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# Human Security, Peacebuilding, and the Hazara Minority of Afghanistan:

A study of the importance of improving the community security of  
marginalized groups in peacebuilding efforts in non-Western Societies

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# Abstract

This thesis is focused on the lack of investment in the human security of the marginalized Hazara minority of Afghanistan. Human security is a relatively new concept over which there is considerable debate and this thesis presents a discussion of various debates regarding human security and peacekeeping before taking a firm stance in the debates, emphasizing the importance of investing in the human security of marginalized groups in non-Western societies. The case of the human security of the Hazara has never been researched before and this thesis therefore represents a unique case study. This thesis finds that there are four clearly identifiable factors which have led to a lack of investment in the Hazara, namely: the inaccessibility of their native region, the Hazarajat, continued discrimination against them, the militarization of aid, and the top-down, donor-driven nature of aid in Afghanistan. The effects of this lack of investment manifest themselves both domestically within Afghanistan and internationally, with thousands of Hazaras emigrating to other countries, which emphasize the importance of a bottom-up human security approach to peacebuilding which involves an understanding of the socio-political situation on the ground.

Key words: Afghanistan, Hazara, human security, peacebuilding, community security, marginalized groups

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# 1 Introduction

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What happens to the Hazara is “not just the story of this people. It’s the story of the whole country. It’s everybody’s story.”

- Dan Terry, American aid worker in Afghanistan, 1946 – 2010<sup>1</sup>

The North American Treaty Organization (NATO) led an invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 with the goal of overthrowing the Taliban and denying al-Qaeda a safe haven in the country which was quickly deemed a success. Ten years later, however, Afghanistan finds itself battling a resurgent Taliban while trying to develop a historically poor country rendered even poorer after decades of conflict. Following the perceived defeat of the Taliban in the months following the October 2001 invasion, billions of dollars of aid began pouring into the country from around the world in a bid to bring peace and development. Efforts at peacebuilding and development in Afghanistan have been widely criticized despite the increased importance of these efforts in the face of the impending withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014, with particular criticism being leveled at the role of NATO forces in providing aid to Afghan citizens in a bid to win hearts and minds away from the Taliban. Critics of these peacebuilding efforts argue that national security is being promoted too much to the detriment of the human security of the Afghan people, which should be the focal point of peacebuilding and development efforts.

Human security is a relatively new concept in the field of security studies which shifts the focus of security from states to people. Afghanistan presents a prime example for examining the implementation of national security, human security, and peacebuilding measures as the situation in which the country finds itself, not quite post-conflict but not precisely in fully fledged conflict either, seemingly blurs the lines between these concepts as simultaneous efforts are being made to secure the country from the threat of insurgency and improve the human security of its citizens. Human security is the subject of much debate as it is discredited by its critics who consider it somewhat vague and too conceptual in the sense that it is hard to translate into policy while those that support the concept are divided as to its definition and implementation. This thesis grounds itself in these debates and argues in favor of the importance of a bottom-up human security approach in peacebuilding and of dissociating human security from national security with an emphasis upon the importance of improving the human security of marginalized groups, particularly in non-Western societies, by focusing on the unique and never before studied, as far as the author can determine, case of the Hazara minority of Afghanistan. By using the lack of investment in improving the human security of

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<sup>1</sup> Cited in Zabriskie 2008.

the Hazara minority as a unique case study, this thesis will illustrate the importance of investing in marginalized groups.

Marginalized groups and the concept of community security, originally proposed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a subsection of human security, is rather underemphasized in human security literature and Afghanistan presents a very fitting case study to emphasize the importance of the community security of marginalized groups as the country is divided on racial, ethnic, religious, and gender lines and is thus representative of the larger differences between group-based non-Western and individual-based Western societies. Non-Western, in contrast to Western, countries are commonly viewed from within not as societies consisting of numerous individuals but as societies composed of different communities and groups whose identities may or may not intersect with one another, which has important implications for peacebuilding in non-Western societies. Understanding a society as consisting of groups instead of individuals leads to an acknowledgement that some groups may be better off than others due to possible factors such as historic discrimination and that marginalized groups, if such exist, should be prioritized in human security-based peacebuilding efforts.

As mentioned, this argument will be given empirical weight through the overlooked case of the Hazara. Given the currency of the topic of Afghanistan for the past decade, there is surprisingly little known about the Hazara outside of Afghanistan and the wider Middle East / South Asia region where they are concentrated. They are of particular importance to the peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan as while the decision to go to war in Afghanistan in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks was widely condemned, the predominantly Shia Muslim Hazara welcomed it as salvation for their people. The Hazara were the targets of ethnic cleansing and brutal treatment by the Sunni Muslim Taliban and in autumn 2001, their fate looked extremely bleak. Persecuted by the Taliban because of their different physical features and religious beliefs, which had served as the weak justification for centuries of discrimination, there seemed to be little hope of deliverance for the Hazara. However, the widely celebrated fall of the Taliban and a constitution guaranteeing equal rights for all minorities opened up a plethora of opportunities for the Hazara which had been unimaginable just a few years earlier.

The turn of the tide was at last in favor of the Hazara, who found themselves promoted to government positions, filling important jobs as NGO employees and translators for NATO forces, and excelling in education in record numbers, leaving other ethnic groups lagging behind. The Hazara were proving to perhaps be the key to the nation's future by being models for the rest of Afghanistan of what could be achieved if all Afghans embraced education and democracy. However, at the same time as the picture of a triumphant Hazara minority was emerging, another very different picture was also being painted: one of a historically marginalized people facing continued discrimination socially, politically, and economically; of an ignored group whose plight was forcing them to make perilous journeys by land and sea to other countries in search of better lives; of a people whose traditional stereotype as the donkey-slaves of Afghanistan doing them no favors in the new sociopolitical landscape of their country.

What with the scale and duration of the international engagement in Afghanistan and the historic plight of the Hazara and their eagerness to be included in the development of the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the lack of aid money being directed towards them to improve their human security is a puzzling issue. These are a people whose historic homeland, where many of them still reside, has consistently been labeled as being among both the safest and the poorest in Afghanistan and who are exhibiting a thirst for democracy and education, and yet a relatively small amount of aid money has been invested in them. Many Hazara face levels of such extreme deprivation that they lack access to the most basic of utilities, such as sanitary latrines, potable water, and electricity, and live in areas that lack paved roads. Additionally, Hazaras make up a majority of the Afghan refugees making their way to foreign countries due to a lack of security and opportunities in Afghanistan. They thus have the lowest levels of human security of any ethnic group and an evident drive to improve their standing and yet there is a consistent pattern of aid being diverted to other groups being prioritized on national security grounds.

This thesis is therefore focused on the following two research questions:

- *Why is there a lack of investment in improving the human security of the Hazara?*
- *What have the effects of this lack of investment been?*

## 1.1 Research Aim

The aim of this thesis is thus to address the above two research questions concerning the puzzling and under-researched issue of the lack of aid money being invested in improving the human security of the Hazara minority of Afghanistan. In so doing, this thesis will emphasize the importance of investing in the human security of marginalized groups in peacebuilding efforts in non-Western societies and thus contribute to existing literature on human security and make a significant contribution to the small existing body of literature on the Hazara. The standpoint of this thesis is that promoting egalitarian human security in Afghanistan is vital to building long-lasting peace and that given not only the historic marginalization of the Hazara but also the opportunities they currently present for advancing the country, there should be much more investment in them than there currently is. This thesis therefore takes a firm stance in the debate on human security and not only answers the topical question of why there is a lack of investment in the Hazara but also illustrates the effects of neglecting to take a bottom-up human security approach to peacebuilding which focuses on marginalized groups.

## 1.2 Relation to Previous Research

This topic was first formulated in response to a lack of research on the Hazara. Not only have they rarely been featured in the news, there has also been very little academic research focused

on them. That which does exist is mostly anthropological or sociological in nature. Alessandro Monsutti's works on the Hazara, written from a political anthropologist viewpoint, are of particular importance in this field. Robert Canfield, a socio-cultural anthropologist, has also authored a number of important works focused on the Hazara. Articles by both authors are used in this thesis. Sociologist Kristian Berg Harpviken wrote a seminal study of the political mobilization of the Hazara from 1978 to 1992 while Sayed Askar Mousavi authored an important book about the Hazara entitled *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: an Historical, Cultural, Economic, and Political Study*. These are the most significant works focused on the Hazara and apart from these, there is little else to be found.

As has been mentioned, there is a considerable amount of existing literature on human security representing a wide variety of views. This thesis discusses a number of these views but places particular emphasis on an aspect of human security which is often underemphasized: community security. Community security was an aspect of the original definition of human security proposed by the UNDP but has not featured so heavily in discussions of human security. Human security and the case of Afghanistan has also been researched before as has the community security of women in Afghanistan, but this thesis provides a new angle by focusing on the case of one overlooked and marginalized ethnic group. This thesis therefore represents a different approach to the issue of human security, peacebuilding, and Afghanistan by focusing on the community security of the Hazara. This thesis therefore fills an important gap in research on two levels: one, by profiling and analyzing the Hazara from a political science viewpoint; and two, by making a new contribution to existing literature on human security and peacebuilding.

## 2 Methodology

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*In this section, the methodology of this thesis is presented. This thesis is designed as an explanatory case study which follows the analytic technique of explanation building grounded in human security theory. In order to increase the validity of the conclusions drawn in this case study, the principle of data triangulation is followed which involves the use of several different types of data.*

### 2.1 Case Study

This thesis is a case study of the Hazara minority of Afghanistan and the issue of there being a lack of investment in them. Choosing an appropriate topic is the first step for a researcher when designing research. Peter Burnham writes that a topic should be “interesting, puzzling, neglected or difficult to understand” (Burnham 2004: 31). This topic was chosen according to these criteria: the author of this thesis finds this topic interesting and it certainly is both puzzling and neglected. The initial decision to choose this topic was due to a perceived gap in research due to a lack of research on the Hazara. Having perceived this gap in research and conducted research into their continual marginalization in the provision of aid money, it was then decided to use human security theory as the theoretical foundations of the research. Through this case study, it is hoped that the significance of investing in the community security of marginalized groups in peacebuilding efforts in non-Western post-conflict societies is emphasized.

This case study can be said to consist of two parts woven into one: one part focuses on the Hazara while the other part focuses on human security. Human security theory therefore informs our understanding of the case of the Hazara while the case of the Hazara informs our understanding of human security. Having chosen a topic that fulfills at least one though preferably more of these criteria, the next step is to design the case study and operationalize the case study design. According to Robert Yin, there are three types of case studies: explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive (Yin 2009: 9). Explanatory case studies normally focus on “how” or “why” questions (ibid.). This case study, seeing as the purpose of this research is to provide an explanation for why there is a lack of investment in the Hazara and the effects of this lack of investment, is of the first variety: explanatory. Focusing on *why* there is a lack of investment in the Hazara instead of focusing on the effects of this lack of investment is important as it affirms certain theoretical arguments and thus disputes others and gives us empirical examples to support this. For example, examining why there is a lack of investment in the Hazara allows us to dispute the mistaken theoretical argument that national security and human security should be converged as this can have negative effects.

### 2.1.1 Explanation Building

The analytic technique most suited to this type of case study is, correspondingly, explanation building. In this technique, the researcher analyzes the case study data by building an explanation about said case. Explaining a phenomenon involves stipulating “a presumed set of causal links about it, or ‘how’ or ‘why’ something happened” (Yin 2009: 141). Explanation building is not the easiest technique as the causal links one stipulates may be complex or difficult to measure precisely. Yin finds the fact that most case studies which follow this technique do so in narrative form problematic as these narratives usually lack precision (ibid.). To overcome this, he recommends that explanations executed in this manner should be grounded in theoretical propositions. This thesis grounds therefore itself in human security theory which, while it cannot be said to provide a complete prediction of exactly why there is a lack of investment in the Hazara or its effects, does provide at least a partial prediction and allows us to understand the importance of investing in marginalized groups, which is reinforced with empirical evidence concerning the Hazara.

By commencing the analytical chapter of this thesis with a section detailing the lack of investment in the Hazara over the past decade, an explanation is built up which allows us to make clear conclusions about the reasons why there has been a lack of investment in the Hazara. It also allows us to document the effects of this lack of investment. Explanation-building can be problematic in narrative form which this thesis has tried to avoid by grounding itself in the theoretical propositions of human security.

