


Lund University

Lund University Master of International Development and Management

May 2011

The seal of Lund University is a circular emblem. It features a central figure, likely a saint or historical figure, holding a staff or scepter. The figure is surrounded by a Latin inscription: "SIGILLUM UNIVERSITATIS GOTHORUM CAROLINAE AD VTRUMQUE REXMQUE" and the year "1666".

**CORRUPTION IN CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS – CCTPs**

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FROM AN ACTOR BASED ANALYSIS OF THE CCTP

MI FAMILIA PROGRESA IN GUATEMALA

LUND UNIVERSITY

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*To all Swedish tax payers*

## Table of contents

Abstract.....	v
Acknowledgements.....	vi
List of abbreviations.....	vii
List of figures.....	viii
List of tables.....	ix
<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. The emergence of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs.....	1
1.2. CCTP’s and aid effectiveness.....	3
1.3. Transparency International’s project <i>Economic Equality in Latin America</i> .....	3
1.4. Purpose of research and research questions.....	3
<b>2. Research design and methodology.....</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1. Transparency International’s pilot methodology on CCTPs in Latin America,...	4
2.1.1.Criteria for evaluating corruption risks and transparency.....	5
2.2. Map of actors in two critical phases of Mi Familia Progresada.....	6
2.3. Selection of target municipality and communities.....	7
2.4. Structured interviews.....	7
2.5. Actor focused participatory workshops.....	8
2.6. Validity, reliability and generalizability.....	11
2.7. Ethical considerations.....	12
<b>3. Communicative action: A theoretical framework for the analysis of corruption risks and transparency.....</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1. Communicative action as transparency.....	12
<b>4. General description of the municipality of Livingston.....</b>	<b>14</b>
4.1. The implementation of the CCTP Mifapro.....	15
4.2. Brief description of the researched communities: Nuevo Nacimiento la Arca, Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá and Nuevo Samaritano.....	15
<b>5. Key actors and corruption risks in two critical phases of Mifapro: results from structured interviews and ethnographic observations.....</b>	<b>16</b>
5.1. Actors and corruption risks in critical phase one: program entry procedure....	16
5.1.1. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: collection of census data.....	16
5.1.2. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: selection of beneficiaries.....	18
5.1.3. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: procedure for including and excluding beneficiaries.....	18

5.1.4. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase one: program entry procedure.....	19
5.1.5. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase one: program entry procedure.....	20
5.2. Actors and corruption risks in critical phase two: procedure for claims and complaints.....	21
5.2.1. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: reception of claims and complaints.....	21
5.2.2. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: remittance of complaint to responsible authority.....	22
5.2.3. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase two: procedure of claims and complaints.....	23
5.2.4. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase two: process for claims and complaints.....	24
<b>6. Community decision making process, corruption risks and Mifapro.....</b>	<b>24</b>
6.1. Community decision making in two critical phases.....	24
6.1.1. Community decision making process in critical stage one: program entry procedure.....	25
6.1.2. Map of actors and evaluation of community decision making process in critical phase one: program entry procedure.....	26
6.1.3. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase one: program entry procedure.....	27
6.1.4. Community decision making process in critical phase two: procedure for claims and complaints.....	29
6.1.5. Map of actors and evaluation of community decision making process in critical phase two: procedure for claims and complaints.....	31
6.1.6. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase two: procedure for claims and complaints.....	31
<b>7. Policy implications for ameliorating corruption risks and improving transparency in the Mifapro CCTP.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>8. Conclusion.....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>9. Bibliography.....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>10. Appendix.....</b>	<b>38</b>

## **Abstract**

Based upon data obtained through participatory workshops, structured interviews and ethnographic observations in three communities of the municipality of Livingston in Guatemala, the thesis explores the current corruption risks present at micro level in the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) Mi Familia Progresada. Results from research indicate a high risk of corruption due to the deficient design of the program as a consequence of the misrecognition and misunderstanding of social organizational structures at a local level. Recognizing and incorporating such structures rather than ignoring and limiting them can help ameliorate corruption risks. Findings from research, if replicated and complemented through quantitative research, could have important policy implications as to improve the shortcomings in transparency and accountability of the CCTP in Guatemala, as well as CCTPs in general.

**Keywords:** Corruption, Conditional Cash Transfer, transparency, accountability, Guatemala

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To Johan Sandberg, mi querido compadre. Mil gracias por tu amistad, tu cariño y en especial, por compartir conmigo tu corazón combatiente lleno de calor humano y luz. Thank you also for introducing me to the world of CCT's and sharing all your knowledge and experience! This is only the beginning my friend.

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Last but not least, to all Swedish tax payers who, knowingly or unknowingly, have granted me the opportunity to nourish myself intellectually and spiritually during these past few years.

## List of abbreviations

AC	Acción Ciudadana
CAD	Citizen Attention Desk of Mifapro
COC	Community Outreach Committee - Mifapro
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CCTP	Conditional Cash Transfer Program
DSI	Direction of Systems Information
EELA	Economic Equality in Latin America project
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
INE	National Institute of Statistics
OSI	Open Society Institute
PDAE	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
Mifapro	Mi Familia Progresá
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
TC	Technical Committee
TI	Transparency International
TSCC - 1512	Telephone service for Claims and Complaints of Mifapro
WB	World Bank

## List of figures

1. Expansion of CCT's in the world 1997 – 2008.....	2
2. Methodological design for the analysis of corruption risks in CCTPs.....	4
3. Facilitator explaining use of the method at the beginning of participatory workshop. Community Nuevo Samaritano, Livingston.....	9
4. Facilitator placing actors on target according to their proximity to beneficiaries. Community Nuevo Samaritano, Livingston.....	9
5. President of Cocode participating in workshop. Community Nuevo Samaritano, Livingston.....	10
6. Validity obtained through triangulation of different qualitative data.....	11
7. Guatemala, Izabal department and municipality of Livingston.....	14
8. Guatemala, Izabal department and municipality of Livingston.....	14
9. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure.....	19
10. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase two: Procedure of claims and complaints.....	23
11. Facilitator at the beginning of participatory workshop in the community's local school. Community Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá, Livingston.....	26
12. Beneficiaries of Mifapro and community leaders in participatory workshop. Community Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá, Livingston.....	26
13. Map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure.....	27
14. Map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase two: Community decision process.....	31
15. Ideal models of transparent and accountable relations amongst actors for Program entry procedure and Process of claims and complaints.....	34

**List of tables**

1. Reference table for evaluating corruption risks and transparency in relations between actors .....	6
2. Details of structured interviews conducted.....	8

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. The emergence of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

Within the last decade Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTPs) have expanded around the world as a new, innovative and efficient strategy to alleviate and reduce poverty (Nistha and Yoong 2009; Standing 2007). The “CCT wave”, as the World Bank calls it, has “been hailed as a way of reducing inequality, especially in the very unequal countries in Latin America; of helping households break out of a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmitted from one generation to another; of promoting child health, nutrition, and schooling; and of helping countries meet the Millennium Development Goals” (WB 2009:29). The first CCTP was designed, implemented and evaluated in Mexico in 1997, initially covering 300,000 households and currently reaching out to more than 5 million households. The same is true in Brazil, where the program started at a limited scale in Brasilia and the municipality of Campinas, and thereafter extending nationwide to presently benefit 11 million families (Lomelí 2008; WB 2009). CCTPs are also underway in many Asian and African countries such as India, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kenya, Nigeria and Burkina Faso (see figure 1).


So what are CCTPs all about and what is so new about them? CCTPs are basically programs that transfer cash, generally to poor households, on the condition that those households make prespecified investments in the human capital of their children, specifically in health and education. Conditions in health and nutrition normally require periodic checkups, growth monitoring, and vaccinations for children less than 5 years of age; perinatal care for mothers and attendance by mothers at periodic health information talks. Education conditions usually include school enrollment, attendance on 80–85 percent of school days, and occasionally some measure of performance. Most CCTPs transfer the money to the mother of the household or to the student in some circumstances, that is, if conditions in health and/or education are properly met (Standing 2007; WB 2009). What is new about them is that they are claimed to constitute an integrated approach to poverty reduction, balancing goals of social assistance and human capital formation, as well as fostering what Amartya Sen (1999) calls “capabilities” in young children.

Depending on the particular context, CCTPs tend to vary in aim, size and scope. In Bangladesh, Pakistan and Turkey they are targeted towards increasing schoolgirls attendance, whereas in Kenya and Tanzania they aim to help cope with the crisis of orphans in the wake of HIV/AIDS, and in Indonesia to prevent children from dropping out of school after the East Asian financial crisis (Son 2008; WB 2009). The size of CCTPs also varies from country to country; the CCTP Bolsa Família in Brazil serves 11 million families and the Child Support Program in Pakistan only 13,265. Similarly, the scope of CCTPs goes from small scale pilot programs, to niche programs to nationwide programs. For example, the CCTP in Ecuador reaches out to 40 percent of the population, 20 percent in Brazil and Mexico and 1 percent in Cambodia (WB 2007).

In spite of differences in aim, size and scope amongst CCTPs worldwide, they all do tend to require at a minimum certain mechanisms to ensure their

functioning. According to the WB (2009:7), CCTPs, alike cash transfers, should at least have: (1) a means to establish the eligibility of clients and enroll them in the program, and (2) a mechanism to pay their benefits. In addition, strong monitoring and evaluation systems are desirable, as well as means to monitor compliance with conditions and coordination among all institutions involved in operating the program.

Figure 1. Expansion of CCT's in the world 1997 - 2008



Source: World Bank 2009:32

The degree to which the latter outcomes are accomplished in many CCTPs is still not clear, and even more so, the extent to which the risks for corruption are eliminated and transparency achieved. While some CCTPs have reliable cutting-edge monitoring and evaluation systems, even claimed to have modernized social assistance practice (WB 2009:91-94), this is certainly not true for all CCTPs. Evaluation and monitoring still remain high on the CCTP agenda (Grimes and Wängnerud 2010; WB 2009:95-96), and especially, transparency and risk corruption analysis which has been left ignored. In their recent article on corruption and CCTs in Mexico, Grimes and Wängnerud (2010) identify only a handful of studies conducted on this topic and on the oldest CCTP in the world, *Oportunidades* (formerly *Progresá*). This shortcoming of interest and analysis on transparency and risk corruption of CCTPs in the academic literature, as well as in CCT programs themselves, calls for a closer exploration of this important issue.

## 1.2. CCTPs and aid effectiveness

Many CCTPs currently implemented in the world depend on external funding. In the particular case of the Latin American region, entities such as the World Bank (WB) and the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) tend to supply such funds. CCTPs are thus inevitably framed within the foreign aid development context and are subject to international cooperation agreements, like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PDAE) (TI 2007:12). In this declaration, it is convened that a major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability and transparency in the use of development resources (PDAE 2005:viii). Hence, many CCTPs are in obligation to make effective, accountable and transparent use of resources provided as international aid and loans.

