

Lund University
Department of Political Science
Peace and Conflict Studies

FKVK01:3
Spring 2011
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The Remnants of Political and Trinitarian Structures in the Post-Cold War Era

Clausewitz Revisited in the Contemporary Middle East

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a contribution to the current waged debate concerning the validity of Carl von Clausewitz's theories regarding actors engaged in the acts of war. These thoughts have been suggested to be obsolete in the post-cold war era whereas the *new wars* theories have emerged and modified and challenged the classical knowledge of the very nature of war. The theoretical framework will be applied on two separate cases: the Taliban movement 1994-2001 and the Hezbollah party 1990-2000. This study investigates the objectives of the organizations, their structure and what means they use to achieve their goals in order to prove that these observed actors are in fact politically motivated. The findings indicate that the organizations are to be understood as political actors as they act in a pattern toward obtaining maximum legitimate support from the regional societies as they develop their power positions in the relationship of power against other domestic actors.

Keywords: Carl von Clausewitz, Center of gravity, Trinitarian structure, Political actors, Relationship of power, the Taliban, Hezbollah

Characters: 71641

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1 Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz, plausibly one of the most important military philosophers in modern history with few other competitors. His words have contributed, affected and helped shape the global comprehension of the nature of war and the underlying mechanics of war and warfare. Among Aristotle's, Sun Tzu's, Machiavelli's, Hobbes's and Smith's works, Clausewitz's *On War* is regarded as a classic since he sought not only to expose and uncover all what is known about war, but he was to educate a notion about how to understand the phenomenon and make it comprehensible for the audience.¹ The legend of Clausewitz's is a story of its own and will not be attended to in this thesis.²

As a philosopher and author, Clausewitz produced a great amount of thoughts regarding the subject of the nature of war. But due to the old-established German tongue, the usage of complex metaphors and its philosophical depth, to read and understand the words of Clausewitz is a mighty task and it might result in a interpretation of thoughts which is far from those of Clausewitz.³ This has created a dilemma in the treatment of his thoughts and the precise definitions of his words are ceaselessly debated. It should also be noted that *On War* never became completed by the author, but remains unfinished and almost totally unvisited.⁴

The relevance of Clausewitz thoughts and his influence over our military thinking has nevertheless been raised in debates continuously during the latest century in different waves of interest from the academic- and political sphere; especially during the two world wars, the end of the cold war and the rise of the *new wars*.⁵ The debate regarding the impact of Clausewitz's theories on the modern discourse of the nature of war is still waging. Some academic scholars claim that the theories are now obsolete and argue that wars within states become divorced from politics, the dominant interests within the *new wars* are rather to be of a more primitive type; religious beliefs ethnical rivalry etc.⁶ As violence loses its connection to a political end, the conflicts tend to drag out, which would make war no longer a mean to an end, but rather a continuation of violence itself.⁷

¹ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1968, p.11.

² The legend of Clausewitz's is a story of its own and it deserves to be told without restrictions, limitations and a possible academic agenda.

³ Mårtensson, Hjalmar, *von Clausewitz Om Kriget; Kommentarer, Definitioner och Register*, Stockholm, 1995, p. 7-9 & Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1982, p.11-12.

⁴ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. ix.

⁵ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Ångström, Jan, *The Nature of Modern War: Clausewitz and his Critics Revisited*, Stockholm, 2003, p. 2-4, 15-16, 30-38.

⁶ Kaldor, Mary, *Nya och Gamla Krig*, Göteborg, 2000, p. 14-16, more details about the criticism against Clausewitz theories will be presented in the subchapter *Critics against Clausewitz* on page nr.13.

⁷ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. 2-3.

Others defend Clausewitz by arguing that the opponents are inaccurate in their view of the causes of wars, or accuse them of misinterpreting the words in *On War* and maintain that the theories of Clausewitz continues to be valid.⁸ This position may be described as where the current debate has reached, and it is from this benchmark this study will be conducted.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

This study aims to make a small contribution to the current waged debate regarding the validity of Clausewitz's arguments⁹ and also to some extent call attention to if the propositions of the *new wars* scholars really holds up to their claims. This issue is of great importance since the policymakers and military planners constantly are in pursuit of valuable and useful knowledge to make the right decisions but are hampered by the delay of studies of current conflicts or wars. This makes them compelled to study the work of their predecessors or scholars who makes contributions to the subject in question.¹⁰ It is crucial that critical or questioning investigations are made to emphasize the correct comprehension and knowledge to the community. This thesis is nothing more but a minimal test of validity regarding the classical ideas in the modern era of conflicts and wars.

⁸ Gray, Colin S., *War, Peace and International Relations; an Introduction to Strategic History* New York, 2007, p. 227 & Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Ångström, Jan, *The Nature of Modern War: Clausewitz and his Critics Revisited*, Stockholm, 2003, p. 29-30.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz thoughts are to be seen as the theoretical framework for this thesis. The intention of Clausewitz thoughts might not have been to be used as theories, but this study will comprehend his arguments as such to be able to investigate their relevance in the modern era. Due to the fact that Clausewitz never finished his work on *On War*, the terminology used for talking about his thoughts will be shaped by a dynamical character in this study.

¹⁰ Gray, Colins S., *War, Peace, and Victory; Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Centuy*, New York, 1990 p. 25-26.

1.2 Research questions

The purpose of this study is to examine if the theories of Clausewitz, combining war with politics, can be proved to be valid in the post-Cold War era. A general question formula has been stated which breaks down into two more defined research questions this thesis will answer.

Can we understand the selected non-state organizations as actors in Middle Eastern politics, based on the fundamental arguments of Clausewitz?

- Are their actions to be seen as instruments towards a political end?
- Are they to be seen as political actors and is there a Trinitarian structure in these organizations supporting those political ends?

1.3 Limitations

The two assumptions of Clausewitz that will be studied can be harshly formulated as: 1, all violent actions can be described as a rational acting to “(...) force to compel our enemy to do our will” and therefore linking acts of war to the political arena as the “(...) *continuation of politics by other means*”.¹¹ 2, that the actors involved in military efforts are driven by a *Trinitarian* interaction.¹² This is **not** to be confused and composited with the other arguments and thoughts made by Clausewitz regarding how to defeat the enemy or what objectives to focus on to destroy the enemies will or ability to wage war.

This study will not examine how the arguments obtained from *On War* legitimize act of terrorism or make any attempts to find a *new* general definition of war, violence, conflict etc. This is not a study is not an attempt to prove what kind of organizations or what warfare type that is most effective in certain conflict. This thesis shall not try to categorize or classify the different organizations and try to generalize the result towards a global understanding of these kinds of groups and their actions, but only present an interpretation of the thoughts of Clausewitz applied on the selected actors.

This thesis is not to be interpreted as promoting any actors in the studied conflicts or their goals and values. This study does not include all sources of information or all the stories that could be told regarding the history of these two organizations. But as a qualitative study, the presented material is the key information gathered from the empirics which constitutes the analysis.

¹¹ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Ångström, Jan, *The Nature of Modern War: Clausewitz and his Critics Revisited*, Stockholm, 2003, p. 5.

¹² A more detailed commentary of the theories is to be found on page 10.

1.4 Disposition

The thesis is divided into five additional chapters; the two following chapters focus on presenting the methodological and theoretical framework which this study is based upon. The fourth chapter will present the cases and the performance of evaluating the empirical material provided in each case. The cases are separated from each other in their own subchapters. The fifth chapter summarizes the conclusions possible to draw from the cases and answers the research question. The sixth and last chapter will conclude a short discussion regarding the subject, the theories, the result and the study as a whole. This study includes two appendixes consisting of maps over Afghanistan and Lebanon; their purpose is to illustrate the context of the cases which can contribute to larger understandings.

2 Method

This chapter shall present four brief parts which will discuss how this study should be understood methodologically. First; how to understand Clausewitz in the subject field of Political Science and Peace- and Conflict Studies. Second; how this study is to be characterized in its methodological identity and how collecting and obtain information about the phenomenon in this thesis has been gathered. Third; a discussion of how the cases have been selected. Fourth and last; a presentation of the used empirics and comments on their impact of my study.

2.1 Academical benchmark

The work of Clausewitz could easily be interpreted as a compound of *realism* and what has become the *rational choice theory* as he witness war as a rational act initiated by the politically motivated goals of one actor against another. One should note that Clausewitz was raised and lived as a soldier his whole life, and that the context of his time was strongly focused on national security and state survival. He thought that the character of war never really changes from the violent nature of war and arises from the true nature of mankind. He was aware and agreed upon *the rise to extremes* (or the power balance as we know it) which is said to be one of the core ideas of realism.¹³ He does also acknowledge world politics as a zero-sum game in which a gain might only be possible for an actor if another actor loses the same *prize*.¹⁴ He does shift from the hardcore realists by stating that wars never will exceed its political goals and does not necessarily have to be in the shape of a duel between states, but rather as a duel between political actors in the character of a *total- or limited war*.

