Mission implausible?

A study of EU foreign policy behaviour

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Abstract

This thesis has the ESDP/CSDP missions as its focal point. The purpose of this study is twofold: first to create a comparative overview of all the missions to map out the behavioural patterns. The descriptive part of the analysis will present the missions mandates, their result and also try to see whether the individual operations can be said to have been successful or not. The second objective is to translate, apply and test the theoretical framework of capacity to act on the missions. This theory has its origins in the school of thought called foreign policy analysis. The reason for using the concept of capacity to act is to see if it can help analyse the foreign policy behaviour of the ESDP/CSDP. The conclusions drawn from the analysis is that capacity to act can help, to a certain degree, when you want to depict the casual mechanisms behind the success or failure of an actor's foreign policy behaviour. The conclusion also makes some general assumptions about ESDP/CSDP behaviour, that it is experimental and has a wide array of tools and competences at its disposal. The negative side is the fact that the missions are often only partially fulfilling their mandates.

Key words: EU, CSDP, missions, foreign policy analysis, capacity to act
Words: 18 456

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1   Introduction

The small seaside city of Saint Malo is by many considered to be the birthplace of the European Security and Defence Policy. The reason for this is that it was there, during a British-French summit, that the first trembling steps were taken into a new and hitherto relatively sparsely trodden track. The foundations were laid down in a document that took its name from its place of origin, The Saint Malo Declaration (Howorth 2007: 33-34). The Policy area has since grown tremendously and got its current name the Common Security and Defence Policy with the Lisbon Treaty. Since 2003 the EU has launched, depending on how you count; around 25 missions both close and far away from home[1]. The study of the Common Security and Defence policy represents a relatively new branch of the research field concerned with studying the European Union. It also represents a new field within the area or international relations. The main reason for this is simply that the policy area has only been around since 1999.

This thesis is about the missions conducted under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Or put differently my focus lies on what the European Union is actually doing when it comes to the ESDP/CSDP. This is also a thesis that is concerned with the foreign policy behaviour of the EU. Is there a general pattern that can be gleamed when you look at all of the missions to date? As an aide to help me map out the behavioural landscape I will be using a theoretical framework that has its origins in a specific school of thought called Foreign Policy Analysis.

The framework relies upon the notion of national attributes as an underlying causal mechanism when it comes to explaining the behaviour of an actor. The framework of explaining actor activities utilizes the concept of capacity to act when analyzing foreign policy behaviour (East 1982:123-142). An aspect of this thesis is also to test whether this theory can be applied successfully when analyzing EU foreign policy behaviour. The method I am employing is a comparative one; I am comparing the missions against one another and over time. This overview of the missions is then coupled with the theory and together they make out the basis of my analysis.

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[1] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN 110524

1.1 Thesis purpose and questions to be answered

Why then is this interesting and what would be the purpose of conducting this study? Well very few studies cover the ESDP/CSDP missions to begin with. Research dealing with Foreign Policy behaviour and the ESDP/CSDP are even scarcer. Another reason would be to test the theoretical framework and see if it can help us understand the topic at hand. The questions I hoping to answer are as follows:

- Will analyzing the missions help us understand ESDP/CSDP foreign policy behaviour?
- If so, what behavioural patterns are there and what can these tell us about the performance and the nature of the ESDP/CSDP?
- Can the theoretical concept of capacity to act be translated and used to analyze and understand this behaviour?

1.2 Scope

I am only studying the missions. The information provided in the analysis mostly covers the mandate and how successful the fulfilling of said mandate can be considered to be. This is then coupled with the theory and from this I draw my conclusions. I am not looking in depth at the institutional frameworks of the ESDP/CSDP and the EU or the progression of these throughout the different treatises and other legislative acts. I am also not analyzing the member states, neither funding from them or the EU institutions. Not included more than briefly are also third party states and organizations such as NATO or the UN. I am also not studying the recipient countries in any larger capacity.

Mentioning everything I am not doing might strike the reader as odd but I would just like to mention these parameters to show you that I am indeed aware of them but that my focus lies elsewhere. I have deemed the scope of my thesis to be enough when it comes to producing a result to draw sufficient conclusions from. This does not mean that I am not aware of other angles that you could tackle my problem from, my choices depict, a way, and not the only one available.

1.3   Research material

The material I have gathered comes from secondary information sources. This means books, journal articles and conference papers. I am also to some degree using the EU web pages when dealing with for instance the newer missions that have not yet been written about by scholars. A word of caution must be raised about the fact that I am relying heavily on a small source of information when it comes to the descriptive parts of the analysis. This is being done out of necessity more than choice. That material is being published by European Union Institute for Security Studies, a European Union Agency so there are some concerns about independent thought and objectivity when it comes to that source of information.

The reason for not using primary sources like various types of legislative texts became clear just after I where done downloading them all and categorizing them according to mission. They are namely too technical to be of relevance when it comes to the purpose of my thesis. When referring to the material I am primarily using two different techniques the Harvard system for books, articles and such. The web pages however are being referred to with footnotes.

1.4   Research overview

My master thesis deals with a quite specific part of the European Union namely the Common Security and Defence Policy. This area is well defined in many ways, first of all in time since the ESDP was launched in 1999. Since then the study of the ESDP/CSDP has taken quite different directions. The aims of this overview will therefore be an effort to map out the theoretical and empirical landscape. But first of all let's not dawdle any longer but jump right in to the task at hand. As the account below will show there are a wide range of angles to use when you deal with a subject of study such as mine. The first of these is the pure descriptive one. There are quite a few examples of authors who just make it their aim to try to describe the origins of and the emergence behind the ESDP/CSDP. The foremost example of this is the book by Howorth from 2007 and after several hours of reading articles his book is still the best and most ambitious account of the topic. He covers most of the different empirical aspects, like the missions, and also tries to give his take on some of the debates going on within the academic community that studies the ESDP/CSDP.
The first one of these debates or angles is what I call the definitions debate. They are authors who have made it their calling to try to define this new and unfamiliar entity that is the ESDP/CSDP. We have several examples and if I have to give an example of one it would be for instance the articles by Rummel (2002), Bendiek (2006) Bailes (2008), Clarke & Cornish (2002) and Zwolski (2009).

These titles and the topic of trying to define what the future of the quite new ESDP/CSDP would do is a common theme and also one that is quite symptomatic to

many scholars the dealing with the EU. But there are of course both pros and cons with this stance, there are the obvious advantage of trying to accurately describe what the CSDP is and what it is not. The disadvantage to me at least is when this is the only thing being done. Defining and then from that definition predicting future behaviour is a quite common theme trough many of the articles. Most of the authors seem to draw the conclusion and agree that it is too early to tell what will happen. Drawing possible scenarios has its merits but when the sole aim of your study is to define then at least to me you are missing something.

Another aspect is the literature that deals with ESDP/CSDP and the relationship with NATO and the US. Clarke & Cornish (2002), Hofmann (2009), Howorth (2009), Irondelle & Merand (2010), Peters (2004), Schweiss (2003), Watanabe (2005) all deal with these topics in some way. The future of NATO and the relationship between EU and the US when it comes to joint military ventures abroad and in Europe's neighborhood seems to be a the main concerns of the authors in question. Will the EU step up to the plate and become a true and equal partner to the US or will the Americans stay the only power with the ability to police the world? Is the EU launching its own version of NATO via the CSDP and trying to rival the US? Can the CSDP really transform the EU into a real superpower or is this just a toothless endeavour with no future? Is the creation of a military capability the wrong way for the European community?

These questions and more are being raised by the authors above when it comes to the Common Security and Defence Policy and its current and future applications. This area of study is indeed relevant since the EU and the US has so close ties. But many times like what has been said above it all breaks down to what the EU is not, namely a nation state. Defining and analyzing something like the EU can be very difficult when you adopt a state-lens so to speak. I would therefore say that if you want to make a comparison between the EU and the US or NATO you have to keep this in mind. You also have to remember that many of the member states are also members of NATO. To me the really productive way of dealing with this dilemma is to view the CSDP and NATO as to different foreign policy tools or arenas if you will. Can tools compete then? Well that depends on who is using the tools and for what purpose. Some problems are better solved with one type of tools and other are in need of something different. Some of the authors do not really seem to be aware of this distinction.

An additional feature of this field of study seems to be concerned with EU's relation with a certain region or a certain member states and the CSDP's impact on said recipient. Examples are Biscop (2003), Chappell (2010), Chen & Lu (2010), Devine (2009), Eliasson (2004), Ferreira-Pereira (2007), Gross (2007), Jakobsen (2009) Lee-Ohlsson (2009), Longhurst & Miskimmon (2007), Missiroli (2002), Olsen (2009), Piiparinen (2008), Rontoyanni (2002), Scheipers & Sicurelli (2008), Splidsboel-Hansen (2002), Vanhoonacker & Jacobs (2010). All of these authors are all describing the current and future impacts that the EU has or could have when it comes to the CSDP. How does this new military capability effect countries that prior to joining the EU where seen as neutral? Will this policy transform the relationship with African countries? Does Russia feel threatened by the emergence of the CSDP? Was the EU successful in their peacekeeping mission in Congo? These and many

other questions are dealt with by the authors of the articles above but they share some core features in that they all either describe, predict and evaluate the CSDP in relation to actors within or outside the EU.

This description of mine might not seem very revolutionary; these could all be seen as core features any type of research. They all illuminate a certain relationship that the EU has with either a member state or neighbour and what the impact of the CSDP has on that relationship. They are all interesting in their own regard but neither of them gives you a broader picture since they deal with specific relationships. Another building-block in this study is the one dealing with the inner mechanics of the CSDP, the institutions and what type of relationships they have between themselves, the member states and the outer world. Dijkstra (2011), Juncos & Pomorska (2010), Juncos & Pomorska (2006), Keukeleire, Thiers & Justaert (2009), Mérand, Hofmann & Irondelle (2010), Reynolds (2006), Reynolds (2007), Scannell (2004), Smith (2011), Webber et al (2003) all deal with these questions in some regard or the other. It could either be governance structures or relationships between different institutional bodies created by the Lisbon Treaty.

