

# A Decolonized State

The Success of Botswana Revisited

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# Abstract

Botswana has since independence showed a remarkable economic and political stability and been spared of conflict, ethnic violence, and large scale human rights violations that have been a common occurrence in other parts of Africa. This single case study examines why Botswana has been spared from neo-patrimonial structures by analyzing three other cases with much less successful performance records. Botswana currently outperforms almost all other African states in many categories and is even beating several European states in corruption indices.

Many African states struggle with parallel institutions that are competing with the state. These neo-patrimonial structures take advantage of ethnic, religious, regional identities and allegiances to spread mistrust of the relatively new state institutions and undermine the legitimacy of the same. This study outlines the systemic causes of neo-patrimonial structures in developing countries by applying a postcolonial critique of state-building practice and Western hegemony in international relations. Factors that have promoted neo-patrimonial structures in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire are compared to Botswana. The final analysis shows how Botswana through historical circumstances, wise leadership, and good policy decisions has managed to retain ownership of its destiny and successfully navigate the treacherous seas.

*Key words:* Botswana, Neo-patrimonial structures, Postcolonial theory, State-building, State legitimacy

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# Executive Summary

Botswana is seen as the democratic role model for Sub-Saharan Africa. Largely covered by the Kalahari Desert and landlocked but with diamond and copper-nickel mines it has avoided conflict, violence and the Dutch disease; things that have caused severe problems to many developing states in Africa. The Botswana economy has since independence in 1966 matched the growth of the Asian tiger economies. The state finances also have the highest credit rating in Africa and corruption is lower than in any other state on the continent.

In many other developing countries neo-patrimonial structures have undermined the legitimacy of the state, but this has interestingly not been the case in Botswana. By applying a postcolonial theoretical framework the author examines why Botswana is a success and how state-building practice and norms in international relations are not only influenced by, but also used to benefit the interest of the West.

The perceived supremacy and universality of the Westphalian state caused by Eurocentric bias in the international system have forced leaders in the global south to import institutions that are foreign and incompatible to local needs and particularities. The systemic causes of neo-patrimonial structures are used in the analysis of three cases of Sub-Saharan African states that share a history of internal conflict, widespread violence and non-functioning state institutions. Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire are individually analyzed and compared to Botswana in a final analysis. Five factors are identified: supremacy and subordination, war of liberation and lingering violence, a colonial construct, united elites, and foreign involvement and control.

The author concludes that the success of Botswana lies in the historical circumstances that allowed for the dominant ethnic group, the Tswana, to remain in control of their own destiny during the colonial era; a tradition of diplomacy, pragmatism, and consensus, which all have worked in favor for Botswana and eased the adaptation of Western-style institutions. Moreover, the seeds of democracy can be traced back to the pre-colonial village assembly, the *kgotla*, where chiefs discussed and consulted with the people before making decisions. It is in this continuity from the pre-colonial Tswana states to present-day Botswana; conditioned on the absence of an ambitious European colonial power that have made the success of Botswana possible.

# Abbreviations

BDF	Botswana Defence Force
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PDG	Parti Démocratique de Guinée
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VE-day	Victory in Europe day
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
Zanu-PF	Zanu-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

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# 1 Introduction

The largest single group of states is on the African continent. Including the northern parts of the continent, the number of states has now reached 55, not counting the occupied territory of Western Sahara. The number of states in Africa alone today is the same as in the whole world in 1914. The differences and forms of states inevitably vary greatly and if the time factor is taken in the number of variants are even higher. Some states have managed the test of time but not all. Some have disintegrated, and some have evolved into entirely different entities. With all available hindsight and accumulated knowledge, both practical and academic, of the institution that the state is, it is interesting to notice that many states still find themselves struggling to keep their head above water.

When the African continent had been divided between the European powers, some 10,000 different polities had become 40 colonies and protectorates. More than 190 ethnic groups were divided by the newly imposed borders; while some of the new entities contained hundreds of ethno-linguistic groups with absolutely nothing in common (Meredith 2006:1-2). Out of this imposed melting pot of cultures Botswana emerged successfully compared to her less fortunate African brothers and sisters.

## 1.1 Research Question

This thesis will investigate the systemic causes of neo-patrimonial structures in developing states. Neo-patrimonial structures have been visible and prevalent in Africa since the continent embarked on its journey of independence fifty years ago. These structures have caused and contributed to violence, conflict, coups, civil war, military rule, crimes against humanity, and genocide. However, Botswana has been and remains an exception that has been spared of these problems that have wreaked havoc, misery, and death seemingly indiscriminately across the African continent.

*Why has Botswana not experienced any serious emergence of neo-patrimonial structures that have severely disrupted the democratic system of governance that has been the hallmark of Botswana since independence?*

## 1.2 Orthodox Explanations

Orthodox explanations have failed to fully grasp and provide understanding of what has happened in Botswana. For many it has become routine to argue that the success Botswana experienced was a result of its ability to import and adapt the idea of the Westphalian state, crediting the wise leadership, a bit of luck and the successful transformation of the British colonial heritage; thus, implying that the secret to Botswana's success lies in a break with pre-colonial institutions and culture (Maundeni 2001:108). A more modest assumption that Botswana managed to mix its pre-colonial or traditional with the modern is also occasionally put forward, but without any attempt to differentiate the traditional or explain why some British institutional exports successfully stuck in Botswana and not elsewhere in the African possessions of the former empire (Beaulier 2003:231-2). The false and deep-seated assumption in the West that tradition or culture, colonial heritage and idea of modernity are universal or at least (as in the case of Africa) continental have made researchers content with such an unspecified answer (Maundeni 2001:108).

## 1.3 Choice of Theory

In order to understand the Botswana case and its particularities, tools that focus on a single case and its particularities are needed. The discussion above on orthodox explanations shows how Eurocentric bias has clouded the effort to fully understand what has happened in Botswana. That success can simply and only be explained by the successful adoption of Western norms and institutions and that it constitutes the only way to reach modernity. That it cannot evolve from underneath but has to be taught from above. This theoretical (and inevitably political) approach to problems facing developing nations has been criticized from African states and policy makers. "African solutions to African problems" is a dogma that is gaining ground on the continent.

Postcolonial theory provides the tools necessary to understand how Western hegemony has influenced policy making and political decisions in developing countries from the colonial era to the present. State-building and international relations theory have mirrored the policies of Western states and institutions and provided policy recommendations for developing nations that have been primarily based on the concern of the hegemon. The critical approach by postcolonial theory can provide a deeper understanding of what has occurred in Botswana and why it has not brought about neo-patrimonial structures.

## 1.4 Choice of Method

The methodological considerations in the social sciences are constantly under debate. This ongoing debate has provided students and scholars a smorgasbord of methodological choices. To answer the research question and to best study the Botswana case, an intensive research design will be used. It provides the researcher tools to remain open minded during the research process and resonates well with the intentions of postcolonial theory and the goal of the thesis. To illustrate the Botswana case a comparison with three other interesting cases will shed light on what has made Botswana's success possible. Analyses of Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire will provide illustrative reference points in the final analysis of Botswana. This will be further elaborated on in chapter Method.

## 1.5 Selection of Material

The material to the theoretical framework is coming from the works of postcolonial scholars Siba Grovogui, Bertrand Badie, and Branwen Gruffydd Jones. Their take on IR and Robert Rotberg's discussion of state-failure is contrasted against Francis Fukuyama's influential liberal work and discussions on state-building.

The empirical data in this study is from secondary sources only. It consists of scientific articles mostly from scholars or scientific journals from African universities and reports, policy briefs and articles from the Institute of Security Studies, which has its main office in Pretoria. The use of sources from Africa is a deliberate choice by the author in line with the theory choice of the thesis. The works by Martin Meredith and Richard Dowden are journalistic and of a popular scientific character and not strictly scientific, which can also be said about the memoir by Douglas Rogers. The material on Côte d'Ivoire has inevitably been restricted by the language barrier. Even though plenty of English language material has been available it remains a fact that French language material on Côte d'Ivoire and French policy has not been used in the study.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 State-building

Throughout history states have failed, disappeared, and been replaced. However, as the basic building blocks of the modern international system the stability of the states, and more precisely the nation-state, is of utmost importance for the stability and predictability of the system. This is the reason states and international organizations have turned to various methods to help strengthen weak states and rebuild failed and collapsed ones. States can be categorized as weak, failed and collapsed. However, there is no clear-cut distinction between the categories or exactly what they constitute.

Rotberg focuses on how well states perform in delivering of the “most crucial political goods” (Rotberg 2004:2) in order to determine in what category a state belong. These political goods can at best be described as the claims citizens make on the state and are very hard, if not impossible, to quantify.

#### 2.1.1 Building Nations and Building States

In daily conversations, we generally pay little attention to the difference in meaning of the words nation and state. More often than not they are used interchangeably as the words have merged, at least for Westerners, in the concept of the nation-state. However, the words, or the concepts rather, are by no means dependent on each other’s existence. This becomes obvious as we need to separate the concepts of state-building and nation-building. Simplified, state-building is the setting up of institutions, the framework, of which the state can become an actor internally and externally. It is in the construction of this framework that external actors can assist and contribute. Consequently state-building is more heard of on the international arena and is considered to be a task for the international community. On the other hand nation-building is a much more difficult, ambiguous, and uncharted endeavor. It is also not possible for an external actor to directly assist in nation-building. Nation-building is essentially the internal process of creating a common identity and building of a sense of community by shared history and experience of the people within the borders of the nation. A task that *prima facie* is overwhelming.

## 2.1.2 Strength and Scope of a State

Fukuyama shows that there is a conceptual difference to be made when discussing whether states are weak or strong. Fukuyama calls this the missing dimensions of stateness. Because of the various shapes and forms the role of the state can take it becomes useful to differentiate between the scope and the strength of a state. The contested role of the state has undoubtedly shaped, as well as being shaped by, the last century. It was for example evident in the ideological struggle between totalitarianism, with communism and Nazism at one end, and neoliberalism at the other. A case in point to illustrate the missing dimension of stateness is the US. The US institutions are deliberately designed with inbuilt weaknesses to weaken the influence of the state. On the other hand, as is well known, the US can project force and power not only within its borders but also globally. It possesses the ability and means in form of numerous law enforcement agencies from local to state to federal level as well as the world's most potent military machinery. Although, limited in scope and with weak institutions the US remains a strong state.

A consequence of this is that a state can appear weak and strong at the same time depending on the definition. Using Max Weber's famous definition of the state as the actor with monopoly of violence and consequently the ability to enforce its will, rules and laws on the people, the US is undoubtedly a very strong state. This is in sharp contrast against Seymour Martin Lipset, who would argue that the US appears to be a weak state. Born out of a revolution, against the authoritarian rule of king George III, with institutions set up to weaken state power rather than to consolidate state power causing the US to have, among other things, an ill-functioning public health care system. This is essentially the case Fukuyama makes for distinguishing between the scope of state activity and institutional capacity. The word strength has been used to describe both scope and capacity, causing confusion. With the two categories separated from each other, matrices can be created and states plotted indicating their level of what Fukuyama labels as stateness. Even though there is no generally accepted hierarchy of state functions the matrix proposed by Fukuyama would require state functions organized from necessary and important to desirable and optional on a continuum, thereby not only creating a shopping list but also, coincidentally, a list of priorities (Fukuyama 2004:6-13).

This discussion is relevant as the end of the Cold War paved the way for the Washington consensus, giving carte blanche for neoliberal market reformers to take control over the aid sector. This course change occurred simultaneously in development discourse and in Western political and economic practices; a process that is seen in Fukuyama's own matrices (Fukuyama 2004 Figure 6).

