


MASTERS THESIS

WELFARE POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT



Partnerships in the delivery of welfare services

A case of the RUMPI project of Cameroon.



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MASTERS THESIS IN WELFARE POLICIES AND
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Dedication and acknowledgement.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents: Madam Hannah Ekume and Justice R.T.Ndoping for their constant guidance and support all through my educational carrier. They mean the world to me.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.

ADB	-	African Development Bank
CDA	-	Community Development Adviser
GOC	-	Government of Cameroon.
MIFED	-	Micro Finance and Development.
MINADER	-	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
NPG	-	New Public Governance
NPM	-	New Public Management
PA	-	Public Administration
PC	-	Project coordinator.
PPP	-	Public Private Partnership
DDARD	-	Divisional Delegation of Agriculture and Rural Development.
PIT	-	Project Implementation Team
PSC	-	Project Steering Committee
RDARD	-	Regional Delegation of Agriculture and Rural Development.
RUMPI	-	A mapped out local area within the South West Region of Cameroon.
SOWEDA	-	South West Development Authority.

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Abstract

My research seeks to present Public Private Partnerships in the delivery of welfare services most especially within a developing country context. I use a project case located in the South West region of Cameroon called RUMPI, jointly financed by the African Development Bank and Government of Cameroon to assess partnership contribution of two different types of institutions partnering for welfare delivery within the New Public Management context. I seek to establish the rationale of the RUMPI project with respect to service delivery and public policy formation. My focus is on the strategic build of the partnership relationship in the attainment of welfare benefits in the state of Cameroon. In essence I use partnerships to denote “working arrangements based on a mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with any other organization outside the public service” (Boviad 2004, P. 200). My use of the theory of Organisational partnerships is to establish the partnership relationship between the government of Cameroon and the African Development Bank for the RUMPI project, while the theory and practice of Collaborative advantage is used to build themes in collaboration as they both contribute to welfare delivery. To accomplish my task, I use interviews, discussions and observations to build on the strategic partnership and its contribution to welfare delivery. In my analysis I discovered that the RUMPI project greatly contributed to welfare delivery in the country though flawed by problems of a marriage between two different types of organisations having different styles of management. It was also discovered that the welfare contribution of the RUMPI project was just a miles stone in a country that has a large percentage of its population below the poverty line.

Key words: Public Private Partnerships, RUMPI project. Welfare Delivery, African Development Bank, Cameroon, Partnerships and collaboration, Participatory Development.

Words: 18,102

1 Introduction

The notion of partnership brings to mind an established arrangement between two parties for the accomplishment of a common goal. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a very common phenomenon in international politics. My main bone of contention is not necessarily our love or dislike for them, but how they have established themselves to conveniently operate for the accomplishment of a common purpose of welfare delivery. PPPs now have a comfortable position in both global governance and public policy implementation within states the world over. Public policy implementation is no longer the prerogative of a single actor (the state) but now encompasses both the civil society and other international actors. The case is even more peculiar within developing nations, where the Breton woods institutions have constantly been calling on privatization, meaning a shift from most state owned corporations to private actors in a bid to reduce national spending and borrowing, while creating open international markets for developing nations and creating more avenues for welfare development.

Welfare provision remains an uneasy burden for most African nations, and in order to meet the constant demands of their population they sought to partner with multinational institutions for the provision of some major welfare services. Moreover, transnational and international financial institutions have also been active in joint efforts with the state to contribute to both poverty alleviation and economic development. Several programs have been created in partnership with the state by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which according to Whitfield (2001) creates new global markets in health, education and other services. Whitfield's idea surrounds the fact that public and private decisions that affects daily lives are dominated by financial efficiency and commercial criteria in the pursuit of market forces (*Ibid* 2001,P.xvi).

Several other writers have also put forward arguments that Public Private Partnerships are a means by which governance could be made effective, and governmental institutions strengthened, see for example Osborne 2010; Bovaird 2004. This could be most effective in cases where multilateral financial institutions partner with poorer economies for purposes of economic development and welfare delivery.

While others call this form of partnership “The New Public Management” (NPM), a concept which advocates the introduction of ‘private sector management techniques’ within public service administration (Osborne 2010; Hood 2010; Henman & Fenger 2006; Whitfield 2001), others term it the New Public Governance, which denotes “a conceptualization of public policy implementation and public services management” geared towards assisting “our understanding of the complexity of these challenges and as a reflection of the reality of the working lives of public managers today” (Osborne 2010,P.6). Each of these terms seek to conceptualize PPPs within public policy and welfare delivery. The question is how do these multinational entities enter into partnership with governments for welfare delivery; what is the rationale for these forms of partnerships and how do they contribute to welfare delivery within these states?

Varied forms of PPPs do exist within an international global context, but this research will focus on a multinational corporation partnering with an African country for welfare delivery. It will lay emphasis on the strategic alliance between both partners based on shared interest. I seek to understand the rationale for this types of partnerships and how they contribute to welfare service delivery. I would be using a case study of a multilateral institution known as The African Development Bank (ADB) and The Government of Cameroon (GOC) partnering under a project known as RUMPI for welfare delivery. I would be using the following research questions to accomplish my purpose:

- ❖ What is the rationale for the RUMPI Partnership between the government of Cameroon and the African Development Bank?
- ❖ How has the RUMPI partnership contributed to Welfare delivery within the state of Cameroon?

For my study outline, I started with an introduction, following will be my background of study. In this section I will present previous research on Public Private Partnerships, especially those related to service delivery and economic development. I will also present the state of Cameroon and the RUMPI project. The next section of the research will be my theories. I will present definitions for PPPs, contextualize, and locate them within public policy formation before presenting my main theories, which are - the

theory of Organisational Partnerships and the theory and Practice of Collaborative Advantage. My method will be next. I will use this chapter to present the case study approach, defend my reasons for choosing the RUMPI project, present my sources of data, and reflect on reliability, validity as well as limitations faced during the research. Chapter five will begin my analysis. I will first of all analyse the strategic build within the RUMPI partnership, and partnership collaboration within the RUMPI project. This introductory phase of my analysis will act as the main link between my theories and empirical material. I will also present the strategic partnership and steps for project accomplishment, this will include: The strategic partnership relationship and institutional set-up for project accomplishment. The last part of my analysis will be RUMPI's rationale. I will attempt at analyzing if the RUMPI project is just an arm chair policy or if it is capable of practically contributing to Welfare delivery. In order to access this, I will present practical examples of accomplished projects and later analyse them on a need based point of view, or just public policy manipulation. I will end my research with a brief discussion and conclusion that will reiterate major points discussed.

2 Background of Study

2.1 Previous research.

This sub-section attempts at presenting previous research on public private partnerships. Since there is a lot of research within this field of study, some of which I will be exploited within my theoretical chapter, I will mainly focus on a few that are related to service delivery and/or economic development.

Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2009 write an article entitled digital diasporas: Identity and transnational engagements. In this article they exploit diaspora communities as a private partner with public service institutions for development and service delivery. Their argument is that Diasporas who maintain a physical and psychological attachment to their states of origin could be termed as private partners who have the capability of contributing enormously to the development of their home states especially those from developing countries. They enforce this through varied information associations such: philanthropic organisations, internet communities, business links and direct advocacy groups. This is significant because on a need based analysis, it greatly contributes to the welfare needs of their home population, assist in economic development and also in alleviating poverty in rural communities. These ideas are similar to the objectives of the RUMPI partnership but while RUMPI is a partnership of formal organisations, they write on informal organisations.

Lipsky 2011 writes an article in a public administration journal entitled - Evaluating the strength of faith: Potential comparative advantages of faith-based organizations providing health services in sub-Saharan Africa. This article seeks to establish the advantages of faith based organizations. Her presentation of partnerships targets those related to health service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa. She explains that the role of these partnerships is significant because of a positive track record in touching the grass roots and needy population of Africa and their attempt at creating a sustainable supply of health services in these areas. She argues that these partnerships could be an extremely significant way to achieve the millennium development goals, while presenting these positive aspects she also illuminates the weaknesses that could be

associated with these sorts of partnerships. This is also linked to welfare delivery as the RUMPI project, she writes about the health sector in particular, and sub-Saharan Africa in general, while the RUMPI project is directed towards several sectors and Cameroon in particular.

Mousma 2004 writes a book entitled - Putting faith in partnerships: Welfare to work in four cities. This book attempts at establishing the public private partnership divide as a new phenomenon. He presents different types of private actors which are now engaged alongside governments in welfare delivery. For example profit based organizations and faith based organizations. His argument surrounds those ideas on presenting what he terms a “welfare to work” for states in order to build a wider scope for welfare delivery within the nation. He also classifies social service providers and use practical examples within cities in the United States to substantiate his case. Again this research focuses on welfare delivery, but is it written within a developed country context, while mine is written within a developing country context.

2.2 The state of Cameroon and the RUMPI project.

Cameroon is a central African country “situated in the crook of the gulf of Guinea with a surface area of 475 442 km²,...bounded to the north west by Nigeria, to the north by Chad, to the east by the Central African Republic and to the south by Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon” (African Development Bank 2010, P.13). The country’s population presently stands above 19 million with approximately 250 ethnic groups and a yearly growth rate of 2.8 %. It is divided into 10 regions, with two being English speaking and eight being French speaking (*ibid* 2010, P.13). The country deals with oil and various agricultural products such as timber, coffee, rubber, cocoa, and cotton. These products largely contribute to its GDP and accounts for up to 75% of the country’s total exports. “On the demand side, consumption has accounted for nearly 80.3% of GDP and investment, 16.9%. On the supply side, the primary sector, whose value added is on the rise, employs 60% of the workforce and accounts for 21% of GDP” (African Development Bank 2010, P13). The major problem faced in the growth

of the primary sector is poor or “inadequate rural infrastructure”, poor farm to market roads, inadequate rural-urban linkages, and “constraints in the financing of production”. On the part of the secondary sector, it’s value added accounts for over 33% of the country’s GDP, but production has also been hampered by “depletion of some oil wells,..low competitiveness of agro-industries and the saturation of the electric energy supply capacity” (*Ibid* 2010, P.13-14).

As a developing country, the state of Cameroon employs a strategy of “strengthening governance with a view to improving the state’s strategic management and infrastructure development” and also converging “government priorities contained in its 2010-2020 Growth and Employment Strategy Document” in a bid to building a “foundation for its 2035 forecast, a timeframe within which the country looks to become an emerging economy” (African Development Bank 2010, P.11). One of its major goals is eradication of poverty amongst rural households, most especially with increasing incomes in a sustainable manner for the rural poor. The strategy involves increasing agricultural output, creating access to local and urban markets as well as enhancing socio-economic development with rural areas. Poverty alleviation is a major concern of the state, especially in its efforts to improve the welfare of its inhabitants. It also employs considerable efforts in providing basic health care and education (RUMPI Project report 2010). Moreover, transnational and international financial institutions have also been active in joint efforts with the state to assist in welfare delivery. Several programs have been created in partnership with the state by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The African Development Bank (ADB) has had a partnership with Cameroon for 33 years, within which period 71 operations in the country have been approved by the bank. Out of these, 55 have already been fully completed totalling to UA 819 million. The amount invested in operations is divided as 53.46% loan and 46.54 grant, of which the private sector alone has had UA 63.6 million.