They deal with new institutions versus old and member states versus them all. Who is actually in power and who is influencing the agenda and how is this policy getting created and with which instruments? This branch of the research field is perhaps the one that to a larger degree deals with questions of democracy, transparency and accountability. I can only agree in this notion that studying the decision making process of the CSDP is highly interesting and very relevant. Mapping out the institutional landscape is never a bad thing when you want to understand the inner workings of something so complex and unique as the EU and its CSDP. With that said I am not claiming that the other branches are not relevant because they are.

A few of the articles deals with the need of a strategic profile for the CSDP, Biscop (2002), Bonvicini & Regelsberger (2007), Cornish & Edwards (2001) but maybe the EU already has a one? My niche in the research field is the missions; they are the focal point from which the analysis stems. There are however not that many researchers that deals with the missions. The absolutely best account that I have been able to find so far is a book published by The European Union Institute for Security Studies, the book is aptly named European Security and Defence Policy - The first ten years (1999-2009) and covers all of the missions that have been carried out between these years. The book is descriptive in its nature and presents the missions chronologically. For the missions after this I have had to use the Councils homepage to get the facts I need. The only thing that can be said about this is that since this book is the backbone of my thesis there is not much room for alternate views so in many ways I am forced to take their word as truth in this instance because they provide information that is not easy to come by in any other way.

What they do not do however is to apply any theory which gives lots of room for me and anyone else interested to do just that. With this said I really hope that we will see much more in-depth accounts of the missions because it really is interesting to study what the EU actually does within the framework of the ESDP/CSDP.

2 Theory

2.1 The European Union as an actor

The first thing that needs to be done before we proceed with the analytical framework is that we need to define what type of actor we are dealing with. Otherwise it will be an almost impossible feat to understand its behaviour. What then is an actor? In International Relations the term refers to the key components in the political machinery most often the states. According to classical Realist theory the states are the only real actors, other polities such as nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations or other types of transnational institutions are sub-actors. The realist notion of actors and sub-actors has widely contested and current debate is in many ways more nuanced. There has however not been any major progress in the field of International Relations when it comes to actually defining what type of actor the EU really is or even if the EU can be considered a actor at all (Bretherton & Vogler 2000:15-22). According to Gunnar Sjöstedt the then European Community fulfilled the necessary requirements when it comes to actorness: "being discernable from its environment" and that it has a "minimal degree of internal cohesion."(ibid 2000:37). Bretherton & Vogler goes further than this and draws up a set of assumptions or requirements needed when it comes to actorness:

1. *Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles.*
2. *The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies.*
3. *The ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system.*
4. *The availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments.*
5. *Domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities relating to external policy.*
    (2000:38)

According to the authors these requirements are fulfilled by the EU and that is to them a proof of actorness (ibid 2000:37). Accepting that the European Union as a whole is an actor with specific abilities is one thing. This thesis explores one specific aspect of policymaking namely that belonging to the ESDP/CSDP. Theories referring to what type Foreign Policy actor the EU is has occurred for a while now, two of the more influential concepts used are Francois Duchêne's civilian power Europe and Ian Manners Normative Power Europe. There are other examples as well of scholars wanting to describe the nature of the European Union when it comes to foreign policy. In my opinion they all share the trait that they seem to focus on what separates the EU as an actor from all other actors in the international arena. They are all looking for a definition that encompasses the essence of the actor, the attributes that makes the EU unique. The need to define and separate the EU from other actors on the stage is natural, but in my opinion you could gain lots of insight simply by

looking at the shared traits as well. To study what the EU actually has in common with other actors could also give interesting results. Defining the actorness of the EU is all very well as long as you take into account that the foreign policy competence of has been evolving over time and that it is not a static polity, meaning that a certain theoretical concept might be true for a specific point or time period (Aggestam, 2008:2-3).

The specific policy field this thesis is interested in deals with a quite narrow time frame. The ambition to add a security and defence competence to the EU came about in 1999. We are therefore dealing with a policy field that is young and an actor that is applying its competences and testing abilities within a new domain. An additional aspect is that the emergence of the ESDP/CSDP does not mean that the individual member states have given up their own international agendas. This policy area is joint venture, a project where the member states come together and collectively realise, for instance, border missions that are in line with their domestic agendas. Having a unified plan and institutional setup to implement and propel said plan is therefore the case. The ambition is not to supplant domestic interests but to enable them (Howorth 2007:1-2). You could say that the way the member states the sharing competences improves and enhances the actorness for them and for the European Union as a whole.

2.2   Introducing the Theory

One of the main features of this thesis is to test theory, or put differently I am testing to see whether a theoretical framework, national attributes and its impact on state capacity to act can be translated and used to analyze the ESDP/CSDP missions. The framework is described in chapter six of the book "Why nations act" by Maurice A. East et al. The foundation for this can be derived from the notion that national attributes affect the foreign policy behaviour of a state (1982:123).

Maurice A. East is said to belong to a school of theoretical thought called foreign policy analysis. According to Neck et.al his generation of foreign policy analysis, the first one, were mainly doing quantitative positivist research. They were often using comparative methodologies and the aim was to produce broad general assumptions that could be applicable on a larger scale. Neck stresses that many of these scholars were actually breaking new ground and creating new theories that the second generation, which she belongs to, were able to draw upon. The first generation scholars were a quite small group with a large ambition to carve its own niche in the study of foreign policy and International relations. The second generation is according to the author much more diverse and is employing a wide range of methodologies. They have expanded the area in many ways both drawing from the first generation and creating new research angles. The main thing that they have in common is this diversity. It is quite hard to pin the theory down and say the main thing that the field of study has in common is that they, put simply, adopt different ways to analyse foreign policy behaviour (1995:3-13).

So why then have I made the decision to use East's version that clearly is considered to mainly belong to the past and is more seen as an inspiration? Well basically because I want to try it out and because I believe it fits quite well with the methodology I have chosen. I have also not yet been able to find a similar study that covers these aspects and tests this theory, using my method on this topic. This to me makes it even more interesting because I get to try something out that has not been done before. One of the main endeavours of this thesis is to see whether East's theory on national attributes can be translated, adopted and used to map out the foreign policy behaviour of the EU by studying the ESDP/CSDP missions. Why then use a theory that is clearly designed for analyzing nation states on an actor that is not? I will say that I am fully aware that the European Union is not a state; its foreign policy behaviour will therefore not be completely the same as a state's would be. What the EU is however is a collection of member states and institutions. With that in mind I have therefore made the hypothesis that some of the driving forces behind state behaviour should be the same with the EU. One way to see if this is true is consequently to use a theoretical framework designed for states. I am testing this model to see if it tells us something about the foreign policy behaviour of the ESDP/CSDP. If it does not, then I will be the first one to say so.

There has not really been that much research when it comes to my topic and foreign policy analysis which is another reason for testing the theory. The reason might be that it does not fit and that foreign policy analysis should be left to the study of states and state behaviour. So are there any alternatives to this theory that I have chosen? Well of course there are many alternative theories available. Howorth has his view of theory and the ESDP/CSDP, namely that the most common thing about the study is that it is lacking theory. He says that there have been many attempts by researchers to relate the field of study with some theoretical framework or model and in his opinion none of them have really succeeded (2007:24). I can definitely agree there is a lack of usable theory. I guess that I myself could have used some of the grand theories available in International Relations. Menon for instance uses institutional theory when trying to explain EU foreign policy (2011). Rynning, (2011) uses a realist account and argues that it can further the understanding of the CSDP. Normative power theory is also a popular theory to apply (Björkdahl, 2008). They also share the feature that they test theory, the same way I am doing. I concur with Howorth's opinion that there really is not any theory that is completely applicable, but then again is there ever? This does not stop me however; I am fully committed to the task at hand a willing to test this state centric framework on the ESDP/CSDP missions. The purpose testing theory in this manner is to enrich the study as a whole. This thesis therefore has a quite exploratory essence to it which I hope it will benefit from.

What then are national attributes? Well according to Hudson, who also covers the national attributes perspective, they can for instance be: natural resources, geography, demographics, political system, military capabilities and economic capabilities (2007:144-153). Resources therefore include both people and material, a quite wide description, which constitutes a nations power base. In this case they are the resources available to the state for use in foreign policy. If you couple that concept with what East calls the nation's ability to allocate those resources, the socioeconomic development you end up with is the concept of capability to act. So number of resources and the utilization of said resources are at the core of the concept. The power base is then the amount of resources available to the actor, a large amount means that you will have more to use in the state foreign policy and a small amount means that you will have less. The socioeconomic development or social organization means the effectiveness of the state to use these resources. A country that has a high power base and high social organization has a high capacity to act and the opposite is true for a country that scores low on this scale. A combination of high and low will yield a medium capacity to act. Differences in capability to act will then have consequences on the foreign policy behaviour of the state. First of all this means that the scoring will influence what type of policy issues the state engages in. A state with low capacity to act will want to address that problem and choose policies that will increase its impact and expand its capacity to act. They will for the same reason avoid policies that might weaken their position. Like for instance joining the EU and participating in an ESDP/CSDP mission. Secondly this means that a low capacity state also will tend to choose low cost techniques when pursuing their policies. This means adopting multilateral ways instead of bilateral which would be the case of a high ranking state. Thirdly a state with a low capacity to act will furthermore be restricted when it comes to the tools available for processing foreign policies. Fewer government institutions with weak interinstitutional cooperation, fewer civil servants with less information which then will hamper the decisions and the scope that the state will produce (1982:123-137). East proposes that from what is stated above you can draw these four basic assumptions:

1. "Limitations on nation's resources will place limitations on the foreign policy activities of that nation."
2. "Given any level of resources, the nation with the highest social organization will be able to convert and control its resources most effectively."
3. "Nations with a high capacity to act will tend to use their capacity in foreign policy."
4. "Foreign policy decision makers will attempt to utilize their nation's capacity to act in a manner that will maximize the achievement of their foreign policy goals."

(East 1982:137-138)

What it all boils down to is that the level of a nation-states capacity to act will have influence over the foreign policy behaviour of that state and it is this view that I will be using when it comes to the ESDP/CSDP missions.

