

WikiLeaks and the Enforcement of Transparency

Classification and Consequences of Disclosed Diplomatic
Correspondence

Daniel Kristoffersson

Abstract

WikiLeaks' disclosure of US diplomatic correspondence is an active enforcement of transparency, and is at the same time challenging the fundamental norm of diplomatic secrecy. Since WikiLeaks has disclosed unsorted material, the purpose of this research is to classify the material. A classification is thus proposed, but I do not have the ambition to sort material into the respective classes. Act-consequentialism is applied to further an objective and hypothetical analysis of how each respective class is affecting the two segments of the elite and the public. A theory of diplomacy is outlined, as well as a dilemma between the two principles of secrecy and transparency to provide deeper understanding of the problem. Based on the proposed classes, consequences of disclosing the diplomatic correspondence will be discussed. This is done in relation to the two segments of the elite and the public. Therefore, several conclusions will be arrived at in the dilemma at hand.

Key words: WikiLeaks, Diplomacy, Secrecy, Transparency, Classification, Act-consequentialism.

Words: 9794

Acronyms

AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula
CT	Counterterrorism
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
NYT	the New York Times
SEP	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

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1 Introduction

WikiLeaks has raised global media attention due to both its organization and disclosures. The relevant dilemma from a political science perspective is that WikiLeaks is promoting – and actively enforcing – more transparency within secret state and foreign affairs. By publicizing diplomatic confidential material, a door between the elite and the public domain has been opened. This has been enabled with the help of today’s advanced and anonymous ICT (Information and Communication Technology). What WikiLeaks has identified as a target is a shortage in openness in the relationship between politicians and diplomats on the one hand and the public on the other. Since the former’s work is often conducted with diplomatic secrecy, no public observation has formerly been possible in certain foreign affairs. WikiLeaks has fundamentally altered this relationship due to the disclosing of diplomatic correspondences. Unfortunately, little attention has hitherto come from academic research in terms of publicized scientific material. Despite this, the organization and its disclosures have had great implications for how we understand the international political and diplomatic life. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to propose a structure in which the disclosed material can be classed and to propose and discuss consequences of publicizing confidential diplomatic material. My aim is not to sort the material, but to propose classes.

1.1 Problem statement and research questions

What the dilemma stated above leads to is questions regarding what principles should be guiding diplomatic correspondence. Identifying core principles – in this study the principles of secrecy and transparency in foreign affairs – that the further analysis holds as a reference point can form the starting point of a normative study (Badersten 2006:73, 187). The dilemma is if the diplomatic correspondence should be secret and thus exclusively reserved for the elite (in this study, I refer to politicians and their diplomats when using the term “elite”) or if it should be open and thus publicly available. In order to make the disclosed correspondence researchable, a classification of the material sets out the start of this research. This is urgent since WikiLeaks does not have the ambition to sort material in distinct classes before disclosing it. The first question to be dealt with is therefore:

What classification can be proposed when analyzing the disclosed correspondence?

Classifying the material is needed to enable an analysis in which consequences of the respective class are discussed. As both the principle of transparency and the principle of secrecy have reasons to be interpreted as ways of prescribing how open or closed diplomatic correspondence should be, the conflicting principles will be of high relevance to elaborate.

Conducting diplomacy or foreign affairs in a secretive way presupposes that this shields information from becoming public, and information protected with secrecy is therefore exclusively reserved for the elites. On the other hand, transparency in the confidential material makes the presupposition that the public will be granted a substantial observational status. The second question to be dealt with is therefore:

What are probable consequences for the elite and the public when disclosing the diplomatic correspondence?

Since I will identify several classes of the diplomatic correspondence, consequences of the respective class will be discussed. This discussion will incorporate how the consequences affects the two segments of the elite and the public.

1.2 Presuppositions of the study

The basic presupposition this study uses is a) that the elite, namely the politicians and their diplomats, are in certain cases dependent of secrecy in the diplomatic correspondence. Otherwise, the information processed in the correspondence is attainable for the public and is thus not exclusively reserved for the elites. And b) some disclosed information, as this study will argue for, is valuable to be open for the public.

Due to its disclosures, WikiLeaks has challenged the fundamental political norm of secrecy by enforcing transparency. Since this is done without distinguishing in the trove of disclosed correspondences, an initial classification is required before discussing consequences. The discussion on consequences in this study will be analyzed with the normative ethic of consequentialism. As my study will be dealing with the implications of disclosing the diplomatic correspondences in relation to the elite and the public, the nature of this discussion will be that it seeks to elaborate hypothetical consequences. Discussing hypothetical consequences is in fact something intrinsic in the ethic of consequentialism. A fuller review of consequentialism will be dealt with in chapter three and as for now it is sufficient to state my use of the normative ethic.

1.3 The relevance of the study

The relevance of this study is diverse. First, the classification I will derive from the disclosed correspondences will be of relevance from a political science perspective. The analysis of the disclosed material's consequences for the elite and the public should be applicable in several fields of political science where the principle of transparency is used or proposed.

Second, as this specific study is dealing with diplomatic correspondence this generates a high applicable relevance since the nature of diplomacy is global. The disclosed diplomatic correspondences are “the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain” (wikileaks.org) and can be seen as the most explosive material that has passed through WikiLeaks (Keller 2011:12). The cables are a sample of correspondence between US foreign missions in form of 270 embassies and consulates on the one hand and the US State Department on the other (Shane – Lehren 2010:54) and thus reveals insights in US relations to countries all around the world. In relation to WikiLeaks other disclosures the diplomatic cables must be interpreted as the most comprehensive disclosures of all time, both because of the amount of documents and because of their global reach.

Third, this thesis is studying the new phenomena of WikiLeaks which heightens the relevance. What has been written hitherto is a great deal of journalistic articles and the book “WikiLeaks and the Age of Transparency” (2011) by Micah L. Sifry. In general, this book is a description of the new wave of digital transparency movements, where WikiLeaks is treated as among others. It is openly biased and argues for benefits of enforcing transparency. As such, it does not deal with the same type of approach as this study, that of an initial and unbiased classification of the disclosed material. Also, unbiased consequences are discussed when relating it to both the elite and the public. This can be seen as an essential first step in the study of WikiLeaks and its implications. Despite the dearth of studies on WikiLeaks, there is an element of cumulativity as I base my classes on previously defined concepts.