### 2.1.2 Data Triangulation

This is thus how this explanatory case study of the Hazara has been carried out: through a technique of explanation building grounded in the theoretical propositions of human security. Having determined what type of case study this is and the method used to analyze the evidence, we come to the important issue of the material from which we draw our understanding of the research subject. This thesis follows the principle of data triangulation, which involves the use of several different data sources. This is one of the major strengths of a case study: the opportunity to use multiple sources of evidence, thus increasing the strength of one’s conclusions (Patton 2002: 247). By using multiple sources of data, a researcher can construct a more valid interpretation of events through a convergence of evidence (ibid.). This thesis uses several different types of data in order to strengthen its conclusions, including academic articles, newspaper articles, books, official reports issued by NGOs, and official reports issued by government entities. The fact that this thesis relies on a number of newspaper articles for data may raise some concern as to accuracy and validity but the sheer number of articles used in tandem with the use of other documents eliminates this concern and guarantees a high degree of objectivity and validity. The number of reports issued by governmental refugee tribunals may also solicit concern as to impartiality, but these documents provide an overview of accessible

material concerning their stated topics and are thus impartial, being not representative of government views on immigrations or refugees. In addition to using a variety of data sources, this thesis also uses a large number of sources to increase the internal validity of its conclusions.

## 3 Theoretical Discussion: Human Security

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*In this section, the theoretical foundations of this thesis are presented and discussed. The theoretical foundations of this thesis are centered on human security, a concept over which there is significant debate. This section presents and evaluates these debates in order to take a stance in the debate and come to a concluding theoretical basis for the purpose of this thesis.*

### 3.1 The UNDP Definition

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued a groundbreaking report which called for a shift in the concept of security from state-centricity to people-centricity. This report sought to redefine security and challenge the dominance of realism by changing the referent object of security from the nation-state to a state's citizens. As a concept, human security was not entirely new as security was historically thought about in relation to individuals (Glasius 2008: 31). Following the French Revolution, however, security thinking shifted to center on the nation-state and remained that way until the issuance of the aforementioned UNDP report (ibid.). State security is therefore often referred to as "traditional" hard security while human security is referred to as "non-traditional" soft security.

The basis for the UNDP's proposal for a paradigmatic shift was that individuals and states have different conceptions of security. A state, for example, may be secure in that it faces no imminent threat of attack or revolution yet its people may be insecure in that they face fear on a daily basis or are deprived of some basic commodity. The concept of human security is not limited to developing countries but is universally applicable (UNDP 1994: 22). One of the most important implications of dissociating security from national boundaries is that human security threats are not limited by these boundaries but can have global consequences (ibid.).<sup>2</sup> Central to the UNDP definition of human security are the concepts of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want," which can be understood as being free from violent threats to one's survival and being free from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and natural disasters, respectively (ibid.: 24). The UNDP's conceptualization of human security implies that enduring peace can only be attained once people are made free from both fear and want.

The report lists seven categories of threats to human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political (ibid.: 24-33). Some of these categories are rather self-explanatory: economic security, for instance, means having a basic level of income and a secure form of employment while food security means having physical and economic access to basic foodstuffs. Health security means having access to basic healthcare and a basic

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<sup>2</sup> However, the same can be said of state security threats: a national security threat may also be an international security threat and have global consequences.

level of protection against preventable diseases (which are often linked to poor sanitary conditions or poor access to healthcare). Environmental security centers on being safe from environmental degradation, natural disasters such as droughts and floods, and having access to clean water. Personal security focuses on the threat to human lives by sudden and unpredictable physical violence which can originate from a number of sources, including the state, other individuals, or oneself. This encompasses, among other forms of violence, crime, state torture, racially or gender-motivated violence, suicide, and drug abuse. Community security moves a step up from personal security in that it focuses on protecting the security of different groups, such as families, communities, organizations, or racial or ethnic groups, from a loss of identity, cohesion, or violence. For instance, many traditional languages and cultures are being adversely affected by globalization. In addition, ethnic discrimination is threatening the security of ethnic groups while ethnic and religious clashes have claimed countless lives. The last human security threat category, political security, means living in a country or society in which one's basic human rights are protected.

The outward similarity between human security and human development has engendered some confusion and debate. The seven threat categories could easily be reclassified as human development priorities, but the UN differentiates between the two by proposing human security to be a necessary but not necessarily sufficient prerequisite for human development (ibid.: 23). Human security addresses whether or not individuals are protected from urgent threats to their security while human development addresses societal well-being.

### 3.2 Criticism and Debate: an Overview

Despite the UN reintroducing the idea of human-centered security to the world and proposing a universal definition, there has since been little consensus on the definition of human security. Within the field itself, there is debate over whether to adopt a broad<sup>3</sup> or narrow understanding of human security while critics of the concept decry it as being too ambiguous and hard to translate into policy. Criticism of human security commonly focuses on the concept having “no clear theoretical grounding, scant political precedent, no consensus-commanding definition, and a highly uncertain future” (Owen 2004: 374). There are a number of views on how human security should be conceptualized and what parameters its definition should have. In order for us to take a firm stance in the conceptual debate on human security, it is necessary for us to examine these various viewpoints.

Let us start with a critique of human security that remains relatively close to the UNDP's threat classification but with some conceptual differences. In P.H Liotta's articles “Boomerang Effect: the Convergence of National and Human Security” and “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” P.H. Liotta argues that the issue is not one of traditional security versus non-traditional security, as human security

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<sup>3</sup> The UN definition of human security is broad, encompassing as it does both violent and non-violent threats.

is not the mirror image of traditional security, but the need to focus on both. According to Liotta, human security is often conceptualized and debated within the framework of traditional security, which detracts from the construction of a freestanding definition of human security (Liotta 2005: 50). The problem lies in the language with which security is associated, namely that of threats and violence.

Liotta disagrees with the UN's seven threat categories in that he does not consider them all to be threats, preferring to distinguish between threats and vulnerabilities, both of which are security issues. In this way, Liotta distances himself from the language of the 1994 UNDP report and indeed, the language of many academics when discussing human security. A security threat is clearly identifiable and acknowledged, often immediate, and requires an understandable response normally involving the military. A security vulnerability, on the other hand, is often a not clearly identifiable indicator linked to a complex interdependence among related issues and as such, does not always imply an understandable response (ibid.: 51). Examples of security vulnerabilities come from all seven of the UN's threat categories: disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards. Vulnerabilities pose a bit of a dilemma for non-traditional security as they are difficult not only to identify but also to respond to, which leads more often than not to a response of inaction (ibid: 52). The more appropriate response, argues Liotta, would be to examine the variables, indicators, and analogies from past examples that may assist the formulation of an adequate response (ibid.).

Liotta ultimately concludes that security thinking should not focus on one unilateral definition but should combine traditional and non-traditional security. His reasoning for this is that "so-called ethical practice in foreign policy that acts on behalf of individual citizens for any state is most accommodated and accommodating when such action 'meshes' with achieving the ends of more traditional national interests of the more powerful state" (ibid.: 61). Liotta therefore views traditional and non-traditional security as two separate concepts that should be viewed as complementary and not in opposition to each other. In theory, the two may be separate concepts but in practice, idealism invariably becomes enmeshed in realism as efforts to protect or improve human security are usually inextricably connected to national security issues. It is therefore important to focus on "multi-level, multi-referent, and interdependent aspects of security" as failure to do so will result in "the boomerang effect" (ibid.: 62).

The considerable divide over the concept of human security is illustrated by the fact that not just one but two articles were published in response to Liotta's argument. The first, written by Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, criticized a number of Liotta's conceptualizations and conclusions with the main argument being that Liotta's ideas are not easily translatable into policy.<sup>4</sup> The second article was a rejoinder to both Liotta and Smith-Windsor by Kyle Grayson which criticized both authors' arguments on the basis that they merely reinforced the conceptual status quo by placing human security within the context of national security – despite Liotta's

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<sup>4</sup> Smith-Windsor was affiliated with the Canadian Department of National Defence.

claims to be doing otherwise. Grayson argues that converging the two concepts results in “the worst of both worlds, as a broad human security agenda is subject to the securitization dynamics of national security doctrines, creating a security policy ‘Frankenstein’s Monster’” (Grayson 2003: 337). Grayson’s concluding argument is that human security should be treated as an ethos rather than being converged with the paradigm of traditional security (ibid.: 341).

As previously mentioned, Liotta remained rather close to the UNDP classification of human security threats despite differentiating between threats and vulnerabilities. The UNDP classification is not embraced by all academics, however: there are those who argue in favor of a narrow definition of human security focused on violent threats / freedom from fear while there are those in favor of a more broad definition encompassing non-violent threats / freedom from want as well. Keith Krause, Andrew Mack, and Neil MacFarlane all argue in favor of a narrow definition centered on violent threats. They reason that a narrow definition is superior to a broad one when it comes to pragmatism, conceptual clarity, and analytic rigor (Owen 2003: 375). Krause describes a broad definition of human security as “a potential laundry list of ‘bad things that can happen’” (ibid.) Proponents of a broad definition provide the counterargument that the analytic and normative difficulties such a definition encounters are the unavoidable consequences of widening the paradigm of security beyond the state (ibid.). Some definitions of human security stretch quite wide indeed, with Jennifer Leaning and Sabina Alkire including the social, psychological, political, and economic aspects of vulnerabilities in their definitions (ibid.).

Two important critiques of human security as a broad concept center on the consequences of connecting suffering in other countries to one’s own national security and of securitizing development<sup>5</sup> and humanitarian assistance. These critiques are very much linked in the context of peacebuilding and warfare, as Krause raises the question of whether securitizing education facilitates more effective action or if instead it results in militaristic strategies for tackling social welfare problems (ibid.: 379). According to critics from the humanitarian relief community, linking suffering in other countries with one’s own national security can have potentially devastating policy consequences: connecting human security and national security could result in the alleviation of poverty in perceived terrorist strongholds taking precedence over the provision of aid to one’s ideological allies, for example (ibid.). Additionally, making this connection could also further the militarization of humanitarian assistance as has occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taylor Owen offers rebuttals to these critiques by arguing that shifting discussions of security away from the state to individuals is simply a way of addressing harms that do not pose a threat to state security but do pose a threat to the lives of its citizens (ibid.: 380). He argues that while the harms included in a definition of human security are debatable,

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<sup>5</sup> It is important to distinguish between the use of the word “development” and the concept “human development”: when used alone in this thesis, development is used according to its lexical sense and not as a reference to human development. Developing a country can therefore mean investing in it so as to improve its circumstances and address urgent human security issues and not necessarily efforts to improve the human development of its people. As we understand it, human development comes after the eradication of human insecurity.

securitizing does not automatically entail militarizing – indeed, this way of thinking, that security is inextricably linked to military solutions, is precisely what human security is trying to challenge. Military action might sometimes be necessary to protect human security but more often than not, it is the resources and prescience associated with the military that are desired and not the weapons (ibid.).

Owen proposes a threshold-based definition of human security that moves away from the UN classification of threats according to cause and instead includes threats based on severity. He argues that this allows for all kinds of possible harms to be considered but their classification as a security threat at any given time would be subject to their severity. Owen states that his definition has two parts: first, human security does not differentiate between deaths caused by environmental disasters or diseases and deaths caused by war; and second, “human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats” (ibid.: 382). These threats correspond with the UN’s sevenfold threat classification but leave one out: community security. The implications of this, along with the other views presented above, are discussed in the subsequent section.

### 3.3 Reaching a Definition Applicable to Afghanistan

As has hopefully become apparent from the previous discussion, human security is thus a fractured and contentious topic. Some of those involved in the debate argue that human security does not need to have a universal definition: instead, it can thrive on its ambiguity as it can manifest itself for various purposes in various contexts – an assertion strongly refuted by Owen, who argues in favor of reaching a common definition (ibid.: 385). However, as evident from the discussion above, despite a universal definition being perhaps desirable, there exists no such definition and human security has to either thrive on its ambiguity or fade in theoretical significance. For the purpose of this thesis, a definition of human security relevant to the specific case of Afghanistan and the Hazara must be derived from the debates over its conceptualization.

If we turn our attention to Liotta’s arguments, his distinction between threats and vulnerabilities and differentiating between human and national security is ultimately weakened by his contention that human security should be linked to national security. He ends up contradicting himself as he begins his article by outlining the importance of distancing discussions of human security from national security but then recommending the convergence of the two. This leads one to ask the question of what exactly his point was in arguing for a clearer distinction between the two in the first place if they should be ultimately be joined together. Smith-Windor’s critical response can be viewed as too policy-oriented, resting too heavily as it does upon the problems with translating Liotta’s arguments into policy, while Grayson’s response leans too much in the opposite direction and is too idealistic. A balance between the two would be ideal: human security is an ambiguous concept which can be difficult

to translate into policy, but that does not mean that the only legitimate conceptualizations of it rest upon realistic policy relevance or pure idealistic merit.

The problem with adopting a narrow conceptualization of human security which focuses primarily on violent threats to individual survival is that this is somewhat too close to the traditional perception of a security threat being a violent one. Broadening the paradigm of security beyond the state entails extending the idea of a security threat beyond threats that are solely violent in nature. Broad conceptualizations of human security, despite Owen's counterarguments, do raise issues of their own, however, namely concerning the securitization of development and humanitarian aid. It is not contested that securitization does not inherently entail militarization, as such a line of thought derives from traditional notions of state security, but it must be acknowledged that the militarization of development and humanitarian aid is indeed a documented phenomenon in the world. Owen's threshold-based definition of human security leaves out a security threat of particular significance in the context of this thesis, that of community security, which leaves a gaping hole in his definition.

