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**THE OTHER SIDE OF FREEDOM:
CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY IN CHINESE ORTHODOX PHILOSOPHY
FROM 1980 TO 2002**

Author: Urmas Pappel
Supervisor: Barbara Schulte

ABSTRACT

Chinese orthodox philosophy is often described as communitarian and characterised by the concept of positive freedom, which, defined by Isaiah Berlin's two concepts of liberty, deems it necessary to curb individual freedom for the good of a community. Still, some orthodox Chinese writers also use aspects of negative freedom, insisting on a sphere of individual freedom that no authority can curb, and thereby seem to defy the categorisation as wholly communitarian. Edmund S. K. Fung theorises that Chinese intellectuals are best not described along the lines of Berlin's theory, but can be shown to use both negative and positive freedom simultaneously without giving precedence to either. By analysing articles from the journal *Social Sciences in China* this thesis gives an overview of the temporal changes in the Chinese orthodox perception of freedom from 1980 to 2002; and, by demonstrating that every treatise on freedom gives ineluctable precedence to only one of the two concepts of liberty, shows that Berlin's theory is apt to describe the orthodox Chinese intellectual discourse on freedom.

Keywords: China, orthodoxy, intellectuals, freedom, negative liberty and positive liberty.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

PRC – People's Republic of China

SSC – Social Sciences in China

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since Max Weber described Chinese culture in communal terms, it has become a stereotypical undertone to much of Western sinology. Rooted in early agricultural practices, upheld by Confucianism, and reflected in present-day psychology, communal ways of conduct seem to penetrate every aspect of Chinese society. If one is embedded in a community – be it the family, state, nation, or religion – then one is essentially defined by it and must inevitably succumb to its will. Western writings on the subject show a continuous tendency to describe the orthodox Chinese concept of freedom¹ as a servitude to some social whole dictated by communal values.² Consequently, it is believed, Chinese do not know “true” liberty. (It is not my intention to describe the philosophical strife between the Chinese concept of freedom and its critics as an East-West dichotomy, but merely to indicate that such a disparity epitomises the mainstream Chinese and Western political and public stereotypes. One does well to keep in mind that proponents for either concepts of freedom are found on both sides of the aisle.)

The discord over the nature of freedom has sparked popular discontent and led to political quarrels with immediate social and economic consequences. This is reason enough to take another look at Chinese understanding of freedom. However, the same theoretical disposition that underlies the stereotype as previously described is also the foundation for an almost deterministic postulation that predicts economic liberalisation will eventually lead to the crumbling of the Chinese orthodox rendering of freedom and consequently bring about all-out democratisation. In other words, the concept of freedom not only explains the present, but is used to predict the future. I deem it therefore important to address one of the main aspects of the philosophical discord between China and the West, the nature of freedom, and to determine if such stereotypical perceptions and bold predictions are or can be true.

¹ The terms “liberty” and “freedom” are taken to mean the same thing and are used interchangeably.

² Fung, Edmund S. K. The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited: Plural Conceptions and Dual Responsibility. *Modern China*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006, pp. 453-454.

1.1. THEORIES OF FREEDOM

In his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford, 1958, Isaiah Berlin laid out a theory of two concepts of liberty.³ The two concepts are “negative freedom” and “positive freedom”,⁴ which, although being only two of many different meanings of that word, are most central in human history. According to Berlin, the concept of negative freedom rests on the foundation that there exists a sphere of private life where every human being has a right to believe, say, and do according to his or her free will without any interference from fellow human beings, provided that this does not infringe on the equal rights of others. Should this privacy be intruded in order to nurture culture, social values, economic equality, or any other value higher than liberty, individual freedom would inevitably be limited. Thus, the concept of negative freedom can always be described as freedom *from* intervention by some sort of authority. Most importantly, this minimum amount of liberty is considered to be a “natural” part of human existence that cannot be given up freely or curtailed by force without losing or degrading human nature.⁵ Such is the “classical” concept of liberty as it has been advocated by Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Bentham, J. S. Mill and various declarations of rights of man in the United States and Europe, and is, Berlin maintains, “as it has been conceived by liberals in the modern world from the days of Erasmus (some would say Occam) to our own”.⁶

Doctrines of positive freedom, such as those of Rousseauist and Marxist decent,⁷ propagate collective self-government and see no difficulty in restricting individual freedom for the greater good. Positive freedom relies on the precept that there exists a “higher” and rational human nature, which is enslaved by its “lower” and irrational counterpart. Further, the “higher” or the “real” self is seen as innately belonging to a greater social “whole” (e.g. race, church, nation,

³ The essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” was first introduced to Chinese readers by Gan Yang in 1989. Zhou Lian. The Most Fashionable and the Most Relevant: A Review of Contemporary Chinese Political Philosophy. *Diogenes*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2009, p. 135.

⁴ According to Fung, Chinese intellectuals are aware and often use Berlin's two concepts of liberty in analysing Chinese perceptions of freedom. Fung, Edmund S. K. Where Chinese Liberals Liberal? Reflections on the Understanding of Liberalism in Modern China. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, 2008, p. 568.

⁵ Berlin, Isaiah. Two Concepts of Liberty – Ed. by Hardy, Henry. *Isaiah Berlin: Liberty*. Oxford, New York, etc., Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 169-178.

⁶ Berlin, Isaiah. 2008, p. 175.

⁷ Taylor, Charles. What's Wrong with Negative Liberty? – Ed. by Goodin, Robert E.; Pettit, Philip. *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*. Oxford, Malden (MA), Blackwell Publishers, 2002, p. 418. It is proper to add here that at least to some Chinese intellectuals Marxist philosophy forms a third branch of philosophy parallel to both Western and Chinese philosophy. Ke Jinhua. Introduction. Special Issue: Dialogue, Interaction and New Developments in Philosophy in Contemporary China. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2009, p. 108.

cosmology) that can set the self free by imposing its will upon it. As a result, an individual should identify him or herself with a principle embodied by the “whole” – a value superior than the individual itself – and consequently realises his or her “higher” freedom by effectively lending his or her identity to its servitude. Thus, positive freedom is always a freedom to “lead one prescribed form of life”, whilst restricting personal liberty for the sake of that life is not only justified but also necessary. After all, as the argument goes, if an irrational individual would be rational, he or she would succumb voluntarily.⁸ Still, as Charles Taylor aptly shows, the concept of positive freedom also implies an “exercise-concept”, postulating that a person is free once he or she has effectively come to control him or herself.⁹ Thus, positive freedom is not all about coercion but ideally a philosophy of conscious self-control. According to Berlin, “[t]his monstrous impersonation [...] is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization”.¹⁰ The Chinese orthodox philosophy and its understanding of freedom would most likely receive a similar condemnation from Berlin.

Akin to the concept of positive freedom is Berlin’s “positive doctrine of liberation by reason”. It follows a rationale that laws of nature, being innate, cannot enslave a human being. These rules may seem to obstruct freedom, but cease to do so as soon as they are understood and freely accepted as part of our rational nature. For example, if one does not grasp the true laws of, say, physics, it may seem repressive that one cannot jump to the moon at will. But, if well understood, physics no longer appears restrictive to freedom. To wish that laws of nature would not be what they are is to be irrational or insane. From that follows a definition of liberty as a rational and voluntary choice to incorporate all inevitable laws of nature into the individual substance, which, therefore, cannot curb freedom. The same logic also applies to social rules. Marx believed that misconceived institutions (such as the natural partition of society into rich and poor) obstruct humans from understanding true socio-economic rules and thus keep them from achieving liberty. Once the “true” social laws are revealed, the false social constructions manifest themselves as mere self-imposed illusions that can be eliminated.¹¹

However, Edmund S. K. Fung deems Berlin’s dual theory on liberty erroneous. Relying on the work of Gerald C. MacCallum Jr.,¹² Fung argues that many modern Chinese authors can be

⁸ Berlin, Isaiah. 2008, pp. 178-181, 183-184.

⁹ Taylor, Charles. 2002, p. 419.

¹⁰ Berlin, Isaiah. 2008, p. 180.

¹¹ Berlin, Isaiah. 2008, pp. 187-191.

¹² For MacCallum’s linguistic analysis of freedom, see: Appendix 1.

shown to defend negative and positive freedom simultaneously – as if sitting on two chairs at the same time. For example, whenever Liang Qichao (1873–1929) – a prominent Chinese political thinker and journalist of the late Qing and early Republican period – wrote about state-building, he argued for freedom *to* have an independent and well integrated political community in which it was the citizens' duty to abide to the will of the state. Yet when it came to state-individual relations, Liang appealed to freedoms *from* interference.¹³ Consequently, according to Fung's logic, it is incorrect to set Liang only among the adherers of positive freedom, as in Fung's assessment does Andrew Nathan,¹⁴ for Liang could just as well be considered a proponent of negative freedom. Does this indicate an inconsistency in Liang's understanding of liberty? Fung thinks not. Rather than trying to place every writer into one of the two camps of liberty, Fung argues, it is more useful to inquire how they adopt different renditions of liberty according to context. He writes:

“ When particular issues of freedom were discussed, Chinese thinkers would attach more importance to some conceptions than to others. Thus, in the discourse on the state building, they invoke the idea of citizenship in the service of the nation-state [but] in the discourse of human rights and democracy, they invoked the idea of rights and the absence of fear and want.”¹⁵

Accordingly, not only one approach to liberty can characterise an intellectual, but many. From that follows Fung's principle of “dual responsibilities”, which compels an intellectual to pay equal respect to both serving the society and to individual freedoms, depending on the context and public morality.¹⁶ Although Fung bases his induction on the intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th century, his reasoning is also applicable to contemporary Chinese authors. As we will see, many treatises in the journal *Social Sciences in China* representing all major socio-political theories – from neoconservatism to neoliberalism – tend to comprise both positive and negative freedom depending on necessity and the subject-matter in question.

¹³ Fung, Edmund S. K. 2006, pp. 453-458.

¹⁴ Fung, Edmund S. K. 2006, pp. 453-454. It is questionable if Nathan indeed places Liang unequivocally among the adherers of the positive concept of liberty. For Nathan's description, see: Nathan, Andrew J. *Chinese Democracy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 48-66.

¹⁵ Fung, Edmund S. K. 2006, p. 472. Fung lists seven different contexts or discourses, each of which may be subject to a different concept of freedom: state building; family revolution, feudalism, and anti-imperialism; human rights and democracy; modern transformation of Chinese culture; self and moral virtues; social reform; and noninterference, all of which invoked different concepts of liberty.

¹⁶ Fung, Edmund S. K. 2006, p. 473.

Albeit Fung's emphasis on the simultaneous usage of negative and positive liberty is admittedly apropos, his criticism on Berlin's generalisation is not. Berlin induces that absolute examples of negative and positive freedom do not exist.¹⁷ Rather, in order to be applicable in reality or included in any comprehensive socio-political theory, they must entail aspects of one another. For instance, proponents of negative freedom fully acknowledge the need for legal restraint accompanied by an inevitable degree of conformity and authority to keep the society from deteriorating into mayhem, often falling no short of idealising the prospect of rational legislation.¹⁸ Likewise, to paraphrase Mill's critique on imperial China, a society embracing a positive concept of freedom must grant some amount of individual liberty or else face stagnation.¹⁹ And indeed if Spinoza is correct in saying that "individual right is never wholly abandoned to the ruling power in a state",²⁰ then absolute positive freedom is a practical impossibility. Hence, given that Berlin admits to the plausibility of using aspects of negative and positive freedom simultaneously, the two theories under survey may seem at no great logical distance from each other. Indeed, they could even be regarded complementary, merely approaching the philosophy of liberty from different angles, if it were not for the fact that by attacking Berlin's theory Fung opens his own theory to criticism.

Berlin's chief discord with Fung, and the true genius of his theory, lies in his insight that the two concepts of liberty originate from contradictory definitions of human nature and consequently give rise to essentially different socio-political theories.²¹ Moreover, because the concepts of negative and positive freedom are based on different ontological (cosmological) premises, they are mutually exclusive. According to Taylor, the two ontologies are "atomism" and "holism". Whereas atomists define society in line with negative freedom as formed of constituent individuals with their own separate understandings of "the good",²² holists adhere to positive freedom by believing that individuals are essentially embedded in society and must therefore succumb to a communal understanding of "the good".²³ Therefore, however intertwined the aspects of negative and positive freedom in one particular treatise may be, the ontological

¹⁷ The political theory here must be distinguished from Berlin's ontological theory.

¹⁸ Berlin, Isaiah. 2008, pp. 170-174, 191-200.

¹⁹ Mill, John Stewart. *On Liberty* (4th edition). London, Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869, pp. 126-130.

²⁰ Spinoza, Benedict de. *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. London, Trübner & Co, p. 287.

²¹ Berlin, Isaiah. 2008, p. 167.

²² Taylor, Charles. *Philosophical Arguments*. Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 181.

²³ Although Taylor insists that making an ontological claim does not amount to advocating a political position as such, he admits that ontology, being implicit in every treatise on liberty, is "far from innocent" in supporting or disproving an argument. Taylor, Charles. 1995. p. 183.

backdrop of that treatise gives an inevitable precedence to only one concept of freedom and makes the whole rationale fundamentally unbalanced. For example, if a treatise propagates some aspect of negative freedom (such as individual economic rights) whilst defining the individual strictly as a communal being, the whole treatise must be considered holist and supportive of positive freedom; but if a treatise propagates some aspect of positive freedom, such as the utility of rule-of-law, and simultaneously insists on the individual's natural right for maximum amount of liberty, the whole treatise must be deemed atomist and supportive of negative freedom. Consequently, although aspects of negative and positive freedom may appear simultaneously in one treatise, one does not have to resort to Fung's theory of dual responsibilities to explain the phenomenon, but can still rely on Berlin's theory to differentiate between theories and treatises for and against one or the other concept of liberty.

The matter of placing individual philosophers or even whole schools of thought in one of the two camps is admittedly more problematic, and indeed this perception lies at the core of Fung's criticism. However, this is also where Berlin's theory obtains its universality. Considering that ontological convictions are relatively stable and reproduced without further reconsideration,²⁴ and that most intellectuals and schools of thought (like individual treatises) are ontologically coherent, the overall framework of Berlin's theory is still applicable. In fact, Berlin takes it for granted that intellectuals and schools of thought consistently sustain their ontological premises. For example, although John Locke could on some accounts be shown to advocate aspects of positive freedom (as is the case with the importance of law in his rationale), it would be wrong to claim that in so doing he abandoned his essentially atomist conviction of individual's right to maximum liberty guaranteed in the "state of nature". Instead, it would make more sense to conclude that Locke's invocation of legal measurements speaks for the fact that negative freedom must inevitably be accompanied by some aspects of positive freedom.

The aim of this thesis is to show how the interdependency of negative and positive freedom manifests itself in the writings of contemporary orthodox Chinese philosophers. Apart from describing the temporal differences in the scholarly accounts on liberty, I will foremost concentrate on the ontology underlying each treatise. If orthodox authors can be shown to rely on clearly distinguishable (and mutually exclusive) atomist or holist ontologies and thus explicitly or implicitly link their arguments to a negative or positive concept of freedom, then Berlin's theory

²⁴ On this point see: chapter 1.4.

of the two concepts of liberty holds true. Alternatively, if the orthodox intellectuals use the negative and positive concepts of freedom interchangeably without basing their arguments on either of the two ontologies, Fung's theory of dual responsibilities prevails and his critique on Berlin's theory is justified.

1.2. TERMINOLOGY

The strife between Berlin's and Fung's theories can also be described by terminological means. We must differentiate between “concepts” of liberty and “aspects” of liberty. While the negative and positive concepts of liberty in Berlin's theory entail ontological premises and are therefore mutually exclusive, aspects of negative and positive liberty (e.g. rule-of-law) do not entail ontological premises (not to be confused with philosophical premises) and are therefore not mutually exclusive. Consequently, the concept of negative liberty can entail aspects of positive liberty and *vice versa*. Fung fails to appreciate this distinction. Instead, Fung perceives every aspect of positive liberty as embodying the concept of positive liberty with all of its ontological ramifications, and in so doing equates a mere aspect of positive freedom to the whole concept of positive freedom.

“Liberalism” refers to a political and socio-economic doctrine that rests on an atomist perception of human nature and propagates the classical concept of freedom. Liberalism is occasionally also referred to as “classical liberalism”, to emphasise its aspects of negative freedom. According to Taylor, liberalism is an “acultural” (universalist) theory that promotes a liberal transformation of all cultures in the same manner regardless of their history, philosophy, environment, etc.²⁵ Hence, in principle, all traditional cultures can become liberal. Liberalism is also regarded essentially self-evident and independent of any moral ontology, for it relies on no religious-metaphysical idea for support.²⁶ Yet, as Fung infers, Chinese intellectuals have always had a somewhat idiosyncratic approach to liberalism – mixing different strands of Western and Chinese thought depending on the circumstances.²⁷ For instance, Chinese liberals skipped the

²⁵ Taylor, Charles. Inwardness and the Cultural Modernity – Ed. by Honneth, Axel; McCarthy, Thomas; Offe, Claus; Welmer, Albert. Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment. Cambridge (MA), London, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1992, p. 88. On Taylor's concept of liberty see: Yong Huang. Charles Taylor's Transcendental Arguments for Liberal Communitarianism. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*. Vol. 24, No. 4, 1998, p. 84.

²⁶ Yong Huang. 1998, pp. 86-87.

²⁷ According to de Bary, ideas akin to liberalism were present in imperial Chinese institutions like the court historian, the censorate, and the critical Confucian schools that all in one way or another stood for political independence and free thought. de Bary, Wm. Theodore. The Liberal Tradition in China. Hong Kong, New York, the Chinese

“classical phase” of liberalism with its emphasis on natural rights and turned directly to the utilitarian “revisionist phase” that served well their nationalistic ambitions.²⁸ Bearing in mind that also today's Chinese intellectuals differ in their perception of liberalism from their Western counterparts, the words “liberal” and “liberalism” in Chinese writings must be interpreted cautiously.