1.4 Delimitations

What is under scrutiny is the so-called “Cablegate”, the case where WikiLeaks has attained over – and is regularly disclosing parts of – 251,287 confidential documents regarding correspondences from US foreign missions around the globe to the US State Department. The Cablegate-cables,

which date from 1966 up until the end of February 2010, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC. (wikileaks.org)

WikiLeaks' disclosures do not end with "Cablegate", the organization has since its foundation in 2006 disclosed a range of different material from around the globe. WikiLeaks has published

hundreds of exposés and critical documents, including more than 6,500 Congressional Research Service reports, most of which were previously only available to members of Congress and their staff; proof of high-level government corruption and human rights abuses in Kenya; confidential records of one of Iceland's top banks revealing its role in the country's financial collapse; details on the hyper-secretive Church of Scientology's operations; lists of thousands of members of Britain's far-right British National Party; documents showing how Barclays Bank was avoiding tax payments; and a Guantánamo Bay prison procedures manual that the American Civil Liberties Union had been unable to obtain under the Freedom of Information Act (Micah L. Sifry 2011:21).

Although this shows a great range of topics that can be attributed to WikiLeaks, these disclosures are in fact minor when compared to the Afghan and the Iraqi war logs that were disclosed in July and October 2010. The Afghan war logs contain 92,000 reports on the war in Afghanistan with the time span from January 2004 until December 2009 (Chivers et al. 2010:247). The Iraqi war logs contain nearly 400,000 reports from the US Army covering the war in Iraq between 2004 and 2009 (Star 2010:250).

WikiLeaks disclosures show that scientific studies of the organization can be conducted in several specific case studies. Despite this, all of WikiLeaks' disclosures must be interpreted as a way to actively enforce transparency in state or organizational secrets. Yet, the principles of both secrecy and transparency and the dilemma between them cannot be disregarded when analyzing the organization. The delimitation that can be made is therefore on what type of material that has been disclosed and my study is focused on the disclosing of the diplomatic correspondence. A study with the focus on e.g. both the war logs and the diplomatic cable disclosure would not have the same coherence as a study with a single focus. Analyzing both military and diplomatic secrets would risk losing the preferable coherence.

I am also making delimitations regarding normative ethics. According to Badersten, there are at least four main normative ethics to consult. These are deontology, consequentialism (or teleology), logic of appropriateness and contractualism (Badersten 2006:109ff). Of these I have chosen consequentialism as the guiding ethic for this study and its relevance will be discussed in section 2.2 and in chapter three.

1.5 Comments on the material

The section on secretive diplomacy will mainly be drawn from scientific texts dealing with common perceptions of diplomacy, i.e. conducted in a highly opaque way. The material from the opposing perspective of transparent diplomacy will be drawn from scientific research as well as from the media attention. The New York Times and The Guardian are the two English newspapers that cooperated with WikiLeaks in the worldwide spread of the disclosed diplomatic cables and in 2011 both published a book on the topic of WikiLeaks. Different materials are found in the books, ranging from specific disclosed cables and related articles as well as open editorials that are analyzing the cables' content and their implications for the diplomatic community, its informational flow and correspondence when challenged with transparency. Material on the topic of transparent diplomacy is also drawn from scientific research in books conducted in the field of foreign policy and fields related to diplomacy.

Furthermore, the disclosed cables represent an enormous cache and are thus not of particularly use. Analyzing these and at the same time upholding objectivity would require a tremendously vast spectrum, which is unreasonable for the scope of this study. Therefore, and due to requirements of intersubjectivity, I state my use of secondary sources in which the NYT's journalists view will be incorporated. However, my study is structured to maintain an objective approach and it is therefore important that the two principles of secrecy and transparency will be discussed. It is also logically unreasonable not to do so since they are opposing principles and are both present in this study's dilemma.

Additionally, Björn Badersten's book "*Normativ Metod – att studera det önskvärda*"¹ (2006) is used twofold; when referring to general normative methodology, and when describing the specific methodology of consequentialism.

1.6 Disposition

Chapter two will outline methodological considerations, chapter three will be dealing with the normative ethic and methodology of consequentialism and chapter four will present diplomatic theories as well as the dilemma between transparency and secrecy. Chapter five will incorporate the first analysis of this study and will be answering what classification that can be proposed when analyzing the disclosed diplomatic correspondence. Chapter six consists of the further analysis and answers what consequences that are probable from each

¹ Normative method – to study the desirable.

respective class. The conclusions will be presented in the form of a matrix in chapter seven.

Due to the lack of research on WikiLeaks, the classification of the disclosed material will be given the most attention.

2 Methodology

The methodological approach that will be guiding my study is the ethic of consequentialism. The classification of the leaked material is further analyzed when relating it to the two segments of the elite and the public. Since it is intrinsic in the nature of consequentialism, I cannot overstate that the discussion on consequences of the disclosing of the diplomatic correspondence will be hypothetical. Yet – to compensate this flaw of consequentialism – the discussion will be conducted with rational argumentation (Badersten 2006:187) and logical stringency. My aim is therefore that the discussion on consequences will be attainable for the reader.

2.1 Classification

Because of the tremendously vast spectrum of the disclosed material, classification, i.e. distinguishing properties from each other, is essential in order to gain analytic comprehension. The scientific term for this pursuit is *fundamentum divisionis* (literally: the basis of division) (Marradi 1990:131). When using classification as a method, it is essential to seek distinguishing properties between objects or events in the material. The defining scientific procedure Alberto Marradi presents is that “[w]hile the *fundamentum divisionis* is a property of any classification in its entirety, the level of generality is a property of each single class concept” (Marradi 1990:131). What this points to is to establish classes that have specific defining properties and when overlapping properties at the same level of generality are lowered, the extension of each respective class is established. (Marradi 1990:131).

The term “level of generality” can be translated into “level of abstraction”, which is used when Björn Badersten is discussing the relationship between intentional and extensional definition of a concept or a class. The extension (reach) of a specific class is formulated by the number of objects or events that are sorted under that class (Badersten 2006:87). This is dependent on the definition of the class’s intention (content); namely the number of fulfilled properties an object or event must have in order for it to be sorted under a specific class (Badersten 2006:86). In sum, classification as a method is conducted by a) defining the properties of a class (extension) and b) identifying how well and often objects or events correspond to this definition (intention). Or to use Marradi’s words, “[t]hrough classing, objects or events are assigned to classes or types which have been previously defined” (Marradi 1990:129).

