example Pattberg, 2010). Secondly, even though PPPs has been associated with both positive and negative effects, the empirical knowledge about the plethora of multilateral PPPs is still underdeveloped. We do not know enough in order to say if the effects discussed in the literature are present or not. The

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<sup>1</sup> Public-private partnerships will from now on be abbreviated “PPP” which is the most common acronym for this form of governance within the discipline of political science. Since this study focuses on multilateral partnerships, “PPP” will implicitly refer to public-private partnerships within the UN-system.

number of PPPs and the societal effects they have could be highly exaggerated: there is an apparent risk that PPPs are surrounded by a win-win rhetoric that lead us to see them as something they are not. The aim of the empirical assessment of PPPs in this study is to present a more complex picture.

In this study PPPs will be defined as “institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the provision of collective goods” (Schäferhoff et al., 2009, 455). This definition is useful since it is narrow enough to exclude looser forms of interaction, but do not raise unrealistic expectations regarding the depth of cooperation between public and private actors. A more elaborated discussion on how PPPs are understood and used in the international relations literature is given in chapter 2.

## 1.3 Research Questions

What role does PPPs play in international environmental politics? This is the underlying puzzle of this study and will be my point of departure. In order to shed light on this puzzle, this study will do two things; empirically map the universe of multilateral partnerships in environmental politics, and evaluate them from a legitimacy perspective.

The first aim of this study is to empirically map the universe of multilateral PPPs within the area of environmental politics. Environmental politics is, together with health and development (Buse and Walt, 2002), the policy area where different kinds of partnerships are most frequent, but there is a lack of knowledge of how this large group of PPPs look like. What are they working with? What actors are involved? What resources do these PPPs have?

The second aim is to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. Legitimacy in a traditional sense refers to the relationship between a political authority and the people that is governed by that authority. When is a political authority to be seen as a rightful system? And consequently, why should people obey the decisions from a political entity? This is one of the most fundamental questions within democratic theory and many influential works have been discussing this highly important relationship (Birch, 1993, 32ff).

In a global governance context legitimacy can be reformulated in order to move the focus from the relationship between, usually, a nation-state and its demos to a more general assessment of the quality of a political order and thereby fit the multi-layered structure of international politics in a better way (Bäckstrand, 2006, 473). In this study, legitimacy will be regarded as a concept connecting a number of generic values that are associated with good political steering. In this way, legitimacy can be at least somewhat detached from the nation-state, which traditionally have been the most commonly used benchmark in political science.

The two research questions that will guide this study are:

1. How does the universe of multilateral PPPs within the field of environmental politics look like?
2. How do multilateral PPPs within environmental politics perform when being evaluated from a legitimacy standpoint?

Previous research has mainly focused on the potential effects of PPPs and how to understand them in theoretical terms (Peters and Pierre, 2010). This work has been very useful for our understanding of PPPs and is a precondition for continued studies on this topic. Without this theoretical background we would not be able to pose relevant and generically interesting questions.

However, there is a lack of systematic empirical studies on the actual functioning of PPPs and this is something that several scholars have been calling for (Bexell and Mört, 2010a, 222; Börzel and Risse, 2005, 213-214). Since PPPs and global governance could be accused of being buzzwords in contemporary political science there is an apparent need for alternative framings of this form of governance. Furthermore there is a need to adjust expectations on what multilateral PPPs can achieve. Empirical studies are one good way of achieving this by enhancing our knowledge of PPPs as policy instruments. This knowledge can in turn be used to further develop our theoretical understanding on multilateral PPPs and their role in global governance.

Since environmental politics is an area that receives a lot of attention from the general public, this study will hopefully be relevant to actors outside of academia. For at least two decades the international political community have tried to find solutions to the environmental problems, with only limited success. Multilateral PPPs can be one way of finding much-needed solutions and are therefore relevant to study.

## 1.4 Methodological Considerations

This section will discuss the main methodological considerations of the study presented in this thesis. The aim is to address the potential problems that the research design gives rise to and not discuss methodology and theory of science in general terms.

The discussion will revolve around two topics that captures the most interesting methodological problems of this study. Firstly, the operationalization of legitimacy will be addressed. Secondly, the relation between the quantitative and the qualitative parts of the study will be discussed. As I see it, these are the two major methodological challenges of this study and this section aims to show how I intend to get around them.

In order to answer the two research questions raised in the previous section both quantitative and qualitative approaches will be used. Each approach can give us different answers and complement each other with the aim of getting a more comprehensive picture of multilateral PPPs in environmental politics.

The quantitative part examines the 348 partnerships registered at UN's Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD). These partnerships will be analysed from several perspectives in order to provide us with an overview of the PPPs and to evaluate their legitimacy.

The qualitative part will be comprised of case studies of three interesting cases of multilateral PPPs. These in-depth case studies will provide us with detailed information about the organisation and activity of these PPPs. The legitimacy of these PPPs will be evaluated to provide insights that are not captured by the quantitative part.

Legitimacy is a fuzzy concept. It is one of the most important concepts within political science but it is surrounded by a vagueness that makes it difficult to operationalize. Legitimacy implies quite different things depending if one looks from a normative or an empirical perspective. Since the ambition of this study is to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs by conducting empirical studies, I will have to clearly state how the concept will be operationalized. Legitimacy will in this study be understood as a way to assess the overall quality of a specific polity, in this case multilateral PPPs. This use of the concept differs from both the traditional understanding of legitimacy, which has a more strict focus on the relation between a political entity and its demos, and from a normative use of the concept, which is focused on what constitutes a rightful political system. The way legitimacy will be used in this study resemblance how it is commonly understood within the field of international relations and is an approach that will suit the purposes of this study.

In order to be able to evaluate the legitimacy of PPPs, I will have to identify and operationalize some dimensions that are associated with this concept. This is done by stipulating a number of values that are associated with legitimacy, or a high quality of a political system. These values can in turn be studied among the PPPs to be able to evaluate them from a legitimacy perspective. The values that will be used to measure legitimacy and how they will be operationalized can be found in section 2.3 where the analytical framework is presented.

If we want to evaluate the legitimacy of PPPs and be able to say something about how the universe of PPPs within the field of environmental politics looks like, why should we use the research design presented above?

When it comes to answering the first research question a quantitative approach seems like a natural choice. Since there is a large number of PPPs within this field and a lack of empirical studies, a quantitative study can give us an overview that would not have been able to get in other ways. However, the usefulness of the quantitative approach does not end there. I would argue that the quantitative part of the study has two other rationales as well. Firstly, we will be able to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs in ways that the qualitative approach cannot do. We can find patterns in the larger population of PPPs in international environmental politics that can tell us something about the legitimacy of this form of governance. Secondly, the overall view provided by the quantitative study will make us able to select cases for the qualitative approach in an informed way.

Legitimacy is connected to the functioning of a governance system or a political order and to be able to study that we need detailed information, which the case

studies can provide us with. The case studies can also provide us with interesting empirical examples of how multilateral PPPs within the field of environmental politics looks like, and in that way provide “flesh to the bones” in relation to what we find with the quantitative approach.

To conclude I would say that I concur with scholars that argue that different research methods have different advantages but that they should not be looked upon as fundamentally separate spheres. Rather, different approaches should be combined in order to give as comprehensive answers as possible (Teorell and Svensson, 2007, 273-275; Jackson, 2011, 207-212) and this is the overarching methodological approach of this thesis.

## 1.5 Outline

The remainder of this thesis will be divided into five chapters that all will contribute to answering the research questions posed in the beginning. In chapter 2 a brief review of the literature on PPPs will be given in order to show how insight from previous research can be used in this study and how this study can contribute to expand the literature on PPPs. In chapter 3 the question of how the universe of PPPs within environmental politics looks like will be answered. In chapters 4 and 5 the legitimacy of PPPs will be evaluated from a quantitative and qualitative approach respectively. To conclude a more general discussion on the findings in this study will be given in chapter 6.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter reviews the literature on PPPs, focusing mainly on scholarly work within the field of international relations. This review aims at giving a theoretical background, which will enable us to place this study in a broader context and see how it can contribute to existing research in the field.

The discussion in this chapter will revolve around four concepts that are important in the international relations literature on new forms of public-private governance. The following concepts will be used as nodal points when we explore the literature on multilateral PPPs: the public-private divide, governance, democracy in a global context and legitimacy. I argue that these concepts capture the essence in the literature on PPPs and the ambition of this thesis is to nuance this discussion.

The first section will discuss how PPPs can be defined, which is a more difficult task than it might seem. The second section will review the existing research on PPPs with a focus on the four concepts presented above. The last section of this chapter will present the analytical framework, derived from the international relations literature, which will guide the evaluation of the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics.

### 2.1 What is a PPP?

How can PPPs be conceptualized and defined? I would argue that Schäferhoff et al. provides the most comprehensive definition of PPPs as “institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the provision of collective goods” (2009, 455). This definition summarizes what many other scholars see as important characteristics of PPPs and could therefore be seen as a bottom line-definition. It is narrow enough to exclude looser forms of interaction, but do not raise unrealistic expectations regarding the depth of cooperation between public and private actors.

As Schäferhoff et al. writes, definitions of PPPs are often comprised of the following three elements; actors, goals and the sharing of risk and responsibilities (2009, 453ff). This conceptualization is helpful as it separates the different components of this form of governance, while at the same time highlight the problematic nature of PPPs. The actors need to be from both the public and the private sphere and their common goal has to be the provision of collective goods. However, as Schäferhoff et al. argues (*ibid.*), the third criteria should not be included in a definition since it refers to the relationship between the actors in a PPP, which

should be regarded as an empirical question and not a defining characteristic of a PPP. PPPs are for example said to often imply an equal and horizontal relationship between public and private actors (see for example Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Börzel and Risse show a similar line of thinking when they emphasize non-hierarchical steering modes as a definitional aspect of PPPs (2005, 196-199). These are without doubt interesting features of PPPs, which have implications for how we are to judge them from a legitimacy perspective, but I would argue that they are preferably left out of the definition.

However, the downside of excluding steering mode from the definition is that it makes it harder to distinguish PPPs from other types of public-private interaction. I cannot find any easy solution to this problem in the PPP-literature. The job of constructing a precise definition in both theoretical and empirical terms is without doubt a difficult task, but I think that Schäferhoff et al. formulates the most appropriate definition for the context of this study.

It is here important to keep in mind that interaction between the public and the private spheres is nothing new. One good and often used example of this is the corporatist governing mode in Swedish policymaking where interest groups have, or at least used to have, a large influence over the formulation and implementation of policies (Petersson, 2004; Premfors et al., 2009, 72-75). Multiple examples could also be taken from local politics where interaction between politicians and local business always has been around (Montin and Wikström, 2007, 55-56).

So why do we talk about PPPs? What is really new about this governance instrument? Interaction between different political entities has always taken place and different modes of steering have been used. Why are PPPs interesting to study and how can we differentiate them from other forms of governance?

I would argue that PPPs are worthwhile to study since they raise questions about, among other things, the four concepts presented on page 7. These concepts are connected to questions that the discipline of political science has been struggling with for a long time and that are central for understanding political organisation. For example, if we want to know more about global democracy or the relation between the public and the private sphere, multilateral PPPs can be a suiting policy innovation to study.

The question of how to differentiate PPPs from other forms of public-private interaction is a lot more difficult to answer. The discussion above is one attempt to find a good definition, but it is not perfect. One aspect that I find important when discussing the definition of PPPs is that the collaboration should be institutionalized. Otherwise we would end up studying a very broad and diverse flora of different governing modes along the public-private divide. The problem is that we cannot judge the level of cooperation between public and private actors before we have studied a PPP empirically. We simply have to live with this kind of vagueness. However, an empirically oriented study as this one can help us to nuance our understanding of PPPs and hopefully make us able to define them in a better way in the future.

Concerning the question whether multilateral PPPs are something new or not, I would argue that some aspects of public-private interaction on the global political

scene are new. The global arena of policymaking, the number of actors involved and some of the ways of interaction are aspects that we have not seen before. The interest of PPPs within the field of international relations is also of quite recent date, while PPPs have been discussed in domestic settings for a longer time.