The ADB’s operations in Cameroon have greatly assisted in welfare delivery and economic development in a bid to step up the fight against poverty. A major emphasis has been on forestry development with integrated rural schemes fisheries and animal husbandry, poultry farming, micro credit for rural areas, just to name a few. “On the whole, the actions seek to develop basic socioeconomic infrastructure, improve

agricultural output, promote income-generating activities, strengthen the capacities of stakeholders and promote micro-credit” (The ADB 2010, P.23). The RUMPI project is one of such projects jointly financed by the Bank and government of Cameroon to cover the South West region of the country. It was created to be an integrated rural development project covering varied sectors within the region.

The RUMPI project is currently one of the projects under the South West Development of Cameroon (SOWEDA). SOWEDA is a state corporation mandated by the government to coordinate and run “economic and social development programs” and projects within the South West region of Cameroon. Approved in December 2002, and later became effective only in February 2004, the RUMPI project has as its main mission to “contribute to poverty reduction among rural households in the South West Region by increasing their incomes in a sustainable manner, through improving agricultural output and access to markets as well as enhancing their socio-economic environment” (RUMPI brochure 2009,P.1) The most interesting part of the project is its joint financing and partnership with several institution in the execution of its programs and projects. With regards to its financing percentages, the ADB has 75% (main funders), the government of Cameroon (GOC) 15%, the Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) 8%, and the beneficiaries by 2% (*Ibid* 2009,P .1)

The project is drafted to cover 6 divisions within the South West region, and has four components. The first is to organise capacity building in “empowering rural communities”, “strengthen rural development institutions”, “implement, monitor and evaluate community –based projects on a sustainable basis”. The second is ensuring a steady agricultural production, and maintain a sustainable production level by “outreach and technology transfer” , improvement of planting materials, as well as natural resource management. The third component involves improvement of rural infrastructure, with the rehabilitation and construction of roads, “portable water schemes, rural markets, health centres and community education and action centres”. The fourth component consist of the “project implementation unit”, it is headed by the RUMPI project coordinator and other stake holders are represented in a steering committee that monitors project progress and takes major decision on the project. But the board of steering committee members is chaired by the governor of the South West Region (RUMPI brochure 2009, P.2-3).

The RUMPI project was originally mandated to cover a period of 6 years (2004-2010), but as a result of halts in execution, stemming from multiple suspensions of the project operations, it was extended up to June 2011 (The African development bank 2010; RUMPI project report 2010, the RUMPI brochure 2009). The project as at February 2011 had made significant progress on sensitization workshops, village capacity building, spreading and improving farming materials for planting, elaboration of village development plans, completion of studies for rural roads, portable water schemes, markets, village banks and health centers. Some micro projects have also been supported, while some roads rural roads and health centers are presently under construction. More so it has established a market information system for some 8 markets where data is collected, analyzed and information transmitted over the media, and some contracts for road construction have been approved awaiting construction to begin, just to name a few (RUMPI project report 2010; RUMPI brochure 2009)

3 Theory

This chapter presents PPPs within a theoretical perspective. It gives a literature review of different definitions and context within which PPPs operate and contextualizes PPPs within welfare service delivery. For the purpose of this research, there is a focus on governance, management, and service delivery. Within this, two theories are analyzed on PPPs, namely the theory of Organizational partnerships which better explains why governments would prefer to partner including the shortcomings of this collaboration, and the theory and practice of collaborative advantage which contextualizes collaboration within partnerships that helps to better understand joint service delivery. Both theories are used to examine the rationale of PPPs and how they contribute to welfare delivery.

3.1 Defining Public Private Partnerships

Public Private Partnerships are not a new concept in international relations or public policy, there exist a plethora of varied definitions and a multiplicity of arguments on PPPs based on context and fields of operation. But what do we actually call PPPs? The simplest way to understand the concept is to examine it as a form of contracting out. A state, region or municipality contracts a service provision to a private actor (See for example Johnston and Romsek 2005). Koppenjan 2005 defines PPPs as “a form of structured cooperation between public and private partners in planning/construction and/or exploitation of infrastructure facilities in which they share or allocate risks, costs, benefits, resources and responsibilities” (P.137). Very close to this definition is that of Grimsey & Lewis, they define PPPs as “arrangements whereby private parties participate in, or provide support for the provision of infrastructure, and a PPP project results in a contract for a private entity to delivery public infrastructure based services”(2007, P.2). Both definitions are mostly situated within infrastructure development and risk sharing within partnerships.

Phumpiu & Gustafsson 2009 use Rein et al 2005's definition to describe that partnerships denote the participation of the private sector within public service activities. Noting that it “ refers to a contract between the public and private sector, a ‘client-contractor relationship’ or outsourcing arrangements bound by contract (...) a shift of responsibilities usually from public to private sector”. This definition is very operational and can be used within varied context of PPPs, but it could also be erroneous to generally term partnerships as a shift of responsibilities from the Public to private sector, partnerships could also be joint responsibilities. In the South African context, a Public Private partnership is defined as “a contract between a public sector institution/municipality and a private party, in which the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risk in the design, financing, building and operation of a project (National Treasury PPP unit, 2002). This definition is enshrined within the South African law, and executed by the PPP unit of the National treasury.

Amongst the varied discussions on an operational definition of PPPs I found two very captivating expressions of the concept. The first is given by Schäferhoff et al 2009. He defines PPPs as “institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private sectors which aim at the provision of collective goods” (P. 455). This definition clearly fits within my context and also briefly summarizes most of the other definitions presented by various authors. But it simply focus on transboundary interactions, meaning the downside might be leaving out local NGOs which partner with the public service for the same purposes. But Bovaird 2004 offers a more encompassing definition, he defines PPPs as “working arrangements based on a mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with any other organization outside the public service (P. 200). This can not only be looked upon as a bottom line definition but almost completely includes all types of Public Private Partnerships, giving it a broad but practical outlook of public private partnerships with all domains. It is permits a better operationalization of the concept.

3.2 Contextualizing Public Private Partnerships within welfare service delivery.

Contemporary welfare reforms have been influenced by the ideas of what Henman and Fenger 2006 calls the 'New Public Management'(NPM) and Whitfield 2001 calls the 'New Public Service management'(NPSM). This new realm of thought became popular between the 80s and 90s. Moreover, governance has also been associated with the term Public Administration (PA) in terms of its structure, scope and definition, and as a result governance found its way into both the daily usage of welfare service delivery and Public Private Partnerships. Both governance and the NPM perspectives focus on the practical aspects of administration and execution of policy processes. This gives us both a relevant perspective of administration, and presents a clearer picture on welfare administrative reforms (Henman and Fenger 2006, P.2).

The association between public administration and governance could be better divided between politics and legality-the rule of law. Within Politics public administration has been described as government's actions (governing) affecting the day to day lives of the inhabitants (the governed) in making strategic decisions of public interest with a manner known as 'collective doing' of a selective few to meet the needs of people who could not do so on their own (Pixie 2010; Simon et al 1991; Denhardt & Denhardt 2009; Osborne 2010). While on the basis of the rule of law, public administration is seen as an agency (governor) which implements legislation and regulates individual and group behavior (the governed) in a bid to maintain a stable and more conducive society for a country's inhabitants (Osborne 2010; Miller & Fox 2007; Lane 2005; Pixie 2010). The argument presented for the implementation of the NPM is built on the necessity of involving private management techniques within the public service in order to increase the capacity of the state and enable it to undertake functions of managing the economy, providing basic necessities, reduce poverty and most essentially promote the development of the nation (Whitfield 2001, P.222 & 253). One of the ways of involving private sector techniques within public service management is partnering with organizations that have the capacity and strength to shape governance and administration with weak state institutions of government. This builds up an entire set up of service delivery and welfare administration, especially within developing

economies. Henman and Fenger state that “Welfare administration is the very locus in which the operation and effect of policy is defined and governmental power relations flowing through welfare agencies, staff and claimants constituted” (Henman and Fenger 2006, P.19).

Other writers even shifted the NPM discourse to a more narrow focus from the term governance to ‘governmentality’. The idea is that governance offers a more descriptive and normative engagement to welfare delivery and administration, while ‘governmentality’ offers a more analytic aspect to both welfare delivery and public policy administration which is capable of building a wider scope that involves partners (like in PPPs) in building a government for the people and by the people. Governmentality avoids the usage of governance and prefers the use of the term ‘government’. Government in this sense stands for a more participative and practical aspect of administration (Henman and Fenger 2006, P.22). The whole idea of governmentality is like a reformation of welfare administration and looks at governance on an imaginary sense on the practices and nature of the state. In other words, it looks at ‘governance’ as a governmental rationality, investigating the way in which ‘governance’ makes up a particular “notion of state, contemporary governmental problems and entities for state action” while creating a base for openness and transparency that could be brought by private entities (within the scope of PPPs) or private management techniques within the perspective of the NPM (Henman and Fenger 2006, P.27-28). I view governmentality as simply a way of conceptualizing an all encompassing government with other actors within the private sector or international community as opposed to a singular stirring of public policy.

The whole idea comes down to the fact that welfare delivery is no longer a singular effort of a state, but a joint contribution of the state, the private sector and service users. But the the question is why do governments constantly engage in PPPs for service delivery? What is the rationale for moves to engage into contracts with a private entity or multinational organization? Whitfield 2010 presents some clear-cut and simple reasons for governments’ engagement into PPP:

They enable government’s improvement of basic services, facilities and public infrastructure, shaping public policy in a better way than just utilizing resources available from government revenues and other budgetary options; Economies with low

spending which also have the incapability of taxing more than the economy can contain use PPPs as avenues to generate income in maintaining infrastructure and or creating new projects and facilities that could boast economic growth and create a more stable welfare provision; Also, PPPs help in manipulating “public sector accountancy rules to conceal public debt and the ownership of public assets”. Government balance sheets present these projects as acquired to be compensated later, because most of them are loans to be refunded instalmentally. Whitfield likens this to “a credit card consumerism boom that contributed to the global financial crises”; Another idea is the fact that the illusion behind PPPs is the idea that projects are being either privately or jointly financed which in essence is most often entirely from tax payers money or users of the service; Moreover, governments, especially in developing economies transfer “public debts to “contract obligations” within a long term with instalmental payments to the public sector from its meagre revenue or tax service users; Lastly, there is also a possibility for “banks, private equity and infrastructure funds” to acquire fresh investment opportunities as well as accumulating that which is “supported by government backed security, designed to maximize their profits and minimize risks (Whitfield 2010, P. 15-16)

3.3 Public Private Partnerships and Public Policy Formation.

How do private multinational actors or local private actors engage in public policy formation with the states they partner? What are the implications? Is it a one sided relationship? A profit directed motive, humanitarian economic or poverty alleviation driven plan of action? All these question come to mind when we elaborate on PPPs and public policy formation. The whole notion boils down to the term governance, management and service delivery. Who governs and how is the management effectuated to ensure users get the services for which the PPP was created for?

