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# The harmonious idea of the political

A critical analysis on the political theory of cosmopolitanism

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# Abstract

Cosmopolitanism is a widely acknowledged theory in the academic debate of global political theory and what this thesis aims to do is, is conducting an idea critique on this political theory of cosmopolitanism. The analysis is divided into two main parts where one is a reconstruction and one is a critical discussion. The reconstruction is based on four analytical dimensions: the temporal dimension, the spatial dimension, the dimension of values, and the practical dimension of decision-making. After capturing the most central political claims of cosmopolitanism, they will be derived to larger traditions of ideas. The conclusion is that cosmopolitanism tends towards having a harmonious idea of *the political*. The critical discussion subjects the most problematic issues of cosmopolitanism to critical positions from both rationalist and post-structuralist perspectives. Within the critical discussion, the critique of cosmopolitanism will also be exposed to critique. The critical discussion will thus be threefold. Together these two parts will enable a discussion on the strength and consistency of cosmopolitanism.

*Key words:* Cosmopolitanism, the political, harmony, idea critique, conflict  
*Words:*19519

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# 1 Introduction

During past decades, there have been significant changes in the world. Due to the expansion of the economic market, technical advances and supra-national political initiatives, most dimensions of life and society has undergone a shift in character and become more interconnected and interdependent with other parts of the world. The political and academic establishment has for some time now, been occupied with understanding this globalization and its implications (see Jansson, 2004; Beck, 1998; Held & McGrew, 2003).

In the field of global political theory, social scientists have been, and are still, busy finding ways of understanding the changes that are taking place in society. One of the most politically successful and influential theoretical streams in this regard is the fashionable theory of cosmopolitanism (see Held & McGrew, 2003).

Cosmopolitanism was as its beginning, a philosophical understanding of humankind. The late stoics called themselves cosmopolites, and referred to a cosmopolitan loyalty and a borderless value of human and nature (see Gueye, 2006). Later in history, Immanuel Kant became a famous advocate of a cosmopolitan moral understanding concerning the value of humanity (see Kant, 1974). Today, the cosmopolitan vision has once more made an entrance in the intellectual debate of global political theory. However, contemporary cosmopolitanism differs from the former definitions. It is not a radical philosophical perspective, but actually a part of the zeitgeist. Even though the philosophical roots are still vital, the current followers of cosmopolitanism are more practical as they believe the globalization makes implementation of cosmopolitanism realistic, possible and in some cases even inevitable. At some points the theory of cosmopolitanism could be perceived as tending towards becoming transcendental. For example there are now liberal cosmopolitans and critical cosmopolitans.

The changes that cosmopolitanism propose concern how politics should be organized, how the world should be structured and divided, how the morals function and the historical timing of globalization. The cosmopolitan discussions interpret what could be seen as fundamental changes in politics as we have known politics to be. They are thus political philosophical discussions that together question the old perceptions of the nature of politics and rather identifies its nature to be changing. Change in the *nature of politics* is different from change *in politics*. It is important to put light upon the fact that *politics* is different from *the political*. *Politics* is in plural and represent the more practical and bureaucratic dimension that contains the attributes of politics. *The political* is in singular and

has a global pretention of defining the core substance of politics. The political is the concept of the political theorists who from an outside perspective explores, goes to the roots and analyzes the dynamics of politics (Norris, 2006: 113). The cosmopolitan rejection of previous perceptions of politics and its promotion of a fundamentally different set of politics makes me wonder what cosmopolitanism implies for the understanding of the natural dynamics of politics. As the cosmopolitan debate, is thus per definition a change in the perception of the political, the successes of the political theory of cosmopolitanism make me wonder what the cosmopolitan claims actually are, what strength they have as a theory, and how we can understand the cosmopolitan idea of *the political*.

## 1.1 The argument in short

To make a thorough idea analysis of cosmopolitanism, there are a couple of pieces that needs to be put together. The first step is capturing and framing cosmopolitanism through reconstruction. Thus a reconstruction of the political idea will help finding the internal structure and contextualizing the theory that is object of analysis. Among the enthusiasts of cosmopolitanism, there is not only one single hegemonical interpretation of cosmopolitanism. Rather it is a multifaceted theoretical school with big internal variations. The first piece of the reconstruction is therefore not only to make a theoretical overview of the research field, but actually identifying and thematizing central ideas and discussions that are consistent and are characteristic for the cosmopolitan literature. The second challenge of the reconstruction is to analyze the idea and see if its ideas and claims are new or could be derived to some specific traditions of ideas. If it is possible to connect cosmopolitanism to some larger traditions of ideas, the question is what underlying perception of the nature of politics these ideas are rooted in. Thus I will position the identified characteristic elements of the theory of cosmopolitanism in a larger theoretical historical context and identify what tendency cosmopolitanism of idea of *the political* that lays in its foreground. This step will be complementing for the reconstruction as it will help understanding what, if any, ideological and philosophical roots it is associated with. Together, these two analytical pieces will help identifying and defining its position and what its perception of what *the political* seem to be.

The reconstruction will itself be divided in two subchapters: the structuring of the cosmopolitan literature and a contextualization of cosmopolitanism. The first subchapter is divided in my analytical thematization of the cosmopolitan literature. The thematization is in four sub sections: the temporal dimension, the spatial dimension, the dimension of values and the practical dimension of decision making. Each sub section will be carried out and analyzed with the same structural foundation. Each sub section begins with a more general discussion of the ideas, claims and arguments of cosmopolitanism in the regard of that specific

theme. Thereafter there will be a deeper and more concrete discussion based on my interpretation of quotes that picture the claims of cosmopolitanism.

The knowledge we will have achieved from the reconstruction is what cosmopolitanism claims and what understanding of *the political* that cosmopolitanism could be identified with. The next step is to conduct a *critical discussion*. To get a deeper understanding of the strength of cosmopolitan arguments and what the cosmopolitan claims implies, the cosmopolitan claims will be explored through an idea critique. The critical discussion will thoroughly examine the specific arguments and explore the most controversial and heated subjects of cosmopolitanism. By achieving a broad critical discussion and put cosmopolitanism under the loupe, this will be enabled. Criticizing cosmopolitanism in a larger contemporary political theoretical context, attention will thus be drawn to the actual meaning, consequence and implications of the cosmopolitanism.

However, to put cosmopolitanism within a political theoretical context does not mean that only the critique against the idea needs to be studied - the fact is that the critique towards cosmopolitanism is also subject of critique. The theoretical subject of the analysis will not accordingly only be put up against its critique, but the critique of cosmopolitanism and its idea of the political, will also be put up against critique. Thus the analytical discussion will be threefold.

The second part of the analysis is a critical conversation between cosmopolitanism, the critique against cosmopolitanism and the critique against the critique of cosmopolitanism. The chapter will be divided in four subchapters that will all follow the structure of the thematization in the reconstruction of cosmopolitanism. The discussions will generally be fluent and not under strict structures. However each subchapter will have some underlying structures. There will be discussions between critical positions towards cosmopolitanism and the harmonious way of understanding the political. These critical positions will as much as possible come from both rationalist and post-structuralist positioning. There will at the same time also be a third conversational part that is the critique of the critique, which will also come from both rationalist and post-structuralist tendencies. The thesis will then end with a chapter with conclusions that could be drawn from the study and make a few suggestions for further research on the subject.

## 1.2 Idea analysis - a methodological excursion

The study of ideas is different from other types of studies. It is different in the way that it is not based on any empirical material. The type of study that I intend to carry out is instead based on political theoretical reasoning. The analysis is

based on and driven forth by, the analyst's own argumentation. Conducting an idea analysis, does therefore not mean that the analysis is formed by a theoretical framework or a strictly cut structure- and rule-book. This freedom permits creativity and independence of the research as much as it puts more pressure and demands on the researcher. However small the field of political theory is, it is a well-established field with broadly accepted methods of research (see Badersten, 2006; Bergström & Borélius, 2005; Beckman, 2007; Lundborg, 1991; Tingsten, 1941; Vedung, 1977). Even though the discussions of concrete logics and toolboxes is often laid up in more general terms and without any strict points of direction, the reasoning throughout the thesis will be brought about in awareness of the methodological discussions of studies such as this (see discussions Badersten, 2006; Bergström & Borélius, 2005; Beckman, 2007; Lundborg, 1991; Tingsten, 1941; Vedung, 1977).

The *method* is the actual tools of conducting research while *methodology* is the theory of the method. The methodological approach in a political theoretical analysis can differ. Rationalism is a theoretical perspective that works on the supposition that reason is the universal measure and rationalism is the theoretical root of idea critique. It mainly focuses on examining the logics and internal rationale of ideas and advocates deduction. (see Tingsten, 1941; Vedung, 1977) Post-structuralism on the other hand, is a conflicting approach that works on the supposition that presence always is accompanied by absence which makes finding the truth impossible - everything is a product of its metaphysics. Discourse analysis comes from the Post-structuralist tradition, and most often focuses on revealing power-structures and the unsaid implications (see Winther, Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). "Our reality is [...] only accessible for us through our categorization and our world views are not mirror images of the reality 'out there' but a product of our ways to categorize the world." (Winther, Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999: 11). The methodological schools are in the strict idealistic interpretation, very different. However in reality the methodological differences are not always as distinct as they are in theory. In regard to methods associated to these two methodological perspectives, rationalism more often approach the study of ideas through *idea analysis* while post-structuralism regularly use *discourse analysis*. The concrete methodological difference between idea analysis and discourse analysis lies in what they are looking for in a text or an idea. Idea critique would rather be searching for the internal logics and rationale of ideas and texts, while discourse analysis would more likely try to unfold and reveal power-structures, what is unsaid and what is actually being said. In between these two methods that seemingly have very different purposes and aims, there is at times something of a grey zone in between the methods and purposes. For example I intend to carry out an idea analysis on cosmopolitanism, as what I am firstly interested in, is studying the internal logics and rationales of the theory. Nevertheless I do not see myself limited to this strict definition, but am also interested in the implications of its arguments and reasoning. In order to make the analytical discussion more interesting, thicker and complete, I choose to actively use the both approaches. Further, the critique against cosmopolitanism will always

be colored by the methodological foundation it stands upon. Choosing only rationalist or post-structuralist critiques in the analytical conversations, the discussion would be halting and only present cosmopolitanism from one specific perspective. The position of the critique would also be more difficult to identify depending on what methodological school its' critique comes from. I therefore choose to strive for using both rationalist and post-structuralistly colored critique and also use both rationalist and post-structuralistly colored critique of the critique. To consciously work with critiques such as these, with methodological assumptions and intentions already attached to them, the analysis will gain a dimension that is not only strengthening, but also analytically interesting.

When it comes to selection of material, the literature on cosmopolitanism is quite broad and quantitatively large in relation to the extent of this thesis, thus I have chosen some texts that I have focused on. The ambition of the thesis is to put focus on the ideas and not on the authors. However in reality it is difficult not to put too much focus on the authors, thus a short introduction of the main authors used in the thesis would be in order. The distinguished cosmopolitan authors that the discussion mainly will be based upon are Daniele Archibugi, Ulrich Beck, David Held and Seyla Benhabib. Archibugi is chosen because of his enthusiasm for a cosmopolitan democracy. Beck is chosen because of his detailed proposals for decision-making. David Held is chosen because of his ambitious propositions for cosmopolitan morals and Seyla Benhabib is chosen because of her ambition for cosmopolitan values but not for cosmopolitan democracy. In the critical discussion many authors will be presented. One of the authors that will be used frequently is Chantal Mouffe. She is chosen because she is one of few middle-way advocates that directly confronts the theory of cosmopolitanism.

## 2 The cosmopolitan project - a reconstruction

The cosmopolitan vision keeps many scholars occupied at the time. The possibility of a united, cosmopolitan world is very much explored and desired these days. This however, does not imply that there is unity and homogeneity in the way the cosmopolitan vision is interpreted or carried out. In contrast, as all other fields of research there is a vivid debate and a broad spectrum of different perspectives on the matter. Nonetheless, I will try to capture some of the consistent elements of the cosmopolitan research field that could be identified as essential pieces of the idea. To complete a reconstruction of cosmopolitanism, I will in the second subchapter, conduct a genealogy of harmony in order to position it in a historical context.