## 1.3. Transparency International's project *Economic Equality in Latin America*

In February 2010, Transparency International's (TI) project *Economic Equality in Latin America* (EELA) was approved and granted funding by the Open Society Institute (OSI). The main objective of the project was to improve the impact of CCTPs in the reduction of poverty through the strengthening of transparency, accountability and participation. Conceived as a pilot project to be conducted in Bolivia, Perú and Guatemala, one of its main expected results was to develop an efficient and reliable methodology capable of identifying corruption risks in CCTPs. Furthermore, from the lessons learned through this pilot experience, a strategic plan would be formulated for a large scale regional intervention, including a monitoring and evaluation model. The importance of this pilot project for TI and CCTPs in Latin America is unprecedented, due to a general lack of interest in corruption risks and transparency in CCTPs.

## 1.4. Purpose of research and research questions

The present research is framed within the EELA project. To a large extent, it draws on the results obtained through the implementation of the EELA pilot methodology developed by TI<sup>1</sup>, as well as additional participatory methods employed by the author as main consultant of the research project in Guatemala. Hence, the purpose of the research was to determine the corruption risks in two - previously identified - critical phases<sup>2</sup> of the CCTP Mi Familia Progresá (Mifapro). In order to determine this, the following questions had to be answered:

- ✓ Who are the actors involved in the two critical phases identified?
- ✓ Which actors create the most corruption risks?
- ✓ What are the characteristics of relationships between actors regarding program norms, accountability and participation?

---

<sup>1</sup> The methodology was designed for TI by Maximiliano Luft, Zigla Consultores.

<sup>2</sup> 1. Program entry procedure; 2. Procedure for claims and complaints.

- ✓ What recommendations can be given to improve transparency and reduce corruption risks in CCTPs?


Consequently, the purpose of research and questions do not correspond with “traditional” academic social science research, but more so with what is known as *action research*. In this type of research, data collection is geared towards solving problems in a program, organization or community. It basically seeks to take immediate action in solving the problems as quickly as possible based upon scientific research (Mikkelsen 2005:133). In this particular case, the problems to be solved are the corruption risks and lack of transparency in CCTPs, that is, for the sake of improving their positive impacts in poverty reduction and accomplishing the overall goals of the PDAE.

## 2. Research design and methodology

### 2.1. Transparency International’s pilot methodology on CCTPs in Latin America

The purpose of research and outcomes mentioned above are only a stage within a broader project methodology on corruption risks in CCTPs of the EELA project. This methodology can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 2. Methodological design for the analysis of corruption risks in CCTPs



In the first stage, analysis of processes, all phases, sub-phases and activities within the CCTP are described. Subsequently, an analysis of risk of corruption for each phase and sub-phase is completed using three indicators in a predefined criteria discussed below. In the second stage, map of actors, two critical phases where corruption risks are prone to occur are selected for further analysis from the previous stage. The map of actors consists in identifying all actors involved in each critical phase and scoring their interaction according to the predefined criteria. From this analytical mapping of actors, the actors creating the highest risk of corruption are clearly identified. While the analysis of processes only required carrying out interviews with government officials and reviewing relevant documents, the map of actors required fieldwork in a locality where the CCTP was being implemented.

In the next stage, reporting, all information obtained throughout stages one and two is systematized in a report detailing key findings, which would then be used in the following advocacy stage. In this last stage, results are presented to CCTP administrators, funding agencies, civil society and media for the purpose of drawing attention on any corruption risks and transparency shortcomings identified in the program. As a last and concluding stage of the project methodology, a final report is prepared integrating results from the advocacy impact and lessons learned throughout the project.

The present thesis only deals with stage two, map of actors, where relevant information was obtained for use in the succeeding stages of the pilot methodology.

### 2.1.1. Criteria for evaluating corruption risks and transparency

TI's professional advocacy work builds on its experience and success in mitigating corruption and increasing transparency in different sectors of society worldwide<sup>3</sup>. As such, it has developed a diversity of tools to evaluate and quantify – qualitatively and quantitatively – the degree of transparency and corruption risks present in different contexts.

Regarding the CCTP pilot methodology and the evaluation to be carried out in the two critical phases of Mifapro, a criteria composed of three key indicators was implemented. The three indicators were: rules, accountability and participation. According to the "Corruption risk evaluation guide" (TI 2011) of the pilot methodology, rules (R) refer to the existence of written norms or regulations formalized between actors, as well as to the availability to regulate the entire framework of relationships. It takes into account both the laws governing the relations of the program, as well as regulations and norms of the phase under study. Accountability (A) refers to the direct control mechanisms amongst participants in the phase under study. It considers the processes of internal accountability between actors involved, as well as mechanisms for the exchange of information between them. Finally, (P) participation refers to the degree of control that independent third parties, who are non-participants, have in the procedures involved. Participation in monitoring may be done by agencies with formal links to the program (be it state or private), as well as any civil society organization that wishes to carry out a social audit.

Using these indicators, evaluations were made for each of the first two phases. This was done in order to have a general assessment on the level of transparency and corruption risks in phases of the program, as well as of the relations amongst actors. The specific assessment procedure for the map of actors, which is the focus of this thesis, was conducted as follows:

- ✓ Data was collected in the field through structured interviews, actor focused participatory workshops and ethnographic observations.

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<sup>3</sup> i.e. at present, TI is the only organization publishing on an annual basis a report on Global Corruption, as well as the Corruption of Perceptions Index (CPI). For further work produced by TI, see <http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications>

- ✓ Preliminary maps of actors and evaluations of their corruption risks were drawn up for the two critical phases from interview data and ethnographic observations.
- ✓ Final maps of actors and evaluations of their corruption risks were drawn up for the two critical phases from results of participatory workshops. The relations between actors in these maps was scored from 1 to 3 in correspondence to the key indicators (R, A and P). For this task, a reference table for scoring was provided in the methodological guide.

Table 1. Reference table for evaluating corruption risks and transparency in relations between actors

	<b>Rules</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	<b>Participation</b>
<b>1</b> (Low)	Inexistence of adequate formal norms or regulations	Inexistence of control mechanisms and accountability between actors and processes	Openness for third parties to participate in monitoring of processes is inexistent
<b>2</b> (Medium)	Formal rules exist but don't manage to correctly deliver and formalize practices and procedures	Mechanisms of control and accountability exist but their application is limited or insufficient	Openness of third parties to participate in monitoring exists, but information is not clear/complete or monitoring is not accomplished
<b>3</b> (High)	Clear and adequate rules exist that properly formalize practices and procedures	Mechanisms of control and accountability apply in all cases and generate sanctions and anticorruption measures	Access to clear and complete information to third parties useful for the control and monitoring of the program, generating sanctions and anticorruption measures

- ✓ A general analysis of corruption risks and transparency was elaborated based on scorings and general findings.

In sum, the first step in the pilot methodology was to conduct a general analysis of processes within the Mifapro CCTP, and specifically to identify critical phases regarding corruption risks and transparency. In the following step, map of actors, two identified critical phases from the previous stage were analyzed further through a map of actors, aiming to point out the actors and relationships that create the most corruption risks. General findings from both steps would then be systematized in a report to be used for advocacy purposes.

## 2.2. Map of actors in two critical phases of Mifapro

The analysis of processes carried out in the first stage identified six phases with their respective processes, which are:

1. Program entry procedure
2. Follow-up of co-responsibilities
3. Procedure for issuing program benefit (cash payment)
4. Process of claims and complaints
5. Formation of Community Outreach Committee (COC) and training of beneficiaries

## 6. Financial management and administration of the program

After identifying all stages and evaluating each one of them according to key indicators, two critical phases were identified with the highest risk of corruption and lack of transparency:

- ✓ Program entry procedure
- ✓ Process of claims and complaints

Subsequently, a map of actors on these two phases would be drawn up through fieldwork, and thus, determining in more detail the relationships and situations with the highest risk of corruption. In addition, the utility and efficacy of the pilot methodology would be tested in identifying and evaluating corruption risks.

### 2.3. Selection of target municipality and communities

Since the beginning of the implementation of Mifapro in Guatemala it has been widely criticized by the media, the political opposition and the general public<sup>4</sup>. Most criticisms point to the lack of transparency and accountability of the program. In response, heads of government and program administrators have entrenched even more restricting the access to information on program beneficiaries. This particular situation posited a series of methodological constraints in using proper sampling and selection techniques. As such, field research was limited to the municipality of Livingston where TI's local partner, Acción Ciudadana, had access to a handful of communities through a grassroots non-governmental organization (NGO) working on land related issues<sup>5</sup>. Thus, communities were chosen on the basis of their overall access to conduct research and the actual implementation of the program. Another limiting factor in the selection of communities was time. Actual fieldwork in communities was only ten days in order to meet project programming. As an end result, a total of three communities were selected in agreement with the local NGO.

### 2.4. Structured interviews

As recommended in the pilot methodology, structured interviews were conducted for identifying all actors involved and their relationships. The following actors were interviewed using specific instruments containing an average of 8-10 questions<sup>6</sup>:

- ✓ Mifapro Regional Coordinator
- ✓ Mifapro Municipal Coordinator
- ✓ Mifapro extensionist workers
- ✓ Ex Mifapro census surveyors
- ✓ Ex Mifapro beneficiaries
- ✓ Assistant Secretary of the municipality of Livingston
- ✓ Treasurer of the municipality of Livingston

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<sup>4</sup> See [http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Nacionales-Mifapro-versiones\\_0\\_428957196.html](http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Nacionales-Mifapro-versiones_0_428957196.html)

<sup>5</sup> Defensoría Q'eqchi'.

<sup>6</sup> See appendix.

- ✓ Director of the Municipal Planning Office of Livingston
- ✓ Director of the Municipal Office for Women of Livingston
- ✓ Fundación para el Ecodesarrollo y la conservación - NGO

Using this method a large amount of qualitative data was obtained revealing in much detail the social dynamics in the two critical phases under study. Thus, it was possible to draw the map of actors required and score their relationships according to the key indicators.

Table 2. Details of structured interviews conducted

Interview and interviewees	Targeted phases		Number of questions	Number of interviews
Structured interviews with Mifapro municipal coordinators and extensionists	Program entry procedure	Process of claims and complaints	12	7
Structured interview to ex census surveyors	Program entry procedure		10	5
Structured interviews with external actors (municipal representatives)	Program entry procedure	Process of claims and complaints	4	13
Structured interview to ex beneficiaries of Mifapro	Program entry procedure	Process of claims and complaints	15	7
Total questions in interview guides and total number of interviews conducted			41	32

## 2.5. Actor focused participatory workshops<sup>7</sup>

Whilst the pilot methodology only required conducting structured interviews in the field, an additional method was used to gain further information and validate results. Actor focused participatory workshops were used specifically to determine – from the perspective of beneficiaries and community leaders – two relevant issues within the two critical phases under study:

1. What actors do beneficiaries recognize cognitively and how do they relate to them? (critical phase one).

<sup>7</sup> The entire methodological description of how the workshop was carried out can be found in the appendix.