Governance was mostly associated with the term Public Administration (PA) in terms of its structure, scope and definition. Public administration is said to depict “what government does, that is governing people and making policies. But taking into

consideration the fact that government activities are extremely wide, such a simple definition would not be most appropriate to completely suit the term (Pixie 2010). This association between public administration and governance could be better divided between politics and legality-the rule of law. Within Politics public administration has been described as government's actions (governing) affecting the day to day lives of the inhabitants (the governed) in making strategic decisions of public interest with a manner known as 'collective doing' of a selective few to meet the needs of people who could not do so on their own (Pixie 2010; Simon et al 1991; Denhardt & Denhardt 2009; Osborne 2010). While on the basis of the rule of law, public administration is seen as an agency (governor) which implements legislation and regulates individual and group behavior (the governed) in a bid to maintain a stable and more conducive society for a country's inhabitants (Osborne 2010; Miller & Fox 2007; Lane 2005; Pixie 2010).

Interestingly, management within the framework of PPPs has been looked upon by various actors from the perspective of the New Public Management (NPM) which breeds the notion that the public service was filled with stereo-typed rules that create room for inefficiency. The idea behind the NPM was that it would be more beneficial to introduce 'private sector management techniques' within public service administration and public service delivery (Osborne 2010; Hood 2010; Henman & Fenger 2006; Whitfield 2001). The NPM is a managerial style which asserts "the superiority of private-sector managerial techniques over those of Public Administration, with the assumption that the application of such techniques to public service delivery would automatically lead to improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of these services" (Thatcher 1995 in Osborne 2010, P3). This new discourse brought ideas of administrative reforms that were geared towards eliminating inefficiency, overlap and or duplication in private sector styled professional techniques of management (Hood 2010; Osborne 2010; Henman and Fenger 2006).

The NPM is seen to be of high need for an increased capacity of the state and enables it to undertake functions of managing the economy, providing basic necessities, reduce poverty and most essentially promote the development of the nation (Whitfield 2001, P.222 & 253). All of these efforts are geared towards the delivery of welfare within nation states and stresses the fact that if public administration is supposed to function efficiently, there must be a high limitation of bureaucracy, fraud has to be

checked, corruption must be fought violently, and the misuse of public funds must be stopped in order for the engine of the NPM to work and meet the welfare needs of the population (*Ibid* 2001, P.255).

This whole idea of governance recently shifted to a non normative focus that is still built on both public administration and the New Public Management by other writers such as Osborne 2010; Rubin 2010; Lynn 2010. Osborne attempts at building his whole idea on governance and PPPs within what he calls the New Public Governance. He describes it as “a conceptualization of public policy implementation and public services management” geared towards assisting “our understanding of the complexity of these challenges and as a reflection of the reality of the working lives of public managers today”. He states that it is “neither a...normative new paradigm to supersede PA and the NPM nor as ‘the best way’ to respond to challenges of public policy implementation and public service delivery in the twenty first century, but a revamped way of looking at public administration and public service delivery in response to the face of the challenges facing PA and the NPM (P.6&9). Lynn has a more direct and focused description to the term, she defines it as “a mode of societal steering that has been de-bureaucratized in favour of emergent hybridized and consociational institutions” (Lynn 2010, P.109). This whole idea of the NPG introduces the idea of networks in administration, a system whereby the administration’s role is revamped to include partners in the delivery of welfare and public service administration.

I find the NPG to be a very interesting concept that is capable of assisting in the understanding of practical issues within the NPM, but the term on its own falls short of any strength of applicability to a practical context, because firstly it is not normative, and secondly it brings nothing really new as Osborne 2010 and Lynn 2010 seemingly assume. Lynn 2010 present it as “a mode of societal steering that has been de-bureaucratized in favour of emergent hybridized and consociational institutions” (P.109), which is a brighter way of looking at Public management and PPPs but it still builds all its ideas and theoretical foundations on the NPM, lacking any normative strength or individuality in capturing public policy formation. The NPG as I see is simply an abstract way of viewing the NPM using softer terms yet building on the same concepts as the NPM. I am going to focus on two theories which though written within

the context of the NPG are built within the NPM and are capable of enabling us grasp the realities of partnerships and collaboration within welfare delivery.

3.4 Theory of Organizational partnerships

This theory is developed with ideas of the NPM and built within the context the NPG by writers such as McQuaid 2010; Osborne 2010. The theory stipulates that the promotion of partnerships between governmental departments, public corporations, private or multilateral corporations and the third sector is gradually becoming a valuable strategy in promoting labor-market inclusions both at national and international levels (McQuaid 2010). It also seeks to establish reasons why policy makers increasingly exploit partnership opportunities or networks in administration to establish a broad base of stakeholders that could contribute to the design, organization, coordinating and public service delivery in a bid to building a better state welfare setup (Whitfield 2001; Henman & Fenger 2006; Osborne 2010; McQuaid 2010).

McQuaid 2010 presents varied types of partnerships that could be established for the delivery of public services, based on the circumstances and setting. But the main issue is to identify a particular partnership type in each circumstance. Defining partnerships within the context of PPPs and their impact on public service delivery, the OECD states that they are “systems of formalized cooperation, grounded in legally binding arrangements or informal understanding cooperative working relationships, and mutually adopted plans among a number of institutions. They involve agreements on policy and programme objectives and sharing of responsibility resources, risks and benefits over a specified period of time” (OECD 2008, P.18). In the theory of organizational partnership McQuaid 2010 presents different dimensions or levels of partnership that could be categorized into inter-agencies of ideal typical forms of cooperation. His examples include: “Facilitating partnerships”: concerned with managing long standing strategic or financial facilitation issues; “coordinating partnerships”, involving both management and implementation “of policy based on broadly agreed priorities”; and lastly “implementing partnerships”, concerned with a more pragmatic

approach to governance and concerned “with specific, mutually beneficial projects” (McQuaid 2010, P129).

The theory of organizational partnership presents reasons why governments choose to engage in PPPs and also the short comings of these partnerships. It builds on the ideas that partnering creates a broader base for public service delivery, builds on financing networks and also lays the foundation for a better labor market inclusion of other policy making stakeholders. (Whitfield 2010; Lynn 2010; Osborne 2010). But also that partnering brings lots of actors and resources together which can as well blur accountability, and creates other major problems in public policy administration (McQuaid 2010; Osborne 2010). I will first of all examine the reasons that encourage economies to engage in PPPs, after which I will look at the short comings of this collaboration.

Partnership for the purpose of service delivery creates a more flexible yet responsive and focused solution to social and economic problems of a nation, as well as contribution to economic growth and the general wellbeing of the citizens. Partnership supports the inadequacy of some states to meet the constantly increasing welfare needs of their population. It creates new avenues for assistance and helps to better direct resources that will go a long way to raise inhabitants over the poverty line (McQuaid 2010). Whitfield’s idea is very close to this when he talks of the power of enabling basic facilities, improving infrastructure and creating avenues for projects out of normal government budgetary options (2010).

The power of partnerships also lies in its ability to provide better innovative ways of approaching policy issues and also in evaluating successes and failures. By bringing different actors and stakeholders in the policy making and implementation process, more innovative ideas are developed and the best solution is created and well tailored towards handling a particular problem. More expertise is galvanized and risks are easily contained. Therefore old ways are challenged while better and effective approaches are put together to solve major policy issues (Lynn 2010; McQuaid 2010). Expertise could be galvanized from various structures of PPPs, especially in cases where infra-state structures partner with developing economies to provide leverage for poverty alleviation and create new global markets in health, education and other services (Whitfield 2010)

Moreover, partnering pools resources together and creates a synergy on a particular policy issues or problem. As more than one stakeholder pools resources, it leads to an increase in the budget and of resources that is “brought to bear” on key problem areas. And when complementary resources are pulled from different organizations or entities, this combination enables them operate in a better ways as opposed to the normal approach of individual organizations, and synergy could be achieved (Jeschke 2006; McQuaid 2010). One of the greatest strengths of PPPs is their ability to synergize public and private sectors in pulling knowledge and bring a joint solution to a local problem, see for example Vangen & Huxham 2010; Hood 2010; Whitfield 2001, 2010; and Osborne 2010. Besides the resources pulled together from different sources, the synergy between these actors provides a scenario where stakeholders and or partners learn from each other. It develops better working relationships among partners, better approaches to handling issues, breeds innovation and avoids duplication of services, improve working communication and also avoid inefficiencies. Hence it creates a different level of professional learning (Jeschke 2006).

Despite these strengths that enables governments to engage into partnerships, there also exist a number of shortcomings in PPPs, for example it is assumed that partnerships might not achieve a synergy for several reasons such as lack of consistent goals; high cost of resources; a tougher impact on some of the services concerned with execution; as well as different styles and approaches between different partners. Public service management is quite complex and bureaucratic, while private service management follows a strict direct style that is mostly geared towards profit maximization and efficiency (McQuaid 2010; Huxham & Vangen 2005). Also see for example Henman and Fenger 2006 when they make mention of the fact that the public service administration had been filled with bureaucratic stereo types and an old system of management, while private service ideas are geared towards organizational efficiency.

Another major short coming of partnerships is the fact that partnering creates problems with accountability. With several actors involved at each stage of execution, it might create a situation where no partner feels completely accountable for their actions of the partnership as a result of the division in both responsibility and control. There could be unclear indications of who is accountable to who, and these conflicts might

create a vacuum in accountability of resources in the project (Huxham and Vangen 2005; McQuaid 2010). Accountability could be looked upon from another angle, Whitfield states that there is some form of manipulation within “public sector accountancy rules to conceal public debt and the ownership of public assets”. Meaning government accounts present these projects as acquired to be compensated later, but they are still paid almost completely from government budgetary options. He likens this to a credit card consumption that could as well lead to crisis (2010, P.15).

Organizational difficulties may also pose as a negative impact on partnerships. This involves poor coordination, and poor approach to problems, as well as merging weak organizations with vibrant and good working organizations. This might produce serious barriers to a smooth partnership working, such as organizational, legal/technical, technological, as well as political hindrances. Also at strategic levels, effective cooperation between governments and other funding institutions might face problems as a result of “rigidity of institutional and policy structures”, with government institutions having the tendency of operating in a more stereo typed or narrowly focused style of public policy management (McQuaid 2010, P.135). Another related impact to this point is differences in philosophy among major partners in the program or project. These differences might stem from ethical values especially as the public and private sectors are brought together in execution partnerships. With different ideas and approaches, it might not be so easy applying both public and private management techniques within that particular setting of collaboration (Whitfield 2010; McQuaid 2010).