“Communitarianism” is the antithesis of liberalism, as it defines human nature according to the holist ontology and corresponds to the positive concept of freedom. In Taylor's account, communitarianism is a “cultural” theory that always depicts norms and values irrefutably situated in one specific culture.²⁹ Consequently, all cultures cannot become liberal in the classical sense of the word because liberalism is unique to one specific culture. In addition, communitarians are concerned about overemphasising rights, which makes human beings selfish and apt to neglect their social duties.³⁰ Although Taylor calls into question such an oppositional separation of communitarianism from liberalism, insisting that the two theoretical concepts do not exclude each other, he nevertheless admits that on the ontological level such a dichotomy is possible. It is precisely this ontological difference in the Chinese intellectual orthodoxy that I aim to demonstrate.

“Authoritarianism” describes a political rationale of propagating the absolute political control of one single party through oppressing opposition by force. An authoritarian state functions through a top-down centralised apparatus that is closed to public participation. Under authoritarianism elections do not occur or are not free and fair.³¹ In that sense, also authoritarianism is opposed to liberalism for it sees fit to restrict individual freedoms.

“Neoliberalism” differs from classical liberalism with its strong economic underpinnings. Neoliberals claim that the state should align its activities and legislation according to the market principles alone, and in so doing accept the inevitable social inequity.³² Although the concept of private property had a defining influence to the historical emergence of liberalism,³³ Fung is

University Press, the Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 98-100.

²⁸ Fung, S. K. Edmund. 2008, pp. 558-560.

²⁹ Taylor, Charles. 1992, p. 88.

³⁰ Svensson, Marina. 2002, p. 40.

³¹ Klein, Kerstin. “New Authoritarianism” in China: Political Reform in the One-Party State. *Telos*, No. 151, 2010, pp. 35-36.

³² Brown, Wendy. American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservativism, and De-Democratization. *Political Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 6, 2006, pp. 694-695.

³³ Knutsen, Torbjørn L. A History of International Relations Theory. Manchester, New York, Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 133-134.

adamant that Chinese liberals never stressed its importance up until the emergence of neoliberalism during 1990s³⁴ – a time that also saw a steep rise in social inequality.

1.3. EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF CHINESE ORTHODOXY

Although Marxist jargon in China's academic writings gradually diminished starting from 1978, the orthodox epistemology and ontology remained largely unchanged. Like Fritz Ringer's discursive schemes (described in the next sub-chapter), historical materialism and the socially embedded human nature were taken for granted by one generation after another, needing no further proof. By presenting the epistemological and ontological beliefs of the Chinese orthodoxy extracted from 1980 to 2002 in SSC, this altogether descriptive sub-chapter provides a background for subsequent analysis.

The most fundamental precept of Chinese orthodox epistemology is a belief in an attainable and objective reality – attainable in the sense that it should be epistemologically possible to understand and describe reality, and objective in the sense that the attained knowledge is not relative but absolute. The more Marxist line of argument follows historic materialism and depicts human beings ultimately dependant on their dialectical relationship with the material world. Writing in 1981, Xia Zhentao³⁵ states that although man's ideas and purposes are ideally subjective, they are not independent but “conditioned by and based on the actual existence of the external objective reality”.³⁶ The objective reality has influenced the historical development of humanity and its social, economic and political relations, which, consequently, have “objective laws independent of men's subjective will”.³⁷ An alternative way of putting the same precept was to regard all social phenomena rooted in nature, as does Hu Chenghuai. Hu believes human essence to have “definite natural premises in biology” and therefore regards nature “the source of man's freedom”.³⁸ The principle however stays the same: no social phenomena can be defined outside the immediate reality, be it nature or the materialistic law of socio-economic relations.

³⁴ Fung, S. K. Edmund. 2008, pp. 573-574.

³⁵ On the first mention of a primary author see Appendix 4 for further information.

³⁶ Xia Zhentao. On Purpose. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1981, pp. 179-180.

³⁷ Xia Zhentao. 1981, pp. 184-185.

³⁸ Hu Chenghuai. Theoretical Premises and Dialectical Features of the Historical Determinism based on Materialism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994, pp. 57-58.

Analogous epistemological statements that take an attainable objective reality for granted are explicitly or implicitly recognizable in most subsequent treatises.³⁹

This epistemological rationale renders the concept of negative freedom inadequate. The Chinese orthodox intellectuals are adamant that the classical concept of freedom is stipulated on abstractions, or just cannot live up to the criteria of objective reality, and is, therefore, effectively useless or possibly harmful. Because “only concrete, practical freedom can guide people step by step to the higher realms of freedom”, Liu Xiaogan maintains, the “myth of universal, absolute freedom can only lead to illusions and impetuous behavior and cannot provide any practical benefits”.⁴⁰ Instead, because freedom could only be achieved if the rules of reality are known and can no longer obstruct its fulfilment, it was held desirable to collect all the scientific data available about nature and human society and to form a concept of freedom accordingly. For instance, in 1994, Li Minghua urges us to “acquire an integrated and complete knowledge of contemporary society” so that we could better “understand the relations of things and their deeper essence”⁴¹ and, one might continue his argument in line with Berlin's positive doctrine of liberation by reason, free man from the self-imposed illusions.⁴² This hyper-scientific mentality emerged already during the Four Modernisations in the beginning of the 1980s⁴³ and remains important to this day.

Following such premises, orthodox philosophy regards human nature and man's relationship to society inevitably conditioned by the laws of objective reality. Individuals are to be regarded “not as they may appear in their own or other people's imaginations, but as they really are; i.e., as they operate, produce materially”.⁴⁴ Because the objective laws of socio-economic relations presuppose that human nature cannot be understood individually, but as inevitably tied to community through social interaction, orthodox intellectuals believe in man's communal nature.

³⁹ According to Thomas A. Metzger, such “epistemological optimism” of the Chinese orthodoxy – as opposed to the “epistemological pessimism” of the Western orthodoxy – is sufficient to account for their different approach to liberty from their Western counterparts. Metzger, Thomas A. *A Cloud Across the Pacific: Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories Today*. Hong Kong, the Chinese University Press, 2005, pp. 15-31. For a longer description of Metzger's analysis, see: Appendix 2.

⁴⁰ Liu Xiaogan. Sartre's and Zhuang Zi's Views on Freedom. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1988, p. 109.

⁴¹ Li Minghua. Three Forms of Historical Determinism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994, pp. 66, 71.

⁴² Lin Fang maintains that “genuine freedom” is attainable only through the “correct understanding of the total structural relationships [...] of the individual, actual society and historical development”. Lin Fang. Comments on Western Humanistic Psychology – With a Discussion of Certain Psychological Problems in Economic Reform. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1985, p. 165.

⁴³ Li Kwok-sing. *A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China*. Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, 1995, p. 422.

⁴⁴ Yu Jianxing. Marx and Liberal Humanism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, p. 91.

According to Chen Xianda, already Marx realised that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual” but rather “the ensemble of the social relations” constituting what he called a “species-being”.⁴⁵ Parallel to this naturalist conviction runs a quasi-psychological theory, which maintains that realizing the objective laws of society provides man the only chance for self-awareness,⁴⁶ and a neo-Confucian cosmology, which insists that man cannot be separated from “perpetual and real [...] innate laws of human relationships”.⁴⁷ This communal interpretation of man is predicated on a theory of society as a unitary whole with its own laws superseding individual interests. For example, Li Minghua describes society as “an organic unit, or vast system, [which] recognizes any social phenomenon as one of a cluster of phenomena, behind which lies a huge system”. It follows from Li’s argument that, as “all phenomena are included within the societies organic system”,⁴⁸ so too are individual human beings. Resembling Berlin’s concept of positive freedom, then, the orthodox ontology not only entails a communal understanding of the individual, but depicts society as “natural”, “organic” and therefore inevitably all-encompassing and inherently logical whole to which the individual must be embedded.

Although some aspects of orthodox philosophy changed through the two decades subsequently surveyed, these fundamental epistemological and ontological connotations did not. Indeed, as the orthodox arguments got more varied, previously antagonistic philosophies like Marxism, neo-Confucianism and natural sciences were eventually drawn upon to make similar ontological arguments. However, the arguments analysed so far do not contain aspects of negative freedom and, therefore, provide no insight to prove or disprove either Berlin’s or Fung’s theory of freedom. This task is taken on in the subsequent chapters.

1.4. RESEARCH METHOD AND EPISTEMOLOGY

I consider the research object (the concept of liberty) to be changing and flexible, meaning different things to different people at different times in different contexts. The research subjects

⁴⁵ Chen Xianda. Two Transitions in the Formation of Marx’s Theory of Alienation. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1982, pp. 107-108. In Chen’s opinion, this “famous thesis” constituted a “fundamental shift away from the attempt to discover the essence of man in the individual and the man himself”.

⁴⁶ Yu Jianxing. 2001, pp. 89-90; Hu Chenghuai. 1994, pp. 57, 60.

⁴⁷ Li Zehou. Some Thoughts on Neo-Confucianism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1982, p. 161.

⁴⁸ Li Minghua. 1994, p. 65.

(intellectuals) are defined in their cultural context that they in turn define themselves.⁴⁹ Thus, as the world is constantly constructed and reshaped this thesis strives not to uncover an objective social reality, but to provide one possible explanation to it.⁵⁰

As shown by Kantian ethnomethodologists, characteristics of the surrounding world are constructed through sense impressions in the minds of individuals. Consequently, every person has a unique take on the world, for each of us has a distinctive set of sense impressions. However, as the ever-reinvented cultural context in which we live in frames these impressions, our actions are comprehensible to other social actors in the same cultural context.⁵¹ Therefore, the myriad of different sense impressions and meanings in one specific era, culture, and socio-political setting are characterised by common assumptions and “truths” that form a “pool of collective knowledge”. Following Foucault, I consider this collective knowledge to be constructed by “representations” (i.e. socially (re)produced facts) that are upheld and carried from one person to the next and from one generation to the next by language, social relations, practices and institutions. A system of representations forms a discourse that allows social actors to present meaningful claims, but simultaneously prevents or limits them from raising certain questions, using particular methods and coming to specific conclusions.⁵²

To comprehend the intricacies of the Chinese intelligentsia, I will draw on the concept of the “intellectual field” as forged by Pierre Bourdieu and described by Fritz Ringer. Accordingly, the intellectuals (but also groups, schools of thought, academic disciplines, etc.) are seen as agents forming a network of hierarchical relationships that constitutes an intellectual field. It is inevitably affected by the concerns and conflicts of the larger society, yet the influence from without is not direct but gets altered by the structure of the field. Put differently, although an intellectual field shares the discourse of the larger society, it has a logic of its own that it uses to interpret the world. For example, the way an intellectual understands liberty depends on whether he or she has close ties to the state apparatus and is structurally more influenced by it, or is a dissident and structurally more dependent on other rationales. The same principle also applies to other agents in an intellectual field, like schools of thought that also can be more or less autonomous. Importantly, Ringer writes, “the agents in the field compete for the right to define

⁴⁹ Moses, Jonathon Wayne; Knutsen, Torbjørn L. *Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research*. Houndsills, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 146-149.

⁵⁰ Bryman, Alan. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford, New York, etc., Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 500.

⁵¹ Moses, Jonathon Wayne; Knutsen, Torbjørn L. 2007, pp. 204-205.

⁵² Moses, Jonathon Wayne; Knutsen, Torbjørn L. 2007, pp. 210-214.

what shall count as intellectually established and culturally legitimate".⁵³ This struggle is, as I see it, what forms them into one intellectual field.

An intellectual field takes ideas as "objectively given", meaning that to understand ideas one does not need to know their authors' specific mind-set or intentions,⁵⁴ but rather their positional relationship to other ideas and texts. Although this principle has been criticised by Quentin Skinner (*inter alios*),⁵⁵ I deem it nevertheless applicable for analysing an intellectual field, which, with its great number of authors and texts demands such a broad approach. Indeed, ideas in an intellectual field are so "interdefined" that they can only be understood in relation or opposition to one another. To study intellectual fields, Ringer writes, "is at least initially to look away from the overt intentions of individual texts, so as to concentrate on shared intellectual habits and collective meanings".⁵⁶ Due to such characteristics, an intellectual field is always in flux as orthodox ideas call into being dialectically opposite heterodox views that then strive for legitimacy. Still, the orthodoxy remains to greater or lesser extent present in all aspects of an intellectual field, no matter how original the idea. Ringer is convinced that original ideas are nothing more than "clarifications" of the "tacit assumptions of a cultural word", which are induced by social change or theoretical inconsistency.⁵⁷ This continuance is another aspect that defines an intellectual field.

The process of clarification, in turn, depends on discourse. Just as discourse influences the ideas, it is itself generated in the process. A discourse entails underlying theoretical and "preconscious" representations that both the orthodoxy and the heterodoxy of one intellectual field in a given discourse share. Thus, ideas not only depend on the theoretical positions of the specific intellectual field, but also on implicit and unconscious assumptions. This leaves an intellectual field open to inconsistencies. The presupposed nature of ideas and their inherent contradictions, however, are only apparent to an outside observer, one that does not belong to the specific discourse. Discourse, Ringer adds, "has a tendency to constitute the objects of knowledge in a certain way", which causes it to produce "particular schemes that appear and reappear in various realms of thought, including the academic disciplines of modern times".⁵⁸

⁵³ Ringer, Fritz. *Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890-1920*. Cambridge, New York, etc., Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 5.

⁵⁴ Ringer, Fritz. 1992, p. 12.

⁵⁵ Skinner, Quentin. Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts. *New Literary History*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1972.

⁵⁶ Ringer, Fritz. 1992, p. 11.

⁵⁷ Ringer, Fritz. 1992, pp. 5-7.

⁵⁸ Ringer, Fritz. 1992, pp. 7-10.

This is foremost true for ontological precepts. For instance, we will see how the notion of teleological social development and the idea of socially-embedded individual reappears in different forms in the Chinese intellectual field throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Such schemes are not independently rethought from scratch, but rather “explained in terms of institutions and social relations” and passed down from one generation to the next without further verification.⁵⁹

Because descriptions of intellectuals have varied in different cultures over time, it is not possible to give a universal definition who counts as an intellectual.⁶⁰ It is possible, however, to define intellectuals in a given time and context. This thesis takes intellectuals to be a wide and inclusive group of Chinese writers, politicians, academics, students, etc. who publish, among other topics, on the concept of liberty. A more troublesome task is to describe the intricate workings within the Chinese intellectual field of social sciences and clearly determine the relationship between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. I consider the orthodox intellectuals to represent an established conformity on a specific matter at a given time, and heterodox intellectuals to represent any deviation from that conformity. However, orthodox and heterodox intellectuals are not fixed groupings with clearly distinguishable and contradictory sets of ideas, but vary in their adherence relative to a specific topic. Put differently, one intellectual can share orthodox opinions on one subject, while advocate heterodox views on another subject. As pointed out earlier, however, orthodoxy and heterodoxy are in constant competition for legitimacy, making the concepts unstable. It is also important to divide the Chinese intelligentsia on the basis of cooperation with the state into establishment intellectuals and dissidents. According to Marina Svensson, the establishment intellectuals in China are “dependent on the system [but] have become less and less homogeneous and put forward views different from those of the regime”. The “dissidents” are intellectuals that “are silenced by the regime”.⁶¹ This categorisation, however, is not absolute and on occasion overlaps with the orthodox/heterodox divide. For example, during the 1980s there was a variety of opinions among the establishment intellectuals concerning economic liberalization. While the reformists were convinced that China's economy must be opened up, the conservatives wished to return to the Maoist economic policies. However, as the former view prevailed and was implemented in state policies only it constitutes the

⁵⁹ Ringer uses such logic to explain beliefs in general. Ringer, Fritz. 1992, pp. 20-21.

⁶⁰ Ringer, Fritz. 1992, pp. 15-16.

⁶¹ Svensson, Marina. *Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, p. 16.

orthodoxy. In addition, both the political liberals and the leftist conservatives have been part of the establishment, although their views did not always form the orthodoxy.

1.4.1. THE JOURNAL *SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA*

Social Sciences in China (SSC) is a journal of the *Chinese Academy of Social Sciences* (CASS) addressing social issues in China from a variety of angles, including sociology, economics, domestic and international politics, philosophy, history, art, etc. It began publishing in March 1980 as a bimonthly in Chinese and as a quarterly in English, and is printed in Beijing by the Social Science Publishing House of China.

During the Mao-era, CASS was a part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences but was granted separate status in 1978. Institutes within the CASS were formed into think tanks and were meant to serve as advisory bodies for political leaders.⁶² According to Sleeboom-Faulkner, from its inception CASS was dominated by reform minded intellectuals, though few were proponents for political change.⁶³ In 1982, changes in CASS leadership gave it more administrative and intellectual freedom,⁶⁴ and with the state withdrawal of financial support in 1984 those freedoms grew further.⁶⁵ This trend continued with the education reform introduced in 1985, which stated that all higher civil servants had to be elected and not appointed by the party.⁶⁶ David Kelly and Anthony Reid are convinced that by 1989 CASS enjoyed so much intellectual freedom that many ideas of the 1989 mass movement were forged or at least supported by CASS intellectuals, and indeed that “almost everybody [in CASS] had been involved in the protest movement in some way”.⁶⁷ After the demonstrations CASS went through formidable change as much of the staff was interrogated and some were imprisoned. Curiously however, Xu Zongmian, the editor-in-chief of SSC and one of the most liberally minded orthodox intellectuals of his day survived the crackdown and went on to chair the editorial board well beyond 1989. In the early 1990s CASS became more politicised. While renowned scholars left or were removed from CASS services,⁶⁸

⁶² Goldman, Merle. *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era*. Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 31.

⁶³ 2007, p. 65.

