

# The European Energy Policy

Framing of Energy Security in the European Union

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# Abstract

At the turn of the century a new situation on the international energy market emerged and the European Union is now facing a growing number of energy challenges. Climate change, import dependency, growing global competition for energy supplies and increasing risks of energy supply disruptions has made energy security the dominant element of European energy policy. The demand for a common European approach on energy has consistently been rising. However, the EU has difficulties to form a European energy policy, evident by the increasing number of infringement proceedings and the sustained fragmentation of the European energy markets. These developments show that there are considerably diverging perceptions of energy security in the EU. This thesis analyzes the development of the European energy policy between 2004 and 2010 and how energy security has been perceived in the EU. By using qualitative frame analysis to study official documents from the three main institutions, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council, the study identifies seven divergent frames of energy security within the EU. Finally, a discussion of the analysis shows that the different branches of new institutionalism offer important insights in explaining the institutions' framing of energy security.

Keywords: European energy policy, energy security, frame analysis, policy framing, new institutionalism

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# 1. Introduction

"I have described energy policy as the next great European integration project. And it's not hard to see why. A safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy supply is key to our economic and strategic interests as a global player." (Barroso 2011: 1)

The statement by the president of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, does not only express the importance of a common European energy policy, but also demonstrates the paradox of energy policy within Europe's integration project. Energy policy appeared to be a prominent feature of European integration by the early institutions of the European Community. Yet, the coming decades would be characterized by limited integration of national energy markets and difficulties in creating a common European energy policy (Buchan 2009: 6-7).

It was not until the late 1980's that discussions of a European energy policy appeared. The discussions were mainly within the context of environment policy and the emerging internal market, focusing on privatization and liberalization of national energy markets. However, during the last decade the European Union (EU) has been facing a growing number of energy challenges. The EU's internal energy production has decreased significantly while energy consumption has increased. The EU has become dependent on imported energy supplies from a limited number of producing countries, mainly located in increasingly instable regions. These developments have made the EU vulnerable to price fluctuations and energy disruptions. The growing threat of climate change has also added new challenges for Europe to create a sustainable European energy sector. Security of a sustainable and affordable supply of energy has become the main issue on Europe's energy agenda.

It has continuously been recognized that the EU need to form a common energy policy in order to cope with the new challenges that its member states face. However, the large differences between member states' energy markets, energy policies and level of import dependency have made coordination and integration of national energy sectors difficult. The enlargements of the EU increased the difficulties further by including twelve new member states with considerably less developed energy sectors (Neuman 2010). Energy security has now become the dominant element of European energy policy, but the EU has been characterized by divergent and conflicting opinions of energy security. Member states have conflicting perceptions of their energy security, which has affected their issue definition within the European energy policy (Pointvogl 2009). Inter- and intrainstitutional conflicts about diverging perceptions of energy security have also appeared within the EU, which has slowed down the development of a European energy policy. (Natortschi, & Herranz Surrallés 2008).

The growing importance of energy, and especially energy security, within Europe has also become apparent by the increasing number of studies and analyses of the European energy

sector. The shortcomings of the European energy market and the limited success of EU's energy initiatives have made both politicians and scholars call for a new direction of the Union's energy policy. The EU's market oriented approach towards energy has had limited success and instead calls for a more geopolitical approach have been called for.

## 1.1 Scope and aim of the study

The developments during the last decade within the European and international energy markets have created new energy challenges for Europe. The limited success of EU's market oriented approach towards energy and the growing importance of energy security, have increased the pressure to form a common energy policy. Yet, the development of a European energy policy has been slow and been characterized by conflicting opinions of different actors. This has been especially apparent in the aspect of energy security, where perceptions and interests have been especially divergent. How actors have defined and communicated, also called framed<sup>1</sup>, energy security have a major aspect of energy discussion within the EU.

Considering the importance of a common European energy policy, it is interesting to analyse how the EU's energy policies have developed during the last decade. In order to analyze the changes within the EU's energy policy, it is clearly important to identify how energy security has been perceived within the EU. Therefore, this paper raises the question of *how the EU's perceptions of energy security have evolved during the period 2004-2010*. In order to identify different perceptions of energy security the paper will clarify *how energy security has been framed within EU's energy policy*. Finally, the identified frames will be discussed, based on an institutionalistic framework, in order to explain *why actors in the European energy policy have framed energy security in certain way*.

## 1.2 Delimitation of the study

The study is delimited to cover the period from 2004 to 2010. This period has been chosen because a number of developments occurred during these years, which have significantly changed the condition of the EU's energy security.

The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 expanded the EU both economically and geographically, giving the Union new immediate neighbours. The new members' energy situations are characterized by high import dependency, comparatively poor developed energy sectors, which have in many ways worsened the EU's energy security. The period also includes several events which affected the EU and its member states' energy policies and relations with energy exporting countries. A number of gas disputes, between Ukraine and Russia, have arisen during this period which affected the energy supply to large parts of Europe. The most significant ones appeared in 2006 and late 2009, and exposed the EU's vulnerability to energy disruptions. The EU's relation with Russia, its main energy supplier, experienced instabilities

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of frame and policy framing is presented in section 4.1.

during this period, e.g. during the South Ossetia conflict in 2008, which has affected energy discussions in the EU.

In order to identify how energy security has been framed within the EU, the study will focus on the three main EU institutions: the Commission of the European Communities<sup>2</sup>, the Council of the European Union<sup>3</sup> and the European Parliament. These actors constitute the main decision-making bodies within the EU, but one should point out that European energy policy is characterized by a growing number of relevant actors<sup>4</sup>. The institutions will be treated as actors within the institutional framework of the European energy policy. Note that the study will not focus on individual member states or party groups, within the European Parliament, even though these actors may indeed influence the development of the EU's energy policy.

### 1.3 Outline of the paper

The paper sets out a brief background of how the EU's energy policy has developed, followed by an account of how energy security has emerged as an increasingly problematic issue for the creation of a coherent European energy policy. Chapter three introduces the theoretical framework and chapter four describes the methodology, frame analysis, which will be applied for the analysis. The empirical findings of the study are put forward in chapter five to seven. Here, the main findings of the frame analysis are presented. In the concluding chapter the main policy frames of energy security are outlined and the main findings are further discussed.

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<sup>2</sup> From now on referred to as the Commission.

<sup>3</sup> From now on referred to as the European Council.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. energy consumers, energy companies, states and oil cartels.

## 2. The emergence of an EU energy policy

This chapter begins with a brief description of the early developments of the EU's energy policy and how energy security has become the primary energy issue for the EU. Finally, it will present an overview of the current energy framework within the EU.

### 2.1 The first signs of European energy cooperation

Energy policy has traditionally been rather insignificant within the European integration process, despite the paradox that two of the founding treaties concerned energy. Even though two of the founding treaties, the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and the Euratom Treaty of 1957, concerned two of Europe's main energy sources it did not lead to any progress towards a common energy policy (Matlary 1997: 14-15, 19). The 1973 oil-crisis revealed the weaknesses of Europe's energy policies, which increased cooperation somewhat by the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA). However, the European Community failed again to gain a momentum for a common energy policy, much due to the member states' refusal to concede any sovereignty over their energy sectors (De Jong 2009: 96-97). The development of a European energy policy can instead be seen as an organic process, a slow progress often running ahead of treaty clauses (Buchan 2009: 7). Policy-makers mainly used legal competences from the economic and environmental parts of the treaties in order to push for common energy initiatives (McGowan 1996: 6). Andersen means that the Commission's ability to introduce energy initiatives "from the side", made it the main driver for a common energy policy (Andersen 2001: 119-120).

It was not until the 1986 Single European Act that the economic importance of energy was acknowledged within the European integration process. Decision-makers realized that a freer European energy market was necessary for a functioning Single Market (Matlary 1997: 20-21). The first real breakthrough in integrating national energy policies was established by the Maastricht Treaty, where the EU set out on a course of liberalization of the European electricity and gas markets (Buchan 2009: 21-22). Yet, at the turn of the century the liberalization process had slowed down significantly because of changes in the international energy market (De Jong & van der Linde 2008: 6).

The last decade has been characterized by an increasing number of energy challenges in what Müller-Kraener calls "the double energy crisis". Limited availability of internal energy resources and growing energy consumption has made the EU increasingly dependent on energy imports. Simultaneously, the limited ability of the atmosphere to withstand increased GHG emissions have put further pressure to develop a sustainable European energy sector (Müller-Kraener 2008: 17-18). Energy security has emerged as the primary challenge for Europe's energy policy.

## 2.2 European energy security

Energy has increasingly been identified as a security issue within the EU. High and volatile oil prices and growing energy demand coupled with increasingly unreliable supply of energy made Europe consider energy supply and sustainability in terms of security (Natarski & Surrallés 2008: 72). The partial success of pushing towards more liberalized European energy markets and the optimism of a common energy policy were soon replaced by a time of vulnerability and instability in the European energy markets. (Larsson 2007: 47).

### 2.2.1 The changed European energy situation

The 1990s had offered favorable conditions for member states to support the Commission's market-oriented approach, through low energy prices, plentiful of European oil and gas reserves and healthy competition between several energy exporting countries, and gave confidence to the market's ability to ensure reasonable energy prices and security of supply (De Jong 2009: 98-99). However, during the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the situation of the European energy markets would change dramatically.

First, European oil and gas reserves were quickly depleting, while investment in energy infrastructure decreased and energy consumption grew, making EU increasingly dependent on energy imports (Umbach 2010: 1230-1231). Secondly, the post-9/11 effects and the increasingly troublesome political situation in many supply countries increased the instability of the international energy market (Larsson 2007: 45-47). Simultaneously new dominant economies such as China and India emerged and increased the global demand of energy supplies significantly (De Jong & van der Linde 2008: 3-4). The international energy market experienced a structural shift from a "buyers' market", where suppliers compete for buyers, to a "sellers' market", where buyers compete for suppliers (Van der Linde 2007: 285-286). The new situation on the international energy market made energy prices grow and the EU's dependence on third countries for energy supplies increased.

Simultaneously, climate change became one of the most urgent issues on the political agenda, making sustainability of energy production a growing security issue for Europe. Considering the fact that energy is one of the most polluting sectors of the European economy, the need for an integrated energy and climate policy became increasingly urgent (Adelle et.al 2009: 38).

### 2.2.2 European import dependency and vulnerability

While the sustainability of Europe's energy sector has become urgent issues for the EU, the increasing import dependency has gained increased attention in the EU. The EU is the world's third largest energy consumer (Wood 2010: 308) and the primary energy consumption grew by ten percent between 1990 and 2005. The primary energy demand in the EU is predicted to grow by 11 percent until 2030 due to economic growth (IEA 2008: 22-23). In 2008, EU27 energy dependency was 54 percent, but is expected to reach 64 percent in 2020 and 67 percent

in 2030. Dependence on oil imports will continue to be the highest, reaching 95 percent in 2030, while reliance on gas imports is predicted to rise from 62 percent to 84 percent in 2030 (Eurostat 2011: 26, 32, IEA 2008: 19). The primary origin countries of its energy imports are Russia, Norway, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Libya and in 2008 over one third of the EU's gas imports came from Russia, who also has become EU's primary supplier of both oil and gas (Eurostat 2011: 38, 40-41).

The EU's import dependence is not in itself a security issue, since a steady supply of energy could be achieved from energy exporting countries (Neuman 2010: 344). However, the worrying political developments in many energy rich countries, with the exception of Norway, have made several energy exporting countries unreliable and unpredictable sources of energy supplies (Larsson 2007: 33). Political, economical and ethnical conflicts in energy exporting countries may cause supply interruptions to Europe and hamper necessary investments in energy infrastructure. Energy industries in most exporting countries are subject to extensive governmental control which adds to the fear that energy can increasingly be used as a political weapon (Checchi et.al. 2009: 3). The main issue of security of energy supply is clearly not availability, but access.

The political developments in Russia towards a more authoritarian political system have strained the EU's relation with its main energy supplier. Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas company, is today the dominating actor on the European gas market and has become an important tool in Russia's foreign policy (Youngs 2009: 79-84). European policy-makers have become increasingly critical to Gazprom's dominance on the European gas market, pushing diversifying European energy imports (Wood 2010: 314). Simultaneously, the unstable situation in the Middle East has increased the instability of the international energy market. Consequently, the Middle East and North African regions have increasingly been considered unreliable energy suppliers (Gupta 2008: 207-208).

