

The Historical Sociology of Space and Time

A Critique of Globalization Theory

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Abstract

Through an historical sociological investigation of space and time, globalization theory is found to be based in a faulty understanding of history. Globalization theory argue that a spatio-temporal shift has occurred which has transformed social reality from a territorialist Westphalian system to post-territorialism. Such an understanding is proven problematic as the historical basis for the Westphalian system is shaky at best. Realist conceptions of territory, authority and sovereignty are anything but timeless principles of the international system. Different modes of organizing space have always contained both a territorial and post-territorial tension. In a word then, historical development has been both uneven and combined. This paper demonstrate the need for more historically and sociologically informed international relations research, as many of the historical understandings of the concepts we use are faulty and based in a decidedly realist, Eurocentric logic. Instead of traditional International Relations theory, this paper employs a constructivist historical sociological theoretical framework based in an understanding of space and time centered on polities rather than states, on uneven and combined development, rather than eurocentrism. Form such a perspective the contemporary global system is not the result of a transformative shift in time and space. The shift in time and space is the result, not the cause, nor is the shift anywhere as fundamental as globalization theory claim.

Key words: globalization, eurocentrism, historical sociology, time and space, world history

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1 Time and Space in International Relations

We live in an age of globalization. It is everywhere around us, in newspapers, in speeches by politicians. It is condemned by people across the world for everything from environmental disasters to financial crisis and war. Most importantly, globalization is increasingly used by researchers seeking to explain contemporary processes. The most common understanding of globalization is based in a conception of a novel type of space, a global space. This has led scholars such as Giddens (1991), Held and McGrew (2002) and Scholte (2005) to conclude that a shift in the meaning of space and time has occurred. Globalization then implies a shift from territoriality to post-territoriality. This shift is based in *a priori* understanding of the past centered in a realist conception of the Westphalian system.

Space and time, are two concepts all perspectives in International Relations (IR) relate to in different ways. Space is most traditionally¹ understood as territorial space, as sovereign states, whilst time refers to how change is understood. Globalization then involves a new way of understanding and relating to these concepts which directly criticizes the main of IR theory. It is, however, not the only way. As is argued in this paper, time can also be signified by the way in which we approach knowledge, as either part of a historical process or as a present sealed off from the past. Like the traditional perspectives, globalization theory belongs towards the end of the spectrum in which the present is sealed off from the past. It is the argument of this paper that in order to truly understand the contemporary, we must understand it as part of a historical process. This entails a more in-depth historical investigation of the nature of space and time.

Such an approach invariably lead us to the historical sociology of international relations (HSIR) which aims to reveal the present as a constantly changing construct situated in a historical context (Hobson 2002: 8; Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 18). Space and time did not simply appear in the present or recent history, nor did their expressions, such as states, territory and civil society. Through a historical sociological investigation of space (and to a lesser extent time) which identifies and analyses different modes of spatial organization (in history) we can gain a better understanding of the proposed contemporary shift identified by globalization theory. It is the argument of this paper that history refutes the claim of globalization theory, what is identified as global space is not a recent development, even if its spread and intensity has increased. Globalization theory is based in a territorialist and Eurocentric understanding of history, which is increasingly rejected by world historians (and historical sociologists) in favor of a historical narrative which understands the world as a continuously interacting system. Europe did not create itself, rather Europe was created through interactions with the orient (the East).

¹ Traditional perspectives are for the purposes of this paper Realism(s), Liberalism(s), some Marxism and a more rationalistic constructivism.

1.1 Aim of the Study

It is the purpose of this paper to stress the need for historical perspectives in understanding international relations. By tracing the historical development of space (in the form of modes of spatial organization) up until the present, with particular emphasis on the competing understandings of the Westphalian system, a better understanding of contemporary space can be reached which refutes the claims of globalization theory. As such, the study takes the form of a theory developing and theory testing paper. The purpose is not to answer a set of research questions but rather to propose a more historically and sociologically informed way of understanding contemporary and historical processes. Thus, in the end, the purpose is not to draw far-ranging conclusions from the analysis but rather to demonstrate inconsistencies and problems within existing IR theory and our relationship with history. History is the focus of this paper; globalization theory is then a way of demonstrating the need for such an historical perspective.

1.2 Delimiting Time and Space

This paper is centered in questions of space and time, indeed, without the use of specific research questions to structure the paper; these dual aspects will provide this so very necessary structural component. Space and time are broad and inclusive concepts and not prone to specific definitions. As such, many aspects of the concepts are ignored, focusing solely on those aspects deemed important for the purposes of this paper. Globalization is also a broad term, used to explain any number of things not limited to contemporary IR. In this paper a globalization theory is presented, which is not to say that such a theory is the only way of understanding globalization. It is however, the argument of this paper that this is the most dominant understanding of globalization and as such, the one in most need of historical analysis. It follows then, that the claims of this paper is limited to a specific understanding of globalization, as a spatio-temporal shift/transformation.

It should also be noted that this is a paper on international relations, not history. As such, the primary purpose of this paper is to test and generate theory, not a celebration of empirical facts. History and historical sources are an important element of this, but the investigation and analysis which makes up the bulk of this paper is not primarily concerned with presenting an accurate portrayal of a historical context but rather connect this historical context with theory in different ways. Thereby, only events and processes deemed important to the theoretical claims of this paper figure in any systematic way, this paper does not celebrate the particular but rather seek to understand larger historical trends².

² The way history is approached in this paper then corresponds to the way history is generally approached in historical sociology (see chapter 4.1).

1.3 Concerning the Literature

Concerning the literature used in this paper some things need to be stated. With regards to the globalization literature, this paper focuses on a few researchers rather than many. This is done in order to get a better understanding of specific works which in turn can be understood as representing a field of similar research. The works of Giddens and Scholte are given particular attention as they in different ways symbolize this globalization theory. The selection of a few rather than many runs the risk of overgeneralization, in that large conclusions are drawn from a few sources. This is however preferable to the superficial study of the many.

As to the historical analysis, attempts are made to use a large variety of sources and from them draw clear conclusions. The problem with such sources is that they present a ‘narrative’ of history understood as the truth. Such narratives still always represent a specific portion of the truth, as understood through the mind of the researcher. Specific voices are heard more than others and specific developments are deemed more important due to a specific understanding of what constitutes good history. As such, all knowledge is suspect and we need to be aware from the outset that, to a large extent, the historical sources presented below are based firmly in a male, Western, Caucasian, progressivist history of the winners.

1.4 Structure of the Study

The research follows a straightforward structure. Initially, methodology is discussed in chapter 2. This chapter situates the paper in the world, illustrating how the research is approached. The methodological commitments outlined here are based primarily in constructivism and historical sociology.

The next chapter (3) deals directly with the subject matter of this paper, outlining the main argument of globalization theory. This argument, a spatio-temporal shift from territoriality to post-territoriality, comes under increasing attack in chapter 5, as the precondition for such a shift is non-existent.

In chapter 4, a theoretical discussion of HSIR suggests more fruitful ways of approaching the present as part of historical processes. Space and time are here outlined in a more historical and holistic manner. Chapter 4, in a way, continues the argument from chapter 2, providing a more theoretical basis for the methodological discussions.

In chapter 5, a historical investigation of space and time, focused on the alleged Westphalian system, analyses the merits of globalization theory and demonstrates the need for a more historical and historicist IR. This analysis demonstrate, that the way history is traditionally understood in IR and globalization theory, is based in a decidedly Eurocentric and territorialist interpretation. The conclusion which follows upon this analysis, suggests ways forward for the field of IR in general and HSIR in particular.

2 Method(ology)

This chapter situates this paper (and the author) in the world. Questions of ontology are discussed in order for the reader to know what to expect and how this paper understands the social world and the role of the researcher. This is important as the researcher has a role in the text, this role is to systematically generate knowledge, but this knowledge in turn is based in the beliefs of the researcher. In other words, different researchers situated in different ontologies focus on different aspects and highlight different causes as more or less important. Therefore it is important to be clear as to ones ontological commitment from the start in order to avoid any confusion.

2.1 Ontology and the Philosophy of Science

Ontology is a fundamental philosophical category which determines what exists in the world. It involves how we as researchers conceive of the world, how we conceptualize what we study (Jackson 2011: 26). Jackson distinguishes between philosophical ontology and scientific ontology, arguing that for much of the IR community, scientific ontology is mistakenly given precedence over philosophical ontology. Philosophical ontology entail the researchers' basic 'hook-up' to the world, the philosophical basis for our claims of the world and questions relating to how we are able to produce knowledge. Scientific ontology, on the other hand, concerns what – in the mind of the researcher or research program – exists in the world (ibid: 28). Philosophical ontology must then precede scientific ontology, as we cannot make claims as to what exists before the foundation on which we are doing so has been spelled out.

Jackson, maintain that the most fruitful way of understanding methodology is as philosophical ontology (henceforth ontology); as setting the context in which particular practices of knowledge production may take place (ibid: 32). This is done by accepting the philosophy of science, as a way of distinguishing between the 'wagers' which are inherent in the different knowledge claims within the field of IR. It is Jackson's argument that ontology, epistemology and methodology are thus mutually dependent upon one another and can be reduced to two specific wagers because;

“Wagers constitute worlds, in that they quite literally set the stage for the kinds of empirical and theoretical puzzles and challenges that a scholar takes to be meaningful and important.” (ibid: 34).

The first of these wagers concern the relation between the “knower and the known” (ibid: 37); how does the researcher understand the relationship between the researcher and the world? Is the world separate from the researcher (mind-world dualism), or, is the researcher

intimately connected to the world in such a way that the two cannot be separated (mind-world monism)? The second wager, or commitment, concern the type of knowledge the researcher has access to; is knowledge limited to only observable factors (phenomenalism), or, can knowledge be generated also by unobservable factors (transfactualism)? This result in four different methodologies for understanding international relations (see figure 1).

[Figure 1]

	Phenomenalism	Transfactualism
Mind-world dualism	Neopositivism	Critical realism
Mind-world monism	Analyticism	Reflexivity

(ibid: 35)

Whilst it is certainly fruitful to make such a demarcation for analytical purposes, a problem still appears; what about researchers, or research, which fit into more than one ontology/wager-category? Jackson only partly answers this question towards the end of the book, clarifying that these ontologies/methodologies should not be considered as four homogenous research traditions, but rather as four ways in which research can unfold.

“The four scientific methodologies function, so to speak, as ways of specifying the logic of actually existing arguments, and spelling out explicitly what the authors of those arguments might have left implicit.” (Ibid: 207).

Specific research may include two or more of the categories identified above, but in such cases, one way of doing research typically dominates the others (ibid: 209). So, where does this leave us regarding methodology? Jackson argues that the four philosophies identified are essentially incompatible and as such, synthesis between them is impossible, which result in the domination of one methodology in any given research (ibid: 210). According to Jackson’s account, any attempt to incorporate more than one of the methodologies identified into ones research will lead to the eventual domination of one such methodology (in the specific research).

* * *

Jackson’s book can be interpreted as a critical response to Hollis and Smith’s *Explaining and Understanding* (1991), which in a similar way as Jackson attempts to map how IR researchers relate to issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Hollis and Smith argue that, within IR, there are essentially two ‘methodological’ positions for researchers to choose from, explaining and understanding. Explaining is research based in a tradition of natural science with methods drawn from the natural sciences. Understanding is a perspective based in a more hermeneutic understanding of reality, rejecting that natural science and method can understand social reality. At first glance explaining and understanding then coincide with neopositivism and reflexivity in Jackson’s schema yet only in the most general way. What Hollis and Smith do, more fundamentally, is establishing (or strengthening) a divide within the field of IR, which Jackson’s account in a way ameliorates. This divide is based in the suggested incommensurability of explaining and understanding accounts; a researcher either explains or understands but cannot do aspects of both. In a way then they precede Jackson’s argument above that research is generally dominated by one of the four categories and take it even further, arguing that there exists but two paths to knowledge and that these paths are somehow closed from one another on a fundamental level. How do they reach such a

conclusion? According to Jackson, even as they initially discuss questions of philosophical ontology, explaining and understanding quickly leave questions of our ‘hook-up’ to the world behind and move on to what exists in the world, the realm of scientific ontology (Jackson 2011: 29). Hollis and Smith then, more so than Jackson, enhances the already present divide within IR, between rationalist and critical perspectives, turning this present divide into a timeless feature of IR in which researchers are either part of one camp or the other. Jackson’s account, even though it has limitations, is then more open to dialogue between perspectives and better captures the methodological pluralism of IR.

After the critique of Hollis and Smith’s account of IR methodology we should not forget that there are also several weaknesses in Jackson’s account of a philosophy of science for IR. Whilst certainly being a good start at starting a dialogue more focused on IR methodology, his account misses many key aspects due to it being limited to two wagers and four perspectives. What is striking concerning these wagers is that they both in a way concern space, but not time. As this paper places time alongside space as essential for any understanding of international relations, any attempt at constructing an IR methodology need to take both into account. How do we as researchers relate to time? How do we explain change? In Jackson’s account, these questions are given a secondary importance to questions of space, a limitation which could have dire consequences as it ignores their mutual constitution. Further, seeking to typecast IR research into four condensed categories (ideal-cases) creates problems of its own. What Jackson is in fact doing, is constructing myths, knowledge-complexes in which few, if any, researchers actually belong, and in a way thereby guiding future research into specific types and situating existing research into specific, for his purposes created, categories. This is what leads him to conclude that IR constructivism is really neopositivism (ibid: 202) and that most critical scholars are not really reflexivists. What Jackson fails to do is to properly situate himself in relation to his research and admit to, and reflect over, the implications of his own position within knowledge-production.

