

Military Co- (operation) of the EU Member States

A case study of Sweden, France, United Kingdom and Germany and their motivations for the use of force in the name of the European Union

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Abstract

The thesis contributes to the debate of an emerging European strategic culture on the use of force. This is highly relevant in order to understand the future development of the military operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In order to be able to analyse the motivations of the following operations: *Concordia*, *EUFOR DR Congo* and *Atalanta*, the research builds on the constructivist theoretical framework and applies two types of norms as analytical tools. Those are the goals for the use of force and conditionality for the use of force. It is further believed that to better grasp the European strategic culture, the analytical tools should be complemented with an overview of the selected member states' security identity. By analysing the strategic norms with the constructivist approach and complementing this with the theory of Europeanization, the study argues that there is both a convergence and divergence of the member states' motivation for the use of force. The case study, which has been conducted on the official governmental documents, illustrates that the member states are converging by emphasizing the need of developing the CSDP, as well as diverging as the UK is taking on both an Atlanticist and European approach of when to launch an EU military operation.

Key words: EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European Strategic Culture, Operation *Concordia*, Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*, Operation *Atalanta*

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
COPS	Comité Politique et de Sécurité
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EAS	European Action Service
EC	European Commission
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
<i>EUFOR DR Congo</i>	European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HG	Headline Goals
IGC	Intergovernmental Conferance
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
WFP	World Food Programme

1 Introduction

In 1998/99 the embryo of what was to become the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created in Saint Malo, which has with time developed into a settled institutional arrangement regarding the use of force in military operations of the European Union (EU) (Bache et al 2011:513-514). This was a remarkable development within the EU as the integration of security and defence had previously been disregarded because this policy area was considered to be of 'high politics'. Nevertheless, the question of when the member states of the EU should take joint external action as a response to breaches of international law is now as controversial as ever before, considering that the member states of the EU are criticised for not having a common will to act and are therefore currently regarded as paralyzed in their response to the situation in Libya.

This outcome is mainly because the external action, more exactly the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)¹ of the EU is intergovernmental, with shared competence between the member states and the EU. The decision making procedures are thus taken by consensus and a Qualitative Majority Voting (QVM), meaning that each member state holds a veto in the decision-making and therefore the military operations conducted by the EU are voluntary and subject to the member states own deliberations.

In light of this, the academics agree that launching a military operation within the CSDP is mainly dependent on the different will of the member states (see for example Herolf (2004), Strömvik (2005), Howorth (2005), Margaras (2010)). Since the twenty-seven member states are supposed to decide whether to launch an EU military operation or not, there is a heated debate whether the EU has a common will, and whether there is a so-called common European strategic culture. It is of interest to study the common European strategic culture since the integration of the EU as a military actor is dependent on a harmonization of the defence policy. Therefore studying its strategic culture on the use of force can provide us with an idea of what kind of an actor the EU really is and why and where it might be heading.

To gain a deeper understanding of the common European strategic culture on the use of force in the EU military operations, this paper aims to analyse which motivations² for the use of force are given and shared by the member states: France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) in the operations *Concordia*, *EUFOR DR Congo* and *Atalanta*. This is conducted to be able to view if the motivations in regards to the launching of a military operation of the EU are becoming more coordinated, and whether there is a convergence or divergence to a more common strategic European culture. The paper takes a constructivist approach as it assumes that norms shape interest and can thus guide us when studying the motivations of the member states.

¹ Previously known as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) but was changed with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

² Motivation will in this paper be defined as : the driving force by which the member states achieve their goals.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

The purpose of the study is to contribute to the current academic debate regarding the evolution of the CSDP by conducting an empirical case study. The future of the CSDP is complex with many angles, but as previously mentioned, the will of the member states are of main importance as this guides which operations the EU should be engaged in. The positions of the individual member states continue to matter and according to Gross, they are particularly important when it comes to the formulation of “reactions and politics in response to international crises” (Gross, 2009:xii). The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the debate by studying the motivations of member states for the use of force as expressed in official documents accessible online. By comparing and contrasting the motivations that drive their actions, I hope to be able to determine a pattern. The common European strategic culture is viewed as a process and thus I am interested in studying where in this process of convergence or divergence regarding the use of force that we can position the member states.

However, keeping the research manageable necessities a selection of which member states that will be analysed. France, UK and Germany have been chosen as they stand apart from the other member states based on their size of military contributions and worldwide engagements, and are believed to be the ‘inner core’ of the ESDP (se e.g. Hyde-Prince 2004:324, Meyer 2006:4, Gross 2009:5, Matlary 2009:88). On the other hand, Sweden is regarded as influential to the ESDP by exerting normative power to the policy area and therefore Sweden has also been included in the study (Björkdahl 2008:135-136.). Moreover, Riker acknowledges that since Sweden became a member of the EU it has been regarded as particularly active in shaping EU’s security identity (Rieker 2005:63).

Having establishing the importance of the study and which member states that will be included in the paper, the research questions that will be answered are:

How are the selected member states motivating the use of force in the EU military operations Concordia, EUFOR DR Congo and Atalanta?

Which signs of convergence and divergence of motivations for the use of force in EU military operations can be observed by the member states?

1.1.1 The Military Operations

To be able to easier follow the motivations behind the member states use of force key factual background of the operations that will be of study will be presented. It should be highlighted that since the implementation of the ESDP the EU has launched seven military operations, but this paper will analyze three of these operations (European Union External Action, 24 April 2011). The military operations that will be of study are the first EU military operation *Concordia* and the most recent military operation *Atalanta*. To this, in between the first and the last, the operation *EUFOR DR Congo* was selected to gain a shorter time-span between the launched operations.

Operation *Concordia*³

On March 31, 2003, operation *Concordia*, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), was undertaken by the EU and it lasted until the 10th of December 2003 (Gross 2009b:174). The operation was EU's first military mission and a taker-over from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which had maintained a military presence in the country since 2001. The operational task of the EU included "monitoring operations in former crisis areas as well as promoting stability and deterring the resurgence of ethnical violence", and also to be able to allow the FYROM Government to implement NATO's Ohrid peace agreement (Gross, 2009b:175). However, before the mission could be launched, the member states needed to agree on if it was in the need of a UN mandate and whether to implement the provisions of the Berlin Plus Agreement that gave the EU access to NATO assets in the planning of the operation.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

Civil wars, inter-state conflict and weak transitions to democracy have been troubling the region of the African Great Lakes since the early 1990s. However, efforts by the international community and the local players led to peace agreements in the end of 1990s. To support this transition processes in the country, the UN Security Council (UNSC) established mission MONUC⁴ in 1999. In December 2005, the UN invited the EU to consider the possibility of a military force that would assist the UN military mission MUNUC in its stabilizing role during the election process in DRC during the following summer. In March 2006 the EU decided to support MONUC and opened its military-strategic planning process. The EU military operation was launched on the 30th of July 2006 and finished five months later (Major 2009:311-313).

Operation *Atalanta*

The ongoing Operation *Atalanta* was launched by the EU on the 10th of November 2008 and is EU's first naval military operation. The purpose of the mission is to deter and combat the piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden (Helly 2009:392). Prior to the EU's launching of the operation, the UN passed several resolutions authorizing nations to enter Somali territorial waters with the agreement of the transitional Somali government. The main objectives of the operation are to protect the World Food Programme vessels delivering food aid to Somalia and to "ensure deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea" (Ibid. p.395).

1.1.2 Conceptualizing European Strategic Culture

In 2003, the European Security Strategy (EES) was implemented after an agreement between the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the Union's heads of state had been reached. The policy document was supposed to provide the leaders with more clear goals on what ESDP's future would look like. In spite of this, the EES remained vague in general and especially in the aspect of the conditions of the use of force.

³ For more information on the respective EU operations see the official webpage of the EU <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>

⁴ MONUC= Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo.

In the document, Solana also calls for the development of a common strategic culture, “which fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust interventions” (Meyer 2004:3). This call of a more strategic culture of the member states on the use of force has spurred a heated debate amongst academics. However, from the practitioners’ point of view, the European strategic culture on the use of force is regarded as in the making and thus they are not as fascinated with the concept as the academics (Ibid., Howorth 2011). On the other hand, according to Meyer, strategic culture should be studied, as there is and continues to be an academic debate on the issue, he asserts that, “in the academic debate, strategic culture plays a role as an intervening variable in foreign policy analysis to understand states and/or international organizations behaviour in security and defence affairs” (Meyer, 2004:3). Additionally, academics also have different takes on the subject, which are mainly dependent on the definition of the strategic culture. This paper is not to assess which side is right or wrong, considering that the answer to whether EU has a common strategic culture has been contrasted and therefore should not be seen as lacking or not lacking, but as a process (Toje 2008:19).

This paper draws on Meyer’s empirical tools when analyzing strategic culture and therefore the study will use a definition that is in line with Meyer’s view of strategic culture. Meyer defines strategic culture as:

“comprising the socially transmitted identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals” (Meyer, 2004:20).

This paper will thus limit the definition to only include the political actors that are involved in CSDP decision-making. The definition makes references to norms. To identify the specific norms of each member states would require a deeper study. Therefore this study is focused on explaining how and which norms are shared among the member states. In other words, norms are studied in the context of the strategic culture and are thus framed as believes about what is appropriate and legitimate regarding the use of force. It is generally assumed that norms are shared, as the concept would not be applicable if there were only individuals and thus no common interpretations of rules and obligations. The constructivist view on norms is that they shape interests and therefore cannot logically be opposed to them (Herolf 2004:47-49).

In the definition of strategic culture, *ideas* and *norms* are, according to Meyer, closely related. Meyer states that ideas are “deeply ingratiated views and perceptions of a political entity’s proper role in the world, its perception of how states interact in international affairs and how security is achieved” (Meyer 2006:20). The final concept that needs to be made clearer before we can apply Meyer’s definition of strategic culture is *established pattern of behaviour*. Established pattern of behaviour are according to Meyer “habitual ways of discussing (societies), deciding (political actors) and doing things (armed forces) in matters of security and defence” (Ibid.).

1.1.3 Delimitation

One important aspect of this research is that it will not take into consideration if the argument or views presented in the analysed documents are of the political party in power or of the opposition. As the benefit of having a vast number of cases, and thus a broader research, is at

the cost of not going deeper to position which side of the government motivated the operations.

A further delimitation is that the study is limited to the military operations of the CSDP, which also include civil operations. This has been conducted as the cooperation in the defence area is the heart of the debate of a common European security culture and thus fundamental for the future evolution in the security and defence area.

1.2 Disposition

To be able to show in which way this paper can contribute to the line of study the following step of the paper will be to give an overview of previous research. Thereafter the selected theoretical framework will be presented. Shortly put, the framework will consist of two parts: constructivism and Europeanization. The latter one is of complementary nature for the constructivist approach. Subsequently, the theory of constructivism will be turned into a methodological tool to be able to conduct a text analysis on the selected member states.

In the analysis chapter, each member state will have four subsections; the first subsection of the analysis is how we are to understand the member states security identity from the Cold war onwards. The following two subsections are the application of the analytical tools regarding the use of force in the three EU military operations. In the last subsection the findings are summarized. Building on the analysis, the final chapter will enable the researcher to answer how the member states motivated the use of force in the selected military operations and whether we can distinguish if the member states are becoming more aligned in their motivations on the use of force.

2 Previous Research

Security and economy have both been the founding stones of the integration processes in the EU. However, researchers that have studied security have mainly focused on traditional security institutions and thus overlooked the EU (Rieker, 2006:23). As the integration theories have not been able to adequately explain whether the EU *is* an actor, the question is being commonly discussed in the European integration theory literature (Lianos 2008:67). Maria Strömvik also stresses, “to explain why the EU is developing into a new actor on the international scene is in itself one important building-block in the way we think about both present and future international relations” (Strömvik 2005:17). The debate is acknowledged but will thus be viewed as enclosing the research as the main focus will be on the question of a common European strategic culture.

Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and stated that it shall include the eventual framing of a common defence policy, researchers have been engaged in studying what such a project would intend. The debate was even more intense after the birth of the ESDP in 1998/1999. Howorth brings up the debates that have been of academic interest, one focusing on the EU’s potential loss as a ‘civilian power’ and taking on more of military instruments. The second debate focuses on to what extent the identity of ESDP should be in opposition or in partnership with US and/or NATO. The third debate regards the potential of a lead towards federalism as a response to the greater defence responsibilities (Howorth 2010:2).

There are different takes when trying to understand the future of EU’s common security and defence policy. However, this research focuses on the military aspects of a common security and defence policy and frames the issue by studying the common European strategic culture. According to Meyer and Strickmann, the academics agree that “cultural factors clearly shape national security policies and preferences towards the use of force, and that these factors are crucial to any understanding of security and defence developments in the EU framework” (Mayer & Strickmann 2011:62).