Import dependence of energy supplies is clearly one of the most urgent security issues, as declared by the EU in its European Security Strategy. (European Council 2003: 3) However, import dependency does not alone constitute the EU's vulnerability to energy shortages or energy crises. Checchi (2009) points out that the EU faces several internal security risks and vulnerabilities. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have increased the EU's import dependency further, since most of the new member states are extremely dependent on energy imports and have poorly developed energy sectors. Several studies have identified a clear division between old and new member states in the level of vulnerability to supply disruptions, where the majority of the old member states have a comparatively lower level of vulnerability (Gnansounou 2008, Neumann 2010). In the case of import dependency, there is no clear division between the old and new member states (Eurostat 2011: 27). Instead, the level of energy intensity, the national energy consumption in relation to GDP, is clearly dividing the EU member states. All the 12 new member states have higher energy intensity than the old member states, making them considerably more vulnerable to supply disruptions (Ibid: 35). Furthermore, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have distinct shortcomings in their respective energy sectors. Their energy mix is considerably less diversified both in the case of energy resources and supply countries, making several

especially reliant on Russian gas supplies compared to their western counterparts (Neuman 2010).

### 2.2.3 Europe's dependency solution: Market or Geopolitics?

The increased vulnerability of the European energy sector and the EU's failure to secure reliable supplies of energy, evident by the gas crises, triggered a discussion about what direction the EU's external energy policy should head towards. The Clingendael International Energy Programme (2004) initiated a wide debate on the future of the EU's energy policy by presenting a number of potential scenarios of Europe's future energy sector. Since the report, several scholars have argued for either a *market/institution* approach, based on promoting liberalisation of third country energy markets and energy governance through multilateral institutions, or for a more *geopolitical* approach, based on strategic relations with important energy exporting and transit countries.

The EU has predominantly been embedded in a market/institution approach. Baumann has been the main advocate for continuing this approach, arguing that energy governance based on multilateral agreements is the only way to guarantee long-term security of supply. Energy relations need to be depoliticized and international agreements must create an understanding of the collective energy security, leading to steady energy flows based on market principles (Baumann 2010: 91-94). Larsson concurs by emphasizing the interdependence of the international energy market and argues that while not ignoring the many geopolitical aspects on energy security, the EU must promote better transparency, and non-discrimination in international trade relations (Larson 2007: 23). Westphal argues similarly by highlighting the interdependence of international energy market, where exporters are dependent on stable demands and importers dependent on stable supply. This requires a holistic approach towards the energy, based on economic, political and socio-cultural cooperation in multilateral initiatives to agree on common energy regimes (Westphal 2006: 59-60).

Other scholars have argued for a more geopolitical and strategic approach by the EU. Mane-Estrada argues that the EU's market/institution approach is unsound and will not improve energy security. The reluctance of Russia, and other energy exporting countries, to open up their energy market for European competition have made the EU's market approach weak and unable to secure reliable energy supply or lower energy prices. Instead, a more geopolitical approach is needed, in creating what Mane-Estrada calls a "European geo-energy space", based on regional and bilateral agreements between the EU and key producer and transit countries (Mane-Estrada 2006: 3784-3785). Youngs (2007) argues that the combination of internal differences within the EU and producer states' resistance to a market approach increases the incentives of bilateral and more strategic relations (Youngs 2007: 15).

## 2.3 The energy triangle

Politicians have insisted that the current energy challenges require a common European response. Consequently, a range of energy directives and policies have been adopted by the

EU in recent years, creating a framework containing what has been termed *the European energy triangle* (De Jong & Weeda 2007: 51). The triangle is based on three dimensions, related to the EU's three main energy objectives: sustainability, the internal energy market<sup>5</sup> and security of supply.

The issue of energy security stretches through all three elements of the EU's energy policy, and the EU has consistently argued for a balanced approach between the different dimensions. However, Buchan (2009) argues that the dimensions are in many ways conflicting. For example, there is clear trade-off for member states between the sustainability and the security of supply dimensions. In order to become less dependent on unreliable energy imports many member states turn to their indigenous energy resources, often consisting of coal resources, which put further pressure on the environment (Buchan 2009: 16-19).

### 2.3.1 Sustainability

The environmental dimension of the European energy policy was developed early, since environmental provisions were used to lead the integration of energy policies. The main issue has been to integrate the EU's climate policy with its energy policy. Adelle et.al argue that the EU has had problems to develop an integrated climate and energy policy, since the trade-off between energy security and energy sustainability has been problematic. However, the EU made significant progress in 2007 when it endorsed the climate targets which now dominates Europe's sustainability policy (Adelle et.al. 2009:50-51). Energy efficiency, promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) and the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are the cornerstones of the EU's sustainability dimension (Wood 2010: 312). Buchan finally concludes that climate change will and should dominate Europe's energy agenda, simply because of the momentum from past commitments (Buchan 2009: 212).

### 2.3.2 The internal energy market

The EU's aim of increasing competitiveness in the European energy sector has mainly consisted of developing a common European energy market, based on competition, transparency and openness. The EU has focused specifically to create a European electricity and gas market based on three energy packages. The first package was adopted in the late 1990's and mainly consisted of a gas directive and an electricity directive in order to privatize and liberalize national energy markets. However, the changing environment in the international energy market made several member states question the effects of liberalization and privatization on Europe's ability to ensure low energy prices and reliable energy supply. The development of a European energy market has been slow (De Jong & van der Linde 2008). Two additional energy packages were adopted in 2003 and 2007, which pushed for new liberalization efforts. However, the current European energy market is still dominated by fragmentation, government supported national champions and national price regulations.

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<sup>5</sup> Often referred to as competitiveness.

### 2.3.3 Security of supply

Security of supply is the latest dimension of the EU's energy policy. The EU's high dependency on energy imports and the effects of the gas disruptions in recent years, has made supply security the most dominant dimension of European energy policy. Wood even argues that: "when we talk about European energy policy, security of supply is today our foremost concern" (Wood 2010: 307).

The EU began to acknowledge the issue of security of supply in 2000, with the Commission's Green Paper on security of supply. The Commission focused mainly on the internal aspect of security of supply by arguing for internal measures to decrease import dependency, through a demand-driven energy policy. Decreasing energy demand, by energy efficiency measures, promotion of RES and improved diversification of energy sources, would reduce the EU's import dependency (De Jong & van der Linde 2008: 4). After having experienced a number of energy supply disruptions in recent year, the EU has instead focused on the external aspect of securing energy supply. Energy has become a priority area of the EU's external energy policy and Youngs (2007) argues that security of supply is today virtually the external dimension of the European energy policy.

The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), established in the 1990's, early became one of the main cornerstones of the EU's external energy policy. The ECT is a multilateral agreement and includes provisions on protection of foreign energy investments, non-discriminatory trade of energy and dispute resolution measures. However, while more than fifty countries have signed the treaty some governments have not ratified its content, e.g. Russia, which has undermined the status of the ECT (Larsson 2007: 25). The importance of energy has also been evident in other elements of the EU's external relations. Energy provision has increasingly been included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and in energy agreements with major producing, transit and consuming countries (Youngs 2007: 3-4).

### 3. Theory

Energy security has increasingly become a dominant concept within the EU. However, energy has traditionally not been a central term within security discussion. Though, with the broadened security concept, energy has increasingly been related to security issues. Hence, this chapter will first discuss the broadened concept of security, the concept of energy security and how framing of energy security has increasingly become important. The chapter will then present the theoretical basis of institutionalism, which will later be used to analyze why actors choose to frame energy security in a specific way. Finally, a brief summary of the theoretical framework will be presented, which will be used as basis when analyzing and discussing the result of the study.

#### 3.1 The broadened security concept and energy security

Traditional perspectives of security within international relations have mainly been based on two concepts; the dominant element of security is military relations, and the state as the central actor in security matters (Terriff et al. 1999: 38-39). After the end of the cold war several new approaches, such as critical theorists, emerged and argued that the traditional security perspective was inadequate and too narrow to reflect the international system (Collins 2007: 54-56). The security concept needed to be broadened in order to deal with the “rising density” of the international arena, with increasing globalisation and interdependence (Sheehan 2005: 47-48). The most significant contributions for the broadening of the security concept came from Buzan (2007) and the Copenhagen school (Buzan et al. 1998). The security concept was broadened in two ways; by introducing new sectors related to security threats and adding new levels of which security could be relevant (Sheehan 2005: 47). Security could not only be considered through a national approach, which merely identified military matters as security issues. In reality, people are affected by security threats from several sectors of society, in which individuals, states and the international system play different parts (Buzan 2007: 288-289).

Buzan presented five sectors which effected security threats: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. The military sector represents the traditional approach of security, concerning military capabilities. Political security concerns stability of states and governments, while economic security involves accessibility to resources, finance and markets. Societal security relates to sustainability of cultures, language, national and religious identities. Finally, environmental security concerns the preservation of local ecosystems and the planetary biosphere (*Ibid*: 38). A fundamental point is that the sectors do not operate in isolation from each other, instead the sectors are inseparable and overlap in a variety of ways, and cannot be considered separately (Buzan et al. 1998: 8). The second broadening dimension concerned the level of which security was considered and analysed. Security cannot be conceptualized solely in terms of the state, but must include the individual below the state, and systems above the state. This meant a separation from the traditional “national security”

concept (Sheehan 2005: 44, 48). This broadening increased the potential actors involved within security issues. Non-state actors, such as companies, social and ethnic groups, and individuals are playing important roles in security issues (*Ibid*: 51).

Considering the broader conception of security, forming of security issues became an essential concern for the Copenhagen school. The invocation of the term security, through a process of securitization, implies priorities for action and use of extraordinary measures. Securitization therefore involves raising an issue above the structure of “ordinary” politics (Buzan et al. 1998: 24-25). An issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because it is a real threat, but rather because the issue is constructed as an existential threat. Securitization is a process which “...frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above ordinary politics” (*Ibid*: 23). The process of securitization not only involves conscious choices of emphasising certain security aspects of an issue in order to justify extraordinary actions, but also includes a process of identifying the main elements of the security issue. Defining referent objects, elements essential enough to use extraordinary measures to defend, identifying threats, agents or developments which may danger a referent object, and finally present appropriate measures to counter the threats are essential elements of securitization (*Ibid*: 23-26). Security can consequently be seen as a socially constructed concept, with a specific meaning within a particular social context (Sheehan 2005: 43). The communication and framing of a security issue can therefore be seen as a conscious action to influence policy-making.

Energy security has increasingly become a dominant element of the European energy policy and has mainly been defined as “safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy supply” (Barroso 2011). However, energy is a particular multidimensional and elusive policy domain, since it theoretically can be framed within all sectors of security (Natarski & Herranz 2008: 74). Simultaneously, a number of different actors on different levels play increasingly larger parts in the energy sector. This has made energy a policy area dominated by diverging and conflicting opinions.

Consequently, the process of securitization of energy has been rather conflicting in the EU. Youngs (2009) argues that securitization has in many ways been rejected, for example the extraordinary measure of using military action for securing energy has vigorously been discarded by the EU. Natarski & Herranz, (2008) argue further that a “lower degree of securitization” has instead been developed in the EU, characterized by divergent perceptions of energy security (Natarski & Herranz 2008: 83-84). Checchi et.al. (2009) finally state that the disparities are mainly based on how energy is considered, as a commodity that should be regulated by the market or as a strategic resource managed by the state (Checchi et.al. 2009: 1-2). Within the EU, the diverging conceptions and perceptions of energy security have been dominant, both between the institutions and between the member states. Natarski & Herranz analysis of the securitization of energy within the EU demonstrate that there are fundamental differences between the institutions’ perceptions of energy security (Natarski & Herranz 2008). Several scholars have highlighted the disparities in perception of energy security between the member states. Pointvogl shows that a number of factors affect member states’ perception of energy security, such as level of import dependency, energy intensity and the

market strength of major national energy companies (Pointvogl 2009). Neumann also highlights the large gaps between national energy sectors of old and new member states, which have caused large differences perception of energy security (Neuman 2010).

## 3.2 New Institutionalism

New institutionalism has developed into a well acknowledged theoretical approach within European studies. It emerged from the rather simplistic conception that “institutions matter”, but has evolved to an extensive and pluralist approach with several branches of thought (Wiener & Diez 2009: 125). New institutionalism has particularly studied European integration as a process and has made important contributions to understanding the EU. Even though different perspectives of new institutionalism are founded on different assumptions and insights of how institutions are understood and why they “matter”, they are all based on a number of common premises (Wiener & Diez 2009: 125).

New institutionalism recognizes that institutions contain “both formal and informal structures that influence human behaviour” (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000: 4). Institutions are a relatively enduring set of rules and practices established in order to create elements of order and predictability. Rules and practices are followed because they are seen as expected or legitimate and define the context in which politics and governance take place (Rhodes et al. 2006: 3-7). Institutions order social relations by setting “the rules of the game” and influence actors’ behaviour, but actors’ preferences may also affect the institutions (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000: 2-3, 5). Institutionalization is not an inevitable process and institutions are neither static, nor irreversible. Yet, structures that are the foundation of institutions cannot be changed arbitrary, even though different approaches have differing assumptions of the *solidity* of institutions (Rhodes et al. 2006: 7).