I would also argue that these are aspects of PPPs that are interesting and worthwhile to study. How do these new conditions affect the way we understand international politics? And, in the case of this study, how can we understand the role of PPPs in international environmental politics?

## 2.2 PPPs in International Relations

We live in times of globalisation. Technical innovations, improved communications and a shared global culture are some of the developments that make many of us willing to agree to such a statement. However, some scholars argue that the uniqueness and the far-reaching effects that often are assigned to the development of the last decades are exaggerated. Yes, the interdependence and connections between many societies around the world is extensive, but what we experience today is not an entirely new phenomenon and the implications of globalization are a contested issue (Sjövik, 2004, 104-118; Karlsson, 2001, 14-19; Scholte, 2002; Held, 1995).

Regardless of the uniqueness of the current development, I concur with the big strand of literature within international relations that argues that globalization is posing some serious challenges to the global political order and to the way we are used to understand it (Pierre, 2000, 1-5; Keohane, 2006).

The concept of global governance is the most influential approach within political science for tackling both the theoretical and the empirical challenges raised by globalization and is applied in several ways (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Even though the concept lacks a concise definition, I would argue that it raises some highly interesting questions for contemporary political science. What does globalization imply from a democratic perspective? Is there a democratic deficit within international politics? What is the impact of multilateral actors on the international policymaking process? And maybe most importantly, if we conclude that there are flaws in the way things work today, how can the global political system be constructed in order to be more legitimate?

The ambition of this thesis is not to answer the grand question posed above. But I think that this kind of reasoning could help us to place the phenomenon of multilateral PPPs in a broader context. By studying multilateral PPPs we can gain a small piece of understanding of how we are to analyse visions of global democracy or improve the functioning of the global political order. By studying multilateral PPPs we can also learn things that we can use to better understand other multilateral actors.

A recurrent theme in the PPP-literature is their implications for the public-private divide. The division of society in a public and a private sphere is one of the most

fundamental elements of Western political thinking (Bexell and Mört, 2010b, 10-11). The two spheres are associated with different values and are expected to fill different roles in society. Closely related to this line of thinking we find the very special position of the state in our political system. The state has for a long time been the most powerful and most legitimate political entity.

This political order has however been greatly challenged during the last decades. Globalisation, market-based reforms, financial distress and environmental problems transcending state borders have changed our view of the problem-solving capacity and the legitimacy of the state (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000, 1-6). Accordingly, I find the concept of governance and the implications of multilateral PPPs relevant and interesting.

Some scholars argue that the development of PPPs lead to a blurring of the boundary between the public and the private sphere (Bexell and Mört, 2010b, 4-11). One way to frame this change is from an economic perspective highlighting trends such as New Public Management where ideas from private business are the driving forces (Helgesson, 2010, 24). Others conceive this as a more open process and the relation between the public and the private sphere as a continuum, rather than a strict dichotomy. From such a standpoint the public sector is “going private” and the private sector is “going public” (Dingwerth and Hanrieder, 2010, 81-85). Dingwerth and Hanrieder’s argument can also be related to discussions within the literature on global governance that problematizes the predominant ideas of the “state on the retreat” and on the contrary argue that the state is still a powerful actor on the international arena. Rather we need to question if the public-private divide ever has been a reality or just a conceptual tool. This does also affect our understanding of the implications of PPPs. If there never has been a public-private divide, PPPs cannot be accused of any boundary blurring.

To summarize I would say that I find the continuum-approach to the public-private relationship as the most useful since it allow us to keep the spheres separate in theory and study the relationship in practice without assuming a strict division.

As the discussion above has shown, the literature on multilateral PPPs is often placed in a global governance context, where they are seen to represent a new steering mode in international politics. But what is global? And what is governance? I have no ambition of making an account of the literature on globalisation. To put it simple, I understand the concepts of globalisation and global as a development or situation where geography and physical distances play a less important role than before, which have had an influence on the way we understand the world as a social space (Karlsson, 2001, 14-16; Sjövik, 2004, 103-119).

The most interesting aspect of globalization when it concerns the development of PPPs is the changed realities for political order and the challenges our view of the global political system faces. I think that Scholte puts this in an excellent way when he argues that; “Globalization – a reconfiguration of social space – has gone hand in hand with a reconfiguration of regulation. Where we used to speak of *government*, it is now suitable to speak of *governance*” (Scholte, 2002, 287). This development has made some scholars to call for a new, less state-centric, framework for analysing

international politics (Keohane, 2006; Rosenau, 2000), which is something that this study will work towards by trying to decouple legitimacy and the nation-state.

The discussion on globalization and governance highlights that the expectations on political steering have changed from a state centric and hierarchical view to a more multi-layered and horizontal approach. This is also the view of governance that I find most interesting and useful for the purposes of this thesis.

However, as Pierre and Peters argue, the concept of governance can be defined in many ways; as structures, as steering and as an analytical framework (2000, 17-27). The advantage of viewing governance as steering is that it opens up for studies of different types of political entities and analyses of their possibilities to steer in legitimate ways. This is therefore a suiting approach for the area that is being explored in this thesis.

I would argue that multilateral PPPs are one part of this broad and elusive development of globalization. As mentioned above, it is though important that we do not overestimate the significance of recent trends of globalization and tries to give a less one-sided picture of its implications. New labels does not necessary imply a new content.

One important discussion within the field of international relations concerns the possibilities of a democratic system on the global arena. One of the most commonly debated issues within this field is that of a democratic deficit in international politics (Erman and Uhlin, 2010, 3-4). The workings of the global political system are compared to the nation-state and the flaws of the latter concerning, among other things, inclusion, deliberation and accountability, are highlighted.

As mentioned above, PPPs are seen in different ways regarding their impact on global democracy. When focusing on the inclusion of civil society as a way to democratize international politics (Scholte, 2002), PPPs can be seen as a channel of such influence (Bexell and Mört, 2010b, 13-15). This possibility is maybe most visible on the global arena where there is no defined coherent constituency or demos. To think of the representation of views or discourses instead can be a more fruitful approach in the global context.

One risk with this line of thinking that has been put forward several times is that PPPs might reproduce already existing power structures and thereby loosing their ability to strengthen global democratic legitimacy (Bäckstrand, 2010, 153). Stakeholders are another concept that is frequently used in these discussions and refer to the same type of logic. PPPs are here said to bring affected stakeholders together and thereby produce a more legitimate process. UN put a lot of emphasis on the so-called multi-stakeholder approach and this can be seen as a way to legitimize multilateral partnerships (Pattberg, 2010).

If stakeholder inclusion is the most apparent advantage of PPPs in a democratic perspective, lacking accountability mechanisms is the other side of the coin. When private actors are allowed to participate in the policy process, some scholars argue that accountability will suffer (Pierre, 2009). This is mainly due to confusion regarding the sharing of responsibility within the PPP, but there can also be also a problem of even identifying the group a PPP is accountable to (Keohane, 2006).

Democracy is closely related to the concept of legitimacy, which is a frequently used term in the literature on PPPs. In this perspective PPPs are said to gain legitimacy by being effective and to lose legitimacy due to lacking accountability mechanisms. Legitimacy in a traditional sense refers to the relationship between a political authority and the people that is governed by that authority. When is a political authority to be seen as a rightful system? And consequently, why should people obey the decisions from a political entity? This is one of the most fundamental questions within democratic theory (Birch, 1993, 32ff).

In a global governance context legitimacy can be reformulated in order to move the focus from the relationship between, usually, a nation-state and its demos to a more general assessment of the quality of a social and political order and thereby fit the multi-layered structure of international politics in a better way (Bäckstrand, 2006, 473). By thinking in this way we can study a political actor, PPPs in this case, and be able to say something about the legitimacy of that political entity, this is the approach that will be used in my thesis.

Another way to think about legitimacy in international politics is the pragmatic approach put forward by Buchanan and Keohane (2006). They argue that we need to look at what is politically feasible when constructing legitimate international institutions, and not be solely directed by normative ideals of legitimacy. This approach is useful as it starts in the actual conditions of international politics and real world institutions, and not in some utopian ideas of how it ought to be. However, this pragmatic approach is not very useful for the purposes of this study since I need to link the concept of legitimacy to some values in order to evaluate the PPPs.

When studying PPPs from a legitimacy perspective many scholars divide the concept into input and output legitimacy in order to make the analysis more manageable (for an excellent example see Kaan and Liese, 2010). Input legitimacy refers to process values like inclusion, deliberation and transparency, and output legitimacy is about the results of the policy process, like effectiveness and goal rationality. This approach was originally developed for an analysis of the EU (Scharpf, 1999), but is used in the same way when it comes to PPPs. A development of this logic is done by Uhlin when he divides the concept of legitimacy into three separate stages, namely input, throughput and output legitimacy (Uhlin, 2010, 23-34). Even though the approach of dividing legitimacy into two, or three, steps is rather common, there are scholars who criticize this reasoning. Their argument is that input and output legitimacy cannot be separated since the same people are affected in both of the processes and that is why an additive way of judging democratic legitimacy is problematic. One should rather focus on creating a system that is democratic in itself (Erman, 2010). I agree with this critique in principle, but it is less helpful when we empirically study the legitimacy of multilateral actors.

Finally, it is important to remember that legitimacy is a problematic concept since it can have different meanings depending if one is looking from a normative or an empirical perspective. From a normative standpoint, legitimacy needs to be connected with some values, like inclusion or deliberation, in order to mean anything at all. From an empirical standpoint we can study what people think of a certain political entity and in that way measure legitimacy. This makes it difficult to grasp

what legitimacy is and what is being studied. However, the view presented above of how legitimacy can be reformulated for a global context is a useful approach when studying multilateral PPPs.

When legitimacy is linked to values like deliberation, transparency and effectiveness it is clearer what we are looking for. In the next section an analytical framework will be developed from values that are associated with legitimacy for the purpose of evaluating the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs in environmental politics.

The literature reviewed above is the landscape in where this thesis is best placed. The central discussions in this literature will be important for me as well since the aim of this thesis is to nuance the scholarly debate on PPPs.

In chapter 3 this debate will be contrasted with an empirical oriented study and in chapters 4 and 5 the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs will be evaluated with help of the framework presented in the next section.

## 2.3 Values Associated with Legitimacy – An Analytical Framework

As the previous section has demonstrated is legitimacy a recurrent concept in the literature on multilateral PPPs. In what ways can this form of governance be seen as an either “good” or “bad” contribution to international politics? Several scholars has discussed this question and ended up in different conclusions. One of the aims of this study is to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs and in that way enhancing our understanding of this form of governance and what we rightfully can expect from it.

In order to conduct this evaluation I will have to operationalize the concept of legitimacy. What will I study to be able to say something about the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs?

The concept of legitimacy will in this study be operationalized by six different values that are frequently connected to a “good” political system in the literature of democratic theory and international relations. These six values can be categorized as belonging to either the input or the output side of legitimacy. The values that will be studied are:

Input values:

1. Representation
2. Inclusion
3. Transparency
4. Deliberation

Output values:

5. Effectiveness
6. Goal rationality

The first four values will be understood as input values since they are connected to the policymaking process. Effectiveness and goal rationality will on the other hand be seen as output values since they are related to the outcome of a political process.

As the discussion in the previous section showed, these values are seen as ways multilateral PPPs can contribute with something valuable to international policymaking. For example are representation and inclusion related to the discussion on the multi-stakeholder approach and goal rationality to the hopes of PPPs as effective implementers.

The advantage of using this analytical framework as a guide to the evaluation in chapters 4 and 5 is threefold. Firstly, this is a way to operationalize the concept of legitimacy, which makes the study manageable. Secondly, this analytical framework will make the analysis more structured. Thirdly, this framework represents general values of “good governance” that can be applied in many contexts. It will thereby enable us to move away from the state-centric approach that often has been used when understanding the concept of legitimacy.

Each of these six values can be seen as a way for a political system to enhance its legitimacy. It is however important to stress that a “high score” in one value not necessarily can compensate for a “low score” in another value, rather I would argue that the trade-off or potential conflicts between different values are an interesting aspect of the analysis. The trade-off between input and output values is for example a common question in the literature on PPPs, but also in more general discussions on the problems of combining rightful processes with effective decision-making in democratic systems.