Clausewitz rational view of war is that nothing but the political objective, which is the underlying motive for the war, can or will determine the military amount of efforts and kinds of actions to reach the desired military objective.¹⁵

“[T]he conception that War is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.”¹⁶

¹³ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 87-88.

¹⁴ Mårtensson, Hjalmar, *von Clausewitz Om Kriget; Kommentarer, Definitioner och Register*, Stockholm, 1995, p. 17.

¹⁵ Gray, Colin S., *War, Peace and International Relations; an Introduction to Strategic History* New York, 2007, p. 21-23.

¹⁶ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1982, p. 402.

He does also differ from the classical realists by stating that the commander of a military army must constantly ask morally based questions during his/her waging of the war and the continued strive for victory. The traditional realists say that all war is above the moral debate and the survival of the state is superior to all other goals or aspects of war. Clausewitz talked about this moral dimension as connected to the Trinitarian structure. Since the outcome of violent actions might affect the crowd's passion which grants the legitimacy to the political and its military activities, and also because all political goals do not require a total elimination of the enemy's forces.¹⁷ This could in a way be seen as a shallow speculation of what would later become the notion of the intrastate security relationship to the national security agenda, a notion which no hardcore realist would agree upon. It could therefore be a mistake to incorrectly categorize Clausewitz as a strict realist and it could lead up to an inaccurate reading of his arguments.

2.2 A theory consuming, comparative case study with a describing qualitative approach

This study is to examine Clausewitz theories and their relevance and validation to understand violent conflicts of the modern era. To be able to find answer to the research questions stated; the thesis will apply a methodological structure. Since the theoretical frameworks are already established within the academical society, and since the function of this thesis is to apply the theories without elaborating anything more, this study will be characterized as a theory consuming study. To try and develop the theories of Clausewitz is not impossible or something that cannot be done, but it is beyond the reach of this thesis and it is not suited to be done with the methodology which has been chosen.¹⁸ It has therefore chosen not to do an explanatory study since it is hard to apply this method without end up elaborating on the ground theory.¹⁹ This is to be recognized with the fact that this study uses an original and famous theory to investigate if it could provide us with an understanding of the observed phenomenon.²⁰ This study will connect the theoretical framework to a set of cases to which the content of the theories will be tested if they are valid to explain the organizations. By focusing on a small amount of samples and to seek a very specific understanding of them without

¹⁷ Gray, Colin S., *War, Peace and International Relations; an Introduction to Strategic History* New York, 2007, p. 21-25, Mårtensson, Hjalmar, *von Clausewitz Om Kriget; Kommentarer, Definitioner och Register*, Stockholm, 1995, p. 15, 31-33 & Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1982, p. 401.

¹⁸ Gomm, Roger, Hammersley, Martyn & Foster, Peter (red.), *Case study method*, London, 2000, p. 119.

¹⁹ Torell, Jan & Svensson, Torsten, *Att fråga och att svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*, 2007, p. 27-30.

²⁰ Gomm, Roger, Hammersley, Martyn & Foster, Peter (red.), *Case study method*, London, 2000, p. 2-6 samt Torell, Jan & Svensson, Torsten, *Att fråga och att svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*, 2007, p. 48-54.

taking risk of making unintentional generalizations, this study will take the form of a comparative case study, since it is to investigate if the theory holds for both selected cases. By doing a multi-site case study, the generalizability of the study might improve, since the study will need to consider more factors and situations.²¹ But this thesis is only to investigate them to find answers to the stated research questions, discuss the similarities and differences in the result, and nothing more since the method of a qualitative case studies stills offers but a small generalizability beyond the two selected cases.²² The operationalization of the theory into a manageable and solid framework which can be investigated will be presented in a later part after a presentation of a more detailed review of the theories of Clausewitz.²³

One might ask why not choose to focus on one organization, which could have been investigated further and contribute more details to answer if Clausewitz is valid. The reasonable answer is because this study should be able to answer if Clausewitz arguments are valid in the modern era, and by only investigating one of these organizations among many is not satisfying enough for that purpose as we seek some descriptive generalizability of the modern conflicts.²⁴ An alternative would be to just focus on a very specific group, as Al-Qa'ida, which has no close similarity with other groups in its inner structure and organization of levels and are fighting a *broader conflict*. But since this is but one example of which this study seeks to be able to compare two examples of.²⁵ Also, by conducting a study without the ability to visit the field of the subject or come in contact with informants, such a study would be condemned to be based on loose facts. Since Al-Qa'ida's (and similar actors) survival depends on *our* misinterpretation and unawareness of their internal structure etc. there would be no reliable source of information. That is why a comparative case study is to be preferred.²⁶

2.3 Case selection

Some might say that case studies are nothing but an *ad hoc* investigation of a phenomenon in a situation that we are expecting to find what we are looking for.²⁷ The case selection in this study has been made to be able to meet some desirable standards. Above all, the cases had to be representing a war/violent conflict

²¹ Gomm, Roger, Hammersley, Martyn & Foster, Peter (red.), *Case study method*, London, 2000, p. 79-81.

²² Ibid, p. 6, 98-102.

²³ The operationalization is to be found on page 15.

²⁴ Torell, Jan & Svensson, Torsten, *Att fråga och att svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*, 2007, p. 68-69.

²⁵ Gomm, Roger, Hammersley, Martyn & Foster, Peter (red.), *Case study method*, London, 2000, p. 98-102.

²⁶ Torell, Jan & Svensson, Torsten, *Att fråga och att svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*, 2007, p. 104-106.

²⁷ Gomm, Roger, Hammersley, Martyn & Foster, Peter (red.), *Case study method*, London, 2000, p. 101-102, 106-107, 152.

somewhere around or after 1989 when the post-cold war period is said to begin and the emergence of the new wars is argued to have appeared.²⁸ They are also selected for representing a group, society, party or organization that are involved in an arena of a deteriorating state or where a state breakdown is foreseen and where war can be observed as separated from the state. These factors are important since it constitutes the arguments of the critics of Clausewitz, and to be able to prove the theories valid under these situations would force the antagonists to reconsider their claims. The case selection has therefore been made to test the theories in cases that they are least likely to be able to explain. This method is used to be able to prove that the reality is more dynamical and versatile than some of us might assume.²⁹

The case of the rising Taliban movement in 1994-2001 is certainly a good case to investigate. It represents the phenomenon stated above: a war torn country in the middle of a raging civil war between the different *Mujahidin*-clans and with a diversity of ethnical and religious groups without a stabile state.³⁰

The other case of Hezbollah is another good example; rising up in the raging civil war and Israeli occupation of Lebanon, a scene of plenty proxy wars among its sixteen different ethnic groups and religious sects, great amount of war materials and many international supporters of different characters.³¹

These cases show some similarities which of importance in order to be able to make any comparison between the two selected organizations, but are also different as there are variations in their variables of sectarian rule or establishment of powerful opponents etc.³² The countries have also been used to provide the opposite result by the critics, as in Martin Van Creveld's *The Transformation of War*.³³ This should prove that the cases have not been selected to provide us with a favorable outcome, but as two examples of modern conflicts, worthy the challenge of proving Clausewitz's theories right or wrong.

2.4 Empirical Materials

In the process of studying these organizations, most information will be obtained from databases, processed monographs and other secondary material, since the difficulties of being able to study these organizations in their natural environment and grant the access to observe all what this study is to observe. Additional contribution with primary material; such as speeches or statements, will be

²⁸ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Ångström, Jan, *The Nature of Modern War: Clausewitz and his Critics Revisited*, Stockholm, 2003, p. 39-42.

²⁹ Torell, Jan & Svensson, Torsten, *Att fråga och att svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*, 2007, p. 154-155.

³⁰ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 8-12.

³¹ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 72, Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 17.

³² Gomm, Roger, Hammersley, Martyn & Foster, Peter (red.), *Case study method*, London, 2000, p. 79-81.

³³ Van Creveld, Martin, *The Transformation of War*, New York, 1991, p. 24-30, 204-209.

included in the study where it is possible to so. It shall be noted that though the scope of this paper may be restricted to secondary sources of information, it might become just as an exhaustive study results as if the author would have collected the data himself. Many researchers have made incorrect analysis and predictions even though they themselves were in the natural environment of the observed phenomenon. In some cases it is even to my advantage to look into processed materials, since there is a good possibility that the writer occupies a greater knowledge of the subject than the author to this thesis at this point.