⁶⁴ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. *The Chinese Academia of Social Sciences (CASS): Shaping the Reform, Academia, and China (1977-2003)*. Leiden, Brill, 2007, p. 72.

⁶⁵ Goldman, Merle. 1994, p. 133.

⁶⁶ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 79.

⁶⁷ Kelly, David; Reid, Anthony. *Weathering a Political Winter: The Chinese Academia of Social Sciences, 1990*. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 24, 1990, pp. 349-351.

⁶⁸ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 263.

increasing numbers of former state organ members stepped in to run CASS. In 1991 the CASS Party Committee was established to control its educational work and finances.⁶⁹ Still, many critically minded intellectuals deemed it better to be part of the state-institute rather than swim against it and be ignored.⁷⁰ Scholars were encouraged to "harmonise" their work with official policies, create socialist theories, and mediate state approved policies to the lower levels of the academic hierarchy.⁷¹ Contrary to universities that increased their independence during the second half of 1990s, CASS research organs became ever more integrated into the political leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In Sleeboom-Faulkner's opinion CASS had by 1998 become a docile advisory organ to the government.⁷² At present CASS is organised directly under the Ministry of Education.⁷³

The developments concerning CASS and SSC must be, of course, situated into the overall political climate to be fully understood. The analysis below also gives a broad historical background. Suffice it to say here that changes within CASS reflect the political trends without. This indicates a tight connection between CASS and the political elites and shows its dependence on the orthodoxy. Yet, it would be wrong to describe the CASS intellectuals as mere puppets of the leadership, for they were political actors in their own right who constantly pushed for their agenda.⁷⁴ Therefore, SSC must be considered an important mediator of Chinese orthodox intellectual thought, on the one hand, and an agent on the political landscape with its own intentions in mind, on the other. That said, SSC's institutional linkage to the state organs through CASS and its obvious dependence on political guidance allow me to consider SSC to be representative of the orthodox Chinese intellectual thought. After all, as Sleeboom-Faulkner states, CASS "is advertised as China's most prestigious institution of higher learning and academic advisory organ of all governmental bodies".⁷⁵

This thesis only makes use of the SSC English edition.⁷⁶ With very few exceptions, most of the articles in the journal are originally written in Chinese and subsequently translated into

⁶⁹ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 150-151.

⁷⁰ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 281.

⁷¹ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 150-151.

⁷² Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 262.

⁷³ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 4.

⁷⁴ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 75.

⁷⁵ Sleeboom-Faulkner, Margaret. 2007, p. 4.

⁷⁶ There appears to be no special editorial unit for the SSC English edition (or, at least, none is mentioned in the published volumes) until 1986 when the journal names its first English Edition Managing Editor Feng Shize and Translation Editors Edward Hammond and Charles Wivell. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1986, front inner cover. The practice of naming the translators in the end of every article continued unchanged also thereafter.

English within a time span of few months to several years. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, although I believe that a scholarly text does not lose its overall meaning in translation, some aspects could have been mistranslated by the translator or misunderstood by me. Secondly, it must be kept in mind that the original texts were written before they were published in the English edition (but also before being published in the Chinese edition *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue*) and therefore were subject to different socio-political conditions than present at the moment of publication. However, although according to the SSC editors “the articles published in this journal represent the views of the authors and not those of the editors”,⁷⁷ the much more immediate influence of the editors on the journal’s content must be taken into account. Editors’ choice to publish these articles in the SSC English edition is significant and, in a way, reinvigorates the message of the articles published in the Chinese edition some time before. Most importantly, SSC English language edition is an outward-directed journal that stands at the end of a debate, assuring us that its content is approved by the authorities, that it represents the official discourse, and indeed can be called orthodox.

1.4.2. DATA CONSTRUCTION & TEXT ANALYSIS

The process of data-selection is always subjective and debatable, and therefore the data presented in this thesis must be considered as constructed and not merely collected.⁷⁸ The thesis is based on data from SSC, particularly from issues published in periods of 1980–1982, 1987–1989, 1994–1996, and 2000–2002 (with some exceptional additions). These periods permits the analysis of a great variety of intellectual opinions belonging to all major intellectual currents from neoauthoritarianism to neoconservatism and neoliberalism. Articles from 1980–1982 provide insight into the early developments of post Mao-era Chinese orthodoxy; the subsequent period from 1987 to 1989 is crucial for its build-up to the 1989 mass demonstrations when, as we will see, calls for more freedom were most fervent; articles from mid-1990s reflect the backlash to the social upheaval and the heyday of neoconservatism; and the first years of the new millennium depict the orthodoxy in the end of Jiang Zemin era. SSC’s varied contents throughout these

⁷⁷ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1980, p. 2. Starting from 1983 this guiding sentence changes to “... not necessarily those of the editors”. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1983, p. 2. (My Italics)

⁷⁸ Access to the journal was found at the library of the Centre of East and South-East Asian Studies at Lund University, at the library of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen, and via Internet starting from 1994 publications.

periods and its importance to the Chinese intellectual field permits to regard SSC as a single source sufficient for the purposes of this thesis.

I interpret each treatise in the hermeneutic tradition. In Gadamer's understanding, which in turn relies on Heidegger, texts are never objectively understood apart from ourselves, but always interpreted according to the tradition projected onto a given text by the interpreter. The meaning of a text can be induced only when these "for-projections" are well understood.⁷⁹ Thus, although I try to be fair-minded in my induction and do not analyse the articles for their philosophical correctness, the reader of this thesis is well-advised to bear in mind that I see myself as a cautious advocate of negative liberty; and, as it is my task to prove the validity of Berlin's theory of freedom, I am unconsciously more inclined to find these proofs as opposed to finding proofs for Fung's theory. According to Gadamer, it is upon such preconceived projections that one formulates the "initial meaning" of a text, which then needs to be confirmed⁸⁰ by a circular motion of hermeneutic understanding from the whole to the part and back to the whole. This hermeneutic circle is described by Ringer as follows: "Starting with a rudimentary knowledge of the relevant vocabulary we actively posit *possible* translations" to a word, sentence, or a paragraph. In so doing one can test if a given interpretation is coherent with the larger text as a whole or "the realities outside the text", and ultimately understand its meaning. If this fails, if one meaning seems to contradict some other meaning in the same text, we need to explain the inconsistency. This may indicate a difference not only in the usage of words and concepts between the author and the interpreter, but in their beliefs, institutions, social relations, and discourses;⁸¹ or, most importantly, may signify an ontological inconsistency in the treatise.

⁷⁹ Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. New York, Continuum, 2006, pp. 269-272.

⁸⁰ Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2006, p. 270.

⁸¹ Ringer, Fritz. 1992, pp. 18-19.

2. EMERGENCE OF LIBERALISM (1978–1985)

In the late 1970s, the party leadership and the intelligentsia called for a new kind of modernization. Most of those who had seen the devastating effects of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) believed that the old form of socialism had failed⁸² and that greater social and economic freedom is paramount if China wished to develop. The “modernization drive” had to include not only science and technology, but also culture and politics. On the orders of Deng Xiaoping, the intellectuals were removed from the category of the loathed bourgeois and elevated to the honoured class of proletariat. They were officially considered professionals who were granted “free hands” to do the state’s developmentalist bidding.⁸³ By “emancipating the mind” from highly ideologised ways of thinking, “scientific truths” were to be separated from ideological dogmatism. This meant reviving valuable aspects of Western tradition that were arguably unnecessarily cast aside in the previous decades.

Also liberalism re-entered China’s philosophical thought with the Democracy Wall movement in the autumn of 1978. Echoing the intellectual trends of the Republican era (1912–1949) many were convinced that the Chinese people need to grow their independent character, free themselves of the authoritarian enslavement fixated in their mentality, and adopt a liberal state of mind necessary for modernization and the realization of human rights. More radical intellectuals inspired by Western Enlightenment philosophy saw freedom very much in the Lockean fashion as innately belonging to human nature. Deprived of it, they held, one would cease to be human and became a slave.⁸⁴ The more intensely discussed topics were not associated with popular sovereignty and democracy but with civil and political rights – that is, freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc. – for these were crucial in establishing all the other types of freedoms.⁸⁵ Moreover, the Democracy Wall intellectuals were critical of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and its authoritarian practices. They not only condemned the arbitrary constraints on freedom of the past decades, but blamed the PRC’s political apparatus and its socialist ideology for these atrocities. According to an American-based Chinese scholar Yan Sun, negation

⁸² Narayanan, Raviprasad. China’s New Left – Review Essay on Wang Hui. *China’s New Order: Society, Politics and Economy in Transition. Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2007, p. 862.

⁸³ Goldman, Merle. 1994, pp. 29-35.

⁸⁴ Svensson, Marina. 2002, pp. 241-243, 246-247. See also: He Baogang. *The Democratization of China*. London, New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 78.

⁸⁵ Kelliher, Daniel. 1993, pp. 381-382; Svensson, Marina. 2002, p. 245.

of Mao Zedong's Thought was meant to “discredit the whole history of the party, the entire national experience under its leadership, and the application of Marxism in China.”⁸⁶

Such an attack against state foundations of course could not be tolerated. Although the CCP theory conference in early 1979 echoed many of the described dispositions,⁸⁷ the subsequent crackdown on the Democracy Wall and campaigns against “bourgeois liberalization” seriously hampered popular liberalist discussion on freedom. Under such circumstances, then and again, the ultra-leftist critique of liberalism and calls for a return to the Mao-era socio-economic system were most fervent. However, although the leftist critique helped to keep the liberals in check, the leadership was in the end of 1970s forced to call a halt to direct campaigns against liberalism as soon as the left started threatening economic development or blaming economic policies for the surge in liberal political ideals.⁸⁸ In subsequent decades, leftist arguments were repeatedly levelled against liberal ideals, followed by a reversal of policies and a manipulation of liberal arguments against the left. By the end of 1979 liberal reforms (both political and economic) were again high on the public agenda. At the meeting of the Politburo in August 1980, Deng Xiaoping legitimised talking about political reform, although criticizing party ideology was still off-limits.⁸⁹ While the content of Marxism and socialism⁹⁰ could be debated, the analysis had to remain “intrasytem” and not threaten party supremacy or its ideology.⁹¹

2.1. FREEDOM IN THEORIES OF SOCIETY-CONSTRUCTION

The early 1980s were characterised by a stand against Enlightenment liberalism, which with its negative concept of freedom was deemed dangerous and theoretically flawed. Firstly, liberalism was believed to serve the Western colonial expansion.⁹² Indeed, liberalism and Westernisation were at times so equated that arguments for one served equally well to counter the other. Liberalism was considered futile also because the multiple pursuits to democratise China in the past were all eventually abandoned and therefore, it was argued, liberal political ideas were

⁸⁶ Yan Sun. *The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976-1992*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 216.

⁸⁷ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 123-125.

⁸⁸ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 222-224, 233-234.

⁸⁹ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 126-127.

⁹⁰ On the use of the term “socialism” in Chinese context see: Lin Chun. *The Transformation of Chinese Society*. Durham, London, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 65.

⁹¹ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 220-223, 229.

⁹² Yu Guangyuan. *Socialist Construction and Lifestyle, Values and Human Development*. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1981, p. 22.

historically unsuitable for China.⁹³ More importantly, however, it was held that the Enlightenment-era bourgeois liberalisation had separated man from the overarching reality of communal relationships and consequently brought about severe social consequences. Chen Xianda claims that the Enlightenment ideal of civic society created an individual who is merely a “legal person” who “becomes his own purpose”; it did not however create a “state sphere” where members of society become “species-beings” through common political action.⁹⁴ Thus, Chen concludes, failing to appreciate the true human nature the Enlightenment liberalism alienated man from society⁹⁵ and could not have brought about “thoroughgoing emancipation”.⁹⁶

Theories of society-construction – purposefully trying to create a better and essentially more liberal society through education or coercion – were based on the same basic premise. The orthodox political philosophy of the early 1980s firmly maintained that in order to become liberated, man not only needed to realise the objective social reality as described above, but also make it work in a political theory that could effectively “transform”⁹⁷ individual human beings and society-as-a-whole for greater good. As grounds for that, orthodox intellectuals distinguished man's rational and “true” nature from her irrational nature, and deemed it imperative that one tries to suppress the irrational part or alternatively be coerced to do so by others. For example, Li Zehou's believes in a “true” human nature enslaved by its supposedly irrational (*sic.*) “humoral nature”, which we can restrain by understanding our “universal nature” and becoming “truly man”.⁹⁸ Chen Xianda, too, is adamant that a non-social man “is controlled by inhuman relations and forces”,⁹⁹ and must be forced to alter one's ways. Thus, like many of his contemporaries, Chen insists on creating a “new people [...] by changing all the existing unwanted social relations, instilling Marxism from without and by education in ethics”.¹⁰⁰ Such an industrious approach to freedom was more prevalent in the beginning of the 1980s than in any other period thereafter. Indeed, in 1983, Qian Xuesen proposes founding a whole new discipline “to study the

⁹³ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 226-227.

⁹⁴ Chen adds, “the entire history and reality of capitalist society proves that ‘natural right’ is not a fact but a theory; people do not possess equal value, rights and dignity”. Chen Xianda. 1982, p. 110.

⁹⁵ Chen notes that “estrangement arises not because the individual loses his social character, but because the social relations which group men together become a force to rule them”. Chen Xianda. 1982, p. 110.

⁹⁶ Chen Xianda. 1982, pp. 105-106.

⁹⁷ Liu Zaifu. Aesthetic Criteria for Literary and Art Criticism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1981, p. 199.

⁹⁸ Li Zehou. 1982, p. 161.

⁹⁹ Chen Xianda. 1982, pp. 105-106. According to Chen, Marx believed that “emancipation of mankind will make men species-beings not only in political life but also in economic life” and thus, following Feuerbach, eliminate all social evils.

¹⁰⁰ Chen Xianda. 1982, p. 111.

creation of socialist spiritual wealth” in order to explore how the masses could be “liberated” by making them “the subjects of knowledge.”¹⁰¹ Qian’s “industry of socialist spiritual wealth” (including natural and social sciences, art, education, physical training, etc.) exemplifies the yearning for some form of spiritual guidance in times of ideological vacuum, such as characterised China after the foundational Sino-Marxist ideology was challenged by alternative rationales. By enhancing the “communist spirit” and the theoretical principles of “Party leadership”,¹⁰² Qian’s aim was to make individuals realise the underlying objective law of the world and ultimately change their behaviour accordingly. In sum, although the arguments for society-construction of these three treatises are somewhat different, they all try to change human nature based on an objective reality much bigger than the individual. Consequently, as all of the authors above rely on explicitly holist ontologies and make no reference to negative freedom, their adherence to the communitarian worldview and the positive concept of freedom is indisputable.

To find some aspects of negative freedom, by contrast, one must turn to the economic theories of the day. As economic liberalisation had to allow some amount of individual liberty and, consequently, adopt aspects of negative freedom into its rationale, the notion of strict society-construction posed a theoretical problem to the developmentalist economic theories of the day. A case in point is Yu Guangyuan, who supports society-construction by advocating “socialist construction” that “involves guidance in lifestyle¹⁰³ and values and enables people to develop their human potential to meet the needs of the new society”.¹⁰⁴ At the same time he insists that “individual consumption should be decided by the individual himself”,¹⁰⁵ and that leisure time should be “genuinely and fully controlled by the individual”.¹⁰⁶ These two arguments seem contradictory because they propagate two different aspects of freedom. While Yu’s economic argument cannot do without some amount of liberty, which at least in the sphere of individual consumption must not be infringed, his general argument advocates absolute communal control. This becomes clear when Yu insists that, should an individual choose to spend his time and money on “enjoyment which is not healthy” and therefore “not compatible

¹⁰¹ Qian Xuesen. Culturology – Study of the Creation of Socialist Spiritual Wealth. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1983, p. 19.

¹⁰² Qian Xuesen. 1983, pp. 21-22.

¹⁰³ Yu’s concept of “lifestyle” includes politics, science, art, religion, and “all various ethical relationships”.

¹⁰⁴ Yu Guangyuan. 1981, p. 18.

¹⁰⁵ Yu Guangyuan. 1981, p. 21.

¹⁰⁶ Yu Guangyuan. 1981, p. 25.

with the nature of socialism”, he must be persuaded otherwise.¹⁰⁷ Thus, because Yu believes in the exclusive right of the community to determine the will of an individual regardless of that individual's stipulated liberty to control one's economic decisions, his economic theory is fundamentally communitarian despite some aspects of negative freedom in it.

2.2. PRAGMATIC THEORIES OF FREEDOM

Apart from being philosophically wrong and posing a threat to party legitimacy, liberalism was also believed to be economically unsound. It was argued that because the liberalist concept of natural freedom grants every individual the right to own private property, it supports capitalism; and as political power in a capitalist society always favours the wealthy, a political system based on the concept of natural freedom lacks the attributes to assure social equity.¹⁰⁸ Although increasing social polarization made apparent the contradiction between such an egalitarian state ideology and its economic policies, orthodox elite never admitted the discrepancy.¹⁰⁹ Instead, the liberal economic policies that had caused the social disparities were believed to be consistent with the socialist cause; and, indeed, the orthodox intellectuals were convinced that socialism was essentially superior to the “classical” liberalist worldview *because* it could uphold social equality.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, while political philosophy of the early 1980s was often impersonal and emphasised transforming “the masses”, the economic discussion of the time was more pragmatic. It was apparent that economic development was fast becoming crucial to government legitimacy, and that it could not be sustained without some economic liberalisation. The new approach to modernization stressed personal “quality” (*suzhi*). All were called upon to improve their “quality” in order to be able to contribute to China’s development. The liberally-minded politicians and intellectuals often made use of the term “expert” to legitimise their agenda. The balancing-act between the “red” and the “expert” – that is, between the leftist conservative values and the reformist values stressing professionalism – is characteristic of the whole political landscape of

¹⁰⁷ Yu Guangyuan. 1981, pp. 23-24.