### 2.1 Four pillars of cosmopolitanism

I will in this subchapter dive into the discussions within the literature on cosmopolitanism. The discussion that follows will be categorized in four subchapters where each will focus on one of the continuous central themes within the literature of cosmopolitanism. Core elements in cosmopolitanism that I find specifically thoroughgoing in the literature and which I believe is where the most interesting and contested arguments and the assumptions where the most heated debates are on. The four themes that will be brought up are: the temporal dimension, the spatial dimension, the dimension of values and the practical dimension of decision making. Within each dimension, I will first begin with a more general discussion of what is said in the literature within the specific dimension. Thereafter I will describe and interpret some quotes from the literature of cosmopolitanism. The quotes will both fill the function of concrete examples from the literature and as a more in-depth discussion to complement the more general discussion.

#### 2.1.1 The temporal dimension

There is an aspect of the cosmopolitan project that is quite subtle. It concerns the perception of time, which is the temporal understanding within the cosmopolitan literature. The cosmopolitan idea is often described as our future and as if it is

happening to us without us having any choice (see Archibugi et.al, 1998; archibugi, 2008; Brock & Brighthouse, 2007). Beck however, opens up and admits that history is made of political decisions and promotes acknowledging the otherness of the future (Beck, 2005b: 285). However, the literature in general still has a *linear* understanding of history and development.

The cosmopolitan enthusiasts make it seem as if we have evolved and grown out of previous, very conflicting relations historically, and are all now moving into a more perfected way of living together (see Archibugi, 2008: 277; Held & McGrew, 2003). I will later on in this chapter show that the cosmopolitan understanding of *the political* is a part of a certain tradition of ideas that can be derived in western thinking. Not only would that disrupt the illusion of the *end of history* image and the discourse of a cosmopolitan world as the only legitimate alternative, but also it will be a critique against the temporal understanding of cosmopolitanism.

*Cosmopolitan democracy is indeed one of the many offspring generated by the great expectations that blossomed after the fall of the Berlin wall. After the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the decisive affirmation of the western democracies, it was hoped that there would be some positive repercussions on the global system. It was thus deemed possible to reform the international organizations, to plan the geographic expansion of democracy, and finally to make human rights more certain and to allow world citizens to express themselves through ad hoc institutions. One goal has been achieved: it is no longer sacrilegious to consider that democracy can be even applied outside the state. However, many, too many, of these hopes have so far been dashed. Why? And above all, what hopes remain today that democracy can make its appearance also in world politics?(Archibugi, 2008: 3)*

What Archibugi expresses through this quote, is that there is a historical context and that the course of history changed after the fall of the Berlin wall. The liberal democracy won the final historical battle and what remains now is globalizing it and perfecting its structures. In the end of the quote, he turns outwardly and asks for a mobilization of hoping and believing in this direction of development.

*A cosmopolitan democracy will certainly not result from a preconceived plan but will perhaps be the outcome of contradictory actions that take place on the stage of history. Above all, it will not be necessary to employ evil means even to achieve desirable ends: each step towards a cosmopolitan democracy is, at the same time, a means and an end. (Archibugi, 2008: 287)*

In the quote above, Archibugi continues and confirms that cosmopolitanism is not a part of a deterministic historical understanding. Rather he explicate that human history is a history of conflict. The cosmopolitan democratic society is underlying in the quote, something that will be generated out of societal conflicts. It is thus the natural result of historical conflicts. History will at some point end its

conflicts and end up in a cosmopolitan democracy that then, according to the quote, can only be interpreted as a post-conflict state of harmony.

Later in the quote, Archibugi, consolidates this interpretation when implying that the liberal democrats do not even need to use war or forcefulness in order for this historical development to take place. It will do so anyway, as all practices and discourses of cosmopolitan democracy is both means of getting there, but also at the same time constitutive of a cosmopolitan democracy. To express that a step towards a cosmopolitan democracy is an end point, implies a perception of cosmopolitanism as *being* the end point. When reaching a cosmopolitan state in a practice or a discourse, there will be no more changes - it is the final stage.

*The relative ease and cheapness of transportation across long distances, mass tourism, large-scale migration, visible multiculturalism in “world-cities”, the flow of commodities to and from all points of the compass and the rapid development of telecommunications [...] have all wrought a socially and culturally interpenetrated planet, on a scale and intensity hitherto unseen. This is the sense of a mounting contemporary “cosmopolitanism” described by a number of commentators. (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002: 9)*

Through the quote above, Vertovec and Cohen express their image of cosmopolitanism in a temporal context. Globalization and the intense integration of world societies, together escalates what is called cosmopolitanism. By their descriptions of the contemporary developments, it is possible to read that the many fragmented developments that much come out of the expansion of the liberal market and technical advancements, without any forceful political directions has created a more and more cosmopolitan world. Thereafter they strengthen their statement by indicating an agreement among scholars of this interpretation.

*Cosmopolitanism has left its philosophical air castles and, however misrepresented it has become, made its way to reality. But this is not all. Cosmopolitanism has become the byline/signature of a new era; the reflexive modernity. The territorial nation-state will be disbanded in this era. The discussions are renewed, now in the sense of “the politics of politics”. (Beck, 2004: 15. Own translation)*

Before interpreting the quote above, the theoretical positioning and terminology of Beck needs some short introduction and explaining. Beck has formulated a theory of *banal cosmopolitanism*. He claims that the process of globalization has occurred and developed latently, under the surface. The *cosmopolitization* of the world, he further explains, has arisen and been strengthened by the *dialectic* processes of the cosmopolites and the anti-cosmopolitans. Thus the opponents of cosmopolitanism, through their global and cosmopolitan ways of organizing, have unconsciously contributed in making the world more cosmopolitan (Beck, 2005a: 39, 119). With this theoretical context,

the quote of Beck can be seen as in line with the earlier quote by Vertovec and Cohen.

Beck pictures the developments of cosmopolitanism, by putting it in the historical context and expressing how it has finally moved into a new historical era of reflexive modernity where the philosophical idea of cosmopolitanism has finally achieved the circumstances which have taken it from theory into realization. In the last part of the quote he claims the national territorial borders to be dissolving as a sign that cosmopolitanism is finally here to bless us with the “politics of the politics” - the self-creational stage of politics that is the more true politics in relation to all other politics.

In summary, what can be concluded is that cosmopolitanism has a very specific temporal understanding where time is a linear progress and history has lead us to this point, the final stage, where cosmopolitanism will be finalized not only in theory but also in reality.

### 2.1.2 The spatial dimension

One of the most prominent characteristic features of cosmopolitanism is, not surprisingly, the ambition of evolving into a borderless world where the barriers of the nation-state will be exchanged for a common worldly belonging. Some scholars anticipate an extinction of the nation-state, while most enthusiasts promote some sort of re-territorialization.

Some scholars do not see the need of breaking down state boundaries per se. Archibugi for example, suggests keeping old institutional levels such as local, national, regional and international alive, and instead simply add an overlapping cosmopolitan level of decision making in the world system (see Archibugi, 2008: Beck, 2005a; Benhabib, 2006). Archibugi argues that the best possible structure of a future cosmopolitan level of decision making would be by the means of political and economic institutions (Archibugi, 2008). One possible option is according to Archibugi, reforming and developing existing institutions, for example the United Nations, into becoming more cosmopolitan. There is however additional proposals of creating new institutions, e.g., a world parliament (Archibugi, 2008: 155, Held, 2005). Ulrich Beck has a slightly different approach to the matter. He acknowledges the state as one of the three actors in the *3-party meta-game* - state, market and civil society - in the contemporary decision making process. He neither defends nor dismisses the state, and rather claims that the future role of the state is not given. In other words the future depends on the state's ability to transform and *transnationalize* itself (Beck, 2005b: 9, 15).

In the existing literature, it seems that scholars identify and observe a conflict dimension when discussing territoriality. The conflict they all refer to is the conflict of culture, ethnicity and nationalism (see Tan, 2006; Archibugi, 2008). Beck differentiates between *globalists* and *cosmopolitans*. He claims that globalists deal with this conflict as if cultural fault lines were given and that there is an innate tension or conflict in the cultural and cross border meeting. The cosmopolitans on the other hand are, according to Beck, individualists who believe in many overlapping forms of belonging and that collectivity does not exist in the traditional sense anymore (Beck, 2005a: 285). Archibugi is also eager to differentiate himself from the type of scholars which he names *multiculturalists* (Archibugi, 2008: 263).

*Nationalism does not include cosmopolitanism, but cosmopolitanism includes nationalism. (Beck, 2005a: 97. Own translation)*

The quote above represents the general spatial understanding of cosmopolitans. The state-centered territorial borders, that at these times lose their authority, do not allow for other forms of territorial perceptions. The new cosmopolitan era is, according to Beck, not as rigid in its perception of legitimate border lines. Cosmopolitanism is by this quote interpreted as accepting and humble before already existing forms of territoriality. In that sense, the quote could be interpreted as if cosmopolitanism is not an absolutist or revolutionary conflict searching approach. Cosmopolitanism is, by the quote above, rather presented as if nobody is going to get hurt or be disadvantaged in the very *smooth* historical transition. Cosmopolitanism is here presented as an including overlapping spatial approach to territoriality, which will not conflict too much with the already existing spatial perceptions.

*Even if cosmopolitan norms arise through treatylike obligations, such as the UN Charter [...] their peculiarity is that they endow individuals rather than states and their agents with certain rights and claims. This is the uniqueness of the many human rights agreements signed since World War II. They signal an eventual transition from a model of international law based on treaties among states to cosmopolitan law understood as international public law that binds and bends the will of sovereign nations. (Benhabib, 2006: 16)*

The quote above seems less defensive than the earlier one. Benhabib illustrates the difference of authority that is left in the state through the legal differences that cosmopolitanism entails. The historical contextualization signals that the change is of historical significance and in a societal context. The focus of international law is disowned from first being in the service of the states and their interests, into mainly being protective and focusing on the individual. The last part of the quote is describing the way the protection of the individual gives consequences to the state's positions in the world. In the previous quote, Beck could be interpreted as assuring the states that the changes will not affect them negative, while this quote could be interpreted as sending contrasting signals.

According to Benhabib, the will of sovereign nations will be bound and bent, which indicates the way cosmopolitan individualistic international law generates a situation where the acting space and power position is significantly compromised. The individual's position against the state is thus strengthened.

*The aims of cosmopolitan democracy thus take the form of the pursuit of democracy at different levels of governance that are mutually autonomous but complementary (Archibugi, 2008: 97)*

Archibugi images an understanding of how to reach cosmopolitanism in the quote above. What could be interpreted from the quote is that the cosmopolitan visions are equal with the overlapping territorial authorities. Thus cosmopolitanism should according to Archibugi not be considered as a fundamentally different society from the existing one. The overlapping territorial structure should not only be viewed as the transitional solution but rather that the overlapping structure *is* cosmopolitanism.

The conclusion that could be drawn from the previous discussion is that cosmopolitanism has an effect on the territorial authorities. Some scholars try to show the state's decreasing authority in relation to the individual and other cosmopolitan levels of authority. Other scholars emphasize the overlapping structures of cosmopolitanism to ensure states that their authority will not be extinguished and the current spatial understanding will not be overthrown. Instead, only one more level of authority will be added.

### 2.1.3 The dimension of values

One of the consistent themes that could be found in the cosmopolitan literature is the ongoing discussion of the possibility to find - and the ambition of finding - a set of moral principles that is or could be shared by all people on the globe (see Archibugi et.al, 1998). David Held is one of the scholars that has taken this challenge by the horn and developed his famous 8 cosmopolitan moral principles: 1) Equal worth and dignity, 2) active agency, 3) personal responsibility and accountability, 4) consent, 5) collective decision making about public matters through voting procedures, 6) inclusiveness and subsidiarity, 7) avoidance of serious harm, 8) sustainability (Held, 2005: 12). In similar forms, propositions of comparable existing or possible cosmopolitan norms can be found in much of the cosmopolitan debate. Archibugi's ambition of building a cosmopolitan *democracy*, is in itself taking a strong normative stand and indirectly assuming that democratic values are universal enough to work on a cosmopolitan level (see Archibugi, 2008). Ulrich Beck has a similar, but a yet more vague approach. He argues that there is something called *global risks*. Global risks are, according to Beck, challenges such as climate change, which affect all, and where all people have common interests. The appearance of global risks brings about a power vacuum that needs to be balanced out with the help of *shared power* between the

state, the market and the civil society (see Beck, 2005b). I will discuss this theory further in chapter 2.1.4, but for now what is interesting in this context, is the underlying moral assumptions of this theory. It is possible to identify the moral assumption that there is one homogenous cosmopolitan understanding of the current problems and challenges we face, and also that there is consensus on the solutions regarding how to face the problems.