Both the rationale that motivates the existence of PPPs and its short comings carry tangible points to either encourage or discourage PPPs from existing, but each context varies and the purposes for their existence differs from one setting to another, while also being guided by certain rules of collaboration and partnering. To isolate a contribution of a PPP one must examine these points within the context of that particular PPP. This point would be adequately illustrated in the analysis of my case in chapter 5. My next focus is theory and practice of collaborative advantage intended to ease the understanding of collaborative efforts of PPPs in welfare delivery.

3.5 Theory and practice of collaborative advantage.

I consider the theory of collaborative advantage to be part and parcel of the theory of organizational partnerships. I use it to denote the relationships that exist among partners as they collaborate and synergize for a common purpose. Originally, this theory was developed from a research that has lasted since 1989 in which varied forms of data was collected on collaborative situations, including “senior managers” associated with organizations and institutions involved in partnerships with other organizations. These collaborations “ranged from ‘dyads’ (two party-collaborations) to international world wide networks”. It is a world of inspiration and possibilities as more than one source and strength is pulled together for a common purpose but also a world of frustration as working with different ideas and philosophies isn’t an easy task (Vangen & Huxham 2010, P.163 Huxham & Vangen 2005, P.3-5).

The theory and practice of collaborative advantage builds its main principle on the idea that “almost anything is, in principle, possible through collaboration because you are limited by your own resources and expertise”. And the possibility of doing resource sharing and expertise among partners (Vangen and Huxham 2005, P.3). It also forms a foundation around “the synergy that can be created through joint working- and collaborative activities to be frustratingly slow to produce output or uncomfortably conflict ridden”. This principle surrounds issues that constantly ‘energize’ collaborations between parties like state and its partners in funding. This spans from their personal agendas and expected benefits. “It seeks to depict what underpins the anxiety and reward in each area” These issues are called “themes in collaboration practice” (Vangen & Huxham 2010, P.163-164). The theory of collaborative advantage builds on some of the following themes as illustrated below:




Fig 1: Themes in the theory of collaborative advantage.

These themes were originally drawn from Vangen & Huxham 2005, P. 59-228 and Vangen & Huxham 2010,P. 164, but I have built them to suit my case study. The idea is that these themes are building blocks for collaboration. When people collaborate, the membership structures must be well spelt out, indicating the type of membership and functions, there should also be a text which clearly specifies the working processes, resources and system of hierarchy (leadership) and also how social capital would be generated. In order for the collaboration to function properly, there should be commitment and determination; members should have an opportunity to learn from each other with a high degree of trust and compromise. Democracy and equity should be the foundation of these working relationships, while accountability and an effective communication are major ingredients for ensuring success of the collaborative working or partnership. I am going to use four of these themes which are very significant in my case to better illustrate the theory and practice of collaborative advantage, these will be: resources, collaborative learning, trust and accountability.

Resources:

Resources could be look upon from three angles, firstly the source, type and constant supply of resources, secondly, how it has to be managed and distributed, and which parties are involved in sharing these resources, and lastly the laid down principles and norms in using the resources (Tschirhart et al 2009). The source of resources has a great role to play in project success. There is need for important questions to be asked in

order to be sure of project success and achievement of objectives: Is the source reliable? Is the supply constant? What types of channels are used to distribute these resources to the management? These questions surround the reliability of resource flow within PPPs in collaborating towards welfare delivery.

The second aspect is how these resources are expected to be managed and distributed among partners in collaboration, and which parties will be involved in using what quantity of resources? Obviously, resources channeling is a major aspect in collaboration. Management is expected to ensure each party gets the actual amount of resources necessary to accomplish a task and on time (Tschirhart et al 2009; Vangen & Huxham 2010).

The last aspect is the laid down principles or norms governing usage of these resources. Vangen and Huxham 2010 write that the manner in which resources are used and managed determines the outcome of an activity or project. This involves the manner of sharing, the style of distribution, who gets what and when should it be issued. What are the criteria for issuing resources to a particular partner and what are the expected results? And lastly the system of laid down control and effective follow up for proper resource usage.

Collaborative Learning.

When stakeholders partner in a collaborative setting, synergy is created, and not only are resources pulled together, but expertise is galvanized. A scenario is created where partners have an opportunity to learn from each other. People learn away from their original organizations and build new working habits and approach to solving problems (Jeschke 2006; McQuaid 2010; Plummer & FitzGibbon 2007).

Collaborative learning is acquired through “learning by doing”, knowledge is integrated from multiple systems, there is the creation of flexibility of management structures in partnering, and collaboration is advanced through a system where power is shared at multiple levels of the partnership (Plummer & FitzGibbon 2007). People acquire some knowledge out of their daily routines within their organizations and also learn to better work with others. Moreover, sharing of knowledge will develop expertise

as stakeholders will be able to tap from each other and innovation is developed to enable the project or partnership structure function in the most appropriate way (McQuaid 2010; Plummer & FitzGibbon 2007).

Trust

Trust remains a major prerequisite for an effective partnership or collaboration. It acts like oil to the collaboration engine, meant to ensure the smooth running of collaboration (Vangen and Huxham 2010). Li and Ferreira writes that with the presence of trust in a PPP, it obviates “the need for expensive governance structures”. Terms of agreement is expected to be fully respected. It is used to maintain good and well structured working relationship among partners. With the ability to predict behavior resulting from trust lets the state to trust prior partners (2008, P.311). Below is a trust building mechanism which can assist in collaboration and ensure a better working partnership:




Fig 2. Illustration of the trust building loop.

This loop was originally built by Vangen and Huxham 2010, P. 168 to illustrate the building of trust in collaboration, but I have redrawn it and shaped the variables to suit my context. At the top, it indicates that for trust to be effectively built, selection should be based on a good trust history among partners. To ensure this aspect in my project case, short listed partners have to be selected based on their past job resumes and not just on documents presented; collaboration meetings should be a forum for clarifications and understanding, in order to re-enforce trusting attitudes among stake holders; ambition must remain the watch word as everyone contributes towards the overall success of the project; outcomes must be clearly stated for everyone to aim at achieving, and output structure should be a less universal goal. Besides this circle, hard work is expected from each member in building a trust worthy collaboration history. And transparency has to remain an essential ingredient for trust.

Accountability

Just like trust accountability plays an essential role in collaboration. Accountability drives ‘interagency collaboration’ in a bid to creating better outcomes. It is central for any form of collaboration to work perfectly (Linden 2010; Vangen and Huxham 2010). In order to ensure a smooth partnership and maintain accountability, Linden 2010 proposes what he calls the CompStat or performance start method. This method is a combination of several factors to build accountability among collaborators. They include focused structured meetings on goal attainment; analysis based on facts; the involvement of senior leaders in building accountability among collaborators; and a rigorous and extremely strict follow up system (P.219).

4 Methodology

My methodology is divided into four sections.: Namely, qualitative case study approach, selection of case and theories, primary data collection and document/text analysis, reflections on reliability, validity and limitations of the researcher. I begin by presenting the case study approach, concentrating on reasons on my choice of the research design as opposed to other designs, its strengths and possible limitations. I will next defend my choice of case and theories for the study and indicate my operationalization method. Lastly, I will present my methods of data collection, starting with the primary to documents and texts for the study. I will conclude the study by presenting some aspects of reliability, validity, as well as limitations faced during the research.

4.1 Case study approach.

There are two ways to learn how to build a house. One might study construction of many houses- perhaps a large subdivision or even hundreds of thousands of houses. Or one might study the construction of a particular house. The first approach is a cross-case method. The second is a within- case or case study method. While both are concerned with the same general subject- the building of houses – they follow different paths to this goal.

(Gerring 2007, P.1)

Besides this explanation by Gerring 2007, some researchers have also attempted to give a clear-cut definition of a case study approach. I found two of such definition to be most enlightening in explaining this particular method of research. First, Yin et al defines it as: “An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and

context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994, P.13); Woodside presents a broader definition on the approach, stating that it is “an inquiry that focuses on describing, understanding, predicting, and/or controlling the individual (ie. process, animal, person, household, organization, group, industry, culture, nationality) (2010, P.1) . Both definitions have similarities but the latter presents a more broader understanding than the former.

My research is built on a qualitative case study approach of a public private partnership between a multinational organization and the state of Cameroon for welfare delivery. Choosing a case study method I agree with Gomm et al when they write that “a frequently mentioned aim of science is prediction and control. But prediction and control cannot be accomplished without something on which to base predictions or formulate controlling actions” (2006, P.27). Based on this, a case study has the ability of procuring a lot of detailed information for analysis in a research. Studying PPPs on it’s own is an extremely broad area, but in order to understand the contributions of a multinational partnership in welfare delivery it was imperative for me to choose a particular case study on which I can access and analyse in order to draw valid conclusions. My sample will be relatively smaller for a case study, and capable of enabling me to emphasize on the particular phenomenon of multinational PPPs and welfare delivery, as opposed to a cross case or comparative study that will instead demand me to handle several cases and have more general information. I assume, drawing from what Gerring 2007 writes, that a builder who specializes on building a particular types of house has more mastery of his art and better information on that particular house, than one that has knowledge of many and a mastery of none.

Another reason for choosing a case study analysis as opposed to a comparative study is the fact that generalization is not my primary motive, but a secondary reason. It is obvious that the greatest weakness of a case study method is its inability to generalize. I intend to build on a multinational PPP geared towards welfare delivery in a particular state of Cameroon, and access its contribution to Welfare delivery in that nation. It could be a valid example that could be used to predict other multinational PPPs but that is but a secondary motive of this research and will not so much affect the outcome of my thesis. A case study like mine will provides an in-depth into the relationship between the African Development Bank and government of Cameroon

within the RUMPI partnership framework which is not so easy in achieving with studies based on a broader focus because of the complexities that could be involved in analyzing large amounts of data (Gomm *et al* 2006).

I also decided on a qualitative study because I found it most appropriate within my line of investigation. Since I am focusing on the strategic relationship between the government of Cameroon and the African development bank on the RUMPI partnership, it was obvious that interviews and text analysis is best at providing answers that will unravel my research questions and enable me fulfill the purpose of my research.

4.2 Selection of Case and choice of theories.

My case study as indicated in my background of study is a project executed on a Public Private Partnership between the government of Cameroon and multinational organization known as the African Development Bank. Owing the fact that I am investigating the contribution of a multinational partnership to welfare delivery, I found this case to be most appropriate. Firstly it is located in a developing country, and secondly it is geared towards welfare delivery and contribution of poverty alleviation in the long-run. Secondly, the strategic partnership between the government of Cameroon and the African Development Bank has lasted for close to forty years, meaning a PPP of this nature has the strength of being tested on an empirical study within the RUMPI project.