Three branches of new institutionalism are generally identified: rational choice, historical and sociological perspectives. The different perspectives have generally been positioned on a spectrum between *calculus* to *culture* (Hall & Taylor 1996: 950). Rational choice perspective focuses on the calculative and strategic aspect of actors, placing it towards the calculus end. The sociological perspective is instead influenced by constructivist insights and focuses on the importance of cultural aspects, placing it towards the culture end. Finally, historical institutionalism is placed somewhere in the middle, focusing on the historical aspect of institutionalization (Wiener & Diez 2009: 126-127). Even though the three perspectives highlight different aspects of institutions, and are based on somewhat different ontological and epistemological insights, many institutionalists argue for greater interchange between the approaches (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000: 7, 16-17). The increased convergence of new institutionalist approaches has been apparent within historical institutionalism. Pierson (2004) shares rational institutionalists’ emphasis on actor intentionality in the short term, while Bulmer (1993) shares sociological institutionalists’ emphasis on endogenous impacts on actors’ behaviour in the long term. Thelen holds that there has been some important borrowing and cross-fertilization within historical institutionalism between rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Thelen 1999: 371). Finally, Kaarlejärvi

states that the reality and complexity of politics demands aspects of all institutionalist approaches (Kaarlejärvi 2003: 20).

### 3.2.1 Rational choice institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism is founded on the assumption that actors behave instrumentally and strategically in order to achieve a fixed set of preferences. Preferences are therefore seen as exogenous to the integration process (Kaarlejärvi 2003: 8). Even though actors are regarded as calculative utility-maximizers, rational choice institutionalists emphasize the significance of institutional context as constraints to the strategic and rational behaviour of actors (Wiener & Diez 2009: 126). Institutions' function is merely to resolve collective action problems by reducing transaction costs and reducing uncertainty of behaviour. Institutions are formed because actors benefit from them and are preserved as long as they provide benefits to the participants (Hall & Taylor 1996: 943-45). If a key actor plays according to different rules, the institution is fragile since the rules are not in equilibrium (Rhodes et al. 2006: 26).

Rational choice institutionalism offers useful insights when examining formation and developing of institutions. Negotiations between the member states have often been analysed by rational choice institutionalists in order to examine how states' preferences affect institutions as outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996: 953). Rational choice perspectives have however faced frequent criticism for a number of theoretical shortcomings. Constructivists have focused on the assumption of actors' interests and preferences as pre-given. Rational choice theorists ignore the important transformative effects of institutions on actors' preferences, especially in the case of the EU (Wiener & Diez 2009: 142). Rational choice has been criticized for overestimating actors' ability and competence to act strategically, and disregarding the cognitive limitations of actors' behaviour (Rhodes et al. 2006: 26-27).

Strategic behaviour within the European energy policy has been highlighted by many scholars. Matláry argues that member states' behaviour, within the European energy policy has mainly been based on national strategic interests (Matláry 1997: 12, 25). Van der Linde argues that energy has increasingly become a tool for the strategic functioning of the state, used in order to ensure political interests (Van der Linde 2007: 274-275). Finally, Natortschi & Herranz Surrallés point out that the Commission's perception of energy as a commodity can be seen as a strategic action in order to increase its influence over energy issues (Natortschi & Herranz Surrallés 2008: 75-77).

### 3.2.2 Sociological institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism is clearly influenced by constructivism. The perspective regards institutions in broader terms, compared to rational choice institutionalism. Institutions include not only formal rules, norms and procedures, but also moral patterns, cognitive scripts and symbol structures that organize "frames of meaning" which effect and steer actors' behaviour (Hall & Taylor 1996: 947). Institutions consist of formal and informal rules, practices and

moral judgements, in which political struggles are played out. Sociological institutionalism does not reject the possibility of strategic behaviour of actors, but highlights that institutions “constitute” actors and construct actors’ views of the world (Wiener & Diez 2009: 126, 148). Participants within an institutional setting act in accordance to the collectively accepted written and unwritten rules. Institutions are consequently socially constructed and embody shared cultural understandings of the world (Thelen 1999: 386). Yet, institutions do not only influence behaviour by specifying what actors should do, but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context (Hall & Taylor 1996: 949). Then institutions do not simply affect actors’ strategic calculations, but also affect the very preferences and identities of participants. Hence, preferences become partly endogenous to the institutional setting (Jupille & Caporaso 1999: 432). Social norms and cultural frames form institutions into symbolic guides that shape participants perceptions, interests and identities (Rosamond 2000: 46). Participants act in accordance to a “logic of appropriateness”, taking influence from the institutional environment as they select appropriate action within a given institutional context (Wiener & Diez 2009: 127). Sociological institutionalists have therefore been especially interested in the construction and communication of norms (Schneider & Aspinwall 2001: 13).

Sociological institutionalism has been criticized for the assumption that institutions shape the preferences of actors, which presents actors as just “slaves of structure”. The answer to this problem has been a dual relationship between institutions and behaviour. Institutions shape actors’ interests, but institutions are also shaped by actors and therefore facilitate change and institutional development (Schneider & Aspinwall 2001: 43). Sociological institutionalism assumes that institutional formation and change are primarily caused by reinterpretations of the institutional environment. These reinterpretations of the institutional structure are often caused by rapid and unforeseeable changes in the international arena (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 7). Reinterpretations are necessary in order to strengthen the social and political legitimacy of the institutional framework (Hall & Taylor 1996: 949). Change and development of an institutional setting is therefore viewed as mainly an endogenous process, through processes of *socialization*.

Sociological institutionalism stresses the importance of ideas within institutionalization and policy formation. Social actors’ perceptions and ideas of the reality effect policy decisions, which shape the chosen institutional path. Changing perceptions of values and interests are connected with behavioural change (Kaarlejärvi 2003: 6). The capacity to shape and communicate particular ideas has become a powerful political tool (Rosamond 2000: 120). Political ideas and issues are not pre-given or pre-defined but their definition is often highly contested. Particular issues can therefore be constructed as being legitimate enough to be managed within a certain political level (Princen 2007: 32-33). Therefore sociological institutionalism has emphasized the importance of *moral entrepreneurs*, and how actors can turn individual beliefs into broader understandings (Schneider & Aspinwall 2001: 43).

Related to the European energy policy, sociological institutionalism highlights the importance of ideas and perception in actors’ behaviour. Pointvogl (2009) argues that perception of energy security, whether accurate or not, significantly influences actors’ behaviour within European energy policy (Pointvogl 2009: 5714). Checchi et.al (2009) concurs by arguing that

the definition of energy security is mainly based on what ideas actors have concerning energy and its role in politics (Checchi et al. 2009: 1-2). Natorski & Herranz Surrallés (2008) conclude by arguing that the framing of energy security has influenced policy choices in European energy policy (Natorski & Herranz Surrallés 2008: 83-84).

### 3.2.3 Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism can be located somewhere between the rational choice and sociological approaches. Though it draws on similar theoretical elements of the former approaches, it distinguishes itself by emphasizing the historical aspect of institutionalization (Kaarlejärvi 2003: 13-14). Historical institutionalism has generally focused on the historical evolution of institutions and their effects over time (Hall & Taylor 1996: 937). It emphasizes the historical development of institutions and the initial culture and problems from which it originates (Rhodes et al. 2006: 39). Even though historical institutionalism contains diverging theoretical approaches, drawing from rational choice and constructivist elements, they are all based on the concept of *path dependency*. Institutions are seen as sticky and rigid structures, which *lock in* actors towards a certain policy path. Past decisions shape and constrain future policy options, causing long term effects on actors' behaviour and choices (Hall & Taylor 1996: 940-943). Institutional frameworks and policies generate incentives for actors to preserve and not abandon existing institutions and policies, and instead adapting them to changing political environments. Institutions are therefore resistant to change or reversal because of the uncertainty of transaction costs of institutional abandonment (Pierson 2000: 252).

A general distinction can be made between historical institutionalists drawing on theoretical insights from rational choice (e.g. Pierson 1996, 2004) and those drawing on insights from constructivism (e.g. Bulmer 1993). Pierson recognizes the initially strong preferences of actors and their strategic behaviour to maximize gains (Pierson 1996: 126). European integration is however path dependent making institutions rather inflexible, which may both create intended and unintended consequences. Self-reinforcing positive feedback creates pressure for institutional development towards a specific path in order to resolve new political issues (Pierson 2004: 20-22). Pierson continues by arguing that institutions and public policies can be characterized by the phenomena of inertia, where past institutional decisions have created problems, unintentionally, in resolving new political issues (*Ibid*: 44). Existing institutions and policies may even have "perverse" effects that can gradually undermine the very social and political support they are founded on (Wiener & Diez 2009: 128). Bulmer (1993) derives instead from a more constructivist approach, emphasizing the long term consequences of institutions in influencing actors' preferences and ideas. Institutions are not necessarily only outcomes of bargaining or historical evolution, but institutions have ideas built into them which influence policy-making (Bulmer 1993: 355-356). Thelen (1999) also shares some constructivist elements, stressing the importance of social norms and routines, rather than formal written rules, for social actors' behaviour. Collective norms define appropriate conduct, shape actor identities and influence actor interests (Thelen 1999: 371).

Historical institutionalism offers insights of how historical aspects may influence actors' behaviour. Neumann (2010) contributes by highlighting the diverging historical legacies between the new and old member states. The CEECs' energy security preferences are significantly influenced by their historical ties with Russia (Neumann, 2010).

### 3.3 Theoretical framework

Security has increasingly been viewed as a broadened concept and as a socially constructed phenomenon, through a process of securitization. Security can be perceived differently by different actors and the ability to frame and communicate a certain perception of security has become important in security issues. This is especially evident in energy security, since it is a particularly multidimensional and complex domain, transcending all security sectors. How energy security is perceived and how actors choose to frame energy security is based on different underlying factors. Actors choice to frame energy security in a particularly manner within the EU has a significant impact on the European energy policy. It is therefore important to identify the different frames of energy security within the EU in order to understand the development of the EU's energy policy.

Institutionalism offers a number of important insights in explaining actors' behaviour and choices within an institutional framework, such as the European energy policy. Firstly, rational choice highlights the importance of strategic and calculated behaviour of actors and offers insights on how institutional frameworks may change due to changes in actors' preferences or as consequences of other external changes. Secondly, sociological institutionalism highlights the importance of ideas in actors' behaviour and in the development of institutional frameworks. It also gives insights not only on how institutions influence actors' behaviour, but also how actors influence the development of institutions. Thirdly, historical institutionalism highlights the importance of history and shows how institutions can "lock in" actors towards a particular institutional direction. Earlier institutional choices and behaviour may create path dependency, making reverse choices and institutional changes increasingly difficult. New institutionalism offers a suitable framework for analyzing actors' behaviour and the underlying factors to why actors choose to frame energy security in a certain way.

# 4. Methodology

This chapter will clarify the methodological framework that will be used in order to analyse the security aspect of the EU's energy policy. Firstly, the concept of frame analysis will be explained and how it has been applied within studies of the EU. Secondly, an outline of the content analysis, an integrated part of frame analysis, will be described. Finally, the analytical tool for the analysis and the choice of material will be clarified.

## 4.1 Frame Analysis

Frame analysis has its origins within communication studies and has been characterized by a mix of different but related methods of analysing communicative texts. The wide range of analytical methods has made it considered to be a rather scattered and dispersed approach (Entman 1993: 51). While being a particular method of studying politics, frame analysis has also a clear theoretical foundation influenced by constructivism. It is based on the premise that an issue can be viewed from different perspectives, which is constructed by multiple values or perceptions. Framing refers to the process when actors develop a certain conceptualization of an issue or redirect their view of an issue (Chong & Druckman 2007b: 104-105, 108). This premise is similar with what Buzan et al. conceptualize as securitization within international relations (Buzan et al. 1998).

The term “frame” has generally been used by communication scholars and political scientists in two ways: as a *frame in communication* and as a *frame in thought*. Frame in communication refers to the words, phrases, images that speakers, e.g. politicians, and media outlets, use when conveying information about an issue to the public. This perspective is clearly focused on the communicator. Frame in thought refers instead to individuals' understanding of certain situations and what the audience is considered to be the most significant aspect of an issue, making frame analysis a fruitful element in public opinion research (Chong & Druckman 2007a: 100-101). The communication perspective has mainly been focused on media studies, how media has perceived and presented political and social issues (Chong & Druckman 2007b: 104). Yet, recently several frame analyses have emerged which focuses on other actors, such as states, institutions, political parties etc. (Daviter 2007: 655). This paper will apply a *frame in communication* perspective and focus on how communicators, the EU-institutions, have framed the concept of energy security within the European energy policy.

Within political science, frame analysis has been adapted in order to examine how political issues have been conceptualized and communicated by different actors. The approach is based on the premise that all policy issues can be subject to divergent and conflicting perceptions and dominating problem definitions influences political choices. Frame analysis examines how issue definition influences the way political issues are processed; how frames influence

which preferences dominate policy drafting and what type of political conflicts emerge during policy formation (Daviter 2007: 654-655). Multiple frames and perceptions can be included in a certain policy issue, but specific frames often need to be attached to something broader. Smaller frames are therefore often put within larger frames, which mean that some issue definition can be more fundamental than others (Nylander 2001: 294).