2. What is the decision making process that beneficiaries make in order to solve their claims and complaints regarding the program (critical phase two).

Hence, the use of this method could deliver a different take on actor relationships from the perspective of program beneficiaries. General conclusions would also be reached through group discussions and open deliberation. Additionally, a better understanding of the community social structure was to be attained through the analysis of the decision making process. The research was thus qualitative and interpretative in nature.

In practice, it was convened in coordination with the NGO that beneficiaries of the program, members of the Community Development Council (Cocode)<sup>8</sup> and community leaders would attend the participatory workshops. An average of 12 people attended each workshop, three in total. Since the targeted communities were Maya Q'eqchi', where proficiency in Spanish tends to be very low, a native speaker was hired and trained to conduct the workshops with the aid of the main researcher<sup>9</sup>. Methodologically, this helped to create a bond of trust with participants through their language and culture, and thus allowed better quality information to be obtained.

In itself, the workshop required participants to name on a large paper target all actors they recognize and interact with. In the center of the target beneficiaries and community (Ego) were represented with two small figures. From this center ring (Ego), three levels of closeness and interaction were symbolized by different size rings; small ring meaning closeness and large ring farness.

Figure 3. Facilitator explaining use of the method at the beginning of participatory workshop. Community Nuevo Samaritano, Livingston.



Figure 4. Facilitator placing actor on target according to their proximity to beneficiaries. Community Nuevo Samaritano, Livingston.



<sup>8</sup> The Community Development Councils were instituted in 2002 by the "Ley de Consejos de desarrollo" (Law of development councils), wherein it was established that communities in all municipalities around the country had to form one. Their task is to legally represent their communities and carry out necessary action in seeking the development of their respective communities. Thus, Cocode tend to be very active, participative and tend to have close relationships with municipal mayors of their locality.

<sup>9</sup> Author also possesses basic knowledge of Maya Q'eqchi'.

Figure 5. President of Cocode participating in workshop.  
Community Nuevo Samaritano, Livingston.



As is shown in figure 5, depending on the closeness to beneficiaries and the community (Ego), actors - represented by premade cut drawings - were located in different rings of proximity. The choices of actors used in the workshop were: beneficiaries, community, COC Mifapro, Cocode, Mifapro extensionist, Mifapro municipal coordinator and mayor of municipality. In addition to these options of actors, a series of “wildcards” were used to represent other actors who were not in the premade drawings. As actors were plotted on the paper target, participants had to specify how they related with them.

In order to begin the plotting process, four specific questions were asked which relate to the two critical stages under study. The questions were the following:

1. To what person do you request enrollment of a new beneficiary into the program?
2. To what person do you request to correct erroneous information registered in the program so you could receive due payment?
3. To what person do you request to meet your needs of infrastructure, equipment and human resources for health services related to the program?
4. To what person do you request to meet your needs of infrastructure, equipment, human resources in education related to the program?

The selection of questions 2-3 derives from the findings of a study conducted by Acción Ciudadana (AC) on types of claims and complaints of the program (Acción Ciudadana 2010). Thus, the questions asked in the participatory workshop are consistent with the types of claims and complaints of this last study, the only one on the subject. This certainly provided a margin to identify the actors involved in the specific stage.

As such, this complementary methodology from a micro level and perspective aimed to supply further information on the corruption risks and transparency shortcomings of the program. The results from this method were scored according to the key indicators described earlier: rules, accountability and participation. As a


last step, all information obtained was systematized and graphed with EgoNetQF, a specialized software<sup>10</sup>.

## 2.6. Validity, reliability and generalizability

Due to the qualitative nature of the study and the sampling restrictions within the particular context, reliability and generalizability were not achieved. That is to say, the possibility for findings to be stable and consistent of responses, as well as to have the external validity of applying results to new settings, people or samples (Creswell 2007). Even though the study was conducted in three different communities, they all belonged to the same municipality and were only studied through qualitative methods. A significant degree of reliability and generalizability could have been obtained if a nationwide sample was to be unreservedly made and quantitative methods were also employed.

In spite of these methodological limitations, the study did achieve a certain level of validity through the triangulation of different qualitative methods (Creswell 2007). On the one hand, a total of 32 structured interviews were conducted with program collaborators, municipal workers and external actors; and on the other, three participatory workshops at the community level with an average of 12 participants were completed. These methods were also complemented with ethnographic observations to fill in gaps in data collection. Altogether, the data obtained through triangulation allowed assumptions to be tested and corroborated, thus obtaining a significant level of validity within overall results.

Figure 6. Validity obtained through triangulation of different qualitative data



<sup>10</sup> <http://www.pfeffer.at/egonet/>

## 2.7. Ethical considerations

The research took into account several ethical considerations to properly inform and protect all participants of research, as well as making the findings useful for the people involved. As a first step, participants were clearly informed about the purpose of the study and by whom it was being conducted and sponsored. This was done by presenting and handing out a formal letter explaining all details of research and researchers before the beginning of interviews and workshops. Upon verbally consenting and agreeing to the research specifications, interviews and workshops were carried out. In the course of the research no problems were reported, other than thoroughly clarifying at the beginning questions participants had regarding the final outcomes of the research. For this purpose, as well as detailing the potential benefit of the research for participants, it was explained to community members that it gave them the opportunity to express their concerns about the program, all of which would be disseminated to be heard and possibly solved. As Creswell (2003:63) acknowledges, "A core idea of action/participatory research is that the inquirer will not further marginalize or disempower the study participants". The present study was aimed at empowering community members by allowing them to have a say on an issue that directly affects them. Regarding collaborators of the program, municipal representatives and other actors interviewed, it was stated that the potential benefit was to help improve the program through a series of recommendations. These recommendations, as well as the end results of the research, would be returned to all participants and be made available to the general public in the advocacy stage of the project. Yet, all research participants were protected by guaranteeing their anonymity and not disclosing any information that could put them at risk.

## 3. **Communicative action: a theoretical framework for the analysis of corruption risks and transparency**

### 3.1. Communicative action as transparency

German sociologist and philosopher Jünger Habermas is widely known and recognized for this theory of communicative action. Although celebrated as a neo-marxist from the so called Frankfurt School, his approach has his been quite different than his more radical predecessors, i.e. T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer; as well as more apocalyptic contemporary poststructuralist and postmodern philosophers. For Habermas, modernity is not a failed project, but one that can – and should – be reconstructed from its fundamental rational beginnings. This type of fundamental rationality, according to him, is found in communication. However, Habermas does not refer to just any type of communication but rather what he calls communicative action.

In his book, *The theory of communicative action Vol. 1* (1984:86), he succinctly defines communicative action as "the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the

action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement". Furthermore, in the theoretical core chapter of his book (1984:287), he also explains that "A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; it cannot be imposed by either party, whether instrumentally or through intervention in the situations directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents".

In relation to corruption risks and transparency, the ideas of Jünger Habermas on communicative action can prove to be very fruitful. But before discussing the relation, or rather application of Habermas' theoretical insights on sound and comprehensive communicative interactions between actors, it is important to define certain key concepts that have been mentioned so far – and which will be used throughout this thesis – such as corruption, clientelism, transparency and accountability. According to TI's *Anti-corruption Plain Language Guide*, corruption is defined as "The abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (TI 2009:14); clientelism as "An unequal system of exchanging resources and favours based on an exploitative relationship between a wealthier and/or more powerful 'patron' and a less wealthy and weaker 'client'" (TI 2009:7); accountability as "The concept that individuals, agencies and organisations (public, private and civil society) are held responsible for executing their powers properly" (TI 2009:2); and finally, transparency is defined as the "Characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and individuals of being open in the clear disclosure of information, rules, plans, processes and actions" (TI 2009:44).

Having said this, we can move on to analyze the former definitions with Habermas' theoretical ideas on the different types of communication, including communicative action. Hence, when two actors establish an interpersonal communicative relation, they can either act upon a type of communication that is instrumental and/or strategic (as cited above), which will most likely result in what Habermas calls "distorted communication" (Habermas 1984:332). In this communication, components of truth, rightness, truthfulness and meaning are not achieved, and consequently true communicative action is stopped. The reason for this is that there is an overall lack of validity and legitimacy of the communication being established (Habermas 1984). Thus, in order for two actors to engage in true communicative action, not only the four elements of truth, rightness, truthfulness and meaning should be uttered in "valid speech acts", but also true understanding amongst actors (*Verständigung*) should be realized (Habermas 1984:307). These fundamental communicative insights that Habermas provides are of utmost relevance when we attempt to approach and theoretically analyze actions such as corruption, clientelism, accountability and transparency. Applying Habermas' ideas to these later actions we are enabled to say, on the one hand, that when acts of corruption and clientelism occur to and fro between actors, communication is not true, truthful, right and lacks general meaning; and conversely, communicative actions of accountability and transparency are established amongst actors when their speech acts are true, truthful, right and meaningful, as well as when actors reach a true and mutual understanding and agreement. The latter is certainly the most desired way of


communication within society, especially for the establishment of democracy and modernity to be realized.

#### 4. General description of the municipality of Livingston

Livingston is one of the five municipalities of the Izabal department. It has nearly 50,000 inhabitants of whom 78 percent live in rural areas (INE 2002). The municipality's population is composed as follows: 52 percent Maya Q'eqchi', 47 percent mestizos and 4 percent Garifunas (an ethnic group of African and Arawak descendants) (Funcede 2008).

In 2006, poverty and extreme poverty indicators for the department of Izabal were 51.71 percent and 18.28 percent, respectively (PNUD 2006). Correspondingly, in 2002 these figures were 47.9 percent and 8.2 percent (PNUD 2002), indicating a significant increase in the overall poverty gaps from 2002 to 2006.

Figures 8 and 9. Guatemala, Izabal department and municipality of Livingston



Source: www.worldatlas.com

Among the major socioeconomic problems of the municipality of Livingston is the degree of poverty, inequality in the distribution of land and lack of opportunities for development. Although Izabal is characterized as a department rich in natural resources and biodiversity, with 60% of the territory considered protected area (CONAP 2008). The basin of Lake Izabal and its surroundings are amongst the most important resources for the country. The main source of income in this area is agricultural production of rubber, bananas, cardamom, corn, beans, and animal husbandry in large cattle ranches. Additionally, there is presence of companies engaged in the extractive industry, specifically mining of nickel and petroleum extraction. In spite of these economic activities, poverty levels still remain high in the municipality. The reasons for this rely on the fact that either local inhabitants are low-wage laborers in large plantations and cattle ranches, or inefficient subsistence smallholder farmers. The largest ethnic groups with the municipality, the Maya Q'eqchi', currently live under extreme conditions of inequality and marginalization in terms of access to land and public services, including health and education (UNDP 2010). For this particular segment of the population, the main source of income is the production of corn and cardamom; the former being a

subsistence crop and the latter a cash crop. Up to date, a firm government intervention to aid local inhabitants to generate income and reduce poverty has been unheard of. However, the CCTP Mifapro is the first widespread governmental intervention to help alleviate poverty in the country and region (Romero 2010).