The analytical framework and a description of each value can be found in Appendix A.

# 3 A Universe of Partnerships

## 3.1 The History of PPPs in Environmental Politics

Between the 26<sup>st</sup> of August and the 4<sup>th</sup> of September 2002 more than 20,000 delegates meet in Johannesburg, South Africa, at one of the largest conferences in the history of the UN. It was the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) that was the cause of this great gathering.

Ten years earlier, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the foundations of international collaboration towards sustainable development were agreed upon. However, the implementation of these “international blueprints for sustainable development” (La Vina et al., 2003, 54) had been unsatisfying since the summit in Rio de Janeiro and the WSSD was faced with the task to fill this implementation gap, rather than to produce new international agreements (Hens and Nath, 2003, 8). In addition, the expectations that conventional intergovernmental diplomacy were to produce any significant results was low at the time (Andonova and Levy, 2003, 19-22). This was the background leading up to the big summit in Johannesburg in the late summer of 2002<sup>2</sup>.

The WSSD can without doubt be seen as a formative moment in the history of partnerships in international environmental politics. There were of course different kinds of partnerships even prior to the Johannesburg summit, but partnerships as a policy instrument to implement international agreements was now highlighted as never before.

The main outcomes of the Johannesburg summit can be summarized in the following three points; 1) the “Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development” which is a political declaration describing the way towards sustainable development, 2) the “Johannesburg Plan of Implementation” which is a comprehensive list of proposals, not legally binding, of how to speed up the implementation of Agenda 21, and 3) “Type II partnerships” which are initiatives including representatives from different sectors in society that work on issues related to sustainable development (Hens and Nath, 2003). They were called “Type II partnerships” or “Type II outcomes” in order to distinguish them from “Type I outcomes”, which refers to political agreements among governments (La Vina et al., 2003).

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<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed discussion about the preconditions of the WSSD in Johannesburg 2002 and how it can be understood in a historical perspective of international environmental politics, please see Hens and Nath (2003) and Seyfang (2003, 8-20).

The initiation of these “Type II partnerships” implied that the spotlight was put on this form of governance, and around 220 partnerships were registered at the WSSD secretariat in conjunction with the summit. After WSSD, UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) were assigned the task to be the meeting-point and coordinator for these partnerships. Among other things CSD arrange annual conferences and partnership fairs. Today there are 348 partnerships registered at CSD (Commission on Sustainable Development, 2011). These 348 partnerships are not all the partnerships that exist within this field, but they are a good starting point if one is interested in getting a better understanding of PPPs in international environmental politics.

## 3.2 How to Get an Overview

The 348 partnerships registered at CSD will be the population under investigation in this part of the study. This is an invaluable source of information if one is interested in studying partnerships within international environmental politics. It is an excellent way to identify partnerships within this field, a task that would have been extremely time consuming, if possible at all, without this source of information.

However, there is a flipside to this coin as well. To begin with, we have strong reasons to believe that the characteristics of the partnerships in the CSD Partnership Database will be skewed in relation to the total population of partnerships within the field of environmental politics. The partnerships that have voluntarily registered at CSD might have a more global focus or it might be more common with participating actors from the UN system compared to the total population of partnerships.

Another potential problem with using this source of information concerns the reliability of the data. The partnerships registered at CSD are requested to regularly update the information at the web page; this is however not always done in a satisfying way, which results in that some of the information at CSD is quite old. One way to get around this problem is to study other sources on the Internet to get more updated information about the partnerships. In the end though, we have to depend on the information provided by CSD.

In order to give a good empirical overview of this population of partnerships, the data from CSD will be analysed according to the following eight variables:

1. Main focus
2. Policy area within environmental politics
3. Focus in a policy-process perspective
4. Participating actors
5. Leading actors
6. Target group
7. Scope
8. Resources

These variables have been selected of two reasons. Firstly, knowledge about these variables will give us a relevant empirical picture of the universe of partnerships within the field. The variables represent aspects that are interesting both from a perspective of environmental politics and from a more general perspective of international policymaking. Secondly, knowledge about these variables can be used to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs according to some of the values in the analytical framework.

The first step in the quantitative study is to eliminate all the partnerships in the CSD Partnership Database do not fulfil the following three criterions. They should...

1. ... be classified as a PPP.
2. ... have a focus on environmental politics
3. ... be active.

The first two criterions are rather self-explaining since they correspond to the focus of this study, namely multilateral PPPs within environmental politics.

The second criterion also highlights how open for interpretation the concept of “sustainable development” is. Greenhouse gas mitigation, management of natural resources, education, poverty eradication and sanitation are examples of some of the issues that are framed as sustainable development. I would not argue that some of these issues are more important than the others, but that not all of them can be classified as environmental politics.

The third criterion might at first seem a bit strange, but when one studies the material from CSD one finds that many of the partnerships listed there are not active anymore. Since the ambition of this thesis is to give a picture of how the universe of partnerships looks like and to evaluate their legitimacy, the cases in the study need to be active.

When all the partnerships that did not fulfil the criterions stated above were eliminated 91 active PPPs with a focus on environmental politics remained. These 91 PPPs were then examined according to the eight variables stated above. The full list of alternatives for each variable and a more detailed description can be found in the codebook in Appendix B.

The overview of the universe of PPPs in environmental politics will be presented in section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of this chapter and the evaluation of their legitimacy will be presented in chapter 4.

### 3.3 What Does the Universe Look Like?

What does the quantitative study tell us? How does the universe of partnerships within the area of environmental politics look like? Let us start with some general trends found in the study of all the 348 partnerships registered at CSD that can help us nuance the picture of the partnerships within the field. In section 3.3.2 will

findings that only relates to the 91 active PPPs with a focus on environmental politics be presented.

### 3.3.1 General Trends

At a first glance the WSSD partnerships looks like a large and diversified group of different actors. However, this is not necessarily the case. As table 1 on page 19 show us, less than half of the partnerships registered in the CSD Partnership Database are active today. Even though the number of partnerships might be larger within the field of sustainable development than in other policy areas, it is not as large as one could expect from the outset.

This result can tell us that many of the partnerships are of temporary character. Information from CSD state that the average life-span of the partnerships is just over six years (Commission on Sustainable Development, 2011), which implies that many of them have a shorter time frame than that.

**Table 1**

**Is the partnership active?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Active	166	47,7	48,7
	Not active	175	50,3	51,3
	Total	341	98,0	100,0
Missing		7	2,0	
Total		348	100,0	

This can give us guidance concerning what we should expect from these partnerships. Six years is a rather short time frame if one would like to make a profound impact on the governance system of multilateral environmental issues. If one considers the time it takes to get a partnership organized in the first place, we should probably revise our expectations on some of these partnerships when it comes to what they really can achieve. On the other hand, this short time span of many of the partnerships could be a sign of the flexibility of this form of governance. The proponents of partnerships could say that these results show that they in fact are flexible ways to solve problems in international environmental politics, which is a reoccurring argument in favour of partnerships as a way of political organisation.

Let us continue by looking at the frequency of PPPs in the CSD Partnership Database. As table 2 on page 19 shows, almost 80 % of the partnerships in the database can be classified as a PPP according to a very rudimentary definition, simply that they have members from both the public and the private sphere.

**Table 2****Can the partnership be classified as a PPP?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	PPP	269	77,3	79,1
	Not PPP	71	20,4	20,9
	Total	340	97,7	100,0
Missing		8	2,3	
Total		348	100,0	

Regardless of the importance of the discussion on how PPPs should be defined, we can see in table 2 that the public and the private spheres are cooperating in many cases. In four out of five partnerships we find members from both spheres. Whether this finding should be understood as if the “state is still strong” or as if the private sphere get more influence in international policymaking depends on what perspective that is used and what yardstick this finding is measured against.

I would argue that this finding is not sufficient to judge whether the relationship between the public and the private spheres have changed since we cannot say in what ways the cooperation between the members function and how the funding of these PPPs is provided, to just take two examples of important factors that we need to know more about. However, these results can tell us that cooperation between public and private actors are common within the field of sustainable development and that we have many cases to study further in order to answer the questions we cannot find answers to here.

**Table 3****Do the partnership have a focus on environmental politics?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Environmental politics	272	78,2	79,8
	Not environmental politics	69	19,8	20,2
	Total	341	98,0	100,0
Missing		7	2,0	
Total		348	100,0	

What are the partnerships in the CSD Partnership Database working with? They are described as partnerships for sustainable development who are contributing to the implementation of Agenda 21, RIO+5 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (Commission on Sustainable Development, 2011). But what does sustainable development imply? When studying the partnerships registered at CSD one finds that sustainable development can be defined in many ways; as biodiversity, as education or as sanitation, to just name some examples. However, as table 3 above shows, issues related to environmental politics is without doubt the most common theme among the population of partnerships studied here. Almost 80 % state that they are working within an area that can be regarded as environmental politics.

As concerning the number of active partnerships and the frequency of PPPs discussed above, this finding can be interpreted in several ways. If one sees the process from which these partnerships stem as a way to solve the environmental problem of today, this result can be disappointing and affect one's view on the goal rationality of these partnerships. Are all of them really working with issues related to improving the environment? On the other hand, if one has a broader understanding of the concept of sustainable development, one might come to the conclusion that other aspects that are equally important in order to achieve sustainable development are neglected in favour of environmental politics. Regardless of one's understanding of the concept of sustainable development, this discussion shows that what we expect from these partnerships affect how they are to be judged and whether they can be said to work with the "right" issues or not.

By studying these three variables we have been able to nuance the picture of the universe of partnerships within environmental politics a great deal. We know that many of the partnerships in the CSD Partnership Database are not active anymore, that cooperation between public and private actors is common and that many, but far from all, of the partnerships are working with issues related to environmental politics. These simple facts can also give us a hint of how to evaluate them from a legitimacy perspective. Are they living up to our expectations or not? Are they working with the right questions? Are they at all active and bringing public and private actors together in the first place? These questions do mainly relate to the output side of legitimacy and raise questions whether these partnerships are effective and if they could be said to achieve goal rationality. But these findings do also raise questions about how present PPPs really are in this policy area. We can now say how many they are but not how they are working or how they influence the relationship between the public and the private sphere. I would argue that the findings so far are a good and well needed reality check on this area. Now we have the basic outlines of the universe of partnerships and can continue to explore it in more detail.

### 3.3.2 A Detailed Picture

The analyses presented in this section are based on the quantitative study of the 91 active PPPs with a focus on environmental politics registered at CSD. These PPPs have been analysed according to the eight variables presented on page 16 which can also be found in the codebook in Appendix B.

Which areas within environmental politics are these PPPs working with? Table 4 and 5 on page 22 show us this from both a perspective of common good/common bad and in respect to different issue areas within environmental politics. Common good/common bad is a reoccurring conceptual toll used to understand environmental politics. This classification can be used to differentiate between issues that are focused on preventing the degradation of the environment, for example to stop CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions, and issues that concern the protection of existing natural resources, for example rainforests.

Table 4 below show that there is a large majority of PPPs that have a focus on questions framed as common good. The preservation of natural resources, renewable energy and biodiversity are examples of issues of this kind that several of the PPPs are working with. It can be good to remember that it sometimes can be difficult to differentiate between common good and common bad since the same issues can be framed in both ways. I would however argue that the result presented in table 4 give us a fairly good picture of the how the PPPs are portraying their work.

**Table 4**

**Main focus: Common good or common bad?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Common good	69	75,8	76,7
	Common bad	21	23,1	23,3
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
Missing		1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	

Table 5 on page 22 show us in which policy areas the PPPs have their main focus. Here it can be important to note that many of the PPPs have multiple foci, but here are their main focus studied. We see that there is a rather even distribution between the different policy areas but that sustainable development and energy are the most frequent ones. It could however be noted that the topics listed in table 5 are not fully comparable. Sustainable development is for example a much broader issue area than forest or water. The focus on sustainable development could also be explained by the buzzword-aura surrounding this concept.