2.2.1 Graphical interpretation showing the relationship of the components within the theoretical framework.

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                    ┌──────────────┐
                ┌──▶│  Power Base  │───┐
                │   └──────────────┘   │      ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
┌─────────────┐ │   ┌──────────────┐   └─────▶│ Capacity to act│       │ Foreign Policy   │
│ National    │─┼──▶│ Social       │─────────▶│              │───┐    │ Behaviour        │
│ Attributes  │ │   │ Organization │          └──────┬───────┘   │    └──────────────────┘
└─────────────┘ │   └──────────────┘                 │           │
                │   ┌──────────────┐          ┌──────▼───────┐   │
                └──▶│ Predispositions│────────▶│ Choice of    │──▶│
                    │ to act       │          │ Foreign Policy│
                    └──────────────┘          └──────────────┘
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(Inspired by the depiction in East 1982:133)

2.3   Translating and situating the theoretical concepts

Simply stating the different aspects and components of the theoretical framework is of course important but in order for them to apply to our case we have to translate and interpret them in a European Union setting. The specific policy field and the inherent limitations within it is also an aspect that needs to be addressed. There is therefore a necessity to translate and situate the concepts of power base and social organization described above to fit the context of the ESDP/CSDP. These two notions are part of the capability to act concept and will shape the choice of action taken in regard to the situation at hand. From the choice of suitable action we will get the behaviour if we are to believe the graphic representation shown above (East 1982:133).

2.3.1   The power base of the ESDP/CSDP

According to East the power base of a country is the amount of resources available to it when it comes to foreign policy (East 1982:132). A clarification might be needed for the sake of argument, power base is therefore not simply the collective power base of all the member states but the amount of resources they are willing to contribute to the ESDP/CSDP. For the ESDP/CSDP this would then mean the resources allocated to it. There is a distinction between having resources and being willing to contribute.

According to Grevi and Keohane one of the major constraints of the ESDP/CSDP has been the lack of resources. There are also problems when it comes to having the right type of resources. The military capabilities of the member states have not always been in tune with the needs of the missions. Since the European Union does not have any military capabilities of its own, all necessary provisions are being provided by the member states which will naturally have an impact upon the missions (Grevi & Keohane 2009:69-71).

There are also differences when it comes to funding; military missions are to a large extent funded by the member states. From problems arising in the first missions the need to have some form of initial pool of funding was identified. The Athena mechanism was created and from it the preparatory stages of the missions could be paid for. Member states contribute to Athena according to size of national GDP. The bulk of the costs are however covered by the member states involved in the missions. This means that member states with big resources or large foreign policy ambitions are more likely to get involved in the military operations since they in the end are the ones paying for them. The EU has since the beginning of the ESDP/CSDP developed and enhanced its capabilities, something that needs to be taken into account when we later in the analysis will map out the missions. The capabilities and the resources have changed from 2003 to 2011 and are continuously evolving, the total expenditure on military capabilities increased with 29% from 1999 to 2009, (Grevi & Keohane 2009:75-81)

The funding of civilian missions is a different matter since they can draw resources from the European Union's budget. In 2004 the EU spent 44, 2 million Euros on civilian ESDP/CSDP missions; in 2009 the budget was estimated to amount to 210 million. Another aspect of funding civilian missions is that since it comes from the EU's budget the European Parliament must approve. This is something that has not always gone smooth. The European Parliament has accused the Council of keeping them in the dark and not providing enough or sufficient information when it comes to spending. When the budget has been approved it is up to the Commission to carry out the actual implementation (Grevi & Keohane 2009:90-94).

The overall impression when it comes to power base is that the EU is steadily evolving and enlarging it. If this progression is visible in the performance of the missions we will leave to the analysis to decide. Having resources and utilizing them are two different things, an aspect that I will deal with in the next section.

2.3.2 The social organization of the ESDP/CSDP

The social organization of the EU when it comes to the security and defence policy is to a large extent dependent on the institutional setup of the ESDP/CSDP. They and the member states are the tools that shape the resources, which utilize them in the missions. It is therefore necessary to study the evolution of the institutions if we are to fully understand the capability to act and in extension the foreign policy behaviour of the EU visible trough the missions. The decision always lies with the member states; the road up to one is however achieved via bargaining and deliberation in the institutions. One thing that was stated from the beginning is that the ESDP/CSDP must be given an institutional setup capable of dealing and utilizing the political ambitions of the member states. To be able to act you have to have a functioning institutional framework that is there from the beginning to the end to enable the decisions and actions (Grevi 2009:19-20). Grevi calls the social organization of the ESDP its capability to decide:

"In this perspective, the capacity to decide can be defined as the ability to formulate, adopt and implement decisions. In terms of ESDP, this capacity entails five key functions, namely the ability to agree common political and strategic priorities, to develop the conceptual framework for EU crisis management, to collect adequate information and generate joint analysis, to harness and expand the military, civilian and financial resources available to the Union, and to carry out crisis management operations." (2009:20).

Mapping out the entire institutional landscape is perhaps not within the scope of this thesis; the interested reader can however find examples of such endeavours within the literature Howorth (2007:69) and Grevi (2009:27). Another necessary thing that we will have to bear in mind is that the institutions have been in a constant development from the very beginning. This evolution has been driven by both experiences gained during the missions and by the treaty revisions and treaty reforms. The latest addition is of course the Lisbon Treaty (Grevi 2009:21, 59). We will see if these constants flux in institutional competences are visible in the performance of the missions.

To end this foray into conceptualization I will try to motivate my method of analyzing the missions. First of all we are mainly looking into three different variables, the mandate, the result or fulfilment of the mandate and the success of the missions. All of these variables are dependent on the resources applied and the utilization of the resources. They are therefore in my opinion the best choice at hand when it comes to fulfilling the purposes of this research. I would also like to point out that looking at these variables you can get indications about the size of the power base and the level of social organization. I am not in any way proposing that these are the only casual mechanisms behind EU behaviour. Finding the variables within the literature might also prove a bit problematic since they are not always stated in a plain manner.

3   Methodology

The method I am employing throughout this thesis is rather straightforward. I am conducting a study whose intent is to discern a behavioural pattern. This is in essence being done by using a technique called longitudal comparative design. Put differently I am making a study of an actor, the European Union, and comparing it with itself over time (Hermann & East 1982:12).

Why then use this technique? Well I am trying to paint a broad picture, it's the overview I am interested in and what that can tell us about the behavioural traits. The analysis itself will encompass all of the missions to date and will describe their mandate, result and how successful they were. This might seem like a lightweight thing to do simply describe the characteristics of the missions. But going in to too much detail about the missions themselves would make this thesis to descriptive; I am not conducting case studies however interesting that would be.

The analysis depicts all of the missions chronologically; they are also separated according to where in the world they have taken place. I am fully aware that bunching together all of the African missions under that heading might seem a bit crude but since they share common features it still serves a purpose. The reason for separating the missions according to geography is because this gives the reader and me continuity, especially because of the fact that many of the missions in a country or region is often followed up by another. Jumping between missions and describing them simply in the order that they were initiated will not however help me bring across the points that I am trying to make. I am treating the regions as separate policy areas and will also accordingly see if the EU is changing its foreign policy behaviour in the same way.

It must be mentioned that this method of separation is only chosen because I believe it will help my case, an example of an article that have made the same distinction is "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning" (Asseburg & Kempin 2011: 184-185) and some inspiration can be said to have been derived from their method of grouping the missions. An excellent book that does the opposite thing and gets away with it completely is "European Security and Defence Policy - The First 10 years 1999-2009" (Bulut et al. 2009). They conduct their overview of the missions in chronological order which makes perfect sense since they are depicting them more in a historical fashion than I am. These are just some examples that will give you a sense of why I have chosen this method when describing the missions in the analysis.

Each descriptive element is then in turn followed by an account that tries to link the empirical findings to the theory. Since this thesis is twofold, I am both describing the missions and linking them to a theoretical framework. I thought it might be helpful for the reader to have these two separated. In this way you yourself decide whether theory and empiric facts can be coupled together in the way I am doing. This

is a way of making my reasoning a bit more transparent than if I for instance would have incorporated both of them in the same text. The analysis is followed by a result section which is there to sum up and gather the information from the analysis. I think this also makes it easier for the reader to remember everything before moving on to the conclusion.

We are perhaps getting a bit ahead of ourselves; first I think there is a necessity to understand why I have chosen to conduct this thesis in this specific manner. When you choose your method there is always a reason why you pick a code of conduct that helps you message get across. My thesis is centred on the missions, they are what I am an analyzing, and from them I will then by means of theory and facts draw certain conclusions.

It was therefore necessary to depict the missions in some way. The thing for me has been to do this without going to deep in to the technicalities even though they are very interesting. I on the other hand am mostly looking at the mandate, purpose and result and then I am by coupling it with theory trying to depict a pattern of foreign policy behaviour.

Another purpose is of course to discern if the theory can be used at all when explaining foreign policy behaviour by the EU. Is this then the only method available if you want to study behaviour the way I do? Well naturally no, there are several ways to actually do a comparative analysis. According to Denk there are essentially three types of comparative studies: descriptive, interpretative and predicative. The logic for naming them in this manner is rather straightforward. A descriptive study aims at describing political entities, and events in a set arena that could be for instance in a state or several states. An interpretative study is on the other hand trying to go beyond merely describing the reality, this type tries to understand why certain things are happening and looking for the causal effects behind those The purpose for this is to understand why something has happened and why something is happening right now. Predicative studies on the other hand takes this a step further than the interpretative and aims at predicting possible future events by looking at what has happened (2002:7-20).

These archetypical versions of categorizing comparative studies is perhaps not the most precise tool, but if I were to hazard a guess my method would fall into the interpretative category. This thesis is drawing conclusions from a specific set of events, the comparison is how the EU chooses to act in different situations, why act in a certain way in Georgia and another in Indonesia, what does that behaviour tell us about the ESDP/CSDP and in the end the EU? These are the type of questions I am looking to answer.

Denk says that there is a certain structure to a comparative study; first you have a problem, secondly from that you create one or several question and describe your intent. The third state is twofold addressing sources of information and the analytical tools used to analyze it. The fourth stage is the analysis that then ends up in the conclusion where the questions posed will hopefully be answered. This is a quite accurate measure of what I am doing in this thesis, I have a problem namely that I want to understand what type of foreign policy behaviour does the EU have. My question is whether this can be answered by looking at what is actually being done by the EU in its ESDP/CSDP missions. To help me analyze the behaviour I will use a

theoretical framework concerned with national attributes and its implications on a states capacity to act (East 1982:123-142).