#### 4.1. The implementation of the CCTP Mifapro

According to the most recent data available on the Mifapro webpage<sup>11</sup>, the program is currently being implemented in 307 of the 333 municipalities in the country; a total of 917, 330 families. The CCTP Mifapro began in April of 2008 targeting 40 municipalities where extreme poverty is most concentrated in the country. It was the first time a program of this sort was implemented in Guatemala, particularly after two consecutive failed Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) during the presidencies of Alfonso Portillo (2002-2004) and Oscar Berger (2004-2008) (Arévalo 2009; Romero 2010, Sandberg 2008). Hence, this was the first attempt of the newly elected social democratic government of Álvaro Colom (2008-2012) to combat poverty during his presidency (Tally 2010). From the original 40 municipalities the program quickly expanded to 187 by the end of December of 2010, and in less than 6 months summed 120 more municipalities for a grand total of 307.

Succinctly put, the program consists on making direct cash transfers to women with children between 0 and 15 years old. A monthly CCT of 300 quetzales, roughly USD\$38, is given to beneficiaries under the condition that they send their children to school and bring them to regular medical check-ups. So far, the program has had great social acceptance amongst the rural poor population, and hash antagonism by heavy criticism of the urban middle and high class elite, as well as by the fierce political opposition. Despite the many ill-fated criticisms played out in the media as a consequence of the extended political and class struggles in the country, valid accusations still remain concerning the shortcomings in transparency within the program.

Lastly, it must stated that Mifapro officially began in the department of Izabal in 2009. By 2011, the program benefits 24,922 families in the department as a whole, and 5,879 in the municipality of Livingston alone (Mifapro 2011).

#### 4.2. Brief description of the researched communities: Nuevo Nacimiento la Arca, Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá and Nuevo Samaritano

The communities studied share many characteristics and are very similar in many respects. Firstly, all three belong to the Maya Q'eqchi' ethnic group and possess a high level of monolinguisism and cultural homogeneity, something that is often referred to in the anthropological literature about this ethnic group (i.e. Wilson 1996). Secondly, all are composed of less than 15 households: Nuevo Nacimiento la Arca had 12 households, Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá had 14 households and Nuevo Samaritano had 10 households. Thirdly, they all have land tenure instability since they are all within "a protected area" to be declared by government environmental agencies. Fourthly, their

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<sup>11</sup> [www.mifamiliaprogresa.gob.gt](http://www.mifamiliaprogresa.gob.gt)

economy is based on planting corn and beans for subsistence and cardamom as a cash crop. Lastly, they are all “new communities” established less than 10 years ago and are composed of poor landless farmers. Thus, having these shared characteristics it was possible to compare data across the three communities.

## **5. Key actors and corruption risks in two critical phases of Mifapro: results from structured interviews and ethnographic observations**

Based on data collected through structured interviews and ethnographic observations, as well as information from the report of *Analysis of processes* (2011), a description of actors in connection to corruption risks is made for the two critical phases: program entry procedure and procedure of claims and complaints. Actors’ relationships are not evaluated with the three indicator criteria, but only serve the purpose of plotting a first map of actors and identifying the potential corruption risks.

### **5.1. Actors and corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure**

The program entry procedure is one of the most important phases of the program due to its decisiveness regarding who receives the benefit and who does not. This phase is composed of three key sub-phases:

1. Collection of census data
2. Selection of beneficiaries
3. Procedure for including and excluding beneficiaries

Thus, the census is firstly carried out in households to gather the necessary information as to evaluate if people are in conditions of poverty or not. Next, beneficiaries are selected through a statistical measure, proxy mean test. Lastly, there is an additional procedure for including new beneficiaries and excluding others. In the following sections each one of the actors involved in the sub-phases will be analyzed in connection to corruption risks. All information is derived from the conducted interviews.

#### **5.1.1. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: Collection of census data**

The first actor in this sub-phase is the First Lady who holds the highest position in the administration hierarchy of the program. As such, she can discretionally approve the municipalities selected for collecting census data. This poses a corruption risk due to the lack of rules that determine what municipality should be chosen, and not what someone arbitrarily decides (i.e. First Lady). A second actor is the Technical Committee (TC) of Mifapro. According to interviewees and data from the *Analysis of processes* (2011), the technical committee simply heeds the orders of the First Lady and communicates them to the manager of the program.

Once a municipality has been selected, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) conducts the census data collection. For this task, the institute commonly hires

persons with at least secondary schooling from the same municipality and trains them on how to conduct the census. For the census data collection in Livingston, interviewees reported that the training of census surveyors was done in less than five days and that data collection for the entire municipality was carried out in less than 10 days. Thus, according to interviews the collection of census data was done too quickly and surveyors did not receive sufficient training. Also, some surveyors did not carry out the census in far away homes because of the distance and did not speak the language of the locality. This situation is not only a source of error, but also of possible corruption through misinformation. Additionally, local surveyors were also a source of corruption since some of them, as it was repeatedly reported in the interviews, registered false information of the surveyed person. This was done due to friendship of the surveyor with the person surveyed, or simply out of outright bribing. Hence, the potential beneficiaries of the program were also actors generating risks. Another form of corruption risks these actors generated was done by providing false information to the census surveyors. The way this was done was by not stating the things in the house they owned (i.e. sound system), as well as understating their economic situation. This way, they hoped that their chances to be selected in the program would be higher. A last risk of corruption from potential beneficiaries was to threaten the surveyors in order to put down the necessary information for them to be selected.

Other actors in this sub-phase generating risk were the people coordinating the census activity, such as the governor of the department, the municipal mayor and the Cocode. The most salient corruption risk in relation to the governor and mayor is their political manipulation of the event for clientelism, especially since they both belong to the elected political party implementing the CCTP. To illustrate this point, while conducting fieldwork in the municipality, the present researcher had the opportunity to witness a political rally of the elected mayor, who was accompanied by the governor and congressmen of the department; both supporting his candidacy for the upcoming elections. In the speeches given by each one of them in front of a large Mayan Q'eqchi' audience, the Mifapro program was mentioned repeated times as something they were responsible for in bringing to the municipality. Thus, the program was something to be regarded as a result of their political merit and not an obligation of the state. Another risk of corruption of these actors was the influence they had in favoring certain groups the census done, particularly the ones that were political allies and which secured votes for them. On their behalf, the Cocode acted out as community facilitators and observers of the census in each one of the localities. While the possibility for them to become instruments of clientelism, this was not reported in the interviews carried out.

Lastly, the Direction of Systems Information (DSI) ran the risk committing errors by mishandling census data due to the exigency from program administrator to process them.

#### 5.1.2. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: Selection of beneficiaries

In this sub-phase, the standard measure used for the selection of beneficiaries is the proxy mean test. This is a statistical calculation used to determine if a household is in fact poor and thus should be included in the program. This test takes into consideration all household income, material assets, human capital, etc. Despite the use of this technical assessment, the First Lady still has a say in the final selection by prioritizing and approving the amount to be selected. Once again, this poses a corruption risks because it endows this actor with discretionary power to select beneficiaries, something that should solely rely on technical evaluations. The TC of Mifapro takes heed of the results from the proxy mean test and approves the final selection decision made by the First Lady. The TC informs the manager of the program who then proceeds to make the inclusion of beneficiaries through the program's regional and municipal coordinators.

Parallel to this last process, potential beneficiaries who were not selected and/or were not surveyed, be it because they were not visited in their homes or were not in their homes at the time of the census, request to be included. This is done by directly speaking to the Mifapro extensionists and/or municipal coordinator. During a discussion on the topic in an interview with the Mifapro extensionist in the programs' office in Livingston, he quickly pointed out to several sheets of paper resting on his desk with the names of people who had requested him to be surveyed and/or included. He said to have submitted copies of these lists to the Mifapro headquarters, but so far had not received an answer. According to some ex beneficiaries of the program interviewed, a corruption risk exists on behalf of the Mifapro extensionists and municipal coordinator, since they are able to manipulate who is actually included on the list and who is not, which is a plausible action and a valid statement. Now, if a response was to be issued by the Mifapro headquarters, on the one hand the potential beneficiaries who had not been surveyed would be surveyed, and on the other, non selected beneficiaries would be re-evaluated by the DSI and proposed to the First Lady and the TC for approval.

### 5.1.3. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: Procedure for including and excluding beneficiaries


Once the census is done and beneficiaries are included in the program, a new sub-phase starts where new beneficiaries can be included and others excluded. The underlying reason for this is that many of the final beneficiaries were in fact wealthy people within the communities, and who were possibly chosen as a consequence of the faultiness of one of the corruption risks described above. From interviews, all interviewees admitted and firmly agreed that people that should not be in the program were selected. Thus, based upon the evaluation of new beneficiaries and the re-evaluation of non-selected beneficiaries by the DSI, a new list of beneficiaries is approved by the First Lady and the TC. In this procedure, discretionary practices are also exercised by both of these actors. After the new selection process is finished, information is passed on to the manager of the program who in turn informs the regional and municipal coordinators in order to include the new beneficiaries.

Regarding the exclusion of beneficiaries, the procedure goes as follows: a field visit is made by the Mifapro extensionists to check-up on the socioeconomic conditions of the beneficiary under question. An actual visit inside the home is not done, as well as the filling out of a new survey in collaboration of the beneficiary. That is to say, the evidence for the exclusion of a beneficiary from the program is made by simple, subjective and non-corroborated observations. In interviews, ex beneficiaries mentioned that their exclusion was conducted on an arbitrary basis and according to the extensionists own criteria, and never in consultation with them. This certainly posits a risks of corruption through the abuse of power, little transparency and accountability. After the field visit and to conclude the exclusion process, the Mifapro extensionist fills out a simple form which is submitted to the municipal coordinator, and thereafter to the Mifapro headquarters.

#### 5.1.4. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure

Following the data obtained on actors and their possibilities of corruption risks, a preliminary map and evaluation were made for the three sub-phases, as observed in figure 7. Small filled in circles represent actors, lines relationships amongst actors and colors level of corruption risks. The color green symbolizes a low level of corruption risk; yellow a medium level of corruption risk and red a high level of corruption risk. In the map's layout, the beneficiaries/community are represented by Ego, which is set in the center of the map. Small rings represent closeness to Ego and large rings farness from Ego.