Now that we have understood some of the main arguments in the debate on human security, we can begin to formulate our own definition applicable to the case of Afghanistan and the Hazara. The essence of the UNDP document that brought human security to the attention of the world is that people should have a basic level of security in seven different categories in order to ensure their freedom from fear and freedom from want. This thesis adopts a very similar view: that human security means being free from fear and want, which involves having a basic level of security in six different categories, namely: economic, food, health, political, environmental, and education. Education has been included in this definition because being denied the possibility of basic education reinforces poverty and social stratification. This is an issue not better classified under human development as it is basic education, such as learning to read and write in a sound school building, which is proposed as a human security issue here and not access to higher education or education of a better quality. This category, along with the other five, is explained more in-depth at the end of this chapter. The category of personal security has been left out of this definition because it is rather vague and idealistic and does not bring any additional analytic value to the case being examined in this thesis. A definition of human security should not veer too much to one side or the other; that is, it should find a middle field between idealism and realism. If human security is to be understood as a baseline level of security, personal threats from crime, suicide, and drug abuse would be more linked to societal well-being and therefore human development than human security. This can perhaps be identified as one of the problems with the UN's definition of human security: by formulating a conceptualization to be universally applicable, it becomes such a general conceptualization that it may not actually be entirely applicable in specific contexts.

As this thesis is focused on a specific case, a more general, universally applicable definition of human security cannot and indeed, should not, be used. Rather, a more narrow and specific definition must be formulated. This is not to say that broad definitions of human security that include threats from crime, suicide, and drug abuse are not without merit, but they

do not represent an analytically relevant baseline level of security in Afghanistan. Threats of violence from crime in Afghanistan (and indeed, threats of crime in many countries) are inextricably linked to a lack of security in the six threat categories to be used in this thesis. The theoretical foundations of this thesis therefore extrapolate from this that gaining a baseline level of security in the six categories is more of a priority than focusing specifically on violence emanating from crime because by gaining this baseline level, crime will reduce. Ensuring that people are protected from crime and further reducing crime is thereafter a matter of human development.

The other types of violence listed under the UNDP description of personal security can be incorporated into the other threat categories, which serves as an additional justification for it to be excluded from the definition adopted in this thesis. Threats of violence originating from the state can be incorporated into the category of political security, as living in a state where basic human rights are guaranteed implies that there is no threat of state violence against individuals. Racial, ethnic, religious, or gender related violence can be incorporated into the category of community security, which leads us to the perhaps rather obvious question of why this category has yet to be mentioned in the definition of human security to be used in this thesis. Community security is an important category in the context of this thesis, focused as it is upon one ethnic group. Grouping community security together with the other six categories does not make much sense in the context of this thesis, however, focused as it is upon the security of one marginalized group in Afghanistan. This issue is explored more in depth below.

### 3.3.1 Community Security

In order to analyze the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and more specifically the Hazara, the six human security threat categories should be understood in relation to the overarching referent object: community security. As Afghanistan is a multiethnic society divided upon ethnic, religious, and gender lines, the starting point for understanding human security and subsequently peacebuilding and development should be human security not on an individual level but on a community level. That is, different communities or groups should be identified within Afghanistan and their respective levels of human security evaluated. There will of course be disparity within these groups, as some women, for example, will be secure in all six human security categories, but the overall situation of a group should inform the amount of aid directed towards them in order to even out any group-based disparities. The importance of using community security as the overall reference point for human security is that this implies recognition of the socioeconomic differences that exist between groups and that some groups are more marginalized than others and therefore require more investment – if indeed marginalization and socioeconomic differences across group divisions exist to begin with. If there are no group-based disparities, then individuals should be used as referents for human security.

Earl Morgan stresses the importance of focusing on marginalized communities in his 2005 article “Peacebuilding and Human Security: a Constructivist Perspective.” He argues that in order to build peace effectively through a human security approach, three things must occur:

1. Culture, identity, and a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding must be taken into account when dealing with marginalized individuals, groups, and communities.
2. Material and socio-cultural contexts must be viewed as critical factors for peacebuilding and human security.
3. Serious efforts must be undertaken to move beyond the short-term tasks of maintaining a ceasefire, demobilizing, disarming, and monitoring competitive elections between former adversaries (Morgan 2005: 69).

It is important to take culture, identity, and a bottom-up approach into account when dealing with marginalized groups because civil wars cause societal disruptions which in turn cause dissatisfaction and multilevel – individual, group, communal, and national – insecurity that have profound implications for both conflict management and peacebuilding (ibid.). Morgan elaborates upon this by arguing that power relations should be understood within a socio-cultural context, meaning that the following three socio-cultural aspects should be analyzed in order to develop an effective peacebuilding strategy:

1. The underlying structure of privilege to the formation and conduct of domestic politics.
2. How daily life is affected by historical constructions of gender, class, culture, and the impact these constructions have on individuals, institutions, and structures.
3. The effect of the construction and reproduction of exploitative class / power elite identities on the theory and practice of peacebuilding and human security (ibid.: 71-72).

Understanding these aspects will allow one to develop an effective, sustainable method for building peace as “emancipation / sustainable peacebuilding occurs when one understands the true nature of things: class, gender, ethnic equality, and so forth” (ibid.: 72). Understanding a society through culture, identity, ideas, knowledge, and structures is therefore crucial to understanding the human security situation of marginalized groups or communities.

Morgan criticizes the oversight of those involved in peacebuilding for disregarding the importance of investing in marginalized groups. He maintains that since universal human rights theories emphasize John Locke’s idea of natural rights, there is a tendency in the West to assume that all individuals are inherently equal, which results in the deemphasis of discrimination based on group identity (ibid.: 78). This means that marginalized groups, especially women and minorities, are overlooked in peacebuilding. This is a serious mistake as culture is particularly relevant in non-Western societies for protecting the rights of the less powerful and peacebuilding and human security should accordingly be based on the needs of the marginalized (ibid.). The Western focus upon the individual is perhaps a reason why community security does not feature so prominently in discussions of human security, as a society may be perceived as consisting of individuals and not a multitude of groups that may or

may not be equal. Additionally, there are those who argue that community security or the security of groups is not the same as human security because the latter is focused on individuals. This thesis disputes that, however, with reference to the UNDP's original definition of human security threats which includes community security and to the fact that just because something has the word "human" in it does not mean that it is based solely on individuals and not groups.

Far from being the only one to maintain that the Western human rights tradition implies a disregard for group identity, Morgan's argument is supported by cultural relativists who decry the inherent individualism of human rights theory. Western societies are frequently contrasted against Eastern societies for the former are seen as individualistic while the latter are seen as group or community-based. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab are particularly critical of universal human rights theory, writing that the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is too Eurocentric, based as it is "on the notion of atomized individuals possessed of certain inalienable rights in nature" (Pollis and Schwab 1979: 18). Seeing as non-Western societies center more on group or community identity, the Western idea of human rights may be of limited validity or even meaningless to non-Western countries (ibid.: 13). Community security, then, and understanding a society as consisting of groups and not just individuals, is of particular relevance for a non-Western society such as Afghanistan.

### 3.3.2 Human Security and Peacebuilding

We have thus established our reference point for human security in Afghanistan, and other non-Western post-conflict societies as well, as being community and not individual security. It is now necessary to delve further into the concept of human security-oriented peacebuilding. As previously mentioned, literature on human security and peacebuilding stresses the importance of a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding and development which involves understanding the situation on the ground rather than enforcing a top-down, liberal approach to peacebuilding which focuses on the stabilizing effect of institutions. Human security reverses conventional ideas about the individual's relationship with the state, as states traditionally looked outward to the international system for legitimacy whereas human security forces states to look inward to their citizens for legitimacy (Futamura, Newman & Tadjbakhsh 2010: 1). This implies that in order for efforts at peacebuilding and development to be perceived as legitimate, they must be based on an understanding of the self-stated needs of the people. A triple-authored United Nations University article maintains that international peacebuilding has had a mixed and indeed, poor record of promoting human security because of the traditional liberal focus on top-down institutionalist peacebuilding (ibid.). This approach, it is argued, has had some noteworthy successes in the areas of conflict containment and stability promotion but only limited success in the promotion of durable peace. This is due to the fact that the traditional peacebuilding agenda is aligned too closely with the traditional idea of security in which stabilizing fragile states is seen as an international security imperative and because of the problems with the liberal institutionalist model of peacebuilding and development (ibid.).

Hafizullah Emadi also argues in favor of bottom-up development, stating that in contrast to developing countries where development is implemented from above, modernization in the West was propelled by people “through grassroots participation in the economic, social, cultural, and political arenas” (Emadi 2008: 142). In developing countries with authoritarian governments, people are given virtually no opportunities to voice their opinions due to a governmental belief that the largely uneducated masses are not qualified to articulate their needs and the resultant top-down imposition of development fails to transform the situation on the ground (ibid.). “Development policies that are imposed from the top in this fashion have failed to transform the entrenched socio-political structure and its corresponding politics, ideology, culture and traditions” (ibid.) Additionally, development is usually linked to economic achievements that raise people’s standard of living. Such a link in and of itself is not necessarily faulty but viewing development as solely economic in nature precludes a conceptualization of development as change and improvement in economic standing but also culture, politics, and social consciousness (ibid.). This is relevant to human security and peacebuilding as understanding human security as primarily economic in nature would disregard the important cultural, political, and social discrimination faced by marginalized groups.

There has been an increasing emphasis placed upon local ownership in peacebuilding and development, in rhetoric at least, but despite the importance of this, limited research is being conducted into local views of peacebuilding initiatives (Futamura, Newman & Tadjbakhsh 2010: 2). The UN University article maintains that this is because peacebuilding has mistakenly been conflated with state-building as a weak, underdeveloped state is perceived as a threat to international security (ibid.). This argument directly contradicts Liotta’s argument in favor of converging human security and traditional security as instead of being the best way forward, this can lead to the securitization or militarization of humanitarian aid which is also the theoretical standpoint taken by this thesis. That is not to say that militarizing humanitarian aid or peacebuilding does not have some advantages, as the UN University article points out that this has brought much-needed international assistance to conflict-prone countries, but it does not contribute to effective promotion of human security or peacebuilding (ibid.).

### 3.3.3 Securitization / Militarization of Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Aid

Now we turn our attention to what exactly the securitization / militarization of peacebuilding, and in turn humanitarian aid, means. Securitizing peacebuilding means associating development and peacebuilding efforts with national and international security – instead of being considered as a separate, bottom-up concept, peacebuilding is molded into the conceptual framework of traditional security, leading to a top-down method of building peace (ibid.). So doing, it is believed, will establish peace and thus bring stability, eliminating any national or international threats. This results in the peacebuilding / development agenda being an externally or donor-driven enterprise with a lack of comprehension of local political culture,

desires, or needs (ibid.). This lack of knowledge from the people on the street, as it were, or indeed, in underdeveloped areas, the people on the dirt road, can lead to a failure to eliminate human security threats and establish an enduring peace. Attempts to impose a top-down, liberal method of peacebuilding can lead to individuals choosing to back sectarian political forces, thereby jeopardizing attempts at peace and egalitarian human security (ibid.: 3). Additionally, donor agencies will not achieve their goals, which means aid will have been wasted and the society in question may be in danger of falling back into conflict (ibid.).

Militarizing aid, which is linked to the securitization of aid but is slightly different, entails the direct involvement of the military in providing aid. This is a phenomenon which is occurring in Afghanistan, where developing insurgent-dominated areas has been linked to national security (Oxfam 2010). The logic behind this is that by pouring aid into an area where the military is engaged in counterinsurgency, this aid will allow the region to develop and diminish the attraction of joining the insurgency and decrease the vulnerability of local citizens. In Afghanistan, aid is being delivered to turbulent areas as part of a military strategy focused on quick-fixes in order to achieve national and associatively, international, security (BBC News 2010; Oxfam 2008; Oxfam 2010; Mulrine 2011). The problems with this have been mentioned in the preceding paragraph with the added issue of the military being a unit whose job is to protect and promote national and international security, not human security. Militarizing aid thus leads to aid being used not for its true purpose but as a short-term way of winning hearts and minds in order for the military to achieve their objectives (Oxfam 2010).