The missions are then analyzed with this framework as a guide and last of all I will end up with the conclusions. So in this sense I have not let Denk down too much when it comes to setting up a comparative study. I am sad to say that the same cannot be said when it comes to the number of objects or entities I have chosen.

Denk concludes that you can categorize a comparative study in three ways according to the number of for instance states you wish to study, or in my case missions. The first category is the comparative case study; it deals with one entity and nothing more. The focused comparative study consist of a group of nations no more than perhaps five, the statistical comparative study on the other hand consist of a much larger set of items and is interested in the overview (Denk 2002:33).

My comparative study does not seem to fit in anywhere if we are to trust the author. If I were to completely heed his advice and view on comparative study I should then pick the last of these alternatives. This could then produce the result I am looking for when it comes to mapping out behaviour. To be honest the notion of doing a statistical study has crossed my mind, if I were for instance interested in a different angle than the one I am using I could use the excellent figures of member states participation stated in for instance the annexes of "European Security and Defence Policy - The First 10 years 1999-2009". They depict estimates on how many personnel the member states have contributed to the missions. From these figures you could then glean the support shown by the individual member states. Since the member states are the driving force of the EU you can then see behavioural patterns by looking at these numbers. In my opinion however doing so would not produce the result I am looking for. Since the numbers are only estimates and the numbers do not take into account which missions are being participated in and when in time (Bulut et al. 2009: 414-415).

I have actually had a hard time finding a complete overview when it comes to member state participation. This book has figures about which states participates in a specific mission but you do not know for instance in what way, are they providing the mission with one person or a hundred, are they contributing with paper towels or are they lending out battle ships. Measuring participation is therefore hard and in my opinion not the best way of answering questions of behavioural traits. The book also covers funding of both civilian and military and according to the authors there is much the same problems estimating actual figures for the individual missions as it is producing figures about participation (Bulut et al. 2009: 71-112)

I have therefore with these limitations in mind chosen my method as a way of coming up with answers to the questions I pose.

4   Analysis

The European Union is at this moment involved in eleven missions and about to launch number twelve[2]. The amount of missions is impressive indeed and we will from this point on study these and also the concluded missions in an effort to create an overview. The overview will in its essence entail three variables, the mission mandate, the result of the mission and the level of success of the operation. So what can the missions really tell us when it comes to the foreign policy behaviour of the EU? Well there are some characteristics that become discernable when you start to look at the bigger picture. A short repetition of the theoretical framework will set us of in the right direction.

4.1   The capacity to act

One way of understanding and indeed explaining the behaviour of the European Union is to apply parameters derived from the theories of foreign policy analysis and the concept of a nation's capability to act. I will instead apply this theoretical lens on the European Union. (1982: 132)

East builds on the notion that there are two distinct features that determines a nation's capability to act when it comes to foreign policy. The first one is the amount of resources available or put differently in this case the EU's general power base. The second one is the actor's capability to actually make use of these resources, or the level of socioeconomic development or social organization. Coupled together they are the actor's capability to act which will influence the choice of foreign policy and the behaviour of the polity in question (ibid).

The EU is however not a nation state and therefore it would be wrong not to keep this in mind when we are discussing concepts. We are indeed describing the member states and to some degree the EU-institutions, capability to act trough a specific institutional framework namely the means of the ESDP/CSDP. This part of the analysis will therefore try to measure the EU's capability to act trough the ESDP/CSDP, by looking at the missions and what this in the end can tell us about its foreign policy behaviour. The capacity to act coupled with the EU's own foreign policies are then the two mechanisms that together make out the foreign policy behaviour if we are to interpret East's way of reasoning.

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[2] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN 110607

So what does this mean when it comes to the EU? Well first of all we have the capability to act aspect to take into account. The capability to act basically refers to a nation's amount of resources and its capability to utilize these, when talking about the ESDP/CSDP this would mean the funding, personnel, materiel and so on and the ability to use them via the given institutional setting. You also have to take into account the fact that just because a member states have resources it does not mean that it is willing to reallocate these on foreign policy and even more importantly foreign policy via the ESDP/CSDP (East 1982:134).

We will from this point on go through all of the missions chronologically region by region. The logic behind this is partly to show the evolution of the missions over time and also to see whether EU capacity to act differs between regions or if there are similarities to be seen in the overall behaviour. The purpose of presenting them in this manner is that I use them to see if they can help me understand the actions of the EU in the various missions. Many of them are described as first time occurrences, the first police mission, the first military, the first time in Africa, the first mission without NATO, and the first time they acted on a UN mandate and so on. There will also be times in the analysis where we are faced with ongoing mission whose end result is yet unknown. You as a reader will have to bear with me when it comes to these repetitive phrasings and descriptions of missions that are too early to fully analyze. We will however now start off where all of this began namely in the Balkans with the EUPM Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.2   The Balkans

In former Yugoslavia there have been a total of four civilian missions. Two of which are still active. The very first real mission that the EU ever did was a civilian one namely the EUPM Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This mission is still an active one and it has so far been exactly what the EU intended it to be. Namely a learning experience and proof that the CSDP was mature enough to move into the open and actually take on real responsibilities The purpose and end goal for this mission is to transform the Bosnian police force into a entity that can be used for the benefit of the civilian population and not as a weapon to be used against them as was being done during the war in the 1990's (Merlingen. 2009:162-163, 169-170). As mentioned this mission is an ongoing one and there still seems to be a need for an EU presence within Bosnia and Herzegovina. For all intents and purposes this mission has so far been successful in fulfilling its mandate and getting the results intended from the beginning (Merlingen 2009:169-170). What has been criticized is that the mandate from the beginning was insufficient since it was to narrow in its scope and that the success therefore is not very indicative. The EU has also been criticised for not wanting to commit whole heartedly when it comes to the EUPM (Howorth 2007:225-226). Seeing that this is the first mission we should probably not be too harsh in our judgement of the success and result.

The two military missions in the Balkans share some common features, not just of course with the obvious geographical closeness and their common political origin.

Well for instance what was the rationale behind getting involved in the first place? One major reason was of course to test the EU's ability to actually perform a military operation through that current ESDP/CSDP system. Another and closely linked to the prior was to actually test the capabilities of the ESDP/CSDP realising if the EU was mature enough to actually undertake a serious military operation. The EU had since 2001 had obligations in the fYROM and Concordia meant a deepening of said engagement. Many things were done for the very first time and the mission itself proved to be a true learning experience for the EU internally and also for its allies externally. This meant that the EU was serious in its aspirations in becoming a viable manager of crisis, but also to be an organization that could throw in and provide a military competence behind it's hitherto solely civilian proficiency. The context of the mission was to take over from the NATO-forces that had been operating in fYROM up to that date. To a large extent the mission in itself can be considered to be a joint EU-NATO endeavour since the two organizations to a large degree cooperated by using the same resources and competences. The mandate was to monitor and enable the country's government to actually carry out the democratic reforms that had been decided upon. If one would want to be a bit critical it could be said that this particular mission's success was more due to the fact that NATO had already done the ground work and the Concordia mission only took over when most of the real problems had been dealt with by the NATO. Well there is some truth to that, the EU carried out Concordia in a quite satisfying manner, but the mission can also be said to be little more than a practical way for the EU to test its abilities in a real situation (Gross 2009:174, 179-180).

The second civilian mission EUPOL Proxima I & II was ongoing between the ends of 2003 to the end of 2005. The mandate of these two missions are almost the same as with EUPM in Bosnia namely to uphold the law, assist local law enforcers and educate the latter accordingly. The target of this operation and with EUPM was to a large extent to battle and weaken elements of organized crime that had started to crop up in the region after the civil war. The purpose was basically to assist in transforming all levels of the local police into a system capable of dealing with the situation. The third operation the EUPAT can be considered to be more of a light version of Proxima I &II. Its main mandate was to ensure that the transition between the latter and a purely civilian Commission led project would run smoothly. EUPAT was conducted on a much smaller scale and on a smaller budget than its predecessor (Ioannides 2009: 188-192). What can be said about these two missions is that they both represent something of a first case scenario for the ESDP/CSDP. These are the second and third police missions conducted by the EU and the first ones that were not a takeover missions started by someone else as in the case with EUPM in Bosnia (Ioannides 2009:190). This meant of course that much of the preparatory stages leading up to the implementation of the mission fell on the EU to conduct. There was no inheriting of intelligence or recycling of structures from prior engagements and actors (Ioannides 2009:196).

In many ways this enabled the EU to proceed and expand its competences by taking on more difficult and more long-term engagements like for instance EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was launched in December of 2004. Also this time the EU took over after NATO had deemed their role in the conflict done with.

One major factor was that the US wanted out of the Balkans because of their engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This meant that the time was ripe for the EU to take over and show that it also could be trusted with a mission of this magnitude and importance. The mandate for this operation came from the UN and the purpose was to manage and enable the conditions and institutions put in place by the Dayton-Paris peace agreement that the NATO IFOR and SFOR had protected and made possible so far. Another reason for this was that the necessity of a large scale operation had become redundant. A smaller number of personnel could perform the same job that earlier required a much larger number of people. NATO had also concluded that the nature of the conflict and the threats posed in the region was no longer that dire and that the likelihood for a new outbreak of a full blown civil war had diminished and that the threats now were of a more civil character. Indeed the US foresaw that the mission would now be more of police mission than a fully fledged military one. These were some of the main reasons given that accompanied the now EU led mission (Keohane 2009:211-213).

What has then been the result or the experiences learned from ALTHEA? Well the operation has to date been the biggest ever conducted though the auspices of the ESDP/CSDP framework. Managing an operation of this magnitude with so many participating countries, both member states and third party nations is in itself a true testament to the inherent difficulties that this type of multilateral venture poses. The point of this is to say that the mere logistics would be a reason enough for a failure, managing it and fulfilling the mandate is nothing less than a wonder for an organization that many on fore hand deemed incapable of launching a operation of this scale. The mission can therefore be said to prove that the EU actually can be seen as a viable peacekeeping alternative (Keohane 2009:219-220).