2.2 The Methodological Commitments of this Paper

In order to develop the methodology of this paper, it is fruitful to first take a stand on the two wagers on which Jackson bases his research. If we begin with the second wager, this research is based in a decidedly transfactual understanding of the nature of the objects available for study. This understanding of the objects of study encourages us to look beyond the facts of the world and seek to understand the deeper structures and processes which constitute these facts. This leads to the necessary conclusion that neopositivist and analyticist methodologies are rejected in favor of critical realism or reflexivity. With regard to the first wager it is more difficult and will in fact not be as conclusive. This is a critical paper, seeking to criticize what is identified as a globalization theory without resorting to the neopositivist critique, which has so far proven deficient in actually changing this globalization theory. Therefore, both a critical realist and a reflexivist methodology are valid. Indeed, the perceptive observer will note that aspects of both methodologies are at different times dominating. The key aspect of the ontology of this paper is then not located in the researchers connection to the world but rather an encouragement that this connection – whether mind-world dualism or monism – be critical of knowledge and knowledge production. Everything needs to be understood through a critical process, not just existing knowledge but also the very act of producing knowledge. From this follows that the problems identified at the onset of this paper, stand in direct relation to the philosophical ontology of the researcher. Critical theorists have always been

especially critical of universalistic and timeless principles; space and time have often been treated thusly.

As already noted in the reservations which concluded the preceding section, we also need to methodologically incorporate time into ontology. One important aspect of time in the case of philosophical ontology is how the researcher relates to change (in all its forms). This is an essential question as change can be understood, and misunderstood, in a number of ways. In this wayer we do not only divide IR into those who understand IR theory as timeless (most realists) and those who understand it as constantly changing (the more critical perspectives) but also a multitude of different understandings of what types of change are significant and what it entails. This paper certainly belong in the latter group, change is possible and happens all the time. A historical perspective is necessary in order to understand these constant changes but such a perspective can do little to tell us which changes are (more) significant. Essentially what is deemed more or less important can be nothing but subjective in varying degrees, something determined initially by the purpose of the research and further by the theoretical and methodological commitments of the researcher. This paper is then critical of existing knowledge complexes not only in an effort to better understand them but also in order to properly situate them in reality, in history.

The underlying (scientific) ontology of this paper is basically constructivist in nature. Even if it is not primarily constructivist theories which make up the bulk of the theoretical discussions, the core understanding of these discussions are constructivist. Constructivism is not so much a theory, as a set social theoretical commitments and concerns regarding; how agents and structures are involved in a process of mutual construction and reproduction, how structure shape and constrain actors interaction and how actors interaction both shape and reproduce this structure (Adler, 2002; Barnett 2002; Wendt 1999). In other words, constructivism understands actors, structures and actions as inherently social, as the products of institutionally grounded identities (Reus Smit 2005: 129; Finnemore 1996: 2). Unlike rationalism/positivism which accepts the world as it is, constructivism sees the world as being in a constant state of construction and reconstruction. The material world is not full of objective facts, the object of our knowledge are dependent on our interpretations and language (Adler 2002: 95). The role of constructivism is to show that social structures are as important as material structures, in fact, material structures can only be understood through social structures. Thereby, the social world is made up of several inter-subjective understandings, subjective knowledge and material objects. For constructivism, the international and domestic environments are mutually constitutive (Geske 2000: 314). The methodological commitments of this paper are then based in a constructivist understanding of the world and a historical sociological understanding of the role of history in research. The focus on social construction and history are apparent throughout the paper, the latter of which is further outlined in chapter 4.

3 Globalization Theory

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the need for a more historicist and historically informed basis for knowledge production. This chapter presents globalization theory as a radically different way of approaching knowledge which celebrates the present. Globalization theory makes claims about both the present and the past not through a study of the past (history) but rather a study of the present as fundamentally different from a constructed territorialist past. Whilst globalization theory has existed in our communal vocabulary for some time, it was not until the early 1990s, that the first attempts at a theory of globalization were attempted (Giddens 1991). This was indeed a time of great shifts and transformations as the end of the cold war signaled the beginning of something fundamentally new (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1996). The end of the Cold War signaled not only the end of great power struggles as the imaginaries concerning the international shifted from bi-polar to uni-polarity, it also shifted, quickly, the foreign policy agendas of states around the world as the doctrine of the cold war ended, replaced by multi-polarity and liberalization (Rosenberg 2005: 6). In this time of great shifts, a vacuum formed as it was increasingly felt that the realist and liberal perspectives failed to capture the dramatic scope and speed (Giddens 1991) of the changes. A vacuum, globalization theory stepped in to fill. Even then, if globalization has never existed empirically, the idea of globalization certainly left its mark on the 1990s (Rosenberg 2005).

3.1 Space and Time

Considering the central role of space and time for globalization theory it would be foolhardy to continue without initially discussing how the two concepts relate to the social sciences.

Space and time are two basic categories of human existence. Despite their complexity they are almost always treated as commonsensical. Time only acquires meaning in reference to something else, space, or more properly distance. This is the basic argument of Scholte and globalization theory, space have won over time (Hall 2010: 16). Focus is then put on the fact that communication across space (distance) is now instantaneous (telephone, internet, television) which entail a spatial rather than a temporal focus. This runs contrary to Harvey's notion of time and space in the social sciences in which modernity entail the conquering of space through time (1990: 205). According to Harvey, this is due to the fact that the classics of social theory (Marx, Weber, Smith and Marshall) privilege time over space as;

“they broadly assume either the existence of some pre-existing spatial order within which temporal processes operate, or that spatial barriers have been so reduced as to render space a contingent rather than a fundamental aspect to human action” (ibid: 205).

This is not strange he continues, as social theory has always been more interested in processes of social change, historical progress, modernization and revolution (of all kinds);

“Progress is its theoretical object, an historical time its primary dimension. Indeed, progress entails the conquest of space, the tearing down of all spatial barriers, and the ultimate ‘annihilation’ of space through time” (ibid: 205).

How are we then to relate to these dual understandings of a space which conquers time (globalization theory) and time which conquers space (modernization, in Harvey’s eyes)? Perhaps the answer is that they are both correct. In many ways, the globalization theory identified in this paper is based in neo-liberalism. Traditionally, liberalism has, in a similar way as Harvey understands modernity, been more interested in time over space. Focused on historical progress, democratization and liberalization, liberalism epitomized a temporal perspective. This all changed with the conclusion of the cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union.

With the fall of the Soviet Union the scope of liberalism shifted. This is nowhere more apparent than in Fukuyama’s (1992) *The end of history and the last man* wherein the victory of a specific type of liberal ideology signals the end of time. Liberal democracy has now been proven as the most effective ideology, a final ideology if you will, which will now more effectively be diffused across the world. Fukuyama’s ideological monism quickly ran into problems but the overall shift from a focus on time to a focus on space was cemented.

3.2 Theories of Globalization and Globalization Theory

At this point, a distinction must be made between globalization theory and theories of globalization. What is discussed below is globalization theory, the most common and widely known approach to globalization. What signifies globalization theory, but does not need to signify theories about globalization, is an attribution of causality to time-space distantiation or compression. Theories about globalization do not focus, in a causal manner, on time-space, but on culture or capitalism, and are not the subject of this discussion. Globalization theory does not just maintain that a qualitative shift has occurred in the nature of social space, they also maintain that this shift is paradigmic³, entailing a new way of approaching knowledge which rejects IR and social theory both as they are supposedly incapable of understanding contemporary processes.

Most scholars agree in loose terms that globalization to some extent involves a compression (or shift) of time and space (Lechner & Boli 2008:4, Held & McGrew 2002: ix; O’Brien 1992: 1-2; Ohmae 1995). As to how this spatio-temporal change is articulated, most are influenced by Giddens line of reasoning which he outlined in *The Consequences of Modernity* (1991). Giddens suggests that we are now living in an age of high modernity, a social reality qualitatively different (discontinuity) from the past, something past social scientists failed to anticipate (p. 3ff). This difference is evident in three ways; the pace of change, the scope of change and the nature of modern institutions (ibid: 6). The first two are fairly self-explanatory and are common within globalization theory, everything happens faster and it happens globally. The third change however is not an aspect of time but space; Giddens argue that most modern institutions are radically different from their previous forms. He

³ The inherent problem of using Kuhn’s notion of paradigms for the social sciences is not reflected over.

makes particular emphasis of the modern city, which is radically different from cities in previous eras, but also the nation state is understood as fundamentally different. Because of this discontinuity, we need to shift our focus from societies to the problematic of time-space distantiation; explaining social phenomena by studying how social complexes differently organize and stretch across time and space (ibid: 14). It is this very notion of time-space distantiation which leads Giddens to conclude that globalization is;

“the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (ibid: 64).

Giddens is thus basically dualistic in his understanding of the social world. Globalization is accompanied by glocalization⁴, modernity with tradition and it should all be understood not by studying society, but through the problematic of time-space distantiation (ibid: 24, 46, 64). For those versed in the globalization literature these tendencies articulated by Giddens are easily recognized. Indeed, globalization theory rests upon the back of Giddens argument. But we cannot, and should not, accept Giddens out of hand. He makes large claims but does he in the end fulfill them?

As his argument unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that he does not. Giddens fails to properly separate the *explanandum* from the *explanans*, or in other words, he explains globalization as an outcome with globalization as a process. This is, in itself, not a problem if Giddens purpose was to simply demonstrate historical change. What Giddens, along with most of globalization theory (not Scholte below) does, is take the outcome of a historical process (*explanandum*), identified as globalization, and transform this concept into a *explanans* which now explains the changing character of the world (Rosenberg 2000: 2-3). This is not a problem in itself if Giddens adequately prove his argument concerning space-time distantiation but it is clear that the theory developed by Giddens is more a house of cards on a wobbly table, ready to fall at the slightest breeze. This breeze comes in part two of the book as Giddens progressively leave time and space behind as he discusses the primary institutions of modernity (Giddens 1991: 55ff). The problem with Giddens approach, a problem which remains in all attempts at theorizing globalization as a spatio-temporal shift, is discussed more carefully in the next section.

In *Globalization: a critical introduction*, Scholte (2005), attempts one of the most careful and well executed attempts to date of delimiting and defining globalization theory. To Scholte, most research on globalization is flawed because it is redundant (p. 54). This redundancy stems from the very definition of globalization in many cases being faulty, as they fail to distinguish themselves from pre-existing vocabulary. These four non-globalizations are;

Internationalization, the most common form of globalization, in that it involves a minimum of political and methodological adjustment. This interpretation of globalization refers to the growth (quantitative) of interaction and interdependence between states. In such an understanding global is interchangeable with international and as such it fails to in any way bring anything new to the table (ibid: 54-56).

⁴ Glocalization is the practices of local agents as they attempt to construct meaning, negotiate identity and construct institutional frameworks within a context of globalization (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking 2010: 1)

Liberalization sees globalization as a quantitative increase in liberalization; the lowering of barriers for the flow of capital, individuals and products. In this understanding we also find ‘anti-globalizers’ who does not so much object to globalization but to a perceived liberalization (ibid: 56-57).

Universalization on the other hand, identifies processes of diffusion of objects and ideas globally as globalization. Global in this scenario is the same a world-wide and everywhere. It is also from this conception of globalization that globalization as homogenization stem (ibid: 57-58).

As *westernization*, globalization is seen as a particular Western universalization in which social processes of modernity is spread from the West to the rest, displacing and destroying local cultural expressions. In this understanding of globalization, it is understood as a continuation of colonialism by another name (ibid: 58-59).

Rejecting all of these ‘non-globalizations’ due to them not really bringing anything new to the table, Scholte, instead suggests that we define globalization as “a shift in the nature of social space” (ibid: 59). This shift involve the emergence of a global space; globality. Globality here has two interpretations; (1) “transplanetary” social links between individuals in different places around the world. This allows for a distinction between international relations (relations between states) and global relations (relations in a global space). This understanding of globality primarily involves a quantitative change, an increase in transplanetary interactions between individuals (actors), rather than something qualitatively different from previous epochs of history (ibid: 61; 85ff). The second (2) interpretation involves a fully qualitative shift in understanding; “supraterritorial’... ..social connections that substantially transcend territorial geography” (ibid: 61). This does not simply involve a compression of time and space but rather a more significant shift from a territorial to a post-territorial ‘place’ (or space) for social interaction. Interactions occurring outside traditional territorially demarcated places, involving as Scholte puts it; transworld simultaneity (something which extends anywhere across the planet at the same time) and transworld instantaneity (something which moves anywhere on the planet at no time) (ibid: 61-62).

Held and McGrew (2002) also define globalization as something qualitative, as a;

“historical process which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional networks of interaction and the exercise of power” (p.1-2).

Different historical forms of globalization can be identified with such an understanding but what distinguish contemporary globalization is;

“unique spatio-temporal and organizational features, creating a world in which the extensive reach of global relations and networks is matched by their relative high intensity, high velocity and high impact propensity across many facets of social life” (ibid: 2).