Since the disclosed diplomatic material is of such a vast spectrum, the material must be narrowed to a comprehensible extent. Articles published in the book “*Open Secrets*” (2011) by the NYT are representing a material of such comprehension. Without this initial selection and narrowing of the material, the classification would have been faulty due to the impossible task of assigning each correspondence in the disclosed cache into a class.

Also, the use of journalistic material gives context to otherwise very specific correspondences. The use of second source material in this case makes a preferable distance from the primary sources. Having a distance will avoid a too narrow scrutiny of the material and hence properties not will be attributable to more than one class. As stated above, this is once again dependent on how broad you define the intension of classes. Therefore, that to the greatest extent possible avoid arbitrariness and difficulties in finding reason for fundamenta divisionis, a proportional agreement between extension and intension will be aimed at. With this proportionality, my definition of classes will not be stretched, and hence not losing its meaning, something referred to as “conceptual stretching” (Teorell – Svensson 2007:237). Marradi stresses that “the role of careful operational definition of the properties adopted as fundamenta divisionis cannot be overrated”. (Marradi 1990:136)

The problem of arbitrariness in the assignments of objects and events into classes cannot be avoided. This problem is present when an object or event indicates properties attributable to different classes. (Marradi 1990:136). I would say that it is reasonable that one diplomatic correspondence can be assigned to several classes. This is because of the fact that the same correspondence can deal with multiple topics. If each individual correspondence would be assigned to an individual class, the number of classes would be the same as the number of correspondences. If such approach would be undertaken, it would be impossible to make a relevant study of disclosed diplomatic correspondence. As previously stated, my aim is not to sort the material in classes, but to propose possible classes.

2.2 Science theory

In order to conduct research that claims to be scientific, certain prerequisites must be fulfilled, which will be outlined here. The foundation in this study – the principles of secrecy and transparency and the normative ethic and method of consequentialism – must be discussed in order to be attainable for others (Beckman 2005:33). Logics of how the principles are working and the different consequences of the principles are of relevance in this study. The consequences of

disclosing the material for the segments (the elite and the public) are of particular relevance. The principle of intersubjectivity is complied with and thus is facilitation of posing critique as well as reproducibility of the research obtained (Badersten 2006:73ff). Due to limitations, the principle of intersubjectivity will not be further outlined, but instead generally complied with.²

Regarding ontology and epistemology, my study will be placed in the field of relativism respectively subjectivism.³ Ontologically, the relativism is present due to the classification of WikiLeaks' disclosure. This analysis will inevitably be based on relativism due to an unfeasible *objective* assignment of the disclosed material into classes (Badersten 2006:59f). Likewise, when analyzing the class's consequences for the elite and for the public, a relativistic approach will be undertaken (Badersten 2006:65).

This study will be conducted with subjective epistemology. The reason is that this type of analysis presupposes that concepts can be problematized (Lundquist 1993:75ff) with a subjective basis, and provide answers that are relative to defined classes. "Knowledge will not stand independent from us as knowledge producing subjects" (Badersten 2006:60, my translation).

2.3 Adjusting consequentialism

The normative ethic of consequentialism forms a part of the methodology on which the further analysis relies. What is studied using this ethic are the consequences that an action has, and the presupposition is that the ends justify the means. One should therefore perform actions that have the best possible consequences (Badersten 2006:114; Tännsjö 2000:24). But the ends do not justify all means. An action is only preferable if it leads to a greater surplus of good for as many as possible than any other actions. This is mostly interpreted as regarding as many *people* as possible. My discussion on consequences will be related to the segments of the elite and the public.

According to consequentialism, the action with the greatest surplus of good is obligatory to conduct (Tännsjö 2000:26). Yet again, this must be adjusted since my aim is to show that both the secretive and the transparent diplomacy are good in certain circumstances and create different kinds of consequences for the different segments. The "obligatory action" can be seen as ideal typical. Since I interpret this action in relation to two different segments of society there is no such obligatory action that both segments would comply with. The conclusions will therefore not propose an obligatory action.

² For a full review, see Badersten 2006, chapter four.

³ Presupposing that the other fields in the matrix are realism-objectivity, realism-subjectivity (and relativism-objectivity).

Critics could say that this is taking a step away from consequentialism and moving towards another normative ethic – the logic of appropriateness. This logic deals with what action is preferable in a particular context, taking into account several aspects: values, ends, means and consequences (Badersten 2008:174). The normative valuation that is conducted is that of an ongoing process, since the preferable action is relative to changing circumstances (Badersten 2006:120). This critique may be possible to address, but it is not possible to complete. The line between the logic of appropriateness and consequentialism is blurred since they are both taking into account “values, ends, means and consequences”. The distinction to be made in this study is that the two conflicting principles of secrecy and transparency are mainly interpreted as means for the elite and for the public. What the logic of appropriateness is giving leeway for is the ability to consider *several* possible contexts and therefore *several* principles regarding “values, ends, means and consequences”. The way I am studying diplomatic correspondence is in relation to only two segments of society. Consequentialism is therefore the relevant normative ethic in this research.

3 Consequentialism

A structural approach is taking form when trying to solve the question of which consequences transparency in diplomatic correspondence has for the elite and the public. Upholding a structural approach changes the notion that the obligatory action will form the conclusion (as referred to by preference utilitarianism) (Badersten 2006:115). Instead of one obligatory action, several consequences will be concluded.

Consequentialism does not provide any guidelines on what principle or segment to prefer. Instead, it is focusing on *how* the consequences are valued – namely to produce the best consequences. Additionally, what is considered to be the “best consequences” is relative to the segments. Furthermore, when using this normative ethic, it is required to rationally calculate the consequences when choosing between opposing segments (Sjölin 2005:20). This calculation of different consequences is of course not an easy task to do without sufficient facts (Tännsjö 2000:32) and when decisions need to be taken quickly. Therefore, consequentialism fails to be a practical ethic on a daily political basis. (Badersten 2006:115ff) What is calculated is *the probability of the expected* consequences. Since expectations can fail to be fulfilled, this raises the requirement that the rational calculation is based on adequate and satisfactory facts (Tännsjö 2000:33). Therefore, what can be conducted is a lengthier study with the ambition to analyze the probability of the expected consequences (Bales 1971:257; Tännsjö 2000:36). I choose to analyze the expected consequences in relation to the two segments of the elite and the public by incorporating the journalists’ view on consequences of the material hitherto (6th of January 2011) disclosed by WikiLeaks.