In 2008 the EU launched a massive civilian mission in Kosovo named the EULEX. The context and mandate of this mission was basically to create an on all levels functioning rule of law system for the recently independent Kosovo. What makes it unique is the number of areas it covers and the overall ambitious layout in the planning and implementation. This in itself is proof of that the EU has become much more mature in how it conducts and carries out its civilian objectives. It shows that the EU is capable of conducting and taking on civilian mission on a large scale and in a situation that is seriously politicised. The mission is still ongoing but what can be said so far is there have been some concerns and problems when it comes to the implementation of the mandates (Grevi 2009: 354-361,366-367)

4.2.1 The power base, social organization and the EU's Capacity to act in the Balkans

Looking at the missions in the Balkan gives you a good view of how the EU's capacity to act has evolved from the very beginning to today's date. EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina began it all and if you look at the EU competences described above you can see that there is an experimental flavour to the missions, a fact that seems to be repeating itself throughout the missions.

The first one was indeed a civilian one and can for all intents and purposes be seen as testing the EU's capacity to act. The mandate itself was met and this can definitely be seen as a success of the correct behaviour to the situation at hand. The criticism that the mandate was not very ambitious to begin with should also be taken into account (Howorth 2007:225-226). The mission itself is still ongoing so the final judgement on EUPM will have to wait (Merlingen 2009:169-170). Setting up a mandate that is not very ambitious could lead you to suspect that the level of social organization was rather low, meaning that they did not assess the situation in a correct manner. It could also mean that there was a lack of resources indicating a low power base. Given the fact that EUPM was the first mission ever conducted the comparison with the following missions might not be to its benefit.

The next mission, Concordia was also groundbreaking because it was the first military operation by the EU; this also meant that it could show that it was capable of performing a military mission. The EU was however not alone, the mission was a joint venture together with NATO which indicates that the they did not at that moment have the capability to act on its own in that specific context (Gross 2009:174). This may not seem like an all together strange thing since it was the first military mission; it can be seen as the EU's way of strengthening its own capabilities and resources. The joint NATO-mandate is not the trait of an actor with a large degree of social organization or power base meaning that the EU that a low level of capacity to act is to be expected. On the other hand an evolution of the capacity to act must be acknowledged since this was the first time the EU did a military mission.

Concordia was followed by two civilian police mission EUPOL Proxima I & II and EUPAT these both took place in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. Both dealt with basically the same issues and can be said to have had similar mandates and results. EUPOL Proxima I & II and EUPAT were the first missions done with no predecessor which meant that the EU had to deal with all of the preparatory stages on its own (Ioannides 2009:190). The scale of the operations was not large but there can be no denying the fact that the behaviour of the EU shows that it was indeed capable of more autonomous action contrary to the missions done earlier on. Again the real progression seems to be in the way the EU is able to utilize its resources in a successful way, managing to actually prepare and launch missions without the help of another actor which in is indicative of a progression both in the capacity to act especially when it comes to social organization.

Building on all of these lessons the mission ALTHEA was launched in 2004. Taking over from a former NATO mission and acting on a UN mandate this mission proved that the EU was able to take over a military mission on a larger scale than Concordia (Keohane 2009:211-213). The size of the mission and the length are the

best way indicators of an actor that is becoming much more mature and confident. They can also be seen as proof of progress when it comes to power base and social organization. You also have to take into account the fact that this mission has been ongoing for a long time, almost from the very beginning. The institutional landscape and the number of resources have changed since the launching day making it tricky to measure by using the theoretical concepts.

But then again looking at the missions in the Balkans we see a strengthening of EU capabilities and its successful way of funnelling these via the ESDP/CSDP. This can be seen as a progression in the way the EU is able to use its resources and also as a testimony to the fact that other entities see that as well. They have evolved their capacity to act by continuously raising the stakes and experimenting with it successfully.

The most recent mission is the civilian EULEX Kosovo mission the scale and level of ambition is perhaps the most striking feature of this still ongoing mission and it shows that the EU is really committed stepping up to prior responsibilities in the Balkans. The mission has however had some difficulties when it comes to the actual implementation (Grevi 2009: 366-367). Not being able to properly implement is indicative of a not sufficient level of social organization the scale is how ever proof that the power base is increasing.

4.3   Missions in Georgia and Moldova-Ukraine

The term first time is beginning to be a bit worn out in this account of the missions but you will have to bear with me since we are dealing with a policy field that has not been around for all that long. The mission EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia begun in 2004 was one of these types of operations. It was the first rule-of-law mission and also the first one to be carried out in an ex-Soviet nation. The aim of this civilian mission was to help the local government with reforms and EU-funding in and for the whole judiciary system. The overall result was not that great, the reforms were implemented but the impacts of them were not very discernible. This mission has been criticized because it tried to do too much with too few resources and not enough time. It can also be pointed out that the mission seemed to lack a wholehearted support from Brussels and from the Georgian government (Kurowska 2009: 201-204, 209). The second mission in Georgia was a result of the short war between Russia and Georgia over the region of South Ossetia. The civilian mission named EUMM Georgia was launched in 2008 as a monitoring operation to observe and through civilian means provide a help in the post-war area. It also meant that the EU had on the ground observers in the conflict zone to analyze and report back to Brussels but also to provide stability to the local inhabitants on both sides of the conflict (Fischer 2009: 379-383). The true success of this mission was the rapid deployment and the shared political will of the member states to act swiftly. This can almost be seen as a victory of its own. The overall goal to provide a stable, normal

situation has also yielded positive results and more is certainly to come of this still ongoing mission (Fischer 2009: 389-390).

The first real border mission conducted under the ESDP/CSDP banner was the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine. It began in December 2005 and has since then been ongoing. The mandate for the operation was laid out in the Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP. The reason why the EU got involved was because that there had been a dispute between the Ukrainian and Moldavian governments over how their joint border should be administered. Moldova accused Ukraine of being too lenient or even sometimes supportive of the apparent criminal activities that took place on their joint border. To make matters more complicated a part of the border was also adjacent to the more or less autonomous Moldovan region of Transnistria. This apparent tension resulted in both of the countries asking the Commission for help. This lead to a joint Commission and Council venture namely the EUBAM to Moldova and Ukraine. (Dura 2009:277-285) The result or the effect of this has mainly been that the governments of Moldova and Ukraine have started working together instead of towards different goals or even against each other. The issue of Transnistria became less heated and a bit more manageable when the nations involved were able to focus on more practical matters of cooperation rather than issues of a more politically sensitive nature like sovereignty (Dura 2009:284-285).

4.3.1 The power base, social organization and the EU's Capacity to act in Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine

EUJUST THEMIS and EUMM Georgia were indeed the first missions in that region which in itself can be seen as widening of the EU's foreign policy (Kurowska 2009: 201-204, 209). In this regard it can be seen as an enhancement of the EU's social organization affecting its capability to act. You can see that the EU is choosing civilian tools when going to ex-Soviet states which could point to behaviour of picking strategies that might not make Russia feel threatened by their presence. With this said there seems to be some concerns on the overall results of the missions. As mentioned the EUJUST THEMIS is not considered a success. Kurowska mentions that the root to the result can be seen in the lack of support from Brussels, this could therefore point to why the EU was not living up to its own capacity to act. Lack of interest is not something that is easily explained with the theoretical concepts at hand the closest casual mechanism might be a low level of social organization (Kurowska 2009: 201-204, 209). Something that should be mentioned is however that the EU despite being less successful went on and launched a second civilian mission.

The border mission EUBAM to Moldova and Ukraine is yet another example of how the EU is diversifying is competences and trying out new ways of conducting a mission. As described above it seems more of a way of enabling Moldova and the Ukraine in to help them while the EU provides the platform and the knowledge. This is again another sign that the ESDP/CSDP missions are in no way staying homogenous and are always willing to test out new techniques and solutions in enabling their capacity to act. The reasons for testing new ways of dealing with

situations could be found in both of the concepts. A low power base could lead to the actor wanting to try out new ways to enhance performance. On the other hand it could also be proof of a well functioning and vigorous climate within the institutional framework of the actor. This shows that the EU's is both willing and able to choose an appropriate foreign policy measure for the crisis at hand indicating an adequate level of social organization.

4.4   Missions in the Palestine territories

The EU has so far carried out two missions in the Palestine regions. Both have been civilian operations, the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories and EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support or EUPOL COPPS and secondly the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Border Crossing Point or EUBAM Rafah. The police mission started in 2005 and is still ongoing and its mandate is as the name describes to help and support the local Palestinian police force and enable the authorities in creating a functioning rule of law system. Another goal was also to create a on the ground office to coordinate member states involvement with for instance humanitarian aid and project funding (Bulut 2009: 287-290). Lesson learned so far can be that it is not easy trying to stay technical in a situation fraught with on many levels severe political difficulties. It is not just a matter of trying to stay neutral but to also achieve something that can be seen as long lasting and having a real value to the recipient (Bulut 2009: 297).

The EUBAM Rafah operations mandate was to help manage the border between the Gaza strip and Egypt. There was also the matter of building up trust between the three actors involved, the Palestinians, Egyptians, and the Israeli. But also to mentor the Palestinian authorities with the creation of a functioning border management (Bulut 2009: 299-302).

It is not easy to measure the success of the mission because of the fact that it did not remain open more than seven months. One of the up sides can be that the EU was able to deploy the mission fast and able to manage all of the necessary logistics in a satisfactory way. The mission itself has been mostly dormant since the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006. In that regard the operation can be seen as somewhat of a failure but because of external factors rather than internal (Bulut 2009: 303, 306-308).

4.4.1 The power base, social organization and the EU's Capacity to act in Palestine

Two civilian missions in the Palestinian territories is again a proof of how the EU tries to use means that cannot be seen as controversial, in a setting that is highly politicised. So the question is if the EU has the capacity to act in a conflict such as the one between Israel and Palestine. Both of them are still ongoing, staying technical might seem like the obvious root but it is questionable if that is a possibility in this instance. What it shows is that the behaviour shown by the EU might not be enough and they have to find a new and more inventive approach (Bulut 2009: 297). The EU does not seem to have the power base or the correct level of social organization to be able to really make a difference in the Palestine territories.

4.5 The missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia

The EUJUST LEX operation that started in 2005 has been a mission that was fraught with difficulties from the very beginning. With a mandate to promote and train civil servants from the different rule of law sectors in the government some thought that the EU was tackling the Iraq situation in a soft way. There have also been some questions raised about the scope of the mission saying that it is too small to make a difference (Korski 2009: 231-232). For the EU itself the mission can so far be said to have been a rewarding learning experience and possibly the same can also be said for the Iraqi personnel being taught (Korski 2009: 239-240).