For Held and McGrew then, like Scholte, globalization involves a transformation of spatio-temporality, a shift from territoriality to globality. Like Scholte, however, they are unable to separate this transformation aspect of globalization from the other forms identified by Scholte above. Scholte’s (2005) globalization argument hinges upon the concept of

supraterritoriality; a shift entailing not just a quantitative difference from previous world orders but also a qualitative difference (See pages 59 ff). Unfortunately, despite the care with which Scholte defines his conceptualization of globalization as supraterritoriality, he cannot fully divorce his argument from the other non-globalizations he earlier rejected. Internationalization (a purely quantitative change in transaction) in particular rears its ugly head (p. 62). Scholte's argument, like that of Held and McGrew (2002), is also decidedly materialist. Whilst admitting to the importance of ideational factors such as identity, norms and ideas, he continuously return to material factors, not ideational, to give weight to his argument. This is doubly troubling as the change he proposes from territorial to supraterritorial understandings of world order can be seen more generally as a shift from material to immaterial explanations. After all, if what are to be explained are changes in material factors such as the development of new technologies for human interaction then such change can be explained by existing terminology and the creation of a new research project based on post-territoriality is unnecessary⁵. Indeed, for there to be any merit for such an undertaking, he must not only demonstrate supraterritoriality as an empirical reality, he must also show how a framework based in globalization theory can explain this development better than the failed (in his eyes) territorially centered IR discipline. So, what needs to be proved in order for globalization - as more than a simply descriptive term – to be feasible is not a quantitative shift but a qualitative one.

3.3 The Games We Play, Globalization Theory and the Transformation of Space and Time

Despite the many problems identified above, globalization theory (particularly Scholte) manages to define globalization in a way which seems to accurately portray a present condition. However, as their arguments continue we find that the initial definitions of globalization less and less make up the substance of their arguments. In essence, globalization theory is playing games, four in particular, which are intimately connected and generally follow the outline below.

In Giddens, Held and McGrew, Scholte, and in many others, a definitional game is played in which globalization is presented as a spatio-temporal shift, or transformation which revolutionizes social (global) reality. The terms space and time are never properly defined, indeed, for the argument to carry any weight, the terms need to be general so that they can explain as much as possible, the definition however, often seem to accurately describe the present. This definition of globalization quickly transforms into a causal variable, shifting from a phenomenon to be described to a process which transforms.

Before we get a chance to reflect over this definitional achievement however, which is understood as implying a paradigmic shift from territoriality to post-territoriality (from IR to globalization theory), a second game begins which bombards readers with statistics and numbers. Globalization theorists, like some kind of statistical magician, points towards these numbers and blinded by the enormity of the changes highlighted, we fail to perceive the inherent weakness of their argument, because what is really highlighted in the numbers is not

⁵ Globalization theory with hard definitions such as Scholte's supraterritoriality ultimately results in technocentrism.

globalization (which was just defined as a spatio-temporal shift), but rather different forms of internationalization and universalization. Yet, globalization theorists continue to employ the statistics of financial transactions, tourism and communication to lend weight to an argument of spatio-temporal change (Held and McGrew 2002; Scholte 2005). It seems clear however, following upon the earlier discussion of globalization theory, that it is not numbers with which they define globalization, but rather as a rise of global social space in which global interactions, (partially) divorced from territoriality, take place. The numbers are then nothing but a mirage, which blinds us (and perhaps the globalization theorists themselves) from the fact that they have no real function for a globalization theory based in spatio-temporal transformation. Only by reintroducing the previously rejected non-globalizations of internationalization, universalization, westernization and liberalization do these numbers make sense and even then, exactly what is globalization and what is not?

After this bombardment of numbers and statistics, which demonstrate the dramatic change which has occurred in global interaction, the third and perhaps most important game begins; the qualification game. The purpose of this game is to allow the previous numbers and statistics (the empirical basis for the argument), back into the definition, in effect loosening up the definition of globalization to include everything from religion (Global Islam, fundamentalism), economy (global corporations, even capitalism) and society (global civil society, transnational activism). So, even if the initial definition is specific and concise, in the unfolding of the argument, this definition is consistently qualified to also include the, at least by Scholte, rejected non-globalizations.

This is a necessary game, because the concise definition needed for the term to theorize anything qualitatively new (Scholte) concerns very little, and to broad a term (Giddens) explains everything and nothing. Globalization theory needs to play these games, because they are essentially theorizing a contemporary phenomenon which they seek to ground in deeper theoretical and historical processes. As globalization theory has already rejected social theory and international relations, any theoretical basis for globalization theory need to come from within the theory itself. Such a foundation is provided by Giddens in his notion of time and space distantiation, or Scholte's supraterritoriality, but these nascent theories also need to be based in a historical reality, the shift from territoriality to post-territoriality need to be qualified. This is done by embracing a quintessentially realist understanding of the Westphalian system (territoriality) which is then juxtaposed with the admittedly fundamentally different contemporary reality (post-territoriality). This fourth, territorial, game, is striking in its improbability, as a perspective focused on the inadequacy of existing theories (IR and classical social theory), turn towards the most orthodox understanding of the international system in IR, the realist conception of a Westphalian system based in sovereign, territorially separated states. Considering the, in Giddens words, scope and pace of change over the last several hundred years, the contemporary 'global' society can be nothing but fundamentally different from such an absolutist interpretation of the Westphalian system.

3.4 Space, Time and Globalization Theory

Aside from being unable to completely separate the supranational argument (globalization as a spatio-temporal shift) from the other aspects of globalization research (most prominently internationalization) another, perhaps an even larger problem for Scholte and globalization theory looms on the horizon. The quantitative change identified by globalization theory; a spatio-temporal shift not only need to be proven to affect the contemporary social reality, but

also to represent something markedly different from previous historical epochs. As Rosenberg (2000) has argued, the historical assumptions of globalization theory are problematic at best and lead globalization theory to endorse the traditional realist conception of the Westphalian system (p. 19).

For most of the IR mainstream, space is almost synonymous with a specific type of territoriality, the historical grounds for which this paper labels *the Westphalian myth*. Most realists, liberalists, and even globalization theorists, buy into this myth of a European international system consisting of territorially sovereign states as the primary (in some cases only) actors. This system is often understood as having begun with the peace of Westphalia (1648) and diffused across the globe⁶. Constructivists (and critical) scholars necessarily have a different understanding of space, but all too often they get drawn into the trap of Westphalia, resulting in an excessive focus on the role of the state and territorialism.

Space in IR and globalization theory is in that case intimately connected with territory. According to globalization theory, international relations is inherently incapable of fully grasping the contemporary social reality as it is based in a territorial understanding of social interaction (Scholte 2005: 66-67). Indeed, there still exist territorial relations, however, according to globalization theory, much of the processes and practices taking place, are doing so in a global space, a post-territorial space. Globalization has brought an end to territorialism, a social geography where all social interactions can be mapped on the earth's surface, measured on a three-dimensional grid of latitude, longitude and altitude (Rosenberg 2000: 23). In a territorialist reality, all of social reality is organized according to this principle of territoriality consisting of spatially separate actors (states), governed by the three laws of position, distance and separation (ibid: 24). Viewed from this perspective, where a realist conception of Westphalia, consisting of territorially separated units asserting irrevocable sovereign rights over a given territory, contemporary space seem remarkably different. As is shown in the historical narrative below however, such a mythological, territorially demarcated Westphalian system has never existed. Consequently, not only are such historical conceptions of a globalization shift Eurocentric, they are also wrong.

Clearly then, globalization theory rests upon a shift in the meaning of space and time in some form. For Scholte, this involves a new form of global space, globality, which is (primarily) post-territorial. Giddens uses the term time-space distantiation, how societies stretch across space, to define globalization as a stretching and increasing of interaction within space so that occurrences in one place influence occurrences in distant localities⁷ Held and McGrew return to Scholte's notion of globality but take it further, arguing that globality is completely separated from territoriality and in essence creates itself. All of these competing understandings are predicated upon *a priori* understanding of history and in particular the development of the modern states system, in the form of the Westphalian myth.

⁶ This myth is one of the main discussions in the final part of this paper in which time and space is historically investigated.

⁷ The vaguest possible definition of globalization present in any of the literature reviewed in the writing of this paper.

4 Theoretical Discussion

In the previous section, globalization theory was presented as a theory which celebrates the present. Globalization theory arose out of a particular historical context in which a void needed to be filled following the conclusion of the cold war. In the methodological commitments however, it was argued that we need to approach knowledge production in a critical manner, as part of a historical process. This chapter moves the methodological discussion into the realm of theory, discussing the role of history in IR. Having already determined at the start of this paper that a historical perspective is necessary in the study of international relations, HSIR is presented as a fruitful way of approaching the present and history as mutually constitutive. This chapter concludes with a discussion of space and time which suggests productive ways of relating to spatial organization from a more historical perspective. Modes of spatial organization and politics are suggested as ways of understanding how space is organized historically which avoids the traps of statism and territorialism. First, however, how history is employed in IR is outlined in order to better situate to following discussions.

4.1 What is History in IR?

The traditional argument of HSIR is that mainstream IR is ahistorical. This argument is also connected to the idea of a trans-Atlantic divide in IR, where a historically informed English IR faces off against an ahistorical American IR (Hobson and Lawson 2008: 415; Jackson 2004). This is however not the case. As Hobson and Lawson shows, it is not a case of ahistoricalism but rather a case of different modes of historical research within the social sciences (Hobson and Lawson 2008: 420). History as it is understood in IR can be separated into the metaphors; ‘history as scripture’ and ‘history as butterfly’ (see Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010). History as scripture is the way of understanding history traditionally associated with realism and liberalism (in all forms) where history can be separated from its specific socio-cultural context in order to devise ‘timeless’ lessons or meta-theories. This view of history leads to selection bias in which history is relegated into an unproblematic site for empirical verification of theoretical claims. Whilst not ahistorical, it is certainly not historicist; “an understanding of the contingent, disruptive, constitutive impact of local events, particularities and discontinuities” (ibid: 7). History as a butterfly on the other hand, is an understanding of history which celebrates the particular over the general. Instead of viewing history as a totality this approach focus on specific instances, incapable of grasping larger historical developments or trends. Scholars within this understanding of history generally focus on specific historical case(s). If the history as scripture approach is historical whilst not being historicist, the history as a butterfly approach is historicist without being historical in that it posits that history can only be understood in temporally and spatially specific segments.

Historical research can thus be divided into four groups situated along a continuum stretching from macro (scripture) to micro (butterfly). To the far left is the quintessential history as scripture approach; history without historicism (Hobson and Lawson 2008: 421;

Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 8). This mode follows the guidelines set out in the history as scripture understanding of history, constructing generalizations without first deconstructing the historical context. On the far right of the continuum we find two groups; traditional history and radical historicism of which the latter is the farthest to the right. These two groups whilst seemingly very different - traditional historians are typically positivists whilst radical historicists are anything but - are still situated close together in a larger social (scientific) understanding of history as they both reject the application of theory on history and has an aversion to grand-narratives, converging on a celebration of the particular (Hobson and Lawson 2008: 423-427). The fourth – and for our purposes – most important mode of history, historicist historical sociology, overlap the previous three modes, essentially stretching from one end of the continuum to the other. This position, in which we find most historical sociologists, is critical of both the scripture and the butterfly approach to history whilst also utilizing aspects of both. It rejects the macro approach as it tends to smooth out historical discontinuities by creating static trans-historical categories and it also rejects the micro approach as it fetishes the particular, ignoring how historical events contribute to larger patterns of continuity and change. This fourth mode is epistemologically placed in the middle of the micro-macro continuum; history is knowable, but produced within a specific spatial-temporal context and subject to interpretation by scholars. Historicist historical sociology both deconstruct (micro) and reconstruct (macro) history, recognizing the role of contingency, agency, contextuality and particularity alongside structure and continuity (Hobson and Lawson 2008: 428-429; Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 11-13). Such an understanding of history conforms to Lawson's (2007: 356) central task of HSIR, to act as a balancing act between theoretical and empirical work, between recognizing the social world's inherent complexities whilst not becoming lost in its *minutiae*. By employing such an approach to history, it becomes clear that mainstream IR is not ahistorical but rather ahistoricist. The main goal of HSIR is then to inject historicist insight into IR, avoiding the absolutes of both the history as scripture and the history as butterfly approaches (Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 13).

Such a proposition cannot be casually accepted as critically minded scholars have pointed out the dangers of historicism, equating it with Eurocentrism writ large. With such an understanding, historicism is not so much a mode of historical inquiry as it is a Western social construction of itself and how the third world should develop. Western critiques of historicism, overlooks the intricate ways in which historicism is interlinked with a Western conception of modernity. As Chakrabarty puts it;

“Crudely, one might say that it [historicism] was one important form that the ideology of progress or “development” took from the nineteenth century on. Historicism is what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global *over* time, by originating in one space (Europe) and spreading outside it” (italics in original, 2000: 7)

As such, historicism was a Western ideology which presented the contemporary world order as something natural, the West had found the one true path and it was up for the third world/global south to simply catch up. In a similar manner, historicism was used during the time of imperialist Europe as a way of saying ‘not yet’ consigning the colonies into the ‘waiting room’ of history (ibid: 8).

Rather than accepting this critique outright, we need to accept that all knowledge involves relations of power, because as Cox so aptly stated; “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1995:31). Historical knowledge and historical inquiry (historicity) is then no different and as several scholars have pointed out, Hobson amongst them, a specific historical

narrative was constructed in Europe, constructing not only Western Europe as a Christian, rational, Europe but which also constructed the Orient as weak and dangerous, as feminine and despotic (2004: 220ff, see also Said 2000). Indeed, in many ways, the purpose of HSIR is to counter the type of historicism Chakrabarty is critical of.