3 Theory about the Trinitarian wars

The structure of this chapter is the following: an introduction to some of the *Clausewitzian* understandings of the nature of war and its uniformity to politics. This will be followed by a longer part where the main theory about the Trinitarian organizations, their structures and procedures is explained in order to create criterias which can be applied in the study to investigate the stated research questions. This will be followed by a part which will focus on the criticism directed against Clausewitz theories and to state some of the claims the critics have raised on how we should understand war and conflicts. This chapter shall be rounded up by a summary of how this study will operationalize the theoretical framework in this thesis.

3.1 Clausewitz's On War

One of the most primary elements of all Clausewitz's arguments is that all wars are a continuation of politics; war is nothing but politics by other means.³⁴ By describing the frames of war as determined or defined by the political objectives, he represent a vision that war can never erupt without any political presumptions, nor does it need to be waged beyond the political ambitions for the violence. The political agenda must therefore constantly prevail over the military activities as war is but a political instrument among many to achieve some manifested goals.³⁵ In this great duel between actors, it always requires at least one actor to seek change and/or transformations while the other defends the status quo. The eruption of war requires an actor seeking to achieve the objective to changing the existing political conditions.³⁶

As a soldier and tactician, Clausewitz spent a lot of time reflecting on the subject regarding the techniques of how to defeat the opponent. Without making an exhaustive review of these thoughts (which he covers in six books devoted entirely to this subject), he reached the conclusion that all violent conflict do not

³⁴ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1982, p. 118-119, Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Ångström, Jan, *The Nature of Modern War: Clausewitz and his Critics Revisited*, Stockholm, 2003, p. 5-11 & Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 100-102.

³⁵ Mårtensson, Hjalmar, *von Clausewitz Om Kriget; Kommentarer, Definitioner och Register*, Stockholm, 1995, p. 15-20.

³⁶ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 103 & Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1982, p. 101.

necessarily need to end solely by the destruction of the opponents forces. Since war is nothing but a grand duel between two actors, the main focus should be to strike at the *center of gravity* which could disarm the opponent's will to continue engaging the acts of war. If one is successful in that mission, wars do not need to end with the massacring of the opponents armies etc.

*"There are many roads to prosperity, but all do not lead to the enemy's total defeat."*³⁷

This means that even in war, politics stands above the actual fighting and political solutions are therefore to be prioritized over the total destruction of the opponent's military capacity. War must therefore be subordinated the political end in which the desirable political goals are the primary focus of the conflict.³⁸ How to interpret what is or what is not a political end shall be discussed in the latter part regarding the operationalization of the theories.

3.2 Trinitarian Wars

One of the cores ideas of Clausewitz theories is his proposition that all actors of war are driven by an unstable and constant dynamical relation among his *trinity of passion, chance and reason*.³⁹ This Trinitarian relationship is how individuals organize and structure the entities which are to be understood as potential political actors. It is the Trinitarian relationship among war waging actors which makes war a social activity that; requires political and social structures, social interactions of passion and emotions, and demands reason and skills.⁴⁰ The remarkable trinity is what makes war a natural phenomenon within the human nature, since they all consists of sometimes irrational elements, controlled and affected by the human reason.

To achieve a better understanding of the three elements of the trinity and how their different combinations can influence the end result (affecting the actions of the actor), a brief description is provided for each one:

Passion: Wars cannot be waged if no one is to volunteer to offer their life in a struggle which might bring them closer to obtain a goal. Passion will therefore always be an ever-present factor in war for so long the actors involved in it require support or capacity of warfare to enable their acts, since the public grants an organization its passion if they find its goals and values legitimate. Passion is

³⁷ Mårtensson, Hjalmar, *von Clausewitz Om Kriget; Kommentarer, Definitioner och Register*, Stockholm, 1995, p. 20.

³⁸ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. 14.

³⁹ Gray, Colin S., *War, Peace and International Relations; an Introduction to Strategic History* New York, 2007, p. 24.

⁴⁰ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 70.

described as a very dynamic element which could flourish from any situation since feelings are to some extent very unpredictable. It is to be understood that passion is a “blind natural force” which makes all humans able to develop feelings of disliking or hate towards one another, and give rise to primordial violence.

“If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them, but they will still affect it to some degree (...).”⁴¹

Reason: To be able to handle and direct the public’s passion towards an end, the element of reason must create the proper channels through which the emotions can be used. By combining and attaching the passion to policies, reason is needed to link ends to means and create a strategy for how this is to be applied, but also to understand what kind of means that are available is best suited for what ends. Reason cannot do much alone without practicing the other elements, but without reason, all other acts would be more or less pointless since none of them would lead to any end.

Chance: Clausewitz states that war is the realm of chance, where it is *applied* more than in any other human activity. This gives weight to the importance of great minds of the commanders in combat and their armies that are fighting the war. Victory or defeat cannot be seen only as a matter of luck, but rather be dependent on the quality and capacity of the army and the commanders and their opponents. It is through the perilous engagement in chance one actor can beat their opponent with their military force, but it is also by chance they might lose this struggle.⁴²

The traditional translation of the readings of Clausewitz does assert that these elements are defined as the different parts of the state, compromising the three different elements to the people (passion), the army (chance) and the government (reason).⁴³ One has to admit, it could easily be understood in that sense since Clausewitz wrote *On War* during the first period of the 19th century, during the Napoleon era, a time characterized by the true Westphalia-state structures and nationalism influenced all of the European people.⁴⁴ But it should be recognized that this is but an interpretation, expressed in a fashionable way in his time. The Trinitarian structure may very well be suited for explaining other social organizations; a group with political leaders, enjoying a military potential and with support from the people of its society. It seems hard to neglect the fact that individuals or groups in the pre-state era would defend their own interests with violence if necessary. It should also be noted that intrastate violence often is a

⁴¹ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz: A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 117.


⁴² Ibid, p. 115-120.

⁴³ Gray, Colin S., *War, Peace and International Relations; an Introduction to Strategic History* New York, 2007, p. 227.

⁴⁴ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Harmondsworth, 1982, p. 17-18

result of a political opposition which cannot make their voice heard, and therefore seek alternative ways of expressing their values.⁴⁵

One could use this traditional approach and formulate *The Trinity of Trinities*⁴⁶(se figure 3.2.1) to illustrate the relationship between these elements, and one can see how the elements are connected and interact with each other.



[Figure 3.2.1] *The Trinity of Trinities; with the example of the state interpretation.*

One must observe the Trinitarian as a very dynamic relationship; in smaller organizations, it could be argued that these elements may intertwine. Leaders that usually are seen as an element of reason may be involved in the fighting, influencing the passion within the fighting group to continue etc. If one would try to analyze a civil rebellion, it could become harder to separate the people, supplying the organization with passion and the overall crowd demonstrating on the streets, representing the element of chance etc.

In this study of contemporary organizations, it needs to prove that there are non-state political actors and that those actors are in command of a military force and gains support from a social public which will legitimize the acting of the actor and also provide it with manpower, weapons, economical support etc. One should consider the organizations limitations considering their capabilities to conduct a full scale war, since these organizations cannot afford high-tech weaponry, tanks, helicopters or airplanes. The type of warfare that these groups are conducting might not be what a western scholar would define as classical warfare.

3.3 Critics against Clausewitz

The ideas of Clausewitz have been declared obsolete by critics many times during history due to what is supposed to have changed war in that time. During the 1960s and the cold war debate regarding total nuclear annihilation and MAD doctrine⁴⁷, war had become too *dangerous* to be a rational instrument of politics. Fortunately, no real event would prove these critics wrong, but the debates

⁴⁵ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. 14-15.

⁴⁶ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 121.

⁴⁷ MAD (Mutual assured destruction) was the nuclear warfare strategy which would result in the total destruction of both the defenders and the attackers. The logic of this doctrine was to deterrence the opponent from escalating any acts of war towards the usage of nuclear weapons since no actor would benefit from such war.

continued.⁴⁸ The critics today are following the everlasting criticism of realism when talking about Clausewitz; by focusing on the state, he loses his relevance for today's situation where the *new wars* are intrastate conflicts, which are to be more common than interstate wars.

Other critics, such as Martin van Creveld, argues that war and violence no longer are to be seen as an instrument of politics, but rather a mean without any end or an end in itself. By claiming that ethnicity, identity, religion or personal wealth makes perfectly good incitements for people and groups to engage in violent acts.⁴⁹ But these arguments have their own shortcomings: ethnicity and identity are both very broad terms without any clear definition; it could be culture, race, language etc. These fundamentals of social identity are undefined and constantly dynamic. It could be argued that an individual can consider being a part of more than one ethnicity and transforming her identity according to her situation.⁵⁰ The author to this thesis believe that one should consider the social impact of religion as well; since religion can be structured in a clear hierarchical way which could make it into an instrument of a preacher.

Van Creveld among others emphasize that warfare has changed, and the war being waged today cannot be understood by the older definitions of war.