Although cautious about the difficulties in pursuing this goal, what is known as how to "get to Denmark" or creating a functioning democratic state in an apparent Western image is not questioned. However, Fukuyama is aware of the problem and realizes that even if all information about the history and structure of Danish society is available, it is impossible to directly transfer such knowledge to

another state. Therefore, focus is on creating institutional capacity instead of scope, which has been the case for many years (Fukuyama 2004:22-3)

This covers what can be described as the supply side of institutions but what is more important is demand for institutions. This demand is only internal and it is difficult for external actors to create incentives for it. Economists would argue that when you have demand, the institutions necessary to address the current problems will appear as out of nowhere. This works well in theory but not very well in practice.

### 2.1.3 Dilemma of Short and Long Approaches

A dilemma for external actors, for example foreign governments, IFIs, and NGOs, is the will to do as much good, to as many and as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, this leads to short term solutions where the external actor, to maximize efficiency, runs and staffs the necessary functions. Never requiring or pressuring the local bureaucracy to learn and adapt to provide for what is needed. The short term need, to provide efficient aid to as many as possible may prevent or even harm development in the longer term and definitely hamper development of a better local bureaucracy (Fukuyama 2004:40-2).

### 2.1.4 State-Failure Internationally: A New Era

State-failure is frequently used as an argument for the international community to override state sovereignty. The lack of a coherent response from the international community when faced with state-failure does not only reflect the lacking ability to predict state-failure, agree on what it actually is, but poignantly points out that it is something that is never expected to happen. Despite historical (Herbst 2004:303-4) and recent examples there are no legal or otherwise agreed upon international procedures on how to deal with a failed state. States seem to be in complete denial of their own potential mortality. Their borders today are more fixed than ever before in history and are considered to be “sacred” (Holsti 1996:83). Arguably, the states' denial of their own mortality is not completely true. Almost all states have a military and plans on how to defend themselves against an armed attack. The inherent right to self-defense, criminalization of wars of aggression and annexation enshrined in international treaties affirm this; however, during the last century a radical shift have taken place. Control over more territory is no longer a guarantee for gain and survival. In fact it is most likely too expensive, both politically and economically, and above all not necessary. Wealth and success for states in the world today is no longer conditioned on what can be dug up from their own ground. Similarly, it is not necessary to be in control of the land to reap the benefits from it. Global trade and a globalized economy have made empires, in the classical sense, redundant. This have not only proved to be a safeguard for smaller states but also transformed the threat to come from within. When foreign powers have been present it has been to

either destabilize or change the regime, but almost never to annex (although a few exceptions exist, for example Kuwait 1991). International relations theory that have explicitly focused on the anarchic international system and security dilemmas and threatening military aggression, now stands somewhat perplexed towards this new challenge when states fail due to internal circumstances rather than external (Herbst 2004:308). This negligence explains why states have gone so far as to completely ban piracy and mercenaries as they pose threat to the state, or to be more precise its monopoly of violence. It is also, according to Badie, the reason why states have turned a blind eye towards the very existence of civil wars and are extremely reluctant, if not incapable, of negotiating with terrorists or rebel groups (Badie 2000:78).

### 2.1.5 Changes and Origins of the Westphalian State

The lack of a general definition of what a state is makes for a large variety of states in different forms and shapes during the course of history. The sheer number of them has increased substantially over the last century. From only 55 recognized polities at the outbreak of the Great War of 1914 to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the 193<sup>rd</sup> recognized member<sup>1</sup> in the prestigious club of polities that can call themselves states. It is noteworthy to mention that many of these new states are the result of failed states and empires. The map of Europe in 1914 contains many names and polities that have dissolved and/or been radically reshaped (Herbst 2004:304).

What causes states to fail, or to be failing, is generally considered to be man-made (Rothberg 2004:14), ergo state failure can also be man prevented. It must also be taken into consideration that the idea of the state as a universal form of governance is a new modern idea. The state did not go global because of spontaneous natural evolution from older, less efficient forms of governance, but through Western colonialism and imperialism. What has been created is maintained by the international system that presupposes the state as the form of governance. The international system also requires states to live up to certain obligations, for example be in control of the monopoly of violence of the territory, have an obedient population, and also possess some form of control of the interactions with the rest of the outside world by military, financial, and diplomatic means. By fulfilling the external and internal demands set up on the state it can secure its existence, but failing to comply with these demands will result in state decay. Burdensome as these demands are for any state, having them forcibly imposed (colonial history) by an outsider (the West) that have also defined and set the territory makes the demands truly herculean in nature (Clapham 2004:77).

In contrast to the continuous evolution of statehood that took place in Europe, European powers simply assumed control over large parts of the rest of the world

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<sup>1</sup> Number of UN member states. September, 2011.

and divided the territory between them without any consideration taken to the people living there. Imposing fixed borders, identities and hierarchical structures from the outside was not only a radically new way of creating states but inevitably created conflict between old and newly imposed structures (Clapham 2004:79).

The conditions in Europe with contiguous states created a need and emphasis on defining and securing territory. States that historically emerged in other parts of the world did not have any neighboring states nearby and could therefore conduct their business with loosely defined territorial borders, for example in Africa. The need to divide every square-inch of the world's landmass between states did not arise until the European scramble for colonies began, and later reinforced by the globalized economy that needs the jurisdiction and regulation of states to function. (Clapham 2004:78-9). An historical consequence of this is that wars fought over land and territorial expansion have been a common occurrence in Europe while wars in Africa have been fought over power as land has always been available in abundance (Dowden 2010:25).

Any scholarly consensus on causes of failure are yet, if ever, to be seen. Disagreement is by and large caused by the sheer number of differences between functioning states and the actual failures. Cases ranging from Haiti to Bosnia and Somalia offer extreme variations in history and context. Scholars have focused on measurable indicators such as governance and economy but also on societal norms and therefore consequently disagree on what causes states to fail. Interestingly, as Kasfir notes, state failure is mostly discussed when the international community is contemplating different kinds of interventions when a government is not performing adequately. This has led to distinctions of state failure ranging from loss of control of territory to functioning law enforcement, judicial system and military, and to a decline of governmental efficiency; leading to central authority being completely absent or merely a facade (Kasfir 2004:57). Thus, realpolitik and foreign policy concerns have a say in when a state has failed.

However, the image of anarchy, violence, and chaos often associated with state failure is not always the case. I. William Zartman argues that the state should not be confused with society and collapse of authority, law, and political order does not necessarily have to be devastating and lead to total anarchy. Life does not end with the state and people usually find ways to continue with their lives (Kasfir 2004:58).

### 2.1.6 Sovereignty and Legitimacy

The Westphalian state system and the sovereign nation-state have found themselves in decline since the end of the Cold War. What used to be considered to be the internal affairs of states have increasingly become affairs of the whole international community. What goes on within a state's border is definitely affecting the international legitimacy of that state's regime. From only being considered to be of humanitarian and human rights concern, the failing state has evolved into a security problem. The securitization of development, including

securitization of refugees and other related areas (Duffield 2001:26-8), have undoubtedly left its mark on state-building and state-failure.

Fukuyama discusses how the previously clear-cut concept of sovereignty has eroded since the end of the Cold War. Implementation of human rights, Western-style democracy, and a liberal market economy according to the Washington consensus have blurred the concept of sovereignty and transformed what it means to be a sovereign. It is not anymore self-evident that the de facto ruler of a state also is the legitimate ruler. In particular, the debate on humanitarian intervention that began in the 1990's has been a catalyst to the erosion of sovereignty and the emerging post-Westphalian state-system (Fukuyama 2004:96-7).

## 2.2 Postcolonial Theory

### 2.2.1 Introduction

Postcolonialism is a theory that emphasizes the experiences of non-Western societies and questions the implicit universalistic claims of Western knowledge and experiences as representative for human nature and all of mankind. Especially in the discipline of IR, Eurocentrism has been the force that single-handedly and inevitably shaped the discourse. Through its imperialistic and colonizing past the West have created and shaped the world in its own image. By claiming superiority of the European experience and the development and history of the European continent the idea of anarchy evolving into modern nation-states has become the universal marker of civilization. With this power, the West, labeled the rest as native, heathen, uncivilized and irrational as opposed to the white European male that saw himself as man, Christian, civilized and rational. The images of the Occident and the Orient as two opposing systems of thought and ideas are indefatigably reproduced by the Eurocentric bias in scientific research.

For whatever reason, Europe considered itself to be uniquely endowed with modern traits such as reason, science and technology; therefore, Europeans decided that it was to be put upon them to spread these ideas and norms to the rest of the world and dictate the direction, which non-Western societies in the world were to take. Arguably one of the most important tools to succeed and legitimize this task was science. Literature, history, philosophy, and anthropology were all used to remake distinctly European experiences. Regional European became global and universal and non-Western cultures, arts, and sciences were degraded to folklore, myths, and shamanism (Grovoqui 2007:230). Even though the vast majority of inhabitants of this world have very little to do with how Europeans have fought and killed each other in Europe and how they trace their philosophy from the Enlightenment and ancient Greece it is impossible for them not to be compared with this paradigm.

IR scholar Gruffydd Jones notes that that there is something ironic in an ostensibly “international” discipline that is so deeply rooted in the experiences of only one of the earth's continents (Gruffydd Jones 2006:2). Likewise, the Westphalian paradigm, a pillar in the social sciences, is falsely perceived to be universal despite its European roots. This “Westphalian commonsense” have become so dominant that instead of treating deviations, particularly in post-colonial Africa, as evidence undermining the universalism of the Westphalian system, they are seen as proof that deviating states cannot live up to the demands of sovereignty (Grovoqui 2002:316). International law does not stem from ethical considerations on how to create a universal order but on how a small group of European states could achieve hegemony. Although international law has been described as universal, it has also been effectively conformed to fit and perpetuate the hegemony of the West. Praxis and jurisprudence have silenced and excluded the other from equal participation on the international stage. Free-trade and liberty have, for example been hailed as good universal values but denied to large parts of the world due to other consideration necessary to preserve the hegemony of Western powers (Krishna 2006:97). The Westphalian system has in a similar way come to be seen as natural, a transcendent form of regime that has become idealized in academia. However, as states in Europe, weak or strong, were given sovereignty the same regime was denied to the peoples of Africa. In Africa other rules applied as evident in the outcome of the Berlin conference of 1884 (Grovoqui 2002:325). The attitude and behavior of the states of Europe contradicts the very essence of the assumption that there is anything natural or inevitable about the Westphalian system. This is summed up by Clapham: “The imposition of statehood as a global norm coincided, unsurprisingly, with the heyday of statehood within the European territories from which the new ideal derived” (Clapham 2004:80).

Consider that small and insignificant Belgium, or its king Leopold II to be precise, could take control over the vast and rich Congo is a case in point. The incoherent and loosely put together states of Belgium and Switzerland could not have survived if it were not for the other Western powers. However, due to ethnic, racial and religious differences the same paradigm that supported the small states in Europe did little to achieve or respect the sovereignty of the peoples of Africa. They were up for grabs. What has happened is that different renditions of sovereignty have been applied and practiced all over the world, despite claims to the contrary. There is nothing essential about the so called Westphalian commonsense. Therefore, any claim that the failure of African states is due to a deviation from the Westphalian system is not only flawed but false. Any input or thought from “natives” on any topic was generally regarded as redundant and of no importance. In other words the “native” was efficiently denied to possess will, conscience, or agency. This “native essentialism” is implicitly present in Eurocentric theories and fully rejected by postcolonialists.

Postcolonialism is not about telling the other's story; it is about delivering an understanding of that the Western Eurocentric knowledge does not represent the “truth”, but reproduces the other as inferior to Western men and civilization. Thus post-colonialism aspires to deliberate those affected by anyone's imperial desire

for hegemony in politics or culture and to introduce a different kind of universalism based on democratic principles.