What can be interpreted by the previous discussion is that there is a moral dimension in cosmopolitanism that needs to be acknowledged. The conclusion could be drawn that there are common uncontroversial values to be found that are or could be shared globally. There is however a pluralist critique towards these types of statements, which accuses them of being *universalist* - That they are values of democracy and human rights on export from the West.

*The principles of political organizations that prevail today were also produced by the West: the western visions of freedom and democracy have become increasingly universal values, and there is no reason to regret this. The west has no cause to be ashamed of having proposed and developed forms of government that have gradually also spread to other parts of the world. The peoples of the five continents have taken to the streets to demand them, often against their own rulers, because they have fully understood that freedom and democracy not only guarantee greater personal dignity but also allow more material benefits to be distributed (Archibugi, 2008: 3-4)*

Here is a quote that is interesting and significant from the perspective of both temporal perception and of the value dimension. The two dimensions somehow fuse together in the interpretation of it. Reading the quote from a temporal point of view, the previous interpretation of cosmopolitanism is further strengthened as the western model is presented as the winner of all systems. Further the quote is not very subtle in its claim that the western values of democracy and freedom are, by the own brilliance of the values, spreading without any political meddling by the west, and becoming more and more universal. Archibugi makes reality claims when using empirical arguments. When claiming that all continents have found salvation, there is also a claim that democracy and freedom actually is universal. The quote feels as an obvious victim of its critics. The five continents have now been enlightened and fully understood the benefits of western values, and the west should be proud of being the *avante garde* of the world. This could easily be interpreted as a Eurocentric self-righteousness which could be perceived as quite demeaning.

Moreover, the quote also gives the reader a sense of what Archibugi defines as moral commons. It is the democratic value system in combination with what, by the diffuse word *freedom* used in this context, can only be interpreted as liberalism. A liberal democratic value system could be understood as what Archibugi claims to be the moral commons of the world.

*The Eichmann trial, much like the Nuremberg trials before it, captured some of the perplexities of the emerging norms of cosmopolitan justice. It will be my thesis that since the UN declaration of human rights in 1948, we have entered a phase in the evolution of global civil society, which is characterized by transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice. (Benhabib, 2006: 15)*

The quote of Benhabib expresses a progress and change from a particularistic world without common values into a more universal, commonly acknowledged value system which is founded on the sets of values that is presented in the human rights declaration of 1948. Thus the declaration of human rights is here the moral commons that are shared globally.

The conclusions that can be made from the discussion above are that universal moral claims are central in cosmopolitanism. The proposition of Held is different from the other two suggestions. It is more normative as Held proposes what *could* be universal values. It is also a set of values that he has developed himself. They could therefore be seen as strictly as value dictums as Held does not make any reality claims. The other two suggestions, made by Archibugi and Benhabib, differ. Archibugi expresses that a liberal democratic value system is on its way to become a consolidated universal moral. Benhabib expresses that the UN Human rights declaration has since its birth in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, continuously transformed international law into universal cosmopolitan law. Both suggestions make empirical claims of what *actually* are universal values. Therefore they could both be seen as reality dictums rather than value dictums.

#### 2.1.4 The practical dimension of decision making

One of the most central elements in the literature of cosmopolitanism, is the perception of the decision making process being a friendly process. The cosmopolitans are in conformance with our zeitgeist, demanding a world where decision making is made consistently and in consensus between all parts of society (see Held, 2005, Beck, 2005b, Archibugi, 2008). Ulrich Beck, as mentioned above, has developed a theory of the *global risk society*, where the common global risks replace the need for democracy (Beck, 2005b: 52). According to this theory, we are at this point stuck in a so called *meta-power game* that includes the political power, the economic market and the global civil society. His message is that we have new challenges that include us all. The old conflicting interests have been eliminated by the external global risks that we are held challenged against. Therefore we need, according to Beck, to understand that in order to make the best decisions possible and overcoming the global challenges, we need to include all *legitimate* actors of society, in what Mouffe (2008) calls *the consensus model* (Beck, 2005b: 53). Archibugi also brings up the subject but in a more elusive way. He mainly focuses on the inclusion of the civil

society in the political process, which is less controversial than giving the financial sector access to public matters (see Archibugi, 2008).

One of the critiques directed at the 3-part consensus model, is the critique of democratic legitimacy for example political influence acquired through wealth and of course also the problem of representativity in the global civil society. Another critique against the consensus model is that conflicts of interest have not yet disappeared as cosmopolitans claim.

*In order to survive, democracy must undergo a radical transformation comparable to that experienced in the transition from direct to representative democracy. Democracy must be able to create new forms of management of public matters that are also open towards the exterior and to include in the decision-making process those who are affected by certain decisions. (Archibugi, 2008: 5)*

The quote above, gives a strong impression of that democracy needs to make significant changes. This claim is by the first part of the quote, given quite some weight. The biggest structural change of democracy has been the one from direct to representative. Thus to compare the democratic changes that needs to be made with the transition from direct democracy to representative democracy is a strong message. The changes that needs to be done, according to Archibugi, is first opening up towards the *exterior*, which can only be interpreted as the actors that are not today *interior*, that is non-representatives and non-public actors, such as financial actors. Secondly, Archibugi wants to *include those who are affected by the decisions*. The possible interpretation of that claim is that he wants a more *deliberate* democratic structure - the inclusion of the so called civil society. Consequently it seems as if the quote expresses a will to change the democratic structure from a representative system into a broad three-party system including private actors.

*While universalism, relativism and nationalism all are based on the principle of either-or, cosmopolitanism on the other hand use the principle of both. (Beck, 2005a: 97. Own translation)*

The quote above is striking and noteworthy for the inclusive consensus model of decision making that is promoted by cosmopolitanism. What is expressed in the quote is that cosmopolitanism differs from previous -isms. In the quote Beck seems to try and make a strong distinction between cosmopolitanism and the other -isms, as if they are opposites of each other. The previous perspectives are all *either-or*, while cosmopolitanism is *both*. What can be read out of *either-or*, is that universalism, relativism and nationalism all have an internal assumption of conflict between *either* and *or*. And that conflict of opponents, result in the survival of *either* or *or*. Cosmopolitanism on the other hand is according to Beck, founded on the principle of *both*, which by the previous interpretation means the opposite of *either-or*. Thus *both* must have an opposite internal structure. The *both* in contrast to *either-or* that seemingly means *conflict*, must then *mean non-*

*conflict or friendly*. The *both* could thus be interpreted as inclusive, with room for both *either* and *or* - that is, room for contrasting interests. Therefore it is possible to make the interpretation of cosmopolitanism as inclusive and consensus. State, civil society and the financial market are all accepted and have a place in the cosmopolitan decision making process, even though they might have different interests and opinions.

Based on the discussion above, the conclusion can be made that cosmopolitanism have a very distinct effect on the decision-making process. Cosmopolitanism would mean a big change in the democratic structure from being based on representativity and only including public actors, into becoming an inclusive deliberate democratic system that is inclusive and fit public actors and private actors.

## 2.2 Cosmopolitanism as harmony

The previous chapter framed the core elements of cosmopolitanism that is more or less shared by all cosmopolitan variations. Thus at this point it is clear what cosmopolitanism *is*. But are the ideas of cosmopolitanism new? If not, what does its connection to larger traditions of ideas say about its fundamental assumption of the nature of politics, that is - what is the underlying cosmopolitan belief of *the political*?

The temporal dimension of cosmopolitanism is, as presented above, one of the distinct aspects of cosmopolitanism. There is a specific interpretation of history and a historical explanation to why cosmopolitanism appears and is realizable at this day of age. Their interpretation is that the ideological conflict in history ended with the fall of the Berlin wall. The liberalism won the last battle and is now uncontested. This development is seen as something good and desirable in itself. Finally historical evolution has lead humankind into the phase where all differences disappear and consensus is achieved (see chapter 2.1). Now this perspective can be approached from different angles.

The cosmopolitan concept of history is revealed in their description of recent historical changes which lead to the birth of cosmopolitanism. When claiming that the ideological battle finally ended with the fall of the Berlin wall, and that history changed when liberalism became the universally accepted ideology, what is revealed is that cosmopolitanism interprets the role of ideas and ideologies as the core reasons for historical changes. There is an accomplished historical perspective that has an *idealistic concept of history*. The followers of this perspective in general interpret historical changes and phenomena as driven by ideas, ideologies, individuals and culture (Russel, 2010: 637). Consequently the

conclusion could be drawn that cosmopolitanism has an idealistic concept of history.

Another aspect of the temporal perspective of cosmopolitanism is that the historical win of liberalism is described in the context of the historical preconditions for cosmopolitanism to appear (see chapter 2.1). The question is thus what relationship cosmopolitanism has with the ideology of liberalism. Either the interpretation of cosmopolitanism implies that the precondition of cosmopolitanism is a global hegemonical ideology per se, or the interpretation implies that the precondition of cosmopolitanism is, specifically, the ideology of liberalism. Whichever alternative is right; there is a cosmopolitan problem of precision in this aspect. However, both alternatives effectively imply that there is a belief of there being needed only one hegemonical ideological basis in order for cosmopolitanism to exist. This is a claim for one universal conscious of a world society. There is a philosophical tradition called idealism, which assumes that the essential prerequisite for reality is the world of ideas. The conclusion could consequently be drawn that cosmopolitanism assumes that the consensus of ideas is necessary and a central aspect in the appearance of cosmopolitanism. There is a link between cosmopolitanism and the idealistic tradition of ideas.

If cosmopolitanism mean that liberalism is the precondition for its birth, then there is certainly an important connection between cosmopolitanism and liberalism. The question is what in the content of the liberal ideology it is that makes cosmopolitanism appear and flourish.

One of the early liberal characteristics that have influenced liberalism is the claim of *natural law*, which is an idea of one universal law of humankind that is based on the universal morals of humans. There is a natural moral that is shared by all and every practice that keeps humankind in harmony is considered desirable (Russel, 2010: 545). Looking at the dimension of values in connection to the temporal dimension, the claims of cosmopolitanism is that there is an existing natural moral which has grown broader as peoples of the world have become enlightened and understood the fundamental character of these (see Archibugi etc chapter 2.1). It is based on the belief that there is one universal moral and that the *cosmopolitanization* of these moral values leads to a better coexistence. This is a typical claim of natural law. Further the name cosmopolitanism, reveals an assumption of that there is something that is universal and essential for all human beings. Effectively it is logically impossible for cosmopolitanism to appear within the rivaling ideology socialism, which is based on the assumption of class antagonism. Therefore it is possible to draw on the conclusion that one of the connections between cosmopolitanism and the tradition of ideas of liberalism is the claim for a natural law.

Moreover cosmopolitanism interprets, that the problems that appear as a result of cosmopolitization and re-territorialization, are cultural problems. These problems are however transitional in the process of cosmopolitization of universal values

(see chapter 2.1). Also what is underlying here is that not having conflicts is seen as desirable. Thus there is a clear idealistic tendency throughout these claims. Further, the claim of conflicts *not* being desirable means consequently that what actually *is* desirable is the opposite, which is consensus. The question is why consensus is desirable. With the interpretations above, the answer could only be that it is desirable because it is considered as possible. The human nature is according to cosmopolitanism capable of solving problems and evolving in symbiosis. Liberalism has one famous idea that is often called *the invisible hand*, which assumes that the state does not need to regulate society because there is an invisible hand in society which naturally solves problems and injustices, and maintains consent in society (see Smith, 1978). There is a strong similarity between these two theories. They are both approaching conflicts in society as something that is not needed to be handled or politically acknowledged in an institutionalized way. Rather the claim in both ideas is that there is something in the nature of society and humankind that will unproblematically solve these conflicts. Subsequently this is an indication of liberalism being an important friend of cosmopolitanism.