“We are said to have moved beyond the age of the state, and wars are now concerned with warlords, drugs barons and other enterprising individuals and their personal interests. In particular, ethnic and resource considerations are important factors motivating individuals to take up their weapons.”⁵¹

The term *low intensity warfare* was coined to prove the differences between the *regular wars* and the *new wars*.⁵² One should note that because of what form the violence might take, one cannot dismiss that the so called *low-intensity warfare* still might be a political instrument for those waging it. The author to this thesis would say that this is no objection to Clausewitz theories; all wars can be understood as a duel between actors, a political debate with other means. War “var[ies] with the nature of their motives and of the situation which gave rise to them”⁵³, so we should not expect all wars to be waged identically.

⁴⁸Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz; A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 36-37.

⁴⁹ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. 3, Van Creveld, Martin, *The Transformation of War*, New York, 1991, p. 49-57, 142-156.

⁵⁰ Joireman, Sandra F. *Nationalism and Political Identity*, London, 2007, p. 55-56.

⁵¹ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. ix.

⁵²Van Creveld, Martin, *The Transformation of War*, New York, 1991, p. 18-25.

⁵³ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Ångström, Jan, *The Nature of Modern War: Clausewitz and his Critics Revisited*, Stockholm, 2003, p. 41-42.

3.4 Operationalization of the theories

To be able to prove Clausewitz correct, this study must show that: 1, the selected actors in the armed conflict are political actors. 2, the actors uphold the Trinitarian structure of passion, ration and chance. 3, these actors are in an active pursuit of political goals. These factors can easily be misjudged, but this should not be a reason for not investigate this issue since it is too important to be ignored. This subchapter shall present how this thesis has operationalize the theories of Clausewitz.

3.4.1 The aspects of politics

In finding evidence for the first argument, this study should be able to separate different kinds of motives and goals. Since Clausewitz himself did not make any attempts to define his own profound definition of politics, it is something that the author had to acquire from other theorists.⁵⁴ Defining political goals and creating a clear distinction between them and economical, religious or sociological goals is rather hard, since politics could be understood as the authoritative allocation of resources as power and wealth or how to organize a society as a whole.⁵⁵ One should notice that political motives do not have to represent those kinds of values and goals that we are used to in western politics, since the implications of political power does not share universal characteristics. Politics may involve dominant roles for individuals or groups as well as it may involve democratic parties.⁵⁶

To define politics and be able to set up variables that we can investigate, this study will use the definitions made by Robert Dahl. Dahl provides us with a toolset to interpret politics as variables, which make it possible for us to investigate the issue, even though he cautions that it is very complicated to analyze politics and the difficulties of identify its consequences.⁵⁷ He describes politics as “any persistent pattern of human relationship” which involves the influencing values of power, rule or authority.⁵⁸ Power is here to be understood as the ability for an actor (called A) to affect another actor (B) in a manner against B’s interest.⁵⁹ By this explanation, it is easy to see why military forces with the ability to coerce opponents are traditionally seen as a symbol of power. By A applying a tactic of sticks or carrots, it makes B choose between taking action because of its relationship to the consequences of the acts. The relationship of

⁵⁴ Making a new definition of politics is beyond the scope of any thesis at this level, due to its complexity and dynamical nature.

⁵⁵ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. 9.

⁵⁶ Dahl, Robert, *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, 1991, p. 6.

⁵⁷ Jan & Svensson, Torsten, *Att fråga och att svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*, 2007, p. 24-25, Dahl, Robert, *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, 1991, p1-11.

⁵⁸ Dahl, Robert, *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, 1991, p. 1-26.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p, 29.

power among actors, as some are more powerful than others, are not to be seen as static and absolute, but rather as relative since there is several sources of power and all might not be useful in every situation.⁶⁰ But the distribution power is to be seen as a zero-sum game, since one can only gain the influence of power which someone else simultaneously is losing.⁶¹

If the powerless actor acknowledges the relationship with the powerful, then that legitimacy will turn power into authority, since A can govern without spending a lot of resources in coerce B to act after what is in A's interests.⁶² This relationship is only said to be legitimate if both actors are considering the current situation as just, since it otherwise would be a form of powerful coercion. The undertaken actions are what define this legitimacy; you do not vote in an election unless you acknowledge its existing authority (this is not to say that you approve of everything they do).⁶³ In our case; if a civilian is active in engaging in an organizations activities or contributes them with additional help, they are to be seen as supporters.⁶⁴ Agendas that are making actors seek political influence over a government or a powerful council may defiantly be seen as an ambition to extend their own political strength. This is the ambition to rule.

An actor who enjoys a high position of great coercive power or legitimate authority can be considered to be a ruler. The elements of power, rule and authority is therefore to be seen as very closely connected, since the meaning of ruling an authority is to get (in one way or another) support from those acknowledging the powerful position. This position could be occupied by parties or individuals depending on what political system we are observing.⁶⁵

3.4.2 Trinitarian structure

By investigating if these actors are political actors with Trinitarian structures, this study shall investigate if they are in fact exercised power, that their exercise is based on legitimacy and authority from their supporting societies and show that their struggles are an ambition of wining and increase their influence of power. It will be investigated if these organizations: have an audience supporting their actions and granting its legitimacy and authority, have a military unit which can grant them a position of power compared to those opposing the group's ambitions.

⁶⁰ Dahl, Robert, *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, 1991, p. 32-34, 43-44.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 52.

⁶² Ibid, p. 47-48.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 54.

⁶⁴ As a quote of the Prophet Mohammed: "*Whoever supplies a warrior in the way of god with equipment is also a warrior and whoever takes the place of a warrior in his family by means of wealth, is also a warrior.*". Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 60.

⁶⁵ Dahl, Robert, *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, 1991, p. 40, 53-56.

3.4.3 Center of Gravity

This study is also to answer if the organizations are fighting for political interests. If this is to be proven, the actors should be organized around some essential political ideology or moral values and thoughts which will provide the organization with the legitimacy of the supporter, or the passion of the crowd as Clausewitz would have stated. Note however that legitimacy also might be acquired by other sources of inspiration, such as charismatic leaders (which could be unanimous with the ideology) or previous military achievements. An ideology can take many shapes and involve many things, but it is essentially a collection of ideas of how the political or social society should be organized and ruled.⁶⁶ This is to be seen as the center of gravity of the political actor, and if this is to be overlapped by the military center of gravity, then it is proven that these two are connected and that war is a mean to a political end. A center of gravity is the source where the all the passion and reason are being collected by an actor, “where all forces of gravity bear on an objective”. By *destroying* the center of gravity, the opponents will to engage in war will cease to exist, and the victory will be achieved.⁶⁷ This is to be seen as strategically important objectives as some particular city or territory that has to be controlled, or as an ideological objective as the spread of the ideological values, or a more personal goal as a specific opponents defeat. This is a lucrative factor since the key center of gravity might be **very** hard to find, because all actors legitimate capabilities is collected from this source. It is therefore easier to find some center of gravities, since there can be many subordinated objectives which might lead up to **the** center of gravity. In these two cases, open speeches and statements can be very useful to investigate different agendas or prioritized goals in our quest to find these centers of gravities since these are the policies that can obtain support from the societies. One should be aware of the fact that no group would ever reveal its pure center of gravity to anyone but the absolute inner circle.

⁶⁶ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, *Clausewitz and African War*, Oxon, 2005, p. 15.

⁶⁷ Smith, Hugh, *On Clausewitz: A study of Military and Political Ideas*, New York, 2005, p. 132-136.

4 Case studies

This chapter will present the information combined with some concluding evaluations predicated from the theological framework which will be used to conclude my analysis in the next chapter. Each organization will be dealt with separately and has got its own subchapter and summary of observations. The focus is to present the key information regarding the period of active engagement by the organizations in an armed conflict or political activity. This will be followed by remarks and evaluation which are relevant to deduce from the material in understanding the analysis.

4.1 Case study I: the Taliban movement (1994-2001)

4.1.1 Afghanistan

The country of Afghanistan is a country characterized by the vast mountainous desert and small isolated fertile grounds. The economic situation varies among the different provinces but is unstable and declining overall. The population inhabiting the country are said to share nothing but the religion of Islam and the ten largest ethnical groups are all ethnically, culturally and linguistically all mixed over the geographical area. The division between the Sunnis and the Shias are remarkable as Sunnis being the dominant faith with 80% of the population, while the Shi'ites constitutes the rest and suffer from political and economic alienation.⁶⁸ The country enjoyed peace and inner stability during the 1970's that ended in a pro-communist coup against the Islamic parties in 1978 which lead to a public outcry for *jihad*. This was followed by a long and exhausting civil war, characterized by brutal violence, and followed by the Soviet invasion in late 1979.⁶⁹ The Soviet forces remained in Afghanistan until mid-February 1989, leaving the country in a horrible shape with a brutal civil war still raging between different groups, which armed themselves with the enormous supply of weapons and ammunitions which the Soviet troops had left in their retreat. A large numbers of Afghan citizens had fled abroad as refugees, particularly to Pakistan and Iran.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 8-10.