4.2 Towards a Historical Sociology of International Relations

Historical sociology started out as a branch of sociology focusing on the formation and transformation of modernity. Put simply, historical sociology advocates an historical approach to understanding the present, viewed as both shaping and being shaped by the past (Delanty and Isin 2003: 1). Due to the historical turn in international relations, historical sociology has become an increasingly important tool for many IR researchers (see for example; Buzan and Little 2000, Reus-Smit 1999). The primary aim of HSIR is to unravel the complexity behind the interaction of structure and agency (deliberate and intentional). This means that domestic practices are juxtaposed with international variables in order to understand international processes (Lawson 2007: 346; Hobson 2002: 14; Bhambra 2010: 133). In other words, the international cannot in itself explain international developments, rather the whole of social reality need to be analyzed which includes ‘opening the box’ (Hollis and Smith 1991) and looking within the state, a clear break with traditional (neo) realist and liberal thought⁸.

The rationale of the second-wave of HSIR⁹, to some extent, boils down to two critiques of mainstream IR (and some first-wave HSIR); chronofetishism and tempocentrism (Hobson 2002: 6-15; Hobson and Lawson 2008: 430; Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 16f). Chronofetishism is basically ahistoricism by another name, in which the present can be understood by studying the present isolated from the rest of history, in effect taking a snapshot of history (Hobson 2002: 6). Such an understanding of the present leads to three illusions, the first of which is the “reification illusion”; that the present is seen as sealed off from the past, painting the present as static, self-constituting and unchanging, obscuring its socio-temporal context. Secondly, it leads to a “naturalization illusion”, a perception of the present as a natural development which spontaneously emerged, obscuring important historical processes such as social power, identity and social exclusion which constitute the present. Third, the “immutability illusion” entails the idea that the present is incapable of structural change and thereby ‘eternalized’.

The sum of these illusions is a perception of the present and history as unchanging, eternal and natural. Tempocentrism, on the other hand, is the reverse process-tracing of history in which the present is extrapolated backwards through time which leads to the perception of history as being timeless and unchanging. Tempocentrism is a method which uses a ‘chronofetishist’ lens of perceiving history (ibid: 9). In so doing, some of the most fundamental aspects of the international system are obscured (ibid: 12). Waltz (1979) is a prime example of this as he maintained the timeless nature of anarchy by pointing towards

⁸ Such an emphasis illustrate however that many historical sociologists remain in a decidedly statist understanding of social reality. A preconception this paper seek to remedy.

⁹ The first being a wave of historical sociological research primarily out of sociology which influenced the IR debate. So whilst the first was made up of mostly researchers from other disciplines, the second consisted mainly of IR researchers.

historical evidence in the shape of Thucydides and the great power war between Sparta and Athens. Waltz used tempocentrism as a way of understanding history by putting the past in the context of his ‘chronofetished’ understanding of the present. Identifying the basic structure of the present system as consisting of anarchy and polarity he then proceeded to maintain that the basic structure of the Athens/Sparta system were identical to the present Cold War system. He in effect applied a generalized understanding of the present upon the past and thereby ignored everything that did not confirm such a generalized picture. In such an understanding of IR, change¹⁰ is impossible because the major structures are timeless. This does not only affect and contort our understanding of history but also paints a simplistic picture of the present.

The remedies for such illusions are to reveal the present as a constantly changing construct situated in a historical context. The present did not emerge naturally from human impulses but through processes of power, social exclusion and norms and is constituted by transformative processes which constantly reconstitute the present (Hobson 2002: 8; Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 18).

* * *

Both the first and second wave of HSIR was broad and inclusive, drawing from a wide range of theoretical schools. Not only did it seek to provide historical analysis, but also to construct powerful theoretical explanations (Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 19). Even though there is certainly value to this HSIR approach, in a more recent publication, Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg (2010), criticize HSIR as being both unwieldy and heterogeneous (p. 20). Their dual critique of HSIR is first, the way it has been used by researchers in a non-reflective manner, often boiling down to a commitment to inject HSIR principles into IR without reflecting over why such an approach is fruitful. Secondly, HSIR, like much of the rest of the social sciences, cannot properly theorize the international.

One of the risks of this failure to properly theorize the international may be that the already separated domestic and international realms (within IR) will be further demarcated (Hall 1999: 108). The remedy for this dual critique is a third wave of historical sociological research which can properly theorize the international (Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 22).

Two of the approaches within this third wave are particularly useful for this discussion; Hobson’s (2004; 2007) Eurocentrism approach and Rosenberg’s (2006; 2007; 2010) uneven and combined development. Hobson argue that the traditional understanding of world history is grounded in racism and Eurocentrism. The west did not “rise” by itself but rather developed in a dialogic relationship with the orient (see next chapter). Rosenberg’s Marxist approach is centered in Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined development. It is uneven because human development is at any given time differentiated, not just in that civilizations differ but that there is also great unevenness within civilizations. It is combined in that, between civilizations and within civilizations there exists a connection to a wide social field. In other words, there exists an inter-connection between the multiplicities of human political developments.

The two approaches are more alike than different. They both question the traditional narratives of world history. As Rosenberg (2007: 460) notes, the perspectives are even inter-related as what Hobson is invoking is the uneven and combined development of historical

¹⁰ This is of course except for change in the internal capabilities of states, which is deemed to be of a secondary nature to structural forces.

societies in which advances in one is spread to others. The inter-connectedness of the two perspectives is further revealed in the historical investigation, where both perspectives figure prominently and are further elucidated.

* * *

Smith once identified HSIR as one of the critical perspectives which challenged the mainstream, but now feel that HSIR is moving closer towards the rationalistic perspectives. His argumentation is however curious, basically arguing that as it is not really critical (as say post-modernism or Critical Theory) it must then be rationalist (like realism or liberalism) even though in many ways the same could be said of constructivism (Smith 2002: 226). The critique, however valid, seems to miss the point. It is valid in that HSIR can be appropriated in order to further rationalist research but it is invalid in that most HSIR research in the last decade have been critical of the rationalistic IR project. Hobden and Hobson's (2002) response to his critique also cast it in a new light, arguing that Smith is promoting a binary understanding of IR in which there is no middle ground between rationalism and critical theories (much like the critique leveled at Hollis and Smith, 1991, see section 2.1). What Smith is really discussing is not what has been presented above but rather epistemology; what is knowledge, how do we acquire knowledge (2002: 223ff)? In the eyes of this paper however, just as social constructivism can move in many directions (more rationalist, more critical), so can HSIR. In many ways, the two perspectives are very much alike. So, rather than as Smith argue that HSIR is moving towards a closer collaboration with rationalism, this paper argues that HSIR joins constructivism and the English school in the epistemological middle, in which individual researchers may be more critical (Reus-Smit according to Smith), or more rationalist (Hobson according to Smith).

Another of Smith's critiques may prove harder to dispel, the lack of gendered research within HSIR (ibid: 237). There is really no valid response to such a critique other than agreeing that the lack of gendered analysis within HSIR is troubling especially considering the connection between historical sociology and gender research evident elsewhere¹¹. Smith also claim that 'non-Western voices are much less pronounced' (ibid: 237) in the HSIR project, a curious formulation indeed considering the works of Frank (1998) and Hobson (2004) which both take a more orientalist perspective (see below). Or does he imply a more post-colonial critique, which would be equally true of all IR perspectives? The Western dominance within academia is indeed troubling but it would be foolhardy to single out a specific perspective for critique for something which is equally true for most perspectives.

4.3 Operationalizing Space and Time

The basic problem of this paper has been outlined as a globalization theory with a conception of history, based in a Westphalian notion of the birth of the modern system. HSIR were suggested as a possible remedy, but much like constructivism, HSIR is a set of methodological and theoretical commitments concerning how we should approach the world

¹¹ I direct the reader here, specifically to the special issue of *Social Politics* (1998 issue 5 (1)) which featured such a marriage between historical sociology and feminist theory

and relate to change. Before the actual historical analysis commences, it is necessary to briefly outline how a constructivist, historical sociological understanding of time and space will guide the analysis.

This paper, necessarily, understands space differently than globalization theory; focus is put on the fact that *space is something which is constructed through processes of power, discourse and identity. Space is understood as intimately connected to time, as a continuous process of becoming rather than being. Space has multiple meanings and if these meanings become cemented, this involves the exercise of power (discourse, inclusion, exclusion, identity construction). Space is neither wholly material nor immaterial but rather a combination of both. Space only acquires meaning however, through human interpretation and action.*¹²

Such a definition of space is of course not used directly in the analysis, what is rather used, are aspects of space, ways of understanding space without referencing space in its entirety. Of fundamental importance are different modes of spatial organization, how territorial space is politically organized into states, empires, city-states and/or villages. Considering the subject matter of globalization, the Westphalian system and the state is given particular attention. Instead of speaking of space in just general terms then, space is also understood in the different ways of organizing space, modes of spatial organization, how space is organized and given meaning through social action and interpretation.

As is demonstrated throughout the analysis, the organization of space discussed in this paper function according to Rosenberg's notion of uneven and combined development. On the one hand, development is expressed in a multiplicity of differing societies, complexes and ways of spatio-temporal organization. On the other hand, as these same societies co-exist in space and time, they affect each other and influence each other's development. Their individual development thus has both a reproductive logic from their internal character and an interactive logic arising from their coexistence with other societies. Development is then both uneven and combined. This is true locally, nationally, internationally and globally. To use the term state, or society, to describe the spatial units discussed in this paper would however miss many of the aspects and interactions which are most relevant. States are not the only, or always the most important, actors in space, nor are realist understanding of states as single actors unproblematic. The mythical basis of the state as a unitary actor, is theoretical rather than factual and stems (for IR purposes) from Waltz initial division of IR which dealt solely with matters external of states, making the internal characteristics irrelevant (Rosenberg 1994: 4-5). Such a perspective however, loses sight of the myriad of different actors which can occupy parts of, or entirely, the same space. Ferguson and Mansbach's (1996: 34) understanding of polities which has "a distinct identity; a capacity to mobilize persons and their resources for political purposes, that is, for value satisfaction, and a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy", offers a more historically informed alternative to a purely statist approach. Different polities can have different conceptions of space whilst at the same time occupying the same physical space (ibid: 44). A polities approach then assume the presence of multiple authority complexes within the same, or similar, space whilst also allowing for the fluctuating of relative power between these complexes. As such, states are polities but so are cities, tribes, clans, villages, organized religion, alliances, regional and global organizations and much more. In focusing on polities in the plural rather than states in the singular we find that the traditional inside/outside demarcation is highly problematic (ibid:

¹² No attempt is made here of capturing any true meaning of space which can be understood as anything from everything to nothing. Any attempt to further define the concept would exclude aspects of space and as such it is left basically undefined.

49). Better then to focus on how polities interact and interrelate with each other in time and space.

Polities interact with each other in different ways. Horizontal interaction mostly resembles what is traditionally understood as the 'inter-national', interactions across space between territorially separate polities. Horizontal interaction is thus primarily between the 'principal' polities (states, empires, city-states), which are considered territorially separate (not occupying the same space). Vertical interaction, involves interaction between polities which share some or all of the same territorial space (ibid: 48-49). For example, interaction between cities and the state, between a domestic corporation and the state, are examples of vertical interaction. These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive, they primarily serve as an aid in the analysis. Perhaps the most important aspects of the polities approach of Ferguson and Mansbach is the notion of nested polities (ibid: 48-51). Considering that polities are constantly interacting both vertically and horizontally, their relative power shifts. In some cases one polity might supersede another through competition or general decline. The 'loosing' (nesting) polity does not then disappear but remains and continues to give meaning and influence the primary polity, perhaps to one day return to a more dominant position. Through colonization, for instance, many existing polities in the colonized world seemingly disappeared only to reemerge at a later date. Polities seldom entirely disappear, even if they certainly can, but continue to give meaning even if in a limited fashion. A nested polity is a polity which continues to influence more dominant polities whilst also in turn being influenced, even if it seems to disappear for long periods of time, it can suddenly reemerge (ibid: 393-397). Whilst in no way invalidating the theoretical basis for a polities approach, Ferguson and Mansbach still commit a blunder in their historical analysis as they treat their cases¹³ as sealed off from the rest of the world ignoring the many world-wide (Afro-Eurasia) interactions which occurred and shaped development (see chapter 5). As others have noted (McNeill 1997: 272), they also place an undue focus on polities which had little real importance, such as clan polities in ancient Greece and inflate the similarities of polities which are spatially and temporally separate.

Considering the inter-connection of polities in space, it is strange that Scholte so casually rejects the notion of the transnational as it; "still takes the nation-state-country as its reference point and to that extent retains traces of methodological nationalism and statism" (ibid: 65). Transnationalism as a concept is contested. Different researchers differ in their demarcation and definition. Vertovec (1999) suggests that transnationalism is a condition in which despite often large distances and notwithstanding international borders, some kinds of relationships have been globally intensified and now take place in a global arena of activity (p. 447; Vertovec 2009: 3). Bauböck (2003) defines transnationalism as institutions and activities that extend across national borders (p. 701).

Considering Vertovec's understanding of the concept, perhaps it is then not so strange that Scholte should reject it, as in many ways, transnationalism and globalization focus on similar practices and processes. Contrary to globalization theory however, transnationalism functions under a different conception of the Westphalian system in which borders are more fluid. Any theory of global social space needs to take into account the fact that such space exists alongside and in constant interaction with the international, domestic, regional and transnational.¹⁴ Consider for instance diaspora groups which relate to space in a way which cannot be understood as simply territorial. Members of such groups are pulled to and from multiple directions, maintaining direct links with the home-land whilst also being intimately

¹³ Mesopotamia, Greek city-states, China, Meso-America, Italian city-states and Islam

¹⁴ This, of course, is not to say that transnational and global are the same types of flows/space.

connected with their host-society and the diaspora itself (Brubaker 2005: 5; Sheffer 2006: 49ff).