Figure 7. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure



#### 5.1.5. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure

From the results of the preliminary mapping of actors and its evaluation, a few comments can be made for each sub-phase, as well as for the entire phase in general. In the sub-phase, Collection of data, it is clear that there are three main actors creating corruption risks all of which appear in red. Out of these three main actors, the ones possessing the most risk were the census surveyors and the mayor of the municipality. The census surveyor was not only important due to his/her closeness to Ego, but also for having a decisive role in the selection process through the data being registered. As described above, Ego was also a source of corruption risk, but certainly most of the responsibility to register the right information relied on the census surveyor. Regarding the second critical actor, the mayor of the municipality, since he is the most immediate government representative interacting with Ego, he has the most possibilities for establishing clientelist relations to buy out votes with communities and individuals. From data obtained through interviews, the regional coordinator of the program openly admitted that some municipal mayors in the area have used the program for political purposes. As was witnessed in the political rally, this happens to be the case for Livingston. Whereas the other actors involved also create corruption risks, including the departments' governor, the degree to which they play out and their actual impact in the locality is quite distinct.

In the second sub-phase, selection of beneficiaries, two major actors are identified: the First Lady and the TC of Mifapro. Whilst in the previous sub-phase their level of corruption risk was relevant, in this sub-phase it is critical. Due to the fact that the selection process is handled in the upper levels of the administration hierarchy, the probabilities for abuse of power and corruption are higher. Even though there are technical mechanisms in place to determine the amount of beneficiaries to be selected (i.e. proxy means test), this technical assessment is irrelevant due to the overriding discretionary decision power of the First Lady to make the final decision. To a certain extent, the same is applicable to the TC of Mifapro since it is the one directly giving out orders to the program manager in the hierarchy ladder.

Lastly, in the third sub-phase, inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries, four key actor generating corruption risks were identified. In the upper levels of the hierarchy of command, the First Lady and the TC of Mifapro kept on creating a high risk of corruption through their discretionary power to select beneficiaries. Yet, at the municipal level, the lack of rules and established procedures for excluding beneficiaries from the program made it very feasible and unproblematic for the municipal coordinator and program extensionists to, in an unaccountable and discretionary manner, include certain beneficiaries on the lists and exclude others. Concerning the latter, while there is general agreement amongst interviewees that certain beneficiaries who were not eligible in the program were chosen, this does not justify abuses of power by any Mifapro collaborators. That is to say, rules, procedures and mechanisms need to be established to avoid corruption risks and assure accountability in the program as a whole.

In sum, the preliminary mapping of actors and evaluation in the three sub-phases clearly evidenced corruption risks in all three sub-phases. These risks involved internal actors, as well as external actors to the program. Within the upper hierarchy of the program the First Lady and the TC of Mifapro played a critical role in selecting beneficiaries, while the municipal coordinator and extensionist of the program played another in the inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries at the local level. Amongst the external actors, the census surveyors were important in setting up the proper outcomes of the program by accounting for the right beneficiaries. And finally, while the mayor of the municipality and the departments' governor did not directly intervene in the functioning of the program in this particular phase, they did create corruption risks by clientelist practices. As a last comment, it should be noted that from the map of actors the only actors that did not pose a potential risk for corruption were the Cocode, an actor that is analyzed further in section 6.

## 5.2. Actors and corruption risks in critical phase two: Procedure for claims and complaints

The report on the *Analysis of processes* states that the operations manual of Mifapro calls for a complete procedure for claims and complaints, which in practice, is never accomplished (Acción Ciudadana 2011). This unaccomplished procedure for claims and complaints includes the reception, analysis, categorization and remittance of complaints, as well as the research, follow up and prompt answer to all claims. The report also identified as actors in this phase the Telephone Service for Claims and Complaints (TSCC-1512), the Citizen Attention Desk (CAD) of Mifapro, the regional and municipal coordinators of Mifapro, and the programs' extensionists. Through the conducted interviews other actors were acknowledged, such as ex beneficiaries, beneficiaries and Cocode members.

In the actual coordination and practice of the procedure of claims and complaints of the program, two specific sub-phases exist:

1. Reception of claims and complaints
2. Remittance of the claim and complaint to the responsible authority

In the sections that follow, both sub-phases will be described in connection to the actors involved and the risks of corruption.

### 5.2.1. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: Reception of claims and complaints

From the onset it is important to point out that Mifapro has two mechanisms for the reception of claims and complaints. The first one is a free of charge TSCC 1512, where people can call to place their claim or complaint. The second one is the CAD located on a permanent basis in the municipal Mifapro office, and on a temporary basis in the cash disbursement event held every two months. Thus, beneficiaries, ex-beneficiaries and other people have access to two different

mechanisms for claims and complaints. Still, these means do not meet their goals for various reasons, which are discussed here forth.

The actors interviewed who complained most forcefully were ex-beneficiaries of the program. In general terms, they all claim to have been excluded from the program by unjustifiable means. For example, most of them report that they were never visited in their homes by a Mifapro representative to make an actual assessment of their socioeconomic situation. Some do recall seeing the Mifapro extensionist roaming around their neighborhoods, but never did they approached them or asked questions. Ex beneficiaries also feel purposefully mistreated and publicly embarrassed, that is, for never being informed about their exclusion from the program other than the day of the cash disbursement while they were waiting in line. Some state that this was a truly humiliating act in which the extensionist was not very compassionate in informing them publicly about their exclusion from the program. In response, a group of ex-beneficiaries had the intention to get organized and make a formal claim and complaint, however, this was unfruitful. On the one hand, they did not know that the two mechanisms for claims and complaints existed – which the interviewer actually informed them about - and on the other hand, they became unmotivated very quickly. Another limiting factor is that most of the women who are ex-beneficiaries do not speak Spanish or know how to read and write.

Similarly, from the information gathered through the participatory workshops, the current beneficiaries did not know about the alternatives they have for placing their claims and complaints. The same was true for the Cocode members who participated in the workshops, and who were quick to write down the phone number for claims and complaints and inquiring more about these options on a personal basis with the researcher. Through this last exchange and the general results from the workshops<sup>12</sup>, it became evident that the Cocode members were the ones who played an advocacy role on behalf of the women beneficiaries concerning their claims and complaints, some of whom were actually their family members or wives. Nevertheless, it is important to mention here that while conducting interviews in the Mifapro municipal office, the researcher noticed a clear sign with the telephone number 1512 visibly displayed next to the front door. It would seem though that beneficiaries and Cocodes have not visited the office, have limitations reading Spanish or the information has been recently displayed to the public. An additional reason derived from the interviews, is that some beneficiaries did not report their claims and complaints fearing that they could be excluded from the program. While threats of program extensionists were not reported in the interviews and workshops, it remains clear that beneficiaries fear very much losing the needed benefits they receive from the program.

5.2.2. Actors and corruption risks in sub-phase: Remittance of the complaint to responsible authority

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
<sup>12</sup> To be discussed in detail in section 6.

Once a claim or complaint is received through the TSCC 1512 or the CAD<sup>13</sup>, it is reported to the corresponding authority and a lapse of time is given for a reply, which could come or not come at all. According to the Analysis of processes (AC-TI 2011), the TSCC 1512 is operated by one person in an office in Guatemala City, and who only keeps a general register of calls in an Excel electronic sheet without conducting a proper follow-up procedure of each case, but only reporting the inconformity. In the case of the CAD, the efficiency in the processing of the claim and complaint depends on the willingness of the Mifapro extensionist and/or municipal coordinator, who could report it immediately or set it aside on a waiting list. Hence, it appears that as a whole the system of claims and complaints - composed of the TSCC 1512 and the CAD - is not only little known by the key actors involved (i.e. beneficiaries, Cocode), but is also inefficient, non-accountable and non-transparent. This evidently sets the stage for corruption risks since beneficiaries cannot voice out their concerns and can thus be subjected to abuses.

### 5.2.3. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase two: Procedure of claims and complaints

In the same way actors were mapped and evaluated in the previous phase, in this phase they are also plotted according to the information obtained through the structured interviews and participatory workshops.

Figure 11. Preliminary map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase two: Procedure of claims and complaints



<sup>13</sup> Since the CAD is located in the municipal Mifapro office, it is served by the Mifapro extensionists and/or the municipal coordinators.

#### 5.2.4. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase two: Process for claims and complaints

In the preliminary mapping and evaluation of corruption risks for the first sub-phase, reception of claims and complaints, two particular actors hold the highest corruption risk: the TSCC 1512 and the CAD. The reasons for this rely on their non-efficient, non-transparent and non-accountable relations with actors affected by the deficiencies of the program. Whilst they were created to solve claims and complaints of beneficiaries of the program, this is clearly not the case. Moreover, even their actual existence is unknown to most of the beneficiaries, as evidenced in the workshops, personal exchanges and interviews. In the upper half of figure 8, lines are drawn across actors as if they held fluid relationships for exchanging information. However, these lines are fictitious since beneficiaries actually don't know the actors responsible for receiving their claims and complaints. If beneficiaries actually became acquainted with these actors, the communication established is prone to be truncated, or claims and complaints simply disregarded due to the deficient operation and delivery of each one of these actors concerning their assigned tasks and responsibilities.

In relation to the second sub-phase, remittance of a claim or complaint, the CAD and TSCC 1512 are still considered as actors of high corruption risk, just as the Mifapro headquarters and other responsible authorities. The reason for the particular assessment of the latter is that they often do not respond and comply to the requests of beneficiaries. Thus, these actors cannot be held accountable of their responsibilities or hold transparent relations other actors in the program, alike the CAD and TSCC 1512.

Facing many limitations within the two phases described and analyzed in this section, beneficiaries and Cocode members tend to seek help from other actors, an action that creates further corruption risks. I now turn to discussing these additional risks.

## 6. Community decision making process, corruption risks and Mifapro

### 6.1. Community decision making process in two critical phases

In the previous section, a description and analysis of actors in connection to corruption risks was presented for two critical stages. The results were based on structured interviews, ethnographic observations and partial results from the participatory workshops carried out during fieldwork. The findings and analysis presented in this section differ substantially from the previous one. Amongst the first and most salient differences, is that it is focused on the community decision making process regarding the two critical stages, rather than the opinions of program administrators, municipality collaborators and external actors. Secondly, the data presented derives from the three participatory workshops conducted in the three researched communities, correspondingly. The use of this method implied participation, discussion and general agreement and/or disagreement on the topic, as described in detail in section 2.5. A last difference worth mentioning is that the relations amongst

actors in maps are scored in correspondence to the three indicator-criteria mentioned in section 2.1.1.

#### 6.1.1. Community decision making process in critical phase one: Program entry procedure

Following the methodology designed and discussed in section 2.5 on the actor focused participatory workshop, relevant data was gathered on the community decision process for phase one. The generating question, “To what person do you request enrollment of a new beneficiary into the program?” was asked by the facilitator and answers from participants were delivered. This particular question was indeed linked to the first critical phase program entry procedure.

Results from the generating question had the same results in all three communities, although, with two different scenarios of responses. On the one hand, there were a series of actions from the community to use the internal program norms and mechanisms for entry; and on the other, there were secondary external non-program norms and mechanisms for entry. In a nutshell, on the one side there were community decisions supported by the program, and on the other, community decisions not supported by the program which created corruption risks. Probably the best way to explain these social actions is to describe them in detail.