### 3.4 In Sum

Summing up the preceding discussion, the theoretical foundations of this thesis are that human security means being free from fear and want, which entails people having a basic level of human security in six different categories, namely, economic, health, political, environmental, education, and food. In order to promote egalitarian human security through peacebuilding and development in post-conflict societies, particularly unstable ones, community security should be the starting reference point. Group, racial, ethnic, religious, and gender divisions across society, if such exist, need to be understood along with the disparities in human security between these groups. Marginalized groups should be the starting point for peacebuilding and development efforts in order to ensure an end result of egalitarian human security. By focusing on the most marginalized groups, this can lead to a transformation of negative entrenched socio-political cultures and ideologies. Efforts to promote human security through peacebuilding and development should not be converged with efforts to promote national security, as this can lead to the militarization of aid which involves a waste of money invested in short-term projects serving political and military interests which do not lead to long-lasting changes.

The six human security categories can be understood as entailing a basic level of security as described below:

- Economic: basic economic security and a steady source of income. Having this basic level of economic security entails being able to afford a basic form of shelter with access, limited or otherwise, to electricity and a hygienic latrine.
- Health: having basic access to healthcare. This entails having a reasonably sized clinic or hospital with sufficient basic resources located a reasonable distance from one's residence. This also entails a basic level of protection from deaths preventable through access to healthcare such as death during childbirth or diseases easily cured by treatment.
- Political: living in a society where the state and its representatives respect basic human rights and where all groups and individuals are recognized as equal under the law and are treated accordingly.
- Environmental: having basic protection from environmental hazards such as drought or flood and having access to sanitary water resources.
- Education: having access to basic education in a properly built facility with basic educational supplies and teachers possessing a basic level of qualification (i.e., education up to a certain level which enables them to teach properly the level at which they are teaching).
- Food: having constant economic and physical access to basic foodstuffs.

## 4 Identifying the Hazara

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*This section begins with a short summary identifying the Hazara to help the reader understand who they are and what they have historically faced in Afghanistan. This summary is followed by an in-depth explanation in order to situate the Hazara firmly as a marginalized group in the complex ethnic, religious, geographical, social, political, and economic landscape of Afghanistan.*

**وقتی که خدا زد خر را، هزارها گریه کردند**

“When God created the donkey, the Hazaras cried”

- Afghan saying

The Hazara are the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, constituting approximately 10 – 19% of the total population following the Pashtuns (42%) and the Tajiks (27%) (CIA 2011).<sup>6</sup> Uzbeks, approximately 9%, are the fourth largest ethnic group, followed by smaller groups (ibid.). The Hazara differ from other minorities in Afghanistan in that they are both an ethnic and a religious minority as they follow Shia Islam in an overwhelmingly Sunni country. They are easily distinguishable from other minorities due to their East Asian features, which are believed to be a result of their descent from Genghis Khan’s invading armies of the 13<sup>th</sup> century (Inskeep 2010; Tromifov 2001; Zabriskie 2008). Their markedly different appearance in combination with their practice of Shiism has made them the target of persecution for centuries. This persecution has manifested itself not only in the form of institutional racism and abuse but, at its most extreme, ethnic cleansing.

To their supporters, the Hazara are a hardworking, industrious people, while to their detractors, they are poor, filthy, foreign infidel donkeys (Amiri 2010; Baldauf 2001). They have historically been relegated to the ranks of second-class citizens, forming a servant underclass as they languished in the lowest of jobs. Their heartland, though not by choice, is Hazarajat, an unofficial area in the mountainous central highlands of Afghanistan. This region is mostly infertile and somewhat isolated from the rest of the country due to poorly maintained and insecure roads and severe winter weather (Singh 2001; Zabriskie 2008). Historically, Hazarajat has been one of the poorest regions in Afghanistan, with the lack of social, political, and economic prospects, in combination with a security situation in constant flux, having resulted in the migration of millions of Hazaras to other places not only within Afghanistan but also around the world (Monsutti 2007). Within Afghanistan, there are significant Hazara populations in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat. Outside of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan host the largest number of Hazara refugees (ibid.; Monsutti 2007; Abdelkhah and Olszewska 2007). There are

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<sup>6</sup> Estimates vary, with different sources citing different percentages.

also steady streams of Hazara immigrants to both Australia and Europe, adding to the already significant Hazara refugee populations there.

#### 4.1 Situating the Hazara in the Ethno-religious Landscape of Afghanistan

The Hazara have, despite their undisputed presence in Afghanistan for several centuries, been widely regarded as outsiders. Their East Asian facial features sharply distinguish them from other ethnic groups to the extent that they have long been regarded as not looking the way Afghans should look (Zabriskie 2008). In addition to their different physical features, they form the majority of the 15 – 20% of the population that practices Shia Islam (CIA 2011). Shias are a minority not only in Afghanistan but also in the world, with 85% of the world's Muslims being Sunni (About.com 2011). The main difference between Sunnism and Shiism concerns the identity of the Prophet Mohammad's legitimate successor. The Shia believe this to be the Prophet's son-in-law, Ali, while the Sunni believe in the legitimacy of the Prophet's elected successor, Abu Bakr (ibid.). The author of this thesis takes the view that the actual differences between the two types of Islam are not as important as the way they have sometimes been socio-politically manipulated to cleave Sunnis and Shias apart. These differences manifest themselves in slightly different practices and holidays. Conflicts and discrimination between Sunnis and Shias is not uncommon and historically in the Muslim world, Shias have been persecuted by Sunnis (ibid.).

The ethno-religious landscape of Afghanistan is hard to describe in depth due to its complexity. In order to facilitate this description, Sayed Askar Mousavi likened Afghanistan to a Chinese box inside of which is nestled a succession of smaller and smaller boxes (Mousavi 1998: 19). Inside of the box of Afghanistan are boxes representing different ethnicities, such as Hazara, Nuristani, and so on (ibid.). However, the ethno-religious division of Afghan society does not stop here as each ethnicity consists of different tribes. Within the dominant Pashtun ethnicity, for example, exists a number of tribes such as the Durranis, Ghilzais, and Kuchi nomads. Hazaras have traditionally been divided into tribes based on their area of origin, so there exist tribes whose names correspond with districts or provinces, such as Behsudi (from the Behsood districts), Ghaznichi (Ghazni), and Oruzgani (Oruzgan).<sup>7</sup> Apart from this tribal division, the Hazara are further divided religiously between Twelver and Ismaili Shias (CIA 2011). The majority of Hazara are Twelvers, who recognize the leadership of a succession of twelve imams beginning with Ali, while a minority are Ismailis, who recognize the leadership of the sixth Shia imam and his lineal descendents (who carry the title of the Aga Khan) (ibid., Amiri 2010; Human Rights Watch 2007). The Chinese box of Afghanistan is therefore quite a capacious one as it must contain such a large number of smaller boxes.

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<sup>7</sup> Hazara tribal divisions are largely believed to be of minimal significance today.

The Hazara are the most liberal Muslim sect in Afghanistan, with the Taliban and its affiliated groups constituting the most conservative (Sappenfield 2007).<sup>8</sup> The Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun – the ethnic group that has been both the historic rulers and the historic enemies of the Hazara. The dominance of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, both numerically and politically, led to the subjugation of the Hazara – although that is not to say that other ethnic groups did not take part (Emadi 2008). Due to their Shia faith, the Hazara are widely perceived as not worshipping the way Afghans should worship (Zabriskie 2008). This has led them to being branded “infidels” and resulted in them being persecuted on both ethnic and religious grounds (Refugee Review Tribunal 2005; Human Rights Watch 1998; Zabriskie 2008). It has been argued that the main reason for their persecution has been religious, with their ethnicity adding another dimension but not being the driving factor.

## 4.2 Hazarajat: Homeland of the Hazara

Decades of conflict drove the Hazara into the region known as Hazarajat, which compounded their persecution due to its remoteness (Larson and Hazelton 2008). In modern terms, Hazarajat can be understood as consisting of the following provinces, either partially or in their entirety (although the exact boundaries can be disputed) (source: Wardak 2007):

- Bamiyan (also Bamyán, Bamian; the cultural heartland of the Hazara)
- Daykundi (formerly a district in Oruzgan province, it was made into its own majority Hazara province in 2004)
- Ghazni
- Maidan Wardak (also known as Wardak)
- Oruzgan

Bamiyan and Daykundi are majority Hazara provinces, while the rest are home to significant Hazara populations, most notably in Ghazni and Maidan Wardak. In Ghazni, the Hazara are the majority in the Jaghori, Jaghatu,<sup>9</sup> and Malistan districts (source: UNHCR District Profiles 2002-2003). In Maidan Wardak, the Hazara are primarily to be found in the two neighboring Behsood districts, Markazi Behsood and Hisa-I-Awali Behsood. In Oruzgan, the Hazara are primarily found in the Sharistan district.

Hazarajat is situated in the mountainous central highlands and possesses only a limited amount of fertile land (Singh 2001). Due to its location, it spends half the year under a thick blanket of snow which renders many roads unusable and isolates the region from the rest of the country (ibid.). Many of the roads in Hazarajat, when they are not covered in snow, are in poor condition (ibid.). Life in the neglected region of Hazarajat is harsh, with a significant lack of social, economic, and political prospects (ibid.; Zabriskie 2008; UNHCR District Profiles). The lack of development in Hazarajat and the continued persecution of Hazaras throughout the 20<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Despite being the most liberal group in Afghanistan, it is important to note that the Hazara are still very conservative as Afghanistan remains a traditional country with strong Muslim values.

<sup>9</sup> Not to be confused with the district of the same name located in Maidan Wardak.

century have led to an exodus of Hazaras, beginning in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and continuing to this day (Monsutti 2007; Monsutti 2004; Abdelkhalik and Olszewska 2007). Historically, Hazaras settled in Quetta in Pakistan and Mashhad in Iran. Today, there are millions of Hazara refugees spread out within Afghanistan, where they are known as internally displaced persons or IDPs, and outside of Afghanistan, mostly in Iran and Pakistan. A significant community of Hazara refugees also exists in Canada, Australia, and Europe, with continuous streams of Hazara asylum-seekers making their way to the latter two destinations. Within Afghanistan, significant Hazara communities exist in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat. In Kabul, Hazaras have settled mostly in the western area in the poorest neighborhoods which have a significant lack of basic infrastructure (Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland 2010).

### 4.3 Socioeconomic Conditions of the Hazara: the Donkey-Slaves of Afghanistan

Former President Najibullah summed up the socioeconomic conditions of the Hazara when he stated that their lot was the most difficult and lowest-paid jobs, poverty, illiteracy, and social and nationalist discrimination (Phillips 2010). Socioeconomic discrimination against the Hazara has not just been forced on them from above in the form of government policy but has been reinforced by the surrounding society. Stereotypes about the Hazara abound and those that live in ethnically mixed areas may encounter frequent discrimination. The plight of the Hazara and the way discrimination against them is entrenched in Afghan society was brought to the attention of the world by Khaled Hosseini through his novel *The Kite Runner*. The book makes numerous references to the discrimination faced by Hazaras, such as being called “mice-eating, flat-nosed, load-carrying donkeys” (Hosseini 2004: 23). One of the earliest references to Hazaras being akin to donkeys is alleged to have been uttered by 19<sup>th</sup> century Emir Abdur (sometimes Abd al-) Rahman, who enslaved the Hazaras. The Pashtuns, he maintained, should have been grateful to him for his actions because if it were not for “the slaving donkeys of Hazaras” doing all the work, the Pashtuns “would have had to work like donkeys” (Emadi 2008). Hazara ex-Vice President and current parliamentarian Mohammed Mohaqeq also said that his people historically were treated “like donkeys, good for carrying things from one place to another” (Zabriskie 2008). Another prominent Hazara said that “it was an embarrassment for Hazara people to show their ethnicity” (ibid.)

Stereotypes and discrimination against Hazaras still exists, as evident in the experiences of a reporter travelling to Bamiyan in 2002. David Filipov was told that Bamiyan was a place where many Afghans were scared to go as it was filled with traitors, murderers, and bandits. “‘Whatever you do, do not go to Bamiyan,’ said Hamayun, a driver, [...] ‘They will cut your throat and steal your money and think nothing of it’” (Filipov 2002). The stereotype of Hazaras being a particularly brutal and vicious race can perhaps be attributed to the fact that they have

not been docile victims but have fought back against their oppressors, perhaps increasing the hatred directed towards them.<sup>10</sup>

As previously mentioned, the homeland of the Hazaras is one of the poorest regions in Afghanistan through a combination of an unfortunate climate and lack of fertile land and the unwillingness of successive Kabul governments to invest in the area. This has reinforced the socioeconomic stratification of the Hazara and confined them to the bottom rungs of society. Not only have the Hazara been forced to work the lowest of jobs, but they were also banned from going to university and under the rule of the Taliban, from school altogether (ibid.). In order to understand fully the extent to which the Hazara have been persecuted and the brutality of the atrocities committed against them, the following section provides a more detailed history of the Hazara in Afghanistan.

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<sup>10</sup> No doubt if they had not fought back, they would instead be negatively labeled as weak and submissive.