If one were to analyse the findings presented in tables 4 and 5, I would argue that the relatively large focus on common good-issues could be explained in two ways. Firstly, common good-issues have a more positive sound to it than common bad-issues. From a discursive approach it might be easier to form a partnership with the aim of saving the rainforest in the Amazonas than it is to have the reduction of toxic waste as the partnerships main theme. Secondly, common bad-issues like energy and CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions could be regarded as “hard” questions, closer to the core of the state’s functions. The reason why energy is still a frequent issue area might be explained by that these PPPs often have a focus on the promotion of renewable energy, which is not such a sensitive question as oil or energy security from a perspective of state sovereignty.

Table 4 and 5 told us what issue areas within environmental politics these partnerships are working with, but this did not provide us with any information about how they are working with these questions. As mentioned above, the WSSD in 2002 had a focus on the implementation of international agreements in the area of sustainable development. Are the PPPs stemming from the Johannesburg summit living up to these expectations?

**Table 5****Policy area within environmental politics**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Climate change and atmosphere	10	11,0	11,1
	Sustainable development	19	20,9	21,1
	Water	14	15,4	15,6
	Forest	4	4,4	4,4
	Biodiversity	9	9,9	10,0
	Energy	17	18,7	18,9
	Other	17	18,7	18,9
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
Missing		1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	

As table 6 on page 23 shows, there is a clear overrepresentation of PPPs that can be categorized as agenda setting. 86 % of the studied PPPs have activities related to agenda setting. Here it can be important to note that each PPP can work with several different activities, classified as different parts of the policy process in the table. Agenda setting is in this study representing several different activities, such as network formation, generating and spreading knowledge and awareness raising activities such as conferences or publication of reports.

All of these activities can be seen as “softer” governance tasks with the purpose to change the attitude or the level of knowledge in certain questions. Agenda setting could in this study also be defined in negative terms, as the opposite of direct implementation.

The second most common activity among the PPPs in the study is implementation. Implementation is here defined as an activity that in a direct way contribute to the realization of agreements in environmental politics. This does often imply that the PPPs are working with the realization of a project or searching for funding to be able to do so. One example of a PPP that is working with direct implementation is called the Bicycle Refurbishing Initiative and is working to promote the use of bicycles as a means of transportation in the developing world. Their aims are to reduce CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions and improve the health status of the people involved in their projects. This is done by setting up plants and shops that repair bicycles (Bicycle Refurbishing Initiative, 2004).

Concerning the activities labelled deliberation/rule-setting, provision of goods/services and monitoring, between 10-15 % of the PPPs are working with these activities each.

**Table 6****Focus in a policy process perspective**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
<b>Agenda setting</b>	Yes	79	86,8	86,8
	No	12	13,2	13,2
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Rule-setting</b>	Yes	14	15,4	15,4
	No	77	84,6	84,6
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Provision of goods/services</b>	Yes	11	12,1	12,1
	No	80	87,9	87,9
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Monitoring</b>	Yes	10	11,0	11,0
	No	81	89,0	89,0
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Implementation</b>	Yes	34	37,4	37,4
	No	57	62,6	62,6
	Total	91	100,0	100,0

Are multilateral PPPs within environmental politics fulfilling the legacy from the Johannesburg summit? Are they as effective implementation mechanism as many hoped for? Based on the result in table 6 this is arguably not the case. Only 37 % of the PPPs are working with implementation in a direct sense. Rather we see that a large majority of the PPPs have a focus on different kinds of agenda setting. The proponents of PPPs, which see them as effective tools for implementing public policies, have reasons to be discouraged by the findings of this study.

Let us continue by studying what kind of actors that are members of these 91 PPPs. To study the participation of different kinds of actors is an important aspect of mapping the universe of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. This will tell us what actors that dominate these PPPs and what kind of actors that these PPPs really bring together. The results are presented in table 7 on pages 24 and 25.

Table 7 show the representation of different categories of actors. The figures show the frequency that these actors are members in the 91 PPPs that have been studied. As an example we see that governments from the industrialized world are active in 76,9 % of the PPPs.

**Table 7**  
**Participating actors**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
<b>Governments, industrialized world</b>	Yes	70	76,9	76,9
	No	21	23,1	23,1
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Subnational public actors, industrialized world</b>	Yes	3	3,3	3,3
	No	87	95,6	96,7
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
Missing		1	1,1	
	Total	91	100,0	
<b>Government, developing world</b>	Yes	55	60,4	60,4
	No	36	39,6	39,6
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Subnational public actors, developing world</b>	Yes	3	3,3	3,3
	No	88	96,7	96,7
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Multilateral organizations (UN- bodies)</b>	Yes	75	82,4	82,4
	No	16	17,6	17,6
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>International organizations (EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN)</b>	Yes	61	67,0	67,0
	No	30	33,0	33,0
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>NGOs</b>	Yes	78	85,7	85,7
	No	13	14,3	14,3
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>For-profit private sector</b>	Yes	41	45,1	45,6
	No	49	53,8	54,4
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
Missing		1	1,1	
	Total	91	100,0	

**Table 7 cont.**

<b>Research institutes and foundations</b>	Yes	49	53,8	54,4
	No	41	45,1	45,6
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
Missing		1	1,1	
<b>Total</b>		<b>91</b>	<b>100,0</b>	
<b>Universities</b>	Yes	28	30,8	30,8
	No	63	69,2	69,2
	Total	91	100,0	100,0

If we start with the actors that are less present in these PPPs we find that subnational public actors from both the industrialized and the developing world are members in only three of the 91 PPPs. This finding can probably be explained by the global focus of this context. The fact that these PPPs stem from the international summit in Johannesburg and that they are today administered within the UN-system makes it less likely that local authorities will participate in this kind of collaborations.

Universities are another kind of actor that we find rather seldom among these PPPs. They are members in 30 % of the cases. It is hard to say what this relative underrepresentation is caused by, and whether it is to be regarded as a low number in the first place. One could however argue that environmental politics is a policy area that is characterised by great scientific uncertainty and that scientist have a large influence within this field (Knaggård, 2009, 26-28), which would call for a large presence of universities in these PPPs. On the other hand there are many other forms of research institutes present, which nuances this picture.

A finding that is more noteworthy is the low frequency of business participation in these PPPs. We find actors from for-profit private sector in 45 % of the cases. This can be contrasted to the high representation of NGOs, which are active in 85 % of the PPPs. I find two intuitive explanations to this skewed representation between these two kinds of private actors. Firstly, NGOs are already very active within the field of sustainable development, which makes it more likely that they will participate in these collaborations. Secondly, business might be afraid of the bureaucracy of the UN-system, which can affect the effectiveness of the PPPs in a negative way.

One explanation for business participation in this kind of partnerships that are put forward by several scholars is the so-called “reputational effect”. Private business is according to this argument prone to join activities that work for a good cause as a way to enhance their image among the public and get depicted as a more credible actor. This tendency is sometimes spitefully called “greenwash” as a way to describe how private business use collaborations like the PPPs studied here to improve their image without doing any far-reaching commitments about actually changing their behaviour (Szulecki et al., 2010, 14; Scholtens and Dam, 2007, 1307; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2009, 574).

Hardly to any surprise, we find that different UN-bodies are very frequent in these PPPs. UN's organisations for environmental and development issues, UNEP and UNDP, are most active, but for example UNESCO is also involved in some of the PPPs. This high presence from the UN-system can of course be explained by the context these PPPs exist in and the fact that sustainable development is an important issue for the UN since it can catch almost every thing that the UN are working with.

Concerning the participation of governments we see an imbalance between the industrialized and the developing world. Governments from the industrialized world are present in almost 77 % of the PPPs, while the same number for the developing world is 60 %. This underrepresentation of developing countries is often discussed within the field of international relations (for an example see Jawara and Kwa, 2003, 18-21) and one obvious explanation is the lack of economic resources to actively participate in multilateral initiatives like the PPPs studied here. The representation between industrialized and developing countries found in this study is therefore maybe what we should expect.

In order to get a better picture of how the relationship looks between different actors and which actors that are the driving forces of these PPPs, we will now study the leading actors of the PPPs. Each PPP state which member that are leading the PPP and to study this make us able to nuance the picture painted above. The results are presented in table 8 below.

The results presented in table 8 confirm the results found in table 7 and make the relationship between different actors stand out more starkly than before. To begin with, we see that those categories of actors that were not so frequently present in the PPPs in the first place are not leading so many PPPs. Subnational public actors from both the industrialized and the developing world, for-profit private sector and universities are very unusual as leading actors.

Table 7 showed us that different UN-bodies were present in many of the partnerships and this picture is confirmed now, almost 20 % of the PPPs have an organisation within the UN-family as their leading actor.

**Table 8**  
**Leading actors**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
<b>Governments, industrialized world</b>	Yes	11	12,1
	No	80	87,9
	Total	91	100,0
<b>Subnational public actors, industrialized world</b>	Yes	0	0,0
	No	91	100,0
	Total	91	100,0

**Table 8 cont.**

<b>Government, developing world</b>	Yes	5	5,5	5,5
	No	86	94,5	94,5
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Subnational public actors, developing world</b>	Yes	0	0,0	0,0
	No	91	100,0	100,0
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Multilateral organizations (UN- bodies)</b>	Yes	18	19,8	19,8
	No	73	80,2	80,2
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>International organizations (EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN)</b>	Yes	10	11,0	11,0
	No	81	89,0	89,0
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>NGOs</b>	Yes	32	35,2	35,2
	No	59	64,8	64,8
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>For-profit private sector</b>	Yes	4	4,4	4,4
	No	87	95,6	95,6
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Research institutes and foundations</b>	Yes	10	11,0	11,0
	No	81	89,0	89,0
	Total	91	100,0	100,0
<b>Universities</b>	Yes	1	1,1	1,1
	No	90	98,9	98,9
	Total	91	100,0	100,0

I would say that two results in this part of the study are especially interesting and worthwhile to highlight. First, we see that NGOs are leading 35 % of the PPPs, which I find two possible explanations to. The NGOs are active in the field of sustainable development and therefore used to work in networks and having a global focus, which might make them more suitable to lead these kind of initiatives and also more prone to do so. Another thing that can explain the high frequency of NGOs as leading actors is that some of the PPPs have their own secretariat stated as the

leading actor, which have been categorized as a NGO. The choice to make this classification can of course be questioned, but I would argue that this is the best way to look upon the secretariat of a PPP since they are bodies of their own with no profit-seeking ambitions.

The other interesting finding is the frequency of governments from the industrialized and the developing world respectively as leading actors. In table 7 we saw that the industrialized world were more frequently represented in the PPPs than governments from the developing world. This pattern is now made even clearer. 12 % of the PPPs have a government from the industrialized world, as leading actor while the same number for the developing world is 5 %. This skewed representation is probably just another sign that developing countries do not have the economic resources or the experience to be leading actors in this context.

Now we are starting to get a fairly good picture of the universe of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. To find out more and enhance our understanding further, we will now study where these PPPs are active. This knowledge is interesting on its own, but can also put earlier findings in a new light. To study this the following five geographical categories will be used: OECD-countries, EU-members, developing countries, the emerging economies in the BRICS-group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The definition of LDCs has been taken from UN's High Representative on this issue (UN-OHRLLS, 2011). These five categories have been used to map where the PPPs are active and the findings are presented in table 9 on page 29. It can be good to note that each PPP can have activities in countries belonging to several of the different categories.

If we study table 9 we find that developing countries are the most common target group for the PPPs' activities, almost 88 % of the PPPs state that they have some kind of activity in one or more developing countries. OECD-countries and the countries within the BRICS-group are home of the activities of around 50 % of the PPPs. It is of course difficult to say what conclusions we should draw from these findings but I would like to highlight two things. First, there is a discrepancy between where the PPPs are active and what actors that are members and leading actors of these initiatives. As we discovered in tables 7 and 8, the developing world are less represented than the industrialized world. But here we find that a majority of the PPPs are active in countries belonging to the developing world.

Whether this condition is to be analysed as an imperialist move from the industrialized world or as a friendly gesture directed towards the developing world, is up to the reader to decide.

However, I would argue that this finding can be seen as a support for the argument that multilateral PPPs risk reproducing existing power structures in international politics (Bäckstrand, 2010).