3.1 Act-consequentialism

There is a whole spectrum of sub-ethics stemming from consequentialism.⁴ The most related, and to a large extent overlapping ethic, is utilitarianism which in addition has similar varieties of sub-ethics as consequentialism. Since this study’s contribution is not an analysis of the normative ethic in its own, further discussion

⁴ SEP (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) identifies actual-, direct-, evaluative-, hedonistic-, maximizing-, aggregative-, total-, universal-, equal- and agent-neutral consequentialism and makes the reservation that the list could be further supplemented (Sinnot-Armstrong 2008).

on this terminology will not be outlined. I am using consequentialism as a guiding normative ethic and method when analyzing WikiLeaks disclosures and their consequences for two segments. A relevant discussion is dealing with some core questions that must be posed when using consequentialism, or more specifically, act-consequentialism. Why this sub-ethic is both relevant and accurate in this study must be defended. One way of doing this is to be generous to the counterpart, i.e. address possible critique against act-consequentialism (Badersten 2006:104, 193). Brad Hooker outlines four reasons why act-consequentialism is counter-productive. These will be spelled out here and discussed afterwards.

First, very often the agent does not have detailed information about what the consequences would be of various acts. Second, obtaining such information would often involve greater costs than are at stake in the decision to be made. Third, even if the agent had the information needed to make calculations, the agent might make mistakes in the calculations. (This is especially likely when the agent's natural biases intrude, or when the calculations are complex, or when they have to be made in a hurry.) Fourth, there are what we might call expectation effects. Imagine a society in which people know that others are naturally biased towards themselves and towards their loved ones but are trying to make their every moral decision by calculating overall good. In such a society, each person might well fear that others will go around breaking promises, stealing, lying, and even assaulting whenever they convinced themselves that such acts would produce the greatest overall good. In such a society, people would not feel they could trust one another. (Hooker 2011)

First, I aim to incorporate information on what the journalists are expecting the consequences to be. Second, the high costs associated with obtaining information are not present when conducting an analysis of this kind. The costs could arise if we were to make informed decisions on an instant command, which is to request too much and is therefore not compatible with act-consequentialism (Bales 1971:258). Third, there is a need to meet a certain standard of objectivity to avoid “natural biases” when analyzing consequences for two different segments. Fourth, the critique of expected effects is something prone to occur when discussing consequentialism and is basically a circular reasoning since it is heavily related to the first critique. Again, the answer is to incorporate unbiased information about expected consequences.

In a broader sense, the discussion if act-consequentialism is counter-productive or not is intrinsically misguided. According to Badersten, this is due to the fact that normative methodology *in practice* is inadequately elaborated in the social sciences (Badersten 2006:70), which means that consequentialism is flawed in the same sense. Yet, it is seen as a highly usable normative ethic when applying normative method (Badersten 2006:114ff), but it is left open for interpretation in practical terms and to specific studies at hand (Bales 1971:257). The important consistency to uphold using act-consequentialism as a research method is to calculate probable consequences for different segments in society (Bales

1971:258). My way of doing so is to structure classes. These classes form the base on which the consequences are discussed.

What answer we can expect of consequentialism will be addressed shortly. Philosophers debate⁵ this question by stating that there is a distinction between decision-making and right-making procedures (Bales 1971:260ff). A general notion is that if the adequate procedure of decision-making is conducted, the deduced conclusion of this procedure also contains the right answer. (Bales 1971:264) My methodology will hence comply with the procedure of decision-making, i.e. calculation of the expected consequences. But the deduced conclusion I will present will not show what alternative will be the morally right one to obey, due to the fact that the conclusions are relative to two different segments.

⁵ For a discussion, see Bales 1971.

4 Theory

This chapter is the continuation of what is required by the normative ethic and method of act-consequentialism. How diplomacy is interpreted in international or foreign relations must be stated in order to attain basic understanding of the phenomena that I am studying. The aim of this chapter is also to outline a) how secrecy is essential if information should be exclusively reserved for the elite, (i.e. the politicians and their reporting diplomats) and b) how transparency is essential if the public should take part of the correspondence the diplomats report to the home country.

Another important point to lay out is how I interpret the principles of secrecy and transparency. I use secrecy to describe that the public was previously not given insight in the correspondence. Instead, the secret correspondence was exclusively reserved for the elite. The principle of transparency is in this study is used to describe that the public is given insight in the diplomatic correspondence. These definitions of the principles are both present; the previously secret correspondence has due to WikiLeaks disclosure become transparent.

4.1 Diplomacy

Diplomats' mandate is a contract from their respective state. Besides this formal structure, the diplomacy is rather freed from formality. What dictates the framework in which diplomacy works is instead (informal) hierarchy and anarchy (Jönsson – Hall 2005:13). Diplomats have no obligation to actively seek continuous mandate from the citizens of their respective states. A main task for foreign diplomats is to report back to their state government, providing decision-makers with relevant knowledge (Fägersten 2010:32), and they have no obligation to make their correspondence visible to the citizens of their home country. Diplomatic correspondence is hence freed from any observation by the public. This is therefore representing a kind of skewedness in the relation between the public and their foreign representatives working for the state officials since there is little or no insight in the work of the representatives.

Then again, secrecy must be supported by a reasonable logic. In general terms, secrecy is present because public insight in precarious foreign affairs would create distrust among the diplomats and also between the diplomats and who they represent. Therefore, in order to meet agreement in a difficult and international political context, it is preferable not to break confidentiality (Leguey-Feilleux 2009:8). It is therefore very reasonable that transparency in terms of public insight is obstructing this logic.

4.1.1 Secrecy

Considerable problems emerge when transferring political power from the national state to the international arena. Parts of sovereignty are transferred, meaning that the state and its representatives are internationalized, which can form a threat to parts of the traditional interpretation of the relationship between the state and democracy (Stenelo 1990:274ff). According to Stenelo, a precarious situation arises when demanding publicity in e.g. pending negotiations, as this would be deluding necessary trust between the negotiators. Several implications are addressed by Stenelo. First, one party of a negotiation will not state its intentions to the counterpart without assurances that the sensitive information will be handled with confidentiality (Gambetta 1988:216). If states want to engage in an international dialogue, confidentiality should be conformed to. Second, a driving mechanism for secret negotiation is effectiveness, or more specifically, that an effective negotiator has low tolerance for publicity. To seek public support in the negotiating process would heavily delay the outcome. Third, the fact that it is diplomats of various kinds and not the politicians that are responsible for the negotiation practices creates a shift in the power relation. For the officials to uphold this relation, anonymity is prone to be maintained. Secrecy is hence explained. (Stenelo 1990:302f) These rational arguments for discretion, confidentiality and anonymity all point towards the same logic; that the elite's work in certain cases is dependent on the principle of secrecy.