In order to be able to grasp what type of research that has been conducted when analysing European strategic culture, Toje outlines three main approaches. One approach is the teleological, this means that goals which are stated in for example the 2003 EU Security Strategy are assessed. The second approach is to trace EU strategic culture through “historical experiences, capabilities, geopolitical settings and values” (Toje 2008:20). The main critique to this approach is that the EU is a great power of nothing at all (Ibid.). The third approach is, according to Toje, the least explored one and it contains the analysis of the EU strategic culture as displayed behaviour (Ibid.). This research belongs to the latter approach and to be able to draw on and contribute to the academic debate on the common European strategic culture the paper will present some of the previous research within the field of study.

Starting with Christoph O. Meyer (Meyer 2006) who describes how the norms of strategic culture have changed in Germany, France, Poland and the UK. He argues that since 1989 there has been common learning’s from crises such as the Balkan wars and also a greater cross-socialization among the member states that have lead to a certain degree of convergence around threat perceptions. As a result of these experiences, Meyer declares that: France embraced the ESDP, Germany moved from the more reserved culture based on soft

security and the primacy of NATO to a more interventionist approach and the UK began to view its fate as belonging to the European continent and that the transatlantic relationship needed to be supplemented with a stronger European identity (Meyer 2006).

On the other hand, Bastian Giegerich in 2006 studied strategic norms and beliefs among the member states France, Germany, the UK and Austria. His findings illustrate that there still remain important ideational cleavages between Europeanist and Atlanticist, between autonomist and cooperatives, and those who support force projection and the once that are in favour of traditional defence. The cleavages are thus hindering the defence cooperation of the member states (Mérand 2010:348).

When studying the increased cooperation in the CSDP of the member states both Rieker and Gross have chosen to apply the theory of Europeanization. However, they have different geographical focuses and ways of viewing the theory.

Pernille Rieker (Rieker 2006) limits her study geographically and focuses on the four largest Nordic states and their strategic identity. Rieker applies the Europeanization theory and analyses the member states instrumental adaptation and learning process in their security identity discourse. In her research she argues, “national security approaches are adapted to the norms defined by a community to which they are closely linked” (Rieker 2006:5). According to Rieker, foreign policy has become institutionalized in the EU and interest change as a result of socialization and learning. In other words, Rieker views Europeanization as a process of change. She focuses her research on the member states’ level and claims that the member states both are adapting to and contributing with the forming of a European security identity.

Eva Gross (Gross 2009) wants to illustrate how the European and transatlantic influences shape the views of the policy makers and thus analyses German, French and British decision-making processes in four military operations: FYROM and Afghanistan in 2001 as well as Lebanon and DR Congo in 2006. Gross states that the application of the theory of Europeanization in CSDP must be established because of the intergovernmental decision making within the policy area (Ibid. p.14). According to Gross Europeanization is also about “changing domestic member states’ attitudes with respect to the use of military force in the name of Europe, and under a EU label, and that of taking a decisive political stance in the name of Europe” (Ibid. *Introduction* xx).

Gross’s overall conclusion regarding the member states’ reactions to the use of force in the military operations is positioned as “British reservations on utilizing ESDP unless NATO does not want to be involved; German reluctance to adopt a proactive stance towards ESDP; and French willingness to push the European agenda in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa, but not in regions or policy areas that are dominated by transatlantic consideration or in situations where the UN represents a more useful platform to exert national influence” (Ibid. p.154).

In view of the fact that both Gross and Meyer have chosen to study the member states Germany, France and the UK, with a time frame that is stretching from the Cold War until 2006, this research will build on their previous findings when analysing the ‘Big Three’. However, own contributions to the line of research will be added by including the most recent operation *Atalanta* and thus combine old findings with more recent ones. Moreover, as the previous research has been focused on the large member states this paper will also add the medium sized member state Sweden.

3 Theoretical Framework

To be able to determine how to navigate, interpret and analyze the subject matter the study shall be positioned within a theoretical framework. This section will thus elaborate on the theories and why they have been selected as well as how they will be applied.

3.1 Constructivism

Before introducing the constructivist theory and explaining how the constructivist theory will be applied in the paper, it should be emphasized that there is a lively debate between realist/neorealist's and postmodernist, poststructuralist/critical - and feminist theorists on which of the theories is best to explain the foreign policy development within the EU. The former group explains International Relations as behaviour responses to the material objects, though most academics hold the belief that the realist perspective cannot properly describe the developments behind the EU's security and defence policy (Peterson & Sjursen 1998:111). The latter group holds the belief of behaviour responses were only ideas matter and can be studied. In between the rationalist and the interpretative approach lies the view of the constructivism theory that is after Emanuel Adler termed as 'the middle ground' (Adler, 321).

Adler's definition of constructivism is, "the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world" (Ibid. p.322). In other words, constructivist approaches add theoretical value by exploring the interaction between ideas, preferences, discourses and interests across different levels of governance. Constructivists view structure and agents as interlinked and two parts of a whole as they believe that norms, which are held collectively, and beliefs operate as a process, thus shaping actors' beliefs and behaviour, but at the same time allowing for change (Ibid.).

The constructivist theory will be applied as it puts emphasis on shared norms and will thus be of guidance when studying whether there is throughout the time of the operations a more aligned set of thoughts and beliefs in the member states motivations of the use of force. A more common culture of the use of force would thus be revealed if the member states are defending the violations of the same constitutional norms, seeing that they would have a more aligned set of thoughts.

Norms and ideas in the paper are defined as: goals for the use of force and conditionality for the use of force. To exemplify this a bit further, if Sweden would have different goals with the use of force than for example the UK, there would not be an aligned set of thoughts by the sharing of norms, and thus there would be a weaker common strategic culture for the use of force. However, as, highlighted by Meyer, even if the norm would not have been violated, the use of force in for example Somalia could still occur, but would then have been caused by other deliberations (Meyer 2006:4)

However, there is also the importance to distinguish not only which norms and ideas that matter but how they change. Constructivists argue that changes in security identities and

interests are outcomes from the maintenance of the political interaction in the EU, in other words, constructivists study the process of socialization to explore how interest are constructed (Matlary 2009:79). To be able to distinguish if there has been a change in the security identity, the paper will thus lift the study to the meso – level, were the member states are interacting in the European setting, by applying the theory of Europeanization. This is elaborated on in the following section.

The main critique towards constructivism is from the epistemological point of view, as it is difficult to measure how the cause of interest changes as a result of states' EU membership (Matlary 2009:82, Smith et al 2008:81)). Meyer also acknowledges that there is a problem with the empirical application of studying strategic culture by applying the theory of constructivism. Therefore he chooses to draw on Katzenstins' *constituent* and *regulative* norms to be able to measure the existence of a common European strategic culture. *Constituent* norms do not change easily, are deeply embedded and identity obtained by collective expectations of what is appropriate behaviour. *Regulative* norms refer to how states should act in order to achieve certain goals, based on assumptions of what works best in international and security affairs (Meyer 2006:21). To be able to answer which signs of convergence and divergence of motivations for the use of force that is being made and if it is contributing to a more common strategic culture, Katzenstines divisions of norms will be applied.

Constructivism has also been criticized for the lack of power, which is central to the study of international relations and foreign policy. According to Checkel the institutional power seems to play a central role for the conventional constructivism for example by keeping certain issues off the agenda in the institutional setting. Despite its criticism, constructivism offers a rich and valuable tool kit to foreign policy analysis. It sheds new light on actors and processes and it gives attention to social contexts (Checkel 2008:80). However, Checkel points out that students of foreign policy must acknowledge the bigger picture and thus take into consideration the increasing interaction between the domestic and the international sphere by taking into account the theories of globalization or Europeanization (Ibid. p. 77).

3.2 Europeanization


Constructivism embraces Europeanization as it explains the development of a European identity by acknowledging the informal socialization of norms and the national inputs in CSDP (Wong 2007:321). However, there is no common agreement on quite what the scope of Europeanization as a force of change is and how this can be consistently measured and analyzed (Radaelli 2000; Featherstone 2002). Researchers that wish to use the term Europeanization are positioned with the challenge of its broad usage (Dryburgh 2010:258). Therefore, the term must firstly be defined to be able to explain it from relating processes and concepts.

The Europeanization approach in this research shares the same definition as Rieker and Wong who both state that, "member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same member states themselves are involved in creating these structures and norms" (Ibid. p. 14, Wong 2007:323). In other words, Europeanization is viewed as a process that functions both as a top-down - and a bottom-up process. As the member states are initiating policy preferences to the EU, but at the same time they are adapting and reacting to the EU-level (Radaelli, 2004). Considering

that the Europeanization is a process, the paper is thus able to delimit the study and focus on the national level where national governmental institutions adopt and project to the EU level. Even if the most favourable situation would have been to study both the EU- and national level, due to time and space restrictions, a compromise had to be reached and the research has been isolated to the national level.

As this research draws on Rieker’s definition of Europeanization her illustrative figure helps us understand how this will be applied to the selected member states (Rieker 2006:12-13) . In the figure Rieker illustrates how she applies the Europeanization theory to her study on the changes in the Nordic states’ security approaches and identities. Rieker states that the nation adopts the national security approach to the community with which it is closely linked and according to Rieker this happens over time as the nations undergo a socialization process. This process is thus thought to contribute to changes in their national security approaches and identities.

Figure 1. Rieker’s Europeanization of the security approaches and identities of the Nordic states



However, the theories presented will not be enough on their own to guide the analysis, and thus a more applicable analytical tool will be needed to be able to measure and interpret the research question. Therefore, the paper will draw on Meyers’ conceptual framework of how norms and ideas can be studied. To this, the process of Europeanization will study the changes of norms. The analytical structure is further elaborated on in the following section.

4 Research Design

In this chapter I will present the analytical tools that will be necessary when analysing how the member states motivated the use of force in the military operations in order to be able to distinguish which type of pattern that can be located behind those motivations. The paper will be conducted by a *qualitative* research method, as its followers acknowledge that the method is appropriate for a deeper understanding of a social phenomenon (Silverman 2001:32).

4.1 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework draws on the work of Christoph O. Meyer, as he has put forward a conceptual framework of how we can understand the common European strategic culture by studying the use of force (Meyer; 2006). Meyer's framework consists of four strategic norms. Howorth on the other hand uses six different dichotomies when studying the differences between national security cultures in Europe, however, according to Meyer, only four of Howorth's dichotomies are suitable when applying a constructivist approach (Ibid. 20-26).

Furthermore, Meyer acknowledges that much of the literature on how to tell apart the strategic culture from other strong norms is studied by contrasting two opposing views i.e. a 'strong' and a 'weak' European strategic culture. However, having only two dimensions, were a 'weak' strategic culture would mean that the member states are united to defeat the opposing actors rather than jointly persuade them to change their views, interests and behaviour, is according to Meyer not enough. Instead Meyer applies four different categorisations to how we can understand each norm.

Meyer analyses the four strategic norms; goals for the use of force, the way in which force is used, preferred mode of cooperation and international/domestic authorization. Meyer's conceptual framework is relevant for the analytical framework of the paper but as it is also applicable to other actors (not only the EU) it is rather broad in its usage. The framework is also not explicit enough on how the norms can be applied to a large set of material and thus a more tailored tool for the analysis is needed.

Analytical Tool

The framework that will be of analytical guidance consists of two norms that draw on the debate of a common European strategic culture and the work of Meyer. Meyer's four strategic norms have been re-designed to two sets of norms which are: goals for the use of force and conditionality for the use of force (See table 2). This has been conducted as international or domestic authorization for the use of force and preferred mode of cooperation partly cover one and another and are thus combined to the question of conditionality for the use of force. The level of domestic authorization is also acknowledged by positioning the level of the member state parliamentary power in regards to defence decisions in general (this is further described under Material). It should also be regarded that having three military operations and four member states, the dimension have been narrowed down to give a depth

to the selected categories. To be able to compare the answers I present four categories under each norm. It should however be highlighted that the norms can take different values in different contexts. As Meyer also states, the differences can be sources of “national security communities, but also within them along social cleavages such as social status, party affiliation, or age cohorts” (Meyer 2006:22).

The first norm asks of the member states’ **goals for the use of force** (see table 2). Drawing on the work of Meyer, there are four categories describing the goals for the use of force:

1. The goal for the use of force is to uphold international security (by disarmament, war prevention, peace creation)
2. The goal for the use of force is to protect international law (by defending Human Rights violations, acting on request from UN)
3. The goal for the use of force is to protect national interests (e.g. protection of own nationals, financial interests)
4. The goal for the use of force is determined by political/cultural motivations (eg. by promoting democracy which is linked to humanitarian reasons in category 2. This category also includes political motivation in form of the development of the CSDP (Ibid.)

The second norm concerns the conditionality for the use of force i.e. what the member states require in order to use military force. This norm can be studied on a spectrum (table 2). To the left of the spectrum is the belief that the use of force should be avoided and used only as a last resort. According to Meyer these views can be found in parts of contemporary Germany (ibid. 24). Moreover, conditionality can be measured in terms of the participation of certain countries: due to other countries’ participation, the “own” country wants to engage in the operation. Conditionality can also be determined by the presence of a UN mandate, where some member states are more likely to engage in the operation if it is backed by a UN mandate.