## 5 Modern History of the Hazara

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*This section provides a brief overview of the modern history of the Hazara starting in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and ending with the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The purpose of this section is to give an account of the ways in which the Hazara were persecuted in order to deepen the reader's understanding of the situation of the Hazara as a marginalized ethnic group.*

### 5.1 1890 – 1978: Hazarajat Subdued and Oppressed

The modern history of the Hazara can be said to begin in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century with the reign of Emir Rahman, yet Hazara persecution dates back much longer. Pashtuns, Uzbek, and Turkmen raided Hazara lands for slaves for centuries and all of the great Sunni rulers of the region launched attacks on Hazara lands, which resulted in the Hazara fleeing to what is now known as Hazarajat (Williams 2012). The events of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century marked the beginning of the modern era of their persecution. Despite the passing of a century, the Emir's tyrannical policies towards the Hazara, premised on the argument that they were foreign infidels, have left an enduring imprint on ethnic relations and political life in Afghanistan (Hanifi 2004). Indeed, the social, economic, and political dynamics of this time can be said to be the template of present-day Afghan society (ibid.).

Prior to Rahman's ascension to the throne, Hazarajat had enjoyed semi-autonomy, with tribal chiefs defending the region against outside interference. Rahman, however, was determined to consolidate his rule over Afghanistan and subsequently launched a series of wars on Hazarajat to bring the region under his control from 1891 – 1893 (ibid.). The Emir justified these wars by building up myths surrounding the Hazara which laid the foundations of their continued persecution: they were the “the terror of the rulers in Kabul;” they harassed travelers; they were always ready to join the first foreign aggressor who attacked Afghanistan; and they were perceived by Afghans<sup>11</sup> as the enemies of their country and religion (ibid.). When the Hazara fought back against the Pashtun king's forces, they exacerbated existing animosities between Sunnis and Shias which caused Sunni clerics to issue a *fatwa* (legal ruling) that the Hazara were infidels – giving an official religious justification for the wars (ibid.).

The Emir succeeded in defeating the Hazara in 1893 and treated them brutally in order to stamp out any possible future threat of dissent. The decapitated heads of slain Hazaras were piled into towers as a warning against rebellion and those that had survived, including women

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<sup>11</sup> A linguistic side note on ethnicity in Afghanistan: Pashtuns are referred to as “Afghan” in Dari by other ethnic groups, including the Hazara. A member of any ethnicity can be referred to as an “Afghani” however.

and children, were forcibly enslaved, heavily taxed, and their lands given to Pashtun soldiers (ibid.). This harsh treatment resulted in a significant number of Hazaras leaving Hazarajat, settling in Quetta, Pakistan, Mashhad in Iran, and various places in Central Asia (ibid.; Singh 2001). Those who stayed and failed to pay their taxes were either tortured or murdered. The emigration of a number of Hazaras left parts of Hazarajat depopulated and the Emir furthered the de-emphasis of the Hazara presence in Hazarajat by allotting empty land to Pashtuns and encouraging their settlement in the area (ibid.). Additionally, royal decrees were issued to Kuchi nomads granting them access to Hazara lands so that they could graze their livestock to the detriment of Hazara landowners (Emadi 2008).

The state abolished the enslavement and excess taxation of the Hazara in 1897, but they remained de facto slaves for nearly two decades until Rahman's grandson Amanullah abolished slavery and declared all ethnicities equal before law (ibid.).<sup>12</sup> Despite this potentially promising move, there was little change in the state's treatment of the Hazara. A succession of kings came and went, all of them continuing to treat the Hazaras as second-class citizens and supporting Kochi land rights in Hazarajat. The Kuchi themselves became major stakeholders in Hazarajat as they grew wealthier and managed to acquire more land, furthering the pauperization of the Hazara (ibid.). In land disputes, the government always sided with the Kuchis, going so far as forcing Hazaras to surrender their land and drawing up royal documents granting ownership to Kuchis. During the 1960s, Hazaras began migrating in large numbers to Iran and the Gulf States in search of better prospects (ibid.). The 1970s witnessed the overthrow of the monarchy and the installation of Afghanistan's first President, Mohammad Daoud. The foundation of the republic of Afghanistan made little difference in Hazarajat, however, with many Hazaras considering Daoud's reign to be the darkest period of Hazarajat (Canfield 2004). The new republic of Afghanistan continued to ignore Kuchi exploitation of Hazaras, leading to a new exodus of Hazaras who migrated to urban centers such as Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul in order to escape the poverty of Hazarajat (ibid.).

## 5.2 1978 – 1989: Soviet Invasion

Daoud's reign lasted only half a decade. In April 1978, a communist coup toppled his government and brought the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to power, with Nur Mohammad Taraki at its helm. The Saur<sup>13</sup> Revolution as it became known quickly resulted in widespread rebellion and the Afghan Civil War ensued. The Hazara rose up in Hazarajat and liberated the region prior to the Soviet invasion, which allowed the region to enjoy virtual autonomy during the 1980s (ibid.). One of the first actions taken by the Hazara following the liberation of Hazarajat was to deny all Pashtuns and Kuchi nomads access to Hazarajat (ibid.). The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 after deeming President Hafizullah Amin, who had seized power from Taraki after ordering his assassination, an unsuitable leader.

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<sup>12</sup> The following information in this paragraph comes from Emadi 2008.

<sup>13</sup> "Saur" being the Dari name of the month corresponding with April in the Persian calendar.

By this time, the numerous rebel groups which had been formed in opposition to communist rule had begun calling themselves the *mujahedeen*, an Arabic term meaning “holy warriors.”

Hazarajat was left largely to itself by the communists, but rather than this bringing peace to the region, Shia anti-communist groups began to fight each other as they vied for dominance (ibid.). Between 1982 and 1984, during which most of the infighting took place, a significant amount of the non-Hazara population of Hazarajat faded from view as according to all sources, there was a sizeable population of Tajiks in the region that either emigrated or became submerged (ibid.). This was highly significant for the Hazara, as although numerically dominant, they had not been politically dominant since the time of Emir Rahman. Once this infighting had calmed down, a period of relative peace ensued which benefited Hazarajat as commercial traffic began passing through the region, avoiding the surrounding territories which were still experiencing fighting between the mujahedeen and the communists. This traffic fostered, to a degree, the improvement of roads and socioeconomic life for the Hazara (ibid.).

### 5.3 1989 – 1994: Chaos

Unable to defeat the mujahedeen, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, leaving Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai as president. Following the cessation of the Soviet-Afghan War and with active support from Iran, Hazara resistance fighter Abdul Ali Mazari succeeded in uniting the rival Shia groups who had been fighting for control of Hazarajat and grounded Hezb-e Wahdat: the Party of Unity (Emadi 2008). Mazari, commonly referred to as “Baba” or “Father” Mazari by Hazaras, is viewed as the father of the Hazara people for bringing them unity. Hezb-e Wahdat was in essence a Hazara movement with strong undertones of nationalism, despite the emphasis upon religion in its official discourse (ibid.).

Civil war in Afghanistan continued to rage on, and in 1992, the Northern Alliance (also known as the United Front) was formed in opposition to the Soviet-backed government. This alliance united three factions: Hezb-e Wahdat, Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud’s forces, and Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s faction (Canfield 2004). Najibullah’s government fell soon after the formation of the Northern Alliance, whose cohesion deteriorated, with the previously united factions fighting both each other and other factions for control of the country (ibid.). Two presidents were installed for short periods of time, neither of which had control over the country. Amidst the chaos, Burhanuddin Rabbani became the second President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) and Massoud Minister of Defense.

Fierce battles between factions and the ISA’s forces raged on in Kabul. On the 11<sup>th</sup> of February 1993, some 750 Hazara civilians were killed in what became known as the Afshar massacre in Afshar, west Kabul (ibid.; Phillips 2010; Human Rights Watch 2001). About half of Kabul’s population was Hazara at this time, residing mostly in the poor neighborhoods of west Kabul. ISA forces and Pashtun warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad forces launched an assault on Afshar, which was serving as Hezb-e Wahdat’s headquarters, but the soldiers turned against Hazara civilians and “a frenzy of looting, rape, and summary executions” followed which saw

70 – 80 people killed in the street (Canfield 2004; Human Rights Watch 2001; Phillips 2010). The exact fate on the 750 civilians is unknown as they disappeared and were presumed to have been murdered (ibid.).

## 5.4 1994 – 2001: The Rise of the Taliban

**تاجیکان به تاجیکستان، ازبک ها به ازبکستان، ترکمن ها به ترکمنستان و هزاره ها به ایران یا گورستان بروند، این جا افغانستان است**

Tajiks to Tajikistan, Uzbeks to Uzbekistan, Turkmen to Turkmenistan, and Hazaras to Iran or the graveyard – this is Afghanistan.

- Taliban saying

“Hazaras are not Muslim. You can kill them. It is not a sin.”

- Mullah Manon Niazi, Taliban governor

Amidst the chaos and brutality of the war, a new group emerged: the Taliban. Originating among Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan, this new group promised peace and stability to a people tired of war. Civilians understandably welcomed them, hoping that they would bring an end to the destruction and lawlessness around them. In the end, however, the Taliban became even more lawless and brutal than the groups they had risen up against. When the Taliban were advancing on Kabul in 1995, they betrayed Mazari, who had arranged a meeting with them, by capturing him and murdering him along with some of his closest companions (Canfield 2004). Karim Khalili was chosen as his successor. The Taliban captured Kabul soon after in 1996 and overthrew the ISA and Rabbani (ibid.). Seeing as there was no longer a governmental position for him to fill, Massoud subsequently reverted to being a rebel fighter and the Northern Alliance, strengthened with more members, regrouped to fight the Taliban (ibid.).

The Northern Alliance pulled back to the north, leaving the Taliban in control of Kabul. In May 1997, the defection of one of General Dostum’s deputies, Mahlik Pahlawan, to the Taliban allowed the Taliban to capture Mazar-e Sharif from the Northern Alliance. Pahlawan quickly reneged on his alliance with the Taliban, however, and a spontaneous resistance movement arose in the streets (Human Rights Watch 2001b). At least 2,000 Taliban fighters were taken prisoner and summarily executed, their bodies dumped in wells or left in remote deserts to rot (ibid.). Northern Alliance forces blamed Pahlawan for this massacre, but by all accounts Northern Alliance forces, including Hezb-e Wahdat militia, took part (ibid.). Shortly afterwards, the Taliban imposed a blockade on southern Hazarajat, which was still under the control of Hezb-e Wahdat (Singh 2001).<sup>14</sup> Northern Hazarajat was virtually cut off due to fighting in the neighboring provinces and the blockade cut southern Hazarajat off from the rest

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<sup>14</sup> No one involved in the civil war in Afghanistan can be said to be entirely innocent and both the Northern Alliance and Hezb-e Wahdat are alleged to have committed human rights abuses. In Hazarajat, hundreds of Tajiks left Bamiyan during 1996 and 1997 due to the behavior of Hezb-e Wahdat forces.

of Afghanistan, preventing food and humanitarian assistance from reaching the region (ibid.). Those trying to leave the region were also prevented from doing so by Taliban forces (ibid.).

Northern Alliance control of Mazar-e Sharif lasted for only a year: on 8 August 1998, this control was brought to an abrupt end when Taliban forces entered the city and embarked on a killing frenzy which resulted in around 2,000 people, the majority of whom were Hazara civilians, being massacred (Human Rights Watch 2001; Zabriskie 2008; Peters 2001). Taliban leader Mullah Manon Niazi justified the killing of Hazaras before Taliban forces entered the city, labeling the Hazara infidels that should either convert to Sunnism or leave Afghanistan if they wanted to avoid death (Phillips 2010). The Taliban partly blamed the Hazara for the massacre in Mazar-e Sharif the year before and conducted house-to-house searches looking for Hazaras, killing many in front of their families, including children and women (Human Rights Watch 2001). Relatives that tried to retrieve their dead were stopped by the Taliban, who said that the bodies were to lie in the streets until consumed by dogs, as had happened to the massacred Taliban forces the year before (ibid.). Human Rights Watch declared the second Mazar-e Sharif massacre one of the worst atrocities to occur in Afghanistan's long civil war (ibid.). In addition to the 2,000 dead, more than 4,500 men were rounded up and incarcerated for months while hundreds fled the violence south towards Hazarajat under the rain of rocket fire and aerial bombardment (ibid.).

One month later, Hazarajat too fell to the Taliban. By this point, Hezb-e Wahdat had become fractured between two factions, one led by Mohammad Akbari and the other by Khalili, Mazari's successor. When the Taliban captured Bamiyan province, the Kuchis returned to Hazarajat and exacted revenge on them for denying them access to Hazara lands (Singh 2004). They disarmed the Hazara, confiscated their livestock and crops, and forced them to pay the sharecropping debts they had not paid for the past twelve years (ibid.). Two years later, on or around the 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2000, another massacre of Hazara civilians took place near the Robatak Pass north of Bamiyan city. While the exact number of victims of the Robatak Pass massacre is unknown, there were 31 confirmed dead, 26 of those who had been unlawfully detained for four months prior to their deaths and tortured (Human Rights Watch 2001). The bodies were discovered more than a week later, their executioners having made no attempt to cover them (ibid.). One man's body was found tied to a tree, his limbs positioned in such a way that the Taliban would have been able to manipulate him like a grotesque marionette (ibid.).