Furthermore, the more concrete and pragmatic the discussion within the cosmopolitanism dimension of decision-making becomes, the more visible are the intensions of the claims for consensus. Cosmopolitanism makes a radical deviation from earlier perceptions of legitimate decision making and proposes a sharing of power between public and private actors. The division of power is recommended to be between states, financial actors and civil society actors. This division of power is based on the argument that we are confronted with a global risk society, where we stand united against the external global threats. The argument here is that we need to have a decision making process that makes the global society *sustainable* rather than adapting the decision making process to democratic claims (see chapter.2.1). There is an old tradition of ideas which has been in the shadows of the political debate the last centuries; it is called *separation of power*. The idea has been applied to different territorial levels in history. The argument is that the power of decision making should be shared between the monarch, the aristocracy and the democracy. The reason for this is to strengthen the society against external threats and make it sustainable. The reason for these three specific groups to be represented in a power sharing is that they are all of different interests and if power would be centered around only one of these groups, it would result in corruption of society and destructive decisions (see Machiavelli, 2007; Manin, 1997). The three-part solution of decision making is directly linked to the three-part solution of separation of power - the state representing the monarch, the financial actors representing aristocracy and the civil society representing democracy. The division is then by both cosmopolitanism and the tradition of separation of power, argued for as necessary for becoming sustainable and strong. It is thus reasonable to make the conclusion that cosmopolitanism is connected to the tradition of ideas of separation of power.

Where does the contextualizing discussion above take us in the question of the cosmopolitan perception of the nature of politics? It can clearly be stated that the ideas of cosmopolitanism are not *new* in history. The previous reasoning and conclusions makes it possible to draw on the conclusion that cosmopolitanism can be derived to a couple of specific traditions of ideas as some claims of cosmopolitanism can be found in these traditions of ideas. The traditions of ideas that have visible connections to the theory of cosmopolitanism are thus idealism, liberalism and separation of power. So what is common between these three traditions? What is their underlying assumption of the nature of politics i.e. *the political*? The conclusion that could be drawn from the discussions above is that they all have a positive approach to the dynamics of human kind where they reject conflicts as being essential for the historical and political evolution. They consequently reject conflict as a fundament in the nature of politics, and thus instead represent consensus – *harmony* - as the basic fundament in the nature of humankind and politics. The contextualizing discussion does subsequently not only tell us that cosmopolitanism is not new, but also that its connections to large harmonious traditions of ideas indicates what fundamental assumptions cosmopolitanism has on the nature of politics. The conclusion and answer to the question is consequently that cosmopolitanism, in accordance with its related traditions of ideas, have a tendency towards a *harmonious idea of the political*.

## 3 Cosmopolitan claims – a critical discussion

The reconstruction of cosmopolitanism has given insight to what cosmopolitanism actually claims, if cosmopolitanism is new and what idea of *the political* it tends towards. But where has these achieved insights taken us, and what do they actually tell us? Cosmopolitanism shares the zeitgeist and identifies the political direction with its claims. I therefore wonder what it more profoundly means to have a harmonious idea of *the political*? The harmonious idea of the political will in this chapter be contextualized and interpreted through a critical discussion between cosmopolitans, the critique and the critique of the critique.

To clarify in beforehand, the close relation between the zeitgeist and cosmopolitanism, makes the critical discussion not always directly pointed at cosmopolitanism, but at what by some is called the post-political society, liberal democracy or harmony. The concept post-political is used in this text by Mouffe, Brown, Žižek, Rancière and Laclau. The concept of liberal democracy is used in the text by Huntington, Fukuyama, Schmitt and Lipset.

### 3.1 Cultural contentions

If we go back to the discussions in chapter 2.1, the first analytical dimension I have identified of cosmopolitanism is the temporal dimension. The reconstruction has given us clarity in what the temporal understanding of cosmopolitanism is. Mainly the literature describes this time of age as the time where the final stage of history has come. Cosmopolitanism is in becoming and the only thing left is the consolidation of it (see chapter 2.1.1). The reconstruction of cosmopolitanism generated the knowledge that cosmopolitanism believes that the appearing cosmopolitan historical stage, is final as it is now all conflicts dissolve and the whole world are able to live with each other in harmony under the wings of a cosmopolitan democratic structure.

Further on, an overlapping discussion is the problematization of cosmopolitanism. *Cultural contentions* are discussed as the downside effect of the cosmopolitization, are discussed from two different angles that could be thematized from the analytical categories temporal dimension and spatial

dimension. The first context could be categorized in the temporal dimension is when cosmopolitanism address cultural contentions as the effect of the end of ideology. The finalizing point of history, where all people are of same political interests, the governing is also supposed to be united. It is at this point where cosmopolitan literature problematizes the cosmopolitanism by suggesting multiculturalism and recognition of the others otherness (see discussion Archibugi, 2008; Beck, 2005b). The second context in which cultural implications are discussed, is in the discussion of re-territorialization which fits into the spatial dimension. Consequently the side effect of the harmonious stage of cosmopolitanism is cultural contentions.

The critique is aimed differently. One of the critiques is the theory on *death of history* where the possibilities for liberalism becoming the winner of the historic ideological struggle, are explored. The theorist that is famous for this theory is Francis Fukuyama. He observes recent history and draws the conclusion that it was not socialism that consolidated, but rather it was the liberal democracy that became the states' more frequent choice of path. Fukuyama's understanding of history is similar to that of cosmopolitanism, he interprets the universalism and consensus of the liberal democracy as similar to the universality of natural sciences (Fukuyama, 2006: 343). He is however critical to cosmopolitanism in the aspect of re-territoriality. Even though he supports the temporal perception of cosmopolitanism, he believes the state should remain the main authority. Fukuyama school argues that some cultures, such as western liberal democracy, can detach themselves from their contextual prison and become universal (ibid.) without leaving the state as the central authority. The liberal democracy is under consolidation and according to Fukuyama, there are some challenges left before the perfection of liberal democracy. He claims that the measurement of the abilities of liberal democracy becoming the historical winner, is exploring if it is able to give all people full recognition (Fukuyama, 2006: 288). He believes that the cultural diversity is fundamental and indispensable. It is thus in the state's ability to fulfill recognition of all that the fate of the liberal democracy lays. The responsibility of the late modern state is basically to handle and manage these differences. He continues and observes that tolerance of group rights are in liberal democracies favored in relation to individual rights. According to Fukuyama these group rights then limits the choices of the individuals. Some cultural groups limit its members to the extent that the state must intervene and reject as they repress individual rights.

The basic assumptions of history is similar to the cosmopolitan. The challenge of full recognition is also very in line with the multicultural challenge of cosmopolitans. The only aspect of this theory that could be seen as critique is that he agrees upon the temporal dimension and interprets that of being the reason for the need of full recognition, while the explanation of spatial dimension is rejected with the argument that having one hegemonical world authority is illiberal (see Fukuyama, 2006).

Further, there is a more skeptical rationalist critique. Samuel P. Huntington is critical to the universal vision and aims his critique towards what could be categorized as the temporal dimension. He rejects the harmonious belief that the cultural contentions are possible to overcome by the expansion of liberal democracy (see Huntington, 1996). The harmonious approach do not believe in conflicts which means that cultural contentions should be seen as resolvable and possible to manage under the wings of the liberal democracy the more global it becomes. Huntington approaches cultural contentions as inevitable, but could be made non-violent with the help of tolerance (ibid.).

Instead of universalism, he could be seen as a pluralist. The reality dictums of the two approaches are different. When universalism interprets the changes in the world as becoming more united and universalized, the pluralist claims the opposite. The critique of Huntington is aimed at what could be interpreted as the temporal dimension when he interprets the developments of the world to be moving towards a division rather than a uniting. He claims this division is a cultural division between the two strong cultures - West and Islam. Huntington has a more antagonistic perspective in relation to Fukuyama as he does not find the liberal democracy as a transcendental common culture that different cultures in consensus submit to. Instead he famously pushes for a view on the present age as ultimately a clash between two civilizations - the western liberal democracy and the Islamic civilization. By more rationalist means such as empirical data Huntington strengthens his arguments in *clash of civilizations* (see Huntington, 1996).

Huntington criticizes cosmopolitanism in a rather fundamental way. He does not at all share the reality claim of cosmopolitanism that the world is becoming more cosmopolitan and harmonious. Instead he interprets the societal development as becoming more contentious and antagonistic (see Huntington, 1996). While cosmopolitanism describes its expansion as a harmonious process of enlightenment of the world, Huntington describes it as an aggressive struggle by two competing cultures for the hegemonical position in the world (see Huntington, 1996). Fukuyama on the other hand is somewhere in the middle. He is basically in agreement with cosmopolitanism, but he still believes in a more international world rather than cosmopolitan and also acknowledges cultural conflicts as a part of humanity. Thus his agonistic approach suggests that a liberal democracy is adequate to be the transcendental ideology which all cultures recognize and adapt to. Huntington rather claim that the different civilizations need to learn how to be tolerant towards each other (see Huntington, 1996). Thus there is an underlying assumption that the civilizations will not unify, but coexist.

The perspective of the world being a more divided place rather than a more united one, is shared by the more post-structuralist scholar, Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe claims in accordance with Huntington, that this division is between the West and Islam. However she does not believe there is an inherent contentious relationship among *cultures*. Rather the Mouffian interpretation is that the *division* itself is

what is inherent in the existence of mankind. The division will always be followed by a battle over the position of hegemonical discourse (see Mouffe, 2010). Before the fall of Soviet, the division was political between two political alternatives. Mouffe claims the existence of real political options instead of one hegemonical discourse, creates a more including and democratic society. Today politics are, according to Mouffe, focused on morals instead of politics and therefore she calls society the *post-political* age. The post-political society is the society that no longer accepts the existence of the conflict. It is a society of consensus that is in accordance with cosmopolitanism a society that looks upon the world as functioning in harmony (ibid.). The result of this post-political stage, according to Mouffe, is the increasing importance of culture and in the extent the importance of good and evil. If one is not able to distinguish oneself from others through politics, the differences will instead be determined by cultural moral codes. Mouffe claims there will always be an *us* and *them*, which means that there will always be a need of distinguishing differences between humans. With a Mouffian interpretation there will always be conflicts. She describes this by discussing the differences between the political era, before the fall of Soviet, and the post-political era, after the fall of Soviet (ibid.).

When Mouffe makes this clear political and historical distinction between socialism and post-socialism, she reveals that her temporal understanding could be interpreted as similar to the cosmopolitan temporal understanding. Thus she reveals that she looks upon history as a straight line, that the fall of Soviet meant the end of the political conflict and the consolidation of the liberal democracy. Nevertheless she deviates as she does not interpret this change as something positive. The *good* world order will always have several powers and not only one (Mouffe, 2010; 92). There is thus a similar reality dictum but a difference in value dictums. In contrast to cosmopolitanism, the Mouffian approach claims that the cultural contention is negative in relation to the political contention which is more progressive. The cultural indifferences are from that perspective intimate with a moral differentiation between people and make the *us* and *them* good or bad. Mouffe claims that the reason the political conflict is preferable is that it becomes more inclusive and neutralizes extremism (Mouffe, 2010: 68). Mouffian critique would be that this harmonious way of organizing the world is excluding, as it only allows one political alternative. The opposition, she claims, will therefore tend towards extremism. Thus it is possible to interpret cultural contentions as the result of the post-political consensus and universalism. A Mouffe-inspired critique against Huntington could in this context be that Huntington indirectly claim that Islam as a culture and civilization as incompatible. Thus he approaches the cultures as in themselves contentious in relation to other cultures. Mouffe in contrast, interprets the contention between West and Islam as antagonism from extremists that made Islam prone to extremism by the excluding political nature of the post-political era.

There are empirical examples that could support both the cosmopolitan and Huntington's societal interpretations. The rationalist cosmopolitan answer to

Huntington's reality dictum, could be the examples of the revolutions of recent decades in South America, eastern Europe, southern Europe, and the ongoing revolutions in the Arab world. Most revolutions in recent history are democratic ones, which could be used as empirical evidence in favor of the claim of cosmopolitanism that the people of the world all choose the western democratic system voluntarily. After 2001 and the war against terrorism, the cosmopolitan claim of universal multiculturalism and of liberal democracy, was largely challenged, and the theory of clash of civilizations à la Huntington seemed more realistic. Nonetheless, when the revolutions of the Arab world broke out, a very strong, civic resistance was expressed against the dictatorships and against the Islamic movements. The unanimous claim was democracy, which made the cosmopolitan theory of overcoming the cultural differences and Islamism being an *evil other* rather than a political other, gain strength. The globalization is thus in cosmopolitan terms, in itself uniting. The only conflicting culture is Islam, it does not agree on the consensus, because it is fundamentally *illiberal*.