The Police mission EUPOL Afghanistan can be said to share many resemblances with the Iraqi one, the main mandate for instance of reforming and rebuilding the rule of law sectors and security sector reforms. Entering a country that is still involved in a civil war is not easy, it therefore took several reconnaissance operations and evaluations before the mission was deemed ready to launch (Peral 2009: 325-327). With this type of beginning the mission has had problems of implementing its mandate in a satisfactory way. Both differences in member state ambitions or lack thereof coupled with logistic difficulties have meant that the operation has yet to make a real difference (Peral 2009:335-336).

The 2005-2006 Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia was civilian in its nature and came in response to the peace agreement struck between the Indonesian government and the GAM separatist movement of Aceh. Its main purpose was to ensure that the Memorandum of Understanding or MOU was being honoured by both parties. The AMM entailed lots of tasks that can be said to be needed in a post-conflict situation. This meant that the EU was there to monitor that the MOU got fully implemented, see too that the Aceh province transitional reforms concerning government, social, security and human rights reforms were carried out (Schulze 2009:265-267) The true victory with the AMM was that there still is peace in the Aceh province, some of this can be attributed to the fact of the EU presence and the effective disarmament of the GAM separatists and the effects of the reforms carried out. The down side can be that the human rights issue has been seriously down played

by the Indonesian government. Some critiques say that this topic could have been given much more focus and attention by the European Union (Schulze 2009:272).

4.5.1 The power base, social organization and the EU's Capacity to act in Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia

Under this heading I have bunched together three civilian missions that share both similarities and differences among them. They are all conducted in areas of the world where the EU had not been active so far and they are also quite remote locations from where we usually tend to find the EU's ESDP/CSDP missions. What they all have in common is that they are examples of when the EU did not perform all that well or in the case of EUJUST LEX and EUPOL Afghanistan at least not so far. The EU does not seem to be able to fully utilize its capacity to act in any of these missions and the reason for this seems to be that they actually lacked or are lacking capabilities. The reason for this is mentioned above and it does seem that the EU is having to high ambitions coupled with too few resources. There seem indeed to be a lag between expectations and funding in this regard (Peral 2009:335-336 Schulze 2009:272). As was the case with the Palestine missions we are again getting indications that the EU is not able to fulfil the setup mandates because of insufficient size of power base and level of social organization.

4.6   The missions in Africa

This section will describe and analyze the twelve missions carried out on the African continent. Five of them have been civilian missions, six have been military and then we have one that has been a mix of both. The first time the EU left Europe to carry out an operation was done in 2003. During the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the military mission named Artemis was launched. This mission was located in and around a town called Bunia. The mandate of the mission was basically to secure the city itself and to some degree the surrounding countryside. The town also had a functioning airport and securing access to it was certainly one of the operations main objectives. Another was to make sure that the civilian population and foreign personnel and aid workers could get to safety (Helly 2009:181-183). Like the missions in the Balkan Artemis was in many ways a first time experience. This time it meant that the EU, on a UN mandate, and alone without NATO were to carry out a mission on a different continent. This positive learning event showed that the EU and the new ESDP institutions could handle a mission of this magnitude. There has however been some critique concerning the scope and mandate of Artemis. Some have argued that the EU could have and should have done much more about the war torn and desperate situation in DRC. This does indeed raise questions about what moral mandate an operation of this type should have outside its technical and legal frame (Helly 2009:184-185).

The second and third mission in this region was the two police missions EUPOL Kinhasa and EUPOL RD Congo. The reason for them was that in 2003 the different fractions in the civil war were able to come together and sign a peace agreement and they also decided that there would be elections held in 2006. This meant that there was a transition period in between these dates and for this the EU was asked by the country's transitory government to step in and help out. The mandate of EUPOL Kinhasa was to assist and enable the creation of a police force, something that had up to that point been the responsibility of different militia fractions. The EU was consequently asked to help with and maintain the newly created Integrated Police Unit whose abilities would range from protecting government institutions to addressing matters of civil unrest. The mission started in 2005 and lasted over the elections with the help of the military mission EUFOR RD Congo and was after the elections replaced by the EUPOL RD Congo whose mission mandate can be seen as similar to its predecessor but its purpose was to monitor and mentor the newly created nation police force PNC. EUPOL RD Congo has been in place since 2007 and is still running to this date (Vircoulon 2009:222-224).

What can then be said about these to police missions? Well they can to some extent be seen as rather successful but also in many ways problematic. The main criticism has been that there simply were too many actors involved in the DRC at that moment. Overlapping agendas and also conflicting interests have been obstacles that the two EUPOL missions have had to deal with. Allocation of internal and external resources and coupled with the dire local situation has been some of the real challenges that the officials have had to sort out and manage from day one (Vircoulon 2009:227-229).

Police missions were how ever not the only type of mission that the EU launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the mid 2000's. There was also the need for military reform and consolidation after the civil war and in response to this the EUSEC RD Congo was launched in 2005. To use a by now worn phrase this mission can also be considered a first time event. The very mandate of the mission was to use the ESDP/CSDP civilian branch in an attempt to reform military competences. The purpose was as well to reform and hone the national military into something that could be used as a tool for internal peace keeping. But also to educate and consolidate the competences of said military into a peace time entity able to protect and prevent further insurgencies. The mission is still active and has also evolved as time has gone by (Clément 2009: 244-245). The result of this mission is to a large degree a success. This is, as mentioned, due to its ability to adopt new policies when necessary and adapt to both a slim budget and somewhat over ambitious expectations. These are also the main obstacles in the mission, having a small budget to work with and large pressure from home to meet almost impossible standards can be tricky. This in tandem with an ever growing number of actors has indeed made the mandate a hard one to fulfil (Clément 2009: 252-253).

The EU has tried different approaches when dealing with matters of security and peacekeeping on the African continent. Examples of this can be seen in the two support operations that the EU carried out in unison with the African Union namely the European Union supporting actions to the African Union missions in Sudan (AMIS I-II) and Somalia (AMISOM). The purpose and mandate of the missions was

to help the AU with the on the ground distribution of funding, resources and technical expertise. The mission itself can be seen as mixture of both civilian and military capabilities since it provided competences from both branches of the ESDP/CSDP tree. These missions has been quite criticized for simply not doing enough, the EU's support did not lead to a end of the conflict and they failed to enable the AU to fulfil its mandate in Darfur and for underestimating the severity of the conflict (Franke 2009:255-259).

In the wake of the AMISOM I-II missions in Darfur the EU was approached again by the AU to help out with a similar mission in Somalia the AMISOM. The mandate of this operation was to provide peacekeeping troops to a war ravaged and torn Somalia. The EU's role was to be similar to that in AMIS I-II that is to say to offer various types of resources and expertise. The mission itself was most successful in enabling aid funding but not with much else. Overall these two missions can be said to be examples of doing too little, too late, with too much confidence and too little ambition (Franke 2009:259-263).

In 2005 the EU was asked by the UN to assist military in the upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the summer the following year EUFOR RD Congo 2006 was launched and it would last until the winter of that same year. The mandate was to through military presence facilitate that a safe environment could be established and that the elections be undertaken in a secure fashion. In other words, protecting civilian and making sure that the UN personnel could carry out their own mandate (Major 2009: 311-313). The result was a success but the road leading up to a final deployment was not. The EU cannot be said to have acted swiftly and according to their obligation to the UN and other partners in the DRC. Critiques have argued that if the EU wants to be seen as a force to be reckoned with when it comes to rapid action they should not act in the same way they did with EUFOR. It has also been said that the apparent asymmetrical interest shown by the member states in the case of this mission is not something to be repeated if the EU want to be seen as a credible security actor (Major 2009: 321-322).

The rather ambitious 2008 EUFOR Chad/RCA military mission was the third or fourth if you count in the mixed missions in Darfur and Somalia. This mission was instigated by the UN and the mandate was to protect their employees and the local population, especially the refugees. Another aim was to help and protect the ongoing various humanitarian projects in the region and in addition to promote a new and more trustful environment between the states in the region. To actually deploy the troops in the area were in itself a feat not only because of political reasons but also in response to the locations geographical remoteness (Helly 2009:339-343). As noticed earlier success can be measured in different ways, in the case of the EUFOR Chad/RCA military mission one such can be said to be that it actually was carried out at all. Conducting a joint venture such as this in a region bordered by three countries that has also seen several years of civil war is not easy. When you add the political implications both at home in the member states and also in the recipient nations it makes it even more difficult. In addition to this there are the logistics of actually doing a mission together with the UN and having a variety of EU member states with varied and sometimes not overlapping agendas things can get complicated indeed. Overall the mission was not that successful (Helly 2009:347-350).

2008 saw a civilian mission that in many aspects can be seen as an opposite of the one previously dealt with. The EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea- Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) had a much smaller budget and personnel size. This missions mandate was to train and assist the local government in security sector reform and determine the need for future ESDP/CDP engagements in Guinea-Bissau. Another motive was to help other external donor's asses the need for funding and donations to the local security sector reform (Helly 2009: 369-371). This mission like some of its predecessors had a mandate that might have been too ambitious for the scope of the operation. When it came to the actual planning, the preparations and the logistics things could probably have been done in a more thorough way. It is also worth mentioning that a mission of this size can only do so much. (Helly 2009: 376-378). The result of the mission was that the reform was implemented in 2010, the civil unrest and mutiny in the spring of said year shows however that there might still be a long way ahead before the reform is actually realized in more than words[3]

2008 also saw the birth of the first ever EU naval operation, EU NAVFOR Somalia or Atalanta. This meant that the EU all of a sudden was faced with a mission that meant the use of naval resources with which the EU so far had not used to a large extent. The reason for this was the more and more active pirates that had begun preying upon commercial and private ships outside of the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Due to the fact that large ransoms were being paid by for instance insurance firms and shipping companies the activities increased to a level that meant that the EU felt inclined to act and therefore launched the mission in 2008. The mission had two main objectives the first one being to protect ships carrying cargos for the UN World Food Program and the second and minor one to also protect other vessels in the area. The mission is still ongoing and it might be early to tell of the long term effect in the short term it can be said that the mission has had some difficulties in the approach to the pirates due to a large extent to the sheer size of the area to be patrolled and as a always a rather slim budget and resource availability (Helly 2009: 391-393, 401-402).