Tragedy for the Hazara did not end there. In January 2001, Taliban forces advanced on Yakaolang (sometimes Yakawlang) district in Bamiyan province in a bid to recapture it from Shia resistance groups. During the course of four days they massacred up to 300 Hazara civilians, including local aid workers and village elders (ibid.; Zabriskie 2008). One of the victims, a 17 year-old boy, had been skinned either alive or after death (Human Rights Watch 2001). The frozen corpses of the victims had to be separated with boiling water prior to burial (Zabriskie 2008). The bazaar in Yakaolang, consisting of 300 shops, was torched, along with schools, the hospital, library, and a number of aid offices (ibid.). Thousands fled to neighboring districts and some even to Iran and Pakistan. (ibid.)

The Taliban only managed to cling onto Yakaolang for two weeks before being driven out again. Exacting revenge after being expelled from the district, the Taliban rampaged through Bamiyan province, burning down more than 4,000 homes, shops, and public buildings, and destroying entire towns in west Bamiyan (Zabriskie 2008). The two towering ancient Buddha statues of Bamiyan city were exploded by the Taliban in March 2001, a symbolic gesture which illustrated the extent of their control over Hazarajat and the Hazara (ibid.). When the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks brought down the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the Taliban onslaught was at its peak. The infamous terrorist attacks and the subsequent decision to invade Afghanistan in order to topple the Taliban and oust al-Qaeda from the country were widely condemned but for the Hazara, these actions appeared to be salvation (ibid.). As one Hazara refugee friend of the author phrased it: “if it weren’t for Bush, I’d probably be dead.”

## 6 Analysis

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*In this section, empirical evidence is analyzed in order to answer the two research questions of this thesis. This section begins with a historical narration establishing the consistent lack of investment in the Hazara since 2001 before proceeding to address the two research questions.*

### 6.1 Post-2001: a Consistent Lack of Investment in the Hazara

The Hazara welcomed the invasion of Afghanistan, which appeared to bring a new era of hope that they could escape their historic persecution and rise to a level of equality with other ethnic groups. However, this era of hope did not manifest itself in international attention and aid money being invested in them. Following its liberation, the situation in Hazarajat was dire. Years of war, Taliban persecution, and a recent drought had further impoverished this traditionally poor region and destroyed much of the basic infrastructure and economic activities that had been present in the region. Hazara-dominated districts suffered from a lack of proper sanitation and drainage systems, health facilities, school buildings where classes could be held year round, school supplies, properly trained teachers, potable water, jobs, and proper roads. Qarabagh district in Ghazni serves as a good example of the level of deprivation in Hazarajat, as despite the population of Qarabagh being very poor, with poor sanitation and drainage systems, the presence of only one run-down hospital with 36 beds, 3% of families (1,491 families in total) lacking a source of income, a 35% literacy rate, and the majority of school lessons being held outdoors due to a lack of proper school buildings, the district was described as comparatively better off than other districts in the region (Qarabagh 2002).

The example of Hazarajat stresses the importance of the concept of human security as following its liberation, Bamiyan province has consistently been labeled as the most secure in Afghanistan, eliminating it from the traditional security agenda. However, life for its residents is far from secure, faced as they are with daily threats in each of the six human security categories. Many houses in Hazarajat post-liberation, for example, had neither proper latrines nor simple baths and those latrines that did exist were traditional and typically had no ventilation or evacuation systems (source: UNHCR District Profiles Bamiyan). Most districts did not have proper drainage systems or appropriate covered ditches, posing a hazardous health risk (ibid.). Additionally, only around a quarter or less of the population had access to potable water in several districts. There was also a severe lack of school facilities and those facilities that did exist were in need of repair, which meant classes were mostly held outside in clement weather and in inclement weather, lessons could be disrupted unless there was an appropriate building, such as a mosque, in which classes could be held (ibid.). In Malistan district in Ghazni, school buildings lacked doors, windows, furniture, and even floors. In addition, there was a limited supply of teaching material and school supplies such as textbooks and stationary. Teachers were

also undereducated, unqualified, and underpaid (Malistan 2003). In no district did the literacy rate exceed 35%. In Malistan, the literacy rate for women was as low as 2% and in Day Mirdad district in Wardak, the literacy rate for the Hazara population was only 5% (Malistan 2003; Day Mirdad 2002).

In all districts, there was a significant need for more health facilities. Due to the presence of only one hospital in Qarabagh which for many was unreachable, half of all patients in the district were referred to the district capital, Ghazni city, for treatment (Qarabagh 2002). Jaghori district in Ghazni boasted one hospital run by NGO Shuhada and five clinics, but given the size of the district, some patients still had to travel quite far to receive medical care which could be life-threatening in the harsh conditions of winter (Jaghori 2002). In some districts, there was not only a lack of widespread health coverage but also a lack of medical equipment and professionally trained staff. In Shibar district, Bamiyan, there was only one clinic with one doctor available which offered neither beds nor specialist treatment (Shibar 2002). As a result of the poor healthcare coverage in this district, deaths from pregnancy and typhoid were common (ibid.).

The adverse effects of the drought were felt throughout Hazarajat, where the most prevalent income-generating activities, primarily agricultural in nature, were severely impacted. In Dehyak district, Ghazni, 30% of the population had no access to paid jobs in the district in large part because of the drought. This led to a large number of the population leaving to search for job opportunities elsewhere (Dehyak 2002). In Day Mirdad, the 37% of the population that was Hazara was severely affected by the drought due to their geographic location while the remaining 63% of the population that was Pashtun remained largely unaffected (Day Mirdad 2002). Politically, Hazara-dominated districts remained largely in the hands of Hazara parties, mostly various factions of Hezb-e Wahdat, with Panjao (also spelled Panjab) and Waras districts in Bamiyan experiencing tension and occasional violence between Hazara factions struggling for control (Panjab 2002; Waras 2002). Malistan was under the control of the Nasr faction of the branch of Hezb-e Wahdat led by Khalili which was resisting outside rule. Followers of the local Nasr strongman, a Commander Irfani, were committing a number of abuses against the local population, resulting in widespread “exasperation and resentment” (Malistan 2003).

There was a small number of NGOs present in Hazarajat, notably Oxfam, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), Shuhada, and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), among others (source: UNHCR District Profiles). However, despite the presence of these NGOs in the region, it soon became apparent that there was a lack of investment in Hazarajat in comparison to other regions in Afghanistan. This is not to say that there was not an improvement in conditions for the Hazara, as there was some investment in areas in which they were heavily concentrated and the ousting of the Taliban eliminated any imminent threat of violence directed against them, securing in large part their freedom from fear. The social presence of the Hazara was also marginally improved, at least on the surface, as President Hamid Karzai appointed four Hazaras to his 28-member cabinet in 2002 and Khalili

of Hezb-e Wahdat was made Vice President (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2003). Hazaras were also represented in the new Afghan national army (ibid.). Also, in 2003 the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) began operating in Bamiyan. However, in 2005, Bamiyan was still receiving “very little development aid” despite being the province that would have benefited the most from a secular democracy that supported minority rights (Baldauf 2005).

The Karzai government, on paper at least, recognizes minority rights but most of the government’s and the international community’s funds were being directed towards more powerful ethnic groups like the Pashtuns or Tajiks or towards more accessible cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif (ibid.). This resulted in Bamiyan remaining a marginalized province with not a single paved road, no reliable electricity, and limited water supplies (ibid.). Hazara frustrations with the lack of attention being paid to them continued as the progression of the years did not bring further progress to Hazarajat. The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) rather paradoxically stated in 2005 that the lack of infrastructure in Hazarajat made it difficult to access the region to dispense aid (Refugee Review Tribunal 2005). In the same year, the SCA described Hazarajat as a relatively safe but underdeveloped region with a notable lack of infrastructure (ibid.). Ahmed Rashid, an expert on Afghanistan, commented on the continued feeling that the Hazara were being ignored, saying that the international community’s lack of investment in Hazarajat, despite major projects being implemented in other parts of the country, was “really pissing off the Hazaras enormously” (ibid.) There were some projects being implemented in Hazarajat and some projects being planned, but there was a noticeable lack of serious investment in the region, especially considering its stable security situation (ibid.).

Despite President Karzai promising to build roads and bring electricity to Hazarajat, there was still a lack of significant improvement in the region. This lack of investment was not just limited to Hazarajat: Hazara-populated areas of Kabul were also being ignored (ibid.). In August 2004, Bamiyan was profiled as having several unique factors in its favor: its security situation, which meant that there was no violence to deter foreign aid projects, and the eagerness of its people, who supported the central government, to rebuild their lives. Despite these unique factors, however, there was still no significant funding flowing in. The deputy governor of Bamiyan, Abdulkhalegh Zaligh, said: “Anything that people need to live, the people of Bamiyan do not have. We don’t have roads. We don’t have schools. We don’t have electricity. We don’t have doctors. We don’t have engineers” (ibid.).

A provincial profile of Bamiyan drawn up in 2006 reads very much the same as its district profiles from 2002. Bamiyan was described as one of the poorest and agriculturally least productive provinces in Afghanistan, with extensive food insecurity, lack of decent school facilities, and no electricity (Bamiyan 2006). Some communities in Bamiyan had experienced improvements from short-term relief programs but there remained a lack of major investment and well-planned projects. Schools were in the process of being rehabilitated with the help of foreign aid money and the Aga Khan Development Network was offering literacy and

numeracy classes in three districts, but this was not meeting demand and would need increased government and donor support if it were to do so (ibid.). Unqualified teachers remained a problem, with most teachers having only eight years of education. The population of Bamiyan were frustrated at the lack of attention they were receiving. Roads remained in poor condition and lack of potable water remained an issue, with the instance of waterborne diseases being high, and lack of decent health coverage meaning maternal and infant mortality rates were also high (ibid.).

Ghazni as of 2006 had experienced some improvement but was experiencing a deteriorating security situation due to the reemergence of the Taliban. Roads also remained unpaved but DACAAR and SCA had installed wells in the province and there were clinics with basic medical facilities present in almost every district (but further detail was not given as to their number or accessibility) (Ghazni 2006). In comparison to other provinces, there were few NGOs operating in Ghazni, with many having recently scaled back operations due to the worsening security situation (ibid.). The role of donors in the province was limited. The provincial profile of Wardak in 2006 echoed UNAMA's earlier comment about Hazarajat's lack of infrastructure making it difficult to access the region, as poor infrastructure, combined with security issues, were deemed to be the main issues hindering development in the province (ibid.).

Decades-old tensions between Kuchis and Hazaras flared in 2007, with more than 4,000 Hazaras being displaced from the region due to fighting between the two groups. 65 Hazara villages were left empty and around a dozen people killed (The Economist 2007). These were no running street battles but involved the use of rocket-propelled grenades on the part of the Kuchi, who had strategically placed themselves in the mountains. Despite the fierceness of this fighting, there were no extra police reinforcements sent to the district and the Turkish Army PRT, which had jurisdiction over Wardak, did not send any forces to Behsood to diffuse tensions (ibid.). A delegation of government officials flew in by helicopter five times in an attempt to mediate, but both the Hazara and the Kuchi dismissed them as useless (ibid.).

Promises by the Karzai government and the international community to pave the roads from Bamiyan to Kabul and Bamiyan to Yakawlang remained unfulfilled, with the roads being described as "glorified mule tracks" (ibid.) Women continued to die during childbirth in winter due to poor health coverage. In Kabul, where some 40% of the population was estimated to be Hazara, the Hazara-populated neighborhoods of Dasht-e Barchi, Kart-e She, and Chindawul in West Kabul lacked electricity and potable water (Zabriskie 2008). These areas were inhabited by a Hazara underclass and labeled ghettos by a fellow at the London School of Economics (ibid.). Sayed Askar Mousavi also stated that the continued discrimination against Hazaras underscored how little had actually changed. In Bamiyan, he said, there were two changes: "there were two Buddhas, and now there are none" (ibid.).

By this time seven years had passed since the fall of the Taliban. The Hazara felt that they had been forgotten: "Across Hazarajat, the question echoes: why has there not been more development and interest in an area that is safe, where the population supports the government,

where corruption is not widespread, where women play a role in public life, where poppies are not proliferating?” (ibid.). The Hazara were quite aware of what factors were being prioritized when it came to the provision of aid, with some Hazaras suggesting that they should begin growing poppy or cause violence in order to attract the government’s attention (ibid.). This article argued that Hazarajat could serve as a model to the rest of Afghanistan of the possibilities available when one buys into the nation-building process – something which the government and international donors did not seem to realize (ibid.).