There is a more antagonistic post-political critique that is critical to all of the earlier mentioned interpretations and claims that the Islamic struggle against western liberal democracy would in his terms be deceiving and to cover up real conflicts. The philosopher Slavoj Žižek (Brännström, 2010) argues that the temporal understanding of our globalized world being in progress is deceiving. He rather speaks of the post-political society as Mouffe does. He interprets the zeitgeist as where there is no longer any political competition, but only an expert elite that governs in accordance with the representatives from multiculturalism. Together they rule out *the political*, that are the conflicts and the claims for justice by the oppressed. He argues that the universalist nature of multiculturalism in the post-political society, categorizes everyone in subgroups. The struggle is about its representatives making the subgroups included into the universal, not just in a formal way, but universally equal in reality as well. Žižek continues arguing that the characteristic *tolerance* in multiculturalism transforms all otherness into minority positions. By that, multiculturalism prevents injustices from becoming political and instead formulated as unprovocative claims that can easily in a harmonious way, be incorporated in the universal whole. The result is lateral movement of injustices into societal *threats* (Brännström, 2010: 21).

The Žižekian critique is different as it makes a reality claim that is quite different. It is possibly the only external critique in this context as cultural conflicts are not viewed as real. Cultural conflicts are from this point of view, false conflicts in the elite's strive to delegitimize and repress resistance and claims for justice. The political conflict is however inherent and will always persist in a liberal democratic order as injustice is the essence of liberalism (see Brännström, 2010). The cosmopolitan answer to that would be that by a deliberate decision-making process, it would be possible to overcome these injustices, and as long as everyone is recognized in the reality, then all people will have the same opportunities to be a part of a participating civil society that will both constitute

and fasten the process of realizing *glocal*, cosmopolitan citizens. The response from a Žižekian perspective could then be that the civil society that is emphasized and given more space in political decision-making on the global arena is by Žižek's definition a multicultural elite with no real claims. There will be a cosmopolitan class of professionals and a large *other* that is not included to claim justice for it. The cosmopolitan answer would then be that the large other that is unrecognized, will organize itself in a cosmopolitan matter which will dialectically result in the synthesis of cosmopolitanism. Thus cosmopolitanism is inevitable as when even resisting it, strengthens it (Beck, 2005a: 185).

By the discussion above, several things could be said. Most of the critique could be seen as internal critique. All of the critique except for the one coming from Žižek accepts the assumption of cultural conflicts. Even though they have different interpretations, both the rationalist and the post-structuralist critique share the belief that cultural conflicts exist. If conflicts can be in themselves cultural that means that there is an inherent conflicting character within the concept of culture. Even the universalists, when claiming that the dissolution of cultural conflicts come through the universalism of liberal democracy, reveals the assumption, that several cultures and morals cannot function together, but one must overwin the others in order to keep all peoples in consensus. This interpretation would make the harmonious universalism not including but excluding. Thus it seems as if universalism assumes harmony could only function in hegemony. A quote that could image the excluding character of universalism is:

*Cosmopolitanism lays down the universal or regulative principles which delimit and govern the range of diversity and difference that ought to be found in public life (Held, 2007: 18)*

The conclusion that could be drawn is that the temporal and spatial developments suggested by cosmopolitans, result in a cultural conflict contention that is resolved by the delimiting character of cosmopolitanism. However, the problem is that there is no specificity of whom and what culture should be delimited.

## 3.2 Borderless inclusion

The previous discussion on cultural implications presented four different more or less critical perspectives. The discussion centered on the in cosmopolitans opinion, downside of cosmopolitanization – cultural contentions. However it also touched some of the other themes of discussion – inclusion and universalism vs. exclusion.

The extent of the inclusiveness of cosmopolitanism could, as discussed in the previous subchapter, be questioned on the basis of the limiting dynamics of the cosmopolitan universalism. Cosmopolitanism is presented as an idea of inclusiveness, and the assumption of borderless inclusion is one of the core pieces

of cosmopolitanism (Archibugi, 2008; Beck, 2005a; Held, 2007). The ambition is to have common value systems and a political and economic global integration through overlapping territorial authorities. The decision making process is most often proposed to be divided in a three-part solution between the market, politics and the civil society (Beck, 2005b: 283). This is suggested with the argument of creating a system that is more inclusive- however without naming *who* is more included. This is one of the difficulties of cosmopolitanism. When there is no clear definition of who should be included, the discussion becomes problematic. The previous, discussion on if cosmopolitanism is inclusive or exclusive, could be interpreted as if cosmopolitanism discuss the inclusion of individuals by the means of universality, while some critics discuss inclusion as inclusion of morals, cultures and politics by the means of pluralism. The lack of precision in the discussion is thus problematic.

Extending the discussion of inclusion/exclusion, it is possible to go deeper into the conflicting relationship of cosmopolitanism and inclusion by approaching the discussion of a cosmopolitan democracy. For example Archibugi mentions the importance of limiting the authority of borders and including all people in a united world system. However I believe the difficulty of the cosmopolitan borderless vision appears in its strive for a cosmopolitan *democracy*. Benhabib describes this in the following quote:

*“...we are also facing the rise of an international human rights regime and the spread of cosmopolitan norms, while the relationship between state sovereignty and such norms is becoming more contentious and conflictual. Such conflicts render starkly visible the “paradox of democratic legitimacy”, namely, the necessary and inevitable limitation of democratic forms of representation and accountability in terms of the formal distinction between members and nonmembers. This is the core tension, even if not contradiction, between democratic self-determination and the norms of cosmopolitan justice.” (Benhabib, 2006: 17)*

Democracy is one political system out of many. Cosmopolitanism has its own priorities and ambitions, democracy has others. Combining these two into a cosmopolitan democracy creates difficulties of exclusion/inclusion. The foundation of cosmopolitanism lies within the aim of including all people in a cosmopolitan society and citizenship. However, as not all states and societies are democratic, when the cosmopolitan community is supposed to be democratic, suddenly there has to be exclusion of non-democrats, which means that the cosmopolitan ambition is compromised.

For example Archibugi speaks of inclusion of all people, in a later context he makes a distinction between democrats and non-democrats. The actors that should be included in the cosmopolitan world system are democracies, and non-democracies are excluded (Archibugi, 2008: 104). In another context he argues that making sharp distinctions between us and them is impossible and that

mankind is structured by overlapping borders. However, the border between democracies and non-democracies might not seem so overlapping. The critics would most likely use the argument that a scenario such as this, would make cosmopolitanism become a hegemonical positioning of western democracies in relation to parts of the world that do not submit to the western model (see Mouffe, 2010). One of the difficulties with the border between democracies and non-democracies in a cosmopolitan system lies in deciding what actor or what states are democratic enough to be included, and what is not. A cosmopolitan democracy that is excluding states which arbitrarily are considered non-democracies would probably lead to a confirmation and strengthening of the domination and power abuse of the existing hegemonical powers.

On the other hand cosmopolitanism would probably agree on the concern and also recognize that there are problems with identifying the grey scale on the spectrum of democracies. For example there are many semi-democratic nations or electoral democracies that are difficult to define (see Archibugi, 2008: 5).

There is further a critique against the claim of it being impossible to draw a line between *us* and *them* (see Archibugi, 2008: 4). Post-structuralists in contrast often claim that the personification of the *other* constitutes the *us* (see Mouffe, 2010). Consequently a critique against the cosmopolitan approach of it being impossible to draw a line between us and them, could from a post-structuralist position be that it is impossible *not* having a border and that the line between *us* and *them* is essential and thus the one cannot exist without the other. The cosmopolitan position in this debate is diffuse and ambiguous. For example Beck argues that we have to face the global risk society together and that it is important to acknowledge the *otherness* of the *other*. Acknowledging the otherness of the other means that there has to be an *other*.

There are more uncertainties with cosmopolitanism in this respect. Beck does not really make any democratic claims when discussing the risk society. The argument is that there are global risks at hand that affect all, and cannot be solved alone. Therefore an including three-part solution of decision making is proposed with the groups: states, economics and civil society (see chapter 2.). A three part decision making such as the one proposed by Beck is not a claim for democracy. It is a immunological negative system of defense against external problems (Žižek, 1999: 405). Thus Beck means that changes in society creates a situation where a global democracy is not a first choice as it would not generate the stability that is needed to confront the global risks. Therefore a three-part decision making would be more stable, as it is stability that is the ambition. Brännström is a critic that emphasizes this aspect and calls it anti-political and elitist. She claims that the discourse in question believes that a total democracy would entail chaos, which needs to be balanced out by professionals and experts (Brännström, 2010: 23).

On the basis of the discussion above, cosmopolitanism and harmony has a contradictory relationship towards democracy. Some theories are not making any democratic claims at all, Sometimes it even seems as if it is taking a step away from the belief of democracy being the legitimate system. Other theories build the whole image of the cosmopolitan society as a democratic society. This is where one of the problematic issues cosmopolitanism. The non-democratic character of cosmopolitanism, in combination with a broader acceptance and vision of a cosmopolitan democracy, changes the internal meaning and definition of democracy. There is a tension here and a lack of precision of if cosmopolitanism is a democratic project or not. Either or, the conflicting statements generates a unconscious re-defining of democracy. But if it is a democratic project, what does it mean to be democratic in the eyes of cosmopolitanism?

The cosmopolitan literature is very consensus-like in its pretension of a *deliberate* participating democracy that includes the ones that are affected. It could be seen as the strive for changing the democratic structure so that it fits the new cosmopolitan conditions. The cosmopolitan democracy is based on a democratic perspective that enhances and emphasizes *deliberation* and *participation* of groups that are affected by the decision. Not only does it raise the question of *how* to decide *who* is affected, but also how immediate the affect must be on the actor in order for it to be included in the decision-making. An example of the problematic situation is the question of the climate. Climate change does not see territorial borders, but affect all societies and all people on the earth. How are we then to choose who is the legitimate actor to choose who should be invited in the decision making process?

Participation is in itself a critical choice of word. *Who* is in the population of possible participants where there will be made a selection of appropriate participants? Participating does not imply tension or conflicting situations. Also the participant is *invited* and looked upon as a legitimate part of the situation. Thus participation is something that is done among *us*. Thus there is no focus on the role of the *other* in the word participation. Therefore the problem of cosmopolitanism is that the other is not even acknowledged in the discussion of inclusion.

Thus the difficulty of having a discussion on the arguments of the different approaches lies in that the critics discuss the inclusion of the *other* while cosmopolitans discuss the *us*. The critique that claims that there is no *us* without the *other*, claims therefore that the social order always is excluding and therefore always unjust. Someone will always remain uncounted, such as women and workers were before etc. The birth of *the political* lies within the tension of when people that are *a part* of a society, but are not *participants* of a society, claims that they are being treated unjust. This is according to critics, the *political moment*, the moment when the political scene reformates, political windows are opened and it is possible to subjectify the *other* (see Rancière, 2010 ). Thus for some critics, *the political* does not concern identification and recognition as the discussion on

cultural implications implied. Rather *the political* is seen as when not identifying oneself with what one is considered to be. In contrast to the cosmopolitan claim of stability as the important shape of cosmopolitanism, the stability is not considered as political but rather as the *polis*. People are unshapable and *the political* is the destabilizing moment when re-shaping the order. The critics thus look upon the democratization and the expansion of the *us* as the political dynamics of society (ibid.).

There is a more post-structuralist approach that aims at taking a middle way. Mouffe is one of them who rejects cosmopolitanism for not allowing or including any form of *legitimate* opposition or alternatives in the decision making process. She claims that if the democratic order does not allow legitimate political alternatives to be included, then the risk of them turning into extremists is bigger. Extremism could here be interpreted as the *other*. It could be interpreted as if Mouffe tries to create a middle-way critique that desires a system that is inclusive for *legitimate* political alternatives (see Mouffe, 2010). The problem here is once again the question of *who*. *Who* it is that is *legitimate* is left undefined, but presumably it is the actors that submit to a transcendental liberal democratic order where the conflicts of interests and opinions can be carried out.