**Table 9****Target group**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
<b>OECD-countries</b>	Yes	49	53,8	54,4
	No	41	45,1	45,6
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
	Missing	1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	
<b>EU-members</b>	Yes	36	39,6	40,0
	No	54	59,3	60,0
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
	Missing	1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	
<b>Developing countries</b>	Yes	79	86,8	87,8
	No	11	12,1	12,2
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
	Missing	1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	
<b>BRICS-countries</b>	Yes	46	50,5	51,1
	No	44	48,4	48,9
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
	Missing	1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	
<b>Least Developed Countries</b>	Yes	41	45,1	45,6
	No	49	53,8	54,4
	Total	90	98,9	100,0
	Missing	1	1,1	
Total		91	100,0	

Secondly, the focus on developing countries shown above can be related to what we found concerning the issue areas that these PPPs are working with, presented in table 5. There we saw that many PPPs focused on issues connected to the management of natural resources, like water or biodiversity, which to some extent could explain the large focus on common good-issues found in table 4. I would argue that questions of management of natural resource are more acute in many parts of the developing world, while common bad-issues, like the reduction of CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions, are more pressing in the industrialized world. So we can see a connection between the focus in policy areas and the geographical focus.

Another way to study the focus of these PPPs is to investigate how broad their geographical scope is. In table 10 we see how many of the PPPs that have a global, regional, national or local scope in their activities. Before we analyse the results it should be noted that the separation between these categories can be difficult to uphold. This problematic can be exemplified by a PPP that is active in a number of local communities in several countries. Should such a PPP be defined as having a local, national or regional scope? To deal with this problem I have chosen to classify the PPPs according to their own description of their activity. By this approach all the units are treated in the same way and we get a good picture of how the PPPs portray themselves.

**Table 10**

**Scope**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Global	54	59,3	59,3
	Regional	31	34,1	34,1
	National	6	6,6	6,6
	Local	0	0,0	0,0
	Total	91	100,0	100,0

As we see in table 10, a large majority, almost 60 %, of the PPPs state that they have a global scope of their activites. A regional scope is the second most common with almost 35 % of the PPPs. One example of a PPP with a regional scope is the Congo Basin Forest Partnership who works with protection of biodiversity and the promotion of good forest governance in countries sharing the Congo River in Central Africa (Congo Basin Forest Partnership, 2004).

On the other hand there are very few cases with a strict national scope and there is not a single PPP that state that they have a local scope. I find two possible explanations to these results. As mentioned several times before, the context the partnerships studied here are situated in have a global focus, which makes it more likely that the PPPs are to have that as well. The other possible explanation is that “global” can be seen as a buzzword and that many actors uses it without reflecting upon if it really is a suitable word to describe their activities.

We started this overview of the WSSD PPPs by studying how many of them that was active in the first place. We will now conclude this journey by investigating what kind of resources these PPPs have. In this context resources will be seen in a broad perspective in order to catch several aspects of the underlying preconditions of the PPPs’ ability to function as an organisation. Before we continue to analyse the results regarding this variable, it has to be noted that it has been highly problematic to find reliable and updated data regarding the resources of the PPPs in this study. For example many PPPs do not simply state how much funding they have received and where it comes from. In table 11 we see that there is a high frequency of missing cases, which implies that we need to be careful when analysing these results.

I would like to highlight two things in connection to the findings presented in table 11. To begin with, it seems like the PPPs receive more funding from public actors than from private one, or are at least more prone to give an account of funding from public actors.

**Table 11**

**Resources**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
<b>Public funding</b>	Yes	58	63,7	79,5
	No	15	16,5	20,5
	Total	73	80,2	100,0
	Missing	18	19,8	
	Total	91	100,0	
<b>Private funding</b>	Yes	36	39,6	52,2
	No	33	36,3	47,8
	Total	69	75,8	100,0
	Missing	22	24,2	
	Total	91	100,0	
<b>Organisational capacity</b>	Yes	58	63,7	92,1
	No	5	5,5	7,9
	Total	63	69,2	100,0
	Missing	28	30,8	
	Total	91	100,0	
<b>Staff</b>	Yes	64	70,3	92,8
	No	5	5,5	7,2
	Total	69	75,8	100,0
	Missing	22	24,2	
	Total	91	100,0	

If this finding corresponds with how it actually looks in reality, it would highlight the question of what effects the PPPs have on the relation between the public and private sphere. If public actors provide a majority of the funding it can be questioned whether the power relations are changing due to the growth of PPPs in international policymaking. This finding does also highlight the question whether PPPs really are a new phenomenon. Maybe the public-private interaction looks like it has done before, and that only the label has changed. However, a more accurate and reliable account of the PPPs funding would be very interesting in order to study public-private relations in international policymaking in more detail.

The second finding I would like to highlight concerns the organizational capacity and if the PPPs have any staff or not. Since these figures show how many of

the PPPs that have a rudimentary form of organisational structure, we have reasons to be concerned. All the missing values tell us that the large number of PPPs has an unclear organisational structure, which is a precondition to be able to function at all.

However, these results should be analysed with great care since there are a lot of missing values. Therefore I would argue that these findings cannot tell us much about how the PPPs are organised.

### 3.4 Nuances that Both Clarifies and Complicates

Our journey through the universe of multilateral partnerships within environmental politics has now come to an end and our knowledge about this form of governance is much bigger now than when we started.

We do now have a nuanced picture that enables us to pose more relevant questions and examine if previous research on multilateral PPPs can be understood in other ways when it is confronted with the empirical findings presented here. I would argue that the most valuable insight from this empirical mapping is that we see that PPPs in international politics is a much more heterogeneous and diversified group of actors than sometimes depicted in the literature. This makes it doubtful whether all the PPPs studied here can be analysed in the same way. The nuances also make us question if we have a suiting definition of this form of governance. What is really the most critical characteristic of a PPP?

# 4 Legitimacy From a Quantitative Approach

In this chapter we will use the empirical results from the quantitative study to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. This evaluation will be guided by some of the values associated to legitimacy stipulated in the analytical framework.

## 4.1 A Legitimate Universe?

Input legitimacy refers to the decision-making process of a political entity. In this section the input legitimacy of the PPPs studied in the quantitative part will be evaluated according to the values of representation and inclusion. As seen in the analytical framework in section 2.3, these values are not the only ones associated to input legitimacy, but they are the only ones that we can find answers to with the data the quantitative study is based on.

Studying the participation of different actors in these PPPs will make us able to evaluate this form of governance according to the value of *representation*. This is an important element in the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs. They carry hopes of bringing different actors together in ways that will improve the policymaking process. But can they realize these hopes? This is the first question that we will try to answer in this section.

Table 7 on pages 24 and 25 presents the frequency with which different kind of actors participates in these PPPs. It showed us that the representation was skewed in favour of the industrialized world. Also business actors and universities could be said to be underrepresented. These are tendencies that affect our evaluation of the representation negatively.

However, the PPPs bring a broad range of different actors together and the question is whether they would have collaborated in this fashion at all without these PPPs as a common platform. I would argue that the PPPs studied here constitutes a good and as far as I know unique form of organisation for this kind of collaboration. The partnerships in this study are also a rather flexible platform that can be used in many ways and for many purposes, which might encourage actors to form PPPs.

The 91 PPPs studied here must be said to fulfil the value of representation fairly well. They bring together actors that unlikely would have worked in this way otherwise, which is a fundamental rationale for forming PPPs. I would argue that not

only the PPPs' are to blame for the imbalance between the industrialised and the developing world, rather it is to be seen as an underlying condition of international relations. Of course it would have been good if the PPPs would have tried to even out these differences. However, the skewed representation should not affect our evaluation of the legitimacy of these PPPs too much.

Rather I think that the underrepresentation of business actors is more harmful for the legitimacy of these PPPs, since one argument in favour of partnerships is that business participation will make public policymaking more effective. But if business actors are not present in the first place, a learning process between public and the private sphere cannot take place. Therefore it would be interesting to further study the incentives for business to join, or not to join, initiatives like these.

The underrepresentation of business actors also highlights the question whether the growth of PPPs in international policymaking really changes the relation between the public and the private sphere. If states and UN-bodies are still dominating the policymaking process, the democratic threat posed by PPPs can be questioned, which in turn affects how we are to understand them from a legitimacy perspective.

Let us continue by evaluate the PPPs from the perspective of *inclusion*. This value is of course related to representation, since they both concern the decision-making process and how different actors take part in that process. Inclusion does however imply a more qualitative judgement of the decision-making process, while representation only concerns the presence of different actors. Now we would like to know in what ways different actor are allowed to take place in the decision-making of these PPPs. By the quantitative approach used in this thesis, this evaluation will be done by studying the participation of different actors, the leading actors and the geographical scope of the PPPs.

If the results presented in tables 7, 8 and 9 are combined we are able evaluate the inclusion of different actors in these PPPs since it provide us with a good picture of which actors that are present in the first place, which actors that are leading the PPPs and where they are working. The most striking finding among these results is the imbalance between the industrialized and the developing world. Governments from the industrialized world are leading more PPPs. At the same time a large majority of the PPPs are active in the developing world. This finding makes us question whether these PPPs include effected stakeholders in a satisfactory way. I would argue that this finding is highly negative for our evaluation of the PPPs' legitimacy since it strikes at the core of the rationale of PPP as a good form of governance. If UN's multi-stakeholder partnerships do not let affected stakeholders take part in the decision-making process, why should we invest in these initiatives?

Even though we find clear patterns that the PPPs are active in the developing world and that the industrialized world are more influential, we cannot say how the relationship between the actors looks like in each PPP. It should also be noted that a certain stakeholder does not have to be the leading actor in order to take part in the decision-making process.

Maybe one could conclude that the PPPs are better in bringing a broad range of different actors together than they are to make affected stakeholders active in the decision-making process. Here it is important to note that this conclusion can prove

imprecise or even incorrect if the decision-making of these PPPs are studied in more detail, but I would argue that according to the findings in the quantitative study, we are right to question the level of participation of different actors in these PPPs. It is also important to give the PPPs the credit they deserve for being platforms that facilitate collaboration between public and private actors, which might turn out highly valuable when we evaluate this form of governance in the future.

Let us now continue by examining the output legitimacy of the PPPs within international environmental politics. The values effectiveness and goal rationality will guide this part of the evaluation.

*Effectiveness* is in this study defined as whether the PPPs are good, or not, at achieving their goals. However, to measure the impacts of a PPP within the field of environmental politics is extremely difficult. As an example, how are we to say if the activities of a certain PPP have caused a reduction in CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions? The causal relationships are very difficult to identify and this is something that several scholars have tried to overcome by using the output of a PPP as a proxy for measuring effectiveness (Szulecki et al., 2010, 3; Schäferhoff et al., 2009, 460). This approach is of course arbitrary but it is probably the best method we have for measuring effectiveness from a quantitative approach.

To begin with, in table 1 on page 18 we find that more than half of the 348 partnerships registered at CSD are not active at all. This finding will of course affect our evaluation of the effectiveness negatively. This will however depend on the expectations we have on this universe of partnerships. The short time frame of many of these partnerships could be interpreted in two ways, as a sign that these PPPs are not influencing international environmental politics in any profound way, or as a proof of the flexibility of this form of governance.

Concerning the time it takes for an organisation to be functioning in the first place, I would argue that the short time frame of many of these partnerships observed in the quantitative study question their capacity to function in an effective way. I find it highly unlikely that a multilateral PPP, with members from several different countries and different spheres of society, will work effectively after just a few years. If one concur with this interpretation, the conclusion cannot be anything else than that these PPPs cannot be regarded as effective since so many of them are not active in the first place.

The other interpretation of this finding is that it highlights the flexibility of this form of governance. A PPP can be formed by affected partners and work with a specific issue for a short period of time and then be closed down. From this point of view a more flexible governing mode is hard to image and that is exactly why PPPs can be a valuable piece in the puzzle of global governance. This interpretation rhymes well with the finding that a large majority of the PPPs are working with issues defined as different forms of agenda setting, presented in table 6 on page 23. Different awareness-rising activities are probably easier to conduct in a successful way during a short period of time than direct implementation, which requires more collaboration with actors outside of the PPP.