For the first set of decisions, internal program norms and mechanisms, the results from the participants were as follows: as a first option, COC representatives<sup>14</sup> were delegated to directly speak to Mifapro extensionists. If this did not produce the desired results, the COC along with beneficiaries would then speak with the Cocode from the community to intercede for them with the program extensionist and municipal coordinator. From there it was expected that programs collaborators passed on their request to the Mifapro headquarter and/or First Lady. For the second set of decisions, the external non-program norms and mechanisms for entry, beneficiaries and COC representatives would directly speak to Cocode members, who in turn would make the request to the municipality’s mayor. Thereafter, it was expected that the mayor would speak to the all Mifapro collaborators, including the headquarter, as well as to the departments’ governor. This last actor was expected to speak to the Mifapro headquarters and the First Lady<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> The COC of Mifapro is an organizational arrangement composed of three women from the local community and who are also beneficiaries. Their duties are mainly to aid program extensionists and beneficiaries themselves. Some of their tasks include coordinating activities, calling beneficiaries to scheduled meetings and workshops from the program, and making sure that beneficiaries comply with all program co-responsibilities, such as medical check-ups and class attendance of children of beneficiaries.

<sup>15</sup> All of the relations between actors are displayed graphically in figure 11.

Figure 12. Facilitator at the beginning of participatory workshop in the communities local school. Community Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá, Livingston.



Figure 13. Beneficiaries of Mifapro and community leaders in participatory workshop. Community Nuevo Nacimiento Moxelá, Livingston.




### 6.1.2. Map of actors and evaluation of community decision making in critical phase one: Program entry procedure

Whereas in the previous maps evaluations of relationships between actors were not performed, in this section they are evaluated according to the three indicator criteria. Simultaneously, they are also graphed with the EgoNetQF software. Thus, to be able to read and understand the map of actors in its entirety, the following legend is provided. To facilitate this further, it is also recommended that the reader refers to Table 1 in section 2.1. It should be stressed that the evaluation for both sets of community decisions here is made *on* the internal program norms for entry, and not from the external non-program norms for entry. The latter are the institutionalized legal proceedings that the Cocode, as the community's representative, can have with other actors, such as the municipality's mayor.

	<b>Rules</b> (Line thickness)	<b>Accountability</b> (Color of line)	<b>Participation</b> (Circle size)
<b>Low</b>			
<b>Medium</b>			
<b>High</b>			

Figure 14. Map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure



### 6.1.3. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase one: Program entry procedure

As mentioned, described and evaluated graphically above, there are two community decision making processes that reflect different degrees of interaction between actors. Each one of these relations was on the program norms and mechanisms for entry. While the internal program norms tended to be recognized and respected as a legitimate means for entry into the program by beneficiaries, they hardly ever got a response and/or solution to their request. Therefore, beneficiaries tended to opt for the second set of decisions – external non-program norms. However, and before moving forward, it is important to explain here the rationale for the evaluation in each one the relationships between actors.

Regarding the first set of decisions in connection to the three indicator criteria, it should be noted that only one actor is evaluated low for the R indicator, the Cocode. Despite this, the Cocode holds high A relations with COC and Ego, since it belongs to the very same community and represents and upholds their interests on a legal and personal basis. However, this is not the same for the Cocode’s interaction with the program collaborators, due to the fact that it cannot hold the latter accountable by any means. As a result, the relationships between Cocode and program collaborators are evaluated low in the A indicator. An additional comment to this evaluation from data obtained through the workshops and structured interviews, conflict and tension tended to be

reported between the Cocode and Mifapro collaborators, generally due to the disregard and/or unresponsiveness to the Cocode's petitions.

Other than the Cocode's low R evaluation, the interactions amongst all other actors<sup>16</sup> was evaluated with a high R, since all these interactions are established in written norms. Nevertheless, the degree of accountability held amongst all other actors varied. Whereas only Ego-COC and Mifapro extensionsit-municipal Mifapro coordinator held high A relationships; COC-Mifapro extensionist, municipal coordinator-Mifapro headquarters and Mifapro headquarters-First Lady had medium A relationships. The main reasons for the former high A relationships amongst actors was their social proximity, as well as the mutual and transparent flow of information. Thus, regarding the latter medium A relationships, information on the request for entry was usually truncated, not given or simply disregarded.

As a whole, the series of relationships between actors in the first set of community decisions - from the program's perspective - can be evaluated as non-transparent and prone to corruption risks, simply because of the lack of effective third party participation and deficient, little accountable relationships. Hence, in order to improve the functioning of the program entry procedure and the net outcome of the community's request, it is suggested that two measures would need to be taken: one, to establish in program regulations the formal participation of the Cocode, which in turn, would be in a better position to hold program collaborators accountable; and two, improve the general accountability between all other actors with a medium A evaluation. Yet, while the Mifapro administration may seek to improve the program by these means, this is not the case so far. In response to the inefficiency and neglect of the program in this particular phase, the community's decision making process to solve their needs for entry follows a second step.

The external non-program norms and mechanisms for entry constitute what may be called "the backdoor option for entry". These external non-program norms refer to alternative measures to acquire entry into the program, which judged from the established rules of the program, are simply illegitimate. That is to say, other than the relationships between Ego-COC, Mifapro extensionist-municipal coordinator and Mifapro headquarters-First Lady, all evaluated with high R, the rest are only attained a low R<sup>17</sup>. Likewise, all actors in both sets of decision making processes have a low P, simply because there is no openness from the program for a third party to oversee the processes at hand, particularly in the first set of internal program norms.

After having evaluated each one of the actors relationships in two sets of community decision processes through the three indicator criteria, the overall picture concerning corruption risks and lack of transparency has become more complex, but at the same time more apparent. Due to the lack of a properly

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<sup>16</sup> Ego, COC, Mifapro extensionists, municipal Mifapro coordinator, Mifapro headquarters and First Lady.

<sup>17</sup> Cocode-Ego; Cocode-COC; Cocode-Mayor of municipality; Mayor of municipality-Mifapro extensionist; Mayor of municipality-municipal coordinator; Mayor of municipality-Mifapro headquarters; Mayor of municipality-Departments'governor; Departments'governor-Mifapro headquarters; Departments'governor-First Lady.

functioning program entry procedure, as depicted in the first set of decision making processes, the program inevitable incurs into a second series of circumstances that all in all, set the program at a high risk of corruption and clientelism on behalf of the local and regional authorities (i.e. mayor of municipality and departments governor). Still, this situation is exacerbated even further as the results of the community decision making process in critical stage two show.

#### 6.1.4. Community decision making process in critical phase two: Procedure for claims and complaints

As can be recalled from the preliminary results in section 5.2, interviewed actors such as ex beneficiaries did not possess any knowledge of the program mechanisms to place their claims and complaints. Results from workshops confirmed the same results: beneficiaries, Cocode members and relevant actors do not know about these alternatives to voice out their concerns. This situation then poses the following question: What do beneficiaries and community members actually do to solve their problems related to the program?

As described in the methodology section, three generating questions were asked in the workshops pertaining the phase of claims and complaints. These questions derived from findings of a study conducted by AC on types of claims and complaints (Acción Ciudadana 2010). Thus, the study provided a backdrop as to what were the main reasons for claims and complaints, as well as the possible actors involved. Thus, the questions asked were the following: To what person do you request to correct erroneous information registered in the program so you can receive due payment?; To what person do you request to meet your needs of infrastructure, equipment and human resources for health services related to the program?; To what person do you request to meet your needs of infrastructure, equipment, human resources in education related to the program? The reader may enquire about further reasons for choosing these particular questions, other than the reference to the AC 2010 study. Here it should be kept in mind that part of the condition of the cash transfer is the responsibility of beneficiaries to take their children to regular medical check-ups and make sure that they attend school on a daily basis. Thus, if there is not a teacher or a health physician in the community to offer the services, their CCT can be put at risk for beneficiaries. Furthermore, it is their children's health and education what is most at stake, which is the state's duty by providing the necessary public services as stated in the country's constitution. From the ethnographic observations made in the communities, only one had a teacher attending school children on a permanent basis.

Similarly to the results from the previous phase analyzed, two community decision making processes were observed: internal program norms for claims and complaints, and external non-program norms for claims and complaints. In general terms, the answers to all three questions followed a homogeneous trend as to the decisions made by beneficiaries and the actors involved. In fact, they were structurally analogous to the ones evidenced in the previous phase.

For the first set of decisions, internal program norms and mechanisms for claims and complaints, in connection to the first question, the results were as follows: as a first option, COC representatives were delegated to speak to Mifapro extensionists. If this did not produce the desired results, the COC along with beneficiaries would then speak with the Cocode from the community to intercede for them with the program extensionist and municipal coordinator. From there it was expected that programs collaborators passed on their request to the Mifapro headquarter and/or First Lady. For the second set of decisions, the external non-program norms and mechanisms for claims and complaints, also in connection to the first question, beneficiaries and COC representatives would directly speak to Cocode members, who in turn would make the request to the municipality's mayor. Next, it was expected that the mayor would speak to the all Mifapro collaborators, including the headquarters.

In relation to the second question for the first set of community decisions, the results were as follows: as a first option, COC representatives were delegated to speak to Mifapro extensionists. If this did not produce the desired results, the COC along with beneficiaries would then speak with the Cocode from the community to intercede for them with the program extensionist and municipal coordinator. From there it was expected that programs collaborators passed on the request to the Ministry of health. For the second set of decisions, also in connection to the second question, beneficiaries and COC representatives would directly speak to Cocode members, who in turn would make the request to the municipality's mayor. Subsequently, it was expected that the mayor would deliver the service himself through municipal funds (i.e. buy medicine), or make the proper request to the Ministry of health.

For the last question regarding education for the first set of decisions, the results were as follows: as a first option, COC representatives were delegated to speak to Mifapro extensionists. If this did not produce the desired results, the COC along with beneficiaries would then speak with the Cocode from the community to intercede for them with the program extensionist and municipal coordinator. From there it was expected that programs collaborators passed on the request to the Ministry of education. For the second set of decisions, also in connection to the third question, beneficiaries and COC representatives would directly speak to Cocode members, who in turn would make the request to the municipality's mayor. From then on, it was expected that the mayor would deliver the service himself through municipal funds (i.e. hiring a teacher), or make the proper request to the Ministry of education.


As can be observed through the results to all three answers, the trends in community decision making are quite constant and analogous, only deviating in the entity responsible to reply to the requests made. However, in the second set of decisions where the municipality's mayor was solicited to solve the community's needs, particularly in health and education, he often complied by large or small means. In the interviews conducted with the municipality's treasurer and assistant to the municipal secretary, both reported that from the time the program started in 2009, the municipality has invested large sums of its budget in hiring new teachers and buying supplies for local clinics. This statement was partly confirmed through the ethnographic observations and

results from workshops, as some supplies were in fact delivered to the schools (i.e. desks for students). Community members also commented that the major had hired teachers in different occasions when the Ministry of education was not able to supply a teacher. As such, the set of second decisions, consequence of the inefficiency and misinformation concerning of the procedure for claims and complaints, the program was highly put at risk through clientelist practices.