The difference between the cosmopolitans who do not make any political claims and those who does could possibly be found in relation to the middle-way theory. The ones that do not claim democratic structures in a cosmopolitan decision-making, in the three-party Meta game, do not acknowledge any differences and claims that we are all of the same interests. The cosmopolitans who claim democracy, could on the contrary, be viewed as admitting some kind of differences as it is the foundation of the democratic structure. Consequently the cosmopolitan democrats could be interpreted as being closer to Mouffe and the middle way.

The dynamic of participation is however questionable in whole. The post-structuralist middle-way critique is in accordance with cosmopolitanism discussing participation. Rancière is the external critique that claims that the aim should be to stretch the boundaries for what is included (see Rancière, 2010).

Mouffe discusses the importance of allowing political alternatives to be legitimate and not only having one hegemonical political alternative in the world (see chapter 3.1). On the other hand she wants only the *legitimate* political initiatives to be included in the political structure, which means the initiatives that accept the hegemonical political foundation. The claims are contradictory. If all included political initiatives are supposed to fit into a small box of submitting the hegemonical foundations, than no political alternatives will *legitimately* be formulated. The contradiction in her claims therefore create a situation where her critique ends up in no critique at all and accepts cosmopolitan position.

One conceptual distinction that has not been made in the literature is the distinction between *participation* and *resistance*. When participation indicates to concern the *us*, the term resistance in this context rather implies the *other*. A real inclusive society would in these terms, be a society that acknowledges resistance.

This takes us to the Mouffian description of extremism. Mouffe claims, as described earlier, that the exclusion of political alternatives makes the excluded more prone to extremism. With the internal logic of inclusion interpreted above, no actual political alternatives to the liberal democracy are accepted into the democratic system of the middle-way either. Therefore all non-liberal democratic political alternatives would be prone to extremism. Extremism is a term with a very negative tone. Accusing all *others* as being prone to extremism, is not only an ungrounded contradictory statement, but also a lacking recognition of power structures between the included and the *others*. Who decides who should be defined as extremist? The included will always be privileged in the discursive battle (see Winther, Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999). Rather than it seems as all *others* are prone of extremism, it is more likely that the included, will in a excluding system such as presented by Mouffe, be more prone of *accusing other* political alternatives of being be prone to extremism.

Extremism is a word with a moral tone. It is a word that could be compared to the words such as criminal, evil and not legitimate. Certainly there are many forms of the *others* that are extremists, but accusing the political others of being extremists is simple power logic. It is a well-used power tool to accuse the competition to be extremists in order to de-politicize them, diminish the competition and keep the own power structures.

Stretching the limits can be done in different ways. Rancière believes that is done by *others* claiming justice. That sounds probable in a society that has different political alternatives and thus more room for other political actors to influence. But how can the *other* claim for justice without being accused to be extremist and become included in a post-political society where resistance is not accepted as legitimate political practices?

### 3.3 Particularism vs. Universalism

One of the characteristics of cosmopolitanism is its universalistic feature. There is a belief in that there are universal interests and values that could be or already are shared by all peoples. What exactly cosmopolitanism claims to be universal, is the moral values. David Held is one of the advocates of cosmopolitanism that elaborates on the ethical and moral matters of cosmopolitanism. He puts up the eight moral values of cosmopolitanism (see chapter 2.3):

[...] which can be universally shared, and can form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person's equal significance in 'the moral realm of all humanity' (Held, 2007: 12)

Cosmopolitanism is a seemingly universalist theory. The impression of having a universal character is given even by its name cosmo-; the word universalism is associated with an idealist tendency; and idealism has a tone of hopefulness. Even though cosmopolitanism is often associated with a positive and hopeful image, it might not always be what it is presented to be. With the eight moral values, Held has the ambition to find the lowest moral limit that could be shared by all people in a contemporary setting. When searching for a *lowest* moral point, the eight values gain a negative character. Held himself argues for the eight values by arguing that they are only formulated in a way to prevent state-abuse of the individual (see Held, 2007). The purpose of the set of values, says something about the attitude of Held and his perception on universalism. Held is a cosmopolitan that believes we have finally reached the place in history where globalization makes cosmopolitanism and universalism realizable. The approach of Held is seemingly idealistic and optimistic. However, when studying his works, the idealism is very much covered with a strong pragmatic and non-optimistic approach. When trying to find the lowest limit, there must be an underlying, perhaps even unconscious, assumption of the limits of reality and of its restricted possibilities. The value dictum of such an ambition is based on a pragmatic foundation of reality claims.

The critique is not always, as what could be imagined, a particularistic critique. In opposite, there is an universalist critique against the harmonious idea of *the political*. Wendy Brown is one of the many critics that agree upon the universalist vision of *equality* and is herself a universalist (Rancière, 2010; Žižek, 1999; Brown, 2010). However, she is still quite critical towards the post-political harmonious universalism. The universalist critique accuses the post-political universalism of being *apolitical*. Brown interpreters universal values to be divided in two - *moral* and *moralism* – where moral is a natural part of political visions and moralism is non-political visions. Brown and her followers are universalists in the sense that they promote universal morals and *not* universal moralism. The Brown position accuses the harmonious consensus-society of turning *the political* morals into moralist *identity politics*. Moral is from this perspective always a part of *the political*, for example in the struggle against injustice and inequality. Moralism on the other hand is considered *anti-political* and particularistic as it occupies itself with reifying identities that were produced in another time (see Brown, 2010).

The critique is that Held's position lacks a human dimension and lacks a radically different vision for the future. Cosmopolitanism could be interpreted, from the Brownian perspective, as not making suggestions of radical changes for society, which means it is a part of the post-political assumptions of today. If it is post-political, it has given up the idea of another better world, accepted the end of

history and entered a condition of dejection. As society is already perfected in its foundation and there is no possibility or reason to change it, then a self-destructive pattern of behavior has been developed where the people that are treated unjustly internalize their victim position while the people trying to fight for these people and against the oppressions, take a moralistic position instead of a political (Brown, 2010: 26). The political alternative that does not go beyond the restrictions of identity is from the Brownian perspective, very limited in its ability to be visionary and create political goals. Instead of progression of society, the post-political project, would in a Brownian sense, be strengthening the existing power system instead of developing it. Consequently the critique shows an optimism and idealistic vision on humankind as having one universal political foundation that should be strived to reach on a cosmopolitan level, without making any reality claims at all.

I interpret cosmopolitanism as a part of the post-political consensus society. If cosmopolitanism is not a theory that has a political vision that differs very much from the present political situation, than it is on the basis of the discussion above, not an optimistic theory. If it does not have universal political visions, it is pragmatic and as making assumptions of the limits of reality when formulating its values. Thus it could be seen as a non-visionary idea that is happy and satisfied with the society as it is and does not want to change its content, but views the universalism of the liberal democracy as something good, and wants to universalize the liberal claims for individual rights and protection. The moral values that are suggested as universal are all in accordance with the liberal democratic ideology and do not suggest any radically different political visions.

Brown does not put the particularistic in opposition to the universalist. The critique is of *what* is wanted to export and universalize - morals that are attached to a political vision, or pragmatic values confirming the present power. When she speaks of it, she refers to the *political* particularistic and the *political* universalism. The political in some sense has, according to Brown, its roots in the *particular and its goals in the universal* (Brown, 2010: 25). Cosmopolitanism could, on the basis of this assumption, be interpreted as the opposite of what brown suggests - *universalistic roots with particularistic goals*.

When discussing *political* universalism, it is possible to identify an indirect critique of the post-political idea of the political – harmony - as a harmonious universalism is not political. The cosmopolitan project could from the discussion be considered as pragmatic and not idealistic as it does not have a radically different vision.

There is a critical answer to that claim. Mouffe is post-structuralist and she is critical to all perspectives as they are all universalist. Thus she represents a critique that is critical to universalism as a whole. Universalism is contrasted by the proposition of particularism and a *multipolar world*. Her critique against cosmopolitanism and universalism is pragmatic. The critique confronts with the

cosmopolitan ambition of creating an effective *multilateralism*. A multilateral world order in a cosmopolitan consensus world would be a pseudo multilateralism as no different political alternatives are allowed (Mouffe, 2010: 113). The result of a universalistic multipolar world would from this perspective be hegemonical governing elite that would most probably use its extreme power to label all oppositions as illegitimate. The difficulty with the cosmopolitan consensus approach in combination with a multilateral order is from the post-structuralist perspective the cosmopolitans' lack of understanding for hegemony and power relations. There is a fundamental indifference between the two positions when cosmopolitanism refuses to acknowledge the nature of power relations in its vision of a world system structured without power relations - when striving towards a state of being that is beyond hegemony (see Mouffe, 2010).

The Mouffian perspective could therefore be interpreted as answering the cosmopolitan protection of the individuals' with the argument that there are hegemonical power relations that is not acknowledged in their claim. The post-structuralist recognition of hegemonical relations generate the proposition of the multipolar world system as the most attractive and *realistic* one. In a multipolar system, the world would admit and allow differences. Thus the critique is that cosmopolitanism lacks diversity.

On the basis of this discussion, universalists accuse the cosmopolitan universalism of being too particularistic and pluralists accuse the cosmopolitan universalism of being too homogeneous and universal.

### 3.4 Antagonism vs. Agonism

By the previous examination of cosmopolitanism, the conclusion to be drawn is that the cosmopolitan project lies on a foundation tended towards harmony. The assumption of the political as harmony becomes clear as the promoters of cosmopolitanism discuss decision-making (see chapter 2.1.4). Consistent in the discussions is that decision-making is something that should be and is possible to be done in consensus and coherence between different parties of society (ibid.). The most concrete and explicit suggestion comes from Beck who claims the global risks of our time have united the world and made it possible for all parts of society (authorities, market, and civil society) to with a common interest, make decisions in consensus (Beck, 2005b: 14).

Moving on, there is however objections to this form of interpreting the internal dynamics of *the political*. There is a contesting idea of *the political* that interprets the political as conflict. It is possible to find front figures of the conflict school in different theoretical fields- both rationalists and post-structuralist. Carl Schmitt was a theorist who already in early 20<sup>th</sup> century attempted moving the discussion

from *politics* to *the concept of the political*. It is possible to interpret a more rationalist tendency in his making of *the political* as he had a rather empirical approach. By logical reasoning of reality, the conflict within *the political* was from this perspective, between the polemic friend- enemy distinction (Schmitt, 2010: 46). Critiques might claim that Schmitt is out dated as his book was written in the 1930ies. However I would claim otherwise. Even though the world looked a bit different in his time, his description of the concept of the political remains functioning and used by contemporary scholars in the discussion of the political (see Žižek, 2010; Mouffe, 2010, Norris, 2006). Even though Schmitt's critique towards harmony is in the shape of liberalism, it is still a valid critique that could be applied towards cosmopolitanism. According to this interpretation, liberalism is an essentially apolitical ideology. Liberalism diminishes conflict to rivalry and by that depoliticizing many dimensions of society. Basically liberalism makes the essential conflict to concern domestic issues of fighting against the state and for the individual freedom. Instead of politics, liberalism creates a dichotomy between ethics and economy (Schmitt, 2010: 86-87). In similar ways, cosmopolitanism would from a Schmittian perspective be considered *apolitical* since it believes a cosmopolitan consensus is possible in decision making. In similar ways cosmopolitanism thus diminishes conflicts of interest between the economy, politics and the civil society when it proposes a three-part decision making process. Cosmopolitanism could therefore be seen as reformulating conflicts into depoliticized rivalry.

The subject of developing country foreign aid could be used as an empirical example. There is an ongoing debate on who is best fitted to organize the foreign aid. The discussion is not on who is a more legitimate organizer of the financial aid in regard to their own conflicting relations and interest in the cause, but rather the discussion is centered around the rivalry between states, NGOs and transnational companies to see who is the more *effective* actor in the organizing of the aid. Hence there is no understanding of conflicting interests between the different parts of society, thus the societal relations are depoliticized. Further, the liberal position of only recognizing the struggle for individual freedom against state authorities could also from this perspective be applied on the cosmopolitan way of presenting reality. For example, cosmopolitans fear cultural implications generated by the deterritorialization of the states. However, they believe that the root of the problem lies within the ability to create broad cosmopolitan rights that gives the individual freedom and protection of being respected to practice their own culture (see similar Archibugi, 2008).