On a secondary basis, I choose a project in Cameroon because it is my home country, besides reduction of cost to do field research, it was easier for me to gather materials in a country in which I am better versed with the attitudes, cultures and terrain, than to do it in another region, and my case also fits perfectly with my purpose of research. While on the field I could easily communicate in local dialects and people would feel free to open up with relevant information owing to the fact that I am one of them.

I use two main theories built within the framework of the New Public Management, and written within the context of the New Public Governance, namely: The theory of Organizational partnership and the theory and practice of collaborative advantage. Both theories perfectly fit in my investigation of why governments, especially the government of Cameroon decided to engage in the RUMPI PPP and also the short comings of these partnerships, they also provide collaboration intrigues and methods on building better practical ways of collaborating that presents a clear-cut contribution to welfare delivery.

My method of operationalization will be based on the rationale for the Cameroon government to engage in the RUMPI partnership and the shortcomings that arise during the project’s implementation as a primary focus, and also on the steps taken in achieving the RUMPI project from the strategic partnership between the government and ADB to the grass root participatory approach with beneficiaries on a secondary basis. This will enable me to access the contribution of this PPP to welfare delivery in the nation.

4.3 Primary Data collection and documents/ text analysis.

My primary data comes mainly from interviews, discussions and observations. Below is a table of my primary data collection:

Services and personalities	Type of data collected	Representing structure
ADB’s country portfolio officer, Cameroon.	Interview	Main sponsors of project
MINADER (Divisional delegate in charge of RUMPI activities)	Interview	Rep. Minister of Agric and Rural Development in region

RUMPI PROJECT UNITS		
Community Development Adviser	Interview	Rep. of project coordinator and capacity building unit leader.
Farming research agronomist	Interview	Farming research and extension unit leader
Infrastructure engineer	Interview	Infrastructure unit leader
Monitoring and evaluation officer.	Interview	RUMPI monitoring and evaluation unit leader.
EXECUTION PARTNERS		
MINADER	Interview	Traditional partner
MIFED	Interview	Partner for village banks
Beneficiaries	Talks and observation of some projects executed.	Projects and beneficiaries of RUMPI.

Table 1: Primary data collection sources.

As presented on the table, my interviews were extremely impressive. I had an interview with a personality from the ADB, another from the regional delegation of Agriculture and Rural Development, four unit heads of the RUMPI project, and an implementation partner within the RUMPI project. I also had discussions and talks with beneficiaries while on the field to observe some of the projects. In total I had seven interviews including discussions and observations. My questions were semi-structured and theory driven. This interview style has an advantage of enabling the interviewees'

ideas and viewpoints to be better expressed, giving more strength to the empirical study and a direct application to theory than in structured questionnaires (Flick 2006). Since I was interviewing the main engine behind the PPP on the RUMPI project, I needed a face-to face interview that will enable spontaneity in answering the questions that were quite essential in my empirical study. Respondents were also selected based on their role in the RUMPI PPP, which is central in a qualitative research (*Ibid* 2006). I also had to use observations and discussion with beneficiaries to substantiate interviews with main respondents.

Other primary sources of data includes RUMPI project quarterly and yearly reports, publications, as well as publications from the African Development Bank on partnership cooperation with Cameroon and the RUMPI project. I also plan to use secondary sources from pamphlets, journals, books, webpages and other forms of publications. This variety of sources enables me achieve what Hammersley and Atkinson refers to as triangulation in social science research. This stands for “checking inferences drawn from one set of sources by collecting data from others”. On a general basis it could be described as comparing data relating to one type of phenomenon but getting it from varied sources within the same research inquiry (1983, P.183).

4.4 Reflections on reliability, validity and limitations of researcher.

Reliability and validity are essential for every research project. I take reliability to stand for the “degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions. It provides evidence about validity and also tells us about the usefulness of the particular research strategy used” (Hammersley 1992: P.67). I have therefore presented previous research on PPPs, especially those concerned with welfare delivery and/or economic development. This will permit my contribution to be isolated within this field of research.

Moreover all materials used for this research have been carefully referenced and could be accurately verified. Hammersley also explains validity to signify the “truth of the claim made. Validity is interpreted in terms of selective representation of reality, with the amount and nature of evidence that is necessary depending on the type of claim involved and on the judgment about its plausibility, credibility and centrality” (1992: P.78). With this in mind I decided to do field work including interviews and discussions with respondents of my case study project. I was also given access to project publications and reports to back-up the claims made in the interviews, and I also took time to observe some completed projects. And in order to acquire a substantial level of validity in my research I decided to use what Yin 2003 calls triangulation of collection of data. This involves using multiple sources of data collection (both primary and secondary) such as: interviews, discussions, workshops, books, pamphlets, journals etc

There were also a couple of limitations faced during data collection. The first major limitation was the setting of my research (rural areas in Cameroon). Some rural roads leading to beneficiary areas were inaccessible; To get data from such areas entailed a lot of patience and time; Some people are always scared of the political atmosphere within the country and usually will not wish to open up on issues related to the government; It was not possible to get an appointment for follow up interviews because all management staffs were always very busy as the project is drawing to an end; some interview appointments were cancelled several times and rescheduled. Even though these limitations were present, the greatest advantage I had was the fact that I was doing a research in my country of origin. I knew the setting, terrain, local dialects, behavioral patterns and how to approach situations. I planned my finances very well to access a few project areas; declared to each interviewee that all materials were confidential and would be used just for academic purposes; I carried my Lund University card almost everywhere to prove that I was who I claimed to be; I most often called some interviewees to remind them of our appointment before hand; I had met some management staffs even out of office hours for unofficial conversations in order to cover up for my planned follow up interviews.


5 The strategic build within the RUMPI partnership.

This chapter is the beginning of my analysis. I use the chapter as the main link between my theory and empirical analysis. I start by indicating aspects of partnership and collaboration within the RUMPI partnership. In this sub-section I present both aspects of the theory of organizational partnership and aspects of the theory and practice of collaborative advantage that could be linked with the RUMPI PPP. I then move on to explain the various stages and partnerships that enabled project accomplishment.

5.1 Partnership and collaboration in the RUMPI project.

The RUMPI partnership is undoubtedly sustained by two different types of organizations. A governmental entity (GOC) and a privately managed organization (ADB). A merge of these two entities is an uneven partnership that will obviously have its merits and demerits. One of the central aspects of collaboration is accountability. It promotes collaboration among various actors and creates the most suitable results and outcomes for success (Linden 2010; Vangen and Huxham 2010). Below is the RUMPI project's accountability set-up.

The RUMPI project Accountability set-up



My illustration of the RUMPI accountability set up points to both internal and external forms of accountability. Internal accountability is built in a system whereby each unit is accountable first to the project management unit (headed by the project coordinator) and also within a united set-up in which all units in the RUMPI project meets regularly with execution partners for coordination meetings in order to render their partners accountable for executed projects. RUMPI project management reports project activities to SOWEDA, while SOWEDA monitors and evaluates execution progress. The general board that controls and decides on major issues within the project is the Project Steering Committee headed by the governor of the South West Region. External accountability is done by both the ADB and the central Administration of Cameroon. The central administration uses two ministries: The Ministry of Economy, Programming and Regional Development, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. They send audit missions on the field to effectively evaluate the progress of program and ensure the attainment of its objectives. The information used in building this figure on

accountability was gathered from project reports and interviews with both project coordinating staff and the ADB in Cameroon.

Partnerships actually have the ability to procure better innovative ways of approaching policy issues and also in evaluating successes and failures (Lynn 2010; McQuaid 2010). By bringing the expertise of an infra state structure like the African development bank, coupled with specialized NGOs, traditional partners in agriculture, research and innovation, contractors, micro-finance experts and local service providers, the RUMPI project partnership is capable of mobilizing innovation with focused and dedicated task force for poverty alleviation within project regions. Moreover, this form of partnering pools resources together and creates a synergy on particular policy issues and/or supplements in welfare delivery in the nation (Jeschke 2006; McQuaid 2010). The RUMPI partnership contract pulls resources from a loan with the African development bank for up to 75 % of project sponsorship that is directly and indirectly disbursed; a grant from same ADB amounting to 8%; direct financing by government by 10% and beneficiary support by 2%. Each of these resources are pulled together and directed to the policy issue of welfare delivery within project areas. With resources from different stakeholders, a perfect synergy is achieved.

The synergy between actors also creates a better setting for learning, most especially government actors learning from private actors, avoiding duplication, improve working conditions and avoid inefficiencies and creates a different level of professional learning (Jeschke 2006). With the synergy created within the RUMPI project by the partnering between various stakeholders, it becomes a perfect learning ground and an avenue for a change of attitudes towards work for the traditional services that had always existed in this domain. It also has the possibility of bringing new ideas and a better vision to tackling coordination, execution and overall welfare delivery.

On the other hand, with varied actors put together for a partnership there is no likeliness that a synergy should be achieved. Goals become inconsistent and ideas may also greatly differ among actors (McQuaid 2010; Huxham & Vangen 2005). The RUMPI project faced two major suspensions during project term of execution. It is certain that during the process of halts brought about by the suspensions goals become inconsistent, while some actors became less motivated than others. Moreover, merging

government services and non-governmental organizations have brought about divergent viewpoints that hampered any form of synergy to be created (Asanga 2011. Interview).

Another major issue with partnerships is the fact that it creates problems with accountability. With more than one actor involved in the financing and management of projects and execution accountability could have some loop holes (Huxham and Vangen 2005; McQuaid 2010). In the context of the RUMPI project funds go either directly to executing partners (contractors) or through the government's autonomous fund from the ADB. This system of payment creates accountability lapses because some contractors getting funds directly might attach their allegiance to ADB and not the management of the RUMPI project. Also, some traditional partners feel accountable to their ministerial departments in which they are permanently employed as opposed to the RUMPI project which they are temporary deployed.

Also, poor coordination, poor approach to problems, and merging weak organizations with vibrant and good working organizations pose serious problems to partnerships and collaboration (McQuaid 2010). The strength of the RUMPI partnership strata lies on the strategic relationship between the government of Cameroon and the ADB, there is a negative effect on project execution when both look at problem solving strategies in a parallel manner. Moreover poor coordination on the part of the management staff greatly affected the whole partnership machinery. It is worthy of note that after one of the major suspensions of RUMPI activities by the ADB, management staff was reshuffled and the project coordinator replaced in order to make the team more effective (Toukara 2011, interview), clearly pointing to the fact that there existed poor coordination and a poor approach to problems.