One of the most recent military mission in Somalia and Africa is however the EUTM Somalia. It was launched in April of 2010 and has as its mandate to train and help develop the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and other institutions. The mission draws its mandate from a UN resolution and is being conducted in Uganda together with the African Union. The main purpose is to train security forces and also to help with funding to the AMISON operations in Somalia. Since this is such recent mission time will tell of the future success or failure of EUTM Somalia.[4]

The EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya is the very latest mission and it has not yet been launched. EUFOR Libya is meant to assist the UN with their humanitarian efforts in the country. Since the

[3]http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100930%20FACTSHEET%20EU%2 0SSR%20Guinea-Bissau%20-%20version%2012_EN.pdf 110323
[4]http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110106%20FACTSHEET%20EU%20ENGAGEMENT%20SOMALIA%20-%2 110323

mission has not actually been approved or implemented there is not really more to tell about it as of yet. [5]

4.6.1 The power base, social organization and the EU's Capacity to act in Africa

Operation Artemis in 2003 was as mentioned above the first mission outside Europe but also unique in the way that it did not have a civilian predecessor in said region. The scale of the mission was not a large one, the mandate not overly ambitious. We have to acknowledge the fact that the ESDP/CSDP in 2003 was in its early phase and that the EU seemed to be testing its own capability to act (Helly 2009:184-185). One way of interpreting this could be to say that the EU had not fully developed its own capabilities and the mission can be seen almost as an experiment and a capability testing ground. It can also be a signal the EU is acting from a position of a small power base and an inexperienced institutional framework. The experience might be seen as a rewarding one because Artemis was later followed by two civilian missions; again the EU is testing its capabilities by switching foreign policy tools.

EUPOL Kinhasa and EUPOL RD Congo where both police missions and both had mandates concerning police reform (Vircoulon 2009:222-224). These two do not perhaps depict the EU's capacity to act in a flattering way. A large number of actors where involved in police reform in the DRC at that point in time and to some degree the EU were even competing with the UN and individual member states. The EU was not able, to a satisfactory degree, utilizes its capacity to act and was therefore not succeeding with its mandate (Vircoulon 2009:227-229). If the level of social organization had been higher at the time, the assessment to launch these missions might have differed.

The fourth mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo can also be considered unique in the way of the EU using its capacity to act in a new way, a civilian mission addressing military reform. As with the entire DRC missions the real problem has been a small budget coupled with large ambition and competing agendas both from external and internal actors (Clément 2009: 252-253). For the EU who was and is still carving out its niche in the security arena the capacity to act seems not to be fulfilled and partial success seems to be the overall judgement for this DRC mission as a whole. Again we see weaknesses in the EU's ability to take on a mission in a correct way. Setting a too ambitious mandate means that you did not assess the overall need in a correct way which could mean a lack of social organization on part of the EU.

The support missions to the African Union operations AMIS I-II and AMISOM can also be seen in the same light. These missions had as their purpose to enable the AU's capacity to act by drawing on the EU's. Partaking in this type of mission is yet again evidence of the EU's inventive thinking when it comes to the ESDP/CSDP missions, using its own capacity to act to enhance the performance of another actor.

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[5] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=2079&lang=EN 110606

The outcome of these missions was however, as seen prior, not that successful, it did not fulfil the bulk of the mission's mandate and did not succeed in helping the AU with its mandate. (Franke 2009:255-263). As was apparent above the problem arises in the actual implementation of the missions. This could very well be proof that the EU is not able to utilize its resources in the necessary way. If the mandate is not fulfilled the reasons could naturally differ, in this instance, with these to missions the blame seems to be a lack of social organization.

The latest mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUFOR RD Congo, was a demonstration of a somewhat ambivalent attitude from the EU. It did not fully utilize its capacity to act and showed almost reluctance in the implementation of the mandate (Major 2009: 311-313, 321-322). This shows that having a capability and being willing to use it are two completely different things and in this case it is not very flattering for the EU. But given the lessons learned in the prior missions there are perhaps some reasons for this reluctance.

The mission EUFOR Chad/RCA was also plagued with the same ambiguity as the other African missions. There seems again to be a gap between setting an ambitious mandate and not following it through, is it because of the mandate or because of the capability to act? Well the EU seems more to lack the will rather than resources (Helly 2009:347-350). Addressing lack of political will with the theoretical concepts is almost impossible because they take the will to act as granted.

Judging the 2008 EU SSR Guinea-Bissau in the same way is not perhaps that farfetched, it managed to fulfil its mandate by getting the government to implement the reforms that was stipulated. The implementation of said reform has however not yet been a victory. If this can be laid at the feet of the EU or on the recipient country is a bit more complicated, we will have see how it plays out in the long run (Helly 2009: 376-378). Looking at the size and ambition of the missions we are again faced with a situation where the EU seems to be overstretching its capabilities. The problem as with many of the other missions seems to lie in a false assessment of the situation at hand. The problem of utilizing EU resources and competences points to real problems regarding social organization.

Two of the latest missions on the African continent have been conducted for the benefit of Somalia. Both are military missions and they are also still ongoing. The EU NAVFOR is testing the capability of EU naval competences by engaging in an anti-pirate mission and the EUTM is a training mission of Somali armed forces. Since the EUTM mission in Somalia was launched in 2010 it is a bit early to tell or interpret the behaviour of the EU in this specific mission. Both of the missions share the notion of helping the Somali help themselves and by doing so also helping the EU. (Helly 2009: 393-394). The EU is also the largest donor of development funding to Somalia according to a factsheet issued by the EU. This means that the EU has interest of its own when seeing that the resources are allocated in a manner that is suitable[6]. If we go back to the description above we are again faced with a situation of large ambition

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[6]

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110106%20FACTSHEET%20EU%20ENGAGEMENT%20SOM ALIA%20-%2 110323

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coupled with broad mandate. The actual fulfilment, especially concerning EU NAVFOR has been tricky because of the sheer size of the mandates and the problems facing the implementation. Assessing whether the problem lies in the sphere of low social organization or size of power base is perhaps a bit hard as of yet.

5   Conclusions

The ambition and purpose of this thesis has from the very beginning been to show that you can learn a lot about the nature of the ESDP/CSDP and the EU by looking at the overseas missions. As you might remember from the research overview most scholars have their focus elsewhere. The comparative method employed is used to give the reader an overview, it is not meant for in-depth analysis. The Foreign Policy Analysis theory I am using is meant to depict behavioural patterns by using a specific singular framework. One reason for using this framework is to test whether it can be applied on the ESDP/CSDP missions. So these are the parameters and the scope that I have had to work with during this thesis. The questions posed in the beginning were:

Will analyzing the missions help us understand ESDP/CSDP foreign policy behaviour?

If so, what behavioural patterns are there and what can these tell us about the performance and the nature of the ESDP/CSDP?

Can the theoretical concept of capacity to act be translated and used to analyze and understand this behaviour?

These questions are quite broad in their nature and also presented hierarchically. So let's start at the bottom and work our way up.

5.1   Can the theoretical concept of capacity to act be translated and used to analyze and understand this behaviour?

When you look at the missions in the Balkans you can glimpse the whole evolution of the missions. This is where it all began and the EU is still active in the region. You can make the assumption that the ESDP/CSDP capabilities started at the bottom when it comes to capacity to act, low power base and low social organization. This means that they do not have lots of resources and a low limited capability when it comes to utilizing said resources (East 1982:123-137).

Does this assumption hold any truths? Well yes, to a certain degree. The EU starts of modestly and keeps raising the stakes continuously experimenting with different types of mandates and varying the foreign policy tools. The latest mission EULEX Kosovo has indeed very ambitious mandate and scope (Grevi 2009: 366-367).

East states for instance that low capacity to act actors tend use multilateral ways of conducting foreign policy behaviour (1982: 123-137), if we were to apply this to the EU you can see proof of this in from the very beginning the with Concordia mission that chooses to collaborate with NATO rather than entering the scene on its own (Gross 2009:174, 179-180). With the EUPOL Proxima I & II and EUPAT the EU acts on its own which using the same logic could mean that they are evolving the capacity to act (Ioannides 2009: 188-196) It could also mean that the EU sees these two latter ones are much less complex. The missions in the Balkans show that the EU has the largest increase in its power base when it comes to its capacity to act. There is also some progress being done when it comes to the social organization, the EU is able to launch bigger and more complex missions like ALTHEA which would indicate that there is indeed some progress when it comes to the capacity to act in the Balkans. This does not however mean that we can say that EU capacity to act is high degree. The setting for Althea is still multilateral drawing on competences from both the UN and NATO which indicates a low level actor (East 1982:136 Keohane 2009: 211-213,219-220). The overall capacity to act outlook for the Balkan can best be summed up as mixed, the EU is neither low nor high. The thing that keeps cropping up sis also that the EU is setting mandates that is either too easy or too complex to fulfil in a correct manner indicating a low level of social organization.

The missions in the former Soviet states of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine depict a similar evolution. EUJUST THEMIS is considered a failure (Kurowska 2009: 201-204, 209). EUMM Georgia has merits when it comes to social organization mainly because of the swift deployment (Fischer 2009: 389-390). EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine is in many ways a success because of the overall results achieved (Dura 2009:284-285). Again mixed results that do not necessarily show a coherent capacity to act. The behaviour is in many ways erratic and is to me best explained by looking into the social organization aspect.

The missions in the Palestine territories are also not cohesive. EUBAM Rafah was not active that long so it is hard to judge, the rapid deployment and effectiveness when open can be an indicator of a higher degree of capacity to act (Bulut 2009: 303, 306-308). The EUPOL COPPS has mainly had problems because of the fraught political climate in the context it is working in (Bulut 2009: 297). The capacity to act seems to have been impeded by external pressures rather than internal flaws. East mentions that actors on the low end of the scale tend to have fewer resources available for foreign policy assessment, that could explain to some degree the failure of not being able to adapt to the external pressures (1982:123-137). In this instance it is also necessary to conclude that with the given setup the EU does not seem to have the capability to act within a highly politicised area such as the Palestine territories.