4.1.2 Transparency

As a general starting point from the perspective of transparency; "publicity is an essential element in every free form of government and if restricted too much, freedom will suffer" (Hecksher 1976:301, my translation). Freedom is circumscribed when officials handle foreign affairs in a traditional manner, which incorporates the principle of secrecy (Stenelo 1990:303). This represents a direct threat to democracy since the public has no insight in the affairs (Etzioni-Halevy 1985:303).

Also the concepts of responsibility and accountability are inherent here; secrecy seems to coexist with the freeing of political responsibility and by using secrecy, accountability is disabled. If the elite is undertaking e.g. corruption as a method, how can responsibility be exercised if the information describing the corruption is unknown to the public due to secrecy? Politicians can therefore have an interest in anonymizing or diffusing the distribution of responsibility. The ability to question officials with suspected wrongdoings will be disabled when secrecy is used. (Stenelo 1990:303ff)

A notion in modern and qualitative democracy is that vertical accountability must be complied with even between elections (Beetham 2005:36). Vertical in this sense describes the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Moreover, the notion of responsive linkage, or responsiveness, is accurate to use when discussing the relationship between the public and the elite. Responsiveness

means that the rulers should in some way or another respond to public demand. A violation of this aspect is when leaders are avoiding this responsive link by information control and corruptive behaviour (Powell Jr. 2005:72).

In sum, secrecy *should* be used when information must be exclusively reserved for the elite. Yet, secrecy *can* be used obscurely, i.e. to hide information that arguably should be known for the public. Unfortunately, such information was hidden in the disclosed correspondence. The crucial point to be made from this section is that the disadvantages of secrecy are the advantages of transparency and vice versa. This is true since they are opposing principles.

4.1.3 The dilemma between secrecy and transparency

Stephen Turner refers to Edward Shils who very accurately described the dilemma that demonstrates how

‘...perplexing and ultimately insoluble was the problem posed by the fact that liberal democracies, which were premised on open discussion, where nevertheless also forced to defend themselves and, in the course of doing so, to keep secrets’ (Shils (1956) in Turner 2003:6). The detailed measures governing secrecy cannot themselves be subject to public discussion, without making them ineffective. But if people in authority use the legal powers given to them to classify as ‘secrets’ things that ought properly to be part of genuine ‘government by discussion’, public discourse quickly becomes a sham, for all that is discussed is that which governmental secret-keepers permit to be discussed. (Turner 2003:6)

This citation puts, as stated above, secrecy and transparency in an insoluble dilemma, which points at the impossibility of choosing an obligatory action as emphasized by consequentialism. The valuation of openness on the one hand and the secrecy of the international political dialogue on the other are prone to be co-occurring (Stenelo 1990:307). Due to this insolubility, it is fruitful to study consequences in relation to the two segments (the elite and the public). In that way, twofold conclusions will be arrived at, instead of one solution to the dilemma.

Turner continues his reasoning when briefly discussing citizens’ *acceptance* of secrets as a reality coming from the phenomena of governing. The state secrets are not revealed and hence beyond public discussion. (Turner 2003:7) Being beyond such discussion, the political language is prone to be less sophisticated in confidential settings (Naurin 2007:19), which can explain informal language as shown in the diplomatic correspondence.

4.1.4 Whistle blowing

A last important notion to take into account is the aspect of whistle blowing since much of the journalistic debate is relating to this concept, and WikiLeaks is

sometimes described as a global whistle blowing organization. I would argue that this is not accurate. It was not WikiLeaks who stole the material, but instead Bradley Manning – the US soldier and security analyst, formerly stationed in Baghdad – who allegedly leaked the diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks (Thompson:48f).

According to Lundquist, it is the civil servant who must blow the whistle when disproportions occur (Lundquist 1998:72ff). Manning is thus the whistle blower. The civil servant has foremost three main ethical relations to consider; towards the law, towards the superior and towards the members of society (Lundquist 1988:172; 1991:45; 1998:106). It is therefore clear that Manning sidestepped the two first as he deemed it necessary to give public insight in the correspondence, in a form of *open* protest, (Lundquist 1998:110, 113) when leaking the material to WikiLeaks that disclosed it publicly. What is new in the case of WikiLeaks is that the organization has an aim not to expose the identity of the leaker, hence not risking the leaker to face trial.⁶ When looking at the whistle blowing at hand, the responsibility and the ethical relation to inform the public was only partly complied with, since not all the material was worth to be publicly open. This will be shown since not all of the disclosed material can be classed as disproportions or corruption.

⁶ The arrest of Manning is due to a tip from the former hacker Adrian Lamo to the US authorities.

5 Identifying classes of the disclosed material

This chapter will find several fundamental divisions, and several classes will thus be identified. When classifying, I will lend support from The New York Times' book "*Open Secrets*", edited by Alexander Star, where disclosed cables as well as a great journalistic debate are to be found. The classes are basically proposed due to their frequency in the book "*Open Secrets*". Much of the debate will be outlined in order to show certain properties of the material that will be of relevance when assigning the material to classes. The agreement between a class's definition and the properties of the disclosed material will be stated. Thus, classes are proposed by studying a limited part of the whole material, but material of any greater extent is not sorted under the classes. The classes I have identified are confidentiality, anonymity, informal language, realpolitik information, corruption and accountability.

5.1 Confidentiality

5.1.1 Definition

A "confidential report" is defined as a "secret document which must not be shown to others than a few named persons" (politicsdictionary.com).

5.1.2 The disclosed material

An important consideration is the status of the disclosed material. Regarding the 251,287 cables,

...many are unclassified, and none are marked 'top secret', the government's most secure communication status. But some 11,000 are classified 'secret', 9,000 are labelled 'noform', shorthand for material considered too delicate to be shared with any foreign government, and 4,000 are designated both secret and noform (Shane – Lehren 2010:56).