⁶⁹ Smith, Farhana, *From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords*, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol21, nr.2, 2010 p. 61-62.

⁷⁰ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p.24-26, 36-37.

4.1.2 The appearance of the Taliban movement

The Taliban movement is said to have begun with a small group of religious students in the city of Kandahar, feeling betrayed and deceived by the Mujahidin leaders who fought over the rule of the city. In the shadows of the larger factions fighting elsewhere, the unknown organization, ultimately lead by a local mullah, Mullah Omar⁷¹, overwhelmed the city-defending military force and took over the city and proclaimed strict Sharia laws. Their religious origins constitutes of participation in the *madrassas*, religious schools which are wide established in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These institutions provide an important network for the movement to collect indoctrinated manpower and supporters in the future.⁷²

By combining the Islamic agenda with the disarming of local gangs brought stability to the local region which the population had longed for. This brought a name to the Taliban of being the rightful and unifying group which had the goal to finally end the Jihad and make Afghanistan a true Islamic state.⁷³ After the capture of the city of Kandahar, their agenda was consolidated since they acted to enforce the Islamic way of living; banned music and other entertainments, enforced requirements that men must wear turbans and grow beards while the women were forced to dress in the totally covering burqa. They organized raids to burn down the poppy fields, since these fields were representing a culture which abstained from the *true* Islamic way of life. By doing so, their organization became far from similar to the other ruling parties. They were granted an almost sacred status by their appearances. It was based on the rumor that Mullah Omar has been wearing a cloak that once belonged to the Prophet Mohammed, giving him alone a name of “*Amir-ul Momineen*” [the Leader of the Faithful].⁷⁴

The Taliban were very successful in appealing to the public support in the Pushtun areas which they controlled. By combining the message of peace and stability with traditional ethnical and religious claims which the current Pushtun parties had ignored, they would politically outmaneuver the rival Pushtun groups and bring additional legitimacy to their own movement, contributing to the pressure of local leaders to join the ranks of the Taliban.⁷⁵

“In identifying purist culture and tradition with the Islam of the village, the Taliban were indirectly condemning the Islam of the ruling parties since most of the party leaders were products of Kabul University (...).⁷⁶

⁷¹ Stenersen, Anne, *The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – organization, leadership and worldview*, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2010, p. 43.

⁷² Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 226-227.

⁷³ Johnson, Thomas H. & Mason, M. Chris, *Understanding the Takuban and Insurgency in Afghanistan*, Orbis, vol. 51, Issue 1, 2007, p. 74, Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 46-47, Smith, Farhana, *From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords*, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol21, nr.2, 2010 p. 72-73, Johnson, Thomas H. & Mason, M. Chris, *Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan*, Orbis, vol. 51, Issue 1, 2007, p. 79-80.

⁷⁴ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 46-47, 51,63, Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 227, 235.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 237-238.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 242-243.

4.1.3 The Taliban conquest of southern Afghanistan

After the ensuring their control on Kandahar, the Taliban advanced fast through the neighboring provinces of Zabul, Uruzgan and Helmand as the civilian societies would almost immediately support the values of the party. The tales of the Taliban movement and their agenda traveled quickly and local leaders had in many cases already made a decision to join the party before they were approached. Others were disarmed by the Taliban during their advance towards Kabul. Due to the values and traditions of the Pushtun commanders, they stood before limited options, between fighting and joining the movement. This was a choice between life or death due to the Taliban's stunning increase in supporters and firepower.⁷⁷ Their increasing power and authority was perceived as a threat to the position of the *Hizb-I Islami* (Hizb-I). This party, with its ambitious mujahidin leader *Hekmatyar*, said to have had the most potential in creating a central modern state with strong coercive power. Hizb-I had lost legitimacy by sacrificing the local political and cultural traditions and sovereignty of its supporting societies in their ideology, weakening their authority among rural communities. The Hizb-I strongholds on the hills overlooking Kabul from the south interfered with the Taliban direction of attack. Repeating the same pattern as before; offering an agenda of true Islamic values, some commanders rethought their allegiance and joined the Taliban with their soldiers while some remained loyal to Hizb-I. Undermined by this process, Hekmatyar retreated from the area and abandoned his power position; creating a temporary political and military vacuum in the Afghani power-balance which both the Taliban and the other parties would take advantage of to enforce their own positions.⁷⁸

While the Taliban advanced towards Kabul by seizing the provinces of Paktia and Paktika, the strong leader Ahmad Massoud⁷⁹ pressured Hekmatyar's position by intensifying their battle against his troops around the area of Kabul. Massoud exploited the change within the political arena by invading his former allies: the weaker Shi'ites parties. Massoud interpreted the Taliban as a great future threat and launch an offensive in the region of Kabul, eradicating the remaining troops of Hizb-I, and forced the Taliban out of their position outside Kabul, enthroning him with the rule over Kabul. This setback made the Taliban reconsider their strategy and turned their eyes towards the west.

In March 1995, a Taliban offensive was conducted from Kandahar towards the strategically important city of Herat and the airbase of Shindand, controlled by Massoud allied Ismail Khan of the Herat shura party. With Massoud's assistance, the offensive was called off after both sides suffered heavy casualties. Khan sought to strike a blow to the Taliban party by advancing towards Kandahar. In his rapid offensive, he made the fatal mistake of overstretching the frontlines

⁷⁷ Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 238.

⁷⁸ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 46.

⁷⁹ Party leader of the pragmatic Islamic party of Shura-I Nazar-I Shamali. Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 224.

which the Taliban exploited with astounding success and defeated and took over the remaining of Kahn's forces. This forced Khan and his party to flee to Iran and left the city of Herat undefended to the Taliban, which at this point controlled almost half country.⁸⁰

4.1.4 The unification of Afghanistan

This achievement granted the Taliban the self confidence by newfound the expertise and tactical knowledge necessary to challenge their mujahidin opponents in the north of Afghanistan. From here onwards, the Taliban will not only be operating on Pushtun territory, challenging their ethnical identity. The Taliban were not known for their ideology in particular, it was rather their military engagement with their opponents. They were seen as neutral in the grand conflict of Afghanistan, who fought for the unification and establishment of an Islamic state instead of having an ethnic-political ideology as the other parties. Due to this character, the non-Pushtun ethnics did not resist the Taliban agenda as they advanced further. Their way of conducting their advances where to send religious envoys to the local commanders that were opposing them and negotiating before moving forward, looking for support or seeking permission to cross. By using the religious networks of the madrassas, the Taliban could send messages over a wide area without risking that anyone would reveal the contents due to the almost holy status of the party.⁸¹

The organization had created a decision-making structure of four different layers of councils that would form policies. It is mainly the first, "inner shura", where Mullah Omar himself with 22 other Taliban are making decisions while the other three layers advices the council and adopt their decisions on the local scale.⁸²

The Taliban finally launched their long anticipated attack on Kabul in September, 1996 after a year of redeployment and enhancing their territory of the newly seized cities of Jalalabad and Sarobi. The imposed religious laws in Herat were not as appreciated by the locals as it had been in other cities, due to the differences in cultural customs and secularization and the situation has been described as a military occupation.⁸³ The situation followed after the fall of Kabul was of a different kind; the war-weary inhabitants hoped that the Taliban would bring peace and stability to a region which had been fought over by different groups constantly since the beginning of the civil war, even though there was a great divide in cultural and political customs.⁸⁴ The successful Taliban movement

⁸⁰ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p.48, Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 228.

⁸¹ Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 243.

⁸² Elias, Barbara, Afghanistan: Taliban Decision-Making and Leadership Structure, *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book*, No. 295, 2009.