¹⁰⁸ Yan Sun. 1995, p. 231.

¹⁰⁹ Yan Sun. 1995, p. 222.

¹¹⁰ Yan Sun. 1995, p. 231.

1980s China.¹¹¹ Hence, the inevitable importance of individual freedom and emphasised personal contribution to economic development were recognised.

Gao Zhihua's 1980 article "What is the Best Economic Setup for China?" is the first article ever published in SSC and befittingly carries the ideal of modernization. Gao criticises the old system of management that is burdened by "bureaucracy, authoritarianism and inefficiency [and] doesn't take proper care of the varying economic-financial interests of collectives and individuals".¹¹² To solve these problems, Gao (and subsequently many others) suggests more economic freedom to increase economic incentives and so support economic growth. Therefore, Gao insists that "while the state reserves the final say on the means of production under its ownership, it is each individual enterprise that actually possesses and uses these means of production".¹¹³ "Thus", and here Gao quotes Zhang Chaozun, "any such enterprise must be recognized as a relatively independent producer of commodities, and has to be given relative independence in the production and exchange of these commodities".¹¹⁴ Jiang Yiwei's argument is clearer still. Jing maintains that "socialist economic democracy can be fully realized only when the enterprises enjoy independence", because direct state control neglects "initiative of the enterprises and the workers" and thereby hampers economic development.¹¹⁵

Such pragmatic sentiments were not only confined to economic considerations. Just like individuals and enterprises need a certain amount of liberty in order to contribute to China's economic development, it was argued, so too must art be free in order to fulfil its social functions.¹¹⁶ Liu Zaifu insists that art be free from all political connotations and strongly condemns the practice of taking "political ideology as the starting point" for art criticism. The new yardstick of art criticism, he maintains, should not repeat the past mistakes and cherish the illusion that there exists "a set of immutable aesthetic criteria for art criticism". Instead, art criticism and art itself should be fundamentally subjective and free from any "constant criteria" such as political ideology or science.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ Guo Xiaolin. Warming to Socialism in Cold Mountain – cited in, Schoenhals, Michael; Guo Xiaolin. Cadres and Discourse in the People's Republic of China. Stockholm, Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2007, p. 45.

¹¹² Gao Zhihua. What is the Best Economic Setup for China? *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1980, pp. 7-8.

¹¹³ Gao Zhihua. 1980, p. 8.

¹¹⁴ Zhang Chaozun. The Socialist System of Ownership by Whole People and Commodity Production – cited in: Gao Zhihua. 1980, pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁵ Jiang Yiwei. 1980, pp. 58-59.

¹¹⁶ Liu Zaifu. 1981, p. 217. Art should also educate and enhance science. Liu Zaifu. 1981, pp. 201-202.

¹¹⁷ Liu Zaifu. 1981, pp. 188-190.

Nonetheless, both described economic theories and Liu's theory of art harbour holistic ontologies that limit the scope of individual freedom. According to Liu, art must be evaluated for its "authenticity" depending on whether or not it "reflects some of the true aspects of social life of a particular period, and thus possesses the value of providing people with a certain degree of knowledge about society".¹¹⁸ This mediating aspect of art is founded on the precept of an attainable objective reality or truth, which must have a real life output for society. Liu maintains that art is good only if it "serves the practical social activity of mankind as a powerful instrument for transforming the world".¹¹⁹ In that respect art and individual artists are not free *per se*, but only in the bounds of a certain community and must serve its essentially political goals. However, with these words Liu in his own mind does not relapse into dogmatism. In Liu's understanding, art cannot possibly be fixated to one single political ideology, but must mediate "universal and permanent moral standards [like] courage, sincerity, etc.",¹²⁰ which no political ideology can accomplish.¹²¹ Thus, at first he seems to separate society from ideology or any political theory. Yet, in all his effort Liu cannot escape the political implications of his argument. Liu writes: "When we weigh the value of socialist art, we should [...] allow authors and artists more freedom to give full reign to their creative powers to serve the people and socialism from all angles".¹²² Therefore, although Liu Zaifu *prima facie* seems to advocate freedom of art from all political constraints, he insists on the fundamental primacy of socialist ideology and thereby relies on an essentially communitarian premise to define what art is.

Likewise, all the described orthodox economic theories acknowledged an objective socialist political reality overarching all individual economic freedoms. No economic theorist of the early 1980s dared to reject the socialist economic discourse in order to propagate all-out economic liberalization. Although some economic principles underlying the capitalist market economy were also believed to function in socialist economy – giving the establishment a way to dispute the claim that socialist economy is incompatible with market mechanisms and therefore remain in

¹¹⁸ Liu Zaifu. 1981, p. 190. Because artistic work "can influence human life in society", Liu argues, also art criticism must begin with "social life". Different social classes find different things valuable and therefore "have different criteria of art criticism". That social background constitutes a critic's "yardstick". Because all critics have a different criteria specific to their social background, Liu writes, "we cannot blame a critic for having one; we can only judge whether his yardstick is right or wrong". Liu Zaifu. 1981, pp. 187-188.

¹¹⁹ Liu Zaifu. 1981, p. 199.

¹²⁰ Noticeably Liu does not name freedom.

¹²¹ Liu Zaifu. 1981, pp. 202-204.

¹²² Liu Zaifu. 1981, p. 205.

a position to “legally” insist on market reform¹²³ – no orthodox intellectual at that time could afford to argue for the long shunned and essentially bourgeois concept of private property. Consequently, all the talk on individual or entrepreneurial economic liberty was set against the backdrop of a firm belief in public ownership and ultimate communal control. As pointed out by Chen Xianda, Marx believed that money and private property reflected in “the confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under the capitalist system” alienated man from labour, capital and land,¹²⁴ and thus he adds that “only by eliminating private property can there be ‘complete emancipation’ of all human senses and qualities”.¹²⁵ He Jianzhang even deems the market regulation to be “supplementary” and calls for “the leading role of the planned economy”,¹²⁶ representing the voice of the leftist hard-liners in the early 1980s SSC.

It is noteworthy that although political freedom was not considered innate to human nature, economic freedoms were on occasion described as “natural” to an enterprise. “The rights and obligations of a socialist enterprise”, Jiang Yiwei writes, “are something inherent in an enterprise and are determined by objective economic laws and cannot be enlarged or narrowed to one’s subjective wishes”. Still, given the importance of the socialist ontology, economic freedoms had to be defined “on the basis of the characteristics of the socialist system”.¹²⁷ Jiang assumes that enterprises’ “inherent” rights depend on the political system they are in, denying them the ideal independence of any factor without. In that respect, it seems, economic freedom is for Jiang not *inevitably* subject to any political system, but *ideally* subject to socialism. Hence, although enterprises should have administrative independence, they must ideologically remain “under unified state leadership and supervision, enjoying its proper rights while fulfilling its obligations to the state”.¹²⁸

2.3. AGAINST HUMANISM

After 1982 the liberalist agenda was carried mainly by humanist intellectuals. These were writers who found their inspiration in the Western Renaissance and the Enlightenment and emphasised, as did their Occidental predecessors, the inherent value of the individual. For them, humanism

¹²³ Gao Zhihua. 1980, pp. 12-14.

¹²⁴ Chen Xianda. 1982, p. 99.

¹²⁵ Chen Xianda. 1982, pp. 103-104.

¹²⁶ He Jianzhang. More on Planned Economy and Market Regulation. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1982, p. 47.

¹²⁷ Jiang Yiwei. 1980, p. 51.

¹²⁸ Jiang Yiwei. 1980, pp. 54-55.

was not solely a prerogative of the bourgeois society, but necessary also for socialism. Relying on the early writings of Marx they argued that Marxism was primarily based on the interest of an individual and not of the society or the state; and that Chinese socialism and its political structures have, by assuming the opposite, alienated the individual and caused violations against human dignity and personal freedom.¹²⁹ Yet, the humanists were quickly condemned and accused in spreading “spiritual pollution” followed by a campaign against “bourgeois liberalism” from October 1983 to the beginning of 1984.¹³⁰

As can be seen from Chen Xianda's notions on the subject, the mood against humanism was set already before the 1983 oppression. While criticizing the political philosophy of the Enlightenment, Chen maintains that “though fine words of abstract humanism may bring temporary comfort to people's hearts, they cannot increase our strength or heal our wounds”.¹³¹ Lin Fang's article, by contrast, was initially written during the campaign against bourgeois humanism in 1984 and served to directly counter the popular philosophical humanism of the early 1980s. Lin advocates “humanistic psychology”, which, in his words, “continues the tradition of Western humanism” but is more “profound” and “developed” because it “examines human existence within the general process of natural evolution and analyzes man's place in the totality of nature”. Such a holistic ontology allows Lin to critique the essentially atomist philosophy of Enlightenment-era humanism. Humanistic psychology “is not confined to merely discussing problems of personal rights and to opposing oppression but emphasizes the congruence between the satisfaction of higher personal needs and social values”.¹³² In other words, Lin argues in line with positive freedom, because freedom is inevitably determined by the rules of nature, it must subsume to social value and to the “higher” individual nature. Moreover, Lin attacks the corruptive influence of individualism and blames it for the “phenomenon of alienation”.¹³³ In so doing, Lin turns the Chinese humanists' argument upside down and, instead of accusing the Chinese socialist political structures in alienating the individual, places the blame on individualism. Albeit the orthodox explanation to the so-called phenomenon of alienation differs from that of the humanists, it is apparent already by the early 1980s that the ideological

¹²⁹ Goldman, Merle. 1994, p. 117.

¹³⁰ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 130-134.

¹³¹ Chen Xianda. 1982, p. 111.

¹³² Lin Fang. 1985, p. 161.

¹³³ Lin Fang. 1985, pp. 170-171.

void had augmented the formerly well-defined social norms and pushed the individual's position in society into undefined territory.

Furthermore, as so many of his orthodox contemporaries, Lin also advocates curbing unwanted social phenomena. In order to "promote attitude towards labor of serving the people" (*sic*), Lin maintains, "the development of a healthy psychology should be encouraged, and the possible development of a morbid psychology should be prevented or restrained".¹³⁴ Thus, coercion is justified for the greater good of society. Still, according to Lin, this does not mean that "genuine freedom" is unreachable, but that it must follow from a "correct understanding of the total structural relationships [...] of the individual, actual society and historical development".¹³⁵ Therefore, Lin's understanding of freedom is situated into a holist ontology, which not only defines human nature as embedded in the greater whole, but also propagates coercion in order to cultivate psychologically healthy individuals that would comply with social norms.

In sum, the orthodox treatises of the early 1980s all relay unequivocally on the positive concept of freedom. This is clearest in political philosophy and the arguments for society-construction, but on close inspection also characterises treatises on art and economy. Although by 1982, orthodox economic theory had accepted the necessity of market reforms and individuals' economic freedoms were to an extent recognised, it still interpreted the world according to holist ontology and limited economic freedom to ideals and goals of a communal society. Consequently, the orthodoxy could not give up the notion of public ownership. Hence, despite its apparent contradictions the orthodox philosophy of the early 1980s interpreted freedom in the confines of Sino-Marxist socialist ontology and is, therefore, compatible with Berlin's concept of positive freedom.

¹³⁴ Lin Fang, 1985, p. 168.

¹³⁵ Lin Fang, 1985, p. 165.

3. HEIGHT OF LIBERALISM AND NEOAUTHORITARIANISM (1986–1989)

China's economic development, or rather its problems, triggered another public debate over political reforms in 1986. To many intellectuals, it had become clear that the stagnant political structure hampered economic progress, even though efforts to disjoin the two had been made. Jumping at the opportunity, liberal intellectuals were quick to criticise the one-sided attitude towards economic reforms that could, arguably, not succeed without parallel political liberalization.¹³⁶ Some intellectuals went even so far as to call upon non-Marxist theories to address the issue. Among other aspects of “bourgeois” thought, attention was paid to the liberalist understanding of freedom.¹³⁷ Yet, the prospect of liberal political reforms in the mid-1980s was short-lived as the ensuing student demonstrations caused the leadership to instigate yet another campaign against the liberals from late 1986 until spring 1987. In a more open political climate of 1988 and 1989, the concept of classical freedom again rose to the public agenda to be pursued academically or utilised for some other gain. Consequently, rule-of-law became an important ideal and diversity of truth at the core of pluralistic democracy appeared as a plausible alternative to the autocratic orthodoxy. However, just like in the beginning of the decade, orthodox intellectuals failed to adopt the core principles of liberalism and used its arguments foremost in order to counter leftist attacks on the liberal reform movement.¹³⁸

3.1. NEOAUTHORITARIAN AND NEO-CONFUCIAN FREEDOM

Gradual political reform was a defining element of the neoauthoritarian ideology that started to take shape in the latter half of the 1980s. While many dissident liberals argued that without state-initiated democratization, the agents of the totalitarian political apparatus would merely adapt to market conditions and refuse to give up their prerogatives, neoauthoritarians claimed that “true” economic liberalization would inevitably lead to political openness.¹³⁹ The neoauthoritarians maintained that marketization of China’s economy would give rise to a strong middle class, which in turn would gradually bring about liberalisation.¹⁴⁰ Yet, the legitimising notion that democracy had to be scientifically developed spelled a rather slow, step-by-step approach to

¹³⁶ Zhang Shichu. 1986, p. 45.

¹³⁷ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 139-140. Although Zhang Shichu did not think highly of “classical” liberalism, he, too, called upon opening up to the ideas of the outside world. Zhang Shichu. 1986, p. 47.

¹³⁸ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 146-150.

¹³⁹ Yan Sun. 1995, pp. 143-145.

¹⁴⁰ Fewsmith, Joseph. Elite Politics in Contemporary China. New York, M. E. Sharp, 2001, p. 86.

political reform. Accordingly, neoauthoritarians argued in line with Marxist teleology that authoritarianism had to go through the stages of “traditional authoritarianism” and “new authoritarianism” before individual political freedoms could be fully realised.¹⁴¹

Writing in 1987, Ling Yunong bases his argument exactly on such a premise. He maintains that because every “form of rule” is a necessary outcome of the economic conditions of the period,¹⁴² China is, by completing the transition to a production system relying on “private means”, ready to establish “a socialist democratic system”. (Note the considerable change from early 1980s when no economic theory dared to accept privatization). However, as socialist democracy is a new “type” of democracy not yet fully developed, Ling insists, it must be implemented in gradual stages.¹⁴³ Consequently, while economic reforms should precede political reforms, so too must economic rights take precedence over political liberties for the time being. In Ling's own words: “Only when the economic structure of the socialist country fully embodies the position of the people as masters of the economy, can their position as the political masters be genuinely established”.¹⁴⁴ Although Ling does not explicitly use terms like “traditional authoritarianism” and “new authoritarianism”, the all-important notion of gradual “step by step”¹⁴⁵ progression towards political freedom is clearly eminent. Additionally, like in the early 1980s Ling stresses the necessity to conduct ideological education before people are ready to take on political responsibility.¹⁴⁶ However, as Ling's article is the only pure example of neoauthoritarianism in the sample, scientifically regulated political reform may not have been very popular among the SSC authors writing in 1987–1989.¹⁴⁷

The middle to late 1980s also saw the rise of cultural relativism, which found more reverberation in the SSC than the previously-discussed gradual approach to political liberalisation. Cultural relativists situated the concept of freedom into its “natural” setting and, by claiming a clear-cut distinction between the “Western” and the “Eastern” or Chinese civilizations, found their understandings of freedom irreconcilable or even opposite to one another. Cultural

¹⁴¹ Fewsmith, Joseph. 2001, p. 76.

¹⁴² Ling Yunong. The Synchronous Relationship Between Development of Socialist Democracy and Economic Restructuring. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1987, pp. 58-59.

¹⁴³ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 57.

¹⁴⁴ Ling Yunong. 1987, pp. 59-60. Ling maintains, “workers rights” should at least initially be limited to their economic rights “to discuss and make policy decisions in management” of enterprises and not in politics. Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 62.

¹⁴⁵ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 66.

¹⁴⁶ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 62.

¹⁴⁷ This claim cannot be verified with absolute certainty as the time scale of the thesis does not allow further research on the matter.

relativists legitimised their theory by borrowing arguments from history, linguistics, economics, geography, biology, psychology, etc. For instance, in order to “perceive the general evolutionary trend of the [Chinese] nation’s culture and its direction” Zhang Enhe deems it necessary to “penetrate into the cultural consciousness and psychological diathesis formed throughout the entire history of the nation”.¹⁴⁸ Such a teleological understanding of culture was commonplace among the late 1980s orthodoxy, foremost the neo-Confucians, who tried to counter the globalizing effects of Western culture (including capitalism) by (re)constructing their own Chinese civilisation. It was maintained that cultures are inevitably different because they have emerged in distinct geographical environments, so-called “national environments”, giving rise to two different modes of thought – the holistic Eastern tradition based on humanism, and the formal Western tradition based on science. Consequently, Zhang Shichu explains, because freedom as a “basic thought structure” is in the “kernel of [every] (spiritual) culture”, the Chinese and Western concepts of freedom are naturally different. That is, while “Westerners place more stress on outward pursuits and take the development and transformation of the world as the way to freedom. Easterners mostly stress the inward pursuit and take the understanding and perfection of self as the way to freedom.”¹⁴⁹ An analogous argument by Zhao Fusan deems “classical” liberalism and its political mechanisms to be historical products of Western capitalism founded on commodity economy, which therefore cannot be transplanted into Chinese culture.¹⁵⁰ Although here the conclusion is deduced from more recent historical evidence, it still emphasises the essential differences of the Occidental and the Oriental. According to Barbara Schulte, such a dichotomised approach to culture can be termed “reversed Orientalism” (or “self-Orientalisation”)¹⁵¹ for it effectively turns the Orientalist arguments inside-out and depicts the “Eastern” or Chinese culture as inevitably superior to the “Western” culture.¹⁵² As was shown by

¹⁴⁸ Zhang Enhe. Reflections on Modern Chinese Literature in the Light of Ethno-cultural Studies. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1988, pp. 129-130.