In 2009, the Hazara were still being described as “the most deprived people in the whole country” (Trofimov 2009). Despite the Hazara being particularly eager to enter higher education and improve their socioeconomic standing, little was being done to help them achieve this. The Hazara were instead trying to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, as it were, by taking advantage of the newfound opportunities presented to them in the sectors of education and work. Record numbers of Hazaras were passing university entrance exams from impoverished districts in Hazarajat and entering higher education with higher levels of girls in education than other ethnic groups (Oppel and Wafa 2010). Social discrimination, however, was still commonplace against the Hazara on class, religious, and racial lines. In Dasht-e Barchi, the average wage of a Hazara worker was 13 afghanis per day while minimum wage was more than four times higher than this at 63 afghanis per day (Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland 2010). The threat of a resurgent Taliban was also looming ever closer in the background, with eleven Hazara civilians being decapitated by the Taliban in Orozgan province in a seemingly random act of ethnic hatred (Rubin 2010).

The Australian government seemed to be of the view that the situation for Hazaras had improved considerably by this time, however, and suspended processing asylum claims lodged by Afghans for half a year. A critic of this action published a sharp rebuttal detailing the deteriorating security situation in Ghazni, Orozgan, and Wardak provinces and how this was affecting the Hazara populations there along with their continued social discrimination. According to analysts, southern Ghazni was now one of the most volatile provinces in southern Afghanistan with the Taliban having closed down the Jaghori – Kabul road (Phillips 2010). According to sources, approximately 60,000 Hazara were displaced due to Kuchi-Hazara fighting during 2008 while May 2010 saw 1,800 families displaced due to fighting during the Kuchi’s annual migratory period, with 68 homes having being burnt down and 28 schools closed which affected 10,000 students (ibid.). The Afghanistan Analysts Network voiced suspicions of Taliban involvement in the incitement of Kuchi attacks against Hazaras (ibid.). Despite the amount of people being affected by this fighting, there were still no serious steps being taken by the government to resolve the conflict. Kuchi-Hazara tensions were not limited to Hazarajat either, but also manifested themselves in Kabul in August 2010 when unconfirmed reports emerged of 18 Hazara protestors being killed as a result of police and Kuchi aggression (ibid.).

## 6.2 Lack of Investment: Why?

Now that we have a sound understanding of the historic marginalization of the Hazara and the continuous pattern of neglect towards them, we can turn to the first question of this thesis: why is there a lack of investment in the Hazara? With the theoretical foundations of this thesis informing our understanding of the importance of investing in the community security of marginalized groups, this analysis will give some empirical weight to our argument. Having established that there has been a continuous lack of investment in the Hazara, we now turn to the reasons why they have been overlooked. Reviewing the available literature on the Hazara and development in Afghanistan, four recurring factors arise which provide an explanation for the failure of the Karzai government and international donors to direct aid towards the Hazara. These are namely: the inaccessibility of Hazarajat, continued discrimination against the Hazara, the militarization of aid, and the top-down donor-driven nature of aid in Afghanistan and its disorganization. These factors are discussed below.

### 6.2.1 The Inaccessibility of Hazarajat

The inaccessibility of Hazarajat was mentioned more than once by sources as being a factor in the lack of investment in the region. This is the rather paradoxical concept that Hazarajat is too underdeveloped to develop. As has been mentioned, the historical marginalization of this region coupled with its rough terrain and harsh climate and the effects of decades of war means that the region lacks significant infrastructure and is largely inaccessible during winter. To an extent, this is an understandable excuse for the lack of development in the region and yet deeper reflection renders this excuse rather incomprehensible. By extending the logic of a lack of infrastructure and a harsh climate making it difficult to access the region to implement aid projects, one reaches the conclusion that aid money is being diverted from Hazarajat because developing more developed regions is logistically easier than developing less developed regions. And yet Hazarajat is one of the, if not the, most deprived areas in Afghanistan which should logically result in more money being invested in the region in order to improve the human security of those living there – after all, what is the point of the concept of development if not to develop underdeveloped areas?

This is not to say that such an excuse does not have limited validity and should be completely discredited, but one has to place it within the context of time. Ten years have passed since NATO forces invaded Afghanistan and NGOs, small though their number may be, have been present in Hazarajat for at least nine years. It cannot be expected that the region should be already somewhat developed in order for it to be more accessible for development projects. Because of its extreme underdevelopment, Hazarajat should be prioritized above other regions due to the extreme human insecurity of its residents. Harsh weather conditions do exist in Hazarajat which can constrain the activities of NGOs in winter but this just makes the Hazara

even more vulnerable and serves as a further justification why aid money should be directed towards Hazarajat and attention be paid to the fact that the Hazara are a historically marginalized ethnic group worse off than other ethnic groups.

## 6.2.2 Continued Discrimination

Another important factor which has limited the amount of aid money being invested in the Hazara is the discrimination they continue to face. This is not to say that the social standing of the Hazara has not improved somewhat nor that they have not been presented with significant new opportunities. After all, Hazaras are achieving astonishing results in education and are showing a determination to improve their lot. Hazaras have also been, as previously mentioned, appointed to government positions and many of the Afghans employed by international NGOs or by the American military as translators are Hazara. Professor William Maley warns against tokenism, however, arguing that while there have been symbolic achievements for the Hazara such as their inclusion in the Karzai government, there has not actually been much real change in the situation of the Hazara (Phillips 2010). This is a factor which is not applicable to a lack of investment in the Hazara on all sides, however, as it cannot be said that international donors and NGOs are purposely discriminating against the Hazara. It can be argued, however, that Afghan aid distribution and NGOs are, whether consciously or not, discriminating against the Hazara. A number of articles chronicle the “rise” of the Hazara and their increasing importance in Afghanistan but any achievements or advancements made by individual Hazaras or Hazaras as a group needs to be placed within the context of their historic marginalization: given the traditional position they have occupied in Afghan society, any achievements made by any Hazara seem exceptional.

In order to render the previous point more succinct, the same can be said of women in Afghanistan: after the fall of the Taliban, women are now able to excel as never before. There are female parliamentarians, women on Afghan television shows, and women entering higher education. Instead of being forced to wear the most restrictive of Islamic garments, the burqa, women are free to expose their faces and wear Western clothing if they so desire. Legally, women do not have the exact same rights as men, as a law passed in 2009 legalizes marital rape amongst Shia Muslim women, but this argument can be reversed in that while the Hazara are legally recognized as equal to other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and are granted the same rights, legal recognition does not translate into actual recognition in practice – especially in such an unstable country as Afghanistan. The point of this comparison between the Hazara and women is that despite significant achievements, Afghanistan is still one of the worst countries in the world to be a woman. No one is writing about the rise of women in Afghanistan because of entrenched social restrictions on women that dictate how they are supposed to act and what they are supposed to wear and yet people are writing about the rise of the Hazara despite continued entrenched discrimination against them.

One merely needs to look at the reactions to the advancement of the Hazara to realize that discrimination continues to be a significant problem facing them. On the whole, Hazaras

may not face overt persecution or discrimination but covert discrimination still continues, entrenched as it has been in Afghan society for centuries. Aid has been directed towards more powerful ethnic groups and while this can be connected to the militarization of aid, the centuries-old sociopolitical culture of marginalization of the Hazara also plays a part. As early as 2005, Najib Fahim, ethnic Tajik and deputy minister of veteran's affairs, stated that "We Sunnis are a dispersed majority; they are an organized minority. Most of the directors of new aid agencies are Shias. Most of the top students at Kabul University are Shias" (Baldauf 2005). Yet if all the directors of new aid agencies were Sunni and all the top students at Kabul University were also Sunni, no one would make any mention of it – apart from possibly the Hazara. That is to say, if Shias were underrepresented in top jobs and at the university level, one can infer that very little fuss would be made given the relative invisibility of the Hazara and their needs.

In 2007, Mohammad Mohaqeq stated that it would take at least another ten years to destroy anti-Hazara sentiment but the situation today suggests that this is still not any closer to being achieved (The Economist 2007a). Hazara successes have been breeding Hazara resentment, as Hazara migration to Afghanistan's cities after the 2001 invasion has stirred up local resentment, particularly in Herat (ibid.). Given their strong opposition to the Taliban due to the brutal treatment they received at their hands and their high profile as translators for NATO forces, the Hazara are now viewed by some as spies and informants, adding another stereotype to their traditional stereotype as slaving donkeys (Phillips 2010; Rubin 2010). Also, given the large number of Hazara returnees from Iran, a majority Shia nation, there are also suspicions that the Hazara are more loyal to Iran than Afghanistan.

The reactions to the results of the 2010 parliamentary elections, in which the Hazara gained a disproportionate number of seats, serve as a further illustration of their continued discrimination. Due to a number of factors, including dissatisfaction with the lack of attention directed towards them, the volatile security situation in Pashtun-dominated districts, and eagerness to take advantage of relatively newfound voting rights, the Hazara turned out in large numbers on voting day (Peter and Arnoldy 2010; The Economist 2011; Surkhe 2011). The entirety of Ghazni province went to the Hazara, despite the Hazara being a minority in the province. In Wardak, Hazaras won a disproportionate three out of five seats, again despite being a minority (Peter and Arnoldy 2010). In response to these Hazara gains, President Karzai established a special tribunal to investigate election fraud and carry out a recount of the vote (The Economist 2011). The only people monitoring this widely-condemned recount were members of parliament (MPs) who had lost their seats in the election (ibid.). The tribunal concluded that one-fourth of MPs should be stripped of their seats due to election fraud (ibid.). The Independent Election Commission, however, who had denounced the special tribunal as unconstitutional, disqualified nine MPs and restored nine MPs who had previously been disqualified. At first glance, Karzai's reaction to the election results may seem understandable and yet if one reverses the situation and imagines that the Pashtuns won a disproportionately

large amount of seats and the Hazara a disproportionately small number of seats, one can easily extrapolate that no recount would have been commissioned.

A disgruntled former Pashtun MP from Ghazni complained that the Hazara were gaining too much power, as international organizations were all hiring Hazaras for lucrative positions and influential human rights groups were overwhelmingly Hazara (Peter and Arnoldy 2010). In the face of Hazaras excelling in education, Pashtun leaders have voiced worries about how Pashtun students are faring and whether the rise of the Hazara will mean the rise of Iranian influence (Oppel and Wafa 2010). The apathetic response of the government to clashes between Hazaras and Kuchis reinforces the argument that the Hazara are still being discriminated against and their needs ignored. One article mentions ethnic Kuchi Haji Naim Kuchi commenting on Hazara-Kuchi clashes and complaining that the Hazara had recently bought a lot of sheep and goats, which meant that lands that the Kuchi had grazing rights to were being grazed by Hazara animals (The Economist 2007). (It is interesting to note that Haji Naim Kuchi is a former Taliban commander). One article claims that in provinces where there is demand for schools, funds are not being allocated to them because they are not Pashtuns (Idihaw 2011).

### 6.2.3 The Militarization of Aid

The militarization of aid is an established phenomenon in Afghanistan, where human security and peacebuilding have been conflated with national and in turn, international, security. The US's commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley A. McChrystal, declared the delivery of "a government in a box" to be a top priority in securing the district of Marja in the volatile province of Helmand (Nordland 2010). This involves the rapid delivery of governmental services which include education, healthcare, and job programs: a kind of band-aid to temporarily heal any grievances in the area. The problems inherent in this have been discussed in the theoretical foundations of this thesis with the added dimension that as the Hazara live in the safest areas of Afghanistan (Hazarajat, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, and Kabul), they end up being unintentionally sidelined. In and of itself, conflating human security with traditional security is problematic as it leads to inefficient development programs which may temporarily eliminate some human security threats but are not sustainable in the long-term, and the waste of aid money, but adding the ethnic dimension of national security threats mostly existing in Pashtun or Tajik-dominated areas makes it even more problematic. The Hazara, who present a great opportunity for the advancement of Western democratic values, are being ignored because aid is being poured into instable areas which are mostly populated by Pashtuns or Tajiks (Idihaw 2011; Phillips 2010).

Pouring aid into these areas is not necessarily bringing sustainable peace or eliminating human security threats either. The Karzai government has directed enormous fiscal allocations to the central and eastern provinces, allowing for schools and hospitals to be built and sidelining provinces desperately in need of schools and hospitals such as Daikundi and Bamiyan, with the end result being that these newly built institutions are burnt down or destroyed by militants

(Idihaw 2011). Associating aid with the military thus makes aid a target for insurgents. Twinning human security and national security also leads to the creation of things such as the PRTs, which are responsible for security and assisting with development: two tasks that do not really go hand-in-hand. When the US Congress reviewed the PRTs, they found them to suffer from a lack of planning which led them to pursue short-term feel-good projects which did not lead to actual development (US Congress 2011). There was no PRT present in the secure province of Daikundi, for example, which remains one of the poorest provinces in Afghanistan and boasts not a single paved road. Also, using aid as a nonlethal weapon, as the US military does, has the end goal not of eradicating human insecurity but of winning the hearts and minds of local people away from the Taliban (Oxfam 2010).