5.2 The strategic Partnership and steps for project accomplishment.

The main 'spinal cord' of the RUMPI partnership is the strategic alliance between the GOC and the ADB. It is both the origin and the end to the partnership, and enables the continuation of other similar partnerships. This sub-section permits an

operationalization of the strategic partnership and other steps towards project accomplishment.

5.2.1 The strategic partnership relationship

The main partnership relationship is between the GOC and ADB, this is what McQuaid calls “facilitating partnerships” that involves managing long standing strategic or financial facilitation issues between a multinational or infra-state entity and an emerging or developing economy (2010, P129). Based on this form of partnerships Li and Ferreira define a strategic relationship as “any cooperative arrangement that uses resources and governance structures from more than one existing organization”. They also state that if there is one existent common denominator faced by Multinational entities when engaging into a strategic relationship with developing economies, it is “a highly complex, unstable and largely unknown business environment undergoing rather profound and rapid changes” (2008, P 308). Chip 2003 also describes a strategic partnership as a relationship between two major parties in facilitating both the creation and realization of a project in responding to a particular need (in my case welfare delivery), which meets the interest of both parties, permitting them to effectively collaborate (not withstanding obstacles) than they would have done separately or independently. Below is a representation of the strategic partnership for the RUMPI project.

RUMPI's STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP




Fig 4: A representation of RUMPI's strategic partnership.

Information used in building this came from RUMPI and ADB publications. The ADB first engaged with Cameroon in a relationship since 1972, making a total of 39 years of strategic alliance. On this diagrammatic representation, at the top of this strategic alliance is the ADB and GOC. These partners are both sponsors of the project. While the ADB is the main sponsor with a loan and a grant, it also has direct control over the project as per their loan and grant policy. Together with the government of Cameroon they set project objectives, time limit for completion, follow up accountability with audit missions, and set outcomes and possible impacts of the project. They all channel their resources through the RUMPI project set up of components and partnership relationships to produce output for beneficiaries.

I find this strategic alliance to be extremely significant for the country, even though it is a fairly imbalance relationship. The ADB practically sponsors almost the entire project. Power lies in their hands and they can use it as they deem fit. Other aspects stand tall in the strategic partnership between the two parties: A massive pull of resources by the government of Cameroon from the multinational entity (ADB), but it comes with its own pitfalls. An 8% grant with a 75% loan that has to be repaid within an agreed period of time. This is what Whitfield calls “manipulating public sector accountancy rules to conceal public debt and the ownership of public assets” (2010, P.15). The projects are actually fruits of a successful strategic alliance, but also a loan burden that makes one party a debtor and the other a creditor, while the debtor nation grapples to handle the welfare needs of its population. But if there is one good thing to go by in this strategic alliance, it will be the fact that it has enabled government’s improvement of basic services, facilities and public infrastructure, shaping public policy in a better way than just utilizing resources available from government revenues and other budgetary options (Whitfield 2010, P.15-16).

Accountability is also one major aspect. The project is almost entirely accountable to ADB, even though there are internal government monitoring and evaluation mechanism that ensure accountability. These are two different structures that form a strategic alliance in collaboration to deliver projects under the RUMPI alliance banner. Each has different accountability mechanisms and report structures. Each organization’s behaviours and attitudes are “embedded in the broader political, economic, and social context that shapes actions” (Li and Ferreira 2008, P.311). These discrepancies of varied settings were clearly proven when the ADB had to consecutively suspend RUMPI projects twice for accountability shortcomings during the term of execution. Management staff was reshuffled and a new team put in place to set a new pace in execution and enable proper accountability of funds disbursed (Famba, 2011. Interview).

Another major aspect in this strategic relationship is trust. Huxham and Vangen 2005 write that trust and respect are very essential ingredients in all forms of collaboration. When trust is present in a strategic alliance, it obviates better governance and policy set-ups, and partners learn to fulfil their promises (Li and Ferreira 2008). The advantage of a trust building mechanism within the RUMPI project is the fact that both


partners have dealt with each other over a long period of time. “By selecting a prior partner, Multinational Corporations assure effective transfer and complete understanding of the knowledge transferred, and foster more committed cooperative relationship” (Li and Ferreira 2008, P.310). This trust building mechanism was obviously not automatic in the RUMPI partnership scenario, the ADB knew its prior partner very well and had to react with stringent measures of suspensions when accountability principles were put to a test. In the end projects were accomplished that could possibly assist in welfare delivery of the nation.

The last significant aspect on the strategic alliance is collaborative learning. Collaborative learning within the NPM is necessitated by the need to involve private management techniques within the public service in order to increase the capacity of the state and enable it to undertake functions of managing the economy, providing basic necessities, reduce poverty and most essentially promote economic development (Whitfield 2001). This is what could be termed learning by doing, “building social memory to respond to feedback from environment, both human and natural” (Armitage et al 2007, P. 28). A multinational entity with its expertise, broad knowledge and varied competencies sharing this know-how with a strict bureaucratic governmental set-up which barely focuses on daily routine tasks and a stereo-typed management style. As they collaborate each partner learns from each other. The GOC learns New Public Management techniques from the ADB, while the ADB learns how to manage uncertainty in a relatively unstable business environment with an African country. This is the “reconstruction or re-organization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience (Lee 1993, P.136). Over time the RUMPI project management became better and results were evident just a few months towards the end execution (Famba 2011, interview).

5.2.2 Institutional set-up for project accomplishment:

The organization of the RUMPI project is organised in a way that permits other segments of co-management both at the project execution level and at the grass roots

with beneficiaries. At the project execution level there is what McQuaid describes as “coordinating partnerships”, involving both management and implementation “of policy based on broadly agreed priorities” (2010, P.18). SOWEDA over-see while the RUMPI management staff coordinates the implementation of projects (see background of study). The RUMPI management staffs harnesses complementary capacities in a bid to distribute costs and benefits with traditional government partners and local NGOs (Armitage 2007). This is where the actual job of execution takes place. Each of the units has its own number of partners specialized in particular areas, while some are traditional government partners, others are either NGOs or contractors. Below is a representation of this institutional set-up between management staff and various local partners.



Built from RUMPI project reports and interviews with management staff. This diagram illustrates how projects are executed within RUMPI’s PIT with the overall supervision of SOWEDA. Traditional government services are complimented with NGOs as partners in execution. This institutional set-up or build up of co-management

shares several features with different partnership designs and cooperative environmental governance (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). This sort of co-management is not a unique on its own, but it is used to bridge different levels or scales (Reid et al 2006 in Armitage et al 2007). Each of these actors collaborate for effectiveness, with each party having complementary capabilities and a comparative advantage in management that profits welfare delivery within the RUMPI project (Armitage et al 2007). Project management leaders harness varied talents from NGOs and create a synergy among actors for the profit of implementation (Bisong 2011, interview). Within this type of set-up, their ability to collectively solve problems that arise evolves over time (Armitage 2007). Suspensions of project dealt a great blow on execution but as time went by the team became more and more efficient which was evident with the level of execution by June 2011 (Famba, 2011; Asanga 2011 interviews). In essence things became even better over time which was also due to the efforts in deliberate problem solving with hierarchy, involving some sort of learning, strategizing, collaborating, and providing feedback to help handle issues that arise (Lee 1993).

Also, the institutional set-up permits a grass root participatory approach which the project indicates has to contribute up to 2% of project funds in total. This sort of co-management enables the building of local institutions at the grass root level, and also acts as “a prelude to developing a working relationship” with hierarchy or government policy making institutions (Armitage 2007, P.26). Below is a representation of the grass root participatory approach between management and beneficiaries of project.




FIG 6 : RUMPI's Grass root participatory approach.

This is built from interviews with RUMPI management staff, talks with beneficiaries and project reports and publication. Palanithurai 2000 presents a two sided argument for the grass root participatory approach to welfare delivery and economic development. On the one hand, he believes a participatory approach to development is a western system of liberalization of civil society involvement in public policy implementation. Which in essence could be considered as “liberating the people from the clutches of a total state system”. On the other hand he considers it as participating in one’s own development that has an advantage of providing sustainability with “equity and Justice” (2000, P.79). Both sides of the argument are foundational in the creation and set up of the RUMPI project.

RUMPI’s 2% grass root support is quantified from expected beneficiary assistance to the realization of various projects in their locality with: providing local materials such as sand and stones for construction works and embedding saves in their village banks; assist in digging trenches for water schemes and back fill the trenches once the pipes are laid; and also assist in transporting materials for construction works within their locality, especially in areas where the roads are impassable by vehicles. (Tambo 2011, Nyongo 2011, Ewane 2011 & Enang 2011. Interviews). With this form of support to the project these grass root beneficiary populations “are freer to broaden their movement and strengthen it through their inclusiveness, addressing a wide range of economic, political, cultural, environmental and social issues” (Gill 2007,P. 197). A management committee is put in place for project take over after completion that enables both sustainability, inclusiveness, civil society participation and a sense of belonging (Nyongo 2011, Tambo 2011, Ewane 2011 interviews).

6 RUMPI's Rationale: An arm chair Policy or Welfare Contribution.

I use this chapter to present the *raison d'être* of the RUMPI project and access its motives and present state of project execution with respect to partnerships, cooperation and service delivery within the nation. I will first present a table of projects realized and possible welfare benefits, after which I will present an analysis of RUMPI's rationale with the help of books and articles while complimenting with interviews, reports, discussions and observations from the field. My goal is to establish whether RUMPI has been able to meet its mission of contributing to welfare delivery in Cameroon.

6.1 Project examples and contribution to welfare delivery.

A good number of projects have so far been achieved by the RUMPI project, below is table of projects achieved and their expected outcomes for welfare delivery within RUMPI project area:

PROJECT EXAMPLS	OUTPUT	EXPECTED WELFARE CONTRIBUTION
WATER SCHEMES	PORTABLE WATER SUPPLY.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A reduction of water borne diseases.• Proximity and constant availability of water supply.

RURAL MARKETS	COMFORTABLE MARKETS WITH SHEDS AND STORAGE FACILITIES.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Localizes buying and selling. • Sales are done all year round. • Farmers can store goods for next market day, and increase sales
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT.	IMPROVED CROP VARIETIES, CHEAP PLANTING MATERIALS AND FARMING GUIDANCE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An increase in the scale of production. • An increase in the quality of production. • Increase in sales.
VILLAGE BANKS	BANKING IN RURAL COMMUNITIES.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevents hoarding • Availability of savings and loans for farming, education, commerce etc, within the local communities. • Brings banking closer and avoids theft.
RURAL HEALTH CENTERS.	HEALTH FACILITIES WITHIN RURAL COMMUNITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proximity to health care. • Improved nutrition

TABLE 2: RUMPI projects expected contribution to welfare delivery

The diagrammatic illustration points to project examples, and possible welfare benefits to be derived from the RUMPI community. This analysis was drawn from reports, interviews, observation and informal discussions with some beneficiaries of projects. I will proceed to analyze RUMPI within the perspective of PPP in the next sub-section of this chapter.