A major argument of this paper is that polities are constantly influenced and in turn influence other polities, both horizontally and vertically. The spatial organization and development of such polities, both horizontally and vertically, function under Rosenberg's notion of uneven and combined development¹⁵. Furthermore, the proposed (by globalization theory), territoriality of the historical Westphalian system, is based in a mode of spatial organization (horizontal and vertical), which has never existed in empirical reality. Polities and processes such as capitalism and imperialism recurrently interact in a mode of spatial organization fundamentally different from the historical past presented by globalization theory. Territory matter but is in no ways absolute.

¹⁵ This is further elucidated in the historical analysis

5 Time and Space in World History

Because of the emphasis put on territoriality and the Westphalian system by globalization theory, this paper focuses on the last 500 years from the beginning of the 16th century and traces the development of modern global political space. Such a development is neither linear nor natural but the result of human action and power-relations. The traditional understanding of this development usually takes its point of departure in the early 16th century or even as late as the 18th century and focus solely on Europe (Hall 2010, Hobson 2004, Frank 1998). This is the historical understanding upon which globalization theory rests and which is in this paper referred to as the Westphalian myth¹⁶. As is argued throughout this chapter, such an understanding has been socially constructed through expressions of power, exclusion and binary identity construction in Europe. Thus, a second way of understanding the development of contemporary global political space is presented, which seeks to move beyond the Eurocentrism and territorialism inherent in the Westphalian myth. It is fruitful however, to first briefly discuss space and time before 1500 in order to contextualize the changes which later occurred. In the next section, developments in time and space before 1500 are briefly outlined and discussed followed by a more in-depth analysis of the last 500 years.

5.1 Space and Time Before 1500

11 000 years ago, a shift occurred as the primary mode of spatial organization began to change as groups began to form sedentary communities based in agriculture and/or domestication (McNeill and McNeill 2003: 41). This new way of life which began in fertile regions in the Middle East slowly spread (or was discovered independently) to other regions of the world essentially remaking the nature of human existence. This shift was not instantaneous. Initially, groups might settle for parts of the year in one location, but over time groups abandoned their earlier lifestyle altogether. Other groups continued a more nomadic existence (particularly in less fertile steppe regions) yet shifted their primary means of sustenance from hunting and gathering to pastoralism (Christian 2005: 217-218).¹⁷ Much of the later world history is signified by the tensions between agricultural and pastoral communities. But this relation was not solely one of tensions as trade must have been common (as were most likely raids) between pastoralists and agriculturalists as their surpluses complemented each other (McNeill 1991: 18). These two new forms of spatio-temporal organization entailed new ways of relating to and organizing space and time. For sedentary agriculturalists space became more complex and more clearly demarcated. Space was in a

¹⁶ This narrative is a combination of Eurocentrism (Hobson 2005), European miracle and Despotic rulers (Hall 2010) and realist IR theory (hard territoriality, absolute sovereignty).

¹⁷ This however occurred after sedentary communities had formed.

way only horizontal as formal hierarchies had not yet emerged. So, whilst the villages were part of systems of interaction, which included other villages, pastoralists and roving bands of hunters and gatherers, the interaction in the system was weak. At this time, only one or perhaps two different polities existed within the same space, the village and the increasingly defined nuclear family. As such most villages were their own social space with only weak connections to larger conceptions of space (pre-international systems). This would however change dramatically with the emergence of a new mode of spatial organization, the city.

The meaning of time also shifted, as agriculture demanded a much more rigorous and systematic adherence to the seasons. The measuring of time became something essential in the Middle Eastern villages¹⁸ as planting too early or too late in the year could lead to the loss of an entire harvest (McNeill 1991: 20). The importance of the measuring and calculation of time would enormously affect future developments. It made important the maintenance of a surplus against contingencies, which also enabled the trade of surplus in one village polity for surpluses in another (pastoralist or agriculturalist). As such, a rudimentary form of horizontal division of labor, in a very weak form, existed in areas of heightened interaction.

* * *

As more and more villages and pastoralist communities emerged, interaction in space increased even as the physical space of each group grew smaller. Then, around 5000 years ago in the Middle East, around the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, agriculture grew more complex as irrigation methods were necessary in order to support the growing number of farmers living in the area (Christian 2005: 268). This growing need of organization, coupled with the surplus produced in villages, resulted in the emergence of the first cities. Unlike agricultural towns, most of which consisted of similar, self-sufficient households, cities were signified by a complex internal division of labor and were forced to import sustenance from the surrounding agricultural towns (ibid: 265; McNeill and McNeill 2003: 43). Towns consisted primarily of uniform¹⁹, households focused on agriculture, whereas cities featured no such uniformity, but rather diversification and specialization. The emergence of cities changed the social organization of individuals; most fundamentally, it instituted a hierarchical division of labor with the spiritual and/or temporal leaders (priests and warriors) at the top, merchants and artisans in the middle and the peasants and slaves at the bottom (Christian 2005: 274; McNeill 1991: 30-31).

Managing growing numbers of people and a larger territory also involved bureaucracy and violence (coercion). Violence had existed previously but the concentration of wealth in a few individuals or groups, allowed them to hire individuals as fulltime warriors which both protected the territorial claims of the city or empire and aided in the extraction of resources from the population (McNeill and McNeill 2003: 48-49). One of the most fundamental aspects of these cities does not reveal itself until we understand them, not singular entities, but rather, as interacting parts of a whole. The cities did not evolve in isolation, but rather in a system of similar cities based in a similar understanding of the transcendental (religion) and part of an even larger system of exchanges which united diverse systems in a weak yet essential manner (ibid: 59). In Mesopotamia the different cities competed and cooperated, traded and to a large extent exchanged ideas and new technologies (Ferguson and Mansbach

¹⁸ As McNeill points out, the accurate anticipation of the seasons and hence time did not have the same importance in other regions in which the seasons were more easily understood, such as monsoon Asia (McNeill 1991: 20)

¹⁹ In the meaning that no division of labor existed in a systematic fashion.

1996: 67). They also drew resources, by force and by trade, from distant locations outside of their sphere of control. Resources which were essential yet not locally available, such as metals needed for weapons, hints at such interactions (McNeill and McNeill 2003: 46-47). Mesopotamia was not the only place in which such city-state-clusters developed though and to a large extent the development of cities in Mesopotamia (and in other locales) involved a continuous process of exchange of ideas and goods between different regions, in a web of exchange which spanned much of Afro-Eurasia (ibid 2003: 51). The emerging Mesopotamian civilization was thus through overland caravans and coastal shipping continuously connected to both an emerging Egyptian civilization and an Indian civilization (ibid: 43).²⁰ As Buzan and Little has demonstrated, there most likely existed a world-wide system of interaction (indirect) even during the time before the first villages (2000: 121), these interactions were especially strong regionally within the emerging complexes discussed above and more weak and intermittent between the different complexes.

The era of the first cities, city-states and empires is constituted by an expanded meaning attributed to space and time as the world in which individuals lived expanded and grew more complex. Space was given new meaning as social relations became more complex due to the expansion of professions and the political, economical as well as the social hierarchies this entailed. New types of polities such as large towns, cities and even empires involved a fundamental shift from the previous village centered space. But even in the village, in which the largest numbers of people lived, the meaning of time and space shifted as it was continuously influenced to a large degree by outside forces and ideas. As interconnections between and within civilizations increased, people on all levels of this new hierarchy came into increasing contact with strangers (McNeill and McNeill 2003: 79-80).

Space also became more complex in a more general sense in that social organization in space became more diverse. In many ways space became hierarchical and the beginnings of territoriality can be observed. Space became hierarchical in that not only were social, financial and political interactions in space based in hierarchy but different polities can also be hierarchically divided from villages to towns to cities and later to proto-states (empires and city-states/leagues). In a similar manner, space became more complex horizontally. As different types of polities became more common, the interaction in space increased and became more complex. The old interaction of trade and ideas coupled by diplomacy (war and agreement) was expanded upon over time to incorporate other exchanges between centers. We find then, that in more general sense of the word, space can expand vertically, in the creation of more modes of spatial organization (polities), and horizontally, in the expansion of these modes of spatial organization across space (globally).

Both the vertical and horizontal expansion of space is also intimately connected to time. In much the same way as Giddens argue that the speed and scope of change in the contemporary world is unprecedented, the same could be said of this time, as interactions increased both between vertical and horizontal space. These very interactions also facilitated the spread of such conceptions of space. As village polities, town polities and city polities became more effective, they increased their output, sustaining larger populations and producing more luxury goods, which in turn, facilitated further horizontal spread of these ways of organizing space which in turn increased interaction (Christian 2005: 284-285). This argument should however not be taken too far as the developments identified here did not happen quickly and continuously, but rather in fits and starts over thousands of years. Compared to the time

²⁰ The emerging Chinese civilization only later joined this web of interaction (McNeill and McNeill 2003; Christian 2005)

before agriculture, this change over thousands of years is still remarkable in its speed and scope.

* * *

With relevance to space and time, the next 4500 years, after the emergence of the first cities, involved quantitative rather than qualitative changes as the mode of spatial organization presented above, pastoralists, agriculturalists, cities, empires and city-states, spread horizontally across Afro-Eurasia and the rest of the world²¹ by various means. The emergence of territorial-polities throughout Afro-Eurasia further increased the interaction throughout the same. As Abu-Lughod demonstrates in her book; *Before European Hegemony* (1989), between 1250 and 1350, there existed several international systems which interlocked into a world system spanning from Western Europe to the coasts of China. Evidence makes clear however that such a world system, even if in weaker form, existed long before 1250 (Hobson 2004; Frank 1998; Buzan and Little 2000).

This is not to say that all territorial polities were undifferentiated in their organization. A fundamental element of such polities before the end on the 20th century is their functional difference. Aside from large differences between pastoralists and agrarian polities, agrarian polities differed to a large extent. One way of making such a division is in the way they extracted income, coercion or capital. The most important form of income for such early agrarian states involved the coercion of 'tribute' from the population, initially in produce, but later in the form of coins (Wolf 1982: 96ff). But commercial activity was also important for most states, not least because it enabled the procurement of resources not locally available, such as luxury or strategic resources, but also as it could bring income of its own (in most cases however this income was remarkably less than from coercion). Whereas tribute taking always involved the indirect (or direct) threat of force (coercion), trade was more consensual (Christian 2005: 278, 324). As exchanges within and between complexes increased and as the interactions increased between regions, it opened up a niche for a new type of territorial polity based primarily on commerce²². Most of the early Mediterranean city-states (the Phoenicians, The Minoans) were examples of such polities based primarily in commerce rather than coercion (even though coercion certainly still existed as a means of power).

One of the reasons behind the slow pace of innovation during this period is the dominance of coercive rather than commercial states. As individuals and groups have more incentive to innovate and experiment if they stand to make profit from it, such innovation would need an environment relatively free from coercion (ibid: 325). Coercive states however, whose primary means of income was its agrarian production, did not provide such an environment.

As such, leading up to the 16th century, Afro-Eurasia consists of many separate systems which connect the entire landmass into a world system. This world system must still be considered fairly weak as the two end regions, Western Europe and China, interact only indirectly, through intermediaries (Islam, Mongols, Persians). Further, the mode of spatial organization is functionally differentiated both between and within regions and within territorial-polities, and the primary meaning of space and time is still local, even if certain

²¹ This account of world history essentially ignores developments in the Americas. This is not because these developments are immaterial but rather because of the limited amount of space. The development of contemporary global space is primarily located in Afro-Eurasia as the Americas were not incorporated into this world system directly until the 26th century.

²² Typically on the fringes or in-between larger empires

groups (nobles, rulers, religious leaders and merchants) might derive a meaning from time and space differently they were but a minority at this time.

We find then that the development and expansion of space and time leading up to the 16th century follows Rosenberg's (2006, 2007, 2010) notion of uneven and combined development. On the one hand, development is expressed in a multiplicity of differing societies, complexes and ways of spatio-temporal organization. On the other hand, as these same societies co-exist in space and time, they affect each other and influence each others development. Their individual development thus has both a reproductive logic from their internal character and an interactive logic arising from their coexistence with other societies. Development is thus both uneven and combined.

Rosenberg's idea of uneven and combined development then accentuates the understanding of polities adopted in this paper. There existed a multiplicity of polities both within and overlapping different complexes. Across space, development of political authority was signified by, at the same time, different and similar types of polities. Religious organizations, merchant's guilds, village communities and urban communities (cities, neighborhoods, diasporas) shaped and gave meaning to human existence alongside the top-level of the territorial polity. The various polities within territorial polities shifted in time and space, as did their relative importance. Further, polities stretched across territorial space, organized religion, kinship-relations and merchant guilds, for example, were often not contained within specific territorial-polities. Development was then uneven and combined both across space and within territorial polities. The two most important aspects of time and space, before the 16th century lies in the multiplicity of polities (horizontally but also vertically) and the fact that Afro-Eurasia is essentially one space, uneven and combined, in which interaction is strongest within specific regions but the entire landmass is connected (indirectly).

5.2 The Westphalian System (1500- 1992)

Westphalia provides the mythological basis for IR as a discipline. The treaty²³ of Westphalia (1648) is attributed a shift in the nature of international relations as it outlined the basic legal principles of sovereignty and in extension, territoriality. The peace of Westphalia is traditionally understood as ushering in a new way of spatio-temporal organization based in territorially separate sovereign states, a system which diffused across the world through colonization and de-colonization (European imperialism). In other words, one type of polity, the territorial Westphalian state, came to dominate all other forms (horizontally and vertically). Sovereign states subsequently out-competed earlier forms or spatial organization, such as empire and city-states, bringing an end to international hierarchy (horizontal homogenization). This development of Westphalian states further entailed an homogenization of political and military authority as polities which previously exerted authority within states (as during feudalism) were replaced by a single polity and all other forms of vertical territorial authority vanished. In other words, the end of empire and the rise of the Westphalian sovereign states meant that hierarchy was replaced with anarchy (de Carvalho et al. 2011: 6-8).