#### 6.1.5. Map of actors and evaluation of community decision making in critical phase two: Procedure for claims and complaints

Once again, here the reader must be reminded that the evaluation of the relationships is made on the program's norms or regulations, and not on the norms of the institutionalized local political proceedings and relations. As in the previous phase, the evaluation is based on the three indicator criteria R, A and P.

Figure 15. Map of actors and evaluation of corruption risks in critical phase two: Community decision process



#### 6.1.6. Analysis of corruption risks in critical phase two: Procedure for claims and complaints

In the previous immediate sections the reasons for the community decision making process for the internal and external procedures was described. In this section, the analysis will be limited to explaining further the reasons for the evaluation in connection to the R, A and P indicators. In the first set of decision community making, the Cocode relationships regarding the R indicator remained to be low and high in the A indicator in their relationship with Ego

and COC. In the same manner as other previous evaluations, the Cocodes' relationship with the Mifapro extensionist and municipal coordinator for the A indicator remained to be low. There remains to be little or no accountability on behalf of the Mifapro collaborators towards the Cocode. The relationship between the Mifapro extensionist and municipal coordinator remained to be high in indicators R and A for the same reasons that the reader can recall. Likewise, the COC-Mifapro extensionist, municipal coordinator-Mifapro headquarters, and Mifapro headquarters-First Lady relationships were once again graded with a medium A, due to their lack of transparency and flow of information. Finally, the relationships of the municipal coordinator with the Ministry of health and education were evaluated with a medium R and a medium A for the following reasons: while there a written norm does not exist for the R relationships between these actors, there is a fluent flow of information and coordination with their regional and local collaborators through monthly meetings held in the municipalities. However, requests made by the municipal coordinator are not always granted.

As far as the second set of decision making process goes, the relations between Ego-COC, Ego-Cocode and COC-Cocode remained the same as the first set for the indicators R and A. Now, the relationships amongst Cocode-mayor of municipality, mayor of municipality-Ministry of health, mayor of municipality-Ministry of education and mayor of municipality-Mifapro headquarters were grade low for both R and A. The basic underlying reason for this is that the requests made from the Cocode to the municipality mayor, and from the municipality mayor to the Mifapro headquarters, as well as from this last actor to the Ministries of health and education are not contemplated and/or indirectly approved by the programs norms, particularly the requests made directly to the Mifapro headquarters by the mayor of the municipality. Lastly, the relationship between the Mifapro headquarter and the First Lady remain to score high on the R indicator, while still medium for the A indicator.

## **7. Policy implications for ameliorating corruption risks and improving transparency in the Mifapro CCTP**

Parting from the analysis conducted so far in “macro” and “micro” levels<sup>18</sup> in the two critical phases of the CCTP Mifapro, a series of conclusions can be drawn for policy intervention. These conclusions should foremost serve the purpose of improving the program for the efficient reduction of poverty by ameliorating corruption risks, guaranteeing accountability and transparency. Thus, the most salient and important conclusion is that the program does not offer an openness for participation to third parties in order to hold accountable all actors involved. This is true for the micro level of as well as the macro level. In the former, of all actors it was the third party Cocode that was present in most processes at the community level, but always ruled out by the norms of the program. Consequently, the Cocode did not play any part in aiding to hold the

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<sup>18</sup> Micro level refers to all interactions between actors within the first two rings; and macro level for all interactions within the third ring of all maps of actors presented.


actors involved more accountable in the two critical stages. As a legal and legitimate community representative, the Cocode could – and actually should – have a more active role in the implementation of the program in general. The resulting position of the Cocode was not a result of the Cocode not wanting to participate, but rather that the program rules did not allow it to play a more proactive role, which in large measure, could help reduce corruption risks and improve transparency. It is thus held here that the first step to ameliorate corruption risks in a micro level is to actually include the Cocode in the norms of the program and let it play a more active role in holding accountable other actors. That is to say, the Cocode should have a high R and a high P in order to be able to acquire in its relation with different actors a high A.

As could be observed in the many maps of actors, the Cocode was the one that held the most amounts of relationships with other actors, that is, even though they were all graded low in R. Thus, by including the Cocode in the norms would actually create a possible high impact on the program in terms of accountability. This actor could also serve as an additional broker between the program and the community, along with the COC, which is highly important and should not be replaced by any means, but rather strengthened. Through this strengthening of the community's social organizational structure the Cocode and COC can begin to establish a different type of relation and communication with the government authorities, and particularly the mayor. Hence, the mayor could begin to communicate with the Cocode, COC and community members as citizens, and *not* as clients. This would definitely require to be pushed forward and strengthened enough as to establish the communicative action proposed by Habermas (1984) and discussed in the theoretical section. In this type of communication, the Mayor of the municipality would not hold a relationship that is strategic or invested in political interests, but rather a type of dialogue of true understanding with citizens as part of a true representative democracy. The end result of this communication would then be agreements based on true, truthful, right and meaningful interactions that could bring forth a renewed transparency and accountability amongst these actors.

Another necessary measure for the program is the improvement of the many relationships between actors with a medium A indicator. If all these “distorted” interactions in communication were summed up, they would make the program extremely inefficient, non-accountable and non-transparent. This chronic situation certainly makes way for many corruption risks that could be avoided to take place. A possible measure to be taken here is to incorporate an external actor at the macro level, analogous to the Cocode, capable of holding accountable the other actors in the program. Through this, communication could be lent for improvement in order to be true, truthful, right and meaningful amongst actors. Thus, this type of active communication could make the program become more efficient by correcting all distorted communication to the extent of achieving high levels of transparency and accountability. The resulting efficiency within the program would also reduce the probabilities of the community in incurring into the second set of external non-program norms, which highly expose beneficiaries and community leaders to clientelist practices.

Finally, three simple recommendations put forth here cannot be overemphasized in their importance for ameliorating corruption risks and improving transparency in the Mifapro CCTP. An assertive additional step would be to put in disposition of administrators of the program ideal models of interactions between actors, as well as a renewed program design that does not undermine local organizational structures present at the micro level. On the contrary, by strengthening and entitling the participation of these local structures and actors, transparency, accountability and general efficiency of the program can be further guaranteed. It is argued here that instead of ignoring and limiting these structures, they should be given priority in ameliorating corruption risks and advancing transparency. The same instance applies at a macro level where a civil society entity of some sort is inexistent to hold accountable the actors in the hierarchy of the Mifapro program, including the First Lady. Though, through more active and proactive citizen interactions with program administrators and collaborators at different levels higher possibilities to secure accountability and transparency can be attained. Such ideal models for all actors involved in both critical phases are shown in figure 16. All in all, this figure not only represents a corruption free, transparent and accountable program, but also a communicative active one.

Figure 16. Ideal models of transparent and accountable relations amongst actors for Program entry procedure and Process of claims and complaints



## 8. Conclusion

In line with an action research paradigm, this study attempted to determine the corruption risks and transparency shortcomings in the Mifapro CCTP in Guatemala, as well as providing specific recommendations for intervention. Privileging an actor focused perspective, the research specifically aimed at identifying the relationships and actors causing the greatest corruption risk in a macro and micro level. Several actors and relationships causing corruption risks were clearly identified, but also additional ones that could and should be recognized, strengthened and included to ameliorate corruption risks and guarantee transparency. Concerning the latter, the Cocode, which not only acts as a legal community representative and stands as a cornerstone in the local social structure, could play a more proactive role within the program if recognized. Thus, it is argued here that if this actor was to be taken into consideration and given voice, it could hold accountable all actors involved in the micro level and partly improve the shortcomings of the program so far.

On the other hand and at the macro level, participation of external actors analogous to the Cocode are inexistent, making it difficult to guarantee accountability of all actors involved. This is particularly true regarding the numerous weak communicative relationships identified within the program, which as a whole make it increasingly inefficient, non-transparent and prone to corruption. To counteract this deficiency, the participation of a “civil society entity” to oversee the relationships between actors in the program is highly recommended. This actor could actively intervene to withhold accountable others at the macro level where the Cocode or an actor alike is non-existent, thus pushing forth transparent communication and relations. The end result expected from the intervention of the Cocode at the micro level and that of a civil society entity at the macro level, is that all communication amongst all actors involved aims to be true, truthful, right and meaningful; that is to say, communicative action.

An additional expected result from these interventions is to lessen the frequency in which the beneficiaries and community seek the second set of external non-program norms, which as a whole contribute to clientelist practices. Thus, the corruption risks derived from this situation would be ameliorated by the elimination of this alternative practice. Similarly, a more proactive community structure prepared to establish another type of communication with the persons in power, i.e. mayor of the municipality, would reduce the risks of corruption and the political manipulation of the program.

Hence, if the recommendations above are followed, the possibilities for the program to be improved are considerable. However, it should be mentioned that this study is only exploratory and qualitative in nature. While a certain degree of validity was obtained, reliability and generalizability were not; but could be attained by replicating the study in a representative number of communities and complementing it with more thorough quantitative data.

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# Appendix



## **Guía de entrevista estructurada para determinar las relaciones entre actores en dos etapas críticas: la perspectiva de los coordinadores municipales y promotores de Mifapro**

### **I. Introducción**

La guía de entrevista estructurada comprende un total 12 preguntas. El entrevistador tiene la libertad de hacer preguntas adicionales para profundizar en cuestiones importantes que surjan de las preguntas, esto es, sin pasar por alto las preguntas de la guía.

Se estima que la entrevista durará aproximadamente 1 hora, por lo cual se recomienda realizarla en un lugar cómodo, silencio y donde sea difícil ser interrumpidos. Se solicita que el entrevistador primeramente entregue al entrevistado la carta que respalda la investigación, luego explique el propósito de la misma, y posteriormente pida permiso para grabar la conversación.

### **II. El censo, ingreso al programa y mecanismos de control**

1. El levantado del censo es un proceso crucial en todos los programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas – TMC – que existen.
2. ¿Cuál ha sido la experiencia, tanto *positiva* como *negativa*, del levantado del censo en El Estor/Livingston?
3. ¿Cuál ha sido la experiencia en El Estor/Livingston sobre el proceso de exclusión e inclusión de personas en el programa?
4. ¿Cuáles son los *mecanismos de control* que se utilizan para que las personas pobres y de escasos recursos sean beneficiadas y no otras que no necesitan el apoyo? (*Reglamentación*)
5. ¿Por qué razón se dieron casos en que personas que no eran pobres y de escasos recursos eran beneficiarias del programa?
6. ¿Hay participación de algún ente o actor externo a Mifapro para verificar que las personas beneficiadas sean las indicadas? (*Accountability y Participación*)

### **III. Quejas y reclamos**

6. ¿Cuáles han sido las principales quejas y reclamos que se han recibido por parte de las beneficiarias y ex beneficiarias sobre el programa en El Estor/Livingston?
7. ¿Cuál es el procedimiento para responder a dichas quejas y reclamos? (*Reglamentación*)
8. ¿Qué quejas y reclamos tienden a quedar sin resolver?