*The political* is from the Schmittian perspective, an anti-thesis between the antagonistic *I* and the *other*. Every tension becomes political when it is tense enough for it to create a friend- enemy division. It is not the struggle per se, but the acceptance of and internalization of the possibility of a battle that creates the importance of obtaining concrete definitions of friends and enemies (Schmitt, 2010: 56). The more extreme the tension becomes, the more political is it- the war is the friend –enemy relationship in its most political state. The enemy and the

friend is moreover never a rival or an opponent. Neither is it an individual relationship. An enemy only appears when there is a struggling group of people with possibility of meeting the enemy group. Thus the enemy is always public (Schmitt, 2010: 48). The critique of harmony turns up in the context of the strict dual division of conflicts. The friend- enemy division does not have any room for a third party. The conflict is always strictly concerning and only understandable for the friend and the enemy.

Schmitt recognizes that some people reject, accept or even see the anti-thesis as an atavistic left-over from primitive times. Some hopes for it to vanish in time and some describe the reality in terms of there not being any more conflicts in pedagogical purposes. The conflict perspective á la Schmitt regard the political not as normative or intellectual. But as the internal reality of and the actual possibility of such distinction. This claim is strengthened by the empirical example of states still grouping themselves in friend- enemy categories (Schmitt, 2010: 48).

By empirical examples and reality claims, Schmitt and his followers reason and argue their way forth. What happens here is that Schmitt counter the claim for harmony as what could be interpreted as a distinction between what could be called reality dictum and value dictum (see Tingsten, 1941). The political as conflict from the more empirical rationalist perspective have reality claims and rejects claims of normative nature. Cosmopolitan enthusiasts more than only describing reality, also claim the future. For example, in the preface of Archibugi (2008), his work is described as being a way of taking responsibility for the future and make an effort to influence the direction of the changes in the world (ibid.). The cosmopolitan project, in this sense, breaths normative value dictums more than reality claims.

Schmitt approaches liberalism by examining its internal logics. When domestic party politics is hot and tense, it is because the domestic arena and the struggle over the state has become the most important struggle. The apolitical liberal ideology has, according to Schmitt, had political influence by allying itself with political ideologies such as social liberalism, social conservatism and national liberalism and additionally been engaged in political democratic movements' etc. In extension cosmopolitanism has also reached a place, where it has become an *over-ideology* that transcends all theoretical categories. For example one can today find critical cosmopolitans, liberal cosmopolitans and so on.

Schmitt rejects the thought of the terms *friend* and *enemy* being a personal, individualistic conflict, as triggered by psychological expressions of emotion and likings (Schmitt, 2010: 47). He argues that the enemy is never a symbolic or an intellectual enemy. The possibility of a physical battle is essential in order to be a real conflict. There should be a real possibility of killing each other between the friend and the enemy in order to have a friend enemy relationship. Mainly, his friend-enemy polemics is in regard to inter-state relations or inter-empire

relations. When applied on the domestic arena, the conflict could result in civil war.

There is a liberal political praxis of condemning state involvement, but it is always negative. It does not have an own positive political vision. On that basis, Schmitt accuses liberalism of not being political but being a critique of the political (Schmitt, 2010: 87). The consistency or validity of the reasoning is interesting. As the liberal individualistic claims against the state is universal to all individuals in a *society* (see discussion Schmitt, 2010), the individual could be considered as a collective i.e. public. If the society is only based on individuals, the state should be interpreted as only existing by its upholding individuals. The polemic between the collective of individuals and the collective of state upholders could in that sense be viewed as an inherent conflict, a political polemic between friend and enemy. The question is if harmony per definition has an inherent impossibility to recognize conflict. If not, the Schmitt must assume that the state as apolitical. Thus Schmitt politicizes the state. The argument here is that enemy is not symbolic or intellectual, but the opportunity of a real physical battle with the possibility of killing. This is looked upon as only possible between states and empires. Domestically, that possibility would mean civil war. However, if we go beyond the territorial obsession, the domestic conflicts between individuals and the state could also be recognized.

Taking a step away from the rationalist interpretation of conflict and take a more post-structuralist approach, the discussion on the political as antagonism and conflict becomes decentered. Ernesto Laclau is one of the distinguished proponents of the post-structuralist antagonist perspective. According to the Laclau understanding of *the political*, antagonism is fundamentally the ontology of political identity (Norris, 2006: 113).

Schmitt believes that the antagonism within *the political* is based on the polemic between organized hierarchical social groups in society. In contrast to Schmitt, Laclau claims that the antagonism within *the political*, is rather on the ontological level and is founded on the internal logic of identity. Instead of empirical examples, Laclau uses logical reasoning (Norris, 2006: 115).

*The moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible constitutes the field of the "political" (ibid.)*

Laclau presents a perspective where the seeming objectivity of all social forms and identities is generated by ungrounded decisions made in the state of antagonistic conflicts which consequently makes developments of order or objectivity impossible. As it is no objective foundation, each position therefore tries to describe the own position as the *fullness*, which our incomplete identities search for. Thus there is created a good and evil. Decisions are not determined by

facts or reality, but are absolutely subjective and free in claiming the empty spaces in the battle over the hegemonical position and interpretation of the political (Norris, 2006: 114). Political concepts are examples of empty spaces where political struggles occur. *The political* is ultimately the space of *decision*, while the Schmittian perspective claims the realistic *struggle* to be the *political*.

The antagonism is violent in its nature. Difference is always conflict in its nature and the identification is from its initial phase, internally violent. When discussing the violence of antagonism, he maintains that the violence and forcefulness within these relations are *symbolic*. This claim is in direct opposition to the rationalist view that the antagonistic relationship is only political when the possibility of a physical battle is real. There is furthermore an exception of antagonism, which is the *logic of equivalence*, which is the pair of two lovers sharing identity (Norris, 2006: 117). But power also, makes the relations of friends and lovers possible. He claims though, that identity in itself is power, which implies that harmony is impossible (ibid.).

*'A harmonious society is impossible because power [the institution of violent hierarchies] is the condition for society to be possible' (ibid.).*

The Laclauian interpretation would make cosmopolitanism as a non-objective claim for the hegemonical interpretation of our reality. The cosmopolitan identity would become a form of identity that tries to fulfill the identity of mankind in the sense that there are no factual differences in interests anymore, and the strive to create an image of all people in the world, sharing a *logic of equivalence* (ibid.). If the creation of identity is violent and when including also excluding forcefully, the diminishing of politics results in a recognition of moral - the good and the evil - democracy and non-democracy - West and Islam.

According to Lacau, the antagonism is the limit of all objectivity. He claims that there is no objectivity and that the antagonism therefore is based on the perceived and formulated *I* that is constituted by the creation of *the other*. Further he states that the contradiction of the forceful antagonizing at the same time prevents the identity it opposes, to be fully perfected. Thus antagonism both prevents and constitutes identity (Norris, 2006: 116). In the extent Laclau points out the *persuasion* as the forceful core of the *political decision* which in itself is the core of *the political* (Norris, 2006: 120). The persuasion is the suppressive process of eliminating the other and making the opposed extinct. The universal ambition that can be found in cosmopolitanism could further be seen as the process of persuasion. The global persuasion of cosmopolitan democracy is with a Laclauian interpretation, the elimination of the current antagonistic political other. Thus the post-ideological society and the de-politization of cosmopolitanism could be seen as the forceful struggle to achieve the hegemonical position of having sole right of choosing the world to be seen as political or as moral.

The cosmopolitan answer to the Laclauian critique would most likely be a reality dictum. Empirical examples of how the world is globalized and how cosmopolitan tendencies in international politics can be found, in order to prove a factual existence and relevance of cosmopolitanism. For example, climate negotiations have been made in unity with transnational companies, the academics and civil society organizations. This empirical example could be a reality claim of cosmopolitanism as a working form identity and that *political decision can* function in harmony. A cosmopolitan defense could here also be that the historical history has shown that the harmonious democratic system is the most *sustainable* one.

The dichotomy of antagonism and harmony has been in itself criticized. There are promoters of a so called *agonism*. One of the post-structuralist agonists is Chantal Mouffe. A former partner of Laclau, that after some time took a different scientific path. Chantal Mouffe objects both the assumption of harmony and antagonism. She defines *the political* as based on conflicts of interest between social groups. If we make a distinction between conflict and struggle, struggle implies an uncompromisable antagonistic battle that only has one winner. Conflict on the other hand is rather differences that can coexist and negotiate. Mouffe argues that cosmopolitanism is a consensus model that is a part of a post-political society, which has overcome societal conflicts (Mouffe, 2010:36). She criticizes the cosmopolitan project for being apolitical and not acknowledging differences in interest. She maintains that a consensus model makes it impossible for political alternatives and instead creates good-evil polemics in society (see Mouffe, 2010:45). Further she claims that extremism will increase in a society that does not have an inclusive plural society (Mouffe, 2010: 74).

However she also attacks the antagonistic approach which denies any form of diplomatic meeting point. She advocates a *third agonistic way* that absorbs both positions. The agonistic perspective both accepts the basic conflict of interests *and* that it is possible to meet each other on common grounds (see Mouffe, 2010). Her position in terms of conflict and harmony, assumes that harmony is possible. Through a transcending ideology, such as democracy, different positions and interests can meet, negotiate and make common decisions that benefit the majority (ibid.). In a Mouffian interpretation, a society that acknowledges and includes political conflicts is the one that can live in harmony.

Thus it is the content of cosmopolitanism that legitimates it or not. If cosmopolitanism is pluralistic and not consensus driven, then we can be relieved from extremism and moral and religious divisions in the world. At a first glance the theory of the post-political society seem to be a critique of cosmopolitanism and harmonious consensus model. But looking closer it is not that clear. Even though she claims a middle-way position, she in reality includes conflict and harmony, but not the struggle which is antagonism. That would make the agonistic position from a Mouffian perspective, more desirous of harmony than of antagonism. She promotes a pluralistic world system rather than a cosmopolitan,

while at the same time promoting a transcendental democratic common ground. Thus pluralism is accepted only within a certain moral frame even in the agonistic perspective. The extremism is from this perspective frowned upon and seen as a negative result of not allowing political alternatives within the common transcendental frame of society. Again Mouffe makes a contradicting statement. Consequently the Mouffe oriented post-structuralist agonistic perspective, do not seem capable of moving beyond the consensus harmonious interpretation and as it aims at, into an interpretation that allows political alternatives.

The critics from the conflict school, criticizes agonists for accepting harmony (see Lipset, 1990). Seymore Martin Lipset is also a promoter of the *middle way* concept. Even though he has more rationalist tendencies rather than post-structuralist, the balancing can be quite difficult and there has been critique against his works. To the critique of being too harmonious, Lipset answers that his empirical work is all based on conflict and change, not at all on consensus and integration (Lipset, 1990: 2). What Lipset has done is to, from a rationalist perspective, confront his critique. In *Consensus and conflict*, he takes a stand back, and in an agonistic fashion criticize both the promoters of consensus *and* the promoters of conflict. The agonistic claim is that both “schools” exaggerate the difference and contradictory relationship between consensus and conflict (Lipset, 1990: 20). In opposite, Lipset claims through empirical examples, that both consensus and conflict are interrelated within complex societies. Rationalist agonism argues that all societies have internal tensions and conflicts. What differentiates it from antagonism is that the Lipsetian interpretation considers the institutional consensus essential in order for society to sustain (see Lipset, 1990).

## 4 Conclusions

The thesis is reaching its end. Let us recapture. The reconstruction generated a deeper understanding for the political theory of cosmopolitanism and made its harmonious idea of the political visible. The critical discussion identified the most problematic issues of cosmopolitanism and subjected them towards critical political perspectives. Together these two parts of analysis has captured and developed a deeper sense of what the harmonious theory of cosmopolitanism infers. So where are we now? What have we understood and what conclusions could be drawn?

First, let us go back to the beginning. Even though the theory of cosmopolitanism is not widely recognized in the public debate and is rather limited to the academic debate, it has influence. In general terms, the contemporary zeitgeist is permeated by the harmonious idea of *the political*. The theory of cosmopolitanism shares this idea of *the political* and is a good example of the contemporary political debate. Somehow, cosmopolitanism is the political theory that has captured the zeitgeist and formulated the political direction on the global arena. Cosmopolitanism is therefore not interesting only because of the influential position it has, but also because in a bigger picture, studying cosmopolitanism will help us to understand the real political direction of the contemporary globalized world.