### 2.2.2 Knowledge and Power

Postcolonialism treats “truth” and knowledge as something that can never fully depict how an event unfolded. “[W]hat is said to be, is never a full account of events” (Grovoqui 2007:232). The gap between what is said and what has happened can only be understood if imperial and colonial structures are revealed and examined. Under the guise of neutrality and scientific objectivism, European scholars provided “truths” about the world and its peoples. As has been observed, for example by Edward Said, these observations were solely European and excluded “native” concerns or knowledge. Not even sympathetic and generous scientists could escape the structures of empire that placed the native outside the processes of research and decision making. Said also illustrated how these stereotypical observations of the other in the Orient were culturally institutionalized by the colonizers and used as the basis of Europe's policies towards the Orient and how these ideas have continued to influence policy both in the West and among the formerly colonized (Grovoqui 2007:237).

Postcolonialism also disputes attempts by critical theorist to make up for these historical injustices by newer, also Western, methods of rationalism and humanism. That critique can never adequately criticize the imperial and colonial past and provide salvation for the rest as these attempts, inevitably, provides the West with a renewed task of having the ultimate responsibility for leading the way for the rest of world and charting the direction.

In the academic field of history the European control of knowledge is prevalent. The history of Europe is the “master narrative” and all other histories, be them Indian or Ugandan, must relate to the history of Europe and subsequently becomes nothing other than a variation of the master narrative. The discipline is so heavily set on European thought and structures that it is impossible to present an alternative history where Europe neither explicitly nor implicitly is the “sovereign subject” (Anghie 2006:113).

The power of labeling the other as the opposite of the European (non-Christian, irrational, non-civilized etc.) legitimized the colonial endeavor in which the burden of civilizing the “native” was laid upon the shoulders of the white Christian European male. This is what has been known as “the white man's burden”. The native became subordinated to the European who imposed a world view that centered on Europe and later the West. The knowledge about the “native” is also distinctly dubious as it is the result of observations from “objective” Westerners, without any input or comment made by the natives themselves. The concerns, histories, philosophies, ideas and world interpretations of the “native” have been effectively put aside and to a large degree erased by Western imperialism. By the ingenious device of linear time, Europe defined and took control of history, culture, and society. Through colonialism and what later become protectorates and trusteeships, the non-Europeans were placed in a

“historical waiting room” until they were deemed civilized enough to possess the means to make decisions for themselves and establish a viable order. Europeans were at the forefront of the evolutionary time-line with the peoples of the non-European world lagging behind. (Grovoqui 2006a:54). The historical neglect of the revolution in Haiti in 1804 by African slaves while giving the contemporary revolutions in America and France overwhelming recognition, magnitude and importance in the history books affects and shapes our mind and views in accordance to a specific narrative. Despite the tremendous historical importance and achievement of the revolution in Haiti, and later in Jamaica and Martinique, these events remain largely unheard of in the West. The ideas of emancipation and human dignity that underpinned these revolutions did not share the enlightenment ideals of the French and American revolutions and became a threat, a rival, to the ideas of Europe. The historical manipulation is not only evidence of the systematic neglect and degradation of non-Western history but also evidence of what happens when the European (historical) monopoly of reason, agency and conscience is threatened (Grovoqui 2006b:186-9).

The social sciences still generally defines Europe and the West as representing “goodness and universalism” (Grovoqui 2006a:55). Fukuyama's above mentioned account of scope and capacity and the effect of Western economic development on state-building through the Washington consensus follows this tradition. The idea that the West represents good and universal is not necessarily false but it is definitely not the whole truth. By conveniently identifying itself with humanitarianism, benevolence and generosity it serves to construct a self-image for the West that is helpful to its cause. Deliberately forgotten is the conquest, enslavement, colonialism and violent processes that were coerced upon the rest of the world, something that does not fit the self-image of a do-gooder. The victims of theft, racism and, worst of all, genocide that followed in the wake of Western imperialism and colonialism are, if even noted, seen as collateral damage in the struggle to spread democracy, human rights and civilization. A sad and regrettable past that is constantly ignored, neglected and preferably forgotten (Gruffydd Jones 2006:4).

### 2.2.3 The Westphalian Hypocrisy

The nation-state is effectively reproduced in the international system in the image of the Western state. Only by adhering to this norm can a polity be accepted and granted admission to the United Nations. This perceived universality of Western sovereignty is nevertheless a chimera. Fukuyama has now posited that we live in post-Westphalian world in order to theoretically explain events in international relations and the erosion of sovereignty. This is however only an observation and does not explain how the previous (supposedly stable?) Westphalian world was awarded the post epithet. The sovereignty granted to the states reflects the state identity on the international arena and in its external relations with other states. This sovereignty does not stem from representing the people and can only partially be described as a state, for example according to Thomas Hobbes. They

can simply be described as “lame leviathans” that only meets the external criteria for statehood but lacks the internal. By upholding a Western-style front, not only do the elites get international legitimacy, they can also take advantage of other states reluctance to get involved in other states' internal affairs. This way the international system acts as a life-support system for regimes with little or none internal political legitimacy. Many regimes in states of the non-aligned movement have heavily criticized the international system as imperialistic and creating dependence while at the same time taking full advantage of the same system to remain in power and crush domestic opposition. The hypocrisy works both ways (Clapham 2004:82)

Democracy in the West came about in different places at different times. To say that it was in the cultural context of the West that democracy was invented in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century is undoubtedly presumptuous. According to Badie democracy was not produced or invented in the West, but defined by the West (Badie 2000:160). This means that developing countries are required to import and use a political grammar that is foreign and unknown to them. The self-proclaimed universality of the Western definition and experience of democracy makes it difficult for non-Western states to define democracy in their context and gain acceptance in the international system.

#### 2.2.4 Badie's Imported State

As hard as it is to find cases where enlightenment ideals have blossomed in the non-Western world, its leaders and elites continue to import Western ideas and solutions; thereby continuing on the path that lead them to failure in the first place. It leaves the problems in their own societies unsolved. This creates a dilemma for non-Western societies as they find themselves torn between what Bertrand Badie describes as “logic of adaptation and logic of innovation” (Badie 2000:2). They are pressured to adapt to the demands of the Western world, processes of globalization and to bring profit to the ruling classes and to move forward as a society and country. However, the solutions to their problems must be indigenous. This is the irony of the convergence and unification that is taken place through globalization in today's world. The South began to mimicry the North directly after decolonization. Depending on allegiance, inspiration came from either the capitalist West or the communist East. The collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of Cold War rivalry did not appear to have slowed down the flow from the center to the periphery. On the contrary, the victory of the West strengthened its structures and exportation to the South intensified (Badie 2000:1-2).

According to Badie, globalization requires a power structure already in place that can drive international relations. The short term solution for the South is, of course, to adapt but for a long term solution and sustainability, innovation is what the South needs. Peace and conflict scholar Johan Galtung proposes that for imperialism to be successful there has be a harmony between the central actors on both sides of the border that separates the center from the periphery. The interests

of the elites on both sides must converge. This implies that the conflict between the elite and the masses are significantly tenser at the periphery than at the center and that the vertical connection is weak or even non-existent (Badie 2000:13).

### 2.2.5 The Elites

Leaders of the South have by imitating the West and labeling themselves as modern have been able to dismiss domestic critics as traditional and backward. Paradoxically, those who oppose Western imperialism and the ruling elites have usually begun their journey to power by invoking a socialist agenda. Hence, they were given the tools to explain shortcomings or complete lack of development, indict the capitalist West, and attack the current regime. It also allowed them to portray themselves as modern and bringers of modernity, something that is always seen as desirable. Nonetheless, even the most hardline anti-imperialist, anti-West, anti-capitalist, revolutionary agenda is in origin and nature essentially, and a bit ironically Western (Badie 2000:102; Clapham 2004:80). Those struggling for independence have to seek international legitimacy. In order to make themselves heard and listened to they have to play the game according to the rulebook of the West. It requires them to pick up a juridical and political discourse to justify and legitimize demands for national independence.

Both the new and old elites have usually received their education in prestigious schools and universities in the West. Most likely, the new rulers will rather quickly find themselves in difficulty of administrating and running the country. The tempting short term solution of looking to the, for them personally familiar, West for aid, guidance, and ultimately dependence is arguably rational. The result is that the Westernization process gets reinforced and entangles the ruling elite and becomes an end in itself more important than the needs, wishes, and hopes of the people. It is thereby slowly severing the vertical connection between the government and the people (Badie 2000:112). Old traditional resentments are revived or new made-up and deliberately camouflaged by imports from the West. Competing ideologies used the simplified ethnic lines that were a result from the colonial enterprise to fight for control of the South, but essentially only serving the imperialistic agenda of both East and West (Badie 2000:134-5).

The bureaucratic, administrative structures, and culture created by the colonial power are kept more often than not. Although likely to be renamed, the ministries, departments, and organizational structures remain as they were. Even if the local communities have an important social role, which was ignored or unknown to the colonizer, the old territorial organization remains unchanged even under a new regime (Badie 2000:142).

### 2.2.6 Conflicting Identity and Inevitable Failure

This imported structure results in discrepancy between the ruling elite and the governed people. Strained political relations and weak institutions that fail to

efficiently channel protests leads to a situation where socioeconomic frustrations are picked up by populist movements. Denouncing the seemingly modernistic Western inspired state project allows for a turn to tradition and ethnic and religious allegiances. Soon any expression of identity is enough to mobilize the marginalized and becomes an antagonist to the attempts of the government to create national unity.

These identity parties aim to create an identity that takes precedence over the allegiance of citizenship. They do not aim to have formal political influence as such but to promote an alternative socialization, mobilization, and allegiance than what is preached by the regime. Using an exclusionary logic and symbolism an alternative imaginary is promoted that is critical of the apparent failures of the West and modernity. Even if a state from the outside appears to have a functioning multiparty democratic system, the debate is about citizenship, identity, and exclusion; not about forging an inclusive national identity. The nation-state wants to be the primary identifier but finds itself in tough competition. It is unable to adapt to local particularities and conditions; the nation-state is, for example, often outmaneuvered by transnational or very local religious collectives. The enormous success of the Catholic Church in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa is evidence of this. Sunday mass regularly attract larger crowds and mobilizes more people than any political meeting on the two continents. This proves that it is possible for Western ideas and institutions to get a firm foothold in other parts of the world if they manage to properly adapt to the context in which they are situated. Although tribal and village allegiances and identities are still existing they are neither eternal nor impenetrable (Badie 2000:179-80).

These mobilizations take place outside of the institutional scope of the state; the particularistic claims of the groups and denunciations of Western modernity appeals to people who cannot relate to or feel included in the imported Western political structure. This severed vertical relation between government and governed means that it becomes impossible for the state to meet the expectations and social needs of the people. What began as frustration of socioeconomic inequality that expressed itself through identity has turned into mobilization based solely on identity (Badie 2000:174).

### 2.2.7 The Particular - Universal Dialectic

“Where the imported product declares itself universal, it increases particularism; where it claims to build a monopolistic political order, it provokes the dispersion of social spaces; where it wants to be rational-legal, it encourages a neopatrimonial management of the state” (Badie 2000:193). The imported Western state is constructed from the top without any connections to the bottom periphery, and especially the rural periphery. The state fails to penetrate the local society and the communitarian resistance that is a reaction to the state itself. What at face value can be thought of as irony, protesters neither attack modernity nor the industrial society. Instead they take aim at the centralization of power and

monopoly of violence and clamor for increased autonomy, thereby slowly but effectively dismantling and neutering the state. This method of taking de facto control is a trade-off made by the central government to keep the country from breaking up and maintaining a unified “Westphalian” front to the outside world at the cost of slowly surrendering internal control (Badie 2000:194-5). The tools provided by the Westphalian state-system, i.e. the idea of a nation and ethnicity, are ironically taken advantage of by those most critical of the present global order.