To conclude, I would argue that the level of activity, and thereby the effectiveness of these PPPs, can be strongly questioned in relation to the findings presented here.

Another output value concerns if the PPPs are working with what they say they do, in other word *goal rationality*. Are their activities coherent with their goals?

When using a quantitative approach we cannot study the stipulated goals of every individual PPP. Instead we have to formulate some overarching goals that can be applied to all the PPPs. As mentioned in section 3.1, the Johannesburg summit was faced with the expectations of accelerating the implementation of existing agreements in the area of sustainable development. If we transfer this goal to the population of PPPs, we can use the results presented in table 6 on page 23 to evaluate their legitimacy according to the value of goal rationality. In table 6 we found that a large majority of the PPPs are working with issues connected to agenda setting. Only 37 % of the PPPs are working with implementation in a direct sense. So if one belongs to the proponents of PPPs that see them as an effective tool for implementing public policies, one should get rather discouraged by the findings of this study.

However, two things should be mentioned that nuances this gloomy conclusion. Firstly, taking the short time frame of many of the PPPs in this study into consideration, we are probably needed to revise our expectations. To hope that these PPPs should implement international agreements in a difficult policy area in just a few years time is probably to hope for too much. Secondly, even though many of the PPPs are working in ways that cannot be classified as direct implementation, their work today might produce the necessary preconditions for future implementation.

“Capacity building” is a common phrase in the discourse among multilateral PPPs within environmental politics and do, even though it is a fuzzy concept, highlight something important. They might produce the networks or the knowledge needed to achieve direct implementation in the future.

This result can also be related to the value of deliberation. These PPPs might not work with implementation to the extent that we have hoped for, but they can still fulfil other of the values associated to legitimacy. To form networks and to organize conferences can be ways of enhancing deliberation in international policymaking. These activities have the possibility to let more groups be heard in the discussion of a certain policy area. This might also produce a common understanding among the actors within a specific field, which would have been difficult to achieve in other ways. A common understanding might also give positive effects on the policymaking process since it produce greater confidence among the actors involved.

## 4.2 What Is the Contribution of Multilateral PPPs?

To summarize, the findings presented in this section can lead us to the conclusion that PPPs are not effective and do not achieve goal rationality. On the other hand,

we can see this result as if the PPPs are contributing with fora for deliberation and building capacity for future implementation. My conclusion would be that these PPPs can contribute with something valuable to international policymaking in their roles as networks and possible fora for deliberation, but at the same time that we need to revise our expectations regarding what this form of governance can achieve in terms of direct implementation under often short time frames.

# 5 Multilateral PPPs in Close-Up

This chapter will examine multilateral PPPs within environmental politics in close-up. In the previous chapters we have been given an overview of this large group PPPs and evaluated their legitimacy from a quantitative approach. Now it is time to complement this general picture with details that can enhance our understanding and put the insights from the quantitative study in another perspective.

Section 5.1 will present three interesting PPPs within the field of energy politics and give a brief account of their history and organisational structure. The legitimacy of these three PPPs will then be evaluated in section 5.2.

Through this chapter references will be made to the findings in the previous chapters in order to highlight similarities and differences.

## 5.1 Interesting Cases

The three multilateral PPPs studied in this section are active within the field of energy politics and are registered in the CSD Partnership Database. They have been selected for these case studies of two reasons. Firstly, they belong to the same issue area within environmental politics, which enable us to compare them in a good way. Secondly, these three PPPs stand out in the larger group of multilateral PPPs studied previously in this thesis. They are more active and institutionalized than many other PPPs. They can be seen as leading and influential actors, which makes them relevant to study. If they set the standard for how multilateral PPPs within the field are to work and organise themselves, they can tell us something about where other PPPs are heading. The three PPPs that will be studied in this part of the thesis are Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21<sup>st</sup> century and Global Bioenergy Partnership.

*The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)* could be seen as a golden standard for how multilateral PPPs within the field of environmental politics should work. With their 350 partners, of whom 45 are governments, REEEP is one of the largest PPPs within the field (REEEP, 2011). REEEP is a tri-sectoral initiative, which means that they have governments, business and NGOs as partners (compare with the discussion in Abbott and Snidal, 2009). REEEP were established in 2002 in connection to the Johannesburg summit. In 2004 REEEP was turned into an independent association and the UK and Austrian governments provided funds to set up an international secretariat in Vienna (Parthan et al., 2010, 84).

The overarching aim of REEEP is to accelerate the market for renewable energy sources. In this work they have a special focus on emerging markets and developing countries where a large majority of their projects are carried out (Shi, 2010, 36-37). In order to move towards their goal of increasing the share of renewable energy sources on the global energy market, REEEP works with three broad tasks; 1) initiate and fund projects, 2) develop and support policymaker networks and 3) disseminate and replicate learnings (REEEP, 2011). The third task have an influence on the other two since REEEP are seeking projects that easily can be replicated in other contexts and work with other organisations when building policy networks (Florini and Sovacool, 2009). During the period between 2004 and 2009, the donors of REEEP provided € 11 million to around 130 projects in 56 countries, which resulted in additionally € 27 million from other actors (Parthan et al., 2010).

In order to facilitate the policymaker networks and spread knowledge about renewable energy, REEEP have initiated a number of web-based platforms. Reegle, a information gateway, and Reil, a platform that connects information about renewable energy and international law, are two examples (REEEP, 2011).

REEEP has a well developed organisational structure with several governing bodies that fulfil different tasks. The General Assembly is the highest body of the organisation and is responsible for the overall guidance of REEEP. The Governing Board and the International Secretariat in Vienna are in turn responsible for the everyday steering of the organisation. REEEP do also have five regional secretariats that represent the organisation in specific projects in respective region of the world (REEEP, 2011).

The governance structure seems to be transparent and is actually similar to traditional international organisations. Some scholars have even raised the question of how different REEEP, and other similar PPPs, are from traditional international organisations and what they can provide to the multilateral policymaking process (Szulecki et al., 2010). A possible answer to this question is given by Florini and Sovacool (2009) when they argue that REEEP are smaller and work together with private actors in a higher degree than most international organisations.

*The Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21<sup>st</sup> century (REN21)* can be placed in the same group of high performing PPPs as REEEP (Szulecki et al., 2010), and obviously they work within the same issue area. However, there are some interesting differences between REN21 and REEEP concerning their function within the policy area.

REN21 describe their organisation as a global policy network that provides a forum for international leadership. Their aim is to bolster policy development that will lead to the expansion of renewable energy sources in both industrialized and developing countries (REN21, 2011). They highlight that they see themselves as a network and not as a partnership. REN21 does not have any authoritative power in relation to the members of the PPP. Rather, REN21 emphasises that the organisation is dependent on its partners for its success and that their main role is to bring different actors together (REN21, 2004).

In resemblance to REEEP, REN21 work with three broad themes to achieve their goal; 1) policy, which implies awareness raising activities, 2) advocacy, they

bring important actors together which will enhance the chances of profound policy development and 3) exchange, they provide knowledge flows within the field of renewable energy (REN21, 2011).

REN21 stem from the conference “Renewables 2004” held in Bonn and is today one of the most well known PPP within the field of energy policy. The PPP is open for a wide variety of stakeholders, such as governments, international organisations, NGOs, industry and also other PPPs, which rhymes well with their ambition of being an important forum within the area of energy policy. Regarding REN21’s organisational structure, they have three bodies that complement each other in the governing of the network. The Steering Committee is composed of representatives from different groups and is responsible for the structural development of the PPP. The Bureau makes the general decisions when the Steering Committee is not present and the Secretariat, based in Paris, provides the network with administrative support (REN21, 2011).

The most visible of REN21’s activities is the annual publication of the Renewables Global Status Report, which is recognised worldwide within this policy area (Shi, 2010, 35). They do also provide several interactive tools on their web page that is used to disseminate knowledge about renewable energy sources.

*The Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP)* is the youngest of the three PPPs studied in this part of the thesis. GBEP is the result of a meeting of G8+5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) in 2005 where the participating governments decided to promote the use of bioenergy. After a short consultation process GBEP were established in 2006 and registered in the CSD Partnership Database in 2007. Since its initiation GBEP have received continuous support from the G8-group, to whom GBEP annually have reported on its progress (GBEP, 2011).

GBEP have a broad focus within its specific field, including aspects such as production, delivery and conversion of biomass for energy (Shi, 2010, 37). It is clear that GBEP is working towards an expansion, though in a sustainable way, of the use of biomass as an energy source. However, due to its broad focus, it is difficult to identify a clearly stipulated goal that GBEP is working towards. Rather, the field of biomass energy is defining the area of GBEP’s activities. This ambiguity is enhanced by the fact that GBEP state that they are working with several vaguely described tasks, such as high-level dialogue, support to policy-makers and cooperate with other relevant initiatives (GBEP, 2011).

GBEP have members from several different groups of actors; governments from both industrialized and developing countries, business, international organisations and several UN-bodies. There are also several governments and organisations that have observer status in the GBEP. The leadership is rotating among the partners on an annual basis (GBEP, 2011).

As in the case of REEEP and REN21, GBEP have a well developed organisational structure. The Steering Committee is the highest decision-making body of the organisation and meet twice a year to provide strategic leadership for the organisation. The Secretariat, which is based in FAO’s headquarters in Rome and funded by the Italian government, is responsible for the coordination and the communication of GBEP’s activities, both internally and externally. GBEP do also

have two task forces that is focused on sustainability and green house gas methodologies respectively, these are working with more technical analysis within respective subfield.

To conclude, GBEP could be described as a more technical oriented PPP than REN21, which have a strict focus on bringing relevant actors together (Suding and Lempp, 2007, 8).

The description of the three PPPs above have given us a more detailed picture of how influential PPPs within the field of environmental politics can look like. We can now see that they have different roles and work in different ways, but that they are organised in fairly the same way. We will now continue by evaluating the legitimacy of REEEP, REN21 and GBEP.

## 5.2 Evaluating their Legitimacy

All of the three PPPs studied here are bringing a wide variety of different actors together. They are all tri-sectoral, which implies that they include actors from governments, international organisations, civil society and business. This must be seen as highly positive for the legitimacy of PPPs from a perspective of representation. I argue that REEEP, REN21 and GBEP could be used by the proponents of PPPs as prominent examples of how different actors can collaborate in new ways.

However, as we saw concerning the *representation* of different actors among the 91 active PPPs studied earlier, there are some actors that are hardly present in the PPPs at all. Subnational public actors and universities are the two most apparent examples. The relative absence of local or regional public actors can probably be explained by the global focus of these PPPs. However, a more active participation of local actors could probably be valuable when these PPPs are to implement their projects. The absence of universities is, as mentioned in section 3.2.2, more difficult to explain but they could without doubt also bring something valuable to this policy area.

However, one difference we can observe in REEEP, REN21 and GBEP compared to the larger group of PPPs is that business representatives are more present. This is an important rationale for PPPs as a form of governance and is consequently good for the evaluation of the three PPPs studied here.

I would argue that REEEP, REN21 and GBEP fulfil the value of representation in a satisfactory way. If one is looking for excellent examples of how multi-stakeholder collaboration can be organised, one does not have to look any further.

Let us continue by evaluating these PPPs according to the value of *inclusion*. In the quantitative part we saw a rather stark difference in the inclusion of different actors. The industrialized world was more influential in the leadership of the PPPs than governments from the developing world. In REEEP, REN21 and GBEP we see similar trends. One example is the influence of the donor countries in the process

of selecting projects in REEEP. This could however be seen as a natural thing since the donor countries, like the UK, Norway and Italy, should have a say regarding where their money is going. However, it is impossible not to see this as a sign of the imbalance in the influence of the industrialized and the developing world. The overall pattern is that the projects is funded by the industrialised world and carried out in the developing world.

Another example of the imbalance in the inclusion of the industrialised and the developing world can be found in GBEP. Governments and international organisations from the developing world, like the African Developing Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, are more frequent as observers, and not as participating actors, than their counterparts from the industrialised world. The close connection between GBEP and G8 could also make us question the relative influence of different actors.