6.2 RUMPI project as need based assessment or public policy manipulation?

PPP's don't happen by chance, they are a deliberate creation by the administration to meet a particular need in a nation (Geddes 2005; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011). In the years before the 1980s, when there was a need for funds for a particular public policy proposal, most governments either increased taxes, or introduced new ones. But as the years went by, that approach became outdated, calling for new avenues to fund public policy, most especially within service delivery. Privatization was proposed as the major option, especially within developing economies. Most of these poor nations had to sell out or contract state owned enterprises to the private sector in order to reduce state expenditure and plow the finances acquired to service delivery and poverty alleviation (Stainback 2000; World Bank 2002). But it also got to an extent where they could sell no more, and traditional methods of financing was also largely insufficient to salvage the needs of their population (Stainback 2000). In essence "public service provision includes more than the rather limited case where the government is responsible for the design, construction, financing and operation of capital assets and the services that these assets generate" (OECD 2008, P.16). There was therefore the need for involvement of other institutions outside the public sector for the provision of infrastructure and service delivery which had traditionally been undertaken by government alone (IMF 2006, P.1).

The RUMPI area participatory development project was designed to generate income for a project that would maintain and build infrastructure, develop agricultural production, enhance better banking procedures, build capacities and undertake other service delivery functions within rural areas of the South West region of Cameroon in ways that will be capable of boasting economic growth, create a stable welfare provision and contribute to poverty alleviation in Cameroon (ADB 2010; RUMPI annual report 2010; Famba 2011, Besong 2011, & Tambo 2011, interviews). The project was formulated in a participatory approach, having stakeholders from government, civil society, beneficiaries and private development partners (ADB 2010). A design which Palanithurai 2000 describes as an all inclusive method that liberates the

civil society from complete government control and creates avenues for funds from private international organisations to supplement service delivery.

The RUMPI project was not the first type of rural development project in the South West region of Cameroon undertaken by the same union between the GOC and the ADB, it was drafted to consolidate an earlier rural development project, as well as include other regions that were not included within the framework of the first PPP project within the same region. Besides the ADB has been sponsoring projects in the country since 1972 (ADB 2010; Besong 2011, Ewane 2011, Enang 2011, Famba 2011 interviews). It seems likely that knowledge held about a previous partner in alliance, increases the likeliness for new alliance with the same partner for similar motives (Li and Ferreira 2008; Whitfield 2010; OECD 2008), or develops and consolidate earlier achieved goals. This does not only add efficiency, but develops more understanding, and “foster more committed cooperative relationships” (Li and Ferreira 2008, P.310). With repeated international strategic alliance for a project does not only reduce the risk of “opportunistic behaviours”, but also “minimizes internal risks” which could be associated with emerging economies with ineffective institutions to protect partner alliances (Khanna et al 1998 in Li and Ferreira 2008, P.309).

The RUMPI project demanded alot of collaborative efforts, from the GOC, international private partners, the civil society, to the beneficiaries. This enables “a fair share and reasonable sharing of risks, responsibilities and costs” (Stainback 2000, P.14). It assisted to reduce development cost, “enhance cash flows” and enabled access to fresh sources o capital with a potential power of streamlining approval of “design and development”, in a bid to saving a tangible cost, time and efforts for the government of Cameroon (Whitfield 2010; Stainback 2000). This sort of partnership and collaboration in the RUMPI project creates a more flexible yet responsive and focused solution to social and economic problems of a nation, as well as contribution to welfare delivery and economic growth which could lead to better welfare facilities and a more stable livelihood within the project areas of Cameroon (McQuaid 2010).

The main goal behind the RUMPI project is improving service delivery, and “creating value for money as opposed to circumstances where the public service delivers the service”. By engaging in this PPP it has the potential of drawing the private sector capacity in efficiently delivering both quality and quantity of services and

infrastructure, improves “service provision” and transfers risks to the private sector. The government of Cameroon utilizes inputs from ADB to broaden its welfare delivery provision to its citizens and help build public policy. The African Development Bank imports innovation, and largely improves efficiency within traditional public service institutions and gets welfare services to the common man, an act which the GOC would not have achieved on its own (OECD 2008; Whitfield 2010; ADB 2010; RUMPI 2011; Famba 2011, interviews).

Besides these cosy public policy ideas behind the RUMPI project and the illusions that all is well and cosy for beneficiaries of the project, the GOC uses RUMPI and other developmental projects within PPP framework to transfer public debts within their contract obligation on a long term instalmental payments from revenue with high interests or through service users (Whitfield 2010; OECD 2008). This project has just an 8% grant from the ADB, while 75% of the funds are derived from a loan (Famba 2011, Tambo 2011, Ewane 2011 interviews; RUMPI brochure 2010). This money must be repaid at the expense of the public treasury and tax payers’ pockets, while it is still not obvious if the benefits of the project might outweigh the burden of repayment.

The RUMPI project provides very attractive projects for the benefit of the rural communities within project areas. They maintain the illusion that these projects were privately financed or a joint collaboration from a good will venture from a multinational entity to the developing nation of Cameroon for poverty alleviation. But in essence these projects are almost entirely financed by tax payers’ money. Facts and figures has it that just 8% of the total project finances is a grant, the remaining 92% comes from either a loan, government funding or an unclear and controversial beneficiary funding (Whitfield 2010; Stainback 2000). Thus while the rural communities rejoice for having new infrastructure and services within their communities of RUMPI, the public sector has only succeeded in manipulating “public sector accounting rules to conceal public debt and the ownership of public assets” (Whitfield 2010, P.15).

But despite some of the fuzzy explanations that could be associated with the creation and existence of the RUMPI project, it is certain that the GOC used this project to tackle a societal problem of service delivery. If any successes are to be derived from the outcome of these projects, then it is as a result of the partnership efforts within the framework of the RUMPI partnership that it is derived. This project

enhanced the effectiveness of governance and contributed to introducing NPM techniques within public sector institutions of Cameroon. And practically it provided a multi-sector approach to welfare delivery, by operationalizing on the distribution of public goods and most essentially ensuring sustainability (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011; Whitfield 2010; Stainback 2000; Osborne 2010).

7 Discussion and conclusion.

I use this last section of my research to reiterate some main point and present an outlook of Public Private partnerships, especially within the context of RUMPI and Cameroon in general. I would also summarise my finding as I conclude the thesis.

The welfare states inherited by the independent nation of Cameroon in the 1960s was fragmented and extremely complex. (Iliffe 1987 in Bevan 2004). There was a lack of clearly defined structures and organisations, social protection mainly remained the sole duty of the family. The public system remained handicapped and incable of salvaging the needs of its population leaving a massive strain on the ‘extended family’, and self-provision as the main answer to welfare demands (Bevan 2004). Poverty remains a big threat to the Cameroonian economy that has close to 40% of its population living below the poverty line (ADB,2010) and also a threat to public policy. Due to low savings, exports and investment capabilities, the government compliments its welfare provision within international partnership frameworks such as the RUMPI project.

Moreover, with the improvement and development of human welfare becoming more and more of an “explicit goal” in the domain of international development and public policy, the ADB and other multilateral organisations are all striving for poverty alleviation strategies, creating a fundamental shift in the ‘global discourse’ (Gough & Wood 2004). A project such as RUMPI within the state of Cameroon is of vital importance because the international approach to social policy within the context of the project has connected the state of Cameroon with a market of transnational capital as well as community and grass root organisations. Also, with an international dimension of social policy, even though expands the risks within which security is sought, “uncertainty is also better managed” (Gough & Wood 2004, P.4 &6).

The RUMPI project no doubt contributed significantly to welfare development in Cameroon but not without drawbacks and loop holes. Problems of accountability, breakdown of trust, mismanagement of resources flawed the laudable achievements acclaimed by the partnerships of these two un-identical institutions. The project suffered a double suspension as a result of this creating a set-back in planned objectives and a re-alignment of priorities by strategic partners. Li and Ferreira 2008 writes that one of the

major common denominator facing multinational entities when they seek to engage in a strategic relationship with developing countries is an environment plagued with a lot of uncertainties, especially marrying with old public administrative stereo-types that seek to maintain the status-quo. The state of Cameroon may have the will to broaden its welfare delivery options but the demands of the New Public Management style might still seem too harsh for an entity that values dictatorial management styles over open inclusive democratic governing. Creating an uneven society that secures a wealthy few against a poor majority.

But this PPP within the nation of Cameroon has actually contributed to building public policy. The ADB maintained a strong management style, and with “a stick and carrot” method, they were able to lure as well as punish delinquency within project execution. If there was any form of collaborative learning on the part of Cameroon, then it is the fact that management must be open and transparent in order to build trust and enable a steady flow of resources for the benefit of its population. For a country that is extremely blessed with natural resources (ADB 2010) it is expected that they are supposed to set a major economic development example within the region, but it remains just another African case.

This project also brought into light another major area to be exploited by the nation of Cameroon and other African states, the idea of participatory development. While the African development bank might also have its secondary motives and interests in the partnership with the nation of Cameroon, it genuinely participates in welfare delivery. The project makes use of local and traditional services; each of these sectors participates in service delivery. And lastly the beneficiaries are made to take an active role. I go by the saying that people will always support what they help create (Tambo 2011,interview). The beneficiaries are included from project drafting to project execution. They feel a sense of belonging, and they help sustain these projects once they are completed. Various actors play their part by participating for the economic development of the nation.

The ADB might also be silent about any form of interest motives to be derived from the loan, but this is a push factor to the strategic relationship (Whitfield 2010). Without interests they can't create the base of capital that they use for their loans and grants to member states. But do we penalize them for making profits in a developing

nation in which they also contribute for poverty alleviation and economic development. I must say this is a cycle, they take and give as a working operation in order to stimulate development within their developing member states and contribute to welfare delivery, while the interests helps in building the base of funds for the cycle. But sometimes the publicity given to these types of partnerships is far more than their actual contribution to poverty alleviation or economic development. As Whitfield 2010 puts it, “a credit card consumaration”. You use now and pay later, but those who fund must dictate the rules. The question is can this strategy be considered as a means of alleviating poverty or improving economic development if a country must achieve a developmental project through a debtor – creditor relationship? This question remains unanswered in this research and may be attempted in another research. But as concerns the RUMPI project of Cameroon, significant welfare projects were realized thanks to the ADB, GOC and the tax payers. But its contribution within an entire state context is still minimal, more avenues for welfare delivery must be sought if the Country genuinely wishes to achieve an “economic miracle” and alleviate its population from poverty.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Can a Public Private Partnership between a multinational institution and the state of Cameroon be a viable source for welfare delivery within the developing nation? This remains the over-arching theme for my research project. Public private partnerships are not a relatively new phenomenon, but their tentacles of operation keeps spreading on a geometric progression the world over. Public Private Partnerships address multiple concerns within states; they presently have a very significant impact on their ability to supplement government public service delivery. While playing these roles, they contribute to public policy and shape decision making within their states of operation. A developing nation such as Cameroon involves multinational partners to create an open market to foreign capital as well as address strategies related to poverty alleviation. Part of the country's growth and employment strategy is to reach the rural poor with basic necessities and infrastructure. But how can a government grappling with a weak unstable economy, democratic and bureaucratic stereo-types as well as management and accountability problems handle this on its own? It is as a result of this that the government extends an invitation to organizations such as the African Development Bank in a partnership meant to assist in welfare delivery, most especially within the rural regions of the country. One of such rural projects is the RUMPI area participatory development project for the South West region of Cameroon.