Entman states that framing: “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman 1993: 52). Policy framing consequently entails two key features: *selection* and *salience*. Selection and salience are instruments which the communicator can use in order to influence the audience perception of an issue. By including and excluding certain aspects or features within a text, the communicator may influence, through selection, how an issue is perceived. Salience is an instrument to emphasize and highlight certain information in a text, which also influences how policy issues are defined (Entman 1993: 52-53). Policy framing is a process-derived phenomenon, where agents are involved in the construction of a reality. However, framing does not imply complete construction of phenomena, but rather that some elements are emphasized over others, and that particular interpretations of reality are made (Nylander 2001: 294).

Recent policy framing studies (e.g. Morth 2000, Nylander 2001) show that frame analysis has particular relevance for the study of the EU. The EU’s multilevel and network structure almost guarantees that multiple definitions of policy issues are in circulation. Different policy styles and perceptions of political issues between member states, institutions and interest groups highlights the importance of policy framing during policy formation (Daviter 2007: 655-656). In policy-making environments distinguished by dense institutional structure and complex policy procedures, such as the EU, the manner in which issues are framed significantly influences the policy-process and policy-outcomes (Nylander 2001: 293). Morth’s (2000) analysis of the EU’s policy discussions on the European defence industry demonstrates that policy framing can especially have an influence in cross-pillar issues.

Three broad strands of policy framing, focusing on different parts of the policy process, can be distinguished. The first strand focuses on the importance of policy framing during the agenda-setting process. Several of these studies have highlighted the importance of the Commission as policy entrepreneur and its ability of issue definition during the initial stages of policy formation (Nylander 2001: 294-295). A second approach focuses on how political conflicts and competing perceptions are present during policy formation and highlights the presence of competing frames during policy discussions. This strand of studies emphasizes how changes in problem definitions can shift the lines of competing issue-perceptions, with new political alliances and adversaries during policy formulation, and how frames can be strategically manipulated (Daviter 2007: 656-657). A third strand of authors has conceptualized problem definition and policy framing as an integrated part of adopted policies. This perspective means that policy framing influences political dynamics and shapes formulation of interests and policies (Pierson 1993). Daviter argues that by tracing policy issues, frame analysis asks how issue definitions change and how these changes affect the way policies are created (Daviter 2007: 655-657).

This paper considers issue definition and frame competition to have an important impact on policy-making. Considering the multidimensionality and complexity of energy security within the broadened security concept, policy framing has become an important aspect within the European energy policy. Conflicting perception and interests about energy security are plentiful, making issue definition and policy framing a vital feature of policy-making. By identifying the main frames of energy security within key policy documents, the study will use frame analysis to examine how energy security is perceived within the EU's energy policy.

## 4.2 Qualitative content analysis

The main element of frame analysis has been to identify which policy frames occur within a certain context. This process of frame-identification has been achieved by using content analysis (Entman 1993: 57). Content analysis involves examining texts in order to determine what is significant and classifying the primary patterns in the data (Patton 2004: 463). Content analysis can be broadly divided into quantitative and qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis has mainly been used within policy framing studies, when analysing media's framing of political issues. Media studies often involve coding and examination of large amounts of data, making quantitative analysis a suitable choice of analysis. Quantitative content analyses have mainly been of deductive nature, using pre-defined frames, based on hypotheses or earlier research, in order to test which of these are present within a political issue area (Chong & Druckman 2007b: 105-108).

Recently a number of frame analyses based on qualitative content analyses emerged. These studies have been concerned with in-depth identification of issue definitions, rather than the frequency of particular terms or concepts within a frame (e.g. Morth 2000, Nylander 2001). These studies have been of inductive nature, by trying to identify what issue definitions are present within a policy area without using pre-defined frames. Qualitative content analysis is based on careful reading and examination of relevant texts. Texts are communicative and entail ideas and messages and must therefore be understood in overall context, while the overall context must be understood on the basis of the parts (Esaiasson, et al. 2007: 252-253). Content analyses are consequently interested in the substance of the text, compared to discourse analysis which is more interested in the language used in texts and its effects power relations (*Ibid*, p. 239). A significant feature of qualitative content analysis has also been categorization, where individual statements and terms are collected into particular categories (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 237).

This paper will apply a qualitative content analysis in order to identify and examine how energy security has been framed in the EU, which involves identifying what features of an issue are included and emphasized in policy documents. Examining the inclusion of certain terms can be achieved by quantitatively measure the frequency of certain terms and phrases. However, a quantitative method may have problems with measuring the salience of certain frames. Even though repetition of words may express a certain level salience, other aspects must be taken into consideration. How certain information is used in a specific context and how certain information is placed within a text, may increase the emphasis of certain aspects.

The study will also be of inductive character, by using *open frames*, rather than predefined frames. This means that categorization of statements and opinions will be done in order to identify and clarify different frames. A qualitative method is therefore suitable, in order to do an in-depth analysis of the framing of energy security within the EU.

Much criticism has been directed towards qualitative methodology, mainly from positivist approaches. Issues such as objectivity and the possibility of generalization have been the central criticism (Marsh & Stocker 2002: 204). Qualitative research involves interpretation, by the researcher, which creates difficulties with objectivity. Interpretations cannot be measured which increases the risk of subjectivity and undermines the reliability and validity of the study (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 80-82). However, constructivists mean that objectivity is impossible and all research is subjective, which is based on the ontological perception that reality is socially constructed. Research results are therefore an interpretation of relationship of social phenomena and therefore do not presume a generalizable truth about reality (Patton 2004: 98-99). Qualitative researchers leaning more towards positivism instead argue that problems of subjectivity can be reduced significantly. A high degree of reliability and validity can be achieved, allowing for a study to be replicated by other researchers (Chesebro & Borisoff 2007: 11). The material analyzed should be able to be processed by the same type of analytical tools, by different researchers based on neutral observation language and leading to the same result, *intersubjectivity*. Research must therefore be characterized by transparency and well-grounded argumentation, with consequent interpretations supported by clear reference to the material (Bergström & Boréus 2007: 36). It is therefore important that the researcher is open and clearly clarifies the analytical tools used when making interpretation of the material and to base interpretations on well-grounded arguments with reference to the material.

### 4.3 Research design

In order to identify which frames are present within the EU's energy policy a framing model will be used. The model will be based on a framing paradigm developed by Entman (1993). Entman argues that frames have at least four locations in the communication process. First, the communicators organize their beliefs by making conscious and unconscious framing judgements, which guides the frame. Second, the text contains frames which are manifested by the absence and presence of certain information or by the reinforcement of certain judgements and facts. Third, the audience have frames that guide how they receive and judge the communicated issue definition. Finally, a stock of commonly invoked frames can be present within a certain social grouping, creating what Entman define as a culture (Entman 1993: 53-55).

Entman presents a framing paradigm that is based on four processes; *defining problems* – analysing costs and effects of an issue, *diagnosing causes* – identifying the sources of a particular issue, *making moral judgements* – evaluating causal links and their effects, and *suggesting remedies* – offer solutions to the issue. This form of frame analysis offers a way to define the power of a communicative text (Ibid: 51-52). By using Entman's framing paradigm to identify different issue definitions, it is possible to examine how energy security has been

framed within the European energy policy between 2004 and 2010. The study will focus on frames located in policy texts, in order to detect which policy frames are present and emphasized by the EU towards its audience. The analysis will employ an *open frame* approach in order to identify and label policy frames within the EU. This process uses an inductive reasoning, by which frames are categorized through careful examining of the material. The inductive approach of the study will increase the risk of subjectivity when interpreting the texts. It is therefore important to base interpretations on well-founded grounds, with reference to the material, in order to achieve greater intersubjectivity.

The research design, to analyse the EU's perception of energy security consist of a model based on three elements: *Defining problem/Diagnose causes* – identify what is perceived as the main referent objects, threats and the underlying causes of threats. *Making moral judgements* – classify what is perceived as appropriate measures of response. *Suggesting solutions* – identify which measures have been presented in order to solve the issue. In order to easier identify and classify the different frames the analysis is divided into three parts, based on the energy triangle presented in section 2.3, sustainability, the internal energy market and security of supply. Table 1 illustrates the outline of the research design.

	Sustainability	The internal energy market	Security of supply
Defining problem /Diagnose causes			
Making moral judgements			
Suggesting solutions			

Table 1. Research design

## 4.4 Material

The study focuses on the main energy policy documents from 2004 to 2010. These will include the main policy documents from the three main EU-institutions: the Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament.

The Commission documents will include Green Papers that outline its main viewpoints on energy issues, together with the main legislative initiatives that surrounds the EU's energy policy. Documents from the European Council are based on presidency conclusions from the period of study. Presidency conclusions are suitable for this study since these documents are rather broad, but indicate how energy policy discussions have developed within the European Council during the particular presidency periods. The study also includes some of the main energy policy regulations and initiatives from the European Parliament. In the study the European Parliament is analysed as a whole, not focusing on individual politician's or political groups' perception on energy security. The relevant EU documents have been attained through the institutions' websites, where they are accessible to the public.

Some critical considerations must be pointed out when analyzing the relevant EU documents. First, one must be careful when analysing presidency conclusions from the European Council, since these documents may present standpoints and emphases from individual member states, i.e. the presidency, or certain groups of member states which do not reflect the general view of the European Council. Simultaneously, these documents are public and may not completely reflect the discussions taking place within the European Council. This point is especially important since much of the work in the European Council is done behind closed doors. Second, within the European Parliament the policy process is also often characterized by long discussions and consensus seeking. The divergent positions of different political groups or committees may not be reflected in the final document.

# 5. Sustainability

Environmental and ecological sustainability has been one of the earliest dimensions of the European energy policy and has in many respects guided the advancements of the EU's energy policy. During the last decade energy sustainability has emerged as an even more urgent issue for the European energy policy.

## 5.1 Define problem / Diagnose cause

Within the sustainability dimension of the European energy policy the main energy security issue is the challenges and effects of climate change. The EU recognizes that "*climate security*" is a global issue that will affect Europe as well as the rest of the world and have an instable effect to world peace (Commission 2006a: 3-4, European Parliament 2006b: 3). The deterioration of the environment and the ozone will have harmful effects on the ecosystem, human health and security and threaten the EU's economic development. (Commission 2005: 43) The long-term economic growth in the EU, social security and the protection of ecological and environmental diversity are the clear referent objects for the EU, within the sustainability dimension.

The connection between climate change and energy policy has been clear to the EU, as confirmed by the Commission in its 2005 Green Paper on Energy Efficiency: "Energy consumption is also a major contributor to climate change, which is the cause of increasing concern over recent years" (Ibid: 39). About 80 percent of Europe's total GHG emissions originate from the energy sector, making it one of the main roots of climate change and air pollution (Commission 2007a: 3). The EU's energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, which accounts for the majority of emissions. The European Parliament states that coal will continue to be an important primary source of European energy supply, since the long-term reserves are plentiful, but will also contribute to increasing CO<sub>2</sub> and GHG emissions (European Parliament 2010: 3). Simultaneously, the EU's economic growth and increased energy consumption creates incentives to increasingly use fossil fuels as energy sources and further contribute to climate change (Commission 2005: 43). A "business as usual" scenario would increase EU CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by five percent by 2030 and be contrary to the Member States' Kyoto obligations (Commission 2007a: 3). The European Council proclaimed that "growth, to be sustainable, must be environmentally sound" (European Council 2004: 8) and energy consumption had to be decoupled from economic growth (European Council 2007b: 20). Persistent growth of energy consumption and Europe's dependence on fossil fuels clearly constitute the main threats to the EU's environmental sustainability and major contributors to climate change.

## 5.2 Making moral judgements

The EU has consistently stated that a common European response is crucial in order to counter the global and regional effects of climate change. The Commission stated that “an approach based solely on 25 individual energy policies is not enough” (Commission 2006a: 4) The moral considerations to act jointly and urgently, in order to create a sustainable European energy sector, are partly based on a broader view of the EU’s obligation to fight climate change. The EU is regarded, especially by the Commission and the European Parliament, as having somewhat of a special responsibility to combat climate change, considering its global effects and the particular vulnerable position of poor people in both developed and developing countries (European Parliament 2006b: 18, Commission 2007b: 2-3). The EU should lead by example in an integrated manner (Commission 2006a: 20).

Simultaneously, the EU needs to counter the effects of climate change, since it will affect the European economic growth and social development. It is continuously highlighted that the EU is and should be at the forefront of decoupling economic growth from increased energy consumption and to “transforming Europe into a highly energy efficient and low CO<sub>2</sub> energy economy” (Commission 2007a: 5). The EU also highlights the importance of a common sustainable energy policy in order to uphold the EU’s leadership over promotion of sustainability, in combating climate change and to create new jobs and economic growth (European Council 2006b: 15, Commission 2007b: 2).