What is interesting with the theory of cosmopolitanism is that it has an almost transcendental character. The transcendental position of cosmopolitanism in the theoretical debate resembles of the theory of democracy in the public debate. When a theory becomes transcendental it almost become invisible. It becomes so normalized and broadly accepted, that it loses its political heat.

It is on the basis of these reasons that made the critical analyze of the theory interesting.

The four dimensions of cosmopolitanism that I have identified, guided me to the critical subjects of the theory where their ambitions and claims were not undisputed. In the reconstruction I first framed the claims of cosmopolitanism and then derived the claims to larger traditions of ideas. Thereafter, I exposed these claims against critique and further exposed the critique to critique. Where did this analysis take us? Well, it has given us insight in the strength and stability of the theory of cosmopolitanism.

For starters, there was the temporal dimension. The reconstruction captured the cosmopolitan perception of time as being something linear that has, through the

ideological battle of liberalism and socialism, resulted in the end point of history where liberalism is undisputed. The only implications that are appointed are possibly cultural ones. These cultural side-effects are later discussed in the critical discussion from different perspectives. Certainly we have a hegemonical ideology in these times. But claiming the end point of history is quite unproven for. Claiming history having an end point at all is problematic and impossible to prove. It has never happened before which makes it from a rationalist position impossible to find empirical evidence for such claim. History has proven itself being ongoing even though some periods in history have been long-lasting, like the middle-ages. With a post-structuralist approach, that type of discourse sounds like a power tool to make the others passively accept and adapt to the hegemonical order, eliminate initiatives to visions of another world order. If there are no political alternatives, it is difficult to imagine something else. Thus if the liberal democracy remains hegemonical forever, it might be due to self-fulfilled prophesy. But claiming anything remaining forever is unrealistic per se. Their interpretation of history might be right, but its prophecy is ungrounded.

Further, the implication of cultural contentions is very much disputed. Some rationalists claim cultural contentions is the last challenge before the perfection of liberalism, some claim it is the struggle of civilizations. Empirically, it is possible to prove tendencies towards both perspectives. Further, some post-structuralists claim that the political contentions are more constructive than cultural. Žižek does not accept culture as the basis of contention at all. He claims that political conflicts are reformulated into minority issues. Cosmopolitanism does not meet this critique. Cultural conflicts are not seen as something problematic. As long as the extent of diversity is within the limits of what is considered legitimate. Cultural implications beyond that point are seen as extremism. Conflicts are however seen as something transitional and thus not seen as problematic. The unclarity with this dimension is the undefined *legitimate* border of cultural diversity. Also it is unclarity about the positions seeing cultural contentions as inherent or constructed.

The spatial dimension was in the reconstruction interpreted as cosmopolitanism claiming overlapping territorial authorities. In the critical discussion the idea of a borderless world is discussed from different positions. Post-structuralists claim there can be no *us* without an *other*, but there is no cosmopolitan discussion regarding who is included and who is not included. This is especially visible in the discussion on cosmopolitan democracy. Some cosmopolitans do not make any democratic claims when proposing the three-party solution of decision-making. On the other hand, there are cosmopolitans that propose a cosmopolitan democratic structure which is most inclusive in a three party solution. There is a big problem of precision and clarity in this aspect of the theory. Critics claim these propositions are both elitist and excluding. What is seen as a democratic structure is having deliberate form of democracy that is based on participation. Again it is unclear who is allowed to participate and who is not.

The dimension of values was in the reconstruction focused on that cosmopolitanism promotes universal values that are or could be shared by all. Some cosmopolitans claim that there already are cosmopolitan values and some claim that it is possible to create universal values. The ones suggesting finding the lowest moral limits that could be shared by all, indirectly reveal an assumption of there otherwise being large moral differences between peoples that are not convergent. On the other hand, the cosmopolitans who claim that there already are sets of values, reveal an underlying assumption of there not being any significant diversity and thus no unobtainable diversity. The critique against cosmopolitanism in this context is that it is not idealistic and visionary, but that it is particularistic and pragmatic. The discussion could be quite confusing, but I would claim that if cosmopolitan values being universalistic or pragmatic also depends on if the claims are, as above, value dictums or reality dictums.

The fourth dimension is the practical dimension of decision-making. The reconstruction identified a belief of a shared decision-making between the public and the private sphere – the state, the market and the civil society. Thereafter it was derived to the idea of separation of powers. The critical discussion on this matter focused on the fundamental assumptions of interaction between different social groups. There is a critique that claims the political to be a continuous conflict between the friend and the enemy. The *us* and *them* is according to these antagonists, inevitable. By rationalists this is described as something physical and by post-structuralists as something symbolic. The critique of the critique was the agonists that claim it is possible to acknowledge interest conflicts and still have consensus on the fundamental ideas of decision-making. For the antagonists, conflict is a natural part of human interaction, which means that it is something desirable and progressive. As cosmopolitanism does find conflicts as neither necessary nor awarding in the human interaction, having a conflict dimension in the decision-making process is not seen as significant. However, I find the questions still in need for answer: who is invited? Who invites the participants? Who is left out? The harmonious three-part solution might be good and rewarding, but theoretically cosmopolitanism is not satisfying in this discussion.

As presented, some modest judgments could be made about cosmopolitanism. In several dimensions, the problem of cosmopolitanism seems to be unclarity, lack of precision and conflicting ambitions. Some statements are not satisfyingly argued for, and could even be understood as a bit arbitrary. However, I find it difficult to make any grand conclusions. The extension of this thesis limits the possibilities of the study to make a broader and more thorough analysis which would mean enabling well founded claims and judgments of cosmopolitanism. It would be interesting for future research to make a fully covered idea critique of cosmopolitanism. However, on the basis of the available resources for this thesis, the discussion above and the conclusions drawn from each dimension of cosmopolitanism, a small further collected judgment could be made. What is consistent in the dimensions and in the critical discussions is that cosmopolitans do not see any conflicts that are of significance. Conflicts are not seen as

problematic, and thus not confronted. The total rejection of conflict implies a conflicting approach. If there are no conflicts then everything must work in consensus - harmony. The opposite of conflict is harmony, and thus cosmopolitanism must have a harmonious idea of *the political*.

## 5 Executive summary

Cosmopolitanism is a widely acknowledged theory in the academic debate of global political theory. It is one of the attempts of understanding the changes generated by globalization and an attempt to form a political direction for the global community. The cosmopolitan theory might not be very known in the public political debate, but it is however still influential. The zeitgeist of these times has a harmonious idea of the political. The theory of cosmopolitanism is a part of the zeitgeist as it shares the harmonious perception of the political. The political claims of cosmopolitanism coincide very well with the direction which the global political community is taking. The cosmopolitan theory seem to even be reaching a transcendental position in global political theory.

Therefore the aim of this study is to get a perception of- and analyze, the cosmopolitan assumptions of the nature of politics. This thesis is thus an attempt of conducting an idea critique on the political theory of cosmopolitanism. The analysis is further divided into two main parts where one is a reconstruction and one is a critical discussion.

The reconstruction has two subchapters. The first one thematizes and processes the cosmopolitan literature. The second part of the reconstruction contextualizes the political claims of cosmopolitanism and derives them to larger traditions of ideas. Together the two parts of the reconstruction allows a penetrating analysis of the political theory of cosmopolitanism.

The first part of the reconstruction is based on four analytical dimensions that I have identified: the temporal dimension, the spatial dimension, the dimension of values, and the practical dimension of decision-making. Each dimension will first be discussed in general terms and then strengthened by interpreting some quotes from the cosmopolitan literature. The temporal dimension discusses the historical concept of cosmopolitanism. What can be stated is that cosmopolitanism believes that liberalism has won the historical ideological battle and the evolution of mankind has reached the place in history where all conflicts in society are disappearing and what is left is to pragmatically perfect the world order by cosmopolitizing it. The spatial dimension concern the perception of territory and the cosmopolitan project of re-territoriality. The contemporary cosmopolitan theory does not want to eliminate all borders. Rather the literature proposes an overlapping structure of territorial authorities with an addition of a cosmopolitan level of decision-making. The dimension of values discusses the universal belief that there are or could be sets of values that are globally shared. There are

different bids here. There are claims of there already being cosmopolitan values. The UN declaration of human rights and the liberal democratic model, are two suggestions. Another bid is that it is possible to create a set of values that could be cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan values are according to this bid, the lowest moral limit of mankind. The practical dimension of decision-making is the dimension that concerns the specific claims for shared power between different social groups in the decision-making process. The suggestion of cosmopolitanism is according to the literature, inclusion of both public and private actors in the decision-making process. Over all the groups in society that are viewed as legitimate participants are the states, the economy and the civil society.

After capturing the most central political claims of cosmopolitanism, they are derived to larger traditions of ideas. In the discussion, the cosmopolitan claims are argued for having possible connections to three different traditions of ideas. First the historical changes are by cosmopolitans interpreted as based on ideological struggles which could be connected to having an idealistic concept of history. The liberal idea of natural law is further connected to cosmopolitanism. There is a cosmopolitan belief that cultural contentions are possible side-effect of re-territorialization. These are however seen as transitional and solved in time. The liberal idea of the invisible hand could be associated to the cosmopolitan belief, as they both believe that conflicts are bad and that the natural dynamics of society will eliminate them. The three-party solution of decision-making is later connected to the idea of separation of powers. The monarch being represented by the state, the aristocracy being the economy and the democracy represented by the civil society. All of the cosmopolitan claims imply a harmonious perception of the nature of politics. The ideas that cosmopolitanism are associated with strengthens this perception. Thus the conclusion that is drawn from the reconstruction is that cosmopolitanism tends towards having a harmonious idea of the political.

The next part of the analysis is the critical discussion of cosmopolitan claims. The critical discussion subjects the most problematic issues of cosmopolitanism against critical positions from both rationalist and post-structuralist perspectives. The issues that are under discussion are: cultural implications, borderless inclusion, universalism vs. particularism and antagonism vs. agonism. Within each critical discussion, the critique of cosmopolitanism will also be exposed to critique. Thus the critical discussion will thus be threefold.

Cultural implications is the part that deals with the cultural implications that are by cosmopolitans seen as the down-side of the consensus that follows the end of history and re-territorialization. Some critics claim that there are indications of unifying but rather that there are indications of society becoming divided between West and Islam. Some critics claim that consensus has resulted in cultural conflicts instead of political conflicts, which is more difficult to handle. Another voice is that cultural conflicts are deceiving and that the post-political consensus society, reformulates political injustices into minority questions. Borderless inclusion is the part that treats the difficulties of wiping out the borders between

*us* and *them* in the cosmopolitan context. Some critics maintain that it is impossible to constitute *us* without an *other*. This difficulty is personified in the democratic claims of cosmopolitanism that are contradictory and need precision. Some cosmopolitans do not make any democratic claims while others build the cosmopolitan vision on the basis of a cosmopolitan democracy. Further there is the democratic position of cosmopolitanism that is based on participation, which is a word that does not include resistance. Participation is argued to solely concern inclusion of *us*. Universalism vs. particularism is an intervening discussion on the universality and visionary tendencies of cosmopolitan values. This is a discussion where some universalist critics claim that cosmopolitanism is pragmatic, non-visionary and aiming at universalizing particularism. The pluralist position criticizes the two ideas from the position that universalism does not make room for diversity. Lack of precision makes it difficult to identify cosmopolitanism in this discussion. The antagonism vs. agonism part, is a thorough discussion about the dynamics of interaction between social groups and the possibilities of harmony and conflicts in decision making. The antagonists believe that the political is based on a friend enemy dichotomy that is by some physically real and by some symbolic. The agonists tries to find a middle way between conflict and harmony and believes that it should be acknowledged that society is based on conflicts between social groups, but that they can exist in harmony under the transcendental wings of democracy.

Together the reconstruction and the critical discussion create an understanding for cosmopolitanism and enable a discussion on the strength and consistency of cosmopolitanism. The extent of this thesis does not give cosmopolitanism full justice. The study is small and making very strong statements might not be fully justified. However on the basis of the discussions of the analysis, the conclusion is that cosmopolitanism has some problems with clarity and precision. Further, at some points, cosmopolitanism also does not have totally satisfying reasoning. However, it can be concluded that cosmopolitanism has a harmonious idea of the political.

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