## 2.2.8 Horizontal and Vertical Legitimacy

The imported state is diametrically different from its European “role model”. The “Westernization” of Europe did not occur over night at the whim of a Prince but is the result of a process surrounding strong dynastic centers that possessed a long traditional legitimacy. It is also a process that has evolved and involved the whole of society and helped strengthen the vertical links between people and government (Badie 2000:169). Englebert builds upon Badie's work on the imported state in Africa and elaborates on the congruence of the imported state with preexisting institutions and norms. Taking the imported state for granted in Africa, the presence of neo-patrimonial structures and negative development outcomes are linked to the extent to which the institutions of the imported state conflict with the preexisting institutions. In other words, the conflict stands between formal and informal institutions (Englebert 2000:10). What informal institutions do is that they impose constraints on formal institutions. They are the norms that rule the routines of daily life in any society and consequently predate the formal institutions that spring from these norms and rules (Seidler 2010:8). Compared to Europe the state institutions in present-day Africa have not sprung from the informal institutions but from colonial legacy. Thus the post-colonial African state rules a society built on norms and values to which it does not completely match or fully understand, thereby severely straining vertical legitimacy. Fukuyama's take on state-building stems from an idea of a liberal and objective state separated from the “nation”, and that a state with universal institutions that can work and be effective regardless of the local particularities.

The two dimensions, vertical legitimacy and horizontal legitimacy, are inextricably linked and are essential for state strength and success. Holsti elaborates on these two dimensions of legitimacy.

Instrumental conceptions of state strength overlook two critical aspects of legitimacy [...]: the principle(s) on which the 'right to rule' is based, and the intellectual and emotional bases of political community, that is, the definition of the population over whom rule is exercised. [...] [Vertical legitimacy] deals with authority, consent, and loyalty to the idea(s) of the state and its institutions; [horizontal legitimacy] deals with the definition and political role of community (Holsti 1996:84).

A state with high horizontal legitimacy is inclusive and tolerant in nature. Low horizontal legitimacy means that the society tries to exclude, oppress, or marginalize others within the state. Low horizontal legitimacy will also affect and gradually erode vertical legitimacy, i.e. the trust and loyalty to the state and its institutions, forcing the excluded to seek other political arrangements. A reversed scenario is also possible. A weak regime may seek to strengthen its position by building a stronger foundation to rule over a certain group by excluding another. The creation of an internal scapegoat, for example Jews, Muslims, or Tutsis, to deflect criticism is a typical and standard strategy for weak regimes. Either way, low vertical legitimacy can create and/or exacerbate low horizontal legitimacy (Holsti 1996:87-8). When these forces are in play in a downward-spiral the distinction between the popularity of the government and the legitimacy of the state becomes garbled. When state and government are perceived as the same the political opposition is an enemy of the state (Holsti 1996:84-5).

### 2.2.9 The Neo-Patrimonial Conclusion

Badie illustrates how a neo-patrimonial society can exhibit a pseudo democracy. In the 1990 National Assembly election in Côte d'Ivoire voter participation varied between 21% where numerous candidates ran for parliament to 99% where a single candidate ran unopposed. This correlation between participation and absence of choice is an example that does not imply an African liking for one-party systems but that the African voter uses the election to formalize the patron-client relationship. When state institutions have no credibility or trust the voter gains access to the political arena through a patron (Badie 2000:170).

The imported state and maintenance of it puts the vertical legitimacy at risk. Western hegemony and continuous export of the Westphalian state model severs the links between the people and the ruling elite in the non-Western world. The effect of the vertical legitimacy on the horizontal legitimacy is a process that induces fractionalization and neo-patrimonial structures that undermines the loyalty, consent, and authority of the state; reducing state strength and ultimately putting the state and the people at risk. Thus neo-patrimonial structures and weak states with badly functioning institutions can be seen as a consequence of Western hegemony and will to spread its democracy and freedoms regardless of underlying intentions; be those benevolence or pure Western selfishness. State-building in developing and war torn countries have used the Westphalian European state as a blueprint. Policy changes in the West have affected state-building and policy recommendations for the developing world without realizing the connection between the European experience and the modern Westphalian state. Thus, the aspects of vertical and horizontal legitimacy reveals the flaws in Fukuyama's discussion of state-building and that liberal interpretation of society and state as two separately viable pieces of the puzzle of successful state-building when they in fact are closely interconnected. The end of state-building is inevitably and constantly striving towards creating a state, the ideal state, which is imagined and reproduced in the international system - the Western state.

The changes in the Westphalian state and the shift towards an increasing respect for human rights have ironically exposed Western hypocrisy. In the post-Westphalian world the West have fallen victim to its own preaching and shopping lists, which the public uprisings of the Arab Spring of 2011 and the ousting of pro-Western dictators have made abundantly clear. Influential scholars such as Fukuyama have promoted the preconceived notions of a static, before the recently added post-prefix, Westphalian state system. The exportation of this Westphalian model through state-building (separated from nation-building) and a belief in the objective universalism and idealizing of contemporary Western institutions and ideas of Western superiority and precedence have created nothing but non-functioning states and artificially kept them alive.

## 3 Method

### 3.1 Case Study Method

In the social sciences, there is an ongoing debate that all but captures the entire spectrum of the philosophy of science. Subjective or objective, deterministic or probabilistic, and qualitative or quantitative are some of the diverging points of view in the methodological debate. Political science has in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries a tradition of aligning with the economic sciences and using a positivistic methodology. However, case study method is frequently used in all social sciences, raising questions among scholars and academics about what case study method actually is. It can be anything from a specific method, for example comparative case study to being almost synonymous with qualitative method as a whole while it also can be used to analyze large sets of quantitative data. Interestingly, postcolonial theory has a similar inherent dilemma. Is there a universal truth or solution to social issues or are there only particularistic and relativistic truths and solutions? (Grovoqui 2006a:55). These dilemmas in the social sciences, case study method, and postcolonial theory can be methodologically distilled to the choice of intensive or extensive research designs (Eckstein 2000:120).

The intensive design is more open-ended and comparable to the circular design process that is found within the qualitative field while the more strictly and closed extensive design is more comparable to the traditional or linear research design (Flick 2006:100; Eckstein 2000:120). Thus, an extensive design requires a larger number of cases, predetermined set of independent variables, and a falsifiable hypothesis. It is clearly a theory driven process and the opposite of a grounded theory approach (Flick 2006:98), which is how the intensive design can be described. Eckstein proposes for political science to become more theory developing instead of theory driven, by learning how to use an intensive design for case studies (Eckstein 2006:119). When it comes to developing theory, we end up in another quagmire of definitions, not as much as what a theory is but rather what it should look like. Eckstein discusses what he calls a more hard-line approach that is positivist and a more soft-line approach that is constructivist in nature. Eckstein positions himself somewhere in between the two positions although leaning towards the hard-line position (Eckstein 2000:124-5).

## 3.2 Generalization

The traditional view of generalization, i.e. the social world for a social scientist operates in the same way as the Newtonian universe functions for a physicist, is still prevalent. Universal laws separated from time and space control and determine our world. This idea is usually illustrated by a machine or that the world works like a mechanical clock. Donmoyer compares this kind of research that tries to find the right interpretation of a phenomenon with the search for a Holy Grail (Donmoyer 2000:62). Whether Donmoyer is thinking of the failed attempts of finding the biblical Holy Grail or Monty Pythons' parody does not matter, both are equally telling. Lincoln and Guba remarks on this and other problems with the traditional view of generalization and especially that researchers, as a consequence of it, have to depend on the assumption of determinism (Lincoln – Guba 2000:29). Even if it were to be accepted as a fact that there is a truth out there and that every social phenomena abides by mechanical laws, this would still not be of any help for a social scientist. Lincoln and Guba's discussion of determinism makes it clear that for practical reasons, the social scientist cannot go any further than to establish a high probability of causality between variables. They also remark on the need for traditional generalization to be context-free as well as time-free. Not only functioning anywhere but also at any time, be it past, present, or future. Lincoln and Guba use an analysis made by Cronbach to show that generalization decay over time and changes, sometimes radically, during the course of history (Lincoln – Guba 2000:31-2). This resonates with the controversial philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend and his famous statement that 'anything goes' in methodology. Feyerabend meant that if we think rationally about science, the only rational conclusion about the methods used during the history of science is that 'anything goes'. This is the paradox that researchers who claim the existence of mechanical laws have to accept.

Despite all of this, critics of case study method, with one or a small number of *N*'s, still argue that the problem with case studies is the lack of generalizability. It is possible to argue that generalization is unnecessary and that it is enough to investigate the particulars of a case for its own sake (Gomm et al. 2000:99). Gomm et al. do not accept this position on the grounds that it is not possible to either find the case or to know what the particulars are without a preconception of what constitutes a case or what the typical is. This is the problem of selecting a single case. The distinctive particularities of the case have to be known by the researcher before the study begins (Gomm et al. 2000:102).

### 3.3 The Single Case Study

As per the discussion above, there are methodological issues that have to be addressed in a single case study. Eckstein emphasizes the need in political science for developing good theories and elaborates on different types of case study method, ranging from hard to soft in their approach to theory. One of these is the disciplined-idiographic study. The position held by its proponents is that we cannot derive theories from case interpretation but that case interpretations need to be derived from theory. The particularities of a case can only be interpreted through explicit general theories as if they were valid as general laws (Eckstein 2000:135). The reason for this is that the final analysis in a study of a single case without an explicit theoretical base, a configurative-idiographic study, will always proceed from implicit general laws with which the researcher categorizes the case (Eckstein 2000:134). Thus, the difference between configurative and disciplined is essentially the age old dilemma found in philosophy of science of whether theory or data comes first.

Disciplined-idiographic studies are partially tied to theoretical inquiry by revealing the need for theoretical ad hoc additions or the removal of unnecessary, albeit always present, elements in case interpretations of, what Eckstein describes as, “prudence, common sense or 'feel'” (Eckstein 2000:135). This is the essence of this “disciplined” method; by applying explicitly stated theories to cases and by correct reasoning prove a high probability of causation. Compelling a certain interpretation may not only prove to be superior to other interpretations of the case but may also invalid competing theories (Eckstein 2000:136).

### 3.4 Reliability and Validity

The strength of the single case study approach is inevitably its biggest weakness. The case interpretation has to rely on the subjective opinion and experience of the researcher. The collection of data as well as the analysis is dependent on the researcher's expertise, knowledge, and judgment of what is relevant to the case and the theoretical analysis (Flick 2006:165).

This type of research design has the potential of capturing the particularities of a case and provides new insights and knowledge to the scientific community, policy makers, and civil society. Insights and interpretations that easily could be missed in comparative case studies with a large number of *N*'s or quantitative survey research, both of which requires the researcher to select cases that are in conformity with the ontology of the selected theory and limit the explanations to established theories based on universally existing laws governing all forms of social interactions. Thereby taking the risk of missing crucial explanatory particularities of the case and providing new contributions to the development of good theory.

The focus of this study is to explain and provide new insights into the success of Botswana. Postcolonial theory provides the critical theoretical glasses that can shed new light on state-building success and state-building failure. The interpretation and conclusions of this study are not meant to be universally applicable. However, the interpretation and conclusion will hopefully be an addition to on-going academic and policy discussions on the subject, and it may in that form be indirectly involved in developing theory that may very well be universal in aspiration and application.

### 3.5 Research Design

This study analyzes the success of Botswana by identifying factors that have fostered neo-patrimonial structures in other developing countries in Africa. Three other cases will be individually analyzed and those results will be compared to Botswana to provide a bigger picture of what has occurred in Botswana. The other cases are Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire.

Neighboring Zimbabwe, which after white minority rule has been in the hands of Robert Mugabe, who has never hesitated to use violence and intimidation to crush political opposition. The West-African state of Nigeria, the most populous in Africa, is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that can compete economically against the continental superpower South Africa. Nigeria has a history of civil war, an attempt of secession, and decades of military rule. The last democratic elections ignited widespread violence and Nigeria has for years remained one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The final case is Côte d'Ivoire, a former French colony, which has experienced two civil wars since 2002. The last as a consequence of the outcome of the 2010 presidential election that did not end until French forces intervened.

These three cases have different histories, colonial histories, and reasons for the difficulties and problems they have encountered and experienced. What they have in common is their failure of implementing democracy, and protecting and providing the human rights and freedoms their populations are entitled to. This is not a comparative case study of four cases but a single case study of Botswana. As far as this study is concerned the observations and analyses of the other cases are valuable as explanatory factors only when compared to Botswana. Therefore this study does not claim to answer or bring clarity into the causes of the situations in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, or Côte d'Ivoire.