The four categories describing ‘**conditionality for the use of force**’ are the following:

1. Conditionality for the use of force is motivated by a UN mandate (the member state is defensive i.e. a hesitation to the use of force which can be expressed by the obligation of a UN mandate or a formal approval from the country where the use of force is to be put in practice).
2. Conditionality for the use of force is motivated by cooperation with international organizations or alliances (eg. conditioned by formal approval/cooperation with NATO, or in the case of non-aligned (Sweden), the conditionality may depend on an approval/cooperation with the EU)
3. Conditionality for the use of force is motivated by cooperation with particular states (eg. France’s tendency to persuade other member states to cooperate and engage in EU operations, or UK’s ties with the US, Germany’s willingness to act when the rest of Europe act).
4. Conditionality for the use of force is motivated by national approval (the member state is regarded as offensive and does not require the legitimacy of the international community prior to the launching of a military operation)

Table 2.

NORMS	CATEGORIES			
GOALS FOR THE USE OF FORCE	International Security	Protection of International law	Protection of national interests	Political or cultural motivations
CONDITIONALITY FOR THE USE OF FORCE	Requirements of a UN mandate, the approval of the country to intervene (defensive)	Requirements mainly focused on cooperation with alliances and organizations	Requirements of particular states also being included before participating	Requirements mainly focused on a national approval (offensive)

The categories from the table are supposed to provide us with the information on a possible pattern behind the launched military operations. The questions and its answers should not be viewed as exhaustive but as a snapshot of different aspects that can be contrasted through time and space among the member states. The findings follow a deductive process, as we from an already established theoretical knowledge on the subject are trying to apply this knowledge to the object of study (Rasmussen et al 2010:108). Therefore the aim of the study is not to explain all the aspects of the object of study, but rather those that are theoretically driven.

4.1.1 Text Analysis

To be able to more structurally approach the findings the researcher applies a text interpretation strategy by Bergström and Boréus that is called the sender oriented interpretation strategy⁵. This strategy is according to the author relevant for political science research that focuses on the sender of a text. Even if the primarily focus of the interpretation strategy is on the meaning of the text during its production, the analysis will be able to provide the researcher with an overall framework on how to approach the material which is being studied. The meaning is determined by what the person or persons that formulated the text intended the text to mean. Bergström and Boréus position three different tools on how to analyse the text: (Bergström & Boréus 2005:26-27)

1. Understand what **type of speech action** that was conducted through the text production: is it a scientific report, political pamphlet etc.
2. The meaning should be determined by the chosen **language of the author and his or her argumentation**.
3. The **context of the text**. To determine what interpretations can be conducted.

⁵ the authors own translation of: *avsändarorienterad tolkningsstrategi*

Each of the three tools will be of guidance when assessing the text (the text material will be presented in subsection 4.2.1). Type of speech action (1) is important for the research because it contains different type of documents. According to Bergstöm and Boréus giving meaning to the text (2) can be tricky but should be viewed in its context. The last tool of the sender oriented interpretation strategy regards the context of the text (3). The context of the text does not have to depend on the framework but it is however necessary to acknowledge the framework to know what type of interpretations that can be reached from the text.

4.1.2 Case Study

The primary criterion for applying the case study method should according to George and Bennett be based on the relevance of the object of study (George & Bennett 2005:69,83). Case studies on the member states are highly relevant in order to assess differences and similarities between the member states' motivations to launch military operations. In addition, prior research on the issue has mainly been conducted through case studies, thus, this study can be regarded as a continuation of a trend (e.g. Herolf; 2004, Meyer; 2006, Rieker; 2006, Gross; 2009).

The research will apply case studies where the results will be compared and analyzed after the same questions have been answered in each case. Yin also states that data collection procedures are not routinized and therefore the ability to pose and ask good questions is of prior condition for the researcher (Yin 2006:30). Moreover, George and Bennett also argue that if two or more different types of interventions are being compared, "the study must be guided by clearly defined puzzles, questions, or problems that may be different from or similar to those of a study of a single subclass" (Ibid. p. 78).

Variables that interest social scientists, but are difficult to measure, such as political culture and states' strengths should according to George and Bennett use "contextualized comparison" by searching for *analytically equivalent* phenomenon (military operations) across different contexts (member states) (Ibid. p. 19). Moreover, the centrality of case studies is that it tries to highlight a decision or a set of decisions and why they were made, how they were conducted and what was the outcomes (Yin 2006:30). Even if case study method is highly relevant for this type of study, there are of course limitations. First of all, one of the main trade offs in this case selection is between resources and richness, due to the fact that the EU consists of twenty-seven member states and this study is only evaluating four of them. Secondly, there is the tension between achieving high "internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalization that apply to broad populations", where the military operations are an example of this (George L. & Bennett 2005:22). However, this paper does not intend to apply its findings on other member states as than the once that have been selected since they are in themselves interesting.

According to George and Bennett "one can generalize from unique cases by treating them as member of a class of type of phenomenon; that is...war intention" (Ibid. p. 11). To be able to draw a set of conclusions on the patters among states motivation on the use of force, generalization will thus be used to a certain extent.

There are on the other hand several advantages of applying case studies such as the ability to conduct complex interactions, which will be conducted in this paper by analysing multiple operations at once. The evidence of multiple- case design is also considered as more convincing and thus a stronger method (Yin, 2009:53). The multiple- case study with four member states that are analysed on the three operations and together consist of twelve different analytical sets, provides the research with high validity.

4.2 Methodology

4.2.1 Material

Assessing what the text material should include when conducting text analysis, Bazerman and Prior have declared that the text should “correspond to the research question...[be] representative of a larger corpus of texts...consist of a substantial number of texts...[and] the size of the corpus should be manageable” (Bazerman & Prior 2004:2).

The text material that is analysed in this thesis has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources have been gathered from the official webpage’s of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the national Parliaments and the governments of each member state. It should be highlighted that the primary material of France and the UK will to a larger extent be positioned by the government and not by the parliamentary debates. As the parliamentary consent to the deployment of armed forces is not required in those countries and instead the national executive reaches the policy decision (Gross 2009:14,173). To complement the primary sources the research will also draw on secondary sources such as books and journals.

The representativeness of the documents is established by acknowledging that the democratic governments have an obligation to provide the citizens with the decisions taken and the process of how the decision were reached by having transparent institutions. Still, it remains important to view documentations as communicative devices produced and therefore one should ask questions such as who produced the document, why and for whom as well as whether there were any institutional intentions to produce the document (Owe Flick 2009:256-259). However, because of the language barriers in the case of France the member state is limited to the sparse material that is available in English and is therefore to a larger degree dependent on secondary sources. Even though there is a limited material France has been selected as a case study because it is by the author perceived as crucial when analysing the common European strategic culture in the military operations. This can however also have impacts on the categorisation, since some of the categories can not be positioned even if it would be motivated in the documents written in French.

To be able to have a manageable research, the focus has been limited to the view of policymakers and thus does not include the public opinion. The elite, which are national officials working in the government offices, are supposed to be the ones forming the country’s security and defence policy and therefore their opinion are regarded as being more relevant for this research. However, it should be acknowledged that there are those who argue that the public play a vital role when it comes to the decisions on the part of states to mobilize and deploy the use of force e.g. Balzacq;2005, Stritzel; 2007, Roe;2008. On the other hand, the elite is perceived to have the more vital role by e.g. Howorth; 2007 and Keukeleire & MacNaughton; 2008.

The time span of the study is ranging from the end of the Cold War and onwards in order to be able to illustrate the key formations of the member states security identity, as culture is not static but changes with time. Additionally, previous research of e.g. Herolf (2004) and Rieker (2006) start their research with the period after the Cold War mainly because of the changed international security framework from then on. Therefore, analyzing the member states in the aftermath of the Cold War will provide the research with a better understanding of for instance Sweden’s changing approach to use of force. This is because

Sweden has previously been regarded as a neutral actor but has in time come to actively participate in military operations (Rieker 2006: 64-74).

4.2.2 Methodological Considerations

There is a critique towards the empirical application of constructivism, in the way it acknowledges norms and ideas as the most important factors of study. As for example Rieker highlights that constructivism do not lack a methodological approach but a common analytical approach. The approach of Meyer is however the departure of this study, as Meyer has been able to establish a constructivist approach to how we can measure norms and ideas by having the previously mentioned, four norms of guidance.

However, it should be acknowledged that there are limitations to Meyer's conceptual framework. Meyer refrains from including operations in which the member states chose not to intervene. This exclusion could according to George and Bennett have damaging consequences for the validity of the research as such limitation may be "ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory (George & Bennett 2005: 24)". Despite this criticism, Meyer's conceptual framework will be applied in this study as the aim of the thesis is to understand the motivations (and if possible determine a pattern of motivation) behind the decision *to* intervene in three specific operations.

Secondly, other factors such as economical or ideological can be hidden or embedded in the motivations to intervene and therefore difficult to reveal. It is therefore important to interpret the material by reading in between the lines and remaining critical to the motivation that is presented. The parliamentary minutes and debates that are used for the text analysis have been transcribed by an interpreter and the members of the parliaments (the speakers) are able to comment on the written document before it is submitted on the official webpage. Thus the reliability of the document has increased as the speakers have the ability to comment of the written documents.

4.2.3 Operationalization

The primary material will be collected by screening the member states' official governmental webpages. More exactly, I will select out the documents that include the name of the operation and the name of the country where the operation was carried out.

Secondly, the material will be operationalized by applying the analytical tools; goals-and conditionality for the use of force (see table 2). This will be conducted by answering which goals and conditions were motivated for launching the operation and viewing whether the answers can be positioned in the categories that are outlined in table 2. Specific quotes and passages have been selected to illustrate the findings. For instance, if the main motivation for the use of force in a particular operation was 'national interest', a quote/passage displaying this is presented. However, as the member states might have several goals or conditions for the use of force, they can be placed under more than one of the analytical categories. It should also be stated that Sweden and Germany, due to their high level of parliamentary inclusion, will have a larger set of primary sources than the United Kingdom and France. Since the United Kingdom and France do not need the official approval of the parliament to deploy military forces and thus their material will mostly consist of official government statements as well as secondary sources.

The analytical toolbox will be complemented with a short overview of the member

states' security identity from the Cold War and onwards. It is however challenging to shortly summarize the security aspects of the member states that have had such a rich history. The use of force of the member states should be viewed in a larger context and thus the key developments of the member states security culture are vital for an overall understanding of their use of force. Moreover, Meyer has also stated that it is important to include the security identity of countries when exploring changes over a small time frame and with a geographical spreading. He declares that "differences between strategic cultures of countries are important, and so are the forces that may explain how these cultures change vis-à-vis one another" (Meyer 2006:26).

5 Analysis

This chapter analyses the gathered primary and secondary sources. The analytical structure will be as followed: firstly, a short overview of each selected member state's security identity will be presented. Secondly, the two analytical tools: the goals for the use of force and conditionality of the use of force, will be of guidance when analyzing each of the three operations. Thirdly, each member state will be summarized and the theoretical framework will be added.

5.1 Sweden

5.1.1 The Security Identity of Sweden

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Swedish early nineteenth century neutrality position in wartime started to fade out. Rieker acknowledges that Sweden no longer needed to be building bridges between different states and thus the possibility of having an impact on other countries decreased. This, together with the financial situation at the time, contributed to the wish of becoming a member of the EU. However, even if Sweden did join the EU, the country insisted that its policy of neutrality should remain (Rieker 2006:63-70). The Swedish neutrality policy was directly challenged during the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and the forming of the EU's CSFP. This contributed to a massive debate and in the end, the term neutrality was replaced by the notion of "military non-alignment" (Ibid. p.71). Although Sweden agreed to replace the notion of "neutrality", the country was concerned about the interest that started to spread within the member states of establishing a common defence. This was according to Reiker because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in a report concluded that they could not see any barrier for why Sweden would not participate in the CFSP and finally the EU managed on the 1 of March in 1994 to get a final agreement regarding the Swedish membership to the Union (Ibid.) Even as the final agreement was in place there was a broad scepticism in Sweden about the formulation in the Maastricht Treaty where it was stated that the EU was in the long-term aiming at a common defence. In a response to this, Sweden together with Finland in 1997 highlighted the importance of conflict management by pushing for the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty. This contributed to the avoidance of a common defence and instead put emphasize on the security dimensions. This argument was confirmed and emphasized by the Foreign Minister Anna Lindh as well as the Defence Minister Björn von Sydow (Lindh and von Sydow 2000). The EU membership clearly influenced the Swedish neutrality but, as acknowledged, Sweden also promoted non-military dimensions of European security policy. However, the major qualitative reforms were firstly taken in 1998 where the territorial defence was being shifted towards more crisis management. According to Rieker, this can be viewed as a response to the European integration process (Rieker 2006:76). The

following year, the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 1999 went as far as declaring that “Sweden has a European identity and responsibility”(Government Offices of Sweden, 10 February 1999) and to this the Swedish Prime Minister supported the proposal of a European force by 2003 (Bengtsson and Ericson 2001).