Despite differences in labelling, all disclosed correspondence are arguably confidential reports, the intent of which is to inform politicians in the home country, and it has no intent to be public information.

5.1.3 Agreement between definition and properties of the disclosed material

Due to the disclosing of confidential material there seems to be an indisputable agreement between the definition of confidentiality and the properties of the material. You do not need to search for properties in the material – it is the material in itself that has been labelled confidential. It is therefore fruitful to propose the class of confidentiality.

All the following classes are sub-classes to the violation of confidentiality. Without this violation, i.e. the disclosure of the diplomatic correspondence, no classes could have been proposed.

5.2 Anonymity

5.2.1 Definition

The concept of anonymity (or individual privacy) can be defined as “not having information about oneself revealed to others” (Kurian 2011: 1355). William Prosser identifies four violations of anonymity:

intrusion upon seclusion, such as eavesdropping; public disclosure of embarrassing facts; publicity that puts one in false light in the public’s eye; and appropriation of one’s name or likeness (Kurian 2011: 1355f).

5.2.2 The disclosed material

The disclosed information can be interpreted as damaging the diplomatic establishment (Shane – Lehren 2010:53) in terms of revealing the identity of civilian sources, the essential secrecy that is needed in the diplomatic correspondence is thus violated (Brisbane 2010:414). The statement from the White House in November 2010 was therefore rather predictable: “We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information” and adds the warning that this could “disrupt American operations abroad and put the work and even lives of confidential sources of American diplomats at risk” (Shane – Lehren 2010:53). Noting a risk for the diplomats’ confidential sources is a very relevant objection to make, as their names are seen in the disclosed material. Those who have had their anonymity revealed range from

foreign legislators and military officers to human rights activists and journalists, often with a warning to Washington: ‘Please protect’ or ‘Strictly protect’ (Shane – Lehren 2010:56).

5.2.3 Agreement between definition and properties of the disclosed material

Prosser's first example of violation of anonymity addresses how the material is acquired. Although the disclosed material was not acquired with the method of eavesdropping as suggested in the definition, the material was acquired through an illegal way since Manning leaked confidential information to WikiLeaks without authorization. Prosser's second example of violation, that of public disclosure of embarrassing facts, and third example of violation, that of putting one in false light in the public's eye, are present. The disclosed facts of this kind are not merely embarrassing but directly threatening to the civilian sources. They gave information to the American diplomats with assurances that their anonymity would be protected. Civilian sources' security is, when living in an oppressive regime, threatened because of the disclosing of their identity. Prosser's fourth example of violation, that of appropriation of one's name, is also present. The names of the civilian sources were appropriated by WikiLeaks since the information was acquired through Manning's unauthorized leak.

This shows that there is agreement between the definition of anonymity and the information in the disclosed material and that it is fruitful to propose the class of anonymity.

5.3 Informal language

5.3.1 Definition

Informal language is defined as language or style is what is used in casual conversation. It is used in writing only when there is a personal or intimate relationship. (englishplus.com)

5.3.2 The disclosed material

When describing how parts of the material are written, critics say that the purpose of the disclosures is to "humiliate the United States with embarrassing assessments of world leaders rather than inform the public of gross misbehaviour" (Cohen 2010:219; Sanger: 336). An often-cited informal simile is when an ambassador compared Vladimir V. Putin and Dmitri A. Medvedev to Batman and Robin (Cohen 2010:220). One could ask what added value this disclosed information gives to the public, more than a form of entertaining reading. Diplomatic talks in-between important decision-makings are not always very formal or correct and the correspondence between the US State Department and its foreign missions should not be any exception, or as Tunku Varadarajan puts it:

Diplomacy, to work at all effectively, must draw a line between the ‘consultative process’ and the ‘work product’. This is but part of the human condition: Human beings need to consult, speculate, brainstorm, argue with each other – yes, even to gossip and say dopey things – in order to find their way through the difficult task of coming to an official, or publicly stated position which then be open (legitimately) to criticism. (Cohen 2010:219)

5.3.3 Agreement between definition and properties of the disclosed material

Informal language in the correspondence is present since this is debated by the journalists. The above stated informal simile is representing such language. It is fruitful to propose the class of informal language, as there is agreement between the definition of informal language and properties of the disclosed material.

5.4 Realpolitik information

5.4.1 Definition

Realpolitik is defined as

politics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean “real” in the English sense but rather connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to things as they are. Realpolitik thus suggests a pragmatic, no-nonsense view and a disregard for ethical considerations. In diplomacy it is often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest. (britannica.com)

Realpolitik also sees the state as an end in itself with an absolute notion of sovereignty and understands military power as an important tool when solving security issues (Peterson 1984). Realpolitik information in foreign relations could therefore be interpreted as information dealing with hard and realistic facts about foreign activity that are of concern to the home country.

5.4.2 The disclosed material

A certain set of the disclosed information are insights in sensitive affairs. The journalistic articles, based on disclosed correspondence, deal with; Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities (Mazzetti – Broad 2010:71), the political instability in Iraq (Gordon 2010:74), Al-Qaeda’s and USA’s involvement in Yemen (Shane 2010:80), former president Mubarak’s leadership in Egypt (Landler – Lehren 2011:96), alleged top-level corruption in Afghanistan (Shane et. al. 2010:100), China’s boycott of the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, (when the prize was awarded

the dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010) (Wines 2010:123), the NATO-Poland defence plan regarding a missile shield that would protect eastern Europe (Shane 2010b:145), a secret arms-sale to the recently independent state of South Sudan (Gettleman – Gordon 2010:160), difficulties of closing the Guantánamo Bay prison (Savage – Lehren 2010:176) etc. The above excerpts demonstrate both the type and variety of political sensitiveness that these issues can be ascribed to.⁷ In order to provide analytic substance, I will refer to material that deals with the fighting of Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the closing of Guantanamo Bay prison.

According to Scott Shane, the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is dependent on an accommodating approach towards US interests of counterterrorist operations within Yemeni borders. I will here describe the reason for this. An initial incident was when Yemeni “militants sent off printer cartridges packed with explosives to Chicago.” Although the attack was not completed, it started intense counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries, when fighting AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula). Saleh applied for US military support by stating that “if you don’t help us, this country will become worse than Somalia,” referring to the “high poverty rate and illicit arms flow in both Yemen and Somalia”. (Shane 2010:80f) Also, a sophisticated armed robbery, with alleged inside help, on a “Arab Limited Bank truck carrying 100 million riyals (equivalent to \$500,000) in Aden on August 17 in a highly coordinated attack that many suspect was the work of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives” (Confidential cable, Embassy of Sanaa 2009:463), gives support to the urgency of counterterrorism operation against AQAP.