# 4 Botswana

## 4.1 The Success

The Botswana case stands out in a region with otherwise poorly achieved results. This has been acknowledged for decades by scholars and Botswana is frequently used as the positive example in Sub-Saharan Africa, occasionally joined by the small island states of Mauritius and Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. The development of “Africa's 'premier' democracy” (Brown – Kaiser 2007:1135) has been so extraordinary that Botswana has also been described as a “growth miracle” (Hillbom 2008:191) and a “deviant democracy” (Sebudubudu – Molutsi 2008:47), the latter because of its success against all odds and a sad reminder of the state of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Since independence from the British in 1966, Botswana has showed a truly remarkable stability and astonishing economic progress. Between 1965 and 1995 Botswana experienced an annual growth rate of 7.7% and was the fastest growing economy in the world (Beaulier 2003:231). The pace accelerated during the 1980's with a recorded GDP per capita increase of 13 % annually, outrunning the Asian tiger economies (Hillbom 2008:191). In 1991 the real GDP per capita had increased by almost nine times since 1966 (Maundeni 2001:105). At independence, approximately 90% of the population lived in abject poverty. Forty years later, figures are showing that only 30% of households live in poverty. Over the same period literacy rates have gone from below 25 to over 90% (Sebudubudu 2010:249). Arguably, the biggest achievement Botswana has made is the execution of 10 uninterrupted democratic multiparty elections between 1965 and 2009, all of which have been considered free and fair by the international community (Sebudubudu 2010:253).

According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index Botswana is one of the world's least corrupt countries<sup>1</sup> beating several European and outranking all other African countries (Sebudubudu 2010:257). Botswana has also received the highest sovereign credit rating of any African state by the

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<sup>1</sup> TI's CPI for 2010 ranks Botswana as the 33<sup>rd</sup> least corrupt country in the world just below Portugal and Spain. Source: [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010/results](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results). August 5, 2011.

international rating agencies<sup>1</sup> and it is one of only two African states that are net creditors to the World Bank and the IMF. Consequently, foreign aid represents a very small proportion of government revenue, only approximately 5%, compared to other African states (Clover 2003:2). Further, it is interesting to note that Botswana has followed the economic advice of donors, policies that usually receive heavy criticism for doing more harm than good.

## 4.2 The Tswana States

### 4.2.1 Pre-colonial Institutions

The pre-colonial Tswana states consisted of tribes of mainly Tswana speaking people. It is from them the names Botswana and Bechuanaland have been derived. Due to inter-ethnic conflict the Tswana states were forced from the arable lands to the south, east and north of present-day Botswana and did not settle there by choice (Sebudubudu – Molutsi 2008:50). This occurred in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century and as they migrated into the area they brought other groups under their control. With very few exceptions these groups were left in their own “ward” and their chiefs became subordinate to the Tswana leadership (Robinson 2009:1). Unlike the agricultural societies that surrounded them, the mainstay of the Tswana economy came from livestock. This resulted in a less egalitarian and more unequal society based on a patron – client relationship. In this kind of feudal system the patron owned the livestock and distributed it among the clients who used and took care of the animals but did not own or had the right to sell them. In exchange for their work the clients were paid with one or two cattle per year. The relationship also called for the patron to look after and protect the client and support material needs the clients may have had (Sebudubudu-Molutsi 2008:50).

Compared to the neighboring pre-colonial states the Tswana did neither have standing armies nor any generals. The Tswana would instead create militias that were led in combat by the Tswana chiefs who compared to their enemies had very little or even none military experience. To make up for this strategic weakness the Tswana invested heavily in negotiation and diplomacy (Maundeni 2001:115). This sentiment of solving disputes by negotiating was also expressed in everyday life in Tswana society. The institution of the *kgotla* or village assembly was the political center where all key decisions were taken and leaders consulted and discussed with the community in the effort of reaching consensus (Sebudubudu-Molutsi 2008:54).

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<sup>1</sup> Standard and Poor's current (August 5, 2011) estimate of Botswana's long-term sovereign foreign currency rating is A- with a stable outlook. Source: <http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovresearch/en/us>. August 5, 2011.

Besides being commanders-in-chiefs, the Tswana chiefs were also the religious leaders. There were no parallel religious or military institutions as these were embodied in the state together with the political institutions (Maundeni 2001:109). Foreigners were not uncommon as advisers in the Tswana states and contacts with missionaries introduced Christianity and chiefs voluntarily converted to the new religion. This not only united the Tswana states but also incorporated the Christian church as a state church under Tswana control. Unlike many other colonized territories, Bechuanaland was already Christianized in 1885 when the British established the protectorate. Christian laws were introduced; banning polygamy and selling of alcohol but in most cases cultural habits were reinterpreted and transformed to work within the Christian faith. For example, instead of entrusting the chief and his magical powers for rainmaking the communities gathered at the kgotla in mass prayer for rain (Maundeni 2001:119-20).

#### 4.2.2 Colonial Institutions

The Tswana territory received very little attention from the colonial powers. Pre-colonial Botswana was extremely poor and did not perform well at all. It was not until after independence Botswana began its successful economic journey (Beaulier 2003:233). Landlocked and with the Kalahari Desert covering most of it, the territory was regarded as a transit route to Africa's interior without any other value. Without any standing armies the Tswana states observed with increased concern the expansion of the Boers in the south, Germans in the west, and the British South Africa Company in east. This compelled the Tswanan chief accompanied by missionaries to travel to London in 1853 and ask the British government for protection. The British were at the time trying to appease the Boers and therefore rejected the offer. However, in 1884 Germany annexed neighboring South West Africa, now Namibia, causing the British to drastically change their policy. The Germans could now cut off one of the British corridors to northern Africa by taking control of Bechuanaland. As a consequence the British pledged to protect Bechuanaland from German or Boer invasion and the Bechuanaland Protectorate was established, but the British interest remained low. The protectorate administration was not even placed inside the protectorate but south of the border in Mafikeng in what today is South Africa (Maundeni 2001:120). Up until the 1950's the British long-term plan was for Bechuanaland to merge with and become a part of the Union of South Africa (Robinson 2009:1).

The British allowed the chiefs in Bechuanaland to continue in their role as leaders and limited their own powers as far as possible to only apply to whites living in the protectorate. The Tswana chiefs agreed that subordination to the British Empire and its authorities was a lesser evil than incorporation into the surrounding settler colonies. Through this strategy the Tswana institutions survived the colonial era relatively intact (Hjort 2010:694). This peculiar colonial relationship between Great Britain and Bechuanaland has by scholars been

referred to as “light rule” (Seidler 2010:16), “benign neglect” (Beaulier 2003:229), and “invited colonialism” (Maundeni 2001:120).

The British did leave several marks on Botswana society. Besides the British common law legal code (as in most other British colonies) and the Westminster parliamentary system they imposed a £1 hut tax in 1899. This caused many, mainly young males, to leave Botswana and seek employment, to which they were guaranteed(!), in the British controlled mines in neighboring South Africa. During the peak in the 1940's up to 50% of the adult male population had emigrated. In a poor country where people survived on subsistence farming and with very limited employment opportunities, emigration remained the only option to earn enough money for families to pay the tax (Beaulier 2003:233). Nevertheless, the Tswana states, the missionaries, and Great Britain managed to create a mutually beneficial relationship (Maundeni 2001:121).

## 4.3 Independence

The creation of post-colonial Botswana differed from the struggles for independence in the neighboring countries. The nationalists in South Africa and Rhodesia were in opposition while the Tswana elite were in full control of events in Botswana. The BDP was created in 1962 and became the party of the chiefs and automatically identified as the legitimate “heirs” to the political institutions. The final drafting of the constitution was held in London. A move that limited the influence of populist movements that through local mass rallies managed to influence the outcome in other colonies. The BDP managed to fully control the drafting process and win a landslide victory in the 1965 election. Thus the BDP not only controlled the political power but also the setting up of political institutions. These institutions included parliament, cabinet, and local village and town councils. The local councils replaced the old chief institutions, but with the chiefs included as ex officio members of the new councils (Maundeni 2001:125).

## 4.4 Governance

### 4.4.1 Leadership

The founder and leader of BDP, Seretse Khama became the first president of Botswana and held the post until his death in 1980. The leadership of Khama has been praised by many as one of the reasons for Botswana's success (Hjort 2008:691; Makgala 2009:230; Sebudubudu-Molutsi 2008:55). He skillfully

managed to balance the many interests of the regions and ethnic groups. For administrative purposes, the colonial administration created a northern and southern committee in charge of the day-to-day affairs and dealings with the local tribal chiefs. Poor transportation and communication made it impractical to administer the protectorate from a single location, especially one that was located outside of the protectorate. This administrative division evolved into a north and south sentiment and an important identity marker for people in Botswana. This administrative division continued post-independence and became a potential source of conflict that Khama understood could not be ignored. Khama's cabinet and large infrastructure projects were carefully divided equally to reflect the regional, i.e. north and south, and ethnic composition of Botswana (Makgala 2009:229-30).

#### 4.4.2 Ethnicity

Botswana's relatively homogenous population is frequently mentioned<sup>1</sup> as a conflict reducing factor and one of the main reasons for the stable form of governance and the economic success. Figures that up to 80% of the population are Tswana (Sebudubudu-Molutsi 2008:53) are questionable as estimates of the proportion of the Tswana vary from 50 to 80%. Although, the Tswana are the dominant group, some areas have a very ethnically diverse population with up to 43 different ethnic communities (Hjort 2010:691). It is also important to note that ethnicity is not a mutually exclusive identity. Identities are layered and multiple and reflect more than only ethnicity (Makgala 2009:226). Inter-Tswana differences are not non-existing and many Tswana identify themselves first with their local tribe and not with the entire Tswana community (Hjort 2010:692). From that perspective, Botswana is not that ethnically unique compared to other African states and Botswana of today has to be considered to be ethnically diverse (Robinson 2009:9). Ethnic diversity is not in itself a factor that increases the risk of internal conflict. That risk is more dependent on how the political leaders chose to either arouse or mitigate ethnic divisions. A look at European and French history of nation-building can serve as an interesting comparison. Robinson points out that historian Eugene Weber concluded that in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century "France was a patchwork of many different languages and ethnicities, with few groups speaking French as a first language or feeling allegiance to the central state in Paris" (Robinson 2009:9). With many of these minorities crossing state borders the situation is not all that different from what is the case in large parts of Africa. The ethno-linguistic fragmentation in Africa can arguably be seen both as a hindrance of nation-building or as an outcome of the absence of nation-building and consolidation of the state.

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<sup>1</sup> Sebudubudu and Molutsi say that Botswana has a "relatively homogeneous society and therefore limited ethnic pluralism (often a source of conflict and political instability)" (Sebudubudu-Molutsi 2008:53).

### 4.4.3 Natural Resources

The discovery of substantial natural resources a couple of years after independence have in a similar way been handled effectively by the government. For many states, especially in the developing world, the discovery of valuable natural resources, in whatever shape or form, is usually a blessing in disguise. Unlike many of its African siblings, Botswana has eluded the curse of natural resources and the Dutch disease. Its diamond and copper-nickel mines have not turned Botswana into another Angola, DRC or Sierra Leone where never-ending fighting and corruption have caused unimaginable horrors to the people living there and sent the societies on a downward-spiral of violence. Nor has it obliterated the traditional meat industry that continues to flourish despite the economically powerful mining industry (Hillbom 2008:202-3).

### 4.4.4 Constitution

The constitution of Botswana has remained intact with only minor adjustments, all of which have strengthened the rights and freedoms of citizens. A comprehensive framework of watchdog institutions (ombudsman, anti-corruption office, independent electoral commission, and independent media) is in place and has on a number of occasions successfully challenged the state in court (Sebudubudu 2010:252,254).