The latest national strategy for participation in international peace-support and security building operations was adopted by Sweden in March 2008. In the strategy, Sweden firstly positions its long term perspective and highlights that Sweden will provide support for combined civil and military capabilities (Government Communication 2007/08:51, 13 March 2008). Moreover, confirmation of Sweden’s dedication to develop ESDP was given as it was declared that Sweden had taken part in all the civil and military ESDP operations and that, “Sweden’s objective is to contribute actively to developing the EU’s capability to conduct operations in support of international peace and security under ESDP” Government Communication, 13 March 2008).

Currently there is a military reform of the Swedish Armed Forces’ where the aim is to have a more assessable defence force, by abolishing the conscription into the army and replacing it with contracted personnel (Swedish Government, 11 of January 2010). In line with this, Sweden declared that the military defence is of importance by stating that: “the crises or incidents in our region involving the use of military force cannot be ruled out.” (Ibid.). To sum up, Sweden’s national security identity has become Europeanized as the CSDP has had and still continues to have a clear impact on the member state’s security and defence policy.

5.1.2 Goals for the Use of Force

Operation *Concordia*

The Swedish Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs highlighted that the military presence in Macedonia is only the beginning of the more long-term goal to achieve stability between the countries two largest ethnic groups (Sveriges Riksdag, 17 of February 2003). In other words, the Swedish goal can be viewed as being reliant on there first being a military operation, which would set the foundation for a further civil management engagement in FYROM. This is further illustrated by the declaration of the government to back up on the need to implement the NATO’s Ohrid peace agreement since the overall aim of the agreement was to promote stability in the region.

”It is in the opinion of the Committee that a continued development towards an increased stability in Macedonia is dependent on the cooperation between the Slavic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians as well as that the Ohrid peace agreement is conducted within a soon future. The Committee furthermore implies that there is the condition of a continuing civil and military presence in the country, for this to be reached”⁶ (Ibid.).

Furthermore, the Swedish Government under the Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, stressed that a Swedish contribution to the EU’s first military operation was of a great importance

⁶ Translation of ”Det är utskottets mening att en fortsatt utveckling mot ökad stabilitet i Makedonien är beroende av att slaviska makedonier och etniska albaner kan samarbeta och att Ohridöverenskommelsen genomförs inom en snar framtid. Utskottet menar vidare att en fortsatt internationell civil och militär närvaro i landet är en av förutsättningarna för att detta skall uppnås.”

(Sveriges Riksdag, 13 of December 2003). The motivation of the Swedish Government in regards to the military engagement was formulated as such:

“The Swedish contribution shall, according to the suggestions of the government, reflect our strong engagement for peace on Western Balkans as well as our aim to actively contribute to the development of the military capacity of the EU. Sweden’s contribution shall also be adapted in relation to the other member states”⁷ (Ibid.)

In light of this, the goal for the use of force was motivated by the Swedish willingness to contribute to the stability of FYROM as this was a precondition for a more long-term peace process. However, Sweden also stated political goals in terms of building the military capacity of the EU, therefore, Sweden can be placed under several categories. Firstly, the international security as they wished to prevent a war, secondly, protection of international law as the goal included humanitarian reasons. Finally, because of political and cultural motivations as they wanted to be an active contributor to the EU military capacity (see table 2).

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

One month prior to the EU’s decision of launching the military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds opened her speech to the Parliament by lifting the crisis in Congo to a broader question of international security (Sveriges Riksdag, 27 of February 2006). The Foreign Minister Fraivalds said that, “The election that will be taking place during the spring or the summer will be of determining impact for the stability, not only in Congo, but in the whole Great Lakes Region”⁸. In addition, Freivalds declared that Sweden was positive to the launching of a military operation in the region as it was of importance for Congo but also for Sweden in terms of increased cooperation with the EU and the UN.

“It is an important contribution to the transition process in Congo. But it is also important for the continuing cooperation between the EU and the UN. This is a concrete example of how the crisis management of the EU can support the UN in a situation like this one”⁹ (Ibid.)

In the proposition it was further declared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Sweden’s participation in the EU-led military operation in Congo is because of the need of stability as well as security of civilians (Sveriges Riksdag, 11 of May 2006). Since the UN supported the operation, the overall goal with the Swedish participation was thus framed by the need of a peaceful democratic election process (Ibid.). In the reflections over the government’s proposition, the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and Defence Affairs declared that they had no setbacks regarding the Swedish participation to the operation *EUFOR DR Congo* (Sveriges Riksdag, 1 of June 2006).

⁷ Translation of: ”Det svenska bidraget bör, enligt regeringens bedömning, avspegla såväl vårt starka engagemang för freden på västra Balkan, som vår vilja att bidra aktivt till utvecklingen av EU:s krishanteringsförmåga. Sveriges bidrag bör dessutom vara väl anpassat i förhållande till övriga medlemsländers.”

⁸ Translation of “De val som ska äga rum under våren eller sommaren kommer att bli av avgörande betydelse för stabiliteten inte bara i Kongo utan i hela Storasjöområdet.”

⁹ Translation of ”Det är ett viktigt bidrag till övergångsprocessen i Kongo. Men det är också viktigt för det fortsatta samarbetet mellan EU och FN. Det här är ett konkret exempel på hur EU:s krishantering kan stödja FN i en sådan här situation.”

In light of the motivations stated by the Swedish government the goals for the use of force will be placed under the category of international security as well as under the category of political or cultural motivations. The category of international security has been chosen as there was a goal to create stability in the region. Sweden can also be categorised under the political or cultural motivations because there was a political motivation to cooperate with the EU and there was also an cultural motivation by the promotion of democracy. Moreover, because humanitarian reasons are the underlying cause of the Swedish promotion of democracy the category of protection of international law also captures the goal for use of force by the member state.

Operation *Atalanta*

In the proposition of the Swedish Government to the Parliament, the goals for the use of force in the Gulf of Aden and outside the coast of Somalia was declared as Sweden's dedication to the ESDP, but also to make sure that the people of Somalia are able to receive humanitarian aid (Sveriges Riksdag, 29 January 2009). The full statement was:

“The Swedish forces will, during the time of the operation, contribute to the solving of the tasks to which the EU has committed itself. Particular focus will be placed to protect the UN World Food Programme (WFP) humanitarian aid, which is of central importance to the people of Somalia”¹⁰ (Ibid.).

This line of argument was also highlighted by the Swedish Committee of EU Affairs where it was affirmed that: “Sweden has clearly stated the importance of operation *Atalanta* primarily being a humanitarian action that benefits the people of Somalia.”¹¹ (Sveriges Riksdag, 26 February 2009). Moreover, the question of whether to launch the military operation was in a Parliamentary debate mainly about the humanitarian situation in the country and how there was a need of assuring that the international humanitarian organizations could continue to provide Somalia with important food reserves (Sveriges Riksdag, 11 of Mars 2008).

In the reflections over the government's proposition, the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and Defence Affairs agreed to the proposition and added that the participation in the operation contributes to make Sweden into a trustworthy and respected actor within the crisis management of the EU (Sveriges Riksdag, 26 February 2009). On the other hand, the Swedish government did very vaguely and cautiously formulate national interest in their proposition to the Parliament (Sveriges Riksdag, 29 January 2009).

“The presence should most likely even facilitate for the trade routes in the area, including the vessels that are under the Swedish flag and those that traffic the area.”¹² (Ibid.).

The evidence provided illustrates that the goals with the use of force were to provide humanitarian assistance and is thus placed under the category of international law. Sweden can also be categorised under the political and cultural motivations as they stressed the

¹⁰ Translation of “Under denna tid kommer det svenska förbandet att bidra till att lösa de uppgifter som EU har åtagit sig. Särskilt fokus kommer att ges åt att skydda FN:s världslivsmedelsprogramms (WFP) humanitära hjälpsändningar, vilkas betydelse för Somalias befolkning är central.”

¹¹ Translation of “Sverige har tydligt betonat vikten av att operation *Atalanta* först och främst ska vara en humanitär insats som kommer Somalias befolkning till del.”

¹² Translation of “Närvaron bör sannolikt även underlätta för handelssjöfarten i området, däribland de fartyg som för svensk flagg och som trafikerar området.”

importance showing dedication to the ESDP. Moreover, Sweden expressed the protection of own nationals and the importance of trade routes and therefore they will also be placed under the category of national interest.

5.1.3 Conditionality for the Use of Force

Operation Concordia

In the proposition by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament, it was conditioned that the requirement in form of a given UN mandate as well as a formal approval of Macedonia was sought before the launching of the operation (Sveriges Riksdag, 13 of February 2003). In view of the fact that the Ministry formulated their precondition as such:

“A prerequisite for the Swedish participation is that the operation is based on international law. The international law mandate as the basis for the EU-led operation is the request from the Macedonian government submitted in writing to the EU on 17 January 2003. Invitations will be followed of an exchange between Macedonia and EU. The operation will also support the UN Security Council Resolution 1371 (2001)”¹³ (Ibid.).

However, this requirement was based on there being a settled arrangement with NATO. As Sweden is not part of the alliance there were not other specific requirements of how this arrangement would look like more than that it was to be arranged with NATO (Ibid.) The overall conditionality of Sweden to launch the military operation is considered as defensive, seeing that Sweden referred both to the approval of international law as well as stating the official request by the Macedonian government. Additionally, Sweden stressed the conditionality of there being a NATO arrangement and they can also be placed under the second category of cooperation with international organizations and alliances.

Operation EUFOR DR Congo

It was stressed in both the Government's proposition to the parliament as well as by the parliament that the Swedish consent of participating in the military operation was under the condition of it being in accordance with International law, in form of a reached UN Security Council Resolution (Sveriges Riksdag, 11 of May 2006, Sveriges Riksdag, 1 of June 2006).

In the Swedish Parliament Committee of European Affairs it was also discussed whether the government of Congo had accepted that EU intervened to support the UN in the process of the governmental election in Congo (Sveriges Riksdag, 10 April 2006). Therefore there was an uncertainty whether there was an acceptance to launch the operation and how the government tended to respond to there not being an acceptance. However, it was stated that the vice- Foreign Minister, Carin Jämtin, had recently been to Congo where she had met with the President who had confirmed that there was an interest of the President for the EU to conduct the military operation (Ibid.). In a response to this, the Government positioned in the proposition that there was a consent to the operation from the Democratic Republic of Congo's transition government and between the President as well as the four vice Presidents

¹³ Translation of ”En förutsättning för svensk medverkan är att insatsen vilar på folkrättslig grund. Det folkrättsliga mandat som ligger till grund för den EU-ledda insatsen är den begäran från den makedonska regeringen som inkom skriftligen till EU den 17 januari 2003. Inbjudan kommer att följas av en skriftväxling mellan Makedonien och EU. Insatsen har också stöd i FN:s säkerhetsråds resolution 1371 (2001)”

(Sveriges Riksdag, 11 of May 2006). Indicating that the Swedish requirements of a mandate from the UN were not enough on their own and that Sweden also acquired the legitimacy of DR Congo in order not to infringe on the country's sovereignty. Thus, the level of preconditions is regarded as defensive and similar to the one of operation *Concordia*.

Operation *Atalanta*

In the reached decision to send troops to the Gulf of Aden and outside the coast of Somalia the main and only precondition of the Swedish Government was the need of a valid UN Security Council resolution (Sveriges Riksdag, 11 of Mars 2008, Sveriges Riksdag, 29 January 2009). This can be seen in the following statement by the government: "there is subsequently a clear mandate in international law on the right to use of force against piracy on international waters"¹⁴ Thus, in the proposition to the parliament, the mandate of the UN was mentioned repeatedly in the document and, unlike the earlier operations, there was also an appendix with the UNSC Resolution (Ibid.). Moreover, unlike the previous operations where the acceptance was required of the country within which the force was used, the formal acceptance by Somalia was however not stressed presumably because of the lack of a functioning government system. In light of this, the conditionality for the use of force will be regarded under the same category as the previous two operations.

5.1.4 Summary of Sweden

The Swedish goals for the use of force have clearly had a humanitarian motivation. However, Sweden has stretched its motivations from mainly being humanitarian to also include national interests by protecting own nationals in the Gulf of Aden which could be seen in the military operation *Atalanta*. Moreover, the goals for the use of force have by Sweden focused on the need to contribute to the EU military operations, thus showing evidence of an Europeanization in the defence area in the form of an increasing adoption to the EU-level. When it comes to the conditionality for the use of force, Sweden has throughout the operations highlighted the importance of having an UN mandate before launching the operations. In addition to this, Sweden has also sought to have the formal approval of the country where the use of force will be applied. This is also inline with the Swedish security identity which has been to have a neutral position to war. Therefore, this norm of a neutrality can be viewed as the constituent norm, as emphasized by the constructivist approach, since it does not change easily, and is deeply embedded and identity obtained by collective assumptions of what is appropriate behaviour. In light of this, Sweden has indicated a similar motivation in all three operations regarding the conditionality prior to launching of the military operations.