9. ¿Hay participación de algún ente o actor externo a Mifapro para verificar que las quejas y reclamos hayan sido atendidos de manera pronta y oportuna? (*Accountability y Participación*)

#### IV. Relación entre actores claves

10. Debido a las fuertes demandas en los servicios de salud, educación y coordinación en general que crea el programa Mi Familia Progresá, ¿han recibido algún tipo de apoyo por parte de la corporación municipal?
11. ¿Qué tipo de actividades han coordinado y coordinan actualmente los integrantes de Mifapro con la corporación municipal de El Estor/Livingston?
12. A pesar de que la meta de los programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas no es servir a ciertos intereses políticos partidarios, esto en ocasiones ocurre.  
¿A partir de su conocimiento y experiencia, cree que el alcalde municipal de El Estor/Livingston en ocasiones ha utilizado el impacto positivo del programa para proselitismo político?



## Guía de entrevista estructurada a encuestadores de Mi Familia Progresá sobre la etapa crítica de ingreso al programa

### I. Introducción

La guía de entrevista estructurada comprende un total 10 preguntas. El entrevistador tiene la libertad de hacer preguntas adicionales para profundizar en cuestiones importantes que surjan de las preguntas, esto es, sin omitir las preguntas de la guía.

Se estima que la entrevista durará aproximadamente 1 hora, por lo cual se recomienda realizarla en un lugar cómodo, silencio y donde sea difícil ser interrumpidos. Se solicita que el entrevistador primeramente entregue al entrevistado la carta que respalda la investigación, luego explique el propósito de la misma, y posteriormente pida permiso para grabar la conversación.

### II. Preguntas

1. ¿Poseía Usted experiencia en realizar encuestas antes de participar como encuestador en el censo del programa Mi Familia Progresá?
2. ¿Por cuánto tiempo recibió capacitación antes de realizar el censo de Mi Familia Progresá?
3. ¿Aproximadamente cuántos encuestadores eran en total?
4. ¿De qué lugar(es) era(n) en su mayoría?

5. ¿A Usted qué comunidades le tocó censar?
6. ¿Conocía a personas en las comunidades que le tocó censar?
7. ¿Habla usted el idioma de las comunidades que le tocó censar?
8. Por razones de amistad, compadrazgo o simple corrupción, algunos encuestadores registraron información incorrecta sobre las beneficiarias. ¿Qué ha escuchado Usted al respecto?
9. ¿Cree Usted que por el registro incorrecto de información por parte de algunos encuestadores se seleccionó a personas que no necesitan el apoyo económico de Mi Familia Progresas?
10. ¿Tiene alguna recomendación para mejorar el procedimiento del levantado del censo del programa Mi Familia Progresas?



## **Guía de entrevista estructurada para determinar las acciones de ex beneficiarias de Mifapro**

### **V. Introducción**

La guía de entrevista estructurada comprende un total 15 preguntas. El entrevistador tiene la libertad de hacer preguntas adicionales para profundizar en cuestiones importantes que surjan de las preguntas, esto es, sin pasar por alto las preguntas de la guía.

Se estima que la entrevista durará aproximadamente 1 hora, por lo cual se recomienda realizarla en un lugar cómodo, silencio y donde sea difícil ser interrumpidos. Se solicita que el entrevistador primeramente entregue al entrevistado la carta que respalda la investigación, luego explique el propósito de la misma, y posteriormente pida permiso para grabar la conversación.

### **VI. Actores involucrados en el proceso de inclusión, exclusión e intento de re-inclusión en el programa**

1. ¿Cómo fue usted seleccionada para ser beneficiaria de Mi Familia Progresas?
2. ¿Le proporcionó alguien ayuda para ingresar al programa?
3. ¿Por qué fue excluida del programa?
4. ¿La visitó algún miembro de Mifapro antes de que fuera excluida?
5. ¿Cómo se enteró que fue excluida?
6. ¿Cree Usted que su exclusión del programa fue injustificada? ¿Por qué?
7. ¿Tomó alguna acción (habló con alguien de su comunidad o de la alcaldía municipal, hizo llamadas a las oficinas centrales del programa, etc.) para que fuera incluida nuevamente en el programa?

8. ¿Le ayudó alguien para intentar ser incluida nuevamente? ¿Quién y cómo?

## VII. Quejas y reclamos

9. ¿Conoce Usted el número telefónico para presentar quejas y reclamos del programa Mi Familia Progresas?
10. ¿Ha hecho uso de este servicio?
11. ¿Logró el servicio solucionar sus dudas, quejas y reclamos? Explique.
12. ¿Conoce Usted la Mesa de atención ciudadana de Mi Familia Progresas?
13. ¿Ha hecho uso de este servicio?
14. ¿Logró el servicio solucionar sus dudas, quejas y reclamos? Explique.
15. ¿Tiene alguna recomendación para mejorar el programa Mi Familia Progresas?



# Guía de entrevista estructurada a actores externos al programa Mi Familia Progresas

## I. Introducción

La guía de entrevista estructurada comprende un total 4 preguntas generadoras. El entrevistador tiene toda la libertad para profundizar sobre los temas surgidos a partir de las preguntas generadoras y según considere necesario.

Se recomienda realizar la entrevista en un lugar cómodo, silencio y donde sea difícil ser interrumpidos. Se solicita también que el entrevistador primeramente entregue al entrevistado la carta que respalda la investigación, luego explique el propósito de la misma y posteriormente pida permiso para grabar la conversación.

## II. Preguntas

1. ¿Cuál es su impresión y opinión personal sobre la implementación del programa Mi Familia Progresas en el municipio de El Estor/Livingston?
2. ¿Cuáles considera Usted han sido los aspectos positivos y negativos de la implementación del programa en el municipio?
3. ¿Cree Usted que el alcalde municipal y su corporación han utilizado los impactos positivos del programa social para proselitismo político?
4. ¿Cuáles aspectos del programa considera Usted son importantes mejorar?



## Guía de facilitación para realizar Mapa participativo de actores

### I. Introducción

La presente guía brinda una descripción de los pasos necesarios para facilitar un mapa participativo de actores. Los pasos descritos responden específicamente a los requerimientos de datos para completar la fase dos (Mapa de actores) de la Guía de implementación de riesgos de integridad desarrollada por Transparency International – TI. El mapa participativo de actores pretende plasmar la relación entre actores involucrados y afines del programa Mi Familia Progresá – Mifapro - a nivel local-municipal.

### II. Paso 1

Ya colocado el objetivo sobre la pared, el facilitador da la bienvenida a los participantes y presenta a los integrantes del equipo de trabajo. Explica también el porqué de la investigación y de la presencia del equipo en la comunidad. Si el número de participantes es menor a 8, se realiza la dinámica “¿De quién es esto?”

### III. Paso 2

Luego de las dinámicas de presentación y “rompe hielo”, el facilitador procede a explicar brevemente en qué consiste el objetivo y el uso que se le dará (mapa), particularmente explicando la ubicación de la comunidad/beneficiaria en el centro del objetivo. También se dará lectura a la pregunta generadora del primer mapa de actores y hacer referencia a los demás mapas que se trabajarán y que deben estar pegados en la pared del salón.

Nota: Las preguntas para los cuatro mapas a trabajar son:

1. ¿A quién acuden para solicitar la inclusión de alguien en el programa Mi Familia Progresá? (Etapa de criticidad sobre ingreso al programa).
2. ¿A quién acuden las beneficiarias para corregir información errónea registrada en el programa Mi Familia Progresá? (Etapa de criticidad sobre quejas y reclamos)
3. ¿A quién acuden para resolver sus necesidades de infraestructura, equipamiento y recurso humano en salud? (Etapa de criticidad sobre quejas y reclamos)
4. ¿A quién acuden para resolver sus necesidades de infraestructura en equipamiento y recurso humano en educación? (Etapa de criticidad sobre quejas y reclamos)

### IV. Paso 4

Seguidamente el facilitador presenta a cada uno de los recortes de actores pegándolos en el tablero. Se recomienda que el facilitador sea ameno en la presentación de cada uno de

los actores tratando de hacer una que otra broma sobre la persona representada con el recorte y que está presente en el taller; esto es en la medida de lo posible.

#### **V. Paso 5**

El facilitador procede nuevamente a leer la pregunta generadora y la dinámica del uso del mapa. Es importante que aquí quede claro el uso de la ubicación de los actores en los niveles 1 – 3 del mapa. Se debe enfatizar que los niveles 1 – 3 refieren a cercanía y lazos de confianza para realizar la gestión mencionada.

#### **VI. Paso 6**

Después de la dinámica ilustrativa se procede a leer nuevamente la pregunta correspondiente al mapa y a dirigirla directamente a los participantes. Conforme vayan opinando cada uno de los participantes, se les solicita que pasen al frente para ubicar al actor en el mapa. Si alguien cuestiona la ubicación del actor sobre el mapa, se le solicita también que pase al frente para ubicar al actor donde corresponde. La idea es que poco a poco el facilitador le dé la voz y participación completa a los participantes para que ellos mismos coloquen a los actores donde ellos consideren apropiado. En este paso se recomienda mucho que el facilitador intente encontrar mecanismos para involucrar a los participantes eficazmente.

#### **VII. Paso 7**

Durante la posible discusión grupal sobre la ubicación de cada uno de los actores, se recomienda que el facilitador vaya ***preguntado el porqué de la ubicación en los distintos niveles de cada uno de los actores***. En esto el facilitador tiene que asegurarse que los actores estén ubicados correctamente en cada nivel según lo que se vaya consensuando dentro del grupo a partir de la discusión.

#### **VIII. Paso 8**

Después de llegar a una ubicación consensuada sobre cada uno de los actores en el mapa, se pregunta la relación que se tiene entre cada uno de estos, incluida la comunidad. Hay dos posibles tipos de relaciones. 1. Unidireccional, 2. Bidireccional. En esta parte del taller el facilitador debe jugar un papel más activo asegurándose que los tipos de relaciones sean las correctas, además de determinar el servicio/retorno que se ofrecen unos a otros. El facilitador también tiene que ***preguntar las razones para el establecimiento de una de las relaciones, servicios y retornos. Los comentarios y razones derivados de la pregunta sobre el porqué de la relación tienen que ser claras y concisas para que puedan ser documentadas. Esto es sumamente importante.***

#### **XI. Paso 9**

Al terminar el último mapa se cierra el taller con un agradecimiento y la entrega de un pequeño regalo de agradecimiento.