At independence Botswana decided to continue without any military and remain with only a police force. When the struggle for independence in South Africa and Rhodesia intensified Botswana's position as one of the frontline states made itself reminded. Cross-border raids and abductions of African nationalists on Botswana territory by South African and Rhodesian security forces prompted the Botswana government to establish the Botswana Defence Force in 1977 (Kenosi 2002:189-90).

The BDP have won every election since independence. However, its electoral support has dropped to slightly above 50% of the popular vote in the last elections from 80% in the first election in 1965. The inherited Westminster style parliament and first-past-the-post electoral system have assisted the BDP to keep a firmer hold of parliament than the drop of the popular vote would suggest. The drop of 30% in popular support since independence only corresponds to a drop of 10% of seats in Parliament, from 90% in 1965 to 80% in 2009. The opposition, although fragmented and occasionally disorganized, does exert political influence, especially through its larger popular support, and cannot be neglected (Good 1992:89; Good 2010:356).

## 5 Rhodesia and Zimbabwe

### 5.1 Ownership of Customs and Traditions

Rhodesian authorities desperately tried to define and catalog customs and traditions. This was a collaboration of bureaucrats and anthropologists and the spawn of the doctrine of indirect rule. Giving Africans indirect rule, under the watchful eyes of the white minority and the imperial government, was the cheapest and easiest way for the colonial administration to rule the native population. However, the Rhodesian African Affairs Department came to create more problems than it solved. Those granted the right to rule came to be seen as collaborators and sell-outs by those struggling for independence and became targets for nationalists. The African Affairs Department also found itself in a bizarre competition with Shona priests and nationalists about who was the custodian of Shona culture. Their files grew thicker and thicker and the practice continued up until the very end of Rhodesia in 1980 (Maundeni 2001:122-3). This practice had been common all over Africa. Missionaries and colonial administrators were obsessed with mapping, identifying and naming tribes, finding (or assign) them an area and a chief. Missionaries documented customs, traditions, language, and wrote down tribal history, which was then taught by the missionaries and later African teachers followed suit. Pre-colonial Africa was a mosaic of tribes, clans, villages, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and empires with shifting, indeterminate borders, overlapping identities, and languages. However, in colonial Africa, a new form of ethnic awareness and identity was born (Meredith 2006:154-5). The aftermath of the Second World War sparked a feeling of betrayal, when the efforts of hundreds of thousands of black soldiers, bravely fighting for their colonial masters, were ignored and forgotten. The racial division became firmly entrenched when white soldiers were awarded land in colonies like Rhodesia while black soldiers only received a medal for their sacrifice (Rogers 2009:75).

### 5.2 Enter Ideology

The nationalist struggle against Ian Smith's regime and white minority rule in Rhodesia evolved into ethnic fractions. Early on in the struggle for independence ethnic division did not exist, but internal rivalry, increased pressure from the

regime, and government crackdowns forced the leaders to seek and find more support among the people. The potential candidates therefore turned to their respective ethnic base and the split was complete. The divisions were exaggerated when the ideological differences of the USSR and China entered the equation. ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, was ethnically Ndebele and received support from the USSR. ZANU, under the leadership of president-to-be Robert Mugabe, was ethnically Shona and had to seek support elsewhere and turned to China and later North Korea.

African socialist ideologues wrote and preached a new African history. They claimed that African societies bore many of the hallmarks of socialism. Communal lands, egalitarian village life, and collective decision making. Essentially, the pre-colonial African was a worker living in a very idyllic society that had been seduced by the materialistic mentality of the capitalistic colonizers; a mentality that for obvious reasons had to be rejected. This made African history equivalent, or at least adaptable, to the history writing of socialism (Meredith 2006:145).

### 5.3 Zimbabwe Is Born

To distinguish between ZAPU and ZANU they turned to different ideologies. Although primarily made for practical reasons the repercussions were horrific. The massacre in the early 1980's of thousands of Ndebele in Matabeleland by the infamous North Korea trained 5<sup>th</sup> brigade is perhaps the most blatant attempt by Mugabe to intimidate and silence any opposition (Meredith 2004:622). Today, Mugabe and his Zanu-PF have their strongest support in the poor and rural Shona masses. ZAPU managed to survive and the two parties merged into Zanu-PF in the late 1980's. The merger was ostensibly an act of national reconciliation, but in reality it was a clever strategy for silencing the voice of the Ndebele people (Dowden 2010:123).

After the Lancaster House agreement, which enabled the formation of Zimbabwe, finally put an end to white minority rule and threw Rhodesia to the scrapheap of history, President Mugabe engaged in broad symbolic and rhetorical Marxism. Left untouched, was the economic sector that remained liberal to appease white farmers, the mainstay of the country's economy, and not to further deteriorate the relationship with neighboring apartheid South Africa (Badie 2000:105). Zimbabwe ended up with a foreign policy that was favorable to the Eastern Bloc, a by and large neo-liberal economy built on the foundations of old Rhodesia and the economically strong white farmers. This was merged with a strong Marxist-Leninist rhetoric to gain support from the black majority. Mugabe's regime found itself in a position where it, in order to stay in power, had to keep an odd mix of economic and ideological policy that made it dependent on the center of the World system (Badie 2000:135). The attacks and forced evictions of white farmers did not begin until the middle of the 1990's when Zimbabwe's economy and support for Zanu-PF began to drop. The use of violence and hatred

commenced to divert public interest from the inevitable failure of Zanu-PF's increasingly populist and patrimonial policies.

## 5.4 A New Opposition

Despite having won every election since its inception in 2001 the present “opposition”, MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai, have not managed to remove Zanu-PF from power. Intimidation and violence against union members, political activists, and white farmers are commonplace today. Despite the signing of the GPA in 2009 and the formation of a GNU, MDC is frequently accused by Zanu-PF officials and affiliates of being a tool of white farmers and Western imperialism (especially the UK). MDC is the first post-independence party that has seriously challenged an incumbent regime in Southern Africa.

Both Rhodesia and Zimbabwe came to create, preserve, and exaggerate tribal and ethnic divisions. The colonial administration were looking for what they perceived as and thought was permissible traditional leaders and the nationalists simplified their struggle for national independence to get international support from rival ideologies. After independence, continued international support required Zimbabwe to continue on the ideological path while it at the same time had to deal with the realities facing Zimbabwean society. Suffice to say the policies did not match.

# 6 Nigeria

## 6.1 Creation of the Traditional Leaders

When the lines were drawn on the maps in Europe the British colony of Nigeria contained approximately 250 different ethno-linguistic groups (Meredith 2005:2). Before the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, British High Commissioner Frederick Lugard ruled over 10 million people in Northern Nigeria with the aid of nine administrators and a 3000 strong African regiment. By the end of the 1930's 20 million people lived in Nigeria and the colonial administration had increased to almost 400. Essentially born out of necessity, it was in the Muslim dominated Northern Nigeria the British began indirect rule. Local chiefs were allowed to continue policing, administering and tax as they had done for generations, but with one major difference. Instead of the traditional balancing act required in a diverse society of many interests, the foremost interest of the chiefs became to please the colonial administration. The chiefs effectively became interchangeable intermediaries between the local population and the Europeans. They were selected for their willingness to collaborate and in areas where no chiefs had previously ruled chiefdoms were simply created and a "traditional" chief appointed (Meredith 2005:6).

## 6.2 Nigerian Independence

The foundation of a state did exist in 1960 when Nigeria became independent, but no nation nor any sense of belonging or community between Nigerians. The business of the colonial government was seen as the white man's business and it was regarded as legitimate to misuse or plunder government funds if used to benefit the family or local community. Corruption and patron-client relationships early evolved as a consequence of colonial politics (Meredith 2005:174).

Three regions, North, West, and East, emerged each with a dominant ethnic group. The immense differences in regional development evolved to be the biggest hurdle in Nigerian nation-building. Prior to independence and in preparations for the elections that were to determine the beginning of a free Nigeria, the colonial administration conducted a rigged census in order to steer the election outcome. The British found the rural Northern elites more pliable than agitating urban Southerners and preferred a Northern election victory (Gberie

2011:6). At the time of independence the North, according to said census, made up 54 % of the population, but only 10 % of those enrolled in primary school were Northerners. People in the south had much more contact with Europeans, were more accustomed to European ways and habits, had a substantially higher level of education, and could easily and suitably enter government service (Meredith 2005:77).

## 6.3 Civil War

After several failed attempts a federal constitution was ready in 1960 and Nigeria embarked on its journey as an independent state. With a diverse economy, large population, democratically elected politicians and efficient civil service, many foresaw Nigeria as a major African player (Meredith 2005:77-8). Unfortunately, corruption and regional (in effect ethnic) ties quickly shaped the political landscape into three major parties, one from each region. As the North was the most populous region with slightly more than 54 % they came to control a majority of the seats in parliament. Political turmoil, battle for oil, and questionable regional censuses, done to distribute parliamentary seats to the districts, resulted in a military coup in 1966. The national and regional leadership were executed as a group of younger officers took control of Nigeria in what they called a revolution. The removal of corrupt politicians and civil servants was greeted by cheers in the South and by skepticism in the North. Violence against minorities in the North erupted and millions of people fled to the Eastern region. The following year, 1967, the East declared itself independent as the state of Biafra. The conflict and the suffering of the people in Biafra caught the world's attention and conscience. Aid was flown in that unquestionably helped to save lives and mitigate the suffering of millions but at the same time some Western governments, Portugal and France especially, had an interest in keeping Biafra alive. Portugal, the last European colonial power in Africa, ostensibly provided air space and staging posts for the airbridge while France secretly supplied Biafra with arms in an effort to divide and destroy any chance of unity among former colonies (Meredith 2005:205).

In 1979 civilian rule was reinstated and lessons learned implemented. A new constitution dividing Nigeria into a federation of 19 states in an attempt to mitigate the ethnic regional dominance and imposing requirements for political parties to have a national presence to be eligible for election. The relaunch of democracy sadly failed despite the calm and successful elections of 1979. Enormous oil revenues generated for the Nigerian state reignited corruption, and patron-client relationships. Oversized projects and overgenerous government contracts were auctioned out behind closed doors. The path to status and wealth in Nigeria went through government office and the civil service. Vast sums were spent on foreign import of luxury goods for the private use of a privileged few. The new rulers thought that they were entitled to the same privileged life as the colonizers. Ordinary Nigerians had no problem taking every possibility to cheat

the government for money and those serving in and working for the government had in a similar way no moral objections to enriching themselves. Meanwhile, issues of national importance such as agriculture and subsistence farming received little or no attention at all. Nigeria went from being self-reliant and exporter of foods in the 1960's to an importer of food. In 2010 Nigeria had to spend US\$ 1 billion on rice import alone. The oil funds, the government institutions, the elite, and their patrimonial networks provided more or less nothing to the ordinary people of Nigeria. Not even enough electricity (Gberie 2011:10).

## 6.4 A New Start

The rigged 1983 election became a new low point and the military once again took over with the justifying words: “[The democracy] died with the elections. The army only buried it” (Meredith 2005:201). 1999 saw a return to civilian rule. The continuous attempts to neutralize the ethno-regional divisions have now resulted in 36 states. All crafted so that no region or ethnic group can achieve dominance or secede. The political parties agreed on a consensus on a rotation between northerners and southerners in the presidency. This worked well until northern president Yar'Adua died in office and was replaced by his southern vice president Goodluck Jonathan. After being reelected as the candidate for the PDP, Jonathan decided that the previous consensus was dead and that competence would determine whether a candidate should run for president or not. Despite promising not to run after a 2011 victory Jonathan's actions received heavy criticism and condemnation from Northern elites (Gberie 2011:7). The election saw the resurface of old divisions between regions and ethnicity/religion. Violence before and after the election led to the death of 1,000 people mainly in the north (Gberie 2011:1).