²³ Actually treaties, in the plural, see below

This Westphalian myth, which locates the emergence of sovereignty, territoriality and modern states solely in Europe, following the peace of Westphalia, remains powerful in IR research to this day (as demonstrated by de Carvalho et al: 2011). As noted, globalization theory takes this understanding of Westphalia as its point of departure, arguing that the Westphalian myth was a historical reality which is qualitatively different from the present global world.

The Westphalian system is a mode of spatial organization in which polities are functionally undifferentiated and separated by hard, territorially defined borders. The historical basis for this mode of spatial organization is located in 17th century Europe where a new polity, the modern state, emerged. This interpretation of the Westphalian system, of sovereignty, territory and anarchy, has been naturalized and universalized through the theories of IR realism and neo-realism, and is today reproduced through globalization theory.

Before the emergence of modern states, regional politics in Europe was signified by competing, complex systems of divided loyalty. In other words, the political structure of Europe was feudal. In this system, religious and secular leaders shared power (however unwillingly) with local and regional powerbrokers such as barons, merchants, guilds and somewhat independent cities. As such there existed no real centralization of power in the hands of a single authority and the relative power between different polities (vertical and horizontal) constantly shifted often leading to periods of intense internal and external conflict (Buzan and Little 2000: 244).

At the heart of Europe, reaching from southern England to Northern Italy, groups of territorial-polities focused on capital were surrounded by agrarian coercive proto-state polities. As the city corridor grew wealthier and towns became more profitable (Spruyt 1994: 184), new towns sprung up surrounding the cities, allowing the proto-states to extract revenue from trade as well as land. This combination of capital and coercion intensive resource mobilization is one of the primary aspects of early modern states. Tilly (1992) argues that the combination of coercion and capital methods for income collection (coupled with the constant threat of war) is the main reason why nation-states later came to dominate all previous modes of political organization (see p. 190). These modern states came to be more capable of both coercion and capital methods than other forms of organization, forcing other types, such as city-states and empires to emulate them (Buzan and Little 2000: 251).

Whilst the developments above began, or at least picked up pace, in the 16th century, early-modern states co-existed with other territorial polities such as city-states, empires, pastoralists and hunter and gatherer bands well into the 20th century. Innovations in military technology and shipbuilding, coupled with greater navigational knowledge, further allowed Europeans not only to travel anywhere on the globe, but to an increasing level, dictate the nature of such trade. In the year 1500 Europeans controlled only 7 per cent of the world's landmass but by 1800 they controlled 35 per cent and in 1914, 84 per cent (Tilly 1992: 183). Following the decolonization during the 20th century, the former colonies assumed the shape of their former 'masters' and with the fall of the Soviet Empire, the modern state remained as the sole type of territorial polity in the world. Buzan and Little's formulation is typical for this narrative;

“The timing and method of the transposition varied from place to place, but its outcome was always the same. Whatever had been there before, what remained was a set of modern states, some well made and some badly, but all copies of the new political form that had arisen in Europe.” (2000: 264)

Indeed, by limiting our historical investigation to Europe, any number of processes and structures in the contemporary world can be located in European history. Capitalism and modern financial institutions such as credit and banking emerged in the Italian city states of

the renaissance. Europe discovered the rest of the world by sea through the voyages of da Gama (1497-8) and Columbus (1492) and, after this, Europe through its superior financial institutions (capitalism), military technologies (gunpowder) and sea-capabilities (better ships, deep-sea navigation) came to rule the world and export the Westphalian system around the world. Because only in Europe did a religion exist, which encouraged innovation (Protestantism) and the rational, hardworking European subsequently out-innovated the rest of the world of stagnant, despotic, empires based in agriculture and coercion. The power-brokering (see Tilly 1992) of modern European states further lead to more democratic and open societies as absolutist, dynastic rulers were replaced by popular sovereignty and the rule of the people. Further, the European topography (forests, mountains, rivers) made it difficult for a single empire to assume control, which resulted in several competing powers which further increased innovation through competition.²⁴

In different forms, and focusing of different aspects, the argument above is the traditional understanding of the development of the modern global system. Europe is here the sole object of analysis and to a large extent 'the rest' simply reacts (no agency) to European states. As already hinted however, this Eurocentric understanding of world history, poorly coincide with the historical evidence as is made clear as soon as we widen our focus.

* * *

A more fruitful way of understanding this development is to emphasize that Afro-Eurasia was (and is) an interacting world system in which Western Europe was, until quite recently, but a small periphery part geographically, but also for large spans of history; economically and politically. Europe has not existed in isolation, but has been continuously connected with a network of systems and/or civilizations throughout Afro-Eurasia (Abu-Lughod 1989; Buzan and Little 2000; Hobson 2004). The development of contemporary global political space thus need be understood in a more dialogic manner as resulting from the meeting between Orient and Occident. Indeed, such a focus allows us to perceive that many of the inherently European developments such as capitalism, industrialism, military and shipbuilding technologies did not first emerge in Europe but rather spread to Europe from the East through the world system, in which Europe was a small periphery part.

Europe was not economically or militarily superior to most of the peoples they encountered in their initial 'mastery of the waves'; in fact the European age of discovery seem less significant in light of the earlier Chinese innovations and discoveries (Hobson 2004: 134ff). The technological and scientific basis for Portuguese ships and deep-sea navigation were all made possible due to the fact that such technologies already existed, and had existed for a long time in China. When da Gama found the sea-route to India (aided by a Muslim sailor), Portugal entered a pre-existing system of exchange in the Indian Ocean, a system in which they were but a small part.

Britain's industrialization was preceded by industrialization in China in the 11th century (ibid: 51). Many of the technological innovations of the industrial age in Europe were actually Chinese in origin, invented in China, often several hundred or thousands of years earlier. Steel production for instance, which grew in England due to new technologies in the 19th century was preceded by China 1400 years earlier (ibid: 211). The development of the steam engine was based on preceding Chinese technologies in hydraulics (ibid: 209). Iron bridges, one of the most potent signs of British industrialization appeared in China as early as 65 CE (ibid:

²⁴ This narrative of European development is of course exaggerated but surprisingly, not by much. What unites these understandings is the focus on Europe and Europe alone in the explanation of historical development.

215). In these ways and many more, Chinese industrialization preceded and influenced British industrialization.

In a similar fashion, the contributions of the Italian city-states to financial institutions and their position in the world-economic-system has been significantly inflated in Eurocentric accounts as many of the innovations which were attributed to them was gained through their interactions with Middle Eastern Muslims, a relationship in which the Muslims always had the upper hand, allowing the Venetians to trade on their terms or not at all (Hobson 2004: 116-133).

This is not to say that nothing interesting happened in Europe (it did), but what happened in Europe must be understood within an existing world system of exchange, to which Europe became more intimately connected in the 16th century.

Yet, claiming that European developments were preceded by developments in the East which influenced them is not so much an explanation, as it is a critique of existing narratives. The important aspect here is the notion of larger systems of interaction (world system). Developments in Europe (as well as developments elsewhere) occurred as part of larger processes directly influenced by other parts in the system. Hobson reiterates; “at every major turning point of European development, the assimilation of Eastern ideas, institutions and technologies played a major part” (2004: 301).

Although it can certainly be fruitful, especially when demonstrating the fallacy of existing theory, to use the categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’, it still hints at problems. The notion of naturalized and timeless civilizations²⁵ (East and West) echoes of the civilizational approach of Huntington (1996) which can easily lead to an inflation of difference between constructed civilizations. Whilst it is not the belief of this paper that this is Hobson’s intent, such casual categorization of East and West reconstructs a narrative in which it is right to speak of the world as naturally consisting of different regions with different attributes, when in fact all such regions are the result of discourse and power.

In the end, the rise of Western Europe cannot be explained by turning solely to materialist developments, as such development (capitalism, industrialization) had already occurred in the East (Hobson 2004: 313). Hobson argues that it is rather European²⁶ identity construction, initially as Christian Europe, later through imperialism and different forms of racism, which enabled the rise of the West. Other states, such as China had stood at the threshold of imperialism, yet choose not to embark upon such a path, much due to a specific Chinese identity (not to mention the fact that the rest of the world came to China any way). Western European states on the other hand, through the social and scientific construction of a hostile and passive ‘other’ constructed an imperial identity based in a racist discourse, making the colonization of lesser peoples a moral (religious and rational) obligation (ibid: 68, 219ff).

Such a notion of European identity construction certainly has merits, yet Hobson treats identity in a most essentialist fashion, condensing the identity of a region into a few aspects (racism and imperialism). Whilst in no way damning his project, such an understanding of identity runs the risk of essentialism and determinism, and we need to keep in mind that at this point (1700-1900) it is not possible to speak of a European identity as such (Hobson seem aware of this and focuses his account on Britain). A more nuanced understanding of European identity, which does not simply equate Europe with rationalism (eurocentrism) or

²⁵ Hobson’s argument is not as naturalized as Huntington’s, yet his approach does treat the West and the East in an essentialist manner.

²⁶ Whilst Hobson’s argument here is aptly done, it still leaves unanswered the elements of power involved in this process of inclusion (Europe) and exclusion (the East). Whilst he goes into some detail on how Europe constructed itself, he leaves unanswered what was included in this Europe and what was not.

racism/imperialism (Hobson), is necessary, even if these aspects of European identity were crucial. This is not to say that such identity construction did not take place, but it should not be treated as something essentialist which results in a specific discourse, but rather as a process or practice which is constantly reconstituted both spatially and temporally. European identity construction, which constructed Europe as a rational, Christian, territorially defined geographical region must be further compared to earlier Chinese identity construction (mandate of heaven, the middle-kingdom) which was also based in an 'us' and 'them' discourse (Hobson 2004: 68ff). If both Europe and China constructed similar identities based in the moral, technological and military superiority of the self, can the rise of the West and Western imperialism be simply attributed to a specific identity construction (as in Hobson's argument)?

Such an identity construction is a prerequisite for imperialism, yet it is not a direct cause. Frank (1998) instead suggests that the fall of East and the rise of the West are mutually constitutive (p. 258). In the middle of the 18th century as the West were increasingly balancing their trade deficit with the East through the injection of silver from America into the now world-wide trading system, the fragile balance of the Asian economy began to collapse, enabling Europeans to take advantage (ibid: 276ff). The decline of the East is then indirectly a result of the large amounts of silver which was pumped into and destabilized the Asian markets, their economic strength lead to their downfall and the rise of the West²⁷. Such an explanation however still leaves unquestioned why China, who had the capability and basis for imperialism (hundreds of years before Western Europe) never embarked on the systematic imperialism which would result in European dominance. Perhaps the answer here is even simpler. The rest of the world came to China to trade because the rest of the world had little of interest for China (hence the large deficit between Western Europe and China), therefore, there existed no need, nor interest in China to resort to imperialism as the rest of the world was already considered subservient and inferior (Hobson 2004: 68-71)²⁸.

* * *

Having now realigned the focus from Eurocentrism to a more polycentric (Hall 2010) notion of historical development, we return to the earlier discussion of the Westphalian system and the problems inherent in the traditional understanding. One common misconception regarding the thirty years' war (which concluded with the peace of Westphalia), is that it was an essentially defensive war, fought by rising individual states only to curb the rising power of the Habsburgs (the Holy Roman Empire) and the Vatican in their attempt to create a single Christian empire. In fact, as Osiander (2001) demonstrate, these nascent states had existed for a long time and neither their independence nor survival was at stake in the war. The treaties of Westphalia (Münster and Osnabrück) did not in fact signal the start of territorial sovereignty, but rather a temporary retreat from a pre-existing idea of sovereignty, as it limited rights stipulated already 1555 in the treaty of Augsburg (de Carvalho et al. 2011: 7). The treaties of Westphalia and Augsburg stipulated sovereignty as valid only within the Holy Roman Empire, not the whole of Europe. In other words, the entire basis for early IR theory upon which the traditional perspectives rest is signified by a misunderstanding of historical sources.

²⁷ Frank's answer is but one of a myriad of factors which contributed to the simultaneous decline of the East and rise of the West.

²⁸ This goes to show the dangers of essentialist accounts of identity, as whilst Chinese and European identity construction both resulted in an 'us' and 'them' discourse, this was but one aspect of their identity not identity in full.

The thirty years' war was not a war fought to curb the dynastic and empire building ambitions of the Habsburgs. Such a historical understanding is based in the propaganda of the winning states (Osiander 2001: 265-266). The treaties themselves did not stipulate universal or even European sovereignty but rather dealt solely with the Holy Roman Empire and involved a regression from the earlier treaty of Augsburg. Rather, than signifying a single shift from hierarchy and feudalism to sovereignty and modern states, the development of sovereignty should be understood as a complex story of advances and setbacks. Even as Europe became more territorially defined in the formation of nation states based in a more and more successful form of sovereignty, these states became imperial which actually created complex international imperial-hierarchies throughout the world, which consisted of single sovereign colonial polities each of which stood upon a large number of non-sovereign polities (de Carvalho et al. 2001: 7).

This understanding of Westphalia as a development over time rather than as a sudden transformation is also evident in Reus-Smit's (1999) argument that what is traditionally understood as a single Westphalian system, which formed following the peace of Westphalia, is actually two temporally different systems, one based in absolutism and after 1850, one based in popular sovereignty. Reus-Smit's argument, locates a shift in the moral purpose of the state around 1850 (earlier in the US) which transformed the absolutists monarchies into territorial modern states, based in the consent of the people (popular sovereignty). Without such a shift, contemporary representative democracy would not have been possible (p. 127; Manin 2002).