The Commission has consistently argued that the lack of binding targets has been the main reason for the EU’s inability to achieve its international environment obligations, under the Kyoto accord, and in order to accomplish its goals the EU must agree on binding target to decrease GHG emissions (Commission 2007a: 12). The Member States have gradually increased their support for binding targets within the sustainability dimension, evident by the final endorsement of the climate and energy targets (European Council 2009a: 9). However, the European Council has also emphasized the different starting points and potentials between member states, which need to be accounted for (European Council 2006b: 32-33, 2007b: 20-21).

### 5.3 Suggesting solutions

In order to solve the sustainability issues of the European energy sector a number of rather concrete objectives and measures have been proposed and endorsed by all three EU-institutions. These measures are mainly based on the current 20-20-20 targets, proposed by the Commission in 2007 (Commission 2007b) which later was endorsed by the European Council, and aims to:

- reduce the EU’s GHG emissions by at least 20 percent below 1990 levels;
- make 20 percent of EU energy consumption originate from renewable resources;
- and to reduce the projected primary energy use by 20 percent, by improving energy efficiency. (European Council 2007b: 12, 20-21)

A climate and energy package, which made the 20-20-20 targets binding legislative goals, was in 2008 adopted by both the European Council and the European Parliament. Measures to directly achieve these targets were however not included, but four main elements have particularly been emphasized by all institutions: Energy efficiency, the EU Emission Trading

Scheme (EU ETS), promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) and improving energy research and technology.

Efforts to improve European energy efficiency were initiated long before the climate and energy package and several energy efficiency directives have been the guiding elements in the early development of European energy policy<sup>6</sup>. However, progress was limited but realizing the mounting energy and climate challenges the Commission presented its Green Paper on Energy Efficiency (Commission 2005) and was able to initiate a wide debate on energy efficiency. Energy savings and efficiency was placed in the centre of European energy policy as the main element of the demand-driven energy policy (Commission 2005: 17). In 2006 the European Council endorsed the Commission's proposition to develop National Energy Efficiency Action Plans based on binding targets (European Council 2006b: 33). The significance of energy efficiency measures to increase the sustainability of European energy policy has frequently been emphasized by the EU-institutions. The Commission has continually considered energy efficiency as one of the main priorities for the EU's energy policy (Commission 2007b: 11) and in 2010 it made energy efficiency the primary priority in order to shift the EU's energy policy back to its initial demand-driven approach (Commission 2010: 7-8).

Since the launch of the European Emission Trading Scheme in 2005, it has become the cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. Accordingly, it has also been emphasized as a significant integrating element of EU's energy policy in order to reduce GHG emission from the energy sector, which especially reflects the EU's general support of using market oriented measures (Commission 2007a: 11). There is a broad support for the EU ETS and the European Council, as well as the European Parliament, has appealed for improvement of its functioning and performance (European Parliament 2006b: 3, European Council 2006b: 33). Promotion and development of RES in Europe has a long tradition. The emphasis on RES has been twofold. Firstly, promotion and support of RES has been perceived as a necessity for the creation of a sustainable energy sector. Secondly, increasing the level of RES has been viewed as an important element of diversifying European energy resources, connecting it to the EU's dependency problems (European Council 2007b: 21). The European Parliament has particularly pushed for increasing the amount of RES in the European energy sector, both in order to decrease GHG emissions and to reduce the EU's dependence on Russian energy supply (European Parliament 2007c: 2-3). It has been the main force in pushing for a more ambitious RES target, arguing that the EU could achieve a 25 percent level of RES in its energy mix (European Parliament 2006b: 3). However, the discussion of RES targets in the EU came to a conclusion of a 20 percent level by 2020, and the Commission has stated that the EU is currently on track in achieving its RES objective (Commission 2010: 3). Amongst the more concrete actions for increasing RES in Europe, the EU has tried to boost RES investments by adopting new RES directives<sup>7</sup> and the Commission's Renewable Energy Roadmap, which sets out the EU's strategy and necessary measures to realize the RES targets (Commission 2007a: 14).

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<sup>6</sup> For example: Directive 93/76/EEC to limit carbon dioxide emissions by improving energy efficiency, Directive 2002/91/EC on energy efficiency of buildings and Directive 2003/96/EC on energy taxation.

<sup>7</sup> For example directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.

Finally, enhancing investments in new energy technologies and increase research and development in the energy sectors have been perceived as a natural part of creating a sustainable European economy. Energy research will not only accelerate the competitiveness of RES and further develop low carbon technologies and energy efficiency equipment, but also enable new market opportunities for European companies and create jobs (European Council 2007b:22). The European Parliament, together with the European Council, has particularly emphasized the need for further development of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), in order to increase the exploitation of the EU's remaining coal reserves (European Parliament 2007c: 6). One of the main solutions to increase energy research has been the Commission's Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan), created in 2007, which sets out concrete measures to enhance the development of new energy technologies in Europe and has been endorsed by both the European Council and European Parliament (European Parliament 2009a: 16, European Council 2008a: 15).

## 5.4 Concluding remarks

The environmental aspect of energy has been one of the leading elements in the early attempts to develop a European energy policy. Consequently, the sustainability dimension has been characterized by few disagreements on identified threats, the EU's response and by which measures. Even though some actors have pushed for more ambitious sustainability targets, there has been a broad agreement on an integrated climate change and energy policy, especially since the climate and energy package with its 20-20-20 targets. All actors recognize that the sustainability challenges require a common response based on binding targets for the member states. Comparatively concrete measures have been suggested in the EU, focused on energy efficiency, the EU ETS, promotion of RES and increasing energy research.

# 6. The European energy market

The creation of a competitive European energy market has been a cornerstone of the EU's energy policy. By the end of the 1990s some progress had been achieved in integrating national electricity and gas markets. However, facing new energy challenges at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, new perspectives of the European energy market emerged.

## 6.1 Define problem / Diagnose causes

Several problems, threats and risks can be identified within the internal energy market dimension. The main referent object has been identified as the economical growth and social development of the EU. In 2005 the Commission stated that EU's Single Market was trailing in competitiveness, compared to other regions in the world (Commission 2005: 39). One significant factor to this development has been identified as the volatile oil prices (*Ibid*: 42, European Council 2006b: 3), which emerged at the beginning of the century. The EU's high dependence on oil (European Parliament 2006b: 7) and limited diversification of energy sources have made it vulnerable to rising oil prices (European Council 2006a: 3). The Commission even stated that "high prices for oil and gas are probably here to stay" and the EU has to cope with this reality (Commission 2006a: 3). Growing energy consumption in Europe and the urgency of economic recovery after the global recession increased the importance of reasonable energy prices (European Parliament 2010: 2). Finally, the European Parliament presented a more holistic understanding of the importance of energy resources for economic growth, employment and social development and underlined that growing energy prices may create social instability in Europe (European Parliament 2006a: 2-3). It has also recognized that uncertainties about future oil reserves are a major factor to the increased energy prices (European Parliament 2008b: 1). High energy prices have clearly been perceived as a risk to the EU's economic growth and prosperity.

With the European gas crisis and major electricity outage of 2006, supply security, energy dependence and the EU's ability to handle energy disruptions became an issue for the internal energy market (Commission 2008b: 2). Internal aspects of security of supply have often been highlighted by the European Council, pointing out that limited diversification of energy sources and poorly developed indigenous energy resources have increased the EU's vulnerability to external supply interruptions (European Council 2006c: 11, 2007b: 18). Poor interconnections between Eastern and Western Europe and isolated national energy markets, like the Baltic States, are also causing increased vulnerability (European Council 2009b: 9). The European Parliament finally underlines that disturbances of energy supply pressures the functioning of European energy market and its ability to handle supply shortages (European Parliament 2006b: 7).

The Commission and the European Parliament focus especially on the completion of the European energy market. First, the completion of the European energy market has been identified as a referent object in itself, threatened by increased government interference and lack of investments (Commission 2010: 3). The Commission argues that the member states' different approaches to market opening and liberalization prevent the completion of a common energy market (Commission 2006a: 5-6). Government interference such as price regulation, subsidization of national champions and interference in company mergers have increasingly been perceived as threats to the completion of the European energy market and a risk to European energy security (Commission 2010: 3). Second, incompleteness of the European energy market has been distinguished as a causing factor for the EU's vulnerability to energy disruptions. The Commission recognizes that European energy markets have persistently been characterized by fragmentation, domination of national champions and large degrees of governmental interference (Commission 2006a: 5, 2010: 4). The European Parliament emphasizes the negative effects of energy price regulation, which "undermine not only the EU energy market but also the internal market in other commodities" (European Parliament 2006b: 14). In addition the lack of transparency, harmonization of rules and the high degree of protectionism weakens the EU's ability to enhance its energy security (European Parliament 2006a: 4, 2010: 3).

Finally, the European Parliament was early in highlighting the vulnerable position of energy consumers and how energy supply disruptions and growing energy prices have negative impacts on individual Europeans (European Parliament 2006b: 3). First, lack of transparency in energy sectors, limited harmonization of commercial rules and inadequate energy infrastructure constrain the rights of consumers and their ability to properly choose energy supplier (Ibid: 16-17, European Parliament 2008a: 2). Second, supply interruptions and growing energy prices have especially negative effect over vulnerable sectors of the European population. This will have negative effects of the EU's social stability and development (Commission 2007c: 4-5, European Parliament 2008b: 2).

## 6.2 Making moral judgements

The Commission has been the greatest supporter for the completion of an internal energy market. By referring to the economical and social benefits achieved by the completion of the Single Market, the Commission argues that similar benefits will be achieved through an internal energy market (Commission 2006a: 3) and states that in the energy sector "the EU will continue to develop market instruments as much as possible" (Commission 2005: 16) and "the consolidation of the energy sector should be market driven, if Europe is to respond successfully to the many challenges it faces" (Commission 2006a: 3). It also refers to the Lisbon Agenda's objective of increasing the EU's overall competitiveness and the necessity of an internal energy market to promote a more competitive EU industry (Commission 2006a: 5, 7). The Commission has consistently emphasized the significance of a competitive and liberalized energy market in order to achieve the EU's three energy targets; reasonable energy prices, sustainable energy production and security of supply (Commission, 2007: 6, 2010: 9). One can especially identify an increasingly emphasis on the market's ability to enhance security of energy supply (Commission 2006a: 8, 2007a: 4). The Commission argues that the

market is essential in order to guarantee adequate predictability, transparency and enhance investments and diversification in the energy sector, which will increase security of supply (Commission 2007: 4).

The European Parliament and the Council have both recognized that an internal energy market would benefit the EU economy and achieve the EU's energy targets (European Council 2007b: 16, European Parliament 2009b: 3). While the European Parliament has pushed for further enhancement of the Commission's oversight of the European energy markets (European Parliament 2010: 3) the European Council has expressed some concerns of too rapid liberalization of national energy sectors (European Council 2007b: 16). Realizing that full implementation of the internal energy market has not been realized the European Council emphasizes the need to take consider the different characteristics of national and regional energy sectors (Ibid: 16).

The European Council has emphasized the significance of diversifying energy sources and improving indigenous energy resources and infrastructure, in order to decrease energy dependence and improve competitiveness. This approach connects the EU's increasing dependency problem with inadequate diversification of energy sources within the European energy mix (European Council 2007b: 18). The importance of the EU's energy mix has been highlighted since 2006, as consequence of the gas crises. After the South Ossetia conflict the European Council underlined that initiatives needed to be taken "particularly as regards diversification of energy supply" (European Council 2008b: 3). Furthermore, the European Council has consistently stated that the choice of energy resources, within each national energy mix, lies within the sovereignty of the member states (European Council 2006c: 11, 2007b: 11), which has been reaffirmed by both the Commission and the European Parliament (Commission 2006a: 9, European Parliament 2007b: 3). The European Council also argues that a European energy policy should be developed "bearing in mind the strategic role of the energy sector" (European Council 2006b: 14). However, the Commission recognizes that each member states' choice of energy mix may affect the other member states' energy situation and therefore advocates for better coordination of national energy mixes on EU level (Commission 2010: 4) and "that their energy mix evolves in a manner that contributes effectively to the EU's energy goals" (Commission 2007a: 19). Finally the European Parliament has emphasized the importance of diversification in order to counter the EU's increasing dependence of energy imports, especially from Russia (European Parliament 2006b: 7-8).

European energy consumers' role within the EU's energy policy was first recognized by the Commission. However this position was mainly focused on how the internal energy market would benefit European citizens (Commission 2006a: 3). The European Parliament emphasized the importance of the individual European citizen and early declared that European consumers must be central to EU's energy policy (European Parliament 2006b: 16). It continued by clearly declaring its view by stating that: "supplying people with energy to meet basic needs is indispensable and that such supplies must be assured" (Ibid: 17). Access to affordable energy is essential for every citizen in order to maintain the principles of social inclusion, equal opportunity and fair access to knowledge, making adequate energy provisions crucial in order for citizens to successfully participate in social and economic life (European

Parliament 2008a: 2). Furthermore, the European Parliament highlighted the increasing problem of energy poverty within Europe and acknowledged the EU's and member states' obligation to adequately protect vulnerable and poor consumers (European Parliament 2006b: 17). The European Parliament stressed "the need to ensure the protection of universal rights, especially as regards access to energy for different social, economic and regional groups" (European Parliament 2008a: 4). The Commission has particularly recognized the increasingly vulnerable position of poorly protected citizens and argued that "the social dimension of Europe's energy policy needs to be taken into account throughout all stages" (Commission 2007a: 4).