# 7 Côte d'Ivoire

## 7.1 France-Afrique Avant l'Indépendance

### 7.1.1 French Betrayal

The humiliating French defeat and surrender to Germany in 1940 sent shock waves throughout the French colonies. The news of Pétain's pledge to end hostilities and cooperate with Germany sparked riots in Chad among veterans of the First World War. The veterans, both black and white, did not stop the riots until Governor Eboué promised to defy the Vichy Government and work towards a restoration of the French Republic, its institutions, and sovereignty over the colonies. Until that moment, August 28 1940, Free France had only been a symbolic movement without any autonomous territory. Governor Eboué's firm stance in French Equatorial Africa spread and he was joined by other colonies in Greater France. Even in French West Africa, which remained loyal to Vichy until the end of 1943, support for the French resistance was widespread among intellectuals. Unique for the French colonies during the Second World War was that the distinctive line between colonizer and colonized became blurred. The shared experience of humiliating defeat and political oppression forced the French to change their policies. Nationality, ethnicity, and race were deemphasized in political and organizational affiliations. The French had created a small African elite, *les évolués*, that through education and acceptance of the norms and values of French society had been accorded with full rights as citizens. Governor Eboué was one of these "evolved" Africans. The political aspirations of this elite was to secure the same rights and privileges to all people in the *Union française* as the Frenchmen enjoyed in Metropolitan France. Independence was not on the agenda and their allegiance to France was firm (Grovogui 2006a:96-8).

However, as the war drew to end the divisions on the organization of the new French republic emerged. On VE-day, May 8 1945, as Europeans celebrated the end of the war and their freedom from tyranny and evil, Free French forces brutally struck down on anti-colonial tendencies in Syria and Algeria (the infamous Sétif massacre). Six months earlier, African war veterans in Thiaroye, Senegal, protested against the poor living conditions and revoked pay and decided to mutiny. The French army responded with a massacre of their brothers-in-arms. When it was clear that freedom, equality and basic human dignity still was a

prerogative of the French, calls for independence could no longer be easily silenced.

### 7.1.2 The First French Domino

The formation of an interterritorial alliance of radical parties, the RDA, was the beginning of the end for the Union Française. The évolués wished to remain in a strengthened European – African union with France but could not agree on how. Meanwhile, the close cooperation between RDA and French communists in Paris turned out to be a strategic mistake as politics adapted to the new conditions of the Cold War. De Gaulle's government saw with suspicion on the RDA and began to decentralize and divide French West Africa to avoid any formation of a large and potentially powerful state or united bloc. The need for raw materials for the reconstruction of Europe, the Bretton Woods system, and NATO plans requiring access to French territories made the French *Métropole* abandon its inclusive policy and adapt a new more pragmatic attitude towards its colonies. This stirred up resentment and bitterness among the anti-colonial elites, especially towards the French left that moved away from its values of universal republicanism (Grovoqui 2006a:190). After the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, referendums were held in all eleven territories on whether to accept the new constitution and Franco-African relationship. A *non* vote would inevitably result in independence.

The Guinean leader Touré was a believer in Pan-Africanism and had founded his own political party, PDG, after many years of trade union politics. When de Gaulle visited Guinea in an effort to secure the yes vote Touré held a speech and denounced the colonial history of France and demanded complete decolonization (Meredith 2006:67). All territories except Guinea voted *oui* and on 2 October 1958, four days after the referendum, Guinea became independent. France falsely believed their African possessions could be managed as before, but the territories wanted greater autonomy, albeit within the Franco-African Community. Inspired and influenced by the events in Guinea and the rest of Africa along with never-ending problems in the relations with Metropolitan France, the remaining French territories declared themselves independent one after another during the fall of 1960 (Meredith 2006:69).

### 7.1.3 Continued French Imperialism

Decolonization did not put an end to the imperial ambitions of France but restructured them. Although recognized as sovereign states, France set up a series of agreements covering political, economic, and military cooperation especially. French officers joined the ranks of the new African armies and the French military

settled permanently in bases in seven former colonies<sup>1</sup>. Since 1945 France have conducted more than a 100 military operations in Africa and 33 of them were launched as late as between 1997 and 2002. Ten of the 33 had a UN mandate or where under UN command. To justify the French presence and influence in Africa, French policy had to adapt to post-Cold War conditions. The necessities of the Cold War and need to defend Western interest in Africa were replaced with the need to maintain stability, order, and security, so that favorable conditions for development could be met and sustained (Charbonneau 2008:281-2). The government of Côte d'Ivoire together with their counterparts in Senegal, Cameroon, and Gabon has since independence enjoyed a special relationship with France. These states were deemed critical to France's regional influence, therefore, France guaranteed immunity and protection for these governments from being overthrown (Cornwell 2000:83).

## 7.2 Côte d'Ivoire Après l'Indépendance

### 7.2.1 Economic Growth at a Price

Long-time Ivorian president Felix Houphouët-Boigny continued the economic policies of the colonial administration on strongly relying on the cooperation with Metropolitan France. Houphouët-Boigny made himself and the Ivorian government and economy dependent on French aid, investments and personnel. French advisors could be found on all levels of government, ministries, military and security services and parastatals. One of the largest communities of French expats, around 50,000, settled in Côte d'Ivoire. French investors were also given special treatment of tax and import duty exemptions and other favorable incentives (Meredith 2006:286). Foreign (French) investments boosted the Ivorian economy that averaged nine per cent growth per year in the 1960's. The export of crops became the country's main source of income and with the help of cheap migrant labor exports quickly quadrupled. The excessive emphasis on export crops came at the price of a neglected domestic food production and non-traditional food had to be imported. The strategy worked well for Houphouët and his one-party system as long and as the economy thrived and could fuel the government machinery and patronage system that supported it. When the prices of cocoa and coffee drastically dropped in the late 1970's the economic system started to crumble. Houphouët, schooled and educated in France, only concerned himself with economic growth. Democratic reform and political liberalization did

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<sup>1</sup> Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon, and Central African Republic (Charbonneau 2008:282)

not interest him. However, student protests that followed in the wake of the economic down-turn in the 1980's, forced a constitutional reform that allowed for public elections, although within the single-party system (Cornwell 2000:84).

### 7.2.2 Failed Governance and Tacit French Consent

Houphouët's strategy was to not confront the political opposition aggressively but to co-opt and incorporate political opponents into his own party. The profits from the Ivorian state-capitalistic system were controlled by a small elite, obviously including Houphouët himself. In a frankly delivered speech in 1983 he admitted that he, personally, had earned “billions of francs” and boasted about his own successful businesses, and crediting himself and his hard work and denouncing any claim that the money came from the state budget (Meredith 2006:287). The government launched enormous agricultural and industrial projects and Houphouët decided to turn his old home village Yamoussoukro into a new buzzing capital along with a grand presidential palace that was called an “African version of Versailles”. To pay for this, Côte d'Ivoire ended up with a huge foreign debt and when export incomes drastically declined, the state began to subsidize the parastatal enterprises. The price for rice and sugar were kept at two to three times the global market price so that the small elite could continue to reap huge profits. The numerous French firms in Côte d'Ivoire also took advantage of the situation and made huge profits that were repatriated back to France. Overwhelmed with debt the Ivorian state declared itself insolvent in 1987 (Meredith 2006:289).

Austerity measures released a new wave of national protests that further pushed for democratic reform and combined with Houphouët's failing health and old age, multiparty elections were introduced. Already in the intraparty elections in the 1980's, home-based politics and tensions between locals and strangers were exploited by politicians. A growing population, lack of land, and government encouraged internal migration to benefit the economy was easy targets. From the early 1990's until today the two political antagonists of Côte d'Ivoire have been Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara (Houphouët's successor). They have come to personify the Northern Muslim and Southern Christian divide (Dersso 2011).

### 7.2.3 Entrenched Ethnic Divide

In the 2002-2003 civil war, sparked by a coup by unpaid military officers, French forces intervened and established a zone of trust that effectively became the demarcation line between the perceived North and South. This action reinforced the ethno-religious narrative and enabled for the “rebels” to take control of the North as the zone of trust cut off any possibility of the government in the South to control and govern the North. France ostensibly intervened as an impartial actor in what they perceived as an internal Ivorian crisis, ignoring the contributions and involvement of Liberia and Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, France and the

international community had already defined the problem and therefore implicitly in their understanding of the problem also defined the solution. The problem was governance and ethnicity – a typical “African crisis” (Charbonneau 2008:290).

The first post-civil war elections that were planned for 2005 were postponed until 2010. President Gbagbo had the support from the military while Northern militia groups supported Ouattara. Hate speech, xenophobic mob attacks and violence resulted in hundreds of casualties and internal refugee flows and reignited the civil war (Dersso 2011). Gbagbo refused to accept defeat and began a campaign of hateful anti-Western propaganda and xenophobic rhetoric claiming that only southerners are real Ivorians. The usage of identity as a political weapon was successfully used by Houphouët and this political tradition have been continued by his successors (Handy 2011). Amnesty International's analysis of the conflicts that have plagued Côte d'Ivoire also ascribes identity and economic difficulties to the underlying causes of the conflicts. Gbagbo and closely affiliated media outlets portrayed Ouattara as a foreigner and not as, what they called, a genuine *Ivoirité* and implied that Ouattara's (and other Northerners') allegiance was not to Côte d'Ivoire but to foreign powers. Particularly Muslims and people with Muslim sounding names became victims of widespread human rights violations. Desperately, Gbagbo accused French forces of planning a genocide and UN personnel of being part of an occupation force (Amnesty International 2011:13-4).

Gbagbo was eventually arrested by French forces and Ouattara could be sworn in as president. The second Ivorian civil war ended with over half a million IDPs and 3,000 dead.

## 8 Analysis

### 8.1 International Politics in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe

#### 8.1.1 Supremacy and Subordination

The significant presence of European settlers intensified ethnification and division among the peoples living in the territory. The need to control and suppress native influence increased as the Europeans needed more control over the land and the people. The racist state of Rhodesia had an inherent lack of vertical legitimacy as it had to constantly reaffirm the supremacy of the white race and subordination of black and other races. This in itself explains the obsession of the Rhodesian state, and colonial powers, to categorize and catalog ethnicities and their historical legacy and tradition. The state inevitably promoted and exacerbated differences and internal disunity to justify its racist order and by doing so set in motion a vicious circle of promoting neo-patrimonial structures.

#### 8.1.2 War of Liberation and Lingering Violence

The struggle for independence was hijacked by the international geopolitical agendas. Not only by the politics of the Cold War and East vs. West but by the inter-socialist struggle between USSR and China. The schooling of natives that had been performed by missionaries was replaced by schooling in socialist ideologies. The missionaries' (re-)writing of the history of the peoples of Africa was replaced with a new history that was commensurable to the history writings of socialism. Again the history was written through the prism of Western history of ideas and used to promote and incite violence and disunity among Africans to the benefit of others.

The mapping of tribes done by the colonial administration and continued after UDI, the state of Rhodesia demarcated the ostensibly traditional and ethnic lines and defined the ethnic groups. The international politics of the Cold War exacerbated the tendencies of ethnification by actively arming and politically define the neo-patrimonial structures that had come to exist among the politically excluded black majority. Acts of violence was not only limited against the ruling white minority but also against political (and ethnic) adversaries. This process

inevitably affected the horizontal legitimacy of the society and hence the vertical legitimacy between the people and the government. The white minority government, which benefited whites and excluded blacks, was replaced by Mugabe's ZANU party and Shona affiliated regime. The massacre in Matabeleland of Ndebele was followed by the merger of the de facto political arms of the two groups into Zanu-PF. This move allowed for Mugabe to politically diffuse the Ndebele and establish Zanu-PF as the only political party for black Zimbabweans. This was followed by a decline of ethnic violence, revealing the politically motivated cause of the ethnic violence.