¹⁴⁹ Zhang Shichu. The Comparative Study of East and West Cultures in China in Recent Years. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1986, pp. 43-44.

¹⁵⁰ Zhao Fusan. 1987, p. 113. Even though communitarianism is of obvious importance to China’s development, Zhang Enhe also values individualism. In his view the modern Chinese literature is a continuation of the “trend beginning with the Renaissance to shake off feudal autocratic shackles”. This modernization does not only manifest itself in communal freedom from suppression, but in simultaneous “liberation of the mind and individualism”. And yet, Zhang states, although it was “in the course of the bourgeois revolution in Europe that man began to be discovered and valued [...] it was not until the May 4th period in China that man emerged as an entity accorded dignity and value”. (*sic*) Zhang Enhe. 1988, pp. 140-141.

¹⁵¹ Chou Chih-Chieh. Bridging the Global and the Local: China’s Effort at Linking Human Rights Discourse and neo-Confucianism. *China Report*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2008, pp. 140-141.

¹⁵² Schulte, Barbara. East is East and West is West? Chinese Academia Goes Global – Ed. by Charle, Christophe; Schriewer, Jürgen; Wagner, Peter. Transnational Intellectual Networks: Forms of Academic Knowledge and the

Zhang's and Zhao's examples, the same reversing principle is true for relativist perspectives on Occidental and Oriental understandings of liberty.

By the late 1980s, socialism in China was moribund and the creation of a new state ideology was a matter of course. Relativist renderings of Confucianism suited ideally for the purpose and during the subsequent decades neo-Confucianism emerged as a new state-sustained ideology, most notably advocated by the neoconservatives of the 1990s. Neo-Confucians emphasised social and economic development over civil and political liberties. Firstly, like each of the “four small dragons” (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea), China needed neo-Confucianism to legitimise a leadership of “enlightened despots” to guide the allegedly uneducated masses through the perils of economic expansion.¹⁵³ And secondly, according to neo-Confucian cosmology, man is “integrated with everything under heaven” and is, therefore, essentially no different from the cosmos.¹⁵⁴ Consequently, as the individual cannot be differentiated from the society, man was obliged to give up his or her individual freedoms for the collective good, be it the society, the nation, or the state; and in so doing support economic progress at the expense of one's political liberties. Although Zhang Enhe sees liberalization not only as manifesting communal values but as a simultaneous “liberation of the mind and individualism”,¹⁵⁵ he nevertheless believes that the Chinese “national consciousness” resides in the concept of “unified nation” and thus defines the individual inevitably through a bigger community.¹⁵⁶ Consequently, all actions and desires rooted in individual self-interest were considered immoral, whereas those rooted in public interest were considered “righteous”.¹⁵⁷ By trying to convince the populace that it was within the Confucian tradition to value the community and to be self-endowed and obedient to the state, neo-Confucianism legitimised the neoauthoritarian understanding of economic reform before political liberalisation.

Paradoxically however, neo-Confucianism with its communal underpinnings, was also used to deal with the social ills caused by economic liberalisation. According to Chou Chih-Chieh, as capitalism was thought to spread inequity and – by equating it to Westernization – pose a threat to Chinese identity, neo-Confucian collectivism was used to fight against the colonising threat of

Search for Cultural Identity. Frankfurt, New York, Campus Verlag, 2004, p. 311.

¹⁵³ Kelliher, Daniel. 1993, p. 383, 385.

¹⁵⁴ Feng Youlan. A General Understanding of Neo-Confucianism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1987, p. 197.

¹⁵⁵ Zhang Enhe. 1988, pp. 140-141.

¹⁵⁶ Zhang Enhe. 1988, pp. 133-134.

¹⁵⁷ Feng Youlan. 1987, pp. 200-201.

Occidental capitalism.¹⁵⁸ It is no surprise, then, that on the pages of SSC neo-Confucian collectivism appears in parallel to the collectivist ideals of socialism, while no attention is paid to the philosophical contradictions or historical animosities between the two ideologies. Without explicitly referring to Confucianism, Sha Lianxiang manages to combine neo-Confucian and socialist arguments in saying that “ours is a socialist country [where] the relationship between persons is characteristic of the tradition and trend of collectivity”;¹⁵⁹ and therefore, “the aim and the objectives of all groups are subordinated to the supreme aims and objectives of the nation”.¹⁶⁰ Sha complements the present socialist “trend” towards collectivism with the “tradition” of collectivism, which most likely alludes to the Confucian collectivist tradition. Indeed, Ling Yunong maintains that “under socialism the fundamental interests of the state, the collective and the individual are consistent in nature”,¹⁶¹ taking the argument full circle back to the relativist neo-Confucian notion that collectivism – and not individualism – is inherent in Chinese culture. In that sense, neo-Confucianism and socialism were mutually legitimising, allowing the state to hold true to the foundational socialist ideals while constructing a fresh ideology in neo-Confucianism. On the other hand, this shows that neo-Confucian emphasis on communal values over individual liberties was not only an outcome of cultural analysis to strengthen nationalist sentiment, but also a social necessity to counteract rampant economic liberalisation. Either way, neo-Confucian ideals put positive freedom above its negative counterpart by stressing the communal essence of the Chinese culture.

Apart from being culturally unsuitable for Chinese civilization, classical liberalism was also taken to be outmoded, riddled with contradictions, and harmful to both the individual and the society. Zhao Fusan maintains that Lockean origins of modern individual freedom reflect “the ideas of the nascent bourgeois in the period of *laissez-faire* capitalism”, but as capitalism has greatly changed since Locke, his notions on individual freedom are out-of-date. And yet because Lockean precepts are still held in high regard in the West, they cause social problems by breaking the values holding the society together.¹⁶² In addition, it was maintained that classical liberalism with its emphasis on individualism was theoretically unsuitable for sustaining socio-economic equality. According to Zhao, while individual liberalism calls for a government that “governs

¹⁵⁸ Chou Chih-Chieh. 2008, pp. 145-148.

¹⁵⁹ Sha Lianxiang. 1988, p. 124.

¹⁶⁰ Sha Lianxiang. 1988, p. 125.

¹⁶¹ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 63.

¹⁶² Zhao Fusan. 1987, pp. 109-110.

least”, socio-economic equality needs a government that “governs most”.¹⁶³ In other words, Western democracies built on classical liberalism emphasise political freedom, but cannot possibly uphold socio-economic equality because the guarantees for political freedom undermine equality.¹⁶⁴ More importantly, in arguing that freedom from restrictions and authority reduces social relations to a mere “relationship of interests”, classical liberalism was also deemed immoral and accused in causing “individual alienation”,¹⁶⁵ “moral decadence” and “sick lifestyles”.¹⁶⁶ Although Liu Xiaogan admits that “free choice of the individual [and] the independence and dignity of the personality” are “not without their rational elements”, he shares Zhao's sentiment and is adamant that freedom must be defined in a dialectic relationship between the individual and the society.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, because classical freedom is self-contradictory and all but destroys civilised society it must be curtailed or changes.¹⁶⁸

Albeit the heyday of society-construction was past with the early 1980s, it never really disappears from the pages of SSC up to 2002. In 1988 Sha Lianxiang stresses the importance of social control through ideology and is adamant that ideological work “should be an important content of Chinese social psychology”.¹⁶⁹ Neo-Confucians insisted in their reversed Orientalist convictions that they saw no other remedy to “Western” political ailments than to adopt the collectivist ideals of the “East”. Indeed, Zhang Shichu believes that the West already has started to move “from an absolute respect for the freedom of the individual [...] to a coordination of the individual with the group”.¹⁷⁰ In other words, Zhang believes, the West is already progressing from the negative concept of freedom to the positive.

In sum, the Chinese orthodox intellectuals of middle to late 1980s with their unequivocally holist ontology have found all kinds of reasons from cultural relativism to different theoretical deductions not to accept classical liberalism. Put simply, the orthodoxy was adamant that inconsistencies embedded in classical liberalism give undue prevalence to individual liberties above social needs and thereby cause social problems. In fact, their essentialist approach to classical liberalism has all but dismissed its communal traits (inherent in all theories of Western

¹⁶³ Barzun, Jacques. Is Democracy Theory for Export? – cited in: Zhao Fusan. Reflections on Certain Aspects of Modern Western Culture – Reading Notes. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1987, p. 101.

¹⁶⁴ Zhao Fusan. 1987, pp. 101-102.

¹⁶⁵ Zhao Fusan. 1987, p. 108.

¹⁶⁶ Zhao Fusan. 1987, p. 113.

¹⁶⁷ Liu Xiaogan. Sartre's and Zhuang Zi's 1988, pp. 100-101.

¹⁶⁸ Zhao Fusan. 1987, p. 110.

¹⁶⁹ Sha Lianxiang. 1988, pp. 122-123.

¹⁷⁰ Zhang Shichu. 1986, pp. 46-47.

political tradition),¹⁷¹ undermining the validity of negative liberty and ensuring the superiority of the Eastern collectivist freedom. The frequent usage of socialist discourse parallel to neo-Confucianism indicates that even though socialism had lost some of its appeal, it served as a viable theoretical tool and remained for the time the foundation of orthodox ideology.

3.2. UTILITARIAN POLITICAL FREEDOM

As stated above, despite a collectivist rationale, neoauthoritarian writings shared an almost deterministic belief that economic reforms would eventually lead to a more liberal society. However, some orthodox intellectuals, or possibly a whole faction among them, insisted that a liberal society was not only a matter of course but in itself necessary to China's development. For instance, Zheng Hangsheng and Zhang Jianming advocate political openness in order to enhance the "performance of the society". They condemn the presumption that the unity of people's interests is superior to "the diversity of and contradictions between their interests"¹⁷² and consider different opinions among various groups in the society as "equal", natural and useful. Thus, according to Zheng and Zhang, free speech should be encouraged¹⁷³ so that public opinion could guide political decision-making.¹⁷⁴ In addition, the authors define political dialogue as being "all-inclusive" and mention, albeit very cautiously, the possibility of resorting to referendum as a "more extensive democratic consultation".¹⁷⁵ Ling Yunong echoes this utilitarian sentiment by considering "democratic methods" to be the most "effective way to reach a correct understanding" from the "normal" array of different political opinions.¹⁷⁶ This suggests that both Zheng and Zhang as well as Ling perceive political liberty not as only a matter of cautious reform controlled by the state, but as open to all kinds of opinions provided that they contribute to China's development.

¹⁷¹ There are some exceptions where orthodox Chinese writings do refer to collectivist traits in Western political philosophy. For instance, Zhao Fusan shows in 1988 that despite its individualistic foundations the Western political philosophy could not have escaped collectivist necessities. Although Thomas Hobbes "made the individual into a solitary subject", Zhao claims, he nevertheless "believed that the duty of a civilized society was not to develop man's natural state but to control his behaviour through law". Likewise, in John Locke's political theory man was forced into social contracts in order to preserve his own existence. Zhao Fusan. 1988, pp.129-130.

¹⁷² Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. A Preliminary Study of the Social Consultation and Dialogue. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1988, p. 108.

¹⁷³ Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, p. 117.

¹⁷⁴ Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, p. 109.

¹⁷⁵ Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, pp. 110-111.

¹⁷⁶ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 66. Ling describes democracy as "a dose of good medicine". Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 66.

However, despite their references on negative freedom, neither article upholds atomist ontologies or portray political liberty as a value *per se*. Firstly, befittingly to the time, Zheng and Zhang insist that all peoples' opinions and demands must be voiced "within the bounds of Constitution and law".¹⁷⁷ Since 1978, China's leadership relied upon legislation (instead of campaigns and directives) to enforce policies, and as a consequence rule-of-law became an important discursive tool (or an empty signifier) to substantiate orthodox and belittle heterodox ideas. Nevertheless, rule-of-law is widely used also by liberal intellectuals and as such is not reason enough to place the analysed arguments among the adherents of positive freedom. Rather, it is how legislation is used that matters.

Despite some contradictory notions above, tolerating freedom of expression and other types of individual liberties were not considered independent of but consequent to social norms, which, in turn, were perceived as rooted in nature. "When the psychology and behavior of individuals tends to contradict or even go against the value orientation advocated by the society", Zheng and Zhang write, it "often leads to social behavior based more on depressed sentiments [...] that would harm the society".¹⁷⁸ Thus, like in Foucault's genealogy of abnormality, an individual deviating from the social norm was implicitly deemed psychologically sick and dangerous.¹⁷⁹ This social norm, in turn, emerges from the notion of all-encompassing nature (Foucault's "juridico-biological domain"),¹⁸⁰ which legitimises the authoritative aspirations towards "normalization".

Nevertheless, Zheng and Zhang insist, a person of "depressed" opinion must not be coerced into submission, but be allowed to express his or her views in order to alleviate social pressure and thereby sustain social stability.¹⁸¹ Therefore, as stated before, freedom of expression was merely a tool used for socio-political gain. Already before the 1989 demonstrations and the subsequent (intellectual) reaction against "radicalism", concern for social harmony and stability seemed to override any kind of push for political liberalisation. In Zheng and Zhang's words, freedom of expression is there to enhance "orderliness" and maintain "social stability and unity" by "harmonizing the development of the sentiments and psychology of the individual and the collective with the whole society", or, in Foucault's terms, to "normalise" society. Although they

¹⁷⁷ Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, p. 117.

¹⁷⁸ Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, p. 112.

¹⁷⁹ Foucault, Michel. Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974–1975. London, New York, Verso, 2003, pp. 31-54.

¹⁸⁰ Foucault, Michel. 2003, pp. 55-56.

¹⁸¹ Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, pp. 112-113.

maintain that in this process “all opinions, whatever critical, attacking social evils, or constructive, help to build up a harmonious social atmosphere and to reduce the tension and confusion”,¹⁸² what is defined “evil” or “depressed” still depends on the authority, which, in turn, relies on an all-encompassing understanding of nature. Regardless of his belief in the utility of political freedom, Ling, too, insists that individual interests are inevitably dependant on communal and state's interests.¹⁸³ Consequently, he argues, it should be every individual's obligations to “give their first consideration to how they might make a greater contribution to the country”,¹⁸⁴ placing individual interests firmly in the service of the collective.

In sum, although Zheng and Zhang as well as Ling argue that one should not stamp out deviance from the norm but harvest it for greater good, individual freedom *per se* was not valued. It remained foremost a tool to guarantee stability and alleviate other social problems. However, because of its practicality, and due to the greater intellectual freedom of the late 1980s, talk of individual liberty was greater than in the beginning of the decade. Orthodox thinkers of middle to late 1980s were also more hesitant to advocate society-construction or resort to coercion in order to build or defend their views. Nevertheless, notions of classical freedom remained elusive. Every description of individual freedom described thus far has been ultimately dependent on society that determines the essence of “good” and “evil” based on a fixed understanding on nature. Hence, if individuals contradict social norms or place their own values above the society they must be considered evil or sick.

3.3. XU ZONGMIAN'S CRITIQUE ON NEOAUTHORITARIANISM

Xu Zongmian's “An Investigation of Those Who Failed: The 1913–1915 Discussion on Democratic Politics in China” is one of only two articles under survey to express philosophical ideas in line with Berlin's concept of negative freedom. Published first in *Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Studies)* in 1984 (No. 4), it was printed in SSC English edition in spring 1989 and exemplifies the freedom of China's intellectual landscape during middle to late 1980s. The significance of this article is great not only because of its content, but also due to the fact that Xu published his article while being the editor-in-chief of SSC, chairing the editorial board from early 1989¹⁸⁵ and

¹⁸² Zheng Hangsheng; Zhang Jianming. 1988, pp. 111-112.

¹⁸³ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 63.

¹⁸⁴ Ling Yunong. 1987, p. 69.

¹⁸⁵ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1989, p. 2.

surviving the interrogations inflicted upon many liberally minded members of the CASS¹⁸⁶ to serve as the editor-in-chief of SSC also after the 1989 oppression.

Corresponding to Marxist agenda, Xu gives credit to intellectuals of the early Republican period who criticised the inherent hypocrisy of the bourgeois approach to civil liberties.¹⁸⁷ In this respect Xu does not differ from orthodox authors of his day. However, in light of his following argument Xu's opening pages seem merely an unavoidable tribute to Sino-Marxist style. By drawing an explicit analogy¹⁸⁸ between the Republican era intellectuals and the neoauthoritarians of his day Xu effectively criticises neoauthoritarian political philosophy, most notably their belief in enlightened autocracy and the curbing of civil liberties. He opposes Liang Qichao and many other early Republican-era authors who believed in enlightened autocracy and argued, much like the neoauthoritarians of the 1980s, that in order to save China from social turmoil and bring about democracy and equality an autocratic leader should first educate the still "feudal" masses.¹⁸⁹ For that end, "restricting or sacrificing 'civil rights' in order to strengthen 'state power'" was considered inevitable.¹⁹⁰ Yet, Xu deems the concept of enlightened autocracy flawed and essentially not republican.¹⁹¹ He states in Lockean fashion that "state power in the Republic was an exercise of civil rights and the interests of the Republic were the interests of all its citizens".¹⁹² Albeit similar rhetoric was also used by his contemporaries to defend neoauthoritarian ideals, and even though Xu himself admits that the state sometimes has to "impose certain restrictions on the immediate interest of the people for the sake of their long-term interests", he immediately adds that "such restrictions should normally be a kind of citizens' adjustment of their own interests [and] could be only imposed by means of certain democratic procedures".¹⁹³ Furthermore, he maintains that unilateral state-imposed restrictions on individual liberties that coincide with enlightened "rule by man" would effectively defeat the end of achieving democracy and rule-of-law.¹⁹⁴ Given such rationale, Xu concludes, one cannot actually talk about the "sacrifice" of civil

¹⁸⁶ Kelly, David; Reid, Anthony. 1990, pp. 349-351.

¹⁸⁷ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 131.

¹⁸⁸ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 140.