## 6.3 Suggesting solutions

The Commission has particularly pushed for increased measures for completion of the internal energy market, both by underlining need for physical and functional improvement of the European energy network and implementation of energy legislation. The development of a common European grid for gas and electricity is considered vital element for the physical creation of a common energy market, which would also increase harmonization of national conditions of grid access for energy companies (Commission 2006a: 6). In its 2008 Green Paper (Commission, 2008a), the Commission focused especially on the development of the European energy network. This included increased investment, through the EU's energy funding framework (TEN-E), in interconnection of especially isolated member states included in the EU by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The Commission also aimed at suggesting a third internal energy market package to introduce new collaborative networks for transmission operators (Commission 2008a: 3). As part of its strategy the Commission identified a number of key projects vital for the functioning of the European energy network, e.g. Baltic interconnections and electricity interconnection within Central and South-East Europe (*Ibid*: 13-14). Both the European Council and the European Parliament have supported the Commission's initiatives for increasing investments on critical interconnections and energy infrastructure (European Council 2007b: 17, European Parliament, 2009a: 9). However, the European Council has more emphasized the importance of interconnection in order to decrease import dependence and intensify the gains of member states' diversification (European Council 2009b: 9).

Simultaneously the Commission has pushed for a more market-oriented functioning of European energy networks. In 2006, the Commission began stressing the significance of unbundling, separating the ownership of transmission lines from the production and trade of energy (Commission 2006a: 7). In 2007, it introduced two options, Fully Independent System Operators<sup>8</sup> or ownership unbundling<sup>9</sup>, although the Commission underlined the larger benefits of the latter alternative (Commission 2007a: 7). The need for unbundling has been acknowledged by both the European Parliament and the European Council. However, while the European Parliament has supported the ownership unbundling approach (European Parliament 2006b: 3), the European Council has argued for an "independently run and

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<sup>8</sup> Vertically integrated energy companies may own transmission lines, but will be actually run by independent companies.

<sup>9</sup> Total separation of ownership of transmission lines and ownership of energy production.

adequately regulated network operation system” (European Council 2007b: 16), showing member states’ reluctance to completely open up their energy networks. The Commission has also argued for increased coordinating of Transmission System Operators by introducing new bodies at community level (Commission 2006a: 8, 2007a: 8). This approach has been supported by the other institutions, evident by the institutionalisation of the ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G within the EU energy framework, and the Commission has repeatedly advocated for increased capacity of these instruments (Commission 2010: 10).

In order to counter the slow integration of national energy markets, the Commission and European Parliament have pushed for better implementation of energy legislation by the member states. The European Parliament pressed for stronger measures by the Commission to increase implementation and compliance of EU legislation in the energy sector (European Parliament 2006a: 4, 2006b: 3). It especially requested a stronger leadership from the Commission and more preparedness to bring infringement proceeding against member states. Furthermore, it called for “visible and convincing demonstration of Member State determination and support” for the completion of the internal energy market (European Parliament 2010: 3-5). The Commission recognized that a number of directives<sup>10</sup> had been adopted in order to increase the pace of integration (Commission 2007a: 7) and that a clear objective of the Lisbon Treaty<sup>11</sup> is a well functioning European energy market (Commission 2010: 2). However, even though energy markets had started opening up, the Commission complained about the limited integration progress and highlighted the increasing number of infringement proceedings brought by the Commission (*Ibid*: 4). The Commission has also advocated for increased independence of national energy regulators. The Commission argues that harmonization of energy regulators’ level of power should be founded on the basis of highest common denominator instead of lowest and they must be obligated to promote the integration of national energy markets (Commission 2007a: 7-8). The European Parliament has been the main supporter for increased independence of national energy regulators, mainly in order to protect consumers, and enhance the competences of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (European Parliament 2006b: 14, 2010: 5). Finally, by the end of the decade a greater emphasis on regional initiatives can be identified, such as the Baltic Energy Market, in creating stepping stones towards an internal energy market (Commission 2010: 10, European Parliament, 2010: 6).

The internal aspect and solution of the EU’s import dependency of energy supply has been emphasized particularly by the European Council. In its 2006 proposal for actions in the development of an energy policy for Europe, the European Council particularly emphasized the necessity to intensify diversification. The diversification would not be limited to external suppliers but more importantly include “the development of indigenous energy potential and energy efficiency” (European Council 2006b: 29), which would increase the competitiveness of the European energy sector (European Council 2007b: 18). In this context the European Council encouraged the Commission’s role to facilitate member states’ choice of energy mix, by regularly assess the advantages and drawbacks of different energy sources (European Council 2006b: 34) and the condition on national energy networks in relation to security of supply (European Council 2007b: 18). While recognizing the necessity for a sustainable

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<sup>10</sup> Included in the second internal energy market package.

<sup>11</sup> Article 194 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

energy sector, the European Council has highlighted the need to make better use of indigenous fossil fuels (European Council 2009b: 10). This may show the European Council's gradual prioritization the short- and medium-term issue of security of supply, in contrast to the long-term issue of sustainability and completion of a competitive internal energy market. Finally, the broad consensus of member states' sovereignty over energy mix, have made discussions on binding targets on level of diversification principally absent. In 2006, the Commission pushed for benchmarks and minimum levels of diversification of national energy mixes (Commission 2006a: 9), but with limited success. However, binding targets of level of RES have been adopted by the EU through the 20-20-20 targets.

The Commission acknowledged early that changed consumer behaviour was crucial in order for the EU to achieve its energy objectives. Public awareness campaigns of energy efficiency and better labelling of electricity products were some of the proposed measures to change and improve consumer behaviour (Commission 2005: 24, 39). However the Commission's emphasis on individual Europeans was mainly focused towards the benefits that the internal market would create for consumers (Commission 2006a: 5) The European Parliament soon identified shortcomings of the protection of consumers' rights in the European energy market and pushed for EU-level measures to counter these developments. It urged that the issues of energy poverty needed to be clearly featured in the Commission's energy initiatives and that member states ensured that universal service obligation was honoured (European Parliament 2006b: 16-17). In 2007, the Commission initiated a discussion of a European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers (Commission 2007c). The suggestion of a possible charter was received positively by both the European Parliament and the European Council (European Council 2007b: 17, European Parliament 2008a: 3). The European Parliament especially viewed the charter as a tool for consumers to better participate in the European energy market (*Ibid*: 4). However, the Commission stated that the charter would neither be legally binding document nor introduce new provision for the European energy policy (Commission 2007c: 6). Instead the charter would only lay down the rights and rules of consumers already provided by current EU-legislation, referring to the directives included in the internal energy packages, and lay down guidance to address vulnerable consumers (*Ibid*: 5). The European Parliament has continued to push for developing national and EU strategies for energy poverty (European Parliament 2009a: 6).

## 6.4 Concluding remarks

The internal energy market dimension has been characterized by divergent perceptions and viewpoints. The main underlying disagreement has concerned who should lead the development of the European energy market. There is a broad understanding of the need and the benefits of a competitive internal energy market, shown for example by the adoption of the third internal energy market package. However, the growing number of infringement proceedings clearly shows the member states' unwillingness, or inability, to implement the EU energy legislation, which has increased the calls for stronger leadership from the Commission. The European Council has increasingly highlighted the need for diversification of internal energy sources, emphasising the internal aspect of the EU's dependency and security of supply problem. This line of thought can connect to the broad consensus over

member states' sovereignty over their choice of energy mix. Lastly, the social dimension of the European energy policy has increasingly been highlighted, especially by the European Parliament, which has had some success regarding the formation of the European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers.

# 7. Security of supply

The security of supply dimension has mainly been described as the external part of the EU's energy policy. There are of course clear relations between external energy aspects and threats with the internal features of the EU's energy policy. For example, the external issue of import dependency may have internal solutions, such as development of indigenous energy resources. However, this chapter will mainly focus on the external aspect of the EU's energy policy.

## 7.1 Define problem / Diagnose causes

Security of supply has been the overall security issue within the EU's external energy policy and can be divided in several elements. The shift in the international energy market was early identified as a major risk for energy security in Europe. With the increasing energy consumption of developing and emerging economies, such as China and India, the global demand for energy resources, particularly fossil fuels, has exploded. Simultaneously, doubts about existing and accessible energy resources have made the global supply side perceived as rather uncertain (Commission 2005:5-6). A situation of growing competition, between energy importing countries, over an increasingly limited amount of primary energy resources located in ever smaller number of states, have made security of energy supply a global issue (Commission 2010: 4).

Energy consumption is also growing in the EU and with decreasing amounts of indigenous energy resources Europe faces increased dependence on imports of energy resources from third countries (European Parliament 2009b: 2). Import dependence has been identified as major security threats in two ways: First, the EU has emphasized the increasing risk of supply disruptions and failures caused by conflicts and instability, since the majority of energy resources are concentrated in politically and economically unstable regions (Commission 2006a: 3). Supply failures and energy disputes may also trigger international conflicts causing social, economic and political unrest threatening both global and European stability (European Parliament 2006b: 13). Second, the EU's dependence on energy imports may threaten the EU's economical and political independence (European Parliament 2007b: 4). The Commission stresses that the EU's import dependence and lack of a coherent energy policy decreases the EU's influence on the international energy market (Commission 2010: 4). The European Parliament proceed by arguing that that the EU's decreased independence in the energy sector may affect and decrease independence in other economical sectors (European Parliament 2007b: 4). The EU's import dependence has increased the importance closer relations with supply countries, but the European Parliament has highlighted the problem of deeper cooperation with many energy exporting countries. Since the majority of supply countries are characterized by authoritarianism and repetitive human rights violations,

the EU's political legitimacy may increasingly become questioned (European Parliament 2006b: 13).

Growing dependence on energy supplies from rather unreliable third countries also increases the risk of supply failures and disruptions, which will have damaging effects on Europe's economy. The gas crises caused by transit disputes between Russia and Ukraine revealed the EU's vulnerability to supply disruptions (European Council 2009c: 13). There are large differences between the new and old member states' capacity to deal with energy disruptions. The diverging levels of import dependency, inadequate crisis mechanisms and limited interconnection between member states increases the vulnerability of the EU (Commission 2007a: 10). The lack of solidarity and policy coherence between member states has continuously been highlighted as risks to the EU's capacity to deal with energy crises (European Parliament 2006a: 4).

## 7.2 Making moral judgements

Early in the period the EU mainly argued for internal demand and consumption driven policies in order to solve its dependency problems (Commission 2005: 4). However, following the supply disruptions from 2006 and onwards the Commission has focused more on an external element of the EU's energy policy. The Commission stresses the growing interdependence between different economical regions in the world, which require a common European approach in order to maintain international influence (Commission 2006a: 4). Consequently, individual member states' voices do not have enough leverage in international energy negotiations and instead the demand for the EU to "speak with one voice" has become substantial (Commission 2010: 17, European Council 2008a: 14). The Commission states: "the EU is a strong geopolitical partner in energy markets and must have the ability to act accordingly" (Commission 2010: 5). On the EU's relation with energy suppliers, especially Russia, the Commission and Parliament have consistently underlined the large degree of interdependence, the importance of reciprocity and that the EU must be treated as an equal partner (Commission 2006b: 3-4, European Parliament 2007b: 9). The Commission argues that the interdependency of the international energy market requires increased transparency and predictability, built on an international legal framework for energy (Commission 2008b: 7). The importance of a global legal framework is coupled with the necessity to expand the European energy market and competition law to primarily neighboring energy supply countries (European Parliament 2006b: 12). A pan-European energy market based on EU energy market legislation and legally binding instruments are perceived as the most effective measure to increase security of supply in the EU. (Commission 2010: 4). The Commission has suggested expanding the Community beyond the EU's border and stating that: "Energy is the market sector where the greatest economic efficiencies can be made on a pan-European scale" (Ibid: 4). Accordingly, the Commission and Parliament connects the importance of completing the internal energy market to the EU's ability to play a stronger international role in energy matters (Ibid: 5, European Parliament 2007a: 2).

While recognizing the positive role of a pan-European energy market in achieving long-term supply security and the necessity of international agreements on energy, the European

Council emphasizes the importance of improving the EU's relation with strategically important energy partners. The European Council argues that external energy policy should: "attach particular importance to energy in the context of the Union's relations generally with major third-country partners" (European Council 2006c: 11). As a response to the gas crises in Europe, the European Council has repeatedly emphasized the significant role of Russia on the European energy market and stressed that improved EU-Russia relations are vital (European Council 2006b: 31). Simultaneously, the European Council has also highlighted the importance of other key neighboring countries, both in order to secure reliable transit of supplies and to diversify energy sources (European Council 2007b: 19). The increasing importance of energy in the EU's external policies and the need for more coherent policies in external energy matters have been acknowledged by the European Council (European Council 2009b: 8, 10). However, the European Council has consistently emphasized member states' sovereignty over the choice of energy suppliers (European Council 2006b: 16) and pointed out the importance of bilateral long-term contracts for national energy security (*Ibid*: 30).