The white community was largely left alone during the first decade of independence. The economic difficulties of the 1990's and failed economic policies of the government forced them to turn the attention toward the relatively economically strong white farmers. Forced land evictions and organized violence towards white farmers and their employed black farm-workers became the new policy of the regime to distract public opinion from apparent policy failures. The government of Zimbabwe and Rhodesia has consequently favored a specific group at the expense of others. The handling of the multi-ethnic MDC have been more elaborate and attempts are constantly made by Zanu-PF and government officials to associate MDC with an imperialistic Western agenda and for standing up for the white farmers – the former oppressors. A paradoxical behavior considering MDC is part of the government of Zimbabwe, but typical Zanu-PF strategy to co-opt the opposition.

## 8.2 The Creation of Nation in Nigeria

### 8.2.1 A Colonial Construct

The colonial creation of Nigeria is one of the most elaborate patchworks that emerged from the European colonial enterprise. The pre-colonial structures and systems of governance that were used by the 250 different groups, although most likely unintelligible to arriving Europeans, were working as result of the continuous historical particularities in this area of Western Africa. The colonial administration superimposed a new institution on top of the existing institutions of government and demanded total obedience and allegiance of those it regarded as chiefs. Any chief who failed to comply was replaced by a more loyal and obedient chief, creating a culture of subordination and fear towards the colonial administration. The territory was properly reorganized into contiguous chiefdoms to comply with European ideas of governance. If the elite wished to remain they had to tend to the needs of the British. The discrepancy between the people in Nigeria and the elite that adapted and tended to the demands and needs of the British grew.

The hastily British decolonization process did not provide Nigeria with the necessary prerequisites for a smooth transition to independence. The vertical bonds between state and people had been severed. The British focus on the southern coastal region gave the people there a springboard to influence in the new state. At the same time the British rigged a census to favor the pliable North. Independence revealed the true diversity and differences between the different parts of the country. The skewed British legacy of inadvertently favoring the people in the south and actively neglecting the other peoples in Nigeria laid the ground for suspicion and mistrust. The prospect of ruling the territory that is Nigeria had never before been presented to the Nigerian people. Colonial Nigeria was a European construct without any roots in the societies it encompassed. The client-patron relationships that had been reinforced during British rule continued in independent Nigeria. The division between North and South and the terrible tragedy Biafra were the products of old and continued Western imperialistic engagements. Not even the rebooting of 1979 with a new constitution and redrawn states within a federal state could do much about the neo-patrimonial structures already in place. The regional-ethnic tendencies had affected horizontal legitimacy in the society and inevitably reinforced the trend of low vertical legitimacy of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian oil deposits have possibly done more harm than good. The massive generation of money funded and fueled corruption and sustained the neo-patrimonial structures in what today is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The state, from colony to sovereign, has consequently been used to benefit the ruling elites.

## 8.3 The French Connection in Côte d'Ivoire

### 8.3.1 United Elites

The continuous French influence in Côte d'Ivoire have remained strong and manifested itself in many different ways. The colonies were cunningly used to first and foremost serve the interest of Metropolitan France. The relatively egalitarian relationship that was formed during the hardships of the Second World War was brutally crushed as the French began to restore the old hierarchy. Geopolitical strategy, economic interests and prestige of France prevailed over the rights and freedoms of the people in Côte d'Ivoire.

The wave of independence, unleashed by the fall of the Fourth republic and Guinea's change of heart, transformed the French agenda. The African intellectuals, the *évolués*, had close relations with the Metropole and French society and clung on to France and their own interests. This became apparent by Guinea's decision to openly confront France and vote for independence. President Touré had risen in the political hierarchy through his work in labor unions and did neither share the background nor the sentiment of the *évolués* for France and all

things French. Not even the lamentable French actions during the end of the Second World War or the turn to a more realist and illiberal policy in France Afrique had dramatically changed the attitude of the évolués toward France. The elites had definitely joined forces to protect their interests and formed bonds that were going to last long after independence, conveniently ignoring the best interest of the Ivorian people and rifting the vertical legitimacy of the state.

### 8.3.2 Foreign Involvement and Control

France kept control through long-term agreements on cooperation in many areas and promised support and guaranteed the survival of the Houphouët regime. Not only does this reveal the imperialistic ambitions of France but also the inherited problems of setting up institutions in foreign countries staffed by foreigners. Although rational at the moment of inception they will in the long run inevitably fail to provide for the societal needs they are meant to address. France held sway over Ivorian institutions and made Côte d'Ivoire dependent on French trade and investment and especially the Ivorian government dependent on French security guarantees. The overall goals of Houphouët appear to have been to tend to his and France's converging interests. The systematic neglect of the interests of regular Ivorians resulted in mass protests, sparked by the inherited flaws in the Ivorian economic system. The small but untimely steps towards democracy, during a time of severe economic austerity, did only reaffirm and further institutionalize the patronage system and use of populist politics. The political and military clout of France in Côte d'Ivoire manifested itself in the civil wars. Not only in the decision to intervene and effectively cut the country in half but also in the pivotal role France played in the arrest of Gbagbo. The neo-patrimonial system, corruption and ethnification of the political system could not have escaped under the radar of France. It is therefore symptomatic that France reinforces notions of irreconcilable ethnic and religious differences and has the final say on who can be the president of Côte d'Ivoire.

## 8.4 Control and Ownership in Botswana

### 8.4.1 Supremacy and Subordination

The control over culture have not been taken over or defined by Westerners. The decision to convert to Christianity was made entirely by the Tswana themselves and involved the entire society and unified the Tswana states in the process. The very special circumstances around the process of insistently asking and inviting a reluctant colonial power meant that the Tswana retained control over the colonization of themselves. Through the institution of the kgotla and the culture of

consensus in decision making, this was not something that was decided over the heads of ordinary people. Transforming rainmaking to praying for rain is a pragmatic adaptation to Western approved “magic” that tends to the particularities of the local needs. The decision of the chiefs to align themselves with Christianity is an example of how the Tswana denied Europeans to subordinate them as natives and savages. The desert covered land, not of interest to farming settlers, and the not yet discovered natural resources kept whites away from the land. This meant that conflicts of interests between black Africans and white Europeans were non-existing.

#### 8.4.2 War of Liberation and Lingering Violence

The lack of political and military interest from colonial powers meant that the Batswana did not have to arm themselves to protect their interests. The proxy wars of the Cold War was fought to the east in Rhodesia, to the south in South Africa, to the west in South West Africa, and to the north in Angola. The BDF was set up after independence to stop incursions from Rhodesia and South Africa as they chased and raided guerillas and freedom fighters. This has meant that the BDF has been under firm civilian governance and not been able to claim benefits from sacrifices for independence. Botswana has been spared from the sowing of dragon's teeth that occurs during prolonged conflict and its harvest that can be used to spread hate and mistrust to coming generations. The deliberate decision by Khama to be a democratic counterweight to the apartheid regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa also made democratic governance a powerful foreign policy statement.

#### 8.4.3 A Colonial Construct

The trust and belief from the British to let the Tswana chiefs rule themselves without substantial involvement or reorganizing the institutions of governance enabled for an entirely different situation in Botswana than in other former colonies. Unlike Nigeria and its numerous pre-colonial polities, Botswana has a strong resemblance with the pre-colonial Tswana states. The partitioning of Sudan represents a crucial shift in the ongoing processes of nation-building in the young African states. The old European colonial borders in Africa can now peacefully be redrawn and new independent polities created<sup>1</sup>. Bechuanaland did not incorporate peoples who did not wish to be part of Bechuanaland or who did not want to be part of an independent Botswana. Old institutions, such as the kgotla, have lived on, and although transformed and depleted of much of their former power and authority they have been incorporated into Botswana’s system of governance.

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<sup>1</sup> The Republic of South Sudan was formally established as a result of the 2011 independence referendum.

Skillful and consensus based leadership have undoubtedly benefited Botswana and effectively mitigated circumstances that otherwise could have had severe implications on the unity of the society and legitimacy of the state. Finally, the idea of a nation can be traced back to the pre-colonial Tswana states and not to the late colonial era.

#### 8.4.4 United Elites

The current elite in Botswana have not inherited a corrupt colonial system but a system that uninterruptedly continued and slowly evolved from pre-colonial to independence. This continuity have helped to maintain strong vertical legitimacy, in turn, the creation of watchdog institutions have worked to control the Batswana elites and limited corruption and establishment of neo-patrimonial structures. The decision to implement and stick to substantial democratic reform after independence can be traced to the institution of the kgotla and consensus in decision making.

Independence for Botswana did not interfere with major British interests. The British plan to incorporate Bechuanaland into the Union of South Africa suggests that any British interests in Bechuanaland would be best addressed through favorable relations to the elites in South Africa and not the Tswana. The chiefs in Bechuanaland were left alone by the British who did not interfere in native matters. The potential danger in the north – south division of the country has been carefully handled by the Botswana government. Batswana do identify themselves as northerners or southerners, but not exclusively and the dangerous potential in this identification has been largely defused.

#### 8.4.5 Foreign Involvement and Control

The involvement of foreign actors in the internal politics of Botswana has remained low. The landlocked and desert covered country did not attract the interest of foreign, colonial powers or superpowers. The Tswana were very pragmatic and did not hesitate to incorporate foreign ideas or take advice from foreigners if it was seen as beneficial to them. The conversion to Christianity and the approach to the British were done with missionaries by their side. Even if this continued after independence the important difference is that instead of setting up and creating institutions foreigners were incorporated into existing institutions under Tswana control and leadership. This is evident in the fact that Botswana, for example, has followed the economic policy advice of its donors, but done so responsibly unlike Côte d'Ivoire during the its early “good” economic years.

## 9 Conclusion

The reproduction of the Westphalian state model in the international system is undoubtedly problematic but impossible to escape from. It is also important to say that it is not necessarily the Westphalian state per se that is problematic. It is the forced superimposition of Western institutions on peoples that would be better off developing state institutions of their own choosing and adapted to local particularities free from imperialistic influences and control. The speedy implementation of the Westphalian state that has been forcibly imposed on the non-Western world has created an imperialistic system that generally fails to execute the essence of the idea of the Westphalian state. The Western long-term memory loss of its own historical journey has made the West incapable of exporting and building well-functioning states in the rest of the world. Historical and existing underlying racism have clouded and infested the state-building effort and the West remains unable to fully free itself from these obscure but influential ideas.

Botswana had more favorable preconditions than many others that allowed for an easier adaptation of a Westphalian state. There are similarities and parallels to the formation of nation-states that took place in Europe and the pre-colonial Tswana states, but these historical parallels are conditional on the absence of European imperialism and colonial settlements. This has meant that Botswana had something that could be independent. Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe had to completely invent themselves after decolonization. These polities did not exist in anybody's mind before they were made-up at the 1884 Berlin Conference. The post-colonial Botswana state can trace its roots directly to the pre-colonial Tswana states through the Bechuanaland protectorate. Essentially, the people of Botswana have been allowed to remain in control of their own destiny. It is this continuity that has resulted in high vertical and horizontal legitimacy of the state. Good leadership has also kept Botswana society inclusive, historically and presently, despite potentially dangerous regional and ethnic frictions. The trust in the Botswana state institutions to deliver and attend to the needs of the Botswana people have created an environment where neo-patrimonial structures are not needed. Therefore, they have never ignited the vicious circle of mistrust towards government and other groups that have caused ethnically, regionally, and religiously incited violence and hatred in countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire.

Botswana did not luckily escape all the hardships of colonization and British rule and it did adhere to the economic policy advice given by international institutions and donors. Most importantly, Botswana is evidence of the ability to develop a functioning democratic system after a Western model adapted to local particularities if the conditions are right, and the elites in both the receiving periphery and giving center are not entirely corrupted.

This is evidence of the universality of democracy and universal want for democracy and that there is nothing essentially and conditionally Western about it. Nevertheless, it is impossible to escape the international system and states have to adapt and adhere to the norms that are still defined by the West. These events and circumstances have turned out favorably for Botswana and are, as the exception that confirms the rule, a powerful indictment of the colonial history of the Western hegemon and the repercussions it still has on the world today.

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