⁸³ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 49.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 52

now controlled four of Afghanistan's biggest cities and set their aim at defeating Massoud. He had escaped the battle of Kabul with a majority of his troops and had retreated back and re-established in Mazar Sharif, the largest city under his control. Between Kabul and Mazar Sharif where the territory of Rashid Dostum's party Kumbish-I Milli, well known for their tremendous effort against the Soviet occupation. The Taliban tried to negotiate a peace with Dostum, but the situation ended with a stalemate between the fighting forces.⁸⁵ The Taliban focused on the objective of unifying the country, by force if necessary, did not take any risks and the stalemate was first broken when one of Dostum's key commanders changed sides. This breakthrough would lead to the capture of the city Mazar. This would prove to be a crucial development since the Taliban party would receive the recognition as the ruling government by a number of states in May, 1997. This event resulted in a lot of commanders turning their backs to Dostum and Massoud. This gave the Taliban the freedom of movement and the ability of re-supplying in these territories.⁸⁶ Some commanders did not however abandon their alliances and tricked large numbers of Taliban forces into encirclements and isolation, making it possible for Massoud to advance towards Kabul. Massoud and Dostum took this opportunity and made a combined effort to take Mazar and Kabul. They succeeded in the first objective and made a great effort in closing in on the city of Kabul itself. During this period, the Taliban was not restless but took the opportunity to advance on the countryside of Afghanistan, closing in on Mazar Sharif and seizing a lot of ground. Due to this development, the troops of Massoud and Dostum created havoc in Mazar; looting, murdering and burned down official houses in the city,⁸⁷ which made the population reconsider the Taliban ideology.⁸⁸ The final assault on Mazar Sharif came in 1998 and resulted in the capturing the city by the Taliban. In this aftermath Dostum disappeared and the only opponent still posing a challenge was Massoud, who retreated to the Panjshir valleys.⁸⁹ The Taliban by now ruled 90% of Afghanistan and received the official support of Pakistan in the summer of 2000. No further significant changes was made in the battle against Massoud's remaining troops before 9/11/2001.

4.1.5 Summary of the Taliban

There are many observations to be made in the case of the Taliban movement. Among them are; first; the leadership of Mullah Omar is very crucial in the movement's identity and his leaderships and religious agenda ties the supporter's legitimacy to the organization. The passion of the supporters does not only tie to

⁸⁵ Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*, Karachi, 2001, p. 50-51.

⁸⁶ Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 230.

⁸⁷ Giustozzi, Antonio, *Empires of Mud; war and warlords in Afghanistan*, London, 2009, p. 83.

⁸⁸ The Taliban *offering* is to be understood as the exchange of secular culture for the providing of security.

⁸⁹ Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 231.

him or the religious agenda, but to the vision of a stable, peaceful and unified Afghanistan.⁹⁰

Second; the organization is clearly seeking a political change but focus on representing different elements depending on where they are and who they interact with. This study finds ethnical, religious and cultural reasons to support the Taliban movement, but these are all addressed to different audiences.

Third; the Taliban acted very carefully when engaging in armed struggle and conducted many negotiations with different actors in seeking a peaceful solution, meaning that the political agenda was above the ambition to defeat the opponent at all time, at all cost. The military objectives were also combined with the political objectives; creating and consolidating the Taliban monopoly in use of violence and forming a unified society which could be ruled by a religious government.

4.2 Case study II: Hezbollah (1990-2000)

4.2.1 Lebanon & the emerging of the Hezbollah party

The small state of Lebanon by land is trapped between Syria and Israel. Due to its exposed location and populated by a great diversity of religious sects, the country has experienced a lot of political and military turbulence between domestic actors and different international actors. The political history of Lebanon has a special character of a dangerous religious mix which resulted in a costly civil war waged during 1975-1990 (claiming nearly 5% of the country's population⁹¹). During the same period; Israel invaded the southern part of the country in the summer 1982 in their countermeasure against the active PLO⁹² who had sought refuge in Lebanon.⁹³ This would become the breeding ground for Hezbollah who is said to have emerged in 1982 as a response to the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. By proclaiming a jihad against the invaders and with the support of Syria, Iran and the affected Shi'ite communities,⁹⁴ Hezbollah (the Party of God) would start acting towards their goals, which was proclaimed in an open letter to the "oppressed" people of Lebanon and the world. This letter present their religious origins and the overall goals; eliminate the Israeli occupation of Lebanon

⁹⁰ Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p.243, Smith, Farhana, *From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords*, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol21, nr.2, 2010 p.73.

⁹¹ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 120.

⁹² Palestinian Liberation Organization.

⁹³ Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 17-19.

⁹⁴ Wiegand, Krista E., Reforming of a Terrorist Group; Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 32, p. 670-671.

(and Palestine), to oppose the corrupt state of Lebanon and work towards the creation of an Islamic state.⁹⁵

The Shi'ite societies had not only paid the dearest price for the Israeli occupation as it was mainly Shi'ite territory being occupied, but also lacked the political unity which other groups enjoyed.⁹⁶ Hezbollah challenged other parties to fill the political void within the Shia community, but as they proved to be successful in battling Israel, the party gave these communities a self-confidence it never had felt before, earning its full support.

4.2.2 The end of the civil war and the jihad on Israel

The Lebanese civil war ended 1990 with a multilateral agreement, *the Taif Accord*, including not only the different domestic religious groups which had to style a new constitution together, but also Syria. The role of the neighboring country was to assist the dismantling of militias and provide security during the first period of peace.⁹⁷ But as the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon continued and did not change after the accord had been sign, Hezbollah had a reason to proclaim themselves as the national resistance group. It was in many Lebanese's opinion true, since the Lebanese army was more or less *de facto* supporting the organization since the army lacked an own capability to repel any Israeli encounter. Hezbollah received nationwide attention in their successes against the occupation force, making the organization summon support from not only their religious Shi'ite communities, but also gaining secular Muslims, Christians and nationalists support.⁹⁸ With the ability to refer to different ideologies depending to which audience they approach, Hezbollah has become a great political actor whom all respect in Lebanon.

In the upcoming of 1992's election in Lebanon, the Hezbollah had furious internal debates if they were to become a political party racing towards elections and thereby legitimizing the current political system. The organization had already a great political responsibility in the Shi'ite communities where it not only was protecting the community against other militias or the Israelis, but also organized social welfare programs and services which neither the government nor other groups were interested in establishing in those areas.⁹⁹ Taking the risk of

⁹⁵ An Open Letter; The Hezbollah Program, *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, nr. 48, 1988, Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 36-40.

⁹⁶ Haddad, Simon, A Survey of Lebanese Shia attitudes towards Hezbollah, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 16, No3. 2005, p. 322.

⁹⁷ Not to mention that Syria more or less becomes the guardian of political access and power, since their legitimate rule over Lebanon was provided by the accord, granting them the right to intervene against groups that did not match Syria's interest or that gained too much political leverage to threaten Syria's position. Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p.45.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p.70.

⁹⁹ Wiegand, Krista E., Reforming of a Terrorist Group; Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 32, p. 673, Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007,

selling out their traditional Islamic beliefs, the party campaigned in the elections after an influential Shi'ite cleric in Lebanon approved and encouraged this move towards a more compromising political agenda.¹⁰⁰ In taking the step of becoming an established political party, Hezbollah had to declare itself a peaceful party and disarm. The party had more coercive power than any other actor in Lebanon, including the Lebanese army. They used the Syrian influence to compromise the agreement to disarm as soon as the threat from Israel disappears. This was a great exhibition of what political leverage the party enjoyed during the pre-election period.¹⁰¹ They benefited from the advantage of not having participated in the civil war against the other religious sects, granting them the possibility to gain support from all sects.

By becoming a political party, Hezbollah started to achieve their domestic goals through political means, while fighting the Israeli troops with their armed militia which easily could have been used to coerce political opponents. A trade off was made as they were granted the right as a political party; Hezbollah had to concession about their stands in creating an Islamic state among some of their most radical values. In return they would be perceived as a legitimate national resistance against Israel, granting Hezbollah much leverage in the security political debates and in military affairs.¹⁰²

This move granted Hezbollah *de facto* the right to exercise jihad against the Israeli occupation, a duty they proved to be very successful in. But the government and Hezbollah would view the battle of the occupied territory differently. The state's aim was to recover the national territory in a civil manner without encouraging more violence. Hezbollah's *raison d'être* had officially been the total elimination of Israeli presence on Lebanese soil.¹⁰³ This issue, was to be treated in practice as the "rules of the game", emerged between the Israeli occupation force and its proxy allies SLA and the Lebanese resistance. It was to be articulated in 1993, without the involvement of Hezbollah as the party forbids any connection what so ever with Israel.¹⁰⁴ The rules of the game imply that all sides should restrict civilian casualties and focus only on military objectives. Even though Hezbollah did not officially take any part in the agreement, this would later become their reality as well during the following three years.

p.107-112, Haddad, Simon, A Survey of Lebanese Shi'i attitudes towards Hezbollah, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 16, No3. 2005, p. 322-324.

¹⁰⁰ Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadl-Allāh permitted Hezbollah to create a political dialog as he saw this as the only peaceful way of working towards a creation of the Islamic state of Lebanon. Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 99-101.

¹⁰¹ Wiegand, Krista E., Reforming of a Terrorist Group; Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 32, p. 674.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 675, Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 52, 63-79.

¹⁰³ Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 114.

¹⁰⁴ By having any communication with Israel or even mentioning Israel would grant Israel legitimacy. Hezbollah preferred not to speak about anything else than the occupied Palestine etc. Ibid, p. 27, Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 83-85.

4.2.3 The Israeli withdrawal and its aftermaths

The support to Hezbollah increased during this period, and using the slogan “*They resist with their blood, resist with your vote.*” the party was able to collect votes and multiple allies from different sects.¹⁰⁵ Their political compromise had been costly as leading figures of the party questioned the core values of the party.