So, as Western European states expanded and colonized most of the world, the traditional Westphalian argument loses weight. With the usurpation of colonies and protectorates across the world, the simple territorial demarcation of inside/outside lost its meaning (if ever there was such a simple demarcation), as the modern state was not so much contained within territory but rather stretched across it. The English Empire is a good example of this territorial stretching and multiple degrees of sovereignty as the territorial claims made on behalf of the homeland (England and to a lesser extent Scotland, Ireland and Wales) was different from those made of its colonies and protectorates. The hard territoriality of the homeland (within the Westphalian system) was then coupled with soft claims for the colonies.²⁹ This duality in territoriality is further exasperated by the notion of informal empire which did not show up on any political maps. Many states were effectively integrated into the British market even if they were never truly colonized, for example Argentina.

This territorial and non-territorial duality is also apparent in the political economy. Rosenberg (2000: 30-32) demonstrate how the international political economy of the early nineteenth century also was not so much contained within, as it transcended territorial boundaries. The English cotton industry involved slaves from Africa transported to the American South where the cotton was grown. Cotton was also imported through the Mediterranean and Egypt (Wolf 1982: 286). It involved the sales of the product in Europe and India and further involved English wage earners in factories which produced the final product. Rosenberg then asks the valid question of how we would situate the British cotton industry on a territorial grid of distance and separation (Rosenberg 2000: 32). Indeed, the division of labor which emerged with the combination of industrial capitalism, and a British form of imperialism ensured that through formal and informal empire, different aspects of the production of certain goods (textiles most prominently) would be dispersed throughout this increasingly global world (Wolf 1982: chapter 9). Aspects of transworld instantaneity and

²⁹ For a similar argument but which draws different conclusions, see Buzan and Little (2000: 263-266)

simultaneity are also already apparent as is hinted at in Wolf's discussion of the emergence of large factories;

“What was new, however, was the creation of such organizations under unified technical management, responsible for *synchronized* productive processes and for changes in production in response to changing conditions of the market” (ibid: 274, my emphasis)

As the market at this time was not local or regional, but rather incorporated the entire world (at least the coastal areas), aspects of globality is inherent in the early developments of industrial capitalism in the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries.

This goes to show that the only real difference, with regards to forms of spatial organization, in Westphalian states is not an absolute territoriality but an increased definition of preexisting territorial demarcations (in Western Europe), transnational and international (and towards more modern times even global) flows and interactions were constantly present. Sovereignty did not emerge out of a sudden transformation in 1648 but constituted a long process in which some states achieved internal sovereignty³⁰ towards the end of the 19th century. The globality of Scholte is then not globalization at all but rather a dimension of industrial capitalism in which different parts of the production occurred simultaneously (transworld instantaneity) in a way which transcended territorial borders (transworld simultaneity).

The shift to a system of sovereign states from a more feudal context was a gradual development, as one form of polity was given increased political legitimacy, both internationally and domestically (in Western Europe). Important to note is that the rise of a new form of polity, was directly influenced by other polities such as economic firms, religion and social and labor organizations, polities which remained relevant and overlapped territorial space before and after this supposed Westphalian shift (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 393ff).

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In a direct rejection of traditional understandings, this paper argues that the development which resulted in the modern global political system took place in an increasingly interconnected world system. By focusing solely on Europe, we miss not only the ways in which European development was informed by interactions with the rest of the world but also the ways in which European modern states continued to stretch across space rather than being contained within it. New polities emerged, modern states, with an increase in legitimacy both internally and externally. Through capitalism, imperialism and colonialism, these new polities were spread across the world, much like agriculture and cities spread across Afro-Eurasia thousands of years before. This did not result in a global space of solely combined development however. Even after the de-colonization and World Wars of the 20th century, state-polities were differentiated internally and externally. Earlier forms of polities remained as nested polities and even if all state-polities across the world assumed external (legal) sovereignty, the internal sovereignty shifted as vertical competition amongst polities (clans, regions, tribes, and agrarian/pastoralist) continued (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 366-369). This vertical competition was hidden from view during the cold war as horizontal interaction stemming from the United States and the Soviet Empire stabilized the system as they

³⁰ Of course, this internal sovereignty was never absolute.

continued their cold war. Due to a high level of military, political and financial support by these powers, weak new states developed along a path which seemingly brought them closer to Western conceptions of what a modern state entailed (institutions and policies) whether this conception was based in communism or liberalism and democracy (Rosenberg 2005: 43ff).

With the fall of the Soviet Union, we return to the place at which this discussion began (see chapter 3). A general belief that one ideology had prevailed (liberalism), coupled with the opening up to this ideology in the former Eastern bloc, painted a picture of the world as homogenous, as combined. The scope and speed of change were indeed revolutionary in the 1990s as the foreign policy agendas shifted around the world (Giddens 1991). The smaller states surrounding Russia, previously a part of the Soviet empire, shifted from anti-Western to pro-Western, many of which attempted entry into the European community and/or NATO. Similarly, the foreign policy of the US and Russia shifted; Russia withdrew many of their imperialist pretensions which resulted in a large number of states, previously under Russian influence which were now essentially alone (Rosenberg 2005: 43). Faced with the option of conforming to the liberalist capitalist world system or survive on their own, essentially cut off from most of the world. The ideological war won, the US could focus on other things than keeping US friendly regimes in power throughout the world which resulted in an even larger amount of weak states, cut loose from a previous informal empire. The carrot of the cold war was increasingly replaced with a stick, human rights, liberalization and multilateralism were the strong words of the 1990s, and indeed, in the years directly following the cold war, globalization seemed to drastically bring the world ideologically, socially, culturally, politically and financially, closer together (Scholte 2005: 17-20). Out of this context and idealist conceptions of the world, globalization theory arose (Rosenberg 2005: 3-4), arguing that the realist understandings which had dominated the cold war (balance of power, anarchy, polarity, deterrence) were not suited for the study of this globalized world in which a shift had occurred from territorial to post-territorial conceptions and interactions.

The brief illusion of combined development following upon the uneven and combined development of the cold war (and before) quickly became problematic however as, around the world, the combined development of the early 1990s turned into uneven development. The genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia involved the reemergence of nested polities (tribes and nations), hidden during the Cold War. Multilateralism stumbled as the US, increasingly acted unilaterally in military (Iraq 2003), environmental (Kyoto1997) and with regards to human rights (the international criminals court). The illusion of combined development in the early 1990s quickly transformed into an uneven and combined reality as nested polities and identities reemerged across the world. The politics of the cold war repressed these polities temporarily as the poles supported polities most beneficial to them and thus repressed other polities. With the conclusion of the cold war and a realignment of politics worldwide, these nested polities could reemerge, leading once again to uneven and combined development.

5.3 Post-Westphalia?

In the previous discussion on the Westphalian system and Westphalian state, it was demonstrated that the territorialism on which globalization theory bases its argument was based in a Westphalian myth which did not correspond with the historical reality. The territorial boundaries which contained states did indeed become more marked with the advent of sovereignty but they were in no way absolute, as polities and interaction, continuously

stretched across territorial space. In a similar manner, the political economy involved simultaneous processes (transworld simultaneity and instantaneity) which reached through and across territorial space to such an extent that we cannot situate them on a territorial grid.

Space and time thus exhibited aspects of ‘globality’ long before the present and what is defined as the very core of globalization theory; supraterritoriality, “social relations which substantially transcend territorial geography” (Scholte 2005: 61) is then not something new, but rather an aspect of the industrial capitalist political economy. What this entail for globalization theory is that its qualitative ambitions (a new form of social space) has been proven invalid as this form of social space is not in fact new. What globalization theory is then left with is simply a quantitative aspect, much more interaction in global space. As such what globalization theory can do, if they follow their own definition of globalization, is very little. They demonstrate that the world today is dramatically different from previous eras, yet fail to adequately reveal why and (theoretically) how it is different.

It bears reiteration that the argument of this paper is *not* that globalization does not exist. The argument is rather, that the attempt to incorporate this phenomenon into a theoretical argument of spatio-temporal change has been sloppy at best and downright ignorant at worst. In most cases globalization is used to describe a phenomenon which highlights the interconnection, of polities, in space. A phenomenon based in modern technologies, such as the computer, satellites and jet travel, which makes communication easy across large distances and enables distant events to directly influence local happenings. A result of which is the emergence of new conceptions of space, place and time, the negotiation of which are increasingly taking place in a global/local dialectic. There is nothing inherently problematic in such a definition³¹, only when we attempt to quantify this phenomenon from a purely descriptive to a meta-causal factor (as in globalization theory) does the problem occur.

* * *

Considering the relational³² manner of the interactions discussed, to simply accept the liberal, Eurocentric contention that modern and liberal institutions, norms and ideas diffused across the world to replace all other forms are problematic. As Hall points out, globalization theory and liberalism are unable to explain the duality of contemporary international relations such as the success and eventual failure of the Asian Tigers, global Islam and the current wave of right-wing sentiments spreading across Western Europe (2010: 17). This is because of the two faulty conceptions of territorialism and diffusion (homogeneity). Considering the historical evidence however and through a relational and polycentric understanding of historical development, we find that the world is heterogeneous; it developed and exists according to Rosenberg’s notion of uneven and combined development. Historical structures, ideas, norms and institutions remain alongside the ‘diffused’ modern liberal ones. Ways of spatial organization are not simply diffused horizontally but rather constructed and reconstructed within a local context (vertically). Nested polities then, influenced the development of modern states throughout the world, leading to fundamentally different territorial polities united only through the legal, external sovereignty attributed to them through an international society of states. Throughout the world, religious polities continue to give meaning to human existence,

³¹ Even if it ultimately fails to properly distinguish itself from other terminology.

³² A relational exchange or interaction involves two or more parties which influence the outcome. This directly opposed by diffusionist interaction or exchange which involves the spread of innovations or ideas from one party to another without it changing along the way (Hall 2010).

nested polities based in tribes and clans quickly reemerged after de-colonization in Africa, fundamentally influencing the state-polity. It is only through the re-discovery of agency in the global-south, third world or Orient that we can understand the fundamentally uneven and combined development which gave birth to the contemporary uneven and combined world.

As such, it does not surprise us when states differ (multiplicity) in fundamental ways (liberalism, authoritarianism, democracy, socialism), globally, but also regionally³³. To understand these states as ‘becoming’ (progressing towards the Western norm) more Western, is to lose sight of the many ways in which states in the contemporary global system are different from each other. This is perhaps the largest problem within this Eurocentric understanding of history; time is understood as progression towards ‘becoming’ something (homogenization). Thereby, states which have yet to conform to Western practices are understood as progressing (China today) or regressing (Yugoslavia during the 1990s), towards or from, the Western norm of liberal, capitalist, democratic states. As others have already noted (Hall 2010), globalization theory continues the traditional Westphalian myth by new means, in effect removing the agency of non-Western actors (states, groups, individuals). China and Japan are understood as incorporating Western features such as capitalism and liberalism through diffusion. Another more fruitful way of understanding this is to see it as a rediscovery (nested polities) as China and Japan took part in a capitalist system well before it reached Europe. The homogenization inherent in traditional understandings (diffusion instead of relational means of exchange) conceals the fact that states are different inherently, and not just in a process of becoming more functionally similar.

That so many states across the world share many aspects is most likely due to a combination of socialization (from the fact that global space is in essence a Western global space, as institutions, organizations and norms in this space is primarily Western in origin)³⁴ and the fact that some types polities have proven more effective. The Cold War also had a large part in this as development was at this time heavily influenced by international, rather than domestic, factors due to the power political nature of the bi-polar international system. A focus on polities rather than simply states is not surprised by such multiplicity but expects it.

* * *

The aim of this paper was to demonstrate the need for a historical and historicist perspective to international relations. This was demonstrated through an historical investigation of the foundational claims of globalization theory. Through such an investigation, globalization theory was demonstrated to seriously misunderstand our historical past to such an extent that their entire argument about spatio-temporal transformation was proven incorrect. But where does this leave us in regard to space and time in the present? As was argued throughout the historical analysis, space has always been organized in a multiplicity of different polities both horizontally and vertically. Through a brief re-interpretation of the 1990s, it was demonstrated that this is also the case in the contemporary world system. Space thus remains organized according to the principles of uneven and combined development. There exists a multiplicity of different polities (not just states) which are combined in a single world system (which does not exclude the notion of sub-systems). These divergent polities such as corporations, organizations, alliances, states, cities, religions, tribes and clans continually influence and

³³ Or that other form of authority complexes such as transnational corporations, regional and international organizations and civil society project political authority within and across territorial space (states).

³⁴ Even though they were constructed through global influences.

interact both vertically and horizontally. Transnational corporations for instance, stretch across space, incorporating the entire world into a network of labor and exchange. International organizations exert influence, however limited across the world and regionally, regionalization in Europe has resulted in a powerful regional polity which has legal rights to affect domestic policy within sovereign state-polities. Contemporary space is signified by a multiplicity of actors which interact and influence each other horizontally and vertically.

Has nothing then changed? Is this paper but repeating a realist logic in which the present is functionally undifferentiated from the past?