¹⁸⁹ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 134.

¹⁹⁰ Xu Zongmian. 1988, pp. 131-132.

¹⁹¹ Since China had nominally been a republic from 1912 onwards, political ideas of all denominations, including enlightened autocracy, were regarded "republican". Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 130.

¹⁹² Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 130. For a comparison with Locke, see: Appendix 3.

¹⁹³ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 130. Furthermore, I believe, Xu implicitly condemns "enlightened autocracy" (and thereby the paralleling neoauthoritarianism) by describing how it was equated to the monarchical political system that Yuan Shikai tried to re-establish in the early days of the Republic. Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 135.

¹⁹⁴ Xu Zongmian. 1988, pp. 134, 138-141.

liberties.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, he concurs with Locke and Spinoza¹⁹⁶ that an individual cannot wholly abandon his or her liberties at all,¹⁹⁷ thus adopting a clearly atomist ontology. Most crucially, however, Xu resents the idea of collectivism *per se* as “passive” and denying “the existence of individual personality and freedom”.¹⁹⁸ Consequently, by depicting society as a collection of citizens' interests, as opposed to a unitary whole with its superseding values, Xu places individual liberties above the collective.

Xu also finds fault in Liang Qichao's argument that China needs “nursery policies” to gradually remedy people's moral qualities before embarking on political reforms. In his opinion it is “philistine” and “self-contradictory” to believe that morality (i.e. customs) determines politics. To the contrary, Xu goes against the neoauthoritarian principle of gradual political liberalisation and argues for political reform before the “old customs of the people” could be changed through education and other means of society-construction. Instead, according to Xu, “modern” politics cannot emerge through education but must be “obtained in the course of political struggle”.¹⁹⁹ Likewise Xu criticises the belief in “individual reform” (*geren de gaige*), which in line with Charles Taylor's exercise-concept held that freedom can only be attained if we reform ourselves by attending to hygiene, improving morality, etc.²⁰⁰

In Xu's opinion the neoauthoritarian justification to curb civil liberties for the sake of the society lacks philosophical ground and socio-political necessity. The most crucial difference from the neoauthoritarian argument is his liberal belief that individual rights and freedoms determine the state's authority and not *vice versa*, and therefore cannot be essentially restricted or postponed for some state defined purpose. He also refutes all arguments calling for society-construction, or, for that matter, waiting for the masses to fully realise the workings of modern economy before granting them political liberties. Hence, because Xu's take on freedom harbours an atomist ontology and resembles more Lockean political principles where restrictions on liberty are minimal depending only on individual interests and not on some supreme will of the society, he can be situated among the advocates of negative freedom. Xu's concept of freedom is exceptional among the authors of SSC and the orthodox Chinese intelligentsia as a whole up to late 1980s. His advocacy of negative freedom not only exemplifies the intellectual freedom of 1988 and

¹⁹⁵ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 130.

¹⁹⁶ Xu himself draws no comparison to Locke and Spinoza.

¹⁹⁷ Xu Zongmian. 1988, pp. 149-150.

¹⁹⁸ Xu Zongmian. 1988, pp. 156-158.

¹⁹⁹ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 148.

²⁰⁰ Xu Zongmian. 1988, p. 142.

1989, but also represents the intense struggle inside the Chinese intellectual sphere for the orthodox concept of freedom that by late 1980s had become critically contested by the advocates of negative freedom, and that Xu and the likes of him lost in June 1989.

4. NEOCONSERVATIVE REACTION TO “RADICALISM” (1990–1997)

As a reaction to the 1989 demonstrations the orthodoxy of early to mid 1990s was strongly against political liberalization. After the Tiananmen demonstrations leftist conservatives took political centre-stage and steered China into a three year period of strict autocracy. They controlled the media and other official forums and launched a campaign against bourgeois liberalization, accusing it of undermining the Chinese socialist heritage and alienating the youth from party leadership.²⁰¹ In spring 1992 Deng Xiaoping once again initiated economic reforms, which reintroduced an expanding consumer culture very much welcomed and propagated by neoliberal intellectuals. However, restrictions on civil and political rights remained steadfast and many liberals were forced to stay silent or go into exile. After the demonstrations the state started to be more active in the human rights debate and formulated its own clearly defined discourse. Nevertheless, there were those who still managed to voice their opinions. As party’s control over the intellectual debates loosened considerably in the 1990s, the academic journals were able to mediate quite bold considerations as long as the arguments did not challenge the state head-on. Thanks to the developing market economy liberals were now less tied to the political patronage than in the 1980s and could voice their critique through private book contracting, public forums, and newly established journals (e.g. “Reform”, “The Way”) that the authorities had little control over.²⁰² However, this liberalisation had no effect on the orthodox understanding of freedom as depicted in the 1994 to 1996 SSC. Moreover, because dissidents and more radical liberals continued to hope that political reform could be introduced without undue chaos, they effectively alienated themselves from the bulk of literary elite, who were by now convinced that political liberalisation would be followed by social turmoil as a matter of course.²⁰³

Neoliberals were a loosely connected group of authors that advocated rapid economic liberalisation and decentralisation, and insisted on the individual's right for economic freedom. Even though they claimed to uphold liberal ideals and painted themselves as “oppositional” or “dissident” to the state, the emergence of the neoliberal economic system was a product of strong political intervention and harboured a concealed dependence on the authoritarian state mechanisms. Subsequently, the political and economic elites were brought together in a

²⁰¹ Yan Sun. 1995, p. 219.

²⁰² Goldman, Merle. 2005, pp. 95-98, 107-115, 131-133, 136-141.

²⁰³ Fewsmith, Joseph. 2001, pp. 105-106.

symbiosis of systemic corruption, which allowed little political freedom.²⁰⁴ In addition, with radically liberal economic policies at its core, neoliberalism forced economic freedoms to stand for all aspects of liberty by ruling out alternative approaches to freedom found within the liberal tradition, and, in the words of Wang Hui, effectively “imprisoned [the concept of liberty] in a monological understanding of economic relations”.²⁰⁵ Indeed, the exaggerated emphasis on economic liberty and development went so far as to permit the neoliberals to claim that freedom was antithetical to democracy and equality.²⁰⁶

Although neoliberalism was the backbone of economic reforms since 1992, neoliberal ideals are not represented in the SSC from 1994 to 1996. In the 1990s social inequity continued to soar²⁰⁷ and, contrary to neoliberal claims, it became irrefutably clear that not all social classes benefited from rapid economic liberalisation. Stark social grievances combined with the ideological void, which neoliberalism could not fill, fuelled popular discontent and “radical” social ideas, making the state fearful of another Tiananmen-like incident. “Radicalism” was widely recognised as the most immediate threat to China’s stability and therefore, it was argued, economic liberalisation as the main culprit for social inequity could not be allowed to continue unchecked.²⁰⁸ This may well explain why neoliberal ideals were not advocated in SSC from 1994–1996.

Neoconservatives were another loosely affiliated group of intellectuals rising during the 1990s and was united in its reaction against radicalism. Despite advocating a variety of socio-political ideas they put social stability above all other considerations, which defines the neoconservative concept of liberty very much in communitarian terms. From the economic standpoint neoconservatives were adamant that China cannot rely solely on market liberalization to solve its social problems and guarantee development, as the neoliberal ideology would have it, but must allow state intervention in economic activities. Li Peilin's treatise exemplifies the neoconservative economic rationale. Although Li regards it inevitable that in a structural transition from one socio-economic system to another (i.e. a shift from a planned economy to a

²⁰⁴ Wang Hui. The Year 1989 and the Historical Roots of Neoliberalism in China. *Positions: East-Asia Cultural Critique*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2004, p. 39.

²⁰⁵ Wang Hui. 2004, p. 31.

²⁰⁶ Wang Hui. 2004, p. 49.

²⁰⁷ Chang, Gene H. The Cause and Cure of China's Widening Income Disparity. *China Economic Review*. Vol. 13, 2002, p. 337.

²⁰⁸ Most intellectuals took the possible damage of more social turmoil very seriously and thus could no longer afford to advocate one or the other ideology, but rather pragmatically focused on solving specific problems, such as corruption, social inequity, the future course of reforms, etc. Fewsmith, Joseph. 2001, pp. 105-106.

planned commodity economy) the discrepancy between different social groups widens and leads to social conflicts,²⁰⁹ he deems the situation rectifiable. So, he insists that the state should not stand idly by and let the economic liberalization go too far, but regulate the economy so as to guarantee social stability.²¹⁰ Control over economic activities in order to assure social order was paramount to neoconservative rationale. In Chen Xiushan's words, intervention in the economy is justified in order “to avoid the social conflicts that can result from polarization, and to maintain social stability and balance during the process of social development”.²¹¹

Apart from social stability, however, neoconservative economic theories also advocate communal values. Indeed, underneath Li Peilin's treatise on restructuring China's socio-economic system lies a holist notion of a “whole picture” that all individuals belong and must adhere to.²¹² This holist ontology characterises all neoconservative economic treatises in the 1994–1996 SSC. A case in point is Li Pengcheng's treatise “Cultural and Moral Considerations in a Market Economy”. Somewhat controversially he applauds Western individualism, which has made possible the legalization of market economy and caused China's progress in the past few decades.²¹³ Such a statement may well be counted as neoliberal if it were not for the ensuing ontological argument. Li points out that the thriving market economy has led many to believe that “economic construction is the ‘objective’ of social development”, causing a decline in “ethical quality and moral standards” and leaving communal values secondary. In order to remedy this situation Li advocates creating an economic theory that encompasses man's group nature and consequently contributes to the public's and “man's all-around development”.²¹⁴ Reminiscent to the theories of society-construction from early 1980s, Han Qingxiang goes even so far as to insist on the necessity to “mold man” from a “traditional” and “sick” into a “modern” and “healthy” man, one that respects “collective morality” and “knowledgeable people”, and overcomes “individualism” and “hedonism”, ultimately complying to the overall economic necessities of the

²⁰⁹ Li Peilin. Another Invisible Hand: Structural Transition in Society. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994, pp. 84-85.

²¹⁰ Li Peilin. 1994, p. 87.

²¹¹ Chen Xiushan. The Market Economy and State Regulation. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1995, pp. 45-46.

²¹² Li Peilin. 1994, p. 85.

²¹³ Li Pengcheng. Cultural and Moral Considerations in a Market Economy. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1996, p. 90.

²¹⁴ Li Pengcheng. 1996, pp. 92-93.

day.²¹⁵ Thus, in Han's argument we see the same Foucauldian genealogy of abnormality at work, which was present in the treatise of Zheng and Zhang.

Akin to the neo-Marxists, neoconservatives also dispute the neoliberal conviction that free market economy is intrinsically just. Although according to Lu Jianjie subjects of market economy are essentially free because "both buyer and seller of a commodity [...] are constrained only by their own free will",²¹⁶ free market is not just as it only serves the interests of the "autonomous" enterprises and causes great social inequity.²¹⁷ Lu infers therefrom that all economic liberties must remain "under the basic system of socialism".²¹⁸ Wei He, on the other hand, is adamant that "in a market economy superficial equality disguises inequalities" and is therefore unjust as it unnecessarily and latently allows equality to be sacrificed for profit.²¹⁹ Such a statement may have served to counter the neoliberals' rationale, which, according to Wang Hui, tried to hide actual inequalities in the society by insisting on the precept of universal economic equality.²²⁰ Additionally, neoconservatives considered the principle of private property ownership unjust, which in many occasions also before has been dubbed bourgeois and harmful to the overall social development. Meng Qinguo criticises the Western continental legal system because it ranks the concept of private ownership "above all the other problems associated with property, thus placing the independence and importance of property utilization itself in the shade".²²¹ Because China is a socialist country, it was argued, it must create its own legislation with public ownership in its core. In such a system, Meng maintains, "property ownership is no longer the final aim" but serves to meet the "demand for social progress and raising the material and cultural standard of the people".²²² Contrary to neoliberal rationale, then, neoconservatives did not perceive social development as equal to or resulting directly from full-scale economic freedom and decentralisation, but deemed it more complex and needing guidance from by the state

²¹⁵ Han Qingxiang. A Socialist Market Economy and the Molding of Man. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, pp. 108, 111-113.

²¹⁶ Lu Jianji. 1995, pp. 21-22.

²¹⁷ Lu Jianji. 1995, p. 22.

²¹⁸ Lu Jianji. 1995, p. 23.

²¹⁹ Wei He. A Theoretical Seminar on Socialist Market Economy and Reforms in Education. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994, p. 38. Wei adds that a market economy is not entirely free in the first place, as it too relies on "government intervention, including state planning [...] to regulate the development of production". Wei He. 1994, p. 38.

²²⁰ Wang Hui. 2004, p. 31.

²²¹ Meng Qinguo. The Historical development of the Concept of Possession and China's Possession System. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994, p. 78. N.B! Meng emphasises the importance of public ownership by granting property the attribute of independence.

²²² Meng Qinguo. 1994, pp. 79-80.

authorities in order to create communal good. Therefore, neoconservative economic treatises of 1994–1996 SSC harboured a clearly distinguishable holist ontology, which describes human nature as embedded in a social whole and is equipped with arguments for society-construction.

Neoconservatives' political philosophy is in many respects similar to their economic rationale. It incorporates traits from neoauthoritarianism and strives to form them into a consistent state ideology. However, while neoauthoritarians sought to build a political system that would eventually grow to support liberal democracy, neoconservatives had no such aspirations.²²³ All they wanted was to strengthen the central state and keep social turmoil in check. It was maintained that China could no longer rely upon the simplistic May Fourth enlightenment project and its uncritical acceptance of individualistic Western values, which through globalization and economic liberalization had brought about moral decay. Instead, much like the neoconservatives a decade before, neoconservatives wished to recast the state-society relations by reviving China's communal traditions. Confucius' 2545th birthday celebrations with great fanfare in Beijing in October 1994 spelled the official revival of Confucianism, which was advocated by many as the ultimate solution to China's social ills and subsequently became one cornerstone to PRC's education policy.²²⁴ Nevertheless, in the 1994 to 1996 SSC there are very few direct references to Confucianism. Like neoauthoritarians writing in the 1980s, neoconservatives too amalgamated Confucian principles into the socialist value system rather than replacing it with neo-Confucianism. For instance, although Wei He states that through education "people's thinking should be liberalized" and "the free and complete development of an individual's character should be encouraged",²²⁵ education remains in his words a "highly socialized" "strategic industry"²²⁶ that must "remould" the Chinese Confucian cultural norms according to "social values".²²⁷ Indeed, as communal values were at the kernel of both socialism and neo-Confucianism, the real ideological adversary to neoconservative cause was classical liberalism with its strongly individualistic underpinnings. Just like orthodox intellectuals of previous decades (most notably Chen Xianda), also neoconservatives blamed the Enlightenment-era

²²³ There are also neoconservatives, such as Wang Huning, that echoing the neoauthoritarian argument talk about an intermediate neoconservative political rule that would lead to democratic reforms. Fewsmith, Joseph. Neoconservatism and the End of Dengist Era. *Asian Survey*. Vol. 35, No. 7, 1995, p. 637.

²²⁴ Yu Tianlong. The Revival of Confucianism in Chinese Schools: A Historical-Political Review. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2008, p. 114.

²²⁵ Wei He. 1994, p. 46.

²²⁶ Wei He. 1994, p. 40.

²²⁷ Wei He. 1994, p. 44.

political ideals in alienating man from the society. He Shunguo provides a thoroughly theoretical explanation for the phenomenon of alienation. He maintains that during the emergence of civil society (in the Enlightenment-era) the concept of people was replaced by that of citizen, exempting some groups, such as slaves, women, etc., from their “natural” right to govern.²²⁸ Yu Keping points out that although the creation of civil society led both to commercial freedom and to the establishment of “citizen's rights as a part of human rights”,²²⁹ it also separated the individual from the community²³⁰ where one “regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes a plaything of alien powers”.²³¹ Such a legitimising anti-imperialist argument against classical liberalism was widely held not only by neoconservatives but also neo-Marxists.

In sum, although the mid-1990s were the heyday of economic liberalisation, orthodox intellectuals writing in SSC seem to have been rather reluctant to openly approve neoliberal socio-economic rationale. Indeed, the articles in the SSC are much more concerned with social justice and stability. The neoconservative orthodoxy was adamant that in order to bring about equality for all the state must not only curb economic freedoms but also foster communal values by limiting civil liberties. Consequently, as the neoconservative theory of liberty places social justice, equality, public ownership, and communal values all above the individual's right for liberty, it falls clearly into the category of positive freedom as described by Berlin.

²²⁸ He Shunguo. 1995, pp. 150-151.

²²⁹ Yu Keping. Marx's Theory of Civil Society and Its Historical Position. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, pp. 89-91.

²³⁰ Yu Keping. 1995, p. 95.

²³¹ Yu Keping. 1995, pp. 88-89.

5. ORTHODOXY OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1997–2002)

Subsequent to the Asian economic crisis in July and the Fifteenth National Congress with “socialist democracy” high on the agenda in September 1997,²³² critique at neoliberals’ ideology and their association with the authoritarian state mechanism grew, particularly among the New Left intellectuals. The New Left is a loosely affiliated group of writers who emphasise popular political participation²³³ and social harmony over economic liberalisation, and stand against “Western” economic practices, such as private property ownership.²³⁴ This criticism, however, had little effect on the orthodoxy. Even though neoliberalism had been criticised in the mid-1990’s SSC, direct attacks at the neoliberal rationale in the SSC during 2000 to 2002 were relatively meagre. Due to China’s dependence on economic growth and foreign investment the pressure to uphold economic liberties was great and thus neoliberalism could not be attacked head-on. Rather, neoliberal ideals became ever more amalgamated into the socialist state ideology.