Hezbollah transformed from a loose umbrella organization in the early 80’s to establish a well-designed hierarchy structure. The complete map of the organizational structure has been kept secret, but Hezbollah is known to have transformed from a decentralized fighting militia to a centralized organization with one ruling elite of religious-politico clerics representing various Shi’ite communities.¹⁰⁶ This central entity in the decision making process was substantial in enabling the controlling the spread of militia groups and make them work towards achieving the shared goals. But some leaders started to question why they should provide Hezbollah with young Shi’ite men to fight for goals shared with the other, non-Muslim, population.¹⁰⁷ Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, would neglect some of the religious ambitions of these more extreme ummas, and continue the successful agenda of providing social welfare and economical support to the growth of religious culture. If someone would to question the Islamic obligations, he addressed the religious jihad which never seemed to end reaping Israeli lives.¹⁰⁸

The religious jihad against Israel had shattered great amount of lives, and by applying mainly guerilla tactics (but also act of terrorism¹⁰⁹) the resistance deteriorate the engagement of the Israeli society in the conflict of southern Lebanon. In end of May 2000, celebration erupted in Lebanon when the Israeli troops withdrew, but as the displaced residences returned to their liberated homelands, Lebanon stood confronted with a dangerous situation; will Hezbollah continue their hunt on the individuals who cooperated with the Israeli troops, and what would Hezbollah do with their militia now when their mission was complete?¹¹⁰ Nasrallah had promised that no blood was to be shed. Being true to his word; Hezbollah collected a great gratitude from the Lebanese people.¹¹¹ As the party continued to gain support for its rational and pragmatic political debate, the religious or nationalistically supporters continued to provide their support due

¹⁰⁵ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 102-103.

¹⁰⁶ Rueda, Edwin O., *New Terrorism? A Case Study of Al-Qaida and The Lebanese Hezbollah*, *Naval Postgraduate School*, 2001, p. 67.

¹⁰⁷ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 106, Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 59. The estimated manpower of Hezbollah has been a subject to many suggestions, but it is believed to be able to raise 25 000 men in Lebanon - Rueda, Edwin O., *New Terrorism? A Case Study of Al-Qaida and The Lebanese Hezbollah*, *Naval Postgraduate School*, 2001, p. 67.

¹⁰⁸ Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 60-61.

¹⁰⁹ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 77.

¹¹⁰ Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 124-128.

¹¹¹ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p. 90, Wiegand, Krista E., *Reforming of a Terrorist Group; Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party*, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 32, p. 676.

to Hezbollah's historical success against Israel, and because of the continuation of the jihad against the Israeli occupation of Sheeba farms.¹¹² The following years would prove to be very unstable for Lebanon as domestic violence between the religious sects continued, Syria withdrew its security force due to public unrest and Israel's retaliation campaign in 2006. The 2006 war has become a core issue for the political division in Lebanon; Hezbollah on one side proclaiming the victory over Israel (as it achieved a tremendous success in fighting the Israeli invasion), proclaiming the threat of Israel and fund much of the rebuilding of properties and infrastructure.¹¹³ The other side blames Hezbollah for creating the incitements for an Israeli attack (which Nasrallah confirms later and answered that he regret the hostilities that lead up to the drastic Israeli response¹¹⁴) and being responsible for endangering the domestic security by not disarming their superior militia which still serves as a symbol of Hezbollah's power.

4.2.4 Summary of Hezbollah

There are plenty observations to be made in the case of Hezbollah and the organization's goals. First; the importance of leadership has grown as the power and responsibility has developed. By organizing a ruling elite of religious clerics of the Shi'ite communities, their support was granted to the party, and by offering secularized values towards other audiences Hezbollah attracted individuals from all different sects of Lebanon. Secondly: By applying different ideologies towards different audiences, Hezbollah could compromise on some values to increase their position in the political debate. The original motives has developed from a religious core; and in the area controlled exclusively by Hezbollah, severe forms of traditional *Sharia laws* are applied.¹¹⁵ But the overall goal seems to be fighting the jihad against Israel, as this is the struggle in which Hezbollah has been most successful in. By becoming the national resistance, they gained the respect from all people of Lebanon. Third: The party has showed subordination towards a number of agreements or accords, and by respecting their rules Hezbollah legitimize these agreements. Even though they are condemning all negotiation with Israel; they conducted the *rules of the game* and disengage from the former extremist role. By acting with reason and thoughtfulness, they shows how the violence is subordinated the leadership of reason and the political ambitions.

¹¹² Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p.142-145.

¹¹³ Ghaddar, Hanin, Hezbollah's Extreme Makeover, *Foreign Policy*, Marsh 17, 2010.

¹¹⁴ Norton, Augustus Richard, *Hezbollah; a short history*, Princeton, 2007, p.140, 154

¹¹⁵ Wiegand, Krista E., Reforming of a Terrorist Group; Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 32, p. 671.

5 Concluding Analysis & Results

This chapter shall work as an instrument in concluding the combination of the theoretical framework with the material presented by the last chapter. By investigate the actors' motive, objectives and their internal structure separately, it will become easier to find how this study argues in the creation of its results. The results will be used to answer the stated research question in its own subchapter. The conclusions reached in the study are to be found in the next chapter.

5.1 The Actors & their objectives

5.1.1 The Taliban movement

The ambitions of the Taliban movement were established in the aftermath of their conquest of Kandahar as they now were involved in the political struggle over power, authority and rule over Afghanistan. Their political-religious values of a stable and unified Afghanistan might have been a vision, but they started by realizing their vision on Kandahar, showing their ambitions for the country. The movement erupted as a response to the illegitimate rule of one of the Mujahidin's control over Kandahar. As the society did not give its support and authority to the ruling leader, it was possible for other actors to claim that authority. The disarmament of the local security threats can be identified as one of the initial centers of gravities, as the Taliban were a response against the instability and insecurity in the community. As their militia was able to bring security to the city, they developed the goal to stabilize the region. As their source of power consistently increased by local commanders and fighters joining their ranks, the Taliban political and military goals developed to include a wider area of the country. In the early stage, the goal of unifying Afghanistan must have been interpreted as an illusion at that stage since their power was far from strong enough to endanger their Mujahidin-competitors. But when they defeated Kahn, their strength proved them able to reach and achieve their goals and the struggle for complete legitimate and authoritarian rule of Afghanistan began. The center of gravity beyond this point is clearly the elimination of all political factions that had the capacity to threaten the Taliban activities in order to establish an Islamic state. Their ambitions were from the start to gain power from their defeated enemies and to coerce all those opposing their authority and rule over the Islamic state of Afghanistan; as they proved in the capture and rule of Herat. The connection between the political and military goals can be interpreted as strong since much of the fighting erupted only subsequent to a failed negotiation between the Taliban's religious envoys and the local commanders or factions.

Audience	Agenda	Goals/Values	Means
Afghani population	Stability and security	Ending the civil war and unrest, end struggle between the current mujahidinian rulers	Military, coercive power
Islamic culture (religious)	Strict religious	Establishment of the Islamic State and strict Islamic rules and traditions	Legitimate rule, coercive power, Mullah Omar Charisma
Pushtun societies (ethnic)	<i>None</i>	No social-ethnic claims	-

[Figure 5.1.1.1] Examples of goals represented by the Taliban movement's agenda and what means they use to achieve these goals.¹¹⁶

Violence never occurred in large scale without first the failure of the Shura councils attempts to achieve a political-religious agreement. The militias (as well as the regular civilians) would never disagree with any orders given by Mullah Omar, the Leader of the Faithful, who enjoyed legitimate authorial rule. There is no evidence found that argues that the Taliban objective would have been connected to ethnical or economic interests, as they operated all over Afghanistan with the same logic and routine. As this became a struggle over power, authority and the possibility to rule, the Taliban movement in the Afghani war is to be defined as a political actor, whom gathered support through the elements of stability and religious beliefs.

5.1.2 The Hezbollah party

Hezbollah's character during the early 80's proclaimed their religious core with the publication of the Open letter. In this statement, the objectives could not be seen as realistic, but more as a vision in which direction the party should act. They erupted from a society almost without any political representation or national unity, and they establish to fight the occupation force ruling their territory without legitimate authority from the people. One of their early centers of gravity was undisputable the vision of an Israeli defeat on Lebanese soil. Meanwhile, the religious center of gravity: the creation of the Islamic state was applied in the ruled territory. But this goal could not be achieved without domestic blood being spilled to a dear price as the country experienced a domestic peace and armed religious sects were ready to defend and conserve their own believes and political power. In order to acquire further political leverage, increasing coercive power

¹¹⁶ Sinno, Abdulkader H., *Organizations at war; In Afghanistan and beyond*, Ithaca, 2008, p. 243-249.

would not work.¹¹⁷ The leadership of Hezbollah turned to attend the increasing of the element of public support. As they were successful in their resistance against Israel, Hezbollah leaders understood that there was a void to be filled, not just ensuring security of Shi'ite territory but to defend all Lebanese territory, which could bring more legitimate authority.