To sum up, the findings are well matched with the argument of Rieker who describes Sweden as being both a teacher and pupil of the EU when it comes to defence and security policy (Rieker 2006:63). In operation *Concordia*, Sweden can be considered as a "pupil" as the country wanted to participate because it was the first EU military operation. Hence, one of the motivations which guided the decision was 'learning' mechanisms. This motivation undermined the level of own projection to the decision making and it can also be analysed as a regulative norm, in accordance with the constructivist approach, where Sweden is acting

¹⁴ Translation of "Det finns följaktligen ett tydligt mandat i folkrätten för att utöva maktbefogenheter mot sjöröveri på internationellt vatten."

according to what works best in international and security affairs. On the other hand, Sweden was taking on the teacher role in the operation *EUFOR DR Congo* as Sweden was injecting norms to the EU level by requiring the high level of legitimacy to the EU military operations.

5.2 France

5.2.1 The Security Identity of France

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, France lost its role as a powerful mediator and thus the decision-makers in France were according to Bozo concerned that the “comfortable position between the US and the Soviet Union was coming to an end” (Bozo 1992:201). On the other hand, the German question was thus, as Meyer calls it “back at the table” and the unease of the French elites of a divided Germany was coming to an end (Ibid.) Therefore the French President Mitterrand sought to make sure that Germany returned to the ‘Europeanized Germany’ rather than a ‘German Europe’, the expression often cited by the German writer Thomas Mann (Hyde-Price 2000:222).

The principal of absolute autonomy of security and defence, which was central to France post-1945 identity, was gradually eroded as France entered into a deeper co-operation within the EU context (Meyer 2000:64). In the military planning law of 1996 as well as in the military planning law of 2003, the French Parliament confirmed the role attributed to the EU as they stated that, “Europe has become the main political and geographical frame of our action” (Terpan 2008:10).

However, while this approach has met some opposition from right-of-centre politicians, Meyer as well as Terpan, acknowledge that France puts more emphasis of a more integrated ESDP in terms of capabilities and less on the ESDP institutions (Ibid., Meyer 2006:64).

The French limited contribution to the first Gulf War led to the decision-makers shift from territorial defence of enlisted armies to a more flexible professionals and rapidly deployable force (Terpan 2008:13). Meyer describes this transformation in France as a rather significant step for the nation seeing that there was a reduced fear of a direct attack on the country. As a subsequence to this, Meyer also positions that “France embraced military co-operation within the EU and the use of force for primary humanitarian purposes” (Meyer 2006:66).

France defence policy has thus been described as the country with the constant support to the ESDP (Gross 2009:91). According to Gross, the reasons for the lifting of ESDP is a sign of the French interest to project and pursue national influence by, besides the NATO, establishing a European security institution (Ibid.). However, Meyer acknowledges that there has been a tension in France of whether to cooperate pragmatically with NATO and US or whether to counterbalance them (Meyer 2006:65). The French decision to support the American intervention in Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, did not have the same impact on the French security identity as in UK, and Meyer also stated that it was “hardly disputed” (Ibid. p.67).

In 2008, France developed a Security Strategy where France takes account of its strategic interests and needs. Besides stating its future interest, the Strategy positions that France has taken an active part in Security System Reform missions and especially in French

speaking countries and highlights that the European ambition still stands as a priority (French Diplomatie, August 2008, p. 20). To sum up, the security identity of France from the Cold War onwards can be described as abandoning the territorial defence and engaging towards the capability of a more common European defence.

5.2.2 Goals for the Use of Force

Operation *Concordia*

The decision of France's participation in EU's first military operation was primarily motivated by the French Government and without a prior discussion in the French Parliament (Bono 2005:26). There was, however, an overall consensus that the operation was important for the development of the European defence and to shape the EU-NATO relationship (Ibid. p. 27). Gross also states that "the view on the crisis in FYROM, applied to both the political negotiations as well as military crisis management was that the 'EU must be ready, Europe must be an actor, when possible it must act' " (Gross 2009:94). The arguments of operation *Concordia* enhancing the EU as a military actor are also evident by the declaration of the French Defence Ministry which positions that:

"Operation *Concordia* highlights the European Unions determination to make a credible defence capability a reality on the ground, particularly on the continent of Europe"(France in the United Kingdom, 30 September 2003)

However, in the primary sources there were no clear motivations of the goal with the operation more than that the French government determined it as being able to "prevent a crisis" (France Diplomatie, 2008). The French government further highlighted that France is dedicated to bring peace and stability to the Balkan region and that this can be seen by their engagement in the different civil and military operations (Ibid.). However, Gross affirms that the French involvement in the crisis is best understood in light of its previous engagement in the region and also in terms of the significance of crisis management instruments within the CSDP (Gross 2009:94).

In light of this, the goals of France for the use of force can be viewed as the need to bring stability to the region and the use of force can thus best be categorized under international security which includes the motivation of the prevention of war (see table 2). However, the goal for the use of force can be viewed as political goals as there was an incentive to put the ESDP into practice.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

As previously mentioned, the role of the French Parliament is that it cannot make any decisions of deploying military operations (Bono 2005:26, Gross 173). Thus, the roles of the President and the government in office is the primarily source when analysing the goal behind the launching of the military operation. Eleven days after the official launching of the *EUFOR DR Congo* Operation, the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs declared its involvement in the region in form of a statement on their official webpage. In the text, France positioned that the goal with the operation was to support the national transition process by reinforcing its previous involvement in the region, an involvement that is according to the French Government built on the close cultural ties of the French language. However, it is according to the sender oriented interpretation strategy important to distinguish the intention of the text, therefore the argument (positioned in the passage below) that France

did not have an economical interest can be interpreted as there being a need to defend itself against a possible critique:

“France has long been involved in the Great Lakes region. This involvement is not based on a colonial past, as none of the countries in this region belonged to the former French Empire, nor is it based on economic interests, which remain very modest, in spite of the economic potential of the DRC. It is, however, fuelled by a special relationship founded in particular on the French language connection. This presence has caused France to play a leading role in supporting the peace process, and, specifically, supporting the national transition processes” (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 11th July 2006).

In addition, the Foreign and European Affairs Ministry highlighted that they have been the once pushing for the EU to take a role in the peace process, as they positioned that, “France has encouraged the escalation of the European Union’s role in the region; the EU has now established itself as a *major* player in the peace process in the DRC (Ibid.).

In regards to this evidence, the main goal of the use of force was to support the peace process in Congo. However, as France needed to defend their involvement in the operation and declare that it is not an economical interest or on the colonial past, the goals can be placed under several categories. Firstly, in the international security, as the goal was to create peace and secondly there was the protection of national interest, in terms of possible economical interest. Thirdly, seeing that the operation overall is promoting democracy, the goal for the use of force will be placed in the category of political or cultural motivations (see table 2). However, Meyer has in his conceptual framework underlined the importance of also acknowledging the humanitarian reasons when use of force is legitimized with the promotion of democracy (Meyer 2006:22). Illustrating that France can be placed under all of the categories matches the statements of Meyer who describes France as having multiple goals for the use of force (Ibid).

Operation *Atalanta*

France was the leading nation behind the launching of EU’s first naval military operation *Atalanta* (Sörensson 2008:16). This was because operation *Atalanta* replaced the operation *Alycon*, where France was an active participant in 2007 and had the same goal which was, according to Karl Sörensson, “to provide close escort to the WFP aid deliveries.” (Ibid.). France thus has a history of engagement against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia (France at the United Nations, 20 of April 2009, French Diplomatie, 2008:1). This argument is also highlighted at the French government’s official website where it is declared that “France played a key role in having the Security Council deal with this issue” (Ibid., 20 of April 2009) Moreover, it has been stated by the French government that: “France has encouraged the escalation of the European Union’s role in the region” (French Diplomatie, 2008:2.). This can thus be seen as a sign of France’s continued willingness to develop the EU as a security actor and therefore also the ESDP.

President Sarkozy declared the goal of launching the military operation outside the Gulf of Aden in a speech on the 16th of September 2008, where he stated that:

“We are no longer faced with isolated cases but with a real criminal industry. It jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, of movement and of international trade (...). I call on the international community to take action and participate in the safety of maritime travel and in the protection of people in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia” (Ibid).

In light of the speech, the President is highlighting the fundamental freedoms that are positioned under the international law. He states that the main reasons for advocating those

freedoms are because of the safety of maritime travel, which is the safety of goods, and on a second place he mentions the people. The goals for the use of force can thus be positioned in all the categories, as the previous operation. The use of force can be positioned under the category of international security as there was a goal to secure the region. Additionally, the category's protection of international law because of humanitarian reasons, and the protection of national interest in terms of international trade can be positioned. To this the category of political motivations will be added because of the France's interest to develop the ESDP.

5.2.3 Conditionality for the Use of Force

Operation *Concordia*

The coordination with the US was important for Paris, because the US has previously played a central role with conflict resolutions in the Balkans and helped to create peace agreements (Gross 2009:92). Thus the main requirement of the member state was to establish cooperation with the US before launching the first EU military operation. However, as France sought to play the key role in the European efforts to negotiate the crisis, so that it could be taken on by the other member states, France in the French-German relationship took "a number of policy initiatives" (Ibid.p.93). Both France and Germany suggested that it would be a positive step to include the Macedonian government by having the Macedonian President addressing the EU Council of the situation of the country (Ibid.). This inclusion of the FYROM government can be viewed as a conditionality of France before launching the military operation.

France can be regarded as being in the defensive category, as France wished to have the support of the government of FYROM before launching the operation. Furthermore, the conditionality for the use of force is also evident in form of cooperation with the US and can thus also be placed under the category of cooperation with particular states.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

Before applying the use of force, France lifted its position of the DRC in the UN platform, as they wanted to gain a mandate of the international community (Gross 2009:119). According to Gross, France was mainly driven by national interests and did not have any requirements except seeking legitimacy so that other member states would be included and participate in the operation (Ibid.). Gross states that for France, "credibility for ESDP in the case of *EUFOR DR Congo* required a more diverse European participation" (Ibid.). Thus, France did not wish to act unilaterally and therefore stated that they pushed for an involvement of the UN, the EU as well as from African actors:

"Ending the Great Lakes crisis is a major challenge that is currently mobilizing unprecedented resources. France has strongly encouraged the progressive involvement of the United Nations, the European Union and African players from this region" (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 11 July 2006).

France can therefore be positioned in the category of cooperation with international organizations seeing that France required legitimacy of the international community before launching the operation.

Operation *Atalanta*

France has had a previous engagement with the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden (French Diplomatie, 2008:1). Therefore the requirements to use force in the EU operation *Atalanta*

can be viewed as being mainly dependent on the legitimacy of the international community in form of a UN resolution (Ibid.). This requirement of the international community can be viewed as a defensiveness of France for the use of force (Ibid.). However, it should also be acknowledged that France did have international interests in the operation, considering that the Gulf of Aden is an important international trade route (France at the United Nations, 20 of April 2009). Nevertheless, France did not emphasise the requirement of an US or NATO cooperation in the primary documents that have been available in English.

In light of this France can be placed under category of requirement of a UN mandate. Additionally, as for the case of Sweden, the legitimacy of the government of the Somalia was not stressed considering the lack of a functional government.

5.2.4 Summary of France

France's goals for the use of force were primarily motivated by humanitarian reasons. In addition to this, underlying national interests are evident in all the three operations. In operation *Concordia* there was the interest to launch the first EU military operation and in the latter operations *EUFOR DR Congo* and *Atalanta* the analysis shows an economic interest. Thus there seem to be similar norms that are of guidance regarding the goals for the use of force; as it appears to be less of a sign of adoption to the EU level but more a sign of projection by France of how the EU should act. It can therefore be presumed that France will keep projecting its norms and ideas as France seems to act as the scriptwriter for the CSDP military operations. This is realized by France's active call for a UN mandate to authorise the operations and by encouraging the development of the ESDP as an influential player in the operations. The French view of its security identity, as France positions itself as a European security actor, is therefore in line with the findings.

In operation *Concordia* France also conditioned that there was a need to cooperate with the US when launching the operation. This conditionality of cooperation with the US was, however, not evident in the later operations where France on the other hand was more inclined to act together with the member states of the EU. Furthermore, France's requirements of having the formal approval of the government of FYROM can also be viewed as less of a request and more of an incentive to have the EU member states taking part of the operation by increasing the level of legitimacy for the use of force.

To sum up, the findings of the use of force in the EU military operations are well matched with the argument that France is pushing for an increased harmonization of defence in the EU i.e. supporting an Europeanization of security and defence policy.