According to Zhu Gaozheng, since Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 statement that “there is no fundamental contradiction between socialism and a market economy”,²³⁵ socialism and social equality were not considered contradictory to economic liberalism, or liberalism in general. Indeed, Zhu maintains, socialism and liberalism have “increasingly become reconciled throughout the country, and it could be said that they are advancing side by side”.²³⁶ To no surprise, then, neoliberal arguments of the 2000–2002 SSC are almost invariably accompanied by the socialist communitarian ontology. For instance, Zhang Xiong expresses an unambiguously neoliberal maxim that “minimal interference from the government and the maximum economic freedom of all individuals not only results in a rapid improvement in social benefits, but also satisfies social needs” and guarantees “individual independence”.²³⁷ Yet, despite Zhang’s liberal claims, his treatise entails a clearly communitarian ontology with an emphasis on the concept of “real individual”:

²³² Goldman, Merle. 2005, pp. 128-130.

²³³ Hao Zhidong. Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China’s Knowledge Workers. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2003, pp. 168-169.

²³⁴ Zheng Yongnian. Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 62-63.

²³⁵ Deng Xiaoping. There is No Fundamental Contradiction Between Socialism and A Market Economy – Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing, Foreign Language Press, 1994, p. 151.

²³⁶ Zhu Gaozheng. 2001, pp. 103-104.

²³⁷ Zhang Xiong. A Philosophical Analysis of Economic Individualism. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2000, p. 73.

“The term real individuals refers to human beings living in society, not individuals living in isolation from one another. Since human beings live in society, they need to amalgamate into a certain form of social relationships so that they can carry on exchanging of materials with nature. [...] They create for themselves a social environment. Once a social environment is created, it in turn has a powerful effect on real individuals. From this we can see that [...] economic activities involve the social relations of exchange between individuals.”²³⁸

Zhang Jun concurs with Zhang Xiong and adds that without the moral restraint of the society economic systems cannot work at all or at least are impotent to benefit the society,²³⁹ because an economy solely built on rights is destined to fail “if not run by virtuous, honest, upright, and cooperative people”.²⁴⁰ Hence, Zhang Xiong concludes, “economists must regard economic man as an organized person but not as an abstract or imaginary person who exerts the utmost efforts for his or her personal gain and interests”,²⁴¹ and, one might continue his argument, not build socio-economic theories on absolute economic freedoms detached from society as the neoliberals claim to do.

Closest to defending neoliberalism comes Wan Junren, but he too ultimately places communitarian ideals above his liberal acclaims. In describing Adam Smith's moral philosophy Wan boldly asserts that “full and rational free competition and creation of the individual will surely bring forth growth in the welfare of the whole society”.²⁴² Moreover, economic liberties and free market are in Wan's opinion “in conformity with moral value”²⁴³ because they provide “superior organization of economic activities for freedom, equality and free competition”, and essentially clear away “the pre-set controls on man because of political, social and cultural factors as political power, tradition, racial differences and differences in belief”.²⁴⁴ Wan even goes so far as to suggest that market economy is not only rational, but also “fairly just”.²⁴⁵ Thus, Wan appears to turn Zhang Jun's and Zhang Xiong's argument around by showing that economic liberties not only comply to the current social values, but are effectively independent from all

²³⁸ Zhang Xiong. 2000, pp. 74-75.

²³⁹ Zhang Jun. Ethics – An Important Variable in Economic Activities and Economic Research. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2000, p. 69.

²⁴⁰ Zhang Jun. 2000, pp. 67-68.

²⁴¹ Zhang Xiong. 2000, pp. 74-75.

²⁴² Wan Junren. On the Moral Dimension of the Market Economy. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, p. 113.

²⁴³ Wan Junren. 2001, p. 110.

²⁴⁴ Wan Junren. 2001, p. 115.

²⁴⁵ Wan Junren. 2001, p. 116.

non-economic factors, including culture. If that would be all what Wan says about economic theory his account could be described as nothing but neoliberal and overall supportive of liberalism. However, Wan acknowledges that all aspects of economic freedom discussed above are idealised and will, under special circumstances, have drawbacks, such as waste or growing wealth disparities. Difficulties accompanying economic liberalism force Wan to admit that certain social, political, cultural, and moral restrictions on liberal economic practices are indeed inevitable. In his words, “moral value is an inalienable and necessary index in human economic life”²⁴⁶ that can “ensure social justice in distribution” by making “economic procedure as rational as possible”. Values also help “maintain the integrity and unity of the political, economic and cultural world of the human race and ensure the integrity and unity of the human social and personal ideals”.²⁴⁷ Such a claim effectively constricts economic freedoms. In other words, Wan only favours economic liberties so far as they do not infringe upon other values, such as social equality or stability. (Note however, that although Wan sees theoretical difficulties in the essentially neoliberal understanding of economic freedom, he does not mention the already present social discrepancies in Chinese society.)

Albeit SSC did not propagate neoliberalism in mid-1990s, by the early 2000s it had recognised neoliberalism as a valid socio-political theory. Still, while some liberal ideals were fervently defended, the orthodox communitarian ontology remained overwhelming. Hence, the antecedent socio-economic theories can at best be called semi-liberal as all of them necessitate some form of cultural or social control over economic freedoms.

5.1. DEFENCE OF SINO-MARXISM

Certainly the best source of Sino-Marxist political philosophy and its holistic take on liberty in the wake of the new millennium is Li Tieying's article “Questions on the Theory of Democracy” published in 2001. The significance of this particular account is great considering the author's position as a member of the Political Bureau of CCP Central Committee and the President of CASS.²⁴⁸ Nonetheless, one must be cautious not to extend Li's concept of liberty to all of SSC and, indeed, to all the orthodoxy, for as we have seen the orthodox philosophy is never monolithic.

²⁴⁶ Wan Junren. 2001, p. 119.

²⁴⁷ Wan Junren. 2001, p. 121.

²⁴⁸ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, p. 196.

Li criticises the shortcomings of bourgeois democracy in strict Marxist manner. He states that even though the bourgeois political system poses to represent “universal interests of society”, in fact it only realises “particular interest of capital” and makes freedom, equality, democracy and human rights into its prerogatives.²⁴⁹ “The Marxist democratic theory”, however, solved this misconception by raising the question of the “proletarian struggle for liberty” and effectively achieving “people's will”.²⁵⁰ Although the neoliberal accounts of the time stress the importance of individual's freedom to China's socio-economic development, Li's treatise is wholly communitarian and does not value individuals' utility. Li admits that human rights do entail protection of individual liberties, but, he stresses, they also comprise “the rights enjoyed by the collective as subjects relative to the rights of the individuals”, and cover not only the political rights of citizens, but also cultural, economic and social rights. Emphasis on cultural, economic and social rights is one of the key arguments of the orthodoxy that despite some great differences spans all the different orthodox schools of thought from 1980 to 2002.

If the antecedent seems too vague or too theoretical to draw any clear conclusions, Li's concept of “democratic centralism” exemplifies well his strong communitarian verve. According to Li, democratic centralism “demands the formation of a unified will and common purpose on the basis of a full reflection of the will of the masses”.²⁵¹ Not only does Li portray the masses as *a priori* one and therefore having one will, but also urges the proletariat to organise “under that party's leadership [to] fight for and protect the right of the proletariat and the broad masses”. Li is supportive of a centralised one-party-rule and considers it to be crucial for the unity and stability of the society.²⁵² For that end he advocates “democratic dictatorship”,²⁵³ where an “overwhelming majority exercises dictatorship and domination over an extremely small minority of hostile elements”.²⁵⁴ By evoking classical Sino-Marxist rhetoric Li's article seems like an aggressive statement that the old-school Sino-Marxist discourse is still alive. More importantly, given Li's conviction that democratic dictatorship allows the majority to suppress certain groups of the society by exempting them from the protection of their liberties he theoretically justifies society-

²⁴⁹ Li Tieying. Questions on the Theory of Democracy. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, pp. 7-9.

²⁵⁰ Li Tieying. 2001, p. 8.

²⁵¹ Li Tieying. 2001, p. 19.

²⁵² Li Tieying. 2001, pp. 15-16.

²⁵³ Li Tieying. 2001, pp. 17-18. According to Li, “democracy is the people's right and the means by which the people manage the affairs of state and society, while dictatorship is a function of the state, the means by which hostile elements are punished according to the law”.

²⁵⁴ Li Tieying. 2001, p. 10.

construction and forcefully asserts collectivism over individualism, because social coercion always implies a clearly defined social coalition and an attainable and supposedly objective ideology. Although he does not explicitly define freedom, he nevertheless expresses clearly why individual freedom cannot be exercised, that is, due to the communal "people's will". This "people's will", however, is the contractual basis that effectively refutes classical freedom.

Li's article is, however, an exception. The majority of intellectuals at the time writing in SSC do not represent such strict and old-fashioned Marxism, but argue for some form of individual liberty. For instance, Yu Jianxing's defends individual freedom by accusing the so called "economic determinists" (by whom he means leftists like Li) in mistakenly believing that Marx and Engels valued society over the individual. But, as Yu shows, this is not the case. According to Yu, the Manifesto of the Communist Party written by Marx and Engels states clearly that "we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". In Yu's opinion, however, the leftists reversed the relationship between the "free development of each" and the "free development of all" and thereby neglected individual freedom ("each") by putting mistakenly too much emphasis on society ("all").²⁵⁵ Chen Duanhong, on the other hand, argues for individual rights by criticizing the principle of "democratic dictatorship" praised by Li. Although he admits that democracy and dictatorship are indeed dialectically bound, the concept of separating people from enemies "leads to the differing treatment of citizens according to their political identity" and therefore violates their civil rights.²⁵⁶ Accordingly, Chen applauds the reforms of 1979 and 1989 that declared personal matters like family background and political identity irrelevant to legal procedure and therefore affirmed individual's equality before the law.²⁵⁷ It is "incomprehensible and intolerable", Chen stresses, for the courts "to depend on and actively pursue political goals".²⁵⁸

Yet, both Cheng and Yu accompany their seemingly liberal arguments with constraining communitarian precepts. Although Cheng acknowledges the importance of civil rights, he also argues for "democratic centralization [...] which according to the orthodox interpretation means centralization based on democracy and democracy under the direction of centralization". This rather ambiguous principle serves, among other things, to make "courts aware that people are the

²⁵⁵ Yu Jianxing. 2001, p. 88.

²⁵⁶ Chen Duanhong. Administration of Justice and Democracy: A Critique of the Democratization of the Chinese Judiciary. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2002, pp. 89-90.

²⁵⁷ Chen Duanhong. 2002, pp. 90-91.

²⁵⁸ Chen Duanhong. 2002, p. 94.

masters of the state".²⁵⁹ Note however, that given the stress on centralisation in Cheng's argument, the term "people" – much like Li Tieying's "masses" – is more likely to mean a collective whole with a unitary will as opposed to a sum of constituent individuals. Yu, on the other hand, states quite clearly that "in order to achieve personal freedom there must be a real community [where] the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association".²⁶⁰ He is adamant that "society or community is prior to the individual and individuality consists of social relations; not the other way around".²⁶¹ Thus, although both Yu and Cheng allude to some aspects of classical freedom, they both adhere to a holist ontology and consequently must be dubbed communitarian.

While in the beginning of the new millennium Sino-Marxism and utilitarianism were ever important in the orthodox philosophy, new communitarian arguments were also making headway. Gao Qinghai and Yu Xiaofeng approach freedom through environmental concerns. Albeit individualism can encourage development, they argue, "unbalanced modernization" has led to "exaggerated" independence and in turn grave environmental consequences.²⁶² However, would man choose to adopt the "doctrine of species", Gao and Yu maintain reminiscent to Chen Xianda's argument of 1982, we could overcome the crisis by bringing about a "global consciousness" where "an independent personality will be elevated to species personality [and] consciously open himself up to nature and the world".²⁶³ Such a modern and perfected being would arguably assimilate him or herself with nature²⁶⁴ and come to realise his or her social responsibilities.²⁶⁵ Yet, Gao and Yu insist, we must "instil a noble personality into independent individual"²⁶⁶ and preserve "egoism".²⁶⁷ Thus, while the so-called global consciousness of a species personality is clearly a communitarian notion, emphasis on egoism makes their argument akin to the neoliberal argument for the practicality of individualism. More importantly, however, they manage to defend collective values by asserting environmental concerns, and in so doing make environmentalism part of the orthodox communitarian discourse very much in vogue in the new millennium.

²⁵⁹ Chen Duanhong. 2002, p. 91.

²⁶⁰ Yu Jianxing. 2001, pp. 93-94.

²⁶¹ Yu Jianxing. 2001, p. 95.

²⁶² Gao Qinghai; Yu Xiaofeng. Species Philosophy and the Modernization of Man. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, p. 102.

²⁶³ Gao Qinghai; Yu Xiaofeng. 2001, pp. 103-104.

²⁶⁴ Gao Qinghai; Yu Xiaofeng. 2001, pp. 99-100.

²⁶⁵ Gao Qinghai; Yu Xiaofeng. 2001, pp. 101-102.

²⁶⁶ Gao Qinghai; Yu Xiaofeng. 2001, p. 107.

²⁶⁷ Gao Qinghai; Yu Xiaofeng. 2001, pp. 103-104.

5.2. MENG FANHUA'S NOTIONS ON LIBERTY

The most apparent albeit somewhat ambivalent challenge to the positive concept of liberty in the SSC from the period 2000 to 2002 is Meng Fanhua's article "Political Culture and Contemporary Studies of Chinese Literature and Art". At first Meng is adamant that China's literature and knowledge creation in general are and have been free. Inspired by Foucault, Meng maintains that "since political culture defines the political psychology and subjective orientation of the nation as a group, the producers of knowledge who are part of the nation will inevitably be controlled by the political culture". Therefore, as Mao Zedong Thought and Sino-Marxism were "incorporated into the subconsciousness of the nation as a group", scholars as producers of knowledge were inevitably subject to their influence.²⁶⁸ With a risk of oversimplifying his argument, Meng seems to state that because Sino-Marxist discourse created the political culture of the era, and because the literati were inevitably situated in this culture, they could not have adhered to any other socio-political thought even if they wished to, for stepping out of the prevalent Sino-Marxism discourse would have been inconceivable. Hence, Meng insists, the Mao-era Chinese literati were essentially free.

In mid-article, however, Meng seems to alter his argument. Despite having previously insisted on the inevitably collective nature of political consciousness, he now deems all policies that try to "give full scope to collective wisdom and improve collective creativeness" as contradictory and demeaning, and outright denounces the anti-individualist political dogmas of the Mao-era.²⁶⁹ According to him, in China's recent history intellectuals were constantly pressured by national campaigns to "forsake independent thought and identify oneself with the common domain of materials and means of discourse" and thereby become "red experts" subservient to state's political agenda.²⁷⁰ Therefore, Meng insists, Chinese political culture is disruptive to "any attempt by intellectuals to construct their own consciousness" and ultimately not free.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Meng Fanhua. Political Culture and Contemporary Studies of Chinese Literature and Art. *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 146.

²⁶⁹ Meng Fanhua. 2001, pp. 150-151.

²⁷⁰ Meng Fanhua. 2001, pp. 148-149.

²⁷¹ Meng Fanhua. 2001, p. 148. Consequently, Meng borrows words from Rudolf Wagner, "most of the humanists and social scientific studies and literary creations after 1949 should be studied from the perspective of political struggle rather than from an academic or literary perspective". Meng Fanhua. 2001, p. 151.

The two antecedent notions, one communitarian and the other anti-communitarian, would leave us guessing about Meng's intentions, if it were not for the decisive ontological argument underneath his treatise. Most interestingly, Meng reproves Mao's holist concept of man, which, as one can understand from the accounts of Chen Xianda, Sha Lianxiang, Yu Jianxing and many others, was the ontological foundation of Chinese orthodox political philosophy. He writes:

"When Mao attempted to free China from the hegemony of capitalism, he made people prey to another kind of unified control. Emphasising the role of man and man's will meant the unity of will and its role rather than the will of the individual and his or her role. This is another characteristic of China's political culture. Mao often used the concept of people, which had nothing to do with the individual and was in fact in direct opposition to the individual [...] Although the focus of the political culture on man's will and spirit appeared to respect man and promise liberation, such theories do not mean the emancipation of man, but the suppression and control of man's natural demands and spiritual world."²⁷²

This paragraph places Meng undoubtedly among the liberals. Meng is obviously disappointed in Mao's apparent promise of individual freedom that the Sino-Marxist political structure could not deliver. Instead, he describes how individual's "natural" liberties ("demands and spiritual world") during the Mao-era were unnecessarily suppressed. In addition, Meng deems Mao's bid to modernise the Chinese people by "reshaping" their will a mistake, and thereby dismisses society-construction as a reasonable way towards social good and well-being. All these arguments place individual rights above communal responsibilities and consequently unveil Meng's atomist ontology.²⁷³

The new millennium began with much more intellectual fervour than the previous decade. The strongly Sino-Marxist arguments with their clear advocacy for collectivist ideals appear on the pages of the SSC side by side with articles calling for freedom in the negative sense of the word. However, as diverse philosophical currents of *fin de siècle* pulled China apart, the leadership fostered nationalistic and patriotic sentiments in hope to bind the nation together. The central government has proclaimed the need to create a "harmonious society" and has thereby shown some interest in the egalitarian notions of the New Left. Indeed, as Wang Hui points out, by the

²⁷² Meng Fanhua. 2001, pp. 153-154.