As they stood ready to compromise some of their earlier statements in order to obtain greater political leverage, the people of Lebanon granted them with the respect of being a political force. The crucial election of 1992 would determinate the political ambitions of Hezbollah as they officially stated that they were willing to rule in a government with non-Muslim partners. This would mark the transformation from the ethno-religious revolutionary guerilla group to an established political party as they subordinated their goal of the Islamic state under the goal of defeating Israel. By taking the political debate and being successful on the battlefield, Hezbollah gained many supporters from its political rivals. By establishing a greater friendship with Syria, Hezbollah could develop its political power in the political debate in a manner that the anti-Syrian actors could not, granting Hezbollah ability to gain a lot of political power while other factions would lose their support from Syria. Hezbollah's authority was not only to be established in the Shi'ite societies (where the party was *de facto* the ruler) but was ultimately granted as they were recognized as an official resistance group against Israel. Their compliance to "the rule of the game" must be seen as an ambition of increasing their legitimacy without taking the risk of contradicting their own stated goals. If their jihad would have been prioritized the political ambitions, than no agreement would restrict their engagement of Israel. The ultimate goal; the elimination of Israel, could be interpret as the political struggle against a non-legitimated actor who is seeking to enforce their presence.

¹¹⁷ Even with their superior number of well-trained soldiers, they would not be able to rule Lebanon by only rely on coercive power as the other sects' militias might unite against them and because their newly-gained authority from the non-shia sects would be demolished by doing so. Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 194-198.

Audience	Agenda	Goals / Values	Means
All the population of Lebanon	Nationalistic	Resistance against Israel , peace and stability in Lebanon	Military resistance , political debates
All Muslims communities (religious)	Islamic	Jihad, the Liberation of Jerusalem, establishment of Islamic state, develop Islamic culture	Military resistance , Social-political development and unify of the Islamic society
The shi'ite communities (ethnic)	Shi'ite unity	Unity, brotherhood, social welfare, religious pride, liberation of territory	Social-political development and unify of the Shi'ite society, legitimate rule

[Fig. 5.1.2.1.] Examples of goals and means represented in Hezbollah's three different campaigns agendas. Their usage depending on what audience they are addressing.¹¹⁸

As figure 5.1.2.1 shows; Hezbollah was free to coordinate their values in order to seek as much greater political leverage and legitimate support as possible to outmaneuver their political opponents in the political arena. By locating weak legitimate support and combining their agenda to fit the right audience, they could win supporters from other sects. This indicates that the goals of Hezbollah were in fact instruments of their political agenda to gain maximum authority. It should be noted that Hezbollah's goals are flexible depending on what level you investigate; their local objectives granting them rule in their stronghold of Beqaa valley differs great from their vision of how to rule in central Beirut, as their sources of passion are based on different legitimate values. Their diversified objectives make it harder to analyze if they are politically-, ethnically-, economically or religiously based, but their quest after legitimate authority indicates their political ambitions.

5.1.3 The Structure

The two organizations have established a leadership managing, operating and ultimately ruling the movements; the Shuras in the Taliban movement with Mullah Omar as the hierarch, and the council of religious-politico clerics in Hezbollah with Nasrallah as their official leader. They do represent the element of reason as they conducted their actions by reason and rationality to achieve their goals or in order of presenting of their goals in a way to organize and gain additional support.

Their military branches have been shown to be subordinated the commands of these leaders and councils, making them instruments of the organizations. They

¹¹⁸ Harik, Judith Palmer, *Hezbollah; The Changing Face of Terrorism*, New York, 2004, p. 63-81.

do engage other armed forces in combat, and by risking their life for the cause of the organization, they do represent an element of chance

Both parties erupted in the outcry of passion against their ruling agents. The Taliban started in the city of Kandahar and gained more support quickly as they represented values and the leadership that some societies wished for. By gaining more fighters as local commanders and other societies joined their ranks, the passion did give legitimacy to the goals and objectives. It should be noted that this study argues that there were almost no hardcore ethnical values in the Taliban movement as they found support all over the country for their religious-political combination of values, which provided the capacity of ruling both by authority and coercive power.

Hezbollah is a social/military association which grants passion to its objective against Israel and the sheltering of Shi'ite communities. How important the religious values are in gaining more passion from the societies is however unclear since this study cannot answer if the fighters are willing to die for the jihad against Israel or in the defense of their country, but the early Iranian support would not have existed without the party's strong religious values. As the political and nationalist objectives of Hezbollah are successful, the additional passion emerges from non-Shi'ite communities, granting Hezbollah more support and legitimate authority. These societies and sects clearly represent the element of passion.

5.2 Results

After the finalization of this study, the analysis provides this thesis with the result which could answer if Clausewitz could be applied on these selected organizations in the post-Cold War era.

The findings suggest that it is possible to understand the selected non-state organizations as political actors. This supports the fundamental arguments of Clausewitz that the actors are using violence as a mean of political ends. This study has proven that the reoccurrence of the acts of war by the organizations are based on rational reasoning and subordinated to their political agenda.

The structures of the organizations are coherent with the Trinitarian structure, combining the elements of passion, reason and chance. The local populations provide the leaders with the passion and support towards the ideology that is later channeled into military capacity or actions. The military engagements act as the element of chance as they, with the passion of the people, fight to fulfill the strategic goals under the guidance of the element of reason. The leadership completes the Trinitarian structure with reason as the leaders provide rational guidelines and agendas towards gaining more legitimate authority and/or ability to rule by combining means in order to uphold and actively strengthen the ideology's aims and values.

6 Conclusions and discussion

This study has presented results which validate the arguments of Clausewitz in a modern context as the actors are to be seen as political entities consisting of Trinitarian structures. The usage of Dahl's definition of politics enabled the study to investigate the relationship between the organization's stated goals and values. By investigating how the actors managed their ideology towards different audiences, one could track which goals and values the parties choose to focus on in order to gain maximum support. As Hezbollah showed a tendency of avoiding some of their religious objectives when they gain more support by doing so, this hints that these goal should not be identified as essential to their ideology.

The observed organizations share some contextual similarities in their origins; both erupted during a civil war between different powerful actors. In the initial phases, they have a minimal source of power, positioning them outside the grim rivalries as no powerful actor register their existence as a threat. The advantages of the Taliban and Hezbollah are that they are filling a void in their societies with ambitions that the population can sympathize with. They become something of an ordinary and protruding nature, making it easy for supporters to become interested and recognize their objectives as distant from the other political actors. With the initial success and fast gathering of support, they both became more self-confident and developed their goals and values. This provides a notion of how they collect more coercive power and legitimacy from their supporting societies on the expense of other factions. The contextual differences that plausibly affected their choice of action are considered to be the legitimate authority providing the relationship of power with a structure. Hezbollah was located in a stabile structure where the actors occupying sources of power had the authority to do so by their supporting societies. The Taliban was confronted with a loose structure where they easily could challenge the other actors by gaining the legitimacy from the opponent's former source of support, leaving the enemy without any legitimate power and with diminishing public support. It would have been interesting to include more cases in this study to investigate how the stability of legitimate rule in the relationship of power affects the possibility of organized parties to establish and gain powerful positions.

The final result in this thesis disputes the modern criticism against Clausewitz. The conclusions of the findings in this study frames the religious and ethnical objectives as something that these two organizations utilizes in order to mobilize a specific audience. The findings argue that the political agenda is the primary cause for the actors action, not specific ethnic or religious dispute. This thesis does not claim that the critics are totally misunderstanding the nature of war, but argues that they are wrong in these cases. This proves that Clausewitz theories should be revisited and not disregarded and comprehended as obsolete.

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
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7.1.1 Appendix 1

Map over Afghanistan featuring the local provinces:¹¹⁹



Map over Afghanistan featuring the ethnic localizations:¹²⁰




¹¹⁹ <http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/images/map-Afghanistan-e.gif>

¹²⁰ http://www.csmonitor.com/var/ezflow_site/storage/images/media/the-ethnic-breakdown-of-afghanistan/7170025-1-eng-US/The-ethnic-breakdown-of-Afghanistan_full_600.jpg

7.1.2 Appendix 2

Map over Lebanon featuring the six dominate sectarian localizations:¹²¹



¹²¹ [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/78A1970D3A897B88C1257458002E9DDE/\\$file/leb_ls_clashes_10may08.jpg](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/78A1970D3A897B88C1257458002E9DDE/$file/leb_ls_clashes_10may08.jpg)