The three odd missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Aceh also seem to be having difficulties when it comes to assessing the situation and producing a functional mandate. EUJUST LEX is said to have a too ambitious mandate coupled with a small scope (Korski 2009: 231-232). Much the same is being said about EUPOL Afghanistan that according to the author have difficulties when it comes to fulfilling its mandate (Peral 2009:335-336). The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia was also only partially successful fulfilling part of its objectives but not all (Schulze 2009:272). All of these missions point to the fact that the EU is, in this instance,

showing a low level of capacity to act. With this said the reason for not being able to correctly carry out the mandate lies with the social organization side of the theoretical framework.

Africa has seen been the staging ground for eleven ESDP/CSDP missions. I am aware that I am starting to repeat my message and myself but the African missions share many of the low capacity to act traits that can be found in the other missions. There is certainly nothing wrong when it comes to the level of participation of the EU in Africa; the EU has indeed been very active. The constant testing of abilities, change of policy tools and the willingness to try out new angles could indeed be proof of a high degree of capacity to act (East 1982:123-137).

T he EU has however only had low or medium results when it comes to fulfilling its mandates, which indicates a low capacity level. The overall judgement when it comes to analyzing missions shows that the EU has a low to medium capacity to act. The collected power base that can be derived from the member states and EU institutions towards ESDP/CSDP has seemed to increase. The sheer number of missions and the variety of mission types is perhaps the best indicator of this. The modest overall success of the missions on the other hand indicates that the EU is lacking the tools to utilize this power base in an efficient and winning way. We are over and over seeing the results of what must lagging degree of social organization. So basically getting money and resources are becoming less and less of a difficulty the real problem seems to lie with the institutional framework.

A high power base and a low social organization will yield a medium capacity to act (Ibid). There does not seem to be many differences in the behaviour of the EU when it comes to where in the world the mission takes place other than the amount of missions.

Is then the concept of capacity to act a good theory when you want to understand EU foreign policy behaviour? To a certain degree yes, there is inherent good reasoning in the theory. The concepts of power base according to resources and the ability to utilize these can tell you a lot about the behaviour of an actor (East 1982:123-137).

There are however limits to this framework. For instance the impact of individuals on behaviour is not taken into account. National attributes or resources are also a quite wide concept that could encompass almost everything at the states disposal. There are also some difficulties when you translate the concept to include the EU. By doing this I did not take into account the fact that the EU might have different foreign policy objectives than a nation state and that there might be other measurements to be used to measure these.

But then again the point of testing a theory is to see if it can be applicable and this is what I have tried to do. Using a capacity to act lens can be useful when you want to get a sense of the behaviour, it is not however a precise measurement since it only has three levels. The Theory does therefore not take into account asymmetries between individual member states and EU institutions and their specific impact on the behaviour shown in the missions. This is indeed a major flaw when it comes to translating capacity to act to the EU. Naturally there are major differences in the foreign policy objectives of for instance France and Malta. As seen in the analysis the framework does not provide any guidance when it comes to understanding

unwillingness to act. If the resources and institutions are there but the political will is missing the concept falls short. There is also no credible explanation to address a situation where external forces influence a ongoing mission. The theory is also not that suitable when you analyze long term missions. The mandates can get rewritten, the size of the power base change and the institutional setting could evolve. I have yet to find a credible solution to this within the theory literature.

5.2   If so, what behavioural patterns are there and what can these tell us about the performance and the nature of the ESDP/CSDP?

What then are the general behavioural characteristics of EU foreign policy when you use the missions as your point of departure? First of all the thing that strikes you is the EU's willingness to experiment. The analysis shows that the EU's uses a wide variety of tools when it goes abroad to conduct missions. Is this lust for experimenting derived from a will to adapt or from a lack of resources? Well I would argue that both explanations are true to some extent.

The willingness to act is also apparent, the number of missions will attest to that. A mission in a country is very often followed by another one which can be seen as proof of the compliance of following through on a commitment.

Not being able to successfully fulfil the mandates is on the other hand not very promising. The mixed results and partial successes could indicate that the EU is not a very reliable actor. The constant testing of new abilities and experimenting can also be makes the EU into an unpredictable actor. Being irregular can be both advantageous and hazardous because third parties will have a harder time predicting your behaviour.

The EU is also often willing to participate in joint ventures, the use of multilateral methods could be seen as a weakness but it could also mean that the EU is being inventive and acting in the spirit of its own values.

5.3   Will analyzing the missions help us understand ESDP/CSDP foreign policy behaviour?

Analyzing the missions, to study what the EU is actually doing is definitely worthwhile. They are an excellent empirical source when you want to understand the ESDP/CSDP mechanisms. They can also tell you a lot about the behaviour of the EU when it comes to foreign policy. They are in a sense the effect of foreign policy being produced both internally and externally by the EU and in the world.

The main benefits from my thesis is that you get a overview of the missions and picture of what type of actor the European Union is and how its actorness is being utilized. Another contribution is the use of the theory and the use of national attributes to better understand EU Foreign Policy Behaviour.

The realization that the EU, for good or bad, is willing to experiment with its foreign policy toolbox was another recognition that I stumbled upon in this thesis.

5.4   A discussion on further research

I am certainly hoping that we in the future will see much more research being done on the ESDP/CSDP missions. They provide are excellent source of material that is rather under developed. This thesis has been about mapping out an overview of the foreign policy behaviour by using a certain theoretical framework. There is abundant material available for anyone interested in doing a case study especially when it comes to the African missions. There is also room for quantitative research, getting the facts and figures done would be most beneficial. I have yet to find I study that depicts the overall costand the levels of member state participation. Getting to know how much each member state has spent on the missions would be very interesting. To further research and create new and more suitable theories about the missions would be most welcome.

I would like to see theories that are adapted to the specific nature of the EU. Doing what I have done namely taking a state oriented theory and translating it to fit the EU can only take you so far. Since there have not been that much research there are many possibilities for anyone interested in the missions. If I would take the conclusions from this thesis a step further I would try to look at the member states and how they influence the behaviour shown in the missions. There is also much that can be done when it comes to economical motives and implications and the missions. Are the member states that participate the most doing so because they can afford to? Does funding vary when it comes to the recipient country?

There is also research to be done about the specific niche that the EU have carved out for itself in the arena of external action. In what way does EU, UN and NATO complement each other? Are there specific situations where one of the actors is more

suitable? This is relevant because they have overlapping agendas when it comes to the realm of intervention. There is also the individual perspective, studying the individual policymakers. How does ESDP/CSDP foreign policy behaviour differ when comparing the reigns of Javier Solana and Catherine Ashton?

Much more work could also be done when it comes to foreign policy analysis and the study of the EU. This is rather odd in my opinion, because the EU would greatly benefit that research branch. In what way does the level of socialization in the EU institutions effect the performance and behaviour? The only thing stopping further research is the lack of imagination

6   Executive Summary

6.1.1   Background

The Common security and Defence policy have evolved tremendously since its creation in 1999 with the St Malo declaration (Howorth 2007: 33-34). Today there have, depending on how you count, been around 25 ESDP/CSDP missions both civilian and military in Europe, Asia and Africas[7]. Research concerning the missions has however been scarce.

6.1.2   Purpose and questions

This thesis is about the missions conducted under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Or put differently my focus lies on what the European Union is actually doing when it comes to the ESDP/CSDP. This is also a thesis that is concerned with the foreign policy behaviour of the EU. To help me map out the behavioural pattern I will be using a theoretical framework that has its origins in a research field called Foreign Policy Analysis. This framework relies upon the conception of national attributes as an essential causal mechanism when it comes to explaining the behaviour of an actor. This framework of explaining activities utilizes the notion of capacity to act when analyzing foreign policy behaviour (East 1982:123-142)

The questions I will be trying to answer are:

- Will analyzing the missions help us understand ESDP/CSDP foreign policy behaviour?
- If so, what behavioural patterns are there and what can these tell us about the performance and the nature of the ESDP/CSDP?
- Can the theoretical concept of capacity to act be translated and used to analyze and understand this behaviour?

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[7] 5 5 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN 110524

6.1.3 Theory

As mentioned above I will be using a theory concerning national attributes to help me explain the foreign policy behaviour discerned in the missions. The core concept of this theory is that an actor is said to possess a certain level of capacity to act (East 1982:123-142). This notion builds upon two features, a states power base which consists of national attributes such as: natural resources, geography, demographics, political system, military capabilities and economic capabilities (Hudson 2007:144-153). The other part of capacity to act is the socioeconomic development or social organization, which means the effectiveness of the state to use these resources. A high capacity to act grants the state a bigger influence when it comes to foreign policy. What it all ends up in to is that the level of a countries capacity to act will have influence over the foreign policy behaviour of that country and that is the view that I will be using when it comes to the ESDP/CSDP missions. In my analysis will make the following assumption: that the EU starts off from the bottom from the bottom, with low powerbase and low degree of social organization.

6.1.4 Method

The method I am using is basically a comparative one. East would call it a longitudal comparative design; I am making a study of an actor, the European Union, and comparing it with itself over a set time frame (Hermann & East 1982:12). The type of comparative method I am using would probably fall into the category that Denk calls an interpretative comparative study. I am in other words trying to go beyond just describing the reality, I am trying to understand why certain things are happening and looking for the causal effects behind those events.

6.1.5 Analysis and Conclusion

The analysis is depicting the entire mission chronologically and separated by region. This technique is employed just to make things easier to understand and follow. The overall thing that connects all of the missions in all of the regions is that you can clearly see how the EU is evolving. The first mission ever was in the Balkans, EUPM Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Merlingen. 2009:162-163) and the latest mission covered in the analysis is the EUTM military mission to Somalia[8]. The overall all impression is that the EU is slowly evolving it capacity to act especially when it comes to its power base Meaning that the EU is getting more and more types of resources available at its disposal. The ability to utilize these resources have however not improved as much since the EU most often are not able to completely fulfil its mandate

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[8] 6 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110106%20FACTSHEET%EU%20ENGAGEMENT%20SOMALIA%20-%2 110323 33

What all of these will show is that there has been a real evolution the way the EU conducts it overseas missions. They are using a wide spectrum of foreign policy tools and they are experimenting a lot with their competences. Using the notion of capacity to act when dealing with foreign policy behaviour can indeed be useful. You just have to be aware that is quite hard to cover all aspect of foreign policy behaviour with a theory such as this.

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