A marriage of these two un-identical institutions is expected to be flawed with management and leadership loop holes, but this also creates an avenue for learning for both partners who learn out of their normal routine tasks, especially government staffs learning to overcome duplication, inefficiency, and adopt faster and effective ways of accomplishing the task. This style of partnership is what Henman and Fenger 2006; Whitfield 2001, 2010, and Osborne 2010 term the "New Public Management". The term seeks to introduce private sector techniques into a public sector which was considered to harbor inefficient and outdated management styles. While within the African setting, Li and Ferreira 2008 considers it to be a two sided relationship: while African governments such as Cameroon learn from the expertise of their private partners, these private institutions also learn to handle a relatively unstable and unpredictable African environment. The thesis was expected to answer two major research projects:

- What is the rationale for the RUMPI Partnership between the government of Cameroon and the African Development Bank?
- How has the RUMPI partnership contributed to Welfare delivery within the state of Cameroon?

The partnership between the African Development Bank and government of Cameroon for the RUMPI project faced two major project suspensions, exposing aspects of accountability, trust, and the need for the state to adopt advanced and transparent ways of managing resources. The RUMPI project is only one among several projects financed by the African Development Bank in the country for welfare delivery and poverty alleviation. Being a participatory development project, it enables the use of a broader base of partners: From traditional government services to NGOs, beneficiaries and other forms of civil society organizations in a bid to create an all encompassing style of governance. This is what Osborne 2010 calls the New Public Governance. A non normative term not meant to supersede Public Administration or the New Public Management but a way by which practical management aspects of working lives and practices of present day managers could be exposed. I found two theories built within the context of the New Public Management, and written with ideas of the New Public Governance very significant to the RUMPI partnership relationship. These are: The theory of Organizational Partnership, and the theory and Practice of collaborative Advantage. While the former exposes the rationale for state's engagements into Public Private Partnership and shortcomings for the merge of the two, the latter exposes themes in collaboration which could lead to long, practical, strong, and lasting partnership relationships.

The data for my research design was accomplished through a qualitative case study analysis. A strong base of data collection was put together from interviews, discussions, observations, project reports, publications, journals and books in order to operationalize on the rationale for the RUMPI partnership (including shortcomings). It emphasized on the strategic build of the partnership relationship. The findings of my research were as follows:

- ❖ The RUMPI area participatory development project is a cycle. “You get now and pay back later”. While the African Development Bank gives with one hand for the RUMPI project, it receives more with another hand. The loan must be serviced and on fixed deadlines. Whitfield 2010 likens this to a “credit card consummation” which could lead to a serious crisis.
- ❖ Government uses the RUMPI project to conceal public debt. They are presented as a benefit from a fruitful partnership of cooperation between the African Development Bank and government, while it is still almost entirely paid from tax payers pockets.
- ❖ The African Development Bank is silent about the profit motive behind this project, but this is their real motivation for the partnership, after all it uses the interest to create the base for funds from which they give out grants and loans to their partner countries. In essence the partnership is not just for the benefit of Cameroon as publicized, but both parties.
- ❖ The RUMPI partnership produced good practical projects that are capable of assisting in welfare delivery within the RUMPI project locality, but with a country context, these projects remain largely insignificant in a country that has more than 40% of its population below the poverty line.
- ❖ The partnerships enabled the government of Cameroon and traditional government partners to learn from the expertise of a multinational entity such as the African Development Bank, dubbed “collaborative learning”.
- ❖ It assisted in building public policy, and creating a good basis for participatory development with almost everyone involved from conception to execution of projects. This build created a sense of belonging and assured sustainability of projects after execution.
- ❖ Corruption was checked, accountability was put to test, but a synergy was achieved which enabled the accomplishment of realized projects thanks to both the tax payer, government of Cameroon and the African Development Bank.

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Appendix:

INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION FOR RESPONDENTS



Author of thesis: Robert Ndoping

Supervisor: Professor Antoinette Hetzler

BRIEF INTRODUCTION:

My names are Robert Ndoping, a Masters student in the program of welfare policies and management with a Major in Political science, University of Lund in Sweden. I am presently undertaking a research within the domain of Welfare Policies and management, most precisely, partnerships between public and private institutions, with my case study being the RUMPI project between the Government of Cameroon and the African Development Bank. My research is within the area of welfare delivery, participatory development and poverty alleviation. I found the RUMPI Area Participatory Development Project - Cameroon to be a perfect case for this study. I would be using this case to unravel the benefits as well as pitfalls from the partnership and collaborative in a bid to attain the goals of welfare delivery and economic development. I focus on the strategic relationship between both parties, but I am also interested in examining the roles that other partners play within the civil society and beneficiary population. My primary data will be drawn mainly from interviews, and supplemented with discussions and observations.

I have planned to interview the following personalities:

- ❖ The resident representative of the African Development Bank in Cameroon
- ❖ The project coordinator of RUMPI (Or representative)
- ❖ The Monitoring and Evaluation officer for RUMPI.
- ❖ The community Development Adviser for RUMPI.
- ❖ The Regional Delegate of Agriculture and Rural Development, South West.
- ❖ Other local partners from NGOs or civil society.

And finally I plan to have discussions with some beneficiaries as management would permit me.

I must state here that all data gathered during this research process will be strictly used only for academic purposes and nothing else. I would greatly need the assistance of everyone concerned in order for me to succeed in this project. Thanks for accepting to be part of this research.

Kind regards from Robert and the administration of the faculty of Social Science, and department of Political Science in Lund University- Sweden.

General interview guide for questions to respondents:

1. Strategic build of partnership relationship:

- ✚ Project funding, how and why? Relationship among sponsors. Reasons behind partnership and interests of both parties.
- ✚ Problems and processes of how partnership functions in practical terms, hierarchy among different levels and frictions that may exist.
- ✚ Why some projects were partially completed and expectations by deadline of project.
- ✚ Problems resulting from suspensions, how it was handled, new measures taken and lessons to build trust.
- ✚ Loan and grant conditions and whether there are bad and good loans. Effects on tax payers, if any?
- ✚ General impressions on partnership.

2. Other civil society partners and government service partners in execution.

- ✚ Roles played in execution of projects and possible level of success.
- ✚ Problems faced, especially those related to the RUMPI suspensions by ADB, resources for project execution, bureaucracy and accountability loop holes.
- ✚ Any lessons learnt in joint working? How can this affect future execution tasks and trust?
- ✚ General impressions and recommendations if any?

3. Guide to discussion with beneficiaries.

- ✚ Do you know who funded these projects?
- ✚ Did you play any role in execution?
- ✚ What difference does it make with the projects that have been executed? Any examples of a major change in your way or standard of living related to a particular project?
- ✚ Will you play any role in sustaining them? If so, How?
- ✚ Any expectations from these accomplished projects?
- ✚ General impressions.
- ✚

PICTURES OF SOME RUMPI PROJECT EXAMPLES

OBSERVED:

1) RURAL MARKETS



Modern rural market at Mudeka Tiko Council Area, Fako Division



Modern Rural Market in Mamfe, Manyu Division



Part of the Modern Market at Bechati, Lebiale Division



Modern Rural Market at Numba, Manyu Division



Modern rural Market at Ekona Mbenge, Fako Division



Modern Rural Market at Bamuso, Bakassi Peninsula, Ndian Division



20 RURAL MARKETS



Modern Rural Market at Ekondo-Titi Ndian Division



Modern Rural Market at Mabeta, Fako Division.



Modern Rural Market at Eyumojock, Manyu Division.



Modern Rural Market at Mwambong Kupe-Muanenguba Division.



Modern Rural Market at Isangele, Ndian Division.

- OTHERS:**
- Nguti
 - Bole
 - Mundemba (Bulu)
 - Konye

2) VILLAGE BANKS



*Village Bank at Mondoni Native,
Fako Division*



*Village Bank at Banga Bakundu,
Meme Division*



*Village Bank at Nkongle, Lebialelem
Division (under construction)*



*Village Bank at Bechati,
Lebialelem Division*

**55 VILLAGE
BANKS**



*Village Bank at Malende,
Fako Division*



*Village Bank at Toko,
Ndian Division*



*Village Bank at Ngomboku,
Kupe-Muanenguba Division*

OTHERS:

- Munyenge
- M'mock Leteh
- Mbakwa-Supe
- Bachuo-Ntai
- Nwametow
- Banga-Bakundu
- Numba
- Lewoh
- Illoani

STATISTICS:

No. of operational village banks:	19
Total No. of members:	1,121
- Men	710
- Women	319
- Groups	82
Total amount of savings:	FCFA 74,000,000

3) AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION



Flourishing maize farm using improved seeds from Rumpi at Dibanda in Fako Division.



Market Information System: capturing prices and availability of principal food crops with a weekly reporting frequency.



Plantains in Muambong Market awaiting buyam-sellams: good feeder roads will boost production.



Yam sets in store in preparation for the planting season to ensure abundant harvest.



Improved quality maize seeds is a prerequisite for abundant harvest.



Distribution of cassava cuttings.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION



Breeder stock of Snails at IRAD Ekona, Fako Division.



Improved Citrus varieties in the nursery at CCSP, Kumba.



Producing improved plantain suckers at CCSP Kumba for better yields.

<u>SOME STATISTICS</u>	
Multiplication and Distribution of Planting Materials:	
Maize:	53 tons (2,120 ha)
Cassava:	1,772,848 cuttings (177.3 ha)
Oil Palm Seedlings:	31,000 (200 ha)
Plantain suckers:	13,454 (12 ha)
Budded Citrus:	2,534 (9ha)
Snails:	56,180
Production and Revenue from some crops	
- Maize:	6,360 tons = 1.2 billion FCFA
- Cassava:	2660 tons = 330 million FCFA
- Plantains:	180 tons = 22 million FCFA
Trainings (164 farmers):	
- False Decapitation Techniques	
- Improved Fallow Management	
- Domestication of Eru, njansang and bush mango, snails, cane rats & bee farming.	

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT SECTOR