The US interests in Yemen do not end with fighting Al-Qaeda. The closing down of the Guantánamo Bay prison has created a long-term problem because USA cannot rely on the security situation in Yemen, the country that has the majority of imprisoned citizens still in Guantánamo. Handing over prisoners to Yemen without adequate security assurances would not be a reasonable solution. For this security situation to improve, it is argued that AQAP and other Islamic extremist affiliates need to be battled. Saleh therefore offered a bargain to John O. Brennan, President Barack Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, and “insisted that Yemen’s national territory is available for unilateral CT [counterterrorism] operations by the US”, with the catch that if any western targets were attacked, it would not be his fault. Further, the US strikes in Yemen were disguised as Yemeni strikes and “US munitions found at the sites [...] could be explained away as equipment purchased from the US”. (Shane 2010:80ff)

⁷ For a full review, see Star 2011, Part Three.

5.4.3 Agreement between definition and the disclosed material

This clearly shows hard facts in US foreign affairs, in which the public now are given insight due to WikiLeaks' disclosures. The articles deal with hard facts about military and security situations all around the world. Because of the inadequate security situation in Yemen, it is impossible to hand over prisoners from Guatánamo. Due to Obama's aim to empty and close the prison, keeping the prisoners represents a pragmatic policy based on the lack of security in Yemen. There is therefore agreement in the definition of realpolitik information and the properties of the disclosed material. It is therefore fruitful to propose the class of realpolitik information.

5.5 Corruption

5.5.1 Definition

The Encyclopedia of Political Science states that "there is no universally agreed upon definition of corruption", but that "most definitions of corruption emphasize the abuse of public power or resources for private benefit" (Kurian 2011:341).

This definition is useful, but one aspect should be addressed. I interpret the word "private" in two different ways. First, it can be seen as a synonym to individual, and second it can be a synonym to the private sector.

5.5.2 The disclosed material

The disclosed material deals with suspected corruption in the global jet market⁸ (Lipton et. al. 2011:196). Lipton describes this market as a sales war between American diplomats and their European counterparts when marketing Boeing respective Airbus.

This is the high-stakes, international bazaar for large commercial jets, where tens of billions of dollars are on the line, along with hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs. (Lipton et. al. 2011:196)

⁸ For more examples, see Lipton et. al. 2011: 196ff; and Confidential cable, Embassy of Manama 2008:499.

A sales deal between Boeing and Saudi Arabia was signed after the involvement of former US president George W. Bush and with assurances that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia could have “all the technology that his friend, President Bush, had on Air Force One” (Lipton et. al. 2011:198). Eventually, a State Department spokesman confirmed the upgrading of King Abdullah’s plane for security reasons, without discussing specifics” (Lipton et. al. 2011:198). Due to a trade agreement stating that politics must be removed from the jet market (Lipton et. al. 2011:197), this should be considered as violating the trade agreement.

5.5.3 Agreement between definition and the disclosed material

With former president Bush’s abuse of political power, and when providing assurances that King Abdullah could have the same technology as in Air Force One, the deal was signed. Since politics was used to sign the deal, I interpret this as corruption was present in this affair. There is therefore agreement in the definition of corruption and the properties of the disclosed material. It is therefore in order to propose the class of corruption.

5.6 Accountability

5.6.1 Definition

The Encyclopedia of Political Science defines accountability as the following:

In political science, the term accountability refers to an actor’s acknowledgement and assumption of responsibilities specific to a role – including the responsibility to report and justify the consequences of actions taken within the scope of the role – and the existence of sanctions for failing to meet these responsibilities (Kurian 2011:5).

The same encyclopedia points out that accountability constitutes of answerability which

involves the ability to ask actors about (1) what they have done and (2) why they have done so. In other words, there is an informational dimension as well as an argumentative dimension to answerability. Both dimensions of answerability require accurate information and are improved by transparency of actions. (Kurian 2011:5)

5.6.2 The disclosed material

As suggested by the previous citation, the information on corruption was provided by transparency, i.e. public insight in the material. Otherwise, the corruption

would obviously not have been known. Thus, accountability can be exercised because of transparency. Without the corruption itself, accountability could not have been enabled. Since it is logical that both corruption and transparency are needed to enable and exercise accountability, this is (in terms of methodological classification structure) forming a sub-class to that of corruption.

The material that has agreeing properties to the definition of accountability is all such behaviour that fails to meet the responsibilities of a role. When corruption is revealed in the jet-market, this represents such properties, and can thus be sorted under the class of corruption. Accountability is not something to be found in the diplomatic correspondence, but something that can be exercised when responsibilities are not met.

5.6.3 Agreement between definition and the disclosed material

In this study, information on corruption represents material that enables accountability. Also, political involvement in the promoting of jet-sales is, according to Lipton, a violation of an international trade agreement. The responsibility not to undertake such political promotion of Boeing was violated. There is therefore agreement in the definition of accountability and the properties of the disclosed material. It is therefore accurate to propose the class of accountability.

5.7 The classification

The classification that can be proposed after studying the disclosed material is as follows:

- Confidentiality
 - Anonymity
 - Informal language
 - Realpolitikal information
 - Corruption
 - Accountability

The highest class is confidentiality. All of the following classes are dependent on the fact that confidentiality is violated, and are therefore sub-classes. In the same way, accountability is in this study seen as dependent on insights in corruption. Accountability is therefore also a sub-class of corruption.

6 The consequences

6.1 Consequences of violating confidentiality

The most obvious consequence is that the public now has insight in the diplomatic material, and that this violation is the cause of the whole disclosure. Violating the diplomatic confidentiality is, as shown above, a threat to trust and effectiveness. If diplomatic correspondence was transparent, the willingness of diplomats to correspond sensitive information would be lowered. Information that is essential to be kept secret for a counterpart could not be corresponded to the home country due to fear that the correspondence risk to be known to the counterpart. If it is of relevance for the politicians in one state to get the information their diplomats want to correspond – but it is also of relevance not to share this information with other states – this information must be kept secret. Without confidentiality, this form of providing information would not be secure and its effectiveness none.