However, as mentioned on page 27, we should not blame these PPPs too hard for the skewed inclusion between the industrialised and the developing world. This is without doubt a problematic aspect in the record of the PPPs' legitimacy, but existing power structures cannot be ignored when evaluating these PPPs. We could also see findings presented above as a way for the industrialised and the developing world to cooperate in new and less formal ways that can bridge the gap between the two groups.

If REEEP, REN21 and GBEP performed well regarding the value of representation, their track record concerning inclusion is somewhat worse but still acceptable. The flaws are mainly products of the international political system, rather than the PPPs as a form of governance.

*Transparency* is an important value associated to legitimacy. It is a precondition for accountability, which is something that PPPs have been accused of lacking.

In relation to the material at hand, I would like to highlight two aspects regarding the transparency of the three PPPs studied here; their organisational structure and their sometimes vaguely defined goals.

As depicted in section 5.1, REEEP, REN21 and GBEP have well developed organisational structures. They are organisationally divided into several governing bodies that have clearly stated tasks and complement each other in the organisation. This could be seen as a sign of a transparent decision-making process. The PPPs are also open with dates of the meetings of respective governing body. GBEP do even provide summaries from past meetings of the Steering Committee and other bodies, which is highly valuable for someone outside GBEP that would like to follow their work. All of these PPPs are also open with contact information, background of the PPP and FAQs. This enables outsiders to get a fairly good picture of the PPPs and their activities by just visiting their web pages.

So far REEEP, REN21 and GBEP have performed rather well when being evaluated according to transparency. They have well developed and open organisational structures and seem to be open towards the general public. However, one thing that soils this rosy picture is the sometimes vaguely stated goals. GBEP is maybe the most apparent example with their broad focus on almost all aspects of bioenergy. This makes it difficult for both insiders and outsiders to judge the

activities of the PPP, which is an important aspect from a perspective of accountability. This is maybe symptomatic for this form of governance and the same kind of critique could be posed towards many of the PPPs studied in chapters 3 and 4. When a PPP's main task is to be a forum for discussion or disseminate information, it is hard to judge whether the goals are achieved or not.

My overall conclusion about the transparency of REEEP, REN21 and GBEP is that they have the necessary preconditions in order to have transparent decision-making processes. The transparency and thereby the accountability is though impaired by the vaguely defined goals.

Increased *deliberation* in international politics is one of the most influential ideas of how to move towards global democracy (Dryzek, 2006). With the data presented in these case studies we will be able to examine what possibilities REEEP, REN21 and GBEP have to be deliberative arenas in multilateral environmental politics.

This is without doubt one of the aspects where multilateral PPPs can give the biggest contribution. REN21 is the best example among the three PPPs studied here. Their clearly stated goal is to be a network, not a partnership, for important actors in the area of renewable energy. In what ways they fulfil that goal is difficult to say for sure. They do at least have visible activity aimed at facilitating deliberation among different actors in the field. REEEP and GBEP do also work with creating deliberative fora, even though they have a broader focus compared to REN21. The task forces within GBEP are one good example. They meet regularly and enable interested stakeholders to discuss technical issues related to bioenergy.

These findings can be related to the results presented on page 23. In table 6 we saw that a large majority of the 91 active PPPs in CSD Partnership Database are working with issues defined as agenda setting. One exception from this trend is REEEP who are also working with implementing a large number of projects.

Even though these case studies have provided us with a better understanding of how multilateral PPPs can play a deliberative role in environmental politics, we cannot say how the deliberation looks within the PPPs. The discussions could be dominated by certain actors, which would reduce the deliberative contribution of these PPPs. The close connection between GBEP and G8 is for example one source of concern.

I would argue that REEEP, REN21 and GBEP have the preconditions to give a profound contribution to the deliberation within international environmental politics. The fora they provide are probably a well needed complement to traditional political stages as the UN.

We shall now continue by evaluating REEEP, REN21 and GBEP from an output-perspective. What is the output of these three PPPs and do their work correspond to their stipulated goals?

As discussed in connection to the quantitative evaluation of the legitimacy of the PPPs in the CSD Partnership Database, measuring the impact of a PPP within environmental politics is virtually impossible. Instead we looked at the level of activity and organisational structure as a proxy for *effectiveness*. The same logic will be used here, with the difference that these case studies provide us more detailed data.

REEEP, REN21 and GBEP are without doubt active. It was one of the reasons why they were selected for this qualitative part of the thesis. They are leading PPPs and can hopefully tell us something about where the larger group of PPPs is heading. REEEP, REN21 and GBEP arrange conferences, participates in meetings, publish reports with wide recognition, provide web-based knowledge platforms, and much more. Actors within the field of energy politics cannot miss to see the presence of these PPPs.

However, being active is not the same as having an impact and these PPPs could be accused of working in ways that give them as much publicity as possible (Szulecki et al., 2010, 10). This will make them noticed and recognised actor, but will not necessarily contribute to change our energy systems, which is the overarching aim of REEEP, REN21 and GBEP.

I would argue that there is an apparent risk that this is the case. As discussed in chapter 3, many PPPs are focused on “softer” tasks that are far easier to succeed with. The only exception in these case studies is REEEP, which through their work have contributed with considerable amounts of money to renewable energy projects.

These findings can be analysed in two ways. Firstly, multilateral PPPs within environmental politics have considerable difficulties with filling the implementation gap in ways that many have hoped for. Secondly, if we believe in the first conclusion, we should revise our expectations on multilateral PPPs. If we were honest and said that these PPPs can, at best, be deliberative fora that provide input to the policy-making process, our judgements would be more nuanced.

The last aspect of legitimacy that will be analysed in this section is *goal rationality*, which can be related to several earlier discussions. When goal rationality was evaluated from a quantitative approach in chapter 4, we had to use the general expectations from the Johannesburg summit and apply them to the universe of PPPs. In these case studies we can instead study the stipulated goals of each PPP and see whether their activities are ways towards those goals or not.

The PPP that are easiest to analyse from this perspective is REN21. They have a clearly stated goal of being a network where actors within renewable energy can meet and form policies. REN21 is working towards this goal by being active in biannual conferences on renewable energy, last time held in Delhi in 2010. This is however only one of the things REN21 is working with. Among other things they publish annual reports and provide an interactive map of renewable energy projects. These activities can of course be valuable, but it is less clear how they will contribute in creating a ” global policy network”.

As mentioned earlier, REEEP could be seen as a golden standard for multilateral PPPs. They have a broad focus on renewable energy and a large number of partners. Their aim is to catalyst the market for renewable energy in order to increase the share of renewable energy sources. REEEP is the PPP with the most varied activities of the ones studied here. They fund projects, provide web-based information platforms and participate in conferences and meetings. It is however difficult to say what effect these activities have in regard to the overarching aim of REEEP. To begin with, REEEP deserves credit for being one of few PPPs that is working with direct implementation, which can actually contribute to change the energy mix. However,

REEEP's other activities is maybe best seen as *capacity building*, which can be valuable in the longer run but have a smaller impact today.

GBEP is due to its vaguely stipulated goals harder to evaluate from the perspective of goal rationality. It is hard to say whether GBEP's activities are working towards the functions they would like to fill. However, we can say that they are active within the field of bioenergy and thereby have the possibilities of having a real impact. I would again argue that vaguely stated goals could be seen as a way to avoid scrutiny of the organisation's effectiveness.

To conclude this evaluation I would like to highlight two things. Firstly, the biggest contribution of the three PPPs studied in this chapter is probably their role as a *deliberative arena* where a wide variety of actors can meet. This is a new mechanism in multilateral policymaking that hopefully can lead to an increased understanding within the field of environmental politics.

Secondly, our hopes of multilateral PPPs as *effective problem-solvers* are the greatest source of concern. These case studies show that few PPPs are working with direct implementation and we need to revise our expectations on what these PPPs can achieve.

## 6 Conclusions

The ambition of this thesis has been to nuance the scholarly debate on PPPs and their role in international politics. The expectations directed towards PPPs as a policy instrument is sometimes high, but these expectations are not always based on empirical knowledge about this form of governance. This thesis is one small contribution to the work of filling that empirical gap.

When studying multilateral PPPs in this thesis we have found several interesting results. To begin with, the quantitative study gave us a well-needed overview of the universe of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. We do now know that a large majority of these PPPs are active in developing countries and work with different forms of agenda setting and awareness raising activities. We did also find that the inclusion of affected stakeholders can be questioned since industrialised countries and UN-bodies seems to be more influential than the developing countries where many of these PPPs are active.

When evaluating these PPPs from a legitimacy perspective we found results that raised both hopes and concerns about the contribution of multilateral PPPs to international policymaking. The most important finding is without doubt that many of these PPPs are not the effective implementers that many of us have hoped. Since many of them are not even active and since a large majority of the active PPPs are working with agenda setting, we cannot say that these PPPs are filling the implementation gap in international environmental politics and thereby live up to the expectations from the Johannesburg summit held in 2002. On the other hand we see that these PPPs bring a wide variety of actors together and form deliberative fora that can contribute with something highly valuable in international policymaking.

Many of the interesting findings in this thesis show us with great clarity that our expectations on a political entity influence our judgements of that entity to a great extent. Maybe these multilateral PPPs are better seen as networks that bring relevant actors together and disseminate knowledge and experiences within a policy field. In this role they can contribute with something valuable and become a less formal meeting-point. The PPPs studied in the case studies showed us many examples of how such a work can be conducted in a successful way.

Of course we should not give up all our hopes that multilateral PPPs also can implement public policies in an effective way. REEEP is one prominent example of how PPPs can work with direct implementation. However, in regard to how the universe of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics looks today, we better revise our expectations and see these PPPs for what they really are; a form of governance that is still in its infancy and can provide the international policymaking with valuable input, but that are not ready to be effective implementers. PPPs are maybe best seen as a complement to other forms of political organisation and not as

a golden third way or a win-win solution. By revising our expectations in this direction we will be able to evaluate multilateral PPPs in a more nuanced and fair way.

One of the most important theoretical tools in the literature on PPPs is the differentiation between *input* and *output legitimacy*. This line of thinking has also been used in this thesis. When PPPs are discussed in theoretical terms they are not seldom accused of prioritizing output over input. I would however argue that it has been difficult to identify the conflict between input and output legitimacy among the PPPs studied in this thesis. The PPPs have flaws and merits concerning values connected to both input and output legitimacy, therefore it is hard to say that this form of governance is prioritizing certain values over others.

I would though still argue that this theoretical tool is useful since it makes the analysis of legitimacy more manageable. However, we should maybe be aware of that the PPPs studied here and other forms of political organisation are too complex, and are constrained by what is feasible, in order for us to clearly identify the tension between input and output legitimacy.

As one last and concluding remark of this thesis, I would like to return to *the question of what a PPP really is*. In the beginning we defined a PPP as “institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the provision of collective goods” (Schäferhoff et al., 2009, 455). This seemed as a clearly stated and useful definition for the purposes of this thesis, even though we were aware of the difficulties in finding a precise definition in both empirical and theoretical terms.

During the work with this thesis it has been more and more clear to me that this, and other definitions of PPPs, are more problematic than I first thought. This thesis has showed us that PPPs can be organised in many different ways and work with many different issues, and to find a definition that catches all of them in a satisfying way and still exclude other forms of public-private interaction is a very difficult task.

Finding a better definition would certainly improve the research on PPPs. It would enable us to see why they are important and worthwhile to study, while at the same time be more critical and question why it is relevant to talk of PPPs in the first place.

*What should the definitional characteristics of a PPP be?* This is a question that scholars within political science need to continue working with. Empirically oriented studies, like the one presented here, are one good way of enhancing our understanding of PPPs and their role in international politics.

## 7 Executive Summary

What role do multilateral PPPs play in environmental politics? This is the underlying puzzle of this study. In order to shed light on this puzzle, this study will do two things; empirically map the universe of multilateral partnerships in environmental politics, and evaluate them from a legitimacy perspective.

The first aim of this study is to empirically map the universe of multilateral PPPs within the area of environmental politics. Environmental politics is, together with health and development, the policy area where different kinds of partnerships are most frequent, but there is a lack of how this large group of PPPs look like. What are they working with? What actors are involved? What resources do these PPPs have?