Indeed, it does not! What this paper does maintain is that the shift identified by globalization theory from territoriality to post-territoriality is not a shift at all. The world has always been simultaneously territorial and post-territorial. At the same time as territorial polities has made authority claims regarding a specific territory, other polities have stretched across this territory. This argument however, says very little concerning the make-up of neither these differing polities nor the institutional, normative and material reality. The purpose from the start was to trace the development of space through time. So whilst the underlying logic of this space, uneven and combined development, remains, this logic is not one of timelessness and naturalization but one of change. It suggests that development contains the dual processes of heterogeneity and homogeneity. Polities will become more similar in some ways and more different in others.

* * *

The greatest danger or problem identified in this paper is then not directly related to globalization theory, but rather in the Eurocentric account of history it promotes and/or takes part in reproducing. Thinking in terms of socially constructed space and world history necessarily leads us to the conclusion that Europe as a geographical entity only exist to the extent that it has been socially constructed as such through a process of 'us' and 'them' rhetoric. As such, Europe has shifted throughout history from Christian Europe to rational Europe and to present day multi-cultural Europe. In a similar manner, Europe (later the West) constructed 'the other' as to best serve Europe's purposes, in effect also constructing a Eurocentric history in which the rise of Europe was not a miracle at all but a natural development as Europeans were morally, economically, militarily, and technologically superior to the barbaric, despotic, effeminate East³⁵. The term 'the European Miracle' is thus a misnomer as according to this narrative, the rise of Europe was not miraculous at all, simply the commonsensical result of a superior European spirit.

The result for contemporary social scientists and historians of the storytelling history of pre-modern and modern Europe is that much if not all of the history and knowledge of this time is suspect because Europe is constructed from a Eurocentric 'insider' account whilst the rest of the world is constructed from a Eurocentric 'outsider' account. If such constructions of the successful West and the failure of the East began from racism as Hobson suggests, it is continued today in social theories such as realism, liberalism and globalization theory and the influence such theories have on scientists, journalists, politicians and individuals. The way forward for such theories is to take seriously the remedies suggested by Hobson and HSIR; to reveal the present as a constantly changing construct situated in a historical context. The present did not emerge naturally from human impulses but through processes of power, social

³⁵ Opposing voices to this narrative were silenced or ignored.

exclusion and norms and is constituted by transformative processes which constantly reconstitute the present (Hobson 2002: 8; Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 2010: 18). Failure to do so will continue to reproduce Eurocentrism and an inability to accurately understand not just the past, but also the present.

6 Conclusions

Even though this paper started out as a critique of existing research, most of this critique was focused on mainstream IR and globalization theory, whilst HSIR (despite Smiths critique) was largely accepted as it is. This does not entail that no problems exist. Just because research unfolds according to HSIR principles, this in no way means that this research will be critical (ontologically) of the role of the researcher in knowledge production. Hobson for example, does a great job in demonstrating how understandings of world history and European development have been largely influenced by Eurocentrism. However, he accepts an East-West divide as commonsensical and natural even though he understands the West as socially constructed. As such he leaves the door open for researchers such as Huntington to point towards the eternal divide between civilizations. Reus-Smit on the other hand, does an apt job of demonstrating how fundamental institutions influenced the development of modern states, democracy and modern sovereignty, yet he does so from a decidedly Eurocentric perspective, which essentially ignores the fact that Europe has always been part of a larger system of exchange, influenced throughout history by ideas, innovations and contact with the East. This is not a glaring problem in Reus-Smits account, yet it contributes to a dangerous historiography in which the Europe can be sealed off from the rest of the world.

Following the historical analysis above, it seems self-evident that the historical basis of globalization theory (as well as much of traditional IR) is based in a mythological notion of the emergence of a Westphalian system. Modern states have since their emergence stretched across space rather than being territorially bounded. This paper has placed an increased focus on the development of modern states at the expense of other actors, such as international organizations and transnational corporations, yet this does not mean that such actors are unimportant. Throughout history, economic actors such as the British and Dutch East India companies have exerted political, as well as economic authority, not just domestically and internationally, but also transnationally.

Scholte and globalization theory was almost immediately forced to bring back the non-globalizations of internationalization, westernization, universalization and liberalization and assign supraterritorial aspects to everything from corporations to tourism. The historical investigation above understands these categories in a different light. Indeed, the spatial and temporal nature of contemporary society is in many ways different from what came before. Space is now territorially divided across the globe in a large number of sovereign states. The rate of interaction has increased dramatically, yet we need to be careful in the way we assign causality to technological developments like computers and satellites (Scholte's supraterritoriality) and rather focus not on the technologies but on their social expressions. In so doing we notice (like globalization theory claim) that identities (individual and collective), are increasingly negotiated in a global/local context. But we need to be clear in that this is an *increase*, not a shift in itself, as the European identity construction identified by Hobson (2004) and Said (2000) also in ways exhibited aspects of globality (Europe was constructed in reference to a larger world).

This however, does not entail a complete rejection of globalization theory. Whilst ultimately resting on unsound historical foundations there are still merits with such an approach, provided that globalization theory stops treating IR and history as solely a province

of realist logic. Discounting all the problems, it is still relevant to take the notion of post-territorial space seriously. At this point it is apparent that the historical foundations for a shift from absolute territoriality to post-territoriality are non-existent, yet it remains a sad fact that much of the study of IR is still firmly trapped in what Scholte terms 'methodological territorialism' (Scholte 2005: 66). Such research is signified by a disproportionate focus on the relationships and actions of states. Indeed, even though the international have been (partly) divorced from a solely statist focus (Rosenberg 2010), most of IR scholarship is decidedly statist. This is a theoretical rather than a historical problem as the dominance of realism and early realist thoughts of Waltz still influence the field of IR (see chapter 2.3). The focus on polities rather than just states is fruitful but also entails certain problems. Such a perspective can easily lead to a conflation of different polities' actual importance at the expense of truly significant polities. It has been criticized as ignoring the distinctiveness of the modern sovereign state (Ferguson et al. 2000: 25) and its superior political and judicial capabilities. Such a problem is ever-present, but is the alternative any better? As is shown in the historical analysis, the excessive focus on one polity (the state) has contributed to an understanding of history and theory which is Eurocentric, territorial and which misses many of the key interactions between such polities and within them. A polity-focus does not mean that the distinctiveness of the modern state is ignored; rather it opens up for study, aspects of politics which a state-centric and territorialist perspective ignores.

As demonstrated in this paper, the problems of globalization (and traditional IR) theory is largely due to an excessive focus on space (territoriality, Westphalia) over time (history, change) and thus, we seriously need to redefine our relationship to history and theory. Like others (Frank 1998, Chakrabarty 2000, Hobson 2004), this paper demonstrates the Eurocentric foundation for most of our knowledge. This is something which cannot be solved by HSIR alone; we also need to inject more critical principles into the HSIR project. HSIR cannot simply be about injecting historical and historicist scholarship into IR³⁶, but rather, it must also be critical of the very act of knowledge production. In other words, just as it makes use of history in a more informed and systematic manner, so must HSIR be critical of this knowledge and its own position in knowledge production. Through a more critical understanding of history and knowledge production we then find that globalization theory (like most of the traditional understandings of IR) is primarily a way of continuing the Westphalian myth through a narrative of global space, a homogenous and Western space which focuses on becoming rather than being (time), developing rather than developed.

This also involves a continuation of Eurocentric understandings of the world in which historical identity constructions of a superior Europe is tempocentrically inserted into the present leading to a world in which the only possible development lies in emulating the West. This leads to serious problems when we attempt to explain the rise of China, India, Brazil, which are understood as not accomplishing anything themselves, they are simply beneficiaries of (Western) development, (Western) capitalism, in other words, the rise of China is not understood through developments in China but rather through the diffusion of Western norms, ideas, and technologies within a global space.

It might seem harsh to blame the development of a basically historically ignorant IR discipline on early realist and idealist debates and research but in many ways the myth of Westphalia in IR is based in a realist conception of space in which territory, state, sovereignty and anarchy is of fundamental importance. This argument has unfortunately been reproduced by liberals, constructivists and even critical scholars due to the hesitancy to reinterpret

³⁶ The recent third wave of HSIR also level this critique against earlier forms of HSIR

historical sources (de Carvalho et al. 2011). Only through a more historically informed perspective which is critical of both existing knowledge production and the researchers' role in such knowledge production, can the underlying eurocentrism and territorialism of existing knowledge be revealed. This is what was attempted in this paper, and it demonstrates the problems inherent not just in globalization theory, but also in mainstream IR research. Whilst Jackson (2011) locates the reasons for this Westphalian focus in the dominance of neopositivism in IR he does so only incidentally. In his understanding, ontology concerns space, not time. This paper demonstrates the need to accept time as an element of ontology. How do we understand time? How can change be understood? These are questions any research needs to properly answer and reflect over.

7 Executive Summary

Globalization was the buzz-word of the 1990s. Politicians, journalists, scientists and the general public all joined together in the understanding that the times we lived in involved a fundamental discontinuity from the past. This paper rather suggests that globalization was not so much an empirical reality but a human condition, something which existed in our collective imaginary and was born out of the inability to understand the speed and scope of change of the second half of the twentieth century. It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the need for a more historical and historicist IR perspective. Considering the radical presentism of globalization theory, this paper instead suggest that a constructivist historical sociology which draws from any number of different perspectives can better explain the development of contemporary space and time. Through a historical sociological investigation of the history of space and time, globalization theory is demonstrated to be based in an understanding of history which is not just problematic but in many respects faulty. To cope with the ever-present problem of presentism and Eurocentrism, this paper suggests that aspects of time are incorporated into ontology. How does the researcher understand change? How is change studied? This paper can then be understood as primarily one big argument which demonstrates the need to reevaluate our relationship between theory and history.

The historical analysis which makes up the main part of this paper contains essentially three main arguments which are presented simultaneously. The first is based in the historical foundations of globalization theory, a realist conception of the Westphalian system and makes up the bulk of the analysis. A second argument concerns history more directly as it is argued that the basis for our historical knowledge is Eurocentric. Third, contemporary space and time is understood as one of uneven and combined development rather than a statist globalized homogenous world system. All arguments are connected. The first two outline problems in existing knowledge whilst the third suggest a more historical sociological way of knowledge production.

The Westphalian system. The foundational argument of globalization theory involves a fundamental shift (discontinuity) between a territorial past (Westphalia) and a post-territorial present. This involved the emergence of a new form of space, a global or supraterritorial space. As the historical analysis demonstrates however, Westphalia is better understood as a myth, constructed through a statist realist understanding of history and politics. Aside from the fact that the emergence of sovereignty and modern states were a long historical process, territoriality has always also involved post-territoriality. Many of the aspects deemed as fundamental to the contemporary global space were in fact aspects of industrial capitalism which involved simultaneous processes which cannot be adequately mapped on a territorial grid. The historical investigation thus demonstrates the inadequacy of both the Westphalian system (as understood by traditional perspectives) and globalization theory.

Eurocentrism. Traditional accounts of the emergence of global political space (Westphalia) are based not just in a misunderstanding of historical sources but also in a decidedly Eurocentric understanding of historical development. In essence, the traditional argument explains the 'rise of the West' by looking solely within Europe, claiming that Europe created itself. This paper instead focuses on the fact that Afro-Eurasia has been one world system throughout history. Whilst Europe and China were only directly connected in

the beginning of the 17th century, indirect interaction between Europe and China has occurred for thousands of years. As such, Europe did not create itself. Europe was created in a world system of interaction and exchanges, many of the innovations which made European development possible came from this world system in which Europe was but a minor part. The traditional understanding of rational, superior Europe has been constructed through European identity construction in which Europe is constructed as superior whilst the East is constructed as weak, effeminate and despotic. This narrative of a superior West is continued to this day in ahistoricist accounts such as globalization theory and realism.

Space and Time. Building upon the problems identified in the first two arguments, the theoretical framework of the paper understand space as something which is constructed through processes of power, discourse and identity. Space is then understood as intimately connected to time, as a continuous process of becoming rather than being. Space has multiple meanings and if these meanings become cemented, this involves the exercise of power (discourse, inclusion, exclusion, identity construction). Space is neither wholly material nor immaterial but rather a combination of both. Space only acquires meaning however, through human interpretation and action. Instead of speaking of space in just general terms (which would be too broad a term to use fruitfully), space is also understood in the different ways of organizing space, modes of spatial organization, how space is organized and given meaning through social action and interpretation. As is demonstrated throughout the analysis, the organization of space discussed in this paper, function according to Rosenberg's notion of uneven and combined development. On the one hand, development is expressed in a multiplicity of differing societies, complexes and ways of spatio-temporal organization. On the other hand, as these same societies co-exist in space and time, they affect each other and influence each other's development. Their individual development thus has both a reproductive logic from their internal character and an interactive logic arising from their coexistence with other societies. This is true, not only throughout history, but as is demonstrated in the analysis, also today.

One of the major problems of traditional accounts is statism, as such this paper incorporates Ferguson and Mansbach's notion of polities instead, which has "a distinct identity; a capacity to mobilize persons and their resources for political purposes, that is, for value satisfaction, and a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy" (1996: 34). Different polities can have different conceptions of space whilst at the same time occupying the same physical space. By focusing on polities rather than just states, the myriad of ways in which actors (including states) interact and interrelate vertically as well as horizontally in and across territorial space is made apparent.

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This research concludes that not only must we take seriously the remedies suggested by Hobson and historical sociology; to reveal the present as a constantly changing construct situated in a historical context, but HSIR also need to more critically reflect over its own role in knowledge production. It is not enough to simply inject historical and historicist principles into IR, HSIR must also be critical of both historical knowledge complexes and the role of the researcher in knowledge production. Failure to do so will lead to a continual reproduction of Eurocentrism and a progressivist understanding of time. It is thus not enough to be historical or historicist, we also need to be critical.

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