Yet, the disclosed correspondence was labelled with a lower level of confidentiality than the most secure one, namely “top secret”. This may be the reason why, as debated by NYT’s journalists, the correspondence as a whole hardly could be criticized. Or as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated:

What you see are diplomats doing the work of diplomacy: reporting and analyzing and providing information, solving problems, worrying about big, complex challenges (Landler 2010:216).

If top secret correspondence was revealed, this could have contained more precarious information.

6.2 Consequences of violating anonymity

The State Department has sent hundreds of warnings to civilians named in the cables “and has moved a handful of them to safer locations” US officials say that they are not aware of any civilian “who has been attacked or imprisoned as a direct result of information in the 2,700 cables that have been made public to date” (6th of January 2011) but that precautions are needed as “many dissidents are under constant harassment from their governments, so it is difficult to be certain of cause of actions against them.” (Landler – Shane 2011:241). Also, tendencies are noted that people in Afghanistan and Pakistan are now more

reluctant to speak with human rights organizations from fear of being quoted (Landler – Shane 2011:242).

A reasonable effect could be “closing doors to United States diplomats, turning candor to reticence and leaving many people leery of baring their souls and secrets to American officials” (Cowell 2010:212). If true, this would in fact have an impact on America’s diplomatic life, as essential secrecy would be absent (Harshaw:406). Civilian sources, if not anonymous, could be an easy target for those who have an interest in disrupting the information flow to American diplomats. Due to this logic, critics claim that it is irresponsible by WikiLeaks not to protect civilian sources with anonymity in the disclosures.

Additionally, the State Department is concerned by the long-term undertaking of dealing with the disclosure’s consequences. The material that hitherto (6th of January 2011) has not been published by WikiLeaks is composed of 99 percent of the 251,287 cables obtained by the organization and

with cables continuing to trickle out,[...] protecting those identified will be a complex, delicate and long-term undertaking. The State Department said it had combed through a majority of the quarter-million cables and distributed many to embassies for review by diplomats there. (Landler – Shane 2011:241)

6.3 Consequences of insights in informal language

Informal language is nothing remarkable and these insights should not have any damaging consequences. Instead, it is not surprising that informal language is seen in the correspondence, since this is communicated within a zone of privacy (Cohen 2010:219). Due to this logic, WikiLeaks has revealed material that has no real informational purpose regarding misbehaviour (Leigh – Harding 2011a:143; Leigh – Harding 2011b:210). Of course, one could argue that what WikiLeaks has done is mainly to disclose informal correspondence at the price of the disruption of the essential zone of privacy. Humiliation of those who spoke with informal language may be a consequence, entertaining reading another.

6.4 Consequences of disclosing realpolitikal information

This class of information deals with US military conduct in Yemen. Therefore, such information should be exclusively reserved for the politicians and the diplomats. Otherwise, insights in US military operations will be attainable by the enemy and the consequence of such knowing would be giving an advantage to the enemy.

Realpolitik, i.e. hard facts and elite pragmatism to handle these facts is dependent on secrecy. When Yemeni militants sent off explosives to Chicago, this made the US security situation urgent, in addition to the plan of handing over Yemeni prisoners from Guantánamo which was dependent on an improved security situation in Yemen. Likewise, Saleh have had a precarious security situation in Yemen for a long time, due to terrorist activities. Therefore, the pragmatic approach would be to cooperate with the US in the counterterrorist operation in Yemen. If the US president openly proposed military actions in Yemen, in addition to those in Iraq and Afghanistan, this would probably be met with harsh critique by the US war-wearied public. For Saleh, to expose the cooperation with the world's military superpower, this would reveal his shortcomings in the battling of terrorism in Yemen and would probably damage his legitimacy. Therefore, the politicians in both countries had an interest in cooperation and the hiding of this activity and hence should the information on the activities be secret. The elite's pragmatic manoeuvrability would probably have been hampered if this kind of activity was publicly open. The public could oppose such activities, thus is secrecy a pragmatic tool when dealing with difficult situations.

6.5 Consequences of disclosing corruption

Who benefitted from the upgrading of King Abdullah's plane? As cited by Lipton, the benefits from a sales deal are billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of high paying jobs. Therefore, the signing of a sales deal must be highly favourable because it benefits the company that wins the deal. Also, because of the creation of jobs, it is beneficial for the country that wins the deal. It is therefore of great interest for both the company of Boeing and the state of USA to win the deal. Abdullah was of course aware of the good consequences of winning a sales deal, and he could therefore propose to be given a bribe.

If you consider qualitative democracy, that the leaders must be held accountable for their actions, this secrecy that hid the corruption worked as a tool for disabling accountability. The ability to exercise accountability against public leaders is thus lowering the willingness to be a part of corruption. Why should you act corruptively if you think that this activity eventually will be revealed?

6.6 Enabling accountability

Politicians and diplomats should be held accountable for corruptive behaviour. Since transparency enabled accountability, transparency would probably lower the willingness to engage in corruption. If politicians are involved in corruption they are in fact risking their legitimacy and if it is likely that this eventually will be

revealed, the willingness of taking such a risk would be lowered. Enabling accountability is a consequence in itself and is thus, as this study proposed above, a sub-class to that of revealed corruption.

7 Conclusions

Based on the discussion on probable consequences, my findings are illustrated in their essential form in the ten field matrix below. The reason why accountability does not have a column is because this is a consequence of the disclosing of corruption.

	Consequences of violating confidentiality	Consequences of violating anonymity	Consequences of insights in informal language	Consequences of disclosing realpolitikal information	Consequences of disclosing corruption
The elite	The material is no longer exclusively reserved for the elite.	Workload to protect civilian sources is created.	Entertaining reading. No real informational consequences.	Pragmatic manoeuvrability is hampered.	Accountability is enabled.
The public	Public insight in the material is enabled.	People become reluctant to provide diplomats with sensitive information.	Entertaining reading. No real informational consequences.	Possibility to oppose the elite's activities.	The public can demand that the elite is held accountable.

Due to the fact that the disclosed material can be structured in several classes, one overall consequence cannot be presented, but instead several consequences. By presenting the above matrix, my aim is not to say that correspondences can be indisputably structured. In a scientifically ideal world, this would be the case. The relevance of providing an analytic matrix is to gain and structure understanding. Although this matrix is not problematizing my conclusions, arriving at these conclusions through the study's dilemma was in itself problematizing.

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