5.3 United Kingdom

5.3.1 The Security Identity of United Kingdom

In the early 1990s, the foreign politics of the United Kingdom were still influenced by the political developments in Russia and Germany (Meyer 2006:59). The Prime Minister, Thatcher, strongly opposed the re-unification of Germany, however, this fear was eased among her and her fellow British policy-makers when Germany decided to take greater part

in NATO and EU and to respect its Eastern neighbours (Ibid. p. 59-61). The end of the Cold War did not alter British actors' position and in the first years of the 1990s the United Kingdom continued to pursue its traditional foreign policy, emphasizing thereof military power and 'special' relationship with the US and thus constructing a Britain 'of' rather than 'in' Europe (Aggestam 2000). Howorth states that, "so long as the Cold War lasted, and even after it ended, Atlanticism remained, for London, the primary reference" (Howorth 2000:378).

In the mid-1990s the United Kingdom had a blooming economy and emerged as the most capable and deployable armed forces (Meyer 2006:61). Given its size and political power, it was important to include the UK in the creation of an EU security and defence policy. However, considering its close transatlantic ties, the UK was from the beginning sceptical to the EU security and defence project. There was also a broad scepticism both by officials and the public of the forming of an 'EU-army' and the weakening of NATO (Howorth, 2005:201). According to Meyer, to uphold the transatlantic friendship the first ESDP operation was conducted in close cooperation with NATO and the US. Even if the UK, according to Gross, values the ESDP as a civil and military crisis management instrument, Gross states that, "London did not push for a greater involvement or a greater scope for military crisis management" (Gross 2006:63). The general belief of the British officials emphasize that the making of a European defence had nothing to do with the support for integration and political union, instead it was viewed as a pragmatic response to the growing security problems (Meyer 2006:62).

However, assessing the strategic identity of the UK is not, in the view of the author, conducted properly without mentioning the British government's controversial decision to support the US on the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The decision of launching the military operation was according to Meyer determined by the strategic interest in the transatlantic partnership and the urge for loyalty with an ally. The decision is often mentioned when stating the reason for the UK being thorn between on the one side a European identity, and the transatlantic at the other.

Nevertheless, the first national security reform was published in 2008 and it highlighted that new threats demand a more coordinated response. Thus the government gave equal value to the security institutions while stating that the intention was to:

"reform and strengthen NATO, EU, and the UN, for example working to make the UN Security Council more representative to give greater legitimacy to decisive international action" (Directgov, 19 March 2008)

In addition to this, the government highlighted that support will instead be on a combination of both military and civil operation as it gives a more long-term support. It has been acknowledged that failing to prevent a conflict, and thus being obliged to launch military operations, cost more. The directions that the UK wished to take regarding the military as well as the civil EU operation were positioned to be operations, "which are in the UK's national interest, which offer good value for money, have clear objectives and, in the case of military missions, only where it is clear that NATO is not planning to intervene" (Directgov, 19 October 2010). To sum up, the United Kingdom's security identity can shortly be described as divided between on the one hand its close ties to its allies, and on the other to Europe.

5.3.2 Goals for the Use of Force

Operation *Concordia*

The United Kingdom supported the military operation in Macedonia because of the fear that the situation would escalate and become another Kosovo crisis (House of Commons, 27 March 2001). The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons emphasized that the UK had learned its lessons and this should not be another one, as they stated that:

“Macedonia has been a model in the region of a multiethnic and democratic government, which has not so far been the subject of widespread ethnic violence. If Macedonia should disintegrate into another Kosovo, Bosnia or Croatia, it would be a massive reverse for the United Nations, the EU and NATO (Ibid.).

According to Gross, there was a shared view by the UK Parliament regarding the goals of the operation, where the overall goal was to prevent “the outbreak of a large-scale violence” and to put into practice “a speedy resolution of the crisis” (Gross 2009:65).

Thus, the UK’s motivation can therefore be described as a need to act before it was too late. It was not an option to take a passive strategy and the situation in Macedonia needed a military force in the early start. The UK’s motivation for the use of force is most applicable in the international security category because it emphasises the importance of ensuring stability in the region. Moreover, analysing the material of the UK, the country did not highlight the importance of contributing to the first military operation of the EU.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

The motivation for the UK to take part of the *EUFOR DR Congo* operation was regarded as low as Gross states that “there was little enthusiasm on the part of the UK to participate in the mission even if there was no political objection towards the missions’ objective of increased EU-UN cooperation in crisis management” (Gross 2009:88). The willingness to give a political support was also stated by the Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs:

“The Government fully supports the objective of supporting MONUC during the elections, and that these elections — the first democratic elections for 40 years in DRC — are crucial for the future stability of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.” (House of Lords, 2 June 2006).

The goals with the use of force are thus to create a future stability in the region. However, in the report given by the Committee on European Scrutiny, the operation was referred to as “compelling”, which indicates that the goals with launching the military operation were seen as an obligation rather than being in the UK’s interest (Ibid.).

In light of this the goals for the use of force can be regarded as several and can thus be positioned in most all of the categories except the one of national interests. In the view of the fact that the United Kingdom wanted to create stability in the region the member state will be placed under the category of international security. However, the UK’s support of democracy is an explanation that is suitable under the category of political or cultural motivations, as the promotion of democracy shall be viewed together with humanitarian reasons (see table 2).

Operation *Atalanta*

Operation *Atalanta* is the first UK led ESDP military operation since the launch of the ESDP (*The National Archives, 9 of December 2008*). The United Kingdom directed the financial importance of having secure trade routes, but they also added more emphasis on the effect it had for not only the national interest but also the interests of the consumers in the country

(Ibid.). In the National Archives of the United Kingdom the launching of the naval military operation outside the coast of Somalia was positioned as:

“Piracy disrupts legitimate trade and adds significant costs to goods that UK consumers rely on. The UK contribution to the EU mission in The Gulf of Aden will send a strong message to pirates that their activities will not be tolerated and that the global community is united in its efforts to deter and disrupt them” (Ibid.).

The Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Caroline Flint, gave her account of why UK is to engage in the operation (House of Commons, 10th of December 2008). Mrs. Flint stated that the involvement of the UK is “in the light of the worrying increase in the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region” (Ibid.). To this, Mrs. Flint added that piracy has implication for the nationals of the UK. As she raised the example of there being two British Nationals that were held as hostages by the pirates and as she puts it “This incident only serves to underline the importance of the ESDP mission” (Ibid.).

In light of these findings the operation will be placed under the category of international law and humanitarian reasons as well as under the category of national interests (see table 2).

5.3.3 Conditionality for the Use of Force

Operation Concordia

Two months prior to the launching of the first ESDP operation *Concordia*, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office discussed the conditionality that was needed to be in place before the UK would give its consent to the launching of the operation (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 of January 2003). The UK required cooperation between the EU and NATO regarding the assets and capabilities in order not to undermine the role of the NATO.

“In the Government's view, the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements for EU use of NATO assets and capabilities also needed to be in place, as did specific arrangements for EU use of NATO assets in Macedonia, before the Decision was adopted” (Ibid.).

Gross also highlights that other than the arrangements between the EU and the NATO assets being in place, there were no objections to the participation of the operation (Gross 2009:64). The same line of argument was raised by Howorth as he positions that the UK stated that there were high risks with launching the operation in view of the fact that the EU did not have the capabilities to carry out the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. In light of this Howorth stresses that “UK tried hard to persuade its EU partners that premature statements were not only meaningless but potentially dangerous” (Howorth 2005:186). Moreover, according to Herolf the UK considered it being enough with the formal agreement of the Macedonian Government and was therefore opposing the mandate of the UN because it was believed to be “adding further complications” (Herolf 2004:223).

However, the reactions of the US towards the ESDP in form of the usage of the NATO assets were important for the UK decision to launch operation *Concordia* (Gross 2009:64). This can also be viewed in the Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence where Minister for Europe and the Director of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were examined and highlighted the role of the US as well as the cooperation with NATO (House of Commons, 21 of January 2003). Thus, the UK will be placed under the defensive category as it required the formal approval of the Macedonian government. Moreover, the

member state can be positioned in the category of cooperation with international organizations and allies as the UK stressed the need of an NATO cooperation.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo* was regarded as compelling and the United Kingdom did not wish to contribute with military forces due to military over-stretch (House of Commons, 26 April 2006). The UK Minister for Europe (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) stated that there were unresolved issues and the Minister referred to the inclusion of NATO and if they were included in the arrangements, which was needed to ensure the cooperation between the UK and NATO (Ibid). The Select Committee on European Scrutiny in the House of Commons also highlighted the importance of acknowledging the position of NATO before agreeing upon whether to launch the military operation *EUFOR DR Congo* (House of Lords, 2 June 2006). However, it was in the end confirmed in the Parliament that NATO would not be involved in the operation but this did not hinder UK's participation. Instead, the Parliament referred to the UN Resolution that had been given to the EU and promoted that as a motivation for the engagement (Ibid.).

There was however certain scepticism by the House of Lords in regards to the launching of short operations (House of Lords, 21 March 2006). It was stated by Mr. Nicholas Grono, Vice-President for Advocacy and Operations, that:

“When it comes to development policy, one of the challenges is that there is often this desire for short-term results, which means that you go in, completely take over the operation—be it peacekeeping or be it institution-building—and then pull out, on the basis that you have a stable situation or you have an institution handed over to key Africans, only to find that in fact you have not built the capacity in the process and therefore there is no long-term sustainability.”

In this operation, the UK ignored its previous requirements of the participation of NATO, as emphasised in operation *Concordia*, and instead the Parliament motivated the intervention by referring to the UN mandate. In light of this, the conditionality for the use of force by the UK will be regarded under the category of requirements of an UN mandate.

Operation *Atalanta*

In the government view of responding to the piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the government stressed the need of cooperation with the NATO and the US before responding to the operation (House of Commons, 10th of December 2008). However, in addition to there being a need to support NATO, the government highlighted the importance of developing the ESDP further and thereby engaging in an EU led operation (*The National Archives, 9 of December 2008*). This can be seen in the following statement:

"The UK has continued to take a leading role in developing ESDP to ensure that it remains in line with our objectives of having a more capable, coherent and active policy that remains supportive of and complementary to NATO."(Ibid.).

In other words, the cooperation with NATO and the US was once again emphasized in this latest operation of the UK and will thus be placed under the same categorizations as the previous operations. However, unlike in the other operations the UK in this operation placed a focus on developing the ESDP and thus showing a sign of Europeanization in their effort to respond to the pressure from the EU-level.

5.3.4 Summary of the United Kingdom

The goals of use of force in the EU military operations have mainly been framed in humanitarian terms by the UK. The first operation can be described in more defensive terms as there was an overall lack of ambition of the UK to launch an EU military operation and instead, the motivation was mainly framed as there being a need to act before it was too late.

However, throughout the operations other motivations than merely humanitarian were held by the UK to support its decisions. This can for instance be seen in *EUFOR DR Congo* where both humanitarian as well as cultural motivations determined the decision to engage in the operation. On the other hand, the UK was once again not having its own ambition to be part of the EU military operation but was encouraged by France to take part in the operation. On the other hand, in operation *Atalanta* the UK showed a stronger commitment of taking part in the EU military operation by stressing both humanitarian as well as national goals.

The conditionality for the use of force was mainly stressed by the need of cooperating with NATO. In all three operations the role of the NATO was emphasised when positioning the requirements before the use of force could be taken. In operation *Atalanta* the UK even stated that the participation was to ensure that the ESDP is supportive to the NATO. Thus, the EU dimension is not enhanced but more the transatlantic friendship. This evidence is also in line with the statements made by the UK in its national security reform of 2008 where it is stressed that NATO was first to be coordinated before agreeing to take on EU military operations. Hence, even if the goals with the operations are becoming more Europeanized, the UK still seeks to ensure the cooperation with NATO before deciding on an involvement in an EU military operation.

5.4 Germany

5.4.1 The Security Identity of Germany

Since the end of the Cold War, the bipolarity and the German reunification provided a great opportunity for Germans to reflect on their European orientations and to reconstruct the national interests (Lantis 2002:23). Hence, the German foreign policy towards and within the EU were significantly reformed. In light of this, Meyer states that Germany has hold on to many of the post World War II lessons learned. This can for instance be seen in the way the re-unified Germany fully took part in multilateral organisations such as NATO and adopted the Maastricht Treaty as well as declaring that Germany would never again challenge the existing eastern borders (Meyer 2006:67).

The perhaps most significant change that was taken by Germany was the way it viewed its threat perceptions, as Germany according to Meyer went from “gradually undermining the firm commitment to territorial defence as the main and only legitimate goal for the use of force” (Ibid. p. 68). Instead, co-operation with multilateral organisations became the fundamental of Germany’s foreign policy and Germany’s foreign policy could best be described by the term “reflexive multilateralism” that has been coined by Katzenstein (Gross 2009:122).