#### 6.2.4 Top-Down, Donor-Driven Aid

The fourth reason for why the human security of the Hazara has largely been ignored is the lack of understanding of the situation on the ground. A theoretical tendency to deemphasize the importance of community insecurity and a Western tendency to understand a society as being composed of individuals and not groups can be argued to have contributed to the marginalization of the Hazara in the provision of aid. If there were a genuine understanding of the human security situation in Afghanistan as expressed by Afghans themselves, the distribution of aid money would be different. Hazara neighborhoods in Kabul and Hazarajat are in desperate need of investment but their plight is continually ignored. When it comes to the provision of aid by the Afghan government, this can be explained by traditional Afghan sociopolitical attitudes towards the Hazara but when it comes to international aid, this may seem slightly more difficult to explain. Lacking an understanding of the complexity of Afghan society must certainly be factors, as the Hazara are virtually invisible to the outside world: little is known or written about them outside of Afghanistan.

This is a larger criticism of international aid in Afghanistan, that it lacks an understanding of the situation on the ground. One cannot use this alone as an argument, however, as international aid is being invested in some marginalized / vulnerable groups and simply saying that there is a lack of understanding of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan does not explain this. The marginalized / vulnerable groups mentioned are namely women and children, particularly the former. Women and children do understandably constitute a much larger percentage of the population than the Hazara, but the Hazara are equally as marginalized as them. The problem still lies in the top-down nature of aid in Afghanistan and a lack of true understanding of the sociopolitical / socio-cultural elements at work in Afghan society, however. Women and children are, after all, groups that are universally recognized as the most vulnerable both during conflict and post-conflict. The plight of women under the Taliban was also well-known around the world while the plight of the suppressed Asian-looking minority generated very little press. Marginalized groups are therefore not being overlooked in Afghanistan but marginalized groups *specific* to Afghanistan are being overlooked: women and

children are rather universal starting points for addressing problems of human insecurity as they are more vulnerable to its effects than others. One source argues that while there are other marginalized groups in Afghanistan such as the Hazara, these groups have been able to fight back and “now factor in state security computations” while women remain more vulnerable (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam 2003: 1). This thesis does not dispute the fact that women may be more vulnerable than the Hazara but it does dispute the fact that the degree of marginalization of groups should be compared in this manner: all marginalized groups should be focused on as entrenched negative attitudes toward the Hazara will take years if not decades to eradicate, just as entrenched negative attitudes toward women will take an equally long amount of time to eradicate. In addition, being factored into state security computations does not mean a large number of Hazara continue to face extreme levels of human insecurity.

Women and children in Afghanistan are also not merely women and children. That is to say, a woman or a child in Afghanistan is not merely just a woman or just a child but is a Pashtun woman or a Tajik child. The importance of this is to further illustrate the lack of understanding of historical and modern constructions of socio-cultural identity in Afghanistan as Hazara women are the most liberal of women in Afghanistan. This is not necessarily to say that Hazara women have the most liberal attitudes but that their community has the most liberal attitude toward women and Hazara women are thus more socio-culturally free than women from other ethnic groups. Given the international community’s eagerness to invest in women, their oversight of the differences of women across ethnic groups is a significant one. Also, recognizing that children as well are divided between ethnic groups would lead to the realization that the overwhelming majority of unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors making their way to Europe are Hazara, something that will be explained more in depth later on.

International aid in Afghanistan also suffers from a lack of organization which is impeding its effectiveness and preventing it from reaching those who need it the most. The few NGOs present in Bamiyan suffered from poor coordination, for example. One article framed the problem of the failure of foreign aid in Afghanistan as follows:

This is the chaos that is foreign aid in Afghanistan, a place where every mistake ever made in every underdeveloped economy is now being repeated. This is a country in which all the best people are being hired away from the national government by the alphabet soup of aid agencies on the ground; in which the same alphabet soup of aid agencies is driving up real-estate and food prices; in which millions of dollars are squandered on dubious contractors, both local and foreign; in which the minister for rural development says he doesn’t know what all the NATO reconstruction teams in rural districts do; in which the top U.N. official, given a mandate to coordinate the donors, says the donors don’t respond to his attempts to coordinate them. Conflicting agendas, overlapping projects, money badly spent. (Applebaum 2008)

The problems with external, donor-driven aid are apparent: in lacking an understanding of the true nature of the situation on the ground and trying to rectify human insecurity from the top-down, donors also lack a coherent strategy. Following the handover of Bamiyan to Afghan control in July, worries were expressed over the durability of the little development the province has seen with one local stating that all the businesses in the bazaar of Bamiyan city were only there because of the help of international NGOs (BBC News 2011). Once these NGOs leave the province, the future of these businesses may be tenuous.

### 6.3 Lack of Investment: Effects

Having understood the main reasons why there is a lack of investment in improving the human security of the Hazara, it is important to understand the effects of this lack of investment in order to emphasize its significance. The continued human insecurity of the Hazara has had effects not only nationally within Afghanistan but also internationally. Immediately following the ousting of the Taliban from the region in 2001, hopeful Hazaras returned from Iran, a country which strongly discourages the presence of Afghan refugees, and Pakistan to assess the situation in their home villages. Upon seeing the lack of improvement and nonexistence of job opportunities, the majority expressed their desire to return either Iran or Pakistan where they had opportunities of a better life than in Hazarajat (source: UNHCR District Profiles 2002-2003). Hazaras have traditionally constituted the majority of the Afghan refugees in Iran, but their representation in the ethnic breakdown of Afghan refugees in Iran rose by six percent between 2004 – 2005, as the Hazara were the most reluctant to repatriate (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007). This was due in part to a fear of continued fighting and ethnic tensions but also because of a lack of job opportunities and educational and medical facilities (ibid.). Those that returned and decided to stay in Afghanistan were deterred from staying in Hazarajat for the same reasons and chose instead to settle in bigger, more developed cities which offered significantly more opportunities, such as Kabul (sources: UNHCR District Profiles 2002-2003; Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland 2010; Oppel and Wafa 2010). This is creating an urban problem which is evident in Kabul where the Hazara mostly reside in extremely poor neighborhoods which lack basic facilities (Oppel and Wafa 2010). Additionally, those who never left Hazarajat during the years of conflict are also migrating to the capital in search of better education and work opportunities (ibid.; Zabriskie 2008).

Hazaras have been residing in Kabul for longer than just post-2001 of course, but the perceived defeat of the Taliban in 2001 witnessed a huge influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan, many of whom are well-educated. Upon returning, however, many Hazaras have been asked to take on menial jobs, which has the possibility of breeding resentment (Refugee Review Tribunal 2005). There is also evidence that Hazara identity may be solidifying as a result of the lack of investment in them and discrimination faced in big cities such as Kabul. There has been a rise in the political consciousness of the Hazara in the past twenty-five years, the scale and intensity of which have been unparalleled among ethnic / sectarian groups in Afghanistan (Hanafi 2004). The Hazara are currently engaged in a “multifaceted struggle... to coordinate their historical consciousness with the newly realized political opportunities in the context of dramatically changed local and regional conditions and the uncertainty of what Afghanistan might become” (Hanafi 2004). Indeed, as previously mentioned, despite the Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat emphasizing religion, it was in essence a Hazara movement with strong nationalist sentiments.<sup>15</sup> There is no suggestion that this solidification of identity may result in ethnic conflict but it does represent a significant missed opportunity to promote a unified Afghan identity and deemphasize ethnic differences. Hazaras have been mobilizing to protest around the world against Kuchi violence and target killings of Hazaras in Quetta. While the current

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<sup>15</sup> Hezb-e Wahdat is largely regarded as no longer being a functional party today due to fragmentation.

situation of the Hazara in Quetta may not be particularly relevant here, the fact that the human security, notably being free from fear, of the Hazara in Quetta is worsening further lends credence to the argument that Hazara identity is solidifying.

There are also significant missed opportunities to propel the modernization of Afghanistan through the eagerness of the Hazara to advance themselves through education. The West's ultimate desire would be for Afghanistan to become an open, democratic society and the Hazara are by all accounts extremely keen to embrace this. The long-term aim of Afghanistan should be to promote the education of its people and the Hazara present the country with a prime opportunity to do this. The more liberal attitude of the Hazara towards women also presents an opportunity to use them as a model for other women who face more conservative social attitudes. This, while it can be said to be an effect of the lack of investment in the Hazara, is not such a tangible effect as it represents something not having been achieved and perhaps may not make such a strong case for investing in the Hazara and understanding human security in Afghanistan from the reference point of community security. This is why we turn our attention to the next effect, which is one of the most compelling in favor of investing in the human security of the Hazara.

As has been mentioned, the concept of human security detaches security issues from national borders and human security issues therefore do not respect these borders but can override them and have global consequences. This has certainly been happening with the Hazara, as the lack of efforts to try to improve their fundamental human insecurity has severely affected a number of other countries. Many Hazaras that reside in Iran and Pakistan, which host the largest number of Afghan refugees in the world, are reluctant to return to Afghanistan given the lack of opportunities available for them coupled with the unstable security situation (Abdelkhalik and Olszewska 2007). Hazaras have been residing in Iran and Pakistan for decades and have become a permanent aspect of the social landscapes there, but Iran in particular would rather there were no Afghan refugees in Iran (*ibid.*). Rather than returning to Afghanistan, however, many Hazaras are staying in these countries and new streams of Hazaras are still coming to both in the face of continued human insecurity in their home districts.

Hazaras also form the overwhelming majority of unaccompanied asylum seeking minors making their way to Europe. In previous years, many of these unaccompanied asylum seeking minors were from Iraq or Somalia but more recent years have seen an increase in the percentage of Afghans and more specifically, Hazaras. Evidence suggests that they are not just migrating to Europe because of violent threats (as in threats from the Taliban which are not specific to the Hazara nowadays) but also because of non-violent human security threats, such as economic insecurity (UNHCR 2010). Hazaras also make up a significant percentage of "boat people" arriving in Australia, which has a stormy relationship with asylum seekers (Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland 2011; Butterfly 2011; Phillips 2010). The implications of this are profound: each country that receives a Hazara asylum seeker has to deal with said asylum seeker by providing them with housing, money, and food (though the levels of care they receive vary widely). For each asylum seeking minor in Sweden, the state has to provide a predetermined amount of money along with a suitable place to live. Once a minor is granted permanent residency, they need to be housed in permanent housing with other minors and all are granted a larger amount of money than when their asylum applications were processing.

Repatriation of failed Hazara asylum seekers also takes time and money. The point of this is not to describe Hazara refugees as a burden on the countries in which they live but to point out the significant international effects that a lack of investment in the human security of the Hazara has had.

## 7 Conclusion

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This thesis was designed to answer two research questions concerning the current and puzzling issue of the lack of investment in the human security of the Hazara minority of Afghanistan and the effects that this lack of investment has had. In order to answer these two questions, it was necessary to define the concept of human security which in turn made it necessary to examine the various debates on the concept. Having done this and found a firm theoretical footing in which to ground this thesis which involved a definition of human security applicable to the case of Afghanistan and the Hazara and more widely, to the case of non-Western post-conflict societies, this thesis then proceeded to provide a background of the Hazara in order to orient the reader with their marginalization and stress the importance of perceiving the Hazara as a marginalized ethnic group. Then, the analysis was presented. This thesis found that there were four identifiable factors which have led to the lack of investment in the Hazara: the inaccessibility of Hazarajat, continued discrimination against the Hazara, the militarization of aid, and the top-down, donor-driven nature of aid in Afghanistan.

The effects of this lack of investment were then analyzed with the intent of emphasizing the effects of overlooking the importance of marginalized groups. The lack of investment in the Hazara has had a number of significant effects, including creating an urban problem in Afghanistan as more and more Hazaras move to big cities in search of opportunities, missed opportunities to promote a unified Afghan identity and to promote a model for the rest of Afghanistan of the possibilities available through embracing democracy and education, a possible solidification of Hazara identity, and one of the most important effects of all – continued migration of Hazaras to other countries along with a reluctance of Hazara refugees living in Iran and Pakistan to return to Afghanistan. This thesis therefore emphasizes the theoretical significance of community security in non-Western post-conflict societies. Overlooking the significance of the Hazara ethnic group in Afghanistan due to faulty ideas about national and human security has had serious international effects. Dissociating human security from national security is of the utmost importance when it comes to peacebuilding and understanding non-Western societies as being composed of different groups and not just of individuals is particularly important when implementing bottom-up human security focused peacebuilding. This thesis cannot claim to speak for other non-Western countries, focused as it is upon just one ethnic group in one country, but the theoretical conclusions of this thesis offer opportunities for further research centered on human security and peacebuilding in other non-Western countries.

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