In the aftermath of the gas crises the solidarity aspect of the EU's energy policy has increasingly been emphasized in the EU's energy discussions. The European Parliament argued in 2006 that: "an essential part of a common energy policy should be enhanced solidarity between member states in order to deal with difficulties related to the physical security of infrastructure and security of supply" (European Parliament 2006a: 4) and continued later that "energy solidarity must become a major European concern" (European Parliament 2009a: 6). Firstly, solidarity has been emphasized as fundamental in the event of supply disruptions or energy crises, since damaging supply disruptions in one Member State affect the rest of the EU (European Parliament 2009a: 6). Secondly, solidarity in national policies towards energy rich countries outside of the EU, in bi- and multilateral infrastructure projects and in negotiations of long-term contracts with energy companies is essential in order to protect particularly vulnerable member states (European Parliament 2006a: 4). The Commission has also highlighted the importance of solidarity, especially in the event of energy crises. However, the Commission's emphasis on solidarity has mainly been related to its market approach, arguing that an internal market would spread the risk of supply disruptions and decrease the vulnerability for member states with weak energy sectors (Commission 2008b: 4).

Finally, the European Parliament has pushed for an enhanced social dimension of the European external energy policy, arguing that the EU has a social responsibility to enhance principles of democracy and human rights within its energy partners (European Parliament 2006a: 3). It has especially been critical towards the EU's increased energy dependence on authoritarian regimes that continuously have violated human rights and international law, meaning that it: "undermine the development of a credible, effective and consistent common foreign and security policy [...] and promotion of the values upon which the EU is founded" (European Parliament 2007b: 2). The EU's external energy policy should therefore be consistent with its foreign policy, contributing to the safeguard of peace, the primacy of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (*Ibid*: 4) and that "energy dialogues should in no way take place at the expense of frank and result-oriented dialogues on human rights" (European Parliament 2009b: 4).

## 7.3 Suggesting solutions

Securing reliable supplies of energy from third countries has mainly circulated around two major multilateral institutional frameworks: the ECT and the establishment of an Energy Community. The expansion of the European energy market and the EU's energy legislation has had a broad consensus within the EU and the Energy Charter Treaty has been emphasized as the main pillar for the EU's external energy policy. The Commission has consistently stressed the importance of the Energy Charter Treaty as mean for the EU to be key driver in establishing international energy agreements (Commission 2007a: 18). However, the main issue of the ECT has been the status of Russia, since it has not ratified the ECT. The Commission, together with European Council, has stressed the need to establish measures to facilitate Russian ratification, for example within the G20 framework or by deeper bilateral dialogue (Commission 2006: 15, European Council 2006b: 31). When it comes to the EU's relation with Russia one can identify a somewhat more confrontational approach by the European Parliament, arguing that the EU should demand Russian ratification of the ECT (European Parliament 2006b: 12). The emphasis on the ECT has especially been coupled with the dominating EU approach to treat energy as an economic commodity.

Expanding the European energy market has also been based on the establishment and enlargement of the Energy Community. The success of establishing the Energy Community Treaty in 2006, based on EU's energy legislation, has been essential in the EU's aim of creating a pan-European energy market. There has been a broad support for the enlargement of the Energy Community, for example by Ukraine, between the EU institutions and the ENP has repeatedly been referred to as a suitable tool to promote Energy Community membership (Commission 2007a: 23). Furthermore, the Commission and European Parliament have pushed for a more global approach on security of supply. The importance of developing internationally recognized mediation systems for cases of energy disputes and conflicts and involving other major energy consuming countries in energy cooperation has been emphasized by the European Parliament (European Parliament 2006a: 3). The European Parliament has additionally argued for enhancing the role of WTO in energy matters in order to reduce upward pressure on energy prices (European Parliament 2007a: 8). Further, the Commission highlights the need for a more effective use of multilateral forums as the UN, IEA and the G20 (Commission 2006a: 17) and that the EU should continue to press for further liberalization of the international energy market in multilateral arrangements (Commission 2008b: 7).

While considering the European Council's support for the Energy Community and the importance of reciprocity in energy agreements, one can identify signs of a slightly more strategic approach towards the EU's relations with energy supply countries. While the importance of securing reliable supply of energy increases, the European Council tends to highlight the strategic importance of certain partners. The European Council early highlighted the necessity for a more cooperative approach regarding access to energy resources which considers "the geopolitical implications of third countries approaches towards energy" (European Council 2006b: 30). Developing strategic partnerships with particularly vital producing and transit countries has been emphasized as valuable tool to increase energy

cooperation (European Council 2006c: 10). In 2008, the European Council specifically argued that securing reliable access of energy was the priority for the European energy policy (European Council 2008c: 7). Simultaneously, the unreliability of energy supply to Europe, demonstrated by the gas crises, has made the European Council more eager to obtain clearer guarantees from suppliers and transit countries that supply will not be interrupted (European Council 2009b: 9). The geopolitical importance of Russia and Ukraine has therefore regularly been highlighted by the European Council. In addition, the regions surrounding the Caspian and Black Seas have also been stressed as particularly strategically important in order to diversify European energy sources and supply routes (European Council 2007b: 19).

Finally, the importance of enhancing a spirit of solidarity has been stressed increasingly after the gas crises. Developing better crisis mechanisms in the event of an energy crisis has been essential. The European Council has mainly pushed for increased cooperation within the IEA and continued development of already established crisis mechanisms (European Council 2007b: 18). The Commission and the Parliament have also pushed for crisis mechanisms within the EU and increased transparency of emergency gas and oil stocks between the member states (Commission 2008b: 10). Additionally, they have also been the main contributors for the discussion of a solidarity element within the EU's legislative framework (European Parliament 2009b: 5). The inclusion of an energy solidarity clause within the Lisbon Treaty, 122 of the TFEU, shows the general consensus that has developed within the EU. Other measures have also been established like the network of energy security correspondents, as an early warning system for supply disruptions (European Council 2007a: 15), and an energy observatory within the Commission, to improve transparency of emergency gas and oil stocks (Commission 2007a: 22).

## 7.4 Concluding remarks

The importance of security of supply has significantly increased since around 2006. Energy crises and worsened relations with certain energy rich regions have made energy an increasingly significant part of the EU's external relations. There have been geopolitical tendencies both in member states' bilateral actions with energy exporters and within the discussion of the external energy policy, but the importance of reciprocity and market liberalization have still remained even in the European Council. Following the energy crises the enhancement of solidarity between member states has increasingly been highlighted and has had some success evident by the new solidarity clause within the Lisbon Treaty.

# 8. Conclusion

This concluding chapter will summarize the main findings of the analysis, consisting of the identified frames of energy security in the EU. It will then discuss the institutions framing in relation to the contributions from new institutionalism. Finally, a reflection of methodology, theory and analysis will be presented, together with suggestion for further research.

## 8.1 Summary of policy frames

Seven broad frames of energy security can be defined within the European energy policy. Within the sustainability dimension of the EU's energy policy one rather unified frame can be identified *the sustainability frame*. Climate change will have harmful effects on the economic growth and social development globally and in the EU. Since the energy sector is clearly the major source of GHG emissions, and energy consumption in the EU continuously increases, a common approach to form a sustainable energy sector is needed. Europe is also perceived as having a special obligation to lead the global struggle against climate change. The main measure to increase the sustainability of the energy sector is the climate and energy package with its 20-20-20 by 2020 targets. There has been a broad consensus on how the climate change challenges and energy policy are connected and relatively few disagreements have been apparent, especially after the agreement of the climate and energy package.

Three different and quite conflicting frames can be identified within the internal energy market dimension. First, *the competitive energy market frame* emphasizes the significance of creating a competitive European energy market in order to increase energy security. The Commission has consistently argued that only a European energy market can achieve the EU's energy objectives, reliable supply of safe, affordable and sustainable energy. Continued governmental interference and fragmented national energy markets are serious risks to the completion of a competitive European energy market. Both the Commission and European Parliament have pushed for better commitment by the member states and the European Parliament has pressed for stronger leadership from the Commission. The large amounts of violations of EU energy legislation and infringements proceedings show the member states' somewhat reluctance to open up their national energy markets. However, the development of a common European energy market has proceeded, evident by the adoption of a third energy market package. Second, *the energy mix frame* focus on Europe's diversification problem by connecting the European energy mix to the EU's increasing import dependency. Development of indigenous energy resources and diversification is viewed as the main solutions to increase competitiveness of the European energy market and decrease the EU's import dependency. The sovereignty over national energy mix lies within the member states, which have particularly been stressed by the European Council. The energy mix frame emphasizes the member states' ability to lead the development of the European energy policy, while the Commission has more of an overlooking role. Third, *the consumer/social frame* puts the

individual citizen in centre by emphasizing the effects of high energy prices and energy disruptions on consumers. Today, access to reliable and affordable energy is crucial in order to participate in social activities. Simultaneously, energy poverty has become a growing problem which may increase social instability in the EU. This frame was early pushed by the European Parliament who argued for an energy consumer charter and enhanced measures to counter energy poverty both at community and state level. The frame has been rather successful both for receiving support from the Commission and European Council and for the formation of a European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers, even though it did not provide any new legislation.

Finally, three divergent frames can be identified within the security of supply dimension. First, *the Energy Community frame* has particularly been pushed by the Commission and European Parliament. The main threats are perceived as the growing global competition of energy supplies and the decreasing reliability of energy supplies from exporting countries. The international energy market is characterized by interdependence and therefore international and multilateral agreements, based on market principles, are needed in order to create a global approach on energy security. The frame is based on three main tools the ECT, an EU formed international energy agreement, the Energy Community, a multilateral agreement aimed at expanding the EU energy market, and increasing the use of international forums, such as WTO and UN, to resolve energy matters. Even though the frame has predominantly been pushed by the Commission, the European Council has consistently recognized the importance of the ECT in order to achieve long-term security of supply. Second, *the strategic relations frame* identifies similar threats as the former frame. However, it emphasizes the importance of strategic relationships with key energy partners. The EU-Russia relation has particularly been highlighted as vital to the EU's energy security while other regions, such as the Caspian Sea and Black Sea, have been viewed as strategically important for diversification. The value of long-term contracts and bilateral agreements has also been acknowledged in order to increase supply security. The main signs of a strategic frame have come from the European Council. Third, *the solidarity frame* focuses on the EU's vulnerability to energy disruptions and the uneven effects energy crises have on the member states. The lack of solidarity within the EU, in case of energy disruptions, and the particular vulnerability of certain member states increase the demand for functioning crisis and solidarity mechanisms. The broad support of the solidarity frame has been evident by the inclusion of a solidarity clause within the Lisbon Treaty and the increase of transparency of emergency oil and gas stocks through the establishment of the EU energy observatory. Table 2 and 3 summarizes the identified frames.