However, the First Gulf War (1990-91), US Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, brought Germany in an uncomfortable situation. Here, Germany wanted to help its allies by

participating in the war, but as positioned by Meyer, this was conflicting with its “normative expectations” (Meyer 2006:68). As a compromise between these two situations the German foreign minister at the time was sending money to the allies and sold military equipment to Saudi Arabia. In spite of this, in 1994 the Constitutional Court in Germany ruled that German troops could be used abroad if they were in compliance with International law and UN resolutions and properly authorised by the German Parliament (Meyer 2006:68). This contributed to the Germans ability to participate in NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 and as a result of this Gross states that “the historical taboos began to erode” (Gross 2009: 122). Furthermore, Gross highlights that the political elite in Germany started to “push for a more proactive role in defining and perusing its national interest” (Ibid.).

The aftermath of the September 11 attacks did not, according to Meyer, fundamentally shift the German strategic culture regarding the use of force to fight terrorism abroad. The German chancellor instead stated that Germany in a friendly matter disagrees with the US on the issue (Meyer 2006:68). On the other hand, the decision in not supporting America’s foreign and security policy is regarded as a shift in the German national identity towards a ‘Berliner discourse’ which implies that Germany became more self confident as a country (Buras and Longhurst 2004).

However, the German government has not adapted a national security strategy, which has been presented in the previous cases of the selected member states. In lack of a national security strategy the opposition party Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU)/Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) in 2008 presented their Security Strategy for Germany. The document has been heatedly debated in the member state as it declares that Germany shall be more active in military contribution. This illustrates, the member state is at crossroads of which position it should take when it comes to the EU military operations (CSU/CDU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 7 May 2008) To sum up, the security identity of Germany can be viewed as being in transformation since the member state is reshaping its security identity by carrying out EU military operations, which were unthinkable in the aftermath of the Cold War.

5.4.2 Goals for the use of force

Operation *Concordia*

Germany was sensitive to the crisis in Macedonia both because of the previous experiences in the Balkans and the failure of the EU to act, but also because there was a threat of refugee flows and instability close to German borders (Gross 2009:124). According to Gross who has conducted interviews with German officials there was a sense of urgency for German policy makers to act (Ibid.).

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschaka Fischer framed the crisis in Macedonia as “central to European and therefore also German security”(Ibid.). Herolf gives a similar description, as she states that it was the German Foreign Minister Joschaka Fischer who suggested that a military presence should exist (Herolf 2004: 223). While the coalition party termed it as “a test case for the EU CFSP” (Ibid.126). The priorities for the Federal Foreign Office was to stop the violence, to put in place a peaceful resolution and involve the US in the peace making process (Ibid.).

The motivation behind the participation in the operation can be viewed as Germany wished to create stability by preventing a war and also of humanitarian reasons as there was a need to help the people of Macedonia. Therefore the goals for the use of force can be positioned under the category of international security and protection of international law

(see table 2). Moreover, it was also declared that the crisis in Macedonia could create implications for Germany and to this it was stated that a threat of European security was a threat to the security of the nation, thus the goal for the use of force can also be positioned in the national interests category.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

The German Government stressed the need of a new start in the DR Congo where democracy was viewed as a precondition (Deutscher Bundestag, 8 May 2006). As the Government stated that:

“These are the first elections in Congo for over 40 years, 95 percent of the population have never been able to participate in an election. The population of the Democratic Republic of Congo hope that the elections will provide a chance of a new start and improve their economic and social situation. The expectations are high as the elections only are a precondition to improve the situation and, in the long-term more requirements will be needed”¹⁵ (Ibid.).

On the other hand, the Parliament quoted the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier where he expressed that the *EUFOR DR Congo* operation was launched to demonstrate the capacity of the ESDP (Deutscher Bundestag, 17 May 2006). A similar finding for the reasons to use force in Congo was given by Gross who states that “one of the fundamental considerations in agreeing to the operation was that this was an opportunity to showcase that ESDP could take on a temporally restricted mission” (Gross 2009:150). To this, the Parliament added that the central reason for the mission where obvious, as the aim was to strengthen the EU’s influence in Africa and within NATO (Deutscher Bundestag, 17 May 2006). The Parliament stretched the arguments for the use of force even further and cited some of the national news papers where it was stated that the primary motivation of launching the operation were because the raw materials in Congo are strategically important for the economy of the Western world, and should not fall into the wrong hands (Ibid.).

However, according to Gross’s interview with German officials the motivations of launching the military operation should not be viewed as a result of greater political interest in Africa and thus a signal of change in German political thinking. Rather, Gross presents the following three reasons behind the German involvement in the operation: “it was feasible, it was an opportunity for Germany to move ESDP forward rather than continue with its role of retarding element, and it was in the spirit of effective multilateralism, which Germany supported” (Gross 2009:150-152)

In light of this evidence, the goals for the use of force by Germany in Congo can be placed under all the listed categories in table 2. The category of international security can be viewed as the need to create stability in the region, while the category of protection of international law can be viewed as there was a humanitarian incentive. Furthermore, the category of protection of national interest can be viewed to a certain extent, however, this goal was not as positioned but there was a suggestion in the parliament that the government had this interest in mind. Lastly, the category of political or cultural motivations is evident as there was a clear promotion of democracy.

¹⁵ Translation of “Dies sind die ersten Wahlen im Kongo seit über 40 Jahren, 95 Prozent der Bevölkerung haben noch nie an einer Wahl teilnehmen können. Die Bevölkerung der Demokratischen Republik Kongo erhofft sich von den Wahlen die Chance auf einen Neuanfang und eine Verbesserung ihrer wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Situation. Die Erwartungen sind hoch, wobei die Wahlen nur eine Voraussetzung zur Verbesserung der Situation sind, die langfristigen weiteren Einsatz erfordert.”

Operation *Atalanta*

The German Parliament stated that there are two main goals with the launching of the operation *Atalanta* (Deutscher Bundestag, 10th of December). Firstly, it is to make sure that the pirates are not preventing the humanitarian aid that is to reach the people of Somalia. Secondly, to secure the commercial ship traffic on the local trade routes by preventing hostage taking and ransom demands and enforce international law. However, the next several lines clearly state that there is a national interest by launching the military operation (Ibid.)

“Waters off Somalia and particularly the Gulf of Aden leads outside the most important trade route between Europe, the Arabian Peninsula and Asia. Germany is as an export nation to secure trade routes that are of a particularly great interest, especially as the import of raw material is mainly shipped by sea and into the country. Moreover, many cruise lines that route in their Catalogs, and several thousand German tourists travel every year with cruise ships through the Gulf of Aden.”¹⁶(ibid.)

The importance of securing the trade routes for the German import was further stressed in the proposed resolution report of the Foreign Affairs Committee (Deutscher Bundestag, 17 of December 2008).

In light of these statements the goal of the use force by Germany can be positioned under the category of the protection of international law violations, because humanitarian reasons were stressed. In addition to this, the protection of national interest category can also be positioned as a goal for the use of force as Germany showed evidence of the need to protect its economical interests.

5.4.3 Conditionality for the Use of Force

Operation *Concordia*

The German Foreign Ministry stressed the importance of the capabilities being in place before operation *Concordia* was to be launched and there was a general reluctance to apply the use of force before the security situation in the country was under control (Gross 2009:132). Germany also stressed the need of a UN mandate to the application of the use of military force in Macedonia (Ibid.). The operation will thus be placed in the defensive category which is the requirement of a UN mandate as conditionality for the use of force.

Operation *EUFOR DR Congo*

The German Government was according to Gross rather critical towards UN's request to launch a military operation in Congo (Gross 2009:150). This was because the government mainly saw the decision as being a French initiative rather than one of the UN (Ibid, German

¹⁶ Translation of: “Durch das Seegebiet vor Somalia und vor allem den Golf von Aden führt außerdem die wichtigste Handelsroute zwischen Europa, der arabischen Halbinsel und Asien. Deutschland hat als Exportnation an sicheren Handelswegen ein besonders großes Interesse, zumal es gleichzeitig auf den Import von Rohstoffen angewiesen ist, die zu einem großen Teil auf dem Seeweg ins Land gelangen. Darüber hinaus haben zahlreiche Kreuzfahrtveranstalter diese Route in ihren Katalogen; mehrere Tausend deutsche Touristen fahren jährlich mit Kreuzfahrtschiffen durch den Golf von Aden.”

Bundestag, 16 May 2006). There were thus high requirements from the government and Gross states that “an overall position, also on the political value of participating in such a mission had to be developed, and the missions feasibility be established” (Gross 2009:150).

Although the Parliament was at first hesitant to send troops to Congo, it did decide to accept the military presence of Germany under the conditions of the mandate of the UN Security Council (German Bundestag, 16 May 2006, German Bundestag, 30 May 2006).

In light of requirement of the UN mandate, but also as Germany was critical to the launching of the operation because it was regarded as an incentive of France rather than of the UN, the conditionality of Germany for the use of force can be regarded as in the defensive category.

Operation *Atalanta*

The German Foreign Committee viewed it as an international obligation to act against the piracy in the Gulf of Aden and outside the coast of Somalia. They declared that “The international community has been asked to take defensive measures against the piracy in the territorial waters outside the coast of Somalia”¹⁷ (Deutscher Bundestag, 17 of December 2008). In the German government decision regarding the conditions for the use of force the mandate of the UN was firstly stressed following the approval of the EU Security Council for the use of force and also referring to German national law (Deutscher Bundestag, 10th of December). The conditionality for the use of force will thus be regarded under the defensive category.

5.4.4 Summary of Germany

The use of force in the analysed EU military operations, can according to the provided findings, shortly be summarized as Germany having humanitarian motivations, which are spurred by national interest. The analysis positioned above suggests that there was the goal of the Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany to play a stronger role in matters of European security by launching the first EU military operation *Concordia*. However, this was mainly framed as a sense of urgency to act to the situation rather than it being important to participate in the first EU military operation, thus, there was no clear evidence of adoption to the EU-level. On the other hand, the reluctance of Germany to launch the operation *EUFOR DR Congo*, which was to support the democratization process in Congo, represents a case where Germany was complying with another EU-member state's pressure into participating in the military operation. This indicates a growing adoptional pressure in the case of EU military operations, as well as an opportunity for Germany to project policy to the ESDP. The goal for the use of force was thus changing from mainly being a humanitarian operation to include other motivations such as the cultural one by stressing the importance of democracy.

This change of regulative norms, as they refer to how states should act in order to achieve certain goals, can perhaps be seen as a pre conditionality of the member state to take part of the navel military operation *Atalanta*. The humanitarian and protection of international law was one of the goals in this operation, but there was also the national interest i.e. the economical importance of having safe trade routes in the Gulf of Aden. The security identity of Germany can thus be viewed as changing towards a more self confident

¹⁷ Translation of: “Die internationale Gemeinschaft wurde darin aufgefordert und ermächtigt, Maßnahmen zur Piraterieabwehr auch in den Hoheitsgewässern Somalias zu ergreifen”

Germany which is more reluctant to take part in EU military operations in order to safeguard other goals than merely the humanitarian one. Following this, the norms guiding the decision to engage in the operations are of a 'regulative' nature. However, when analyzing the conditionality for the use of force, a different picture of the motivation for the use of force seems to be evident. The first operation illustrates that the cooperation with NATO was a precondition as the operation was not considered as being safe enough. There was thus defensiveness for launching the operation, because there was a notion that the EU lacked the necessary military capabilities. The operation did not reflect Europeanization of national foreign policy at the expense of the transatlantic alliance and domestic preferences. A similar conditionality can be viewed in the operation *EUFOR DR Congo* where Germany was hesitant to send troops to Congo and viewed it as a French incentive. In the end, Germany was persuaded and conditioned the launching of the operation mostly by stressing the mandate of the UN. A change of regulative norms can however be viewed as Germany had previously engaged in an operation where there were other motivations than the humanitarian one. However, this change of regulative norms still conditioned a strong UN mandate before there was considered as an need to act against the piracy in the Gulf of Aden by launching operation *Atalanta*.

6 Conclusion

Conducting an analysis of the selected member states, the thesis has been able to provide an indication of how the member states have motivated the launching of the studied military operations. The findings of the case studies will be concluded in this chapter by answering the research questions and thereafter reflecting over possible future research.

6.1.1 Member States Motivations for the Use of Force

The first research question is more empirical in nature by asking, *how are the selected member states motivating the use of force in the EU military operations Concordia, EUFOR DR Congo and Atalanta?*

Sweden's motivation for the use of force can shortly be described as humanitarian actions that are in need of a high level of international legitimacy. The member state stressed the humanitarian aspects in its motivations in all three analysed operations. Moreover, Sweden highlighted the necessity of a UN mandate when launching an EU military operation. The country's motivations for the use of force in the EU military operations were also governed by the interest of being an active participant in the EU military operations. Furthermore, in the most recent EU military operation, *Atalanta*, Sweden motivated the use of force with national interests by stating the need of protecting its nationals in the Gulf of Aden.