The second aim is to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. Legitimacy in a traditional sense refers to the relationship between a political authority and the people that is governed by that authority. When is a political authority to be seen as a rightful system?

In a global governance context legitimacy can be reformulated in order to move the focus from the relationship between, usually, a nation-state and its demos to a more general assessment of the quality of a social and political order and thereby fit the multi-layered structure of international politics in a better way. In this study, legitimacy are regarded as a concept that is connecting a number of generic values that are associated with good political steering.

The two research questions that guide this study are:

1. How does the universe of multilateral PPPs within the field of environmental politics look like?
2. How do multilateral PPPs within environmental politics perform when being evaluated from a legitimacy standpoint?

Previous research has mainly focused on the potential effects of PPPs and how to understand them in theoretical terms. This work has been very useful for our understanding of PPPs and is a precondition for continued studies on this topic. Without this theoretical background we would not be able to pose relevant and generically interesting questions.

However, there is a lack of systematic empirical studies on the actual functioning of PPPs and this is something that several scholars have been calling for. Since PPPs and global governance could be accused of being buzzwords in contemporary political science there is an apparent need for alternative framings of this form of governance. Furthermore there is a need to adjust our expectations on what multilateral PPPs can achieve. Empirical studies are one good way of achieving this by enhancing our knowledge of PPPs as policy instruments. This knowledge can in

turn be used to further develop our theoretical understanding on multilateral PPPs and their role in global governance.

In order to answer the two research questions stated above both quantitative and qualitative approaches are used in this study. Each approach give us different answers and complements each other with the aim of getting a more comprehensive picture of multilateral PPPs in environmental politics.

The quantitative part examines the 348 partnerships registered at UN's Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD). The quantitative study is conducted in two steps. First, all the partnerships that are not active, that are not PPPs and that do not work with environmental politics were eliminated. This left us with 91 active PPPs with a focus on environmental politics. In a second step these 91 PPPs were analysed according to the following eight variables: main focus, policy area within environmental politics, focus in a policy-process perspective, participating actors, leading actors, target group, scope and resources.

These variables were selected of two reasons. Firstly, knowledge about these variables will give us a relevant empirical picture of the universe of partnerships within the field. The variables represent aspects that are interesting both from a perspective of environmental politics and from a more general perspective of international policymaking. Secondly, knowledge about these variables is used to evaluate the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs.

The qualitative part is comprised of case studies of three interesting cases of multilateral PPPs. These in-depth case studies can provide us with detailed information about the organisation and activity of these PPPs. The legitimacy of these PPPs was then evaluated in order to provide insights that were not captured by the quantitative part.

When evaluating the legitimacy of multilateral PPPs in this study an analytical framework have been guiding the analysis. This framework is comprised of six values that are associated with legitimacy or a good political system. The six values that have guided the evaluation are; representation, inclusion, transparency, deliberation, effectiveness and goal rationality. This framework has made the evaluation manageable and structured. It has also helped to pinpoint how to use the concept of legitimacy in the context of this study.

The study of multilateral PPPs in this thesis has given us several interesting results. To begin with, the quantitative study gave us a well-needed overview of the universe of multilateral PPPs within environmental politics. The study showed that these PPPs bring a wide variety of actors together, but that they are not all represented to the same degree. For example are local public actors, universities and business not present to the degree that we would have hoped. The underrepresentation of business actors is especially troubling for the legitimacy of these PPPs since business are said to provide effectiveness to these collaborations. And if business actors are not present enough, a learning process between public actors and business cannot take place.

We do also now know that a large majority of these PPPs are active in developing countries and work with different forms of agenda setting and awareness raising activities. This work does often take the forms of arranging conferences,

publishing reports and provide web-based information platforms. This work can prove to be valuable as capacity building for future implementation. Environmental politics is without doubt a policy area where there is a great need for more knowledge and new solutions. However, the activities of many of the multilateral PPPs studied in this thesis do not imply direct implementation today. Therefore it is questionable whether they can be said to contribute to effective implementation in international politics.

We did also find that the inclusion of affected stakeholders can be questioned since industrialised countries and UN-bodies seem to be more influential than the developing countries where many of these PPPs are active. This finding does also make us question whether multilateral PPPs change the relation between the public and the private sphere. If public actors are most active and provide a majority of the funding to these PPPs, then they cannot be seen as an argument for the view of “the state on the retreat” in international politics.

When evaluating these PPPs from a legitimacy perspective we found results that raised both hopes and concerns about the contribution of multilateral PPPs to international policymaking. The most important finding is without doubt that many of these PPPs are not effective implementers. Since many of them are not even active and since a large majority of the active PPPs are working with agenda setting, we cannot say that these PPPs are filling the implementation gap in international environmental politics and thereby live up to the expectations from the Johannesburg summit held in 2002. On the other hand we see that these PPPs bring a wide variety of actors together and form deliberative fora that can contribute with something highly valuable in international policymaking.

In order to improve the research on PPPs in international politics we need to do two things. Firstly, revise our expectations of what PPPs as policy instruments can achieve. They are maybe better seen as networks than effective implementers. Second, we need to continue the work on finding a good definition of PPPs. This study has showed that multilateral PPPs can be organised in many different ways and work with many different questions. To find a definition that catches all of them in a satisfying way and still exclude other forms of public-private interaction is a very difficult task. However, finding a better definition would certainly improve the research on PPPs. It would enable us to see why they are important and worthwhile to study, while at the same time be more critical and question why it is relevant to talk of PPPs in the first place.

Empirically oriented studies, like the one presented here, are one good way of enhancing our understanding of PPPs and their role in international politics.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A: Analytical Framework

This analytical framework summarizes the discussion in section 2.3. The six values associated with legitimacy by which the PPPs will be evaluated are stipulated and their operationalization presented.

Value	Operationalization
1. Representation	What groups and kind of actors are represented in the PPP? Do we find governments, IOs, NGOs, business etc. as members of the PPP?
2. Inclusion	To what extent can different actors participate in the decision-making process of the PPPs? Are all the members included in the same way, or do we find imbalances?
3. Transparency	Does the PPP seem to have an open decision-making process and organisational structure? Is it easy for outsiders to find information about what the PPP is working with?
4. Deliberation	What room does the PPP have for debates in their activities? Can they be seen to increase the deliberation within its policy area?
5. Effectiveness	Does the PPP have the necessary preconditions to be able to function in an effective way? Are the PPP active, and are the activities relevant?
6. Goal rationality	Are the PPP activities coherent with its goals? Or is the PPP working with several different things that only vaguely lead towards their goals?

## Appendix B: Codebook for the Quantitative Study

This codebook defines all the variables and the alternatives to each variable used in the quantitative study. Variable 1-3 relates to the criterions stated on page 17 that the partnerships should fulfil in order to be a part of the quantitative study. The remaining variables relate to the eight aspects that guided the quantitative study, mentioned on pages 16 and 17. These variables are divided into several alternatives, which are handled as separate variables even though they answer to the same question. This procedure allows for giving several positive answers to the same variable when the data is coded into SPSS. A more detailed description of each variable as well as coding instructions are given in the codebook.

Variable	Description	Coding Instruction
1. Fulfilment of the PPP-definition	Are actors from both the private and the public spheres members in the partnership? This is to be regarded as a rudimentary definition of a PPP, but a more comprehensive analysis of the partnerships is not possible when using the data available.	1=Yes 2=No
2. Active or not?	Is the PPP still active?	1=Active 2= Not active
3. Focus on environmental politics	Does the PPP working with issues related to environmental politics (such as energy, climate change, biodiversity, water, common resources...) or not?	1=Environment 2=Not environment
4. Main focus: Common good or common bad?	Does the PPP have focus in issues that can be classified as common good (e.g. the protection of biodiversity) or as common bad (e.g. the prevention of CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions)?	1=Common good 2=Common bad
5. Policy area within environmental politics	What of the following policy areas within environmental politics is main theme of the PPP's activities?	1=Climate change and atmosphere 2=Sustainable development 3=Water 4=Forests 5=Biodiversity

		6=Energy 7=Other
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6a. Focus in a policy-process perspective: Agenda	Is the PPP working with different kinds of agenda setting, network formation, knowledge generation or similar activities? These activities could be regarded as “softer” tasks compared to rule setting or implementation.	1=Yes 2=No
6b. Focus in a policy-process perspective: Deliberation/Rule setting	Is the PPP working with some regulatory activity or deliberating with government agencies with the aim of influence regulation? This could be seen as more traditional lobbying activities focused on changing regulation in a certain way.	1=Yes 2=No
6c. Focus in a policy-process perspective: Provision of goods/services	Is the PPP's activity aiming at providing goods or services in a direct way? Capacity building is not to be regarded as a direct provision of goods or services.	1=Yes 2=No
6d. Focus in a policy-process perspective: Monitoring	Is the PPP focused on monitoring in different forms? The activities can be directed at both public and private actors.	1=Yes 2=No
6e. Focus in a policy-process perspective: Implementation	Is the PPP working with implementing policies in a direct way? Seeking funds is regarded as one kind implementing activity.	1=Yes 2=No

7a. Participating actors: Governments, industrialized world	Are governments from OECD-countries members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7b. Participating actors: Subnational public actors, industrialized world	Are subnational public actors from OECD-countries members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7c. Participating actors: Government, developing world	Are governments from non-OECD-countries members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No

7d. Participating actors: Subnational public actors, developing world	Are subnational public actors from non-OECD-countries members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7e. Participating actors: Multilateral organizations	Are multilateral organizations (such as UN-bodies, WTO and IMF) members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7f. Participating actors: International organizations	Are international organizations (such as EU, MERCOSUR and ASEAN) members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7g. Participating actors: NGO	Are non-governmental organizations members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7h. Participating actors: For-profit private sector	Are private business or business associations members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7i. Participating actors: Research institutes or foundations	Are private research institutes or foundations members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
7j. Participating actors: Universities	Are universities members of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No

8a. Leading actor: Governments, industrialized world	Is a government from the industrialized world the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8b. Leading actor: Subnational public actors, industrialized world	Is a subnational public actor from the industrialized world the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8c. Leading actor: Government, developing world	Is a government from the developing world the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8d. Leading actor: Subnational public actors, developing world	Is a subnational public actor from the developing world the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8e. Leading actor: Multilateral organizations	Is a multilateral organization (such as UN-bodies, WTO or IMF) the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No

8f. Leading actor: International organizations	Is an international organization (such as EU, MERCOSUR or ASEAN) the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8g. Leading actor: NGO	Is a non-governmental organization the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8h. Leading actor: For-profit private sector	Is a private business or a business association the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8i. Leading actor: Research institutes or foundations	Is a private research institute or a foundation the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No
8j. Leading actor: Universities	Is a university the leading actor of the PPP?	1=Yes 2=No

9a. Target group: Industrialized countries	Is the PPP working in industrialized countries?	1=Yes 2=No
9b. Target group: OECD	Is the PPP working in countries belonging to the OECD-group?	1=Yes 2=No
9c. Target group: EU	Is the PPP working in a country belonging to the EU?	1=Yes 2=No
9d. Target group: Developing countries	Is the PPP working in developing countries?	1=Yes 2=No
9e. Target group: BRICS	Is the PPP working in one or more of the following countries; Brazil, Russia, India, China or South Africa? This group of emerging economies are often called the BRICS-countries.	1=Yes 2=No
9f. Target group: Least Developed Countries	Is the PPP working in one or more countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (as defined by the UN)?	1=Yes 2=No

10. Scope	The geographical scope of the PPP's activities?	1=Global 2=Regional 3=National 4=Local
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11a. Resources: Public funding	Does the PPP receive funding from public actors?	1=Yes 2=No
11b. Resources: Private funding	Does the PPP receive funding from private actors?	1=Yes 2=No
11c. Resources: Organizational capacity	Do the PPP have a basic organizational capacity (like a secretariat and different governing bodies)?	1=Yes 2=No
11d. Resources: Staff	Do the PPP have any staff that is working directly for the PPP? It can sometimes be hard to decide whether the staff are working directly for the PPP or for some of its members.	1=Yes 2=No