The energy triangle	Sustainability	The internal energy market		
Define problem / Diagnose causes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Harmful economical, social and ecological effects of climate change.</li> <li>- Energy sector main contributor to GHG emissions.</li> <li>- Increased energy consumption leading to increased GHG emissions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fragmented markets increase Europe's vulnerability.</li> <li>- Governmental involvement in energy markets increases energy insecurity.</li> <li>- High energy prices threaten economical growth.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Import dependency threatens the security of national energy markets.</li> <li>- Lack of diversification in Europe has made it vulnerable to energy disruptions.</li> <li>- Poorly developed indigenous resources increases import dependency.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- High energy prices lower consumers' ability to interact in society.</li> <li>- Energy poverty, volatile energy prices and energy disruptions increases the risk of social and political instability.</li> </ul>
Making moral judgements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Climate change is a global as well as regional threat.</li> <li>- Climate change needs a common response.</li> <li>- EU has an obligation to lead by example.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Only a competitive European energy market can guarantee long-term energy security.</li> <li>- Completion of the internal energy market would benefit industry, consumers and energy security.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal diversification and development of indigenous energy resources is vital in order to form a competitive energy market.</li> <li>- The sovereignty of choice of energy mix lies within the member states.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Adequate supply of affordable energy is a fundamental right.</li> <li>- Consumer rights are essential for a well functioning energy sector.</li> </ul>
Suggesting solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Climate and energy package, including the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets.</li> <li>- Increased actions on energy efficiency, EU ETS, RES, and energy research.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation of the internal energy market packages.</li> <li>- Stronger leadership from the Commission.</li> <li>- Increase infringement proceedings against member states.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member states must enhance their diversification efforts.</li> <li>- The Commission should regularly assess different energy sources and the diversification of national energy mixes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers.</li> <li>- Increase national and Community measures to fight energy poverty.</li> <li>- Member states must uphold their universal service of energy supply.</li> </ul>
Identified Frames	<i>Sustainability frame</i>	<i>Competitive market frame</i>	<i>Energy mix frame</i>	<i>Consumer/social frame</i>

Table 2: Identified frame

The energy triangle	Security of supply		
Define problem / Diagnose causes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU has increasingly become import dependent.</li> <li>- The EU is vulnerable to energy disruptions and crises.</li> <li>- Energy disruptions threaten the functioning of the European energy market and the Single Market.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU has increasingly become import dependent.</li> <li>- Energy imports originate from a limited number of regions.</li> <li>- Exporting countries increasingly use energy as a political tool.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU's vulnerability to supply disruption is high.</li> <li>- The vulnerability of member states is unequal, with some being extremely vulnerable to energy crises.</li> <li>- Gas disruptions have shown the EU's lack of energy solidarity.</li> </ul>
Making moral judgments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The current international energy situation is based on interdependence.</li> <li>- International energy agreements need to be based on market rules.</li> <li>- International and multilateral agreements are needed to form a global understanding of energy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The EU need to establish closer relations with key energy partners.</li> <li>- Long-term energy contracts and bilateral agreements play an important part in securing energy supplies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Solidarity is an essential part of EU membership.</li> <li>- One member state's actions affect the rest of the EU.</li> <li>- The EU needs to speak with "a common voice".</li> </ul>
Suggesting solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Facilitate ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty.</li> <li>- Establishing and expanding the Energy Community.</li> <li>- Increase the use of international institutions like the UN, WTO and G20.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishing new energy agreements with Russia.</li> <li>- Improved relation with regions like Caspian Sea and Black Sea, e.g through the Black Sea Synergy.</li> <li>- Coordination of member states' energy relations and bilateral agreements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Developing solidarity mechanisms in the IEA.</li> <li>- Establish solidarity mechanisms in the EU's legislative framework.</li> <li>- Increase transparency of emergency energy stocks through the EU energy observatory.</li> </ul>
Identified frames	<i>Energy Community frame</i>	<i>Strategic relations frame</i>	<i>Solidarity frame</i>

Table 3: Identified frames

## 8.2 Discussion of actors' use of the frames

Considering the frames identified within the European energy policy one may analyze why actors, the institutions, have framed energy security in a specific way. The Commission has consistently framed energy as a commodity and as market issue. In the light of rational choice institutionalism this could be viewed as rather strategic and calculative act, since the Commission has significant influence in economic and market issues. Framing energy as a more strategic resource would instead move it towards foreign and security policy, where the Commission has comparatively little power and ability to influence policy outcomes. Similarly, the signs of a more strategic approach by the European Council by focusing on diversity and strategic relations with energy partners can be considered a rather strategic behaviour in order to maintain control over the national energy policy.

In line with sociological institutionalism, the European Parliament's ability to press for a more social consideration in the EU's energy policy highlights the importance of ideas in the development of institutional frameworks. The social framing of energy security gained a broad support within the EU, through the establishment of the European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers, much thanks to the European Parliament's emphasis on energy poverty and the individual European. Likewise has the solidarity frame, within the supply security dimension, gained broad support within the EU, since the solidarity principle is embedded within the EU-membership. Actors expect that actions within the EU's energy policy solidarity will be based on solidarity and behaviour which decreases energy security of other member states have been firmly criticised. In line with sociological institutionalism this shows the importance of ideas and norms in actors' behaviour in an institutional framework.

Similarly, the idea how energy should be treated have had a significant impact actors' behaviour within the EU's energy policy. Energy has since 1990s mainly been perceived as a commodity that should be managed by market principles. The Commission has emphasized this view continuously and pushed for increased liberalization and competition both within the EU and in its external relations. The European Council has instead started to show signs of more strategic perception of energy and especially highlighting the importance of security of supply. Diversification and bilateral agreement with key energy partners are increasingly becoming important tools to secure energy supply. The conflict between these viewpoints may also lie on a deeper level than how energy security is perceived, but rather on the idea of who should lead the development of the EU's energy policy.

Sociological institutionalism also offers valuable insights on why a more strategic framing has started to appear within the EU. The paradigm shift of the international energy market and the energy crises that member states have experienced during the years have led to increased internal and external pressure for changing of the EU's energy policy. The EU's market oriented approach has clearly received rather limited support from some energy exporting countries and needs to be modified to the current international energy situation.

The two former approaches falls short in explaining why the European energy policy has in many ways continued to be based on a market approach, even though internal and external pressure for institutional change of the EU's energy policy have increased. However,

historical institutionalism offers some interesting perspectives. Even though there are increasing signs of a more strategic approach by the European Council, it has repeatedly emphasized the value of a competitive European energy market and to promote liberalization of energy sectors to third countries. The progress made during the 1990s and the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has made the institutional framework of the EU's energy policy rather sticky, creating what historical institutionalism refers to as *path dependency*. The European Council has had problems in changing their behaviour within the EU's energy policy since it is bound by its previous agreements and endorsements.

Furthermore, the external pressure, by the paradigm shift in the international energy market, and internal pressure, from member states arguing for a more strategic approach, has increased, pushing for changes in the European energy policy. However, it has been hard to change the direction of the European energy policy, which continues to be dominated by a market-oriented approach. Considering that some of the EU's main energy partners, e.g. Russia, have shown limited support for the EU's market-oriented external energy policy, there is a risk, still rather small, that the current framework of the European energy policy is heading towards a state of "inertia", which might worsen the EU's energy security.

It is clear that there are divergent perceptions of energy security within the EU's energy policy and some of these are conflicting and will have to be resolved in order to achieve a common energy policy. However, there are some clear signs of a rather broad support for certain frames of energy security. Firstly, there is a clear support for a sustainability aspect of European energy policy. The importance of creating a sustainable energy sector in order to counter climate change has consistently been highlighted within the EU. The climate and energy package have significantly increased the EU's commitment to halt climate change and to lead internationally by example.

Furthermore, the social framing and solidarity aspect of the European energy policy has made a breakthrough in the EU. The broad support for the social aspect has in many ways been achieved by the European Parliament and the Commission, who have been successful in framing energy security as an issue for individual Europeans. Similarly, the success of the solidarity aspect of the EU's security of supply dimension gained early support in the European Council. This new member states have particularly pushed for this aspect in order to achieve a more coherent policy towards energy exporting countries. These two aspects may very well become a key in order to achieve a truly common European energy policy.

However, there are conflicting perceptions of energy security within the EU which hinders the development of a common European energy policy the EU's energy policy is moving into somewhat of crossroad. The external and internal pressure for a rather more strategic direction is increasing, while the Commission's market-oriented approach still dominates the EU's internal energy policy. The EU's external energy policy is dependent on its internal policy, and if the EU is to successfully promote a global approach on energy, based on market principles, the completion of a European energy market is crucial. Yet, a more balanced approach might be appropriate by combining the EU's energy interests with exporting countries' interests in order to increase energy security.

Finally, some recent events in the international arena may have significant impact on the EU's energy policy. Firstly, the Fukushima-nuclear disaster in Japan has already had some effects on energy policies in Europe, for example the German government's decision to phase down their nuclear energy sector. The disaster might have effects on public support for nuclear power in Europe and on the EU's nuclear energy policy. Simultaneously, the political developments in the Middle East and Northern Africa may have stabilizing effects on the international energy market, if they result in positive economical and political reforms.

### 8.3 Reflections

The study has shown that within the European energy policy a number of policy frames are present. Security has become an increasingly multidimensional and broadened concept, where actors can perceive security differently and framing of issues are growing in importance. Energy security is a particularly complex policy area, even more complicated by the multilevel and network structure of the EU. Frame analysis has proven fruitful in analyzing how energy security is perceived within the EU, showing that it can be useful tool when analyzing complex policy areas characterized by conflicting views and perceptions.

New institutionalism offers significant insights in explaining why actors have framed energy security in a certain way and why certain frames have received broader support than others. The different branches of institutionalism contribute in explaining actors' behaviour within the European energy policy. This also shows that even though rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism is based on different line of thoughts, they do all offer valuable insights when analyzing institutional frameworks.

Finally, the study opens up for further research within the European energy policy. A quantitative analysis of the energy frames could complement this study in order to better observe how influential and dominant the different frames are within the EU. Furthermore, study does not focus on the member states, which do have a large impact on the EU's energy policy. A deeper analysis of the energy discussions within the European Council would be fitting in order to better understand the development of the European energy policy.

## 9. Executive Summary

The development of a European energy policy has been somewhat of a paradox. Even though the foundation of the European Community, by the European Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM, was closely related to Europe's two main energy sources, coal and nuclear power, there were limited attempts to initiate the development of a common European energy policy. In the 1980s some early initiatives of integrating national energy policies began, but it was not until the 1990 that some clear progress was achieved. The EU pressed for liberalization of national energy markets and with the completion of the Single Market, together with low energy prices, there were optimistic views on the possibility of a common European energy market. However, at the turn of the century a new situation emerged on the international energy market. A paradigm shift towards "a seller's market", with high competition over limited sources of energy, appeared. The time of cheap and plentiful energy resources was over and instead energy prices started to increase, fewer countries had energy resources to export while the global energy consumption consistently grew. Simultaneously, the issue of climate change moved increasingly higher on policy-makers' agenda in order to halt the stress on the biosphere caused by pollution and emission. While the need for a common European energy policy has consistently increased, different perceptions and framing of energy security has limited the process of integrating national energy markets and forming of a European energy policy. The issue of energy security have become a dominant element of the European energy policy.

The concept of security has become increasingly broadened in international relations. Security has increasingly been conceptualized as a socially constructed phenomenon which can have different meanings in different context. The procedure of creating a security issue, also called securitization, involves a process of framing an issue as a security matter. Consequently security issues can be framed differently and perceived differently by actors. While energy is not a traditional aspect of security it has increasingly been conceptualized as a security matter, since the broadened concept of security. However, energy is a multidimensional and complex policy domain which is dominated by divergent perceptions of energy security. This is additionally true in the EU where framing of energy security has significantly influenced the development of the European energy policy. This thesis studies how energy security is perceived within the EU's energy policy, by analyzing *how energy security has been framed in the EU between 2004 and 2010*. The study aims to reach a fruitful discussion on *the underlying reasons for actors' choice of framing energy security in a particular way*. The analysis focuses on the three main EU-institutions, the Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament.

The study applies a frame analysis in order to identify different frames of energy security within the EU. The analysis is based on an analytical tool consisting of three elements; *Define problem/Diagnose causes, making moral judgments and suggesting solutions*. The tool is then

used to analyze the three main elements of the European energy policy; sustainability, the internal energy market and security of supply.

The Study identifies seven different frames of energy security within the EU. The *Sustainability frame* is emphasized by all the institutions. There is broad consensus on the urgency of creating a sustainable European energy sector in order to counter climate change. The EU is considering itself having an obligation to lead the global struggle against global warming and to lead by example. The climate and energy package, which was adopted in 2008, has only increased the EU's commitment to create a sustainable European energy sector. Within the internal energy market dimension, three frames are identified. First *the Competitive market frame*, which has mainly been emphasized by the Commission and the European Parliament. This frame emphasizes the necessity for a competitive internal energy market in order to achieve the EU's energy objectives. The European Parliament has pushed for a stronger leadership by the Commission, who have initiated new legislative proposals by the third internal energy market package. *The Energy mix frame* has mainly been pushed by the European Council. The frame emphasizes the need for diversification and development of indigenous energy resources in order to increase competitiveness of the European energy market and to decrease the EU's import dependency. The frame is based on member states' sovereignty to choose their internal energy mix and clearly shows the member states' intent to lead the development of the European energy policy. Third, *the Consumer/social frame* has particularly been pushed by the European Parliament and focuses on the rights of individual consumers and the vulnerability of certain parts of the European population. The frame has been successful in gaining support, evident by the formation of a European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers. Within the security of supply dimension three frames can be identified. First *the Energy Community frame*, which emphasizes the need for international and multilateral energy agreements, based on market principle, to create global understanding of energy security. This frame has been particularly been pushed by the Commission and emphasizes the importance of the ECT and WTO. Second *the Strategic relations frame* emphasizes the importance of deeper and more strategic relations with key energy partners. This frame has been mainly been highlighted by the European Council is based on principle of energy as a strategic resource. Finally, *the Solidarity frame* has gained a broad support by the institutions partly because the principle solidarity is already embedded within the EU-membership. The frame emphasized the unequal effects energy disruptions have on the member states and that solidarity mechanisms are needed within the European energy policy in order to protect vulnerable nations.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the main finding, on basis of institutionalist framework. The different institutionalist approaches offers important insights in explaining the actors behaviour with the European energy policy. Especially historical and sociological institutionalism contributes in explaining the underlying reasons for the institutions' choice of how to frame energy security in the European energy policy. Finally the paper presents some reflection of the study and suggests some further research of the European energy policy.

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