France's motivation for the use of force can also be described as humanitarian actions, but in contrast to the Swedish motivations, the French have to a greater extent been guided by national interests. The motivations that were given highlighted the need of a UN mandate, but the main drive of France was to make sure that the other member states also would take part in the operations as there was a motivation to develop the ESDP. This was noticeable in the way France took the initiatives of which operations the EU should launch and by the country's more active role in the UN platform where it lobbied for a mandate to the EU. As the security identity of France has shown, the country has always been the leading actor in the ESDP.

The motivation for the use of force by the UK matches France's and Sweden's humanitarian motivations. However, the motivations of the UK are mainly based on the presence of NATO and the possibility of cooperation between EU and NATO. The UK did not, to the same extent as France and Sweden, base its decision to participate in the ESDP operations in *Concordia* and *EUFOR DR Congo* on a motivation to 'develop' the ESDP. Although, this motivation was noticed in operation *Atalanta*, it was stated in combination with the necessity of cooperation with NATO.

Germany's motivation for the use of force is in line with the other member states and here the humanitarian motivation has also played a major role in influencing the decision of intervention. It should also be stressed that the member state did have motivations in terms of the need to develop the ESDP as this was highlighted in all three operations. Moreover, the motivations of Germany did in the latter operations also include cultural motivations, protection of international law and in the latest operation it also included national economical

interests. However, the first operation can be viewed as defensive, since it was considered unsafe and a similar hesitation to launch troops could also be seen in operation *EUFOR DR Congo*, which was considered to be the incentive of France rather than the UN. In the most recent operation the hesitations of Germany was reduced as the member states was the leading nation of operation *Atalanta*. Moreover, Germany also adopted the motivation of protecting its economical interests. Finally, it should be highlighted that the member state motivated all the operations with the need of a UN mandate.

6.1.2 Patterns of Convergence and Divergence

The second question has a more comparative and theoretical guidance by asking, *which signs of convergence and divergence of motivations for the use of force in EU military operations can be observed by the member states?*

Firstly, it should be stated that there are both signs of convergence and divergence of the motivations for the use of force. There is an overall indication that France, Sweden and Germany are taking a more active part in the military operations by motivating their participation with the need to develop the ESDP. France and Sweden stressed this motivation already in the first operation, but in time this view has increasingly been shared between the actors. Germany was sceptical to launch the first EU military operation, but has throughout the operations, and by persuasion of France come to take a more active part in military operations. As a response to the increased adoption to the EU-level, Germany also launched operation *EUFOR DR Congo* and stated the need to develop the ESDP, a motivation that has been coordinated with France as well as Sweden. Moreover, in time this line of argument was also embraced by the UK in its motivation for launching operation *Atalanta*. Thus, these motivations illustrate that the member states are converging to a more common European strategic culture on the use of force as they are sharing the same set of regulative norms and ideas regarding the use of force. The regulative norms are being shaped as a result of the Europeanization process where the member states are both injecting how to motivate the operations at the EU- level and are also adopting to the motivations at a national level.

Secondly, as a result of the Europeanization process the member states also show signs of convergence towards a more common strategic culture of the use of force by taking on more common norms. An example of this can be viewed in operation *Atalanta* where all four actors stressed the need of protecting own nationals. The outcome of a more aligned set of thoughts by positioning this similar motivation, which was not evident in the previous motivations of the analysed operations, thus illustrates a convergence towards a more common strategic culture.

Additionally, another interesting finding is that while the member states are converging to a more common European strategic culture, what guides this development actually derives from the member states themselves and particularly under the lead of France. Germany, Sweden and France have frequently referred to the aim of ‘developing’ the ESDP as a motivation for engaging in the selected operations. Hence, this supports Rieker’s definition of Europeanization, as outlined in the theoretical chapter, where it was stated that the member states themselves are involved in creating new structures and norms. The member states can be considered as ‘engines’ which spur the process of Europeanization. The findings of this research show that the motivations behind the use of force have been harmonized between the member states: in the four cases, humanitarian reasons have been held as the main motivation for intervention. Moreover, the member states contribute to the establishment of new structures and norms by further developing the ESDP.

While assessing the convergence of the member states it is also interesting to note that the less-active defence culture of Sweden and Germany have probably converged the most in regards to the goals for the use of force. However, in terms of conditionality for the use of force, both Sweden and Germany have mainly been constant during the analysed time span, while the UK has to a certain extent converged to increased cooperation with Europe, however, with the coordination of NATO. Therefore, convergence seems to be affecting all the member states but in different ways, due to the different set of national security identity. This is why, as emphasised throughout this research, the common European strategic culture is to be viewed in relation to the member states' national security identity.

On the other hand, the analysis has also shown signs of a divergence by the member states when it comes to the authorisation of and cooperation with other actors. This is specifically evident in the case of the UK, where it has been clearly noticeable that the country is divided between on the one hand supporting the European forces (ESDP) and on the other hand, the Atlantic forces (NATO). This division of authorisation and whether to include the NATO and the US or not, seems to continuously be the main 'stumbling block' in the development of a common strategic culture within the EU. Here are also other divergences in terms of the democratic institutions and the role of the national parliaments, where Sweden and Germany demand a higher level of parliamentary approval before launching a military operation than the UK and France. This is often a neglected part when assessing the European strategic culture. Other than the work of Bono, there are few that have touched upon the debate of the different roles of the democratic institutions when it comes to the decision making of when to launch a military operation of the EU.

This thesis is thus in line with the previous research of Gross where she states that despite the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP there is some degree of Europeanization even in the field of security and defence. Additionally, as the paper builds on the previous work of Meyer it has also come to adapt a similar view of a convergence of the common strategic culture, even after adding the most recent military operation *Atalanta*. However, as discussed previously in the paper, the conceptual framework of Meyer is not regarded as flawless, as there is an issue of generalization where the framework solely focuses on the launched operations. Thus this is the weak side of the conceptual framework, since it should also consider applying operations where the EU chose not to intervene, considering that it might give a different set of results.

Furthermore, the constructivist approach has improved our understanding of the ESDP by showing how ideational processes, notably the evolution of national strategic cultures, simultaneously enable and constrain the emergence of a common security and defence policy. In addition to this the Europeanization theory which is embraced by the constructivist has been able to explain how the member states are, as a result of the process of interaction at the EU-level, projecting as well as adopting the norms. This process is thus able to give an account of how the norms are becoming more aligned as a result of the interaction in the EU. On the other hand, as the selection of theories is also guiding the results of the analysis it should be acknowledged that if other theories such as for instance realism would have been applied, the research results would have taken another form; mainly as the realist approach stresses the capability of the EU as a military actor and this view has not been incorporated in the constructivist approach.

Finally, in order for the ESDP to be (come) a truly successful policy, a more forceful commitment on the part of its member-states, where the political will is concerned, will be required. However, the future evolution of the common European strategic culture remains to be seen.

6.1.3 Future Research

While Studying the member states of the EU and their motivations for the use of force there was a constant reminder of the different democratic institutional set up. Even if the research did not focus on the democratic decision making process when trying to answer if the member states are converging or diverging towards a more common strategic culture. Therefore, this question could not in the author's point of view be disregarded. As mentioned in the paper, Sweden and Germany have a higher level of parliamentary involvement when decisions regarding the use of force are taken, while the UK and France belong to the lower level of parliamentary inclusion. This institutional set up therefore mirrors how, and for what reasons, decisions are taken and are therefore important aspects when studying the common European strategic culture of the use of force in military operations. As a response to this, the recommendation for future research would be to put more emphasis on the differences between the member states level of parliamentary inclusion in the decision making of the use of force in EU military operations.

A research more in line with the paper would be to instead of Sweden select another member state such as Poland, Italy or Spain as they are large contributors in form of military supply to EU military operations. Moreover, as highlighted in the introduction of the paper, the war in Libya is the most recent conflict where there was an expectation for EU to act as an external actor and it would thus be of relevance and interesting to include this operation (or lack of operation) in a future study.

A last suggestion would be to conduct a quantitative research. This can be conducted by selecting the member states that need a higher level of parliamentary inclusion when decision to launch a military operation in the name of EU are being taken and see over time if and how the voting in the parliament has changed. This could give certain indicators of whether the member states are becoming more willing to launch the EU military operations and include a more democratic approach.

7 Executive Summary

The thesis has analysed the member states Germany, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom and their motivations for the use of force in the EU military operations. The aim of the thesis has been to contribute to the debate by studying the motivations of member states for the use of force as expressed in official documents accessible online. This is conducted to be able to distinguish a possible pattern of convergence and divergence in regards to the use of force among the member states in both time and space. The purpose of this has been to be able to contribute to the current academic debate on the evolution of the CSDP, because the will of the member states is regarded to be the most crucial aspect when decisions of whether to launch a military operation are being reached. This is because matters of the CSDP are of intergovernmental concern and thus subject to the member states' own deliberation and will of whether the EU should launch a military operation and under which conditions. However, this research has been guided by the overall research aim, which is to gain a deeper understanding of the common European strategic culture. In view of the fact that there is a heated debate on the common European strategic culture among academics since it is thought to be able to give a deeper understanding of where the CSDP is heading in terms of military cooperation. The research has thus focused on three of the seven EU launched military operations, namely: operation *Concordia*, *EUFOR DR Congo* and *Atalanta*, as the operations are spread in time. The first operation *Concordia* was launched in 2003 and the progressing operation *Atalanta* was launched in the end of 2008. Operation *EUFOR DR Congo* was chosen to gain a shorter time-span between the launched operations. The research questions that are answered in this thesis are; *How are the selected member states motivating the use of force in the EU military operations Concordia, EUFOR DR Congo and Atalanta? Which signs of convergence and divergence of motivations for the use of force in EU military operations can be observed by the member states?* The research is framed by a constructivist approach where the theory of Europeanization has been added, since the nature of the research question could not solely be answered from a constructivist point of view as it does not acknowledge the broader picture and the changing of the norms. However, as the theories were not on their own enough to guide the analysis, a more applicable analytical tool was needed to be able to measure and interpret the research question.

Therefore, the paper has drawn on the work of Christoph O. Meyer who has put forward a conceptual framework of how we can understand the common European strategic culture by studying the use of force. Meyer's framework consists of four strategic norms: goals for the use of force, the way in which force is used, preferred mode of cooperation and international/domestic authorization. To these norms Meyer has provided four possible categorisations. However, as Meyer's framework is not explicit enough on how we should apply the norms to a large set of material a more tailored tool for the analysis was applied. Firstly, Meyer's four norms were redesigned to two sets of norms: goals for the use of force and conditionality for the use of force. These two norms were thereafter applied to the text material of the member states official documents regarding the decision to participate in the EU led military operations. To this, the analysis was complemented with an overview of the selected member states' security identity from the Cold War and onwards. This was conducted to be able to better grasp the common European strategic culture.

The answer to the first research question was thereafter presented by stating each

member states overall motivation for participating in the three military operations. To start with, all the member states stressed the humanitarian aspects in their motivations and also highlighted the importance of having a UN mandate when launching an EU military operation. Sweden's motivations for the use of force in the EU military operations were in light of the need of being an active participant in the EU military operations. Additionally, in the most recent EU military operation *Atalanta*, Sweden motivated the use of force with national interests by stating the need of protecting its nationals in the Gulf of Aden. In contrast to the Swedish motivations France was to a large degree guided by national interests. The motivations that were given highlighted the need of a UN mandate but mostly to be able to make sure that the other member states also take part in the operations. The motivations of the UK were grounded in there being cooperation with NATO. Moreover, in contrast to both France's and Sweden's motivations of taking an active part in the EU military operations, this motivation was largely absent by the United Kingdom in the operations *Concordia* and *EUFOR DR Congo*. However, in operation *Atalanta* the UK motivated its decision with the need of developing the ESDP, but this was once again stated in addition to a coordinated view with NATO. Finally, the German motivations were of a wide range and moved from solely being of a humanitarian characteristic to also include cultural motivations, protection of international law and in the latest operation it also included national interests.

The answer of the second question shows both signs of convergence and divergence of the member states motivation for the use of force. Firstly, it was stated that France, Sweden and Germany are motivating their participation with the need to develop the ESDP and have thus taken a more active role in the military operations. In time this line of argument was also embraced by the UK as viewed in the country's motivation for launching operation *Atalanta*. This can thus be seen as an indication that the member states are converging to a more common European strategic culture on the use of force as they are declaring the importance to the development of the ESDP. Secondly, the member states also show signs of convergence towards a more common strategic culture of the use of force by throughout time taking on common norms as a result of the Europeanization. An example of this can be viewed in operation *Atalanta* where all four actors stressed the need of protecting own nationals. Thirdly, the findings show that France has had a vast impact on which operations should be launched and thus the motivations of the member states have been in line with the French ones. Fourthly, while assessing the convergence of the member states it is also interesting to note that the less-active defence culture of Sweden and Germany have probably converged the most in regards to the goals for the use of force. However, the analysis has also shown signs of a divergence by the member states when it comes to the authorisation of and cooperation with other actors. This can be viewed in the case of the UK as the member states is on the one hand promoting the cooperation with the NATO and on the other stressing the need of contributing to the CSDP.

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