²⁷³ Meng also laments that "the overemphasis on the 'national consciousness' aggravated the confrontation between Eastern and Western culture, and meant losing the opportunity for communication and exchanges with the West". Meng Fanhua. 2001, p. 155.

late 1990s some Chinese intellectuals had gone along with the economic development and had “been reorganized into relations internal to the state, educational institutions, think tanks, commercial activates”, etc; still others had refused to follow the trend. The approach to political liberties of the coopted intellectuals remained largely based on the reaction to “radicalism” and thus continued to justify the communitarian state ideology.²⁷⁴

²⁷⁴ Wang Hui. 2004, pp. 40, 55-56.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The chief discord between Isaiah Berlin's theory of two concepts of liberty and Edmund S. K. Fung's theory of dual responsibilities is in their foci. Berlin's induction relies on an ontological differential between the atomist and the holist definition of human nature, which is implicit in every argument about freedom and separates all essentially negative treatises of liberty from the essentially positive ones. Fung, on the other hand, founds his theory on the synchronic principle of dual responsibilities, which allows intellectuals to argue for negative and positive freedom simultaneously depending on the necessity, while paying no attention to ontology. I find the latter argument flawed. Even if it were possible for a treatise, a theory, or an intellectual to uphold two contradictory ontological positions simultaneously or escape an ontological premise altogether, it is a matter of fact that all treatises analysed in this thesis do contain an ontological premise, and that this premise is always only holist or only atomist, but never both. Consequently, as the ontological backdrop gives unavoidable precedence to only one concept of freedom, it is possible to determine whether a treatise is liberal or communitarian. This fact proves Berlin's theory correct and Fung's criticism on it erroneous. The following explains the conclusions of the thesis in more detail.

Appearing to China's political landscape in 1980 SSC broadly reflects the orthodox philosophy in the period from 1980 to 2002. The articles never challenge the party leadership head-on, nor stray too far from the socio-economic "truths" underlying its legitimacy. Although orthodox Sino-Marxist rhetoric gradually diminishes and its ideals are occasionally rethought, its holist ontology remains prevalent. Indeed, different and even previously shunned philosophical rationales such as Confucianism and natural sciences are used to argue for the same ontological precepts. This is not to say, however, that the opinions expressed in SSC are monotonous and unchanging. The journal contains great debate over the nature of freedom both at one given time and through different decades. Articles from the early 1980s put more stress on society-construction, which, with its explicitly communitarian principles, poses a philosophical problem to the more pragmatic and liberal economic theories of the era. Despite their differences, however, all theories of the early 1980s rely invariably on a holist ontology. The second half of the 1980s brings with it the neoauthoritarian theory of gradual progression towards an open and democratic society. Indeed, the treatises from 1987 to 1989 contain more notions of negative liberty than any other period under survey. But even then liberalism is not generally valued *per*

se, but used for social progress and stability, or regarded alien and inferior to Chinese communal traditions. Because such neo-Confucian principles persisted and the 1989 Tiananmen uprising sparked a wide reaction against liberal “radicalism”, references to negative freedom during the mid-1990s are particularly few. The explicit recognition of neoliberal economic theories into the orthodox rationale at the wake of the new millennium again spurs greater interest towards liberal ideals, but almost all accounts on freedom remain true to a holist ontology. Li Tieying's somewhat old-fashioned article from 2001 is an apt reminder of how strong the Sino-Marxist rationale of the Chinese orthodox philosophy still could be. Nonetheless, given that his assertively communitarian treatise is published amidst of some semi-liberal treatises shows how varied the orthodox discourse on freedom had become.

The period from 1980 to 2002 also produces at least two overtly liberal treatises, one by Xu Zongmian in 1989 and the other by Meng Fanhua in 2001. The political climate of the late 1980s and the early 2000s was relatively relaxed and therefore more open for liberal dispositions such as these. However, one does well to keep in mind SSC's relations to the state apparatus and the ensuing possibility of merely using liberal treatises against the ultra-leftist critique. The overall temper of the SSC was more often than not a reaction against the so called “radical” discourse of the time. For instance, when the state ideology was weak in the first half of the 1990s and the threat of another Tiananmen-like uprising seemed imminent, SSC stood firmly against any kind of liberal thought, including the neoliberal economic theories already latently excepted by the state authorities. On the other hand, when the political situation relaxed, as was the case in the late 1980s and from 2000 to 2002, the SSC could come forth with more liberal arguments. However, this was not always done in the interest of liberalising the society, but possibly to refute the conservative critique of the far-left on the neoliberal economic policies.

All the same, there are good reasons why not write off Xu's and Meng's articles as merely circumstantial. Their atomist ontologies put them far apart from the communitarian orthodoxy and therefore make their arguments possibly dangerous to the established *status quo*. Indeed, should the atomism of Xu and Meng win more adherence and in its fight for legitimacy come to dominate over the conventional holist ontology, it would have revolutionary implications to the Chinese society. The CCP would have a hard time explaining their deeply communitarian state ideology, which with its amalgamated traits of socialism and neo-Confucianism dominates much of China's socio-political life, not to mention every aspect of its orthodoxy. The state would be

pressed to remove constraints on civil liberties, possibly generating social upheaval and certainly causing the leadership to lose face not only among their compatriots but also in front of the international community. It is not my intention, however, to analyse atomism's effects on the Chinese society, but simply to point to the fact that if the state needed to invoke liberal arguments against the conservative ultra-leftist critique, it would probably not use treatises with such explicitly liberal characteristics, but resort to more conventional means. Thus, the fact that Xu's and Meng's treatises could be printed in one of the most orthodox journals in China points not only to their definitive efforts to push for a more liberal society, but to a struggle among the orthodox intelligentsia over the nature of freedom.

Now let us turn to the main argument. From the above analysis of the orthodox Chinese intellectuals one can induce a repeating pattern – although the communitarian features of the Chinese orthodoxy remain strong, accounts from all four time periods contain aspects of negative freedom parallel to aspects of positive freedom. If Fung's theory is to be applied, the simultaneous usage of negative and positive freedom by the orthodox intellectuals would simply bespeak of their dual responsibilities – one which advocates negative freedom and regards individual liberty inevitable or for some reason necessary, and the other that advocates positive freedom and considers communal values and the greater good of the society more important. For example, when Zhang Xiong²⁷⁵ (2000) writes on economy he argues for minimising government's role and maximising individual freedoms, thus appealing to negative freedom, but when he comes to define the individual he asserts a communitarian view of human relations with overt aspects of positive freedom. According to Fung, then, this parallel appearance of negative and positive freedom indicates that Zhang adheres to two different “responsibilities” and cannot be regarded as only liberal or only communitarian. More precisely, to paraphrase Fung, in the discourse on economic development Zhang invokes the idea of individual rights and liberties; in the discourse on human nature he invokes the Marxist idea of man's communal essence. Consequently, rather than grouping individual intellectuals together on the basis of their concept to liberty, Fung maintains, one should comprehend that intellectuals can alter their definition of freedom respective of “responsibility” or of the topic at hand and uphold more than one concept of freedom at any given time.

²⁷⁵ For a full analysis of Zang Xiong's treatise, see: pp. 50-52 of this thesis.

This thesis finds Fung's induction both philosophically and historically wrong. The philosophical structure of Berlin's theory can be described as follows. Every argument on liberty entails an ontological premise. Depending on whether a treatise harbours a holist or an atomist ontology it defines human nature, its relationship to the society, and consequently also freedom in that society differently. Whilst atomist ontologies align with negative freedom and depict society as a sum of constituent individuals with their own individual value-holdings, holist ontologies correspond to positive freedom and regard individuals essentially situated in a societal whole with a unitary value system. Now, because the two ontologies are mutually exclusive (entailing contradictory definitions of human nature), one intellectual cannot uphold them both without being inconsistent. This logical inference lies at the core of Berlin's theory, and allows him to discern all fundamentally negative concepts of freedom from all fundamentally positive concepts of freedom.

Furthermore, because ontological convictions cannot be changed at will, but are continuously reproduced without further proof, the ontology of one treatise reflects the way intellectuals perceive freedom throughout their work. I do not wish to refute completely the possibility of altering one's ontological affiliations in time. However, should this be the case, all arguments adhering to the former ontology must be regarded oppositional to all arguments adhering to the latter ontology. All the same, the persistence of the ontological premises assures us that even though some treatises contain aspects of positive and negative freedom that seem of completely unrelated topics, they nevertheless must adhere to the same ontological point of reference and deep down also to the same concept of liberty. This means that the concept of liberty cannot differ depending on a given topic, as Fung suggests.

However, it is not enough to rely on mere logic to prove Berlin's theory correct. It must also be backed up with historical evidence and found working in intellectual treatises. And that, if anything, has been the purpose of this thesis. As is evident from the above analysis of the Chinese orthodoxy, no intellectual can indeed escape giving an ontological premise to his or her concept of freedom. It is also evident, that even if the choice between an atomist and a holist ontology could be avoided, none of the orthodox Chinese authors choose to do so – which may indicate that it is, in fact, impossible. Take for instance the same treatise given to illustrate Fung's theory. The ontological premise of Zhang Xiong's treatise is clearly eminent – he perceives human nature as a collective of amalgamated individuals bound together by “a whole gamut of social

institutions, customs, habits, and ideologies”, thus giving his whole treatise a clearly holistic backdrop. Simultaneously Zhang insists on some clearly negative aspects of freedom, such as “minimal interference from the government and the maximum economic freedom of all individuals”. However, the holist ontology of the treatise takes philosophical precedence over individual interests and justifies limiting these aspects of negative freedom to a point where individual liberties can be curbed to serve the communal good of the society. Put simply, Zhang's economic argument can be regarded liberal only if taken out of its ontological context. However, once the holist ontology is accounted for, his economic principles are subsumed into a larger communitarian argument and cease to function as liberal. And Zhang himself proves this by stating that “economists must regard economic man as an organized person but not as an abstract or imaginary person who exerts the utmost efforts for his or her personal gain and interests”.

The consistency with which the orthodox Chinese authors use ontological reasoning in their arguments on freedom verifies the logical premises of Berlin's theory. Therefore, we can divide intellectuals according to their concepts of freedom into liberals and communitarians. In addition, given that all economy treatises discussed above stay true to the positive concept of freedom regardless of the strong pressure to liberalise China's economy, the concept of liberty in China's intellectual field appears not to depend on the necessity or the topic at hand, as Fung would have it, but rather on the overall political climate of the day. After all, Xu's and Meng's arguments for classical liberty rise from a principally philosophical insight and not from an economic calculation.

The usage of oppositional concepts of freedom by the orthodox Chinese intellectuals seems contradictory. As Fritz Ringer explains, the presupposed nature of ideas and their inherent contradictions of the orthodox political theory are only apparent to the viewer from outside the discourse who does not share the same epistemological rationale.²⁷⁶ However, we should not regard orthodox holist accounts containing aspects of negative freedom (or *vice versa*) incoherent. According to the Chinese orthodox philosophy, it is not contradictory to state that an individual is absolutely free while bound by the essentially holist cosmology and its materialistic societal laws. Instead, in line with Berlin's theory of positive doctrine of liberation by reason, much of the Chinese orthodoxy perceives freedom as the realization of the inevitable, which may seem restrictive only if it is not fully understood. Once the objective laws of the society are

²⁷⁶ See: pp. 15-16 of this thesis.

adopted into one's rational nature, however, these laws cease to seem restrictive. Hence, the orthodox intellectuals can argue without any contradictions that within the natural laws of the society individual liberty is absolute.

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APPENDIX 1: MACCALLUM'S THEORY OF LIBERTY

MacCallum's linguistic analysis of freedom comes to a conclusion that Berlin's distinction between two concepts of liberty is wrong. Instead he proposes a triadic concept of liberty where all variables of any possible notion of freedom – (a) an agent, (b) a goal, and (c) a preventing condition – are simultaneously present. His argument is as follows: Whenever one says that an individual (a) is free *to* do or be something (b), one unavoidably also notes a freedom *from* something (c) that could hinder this from happening, and vice versa. As the three variables that form every possible definition of liberty vary enormously, MacCallum maintains, the division of intellectuals on the basis of Berlin's two concepts of liberty is futile. Moreover, while the adherers of negative freedom see the individual as a separate entity, and those of positive freedom see the individual as part of a bigger “whole”, they both still talk about liberty that is both freedom *to* and freedom *from* at the same time. So, no matter how these variables differ, the concept of freedom remains always unchanged and cannot be divided in two.²⁷⁷

APPENDIX 2: METZGER'S THEORY OF LIBERTY

According to Thomas A. Metzger, classical liberalists maintain that because the knowledge to craft rational solutions to political problems is not attainable, restricting personal liberty and the freedom of the intellectual, political and economic marketplaces is not justified. Metzger calls such a philosophical approach “epistemological pessimism”. The orthodox Chinese intellectuals, on the other hand, hold true to “epistemological optimism” and claim that correct political knowledge is attainable by “moral-intellectual virtuosi” who, thus, have the knowledge and capacity to restrict individual freedom and the freedom of the three marketplaces. Furthermore, epistemological optimism allows the political elite to assert thick social parameters in order to “spiritually transform the citizenry” and guide it towards recognizing its true nature and real liberty in social harmony.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ MacCallum, Gerald C., Jr. Negative and Positive Freedom. *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1967, pp. 312-327.

²⁷⁸ Metzger, Thomas A. 2005, pp. 15-31.

APPENDIX 3: COMPARING REMARKS FROM JOHN LOCKE

Locke states in his “Two Treatises of Government” that “political power is that power, which every man [...] has given up into the hands of the society [...] with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good [...] to preserve the members of the society in their lives, liberties and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes. [...] And this power has its original [sic] only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the community”.²⁷⁹

APPENDIX 4: BACKGROUND ON SSC AUTHORS AND THEIR TREATISES²⁸⁰

- Chen Duanhong was an associate professor at the School of Law of the Peking University.²⁸¹
- Chen Xianda was working at the Institute for Research on the History of Marxism-Leninism affiliated to the Chinese People's University.²⁸² Chen Xianda's article is translated by Zhu Shida.
- Chen Xiushan was an associate professor at the Department of Economics of the Chinese People's University.²⁸³ Chen Xiusha's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1994 (No. 2) and is here translated by Lin Hong and Bruce Doar, and revised by Li Wen and Su Xuetao.
- Gao Qinghai's and Yu Xiaofeng's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1999 (No. 1) and is here translated by Huang Weiwei and is revised by Yu Sheng and Su Xuetao. In their digital versions Yu Jianxing's article “Marx and Liberal Humanism”, Zhu Gaozheng's article “The Opposition and Interaction between Liberalism and Socialism”, Gao Qinghai's and Yu Xiaofeng's article “Species Philosophy and the Modernization of Man”, and C. L. Sheng's article “New Comments on Rawls' Theory, Particularly the Difference Principle” of the same issue have overlapping page numbers.

²⁷⁹ Locke, John. *Two Treatises of Government*. London, printed for R. Butler, Bruton-street, etc., 1821, pp. 337-338.

²⁸⁰ Information on some of the authors and treatises was not found in SSC or was partial.

²⁸¹ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2002, p. 95.

²⁸² *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1982, p. 235.

²⁸³ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1995, p. 222.

- Gao Zhihua's article was translated by Zhao Guanglu.
- Gu Peidong's and Zhang Jiankui's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1998 (No. 6) and is translated by Huang Weiwei and revised by Yu Sheng and Su Xuetao.
- Han Qingxiang was an associate professor at the Department of Philosophy of the Party School of Central Committee.²⁸⁴ Han Qingxiang's article was first published in *Zhongguo Shihui Kexue* in 1995 (No. 3) and is here translated by Yang Zhi and revised by Su Xuetao.
- He Jianzhang was a research fellow and deputy director of the Institute of Economics under the State Planning Commission. He Jianzhang's article was translated by Zhao Shuhan.
- Hu Chenghuai worked at the Theoretical Research Institute of the Zhejiang CCP Party School.²⁸⁵ Hu Chenghuai's article was first published in *Zhexue Yenjiu* in 1992 (no. 3) and is here translated by Zhao Qinghua and revised by Zhu Shida and Yang Dawu.
- He Shunguo was an associate professor at the Department of History of Beijing University.²⁸⁶ He Shunguo's article was first published in *Lishi Yanjiu* in 1993 (No. 2) and is here translated by Li Huailin and revised by Liu Ruixiang and Tao Busi.
- Jiang Yiwei was on the Academic Council of the Institute of Industrial Economics of the Academy of Social Sciences. Jiang's article was first published in *Lishi Yanjiu* (Historical Studies) in 1980 (No. 1) and is translated here by Liang Liangxin.
- Li Minghua was an associate research fellow and a director at the Institute of Philosophy and Culture of the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences.²⁸⁷ Li Minghua's article was first published in *Zhexue yanjiu* in 1992 (no. 6) and is here translated by Li Huailin and revised by Xie Zhenqing and Bruce Doar.
- Li Peilin was an associate researcher at the Institute of Sociology of CASS. Li Peilin's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1992 (No. 5) and is here reviewed by Huang Weiwei and Shen Jiangrui and is revised by Yang Zhi and Susan Dewar.

²⁸⁴ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, p. 194.

²⁸⁵ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994, p. 224.

²⁸⁶ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, p. 223.

²⁸⁷ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994, p. 224.

- Li Pengcheng was an associate research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy of CASS.²⁸⁸ Li Pengcheng's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shihui Kexue* in 1995 (No. 5) and is here translated by Yang Zhi and revised by Su Xuetao.
- Li Tieying's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 2001 (No. 1) and is translated by Feng Shize and revised by Yu Sheng and Su Xuetao.
- Li Zehou was a research fellow of the Institute of Philosophy under CASS. Li Zehou's article was translated by Zhu Shida and edited by Anders Hansson.
- Lin Fang's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shihui Kexue* in 1984 (No. 4) and is here reviewed by Li Jianxiong and translated by Han Mengde.
- Ling Yunong was a postgraduate majoring in scientific socialism at the Party Central Committee School.²⁸⁹ Ling Yunong's article was first published in the *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1986 (No. 5) and is here translated by Xie Zhenqing.
- Liu Xiaogan was teaching at the Department of Philosophy of the Beijing University.²⁹⁰ Liu Xiaogan's article is translated by Zhu Shida and was published in the *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1986 (No. 2).
- Lu Jianjie was a professor and an editor-in-chief of the Nanjing Social Sciences.²⁹¹ Lu Jianjie's article was first published in the *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1993 (No. 5) and is here translated by Zhu Tingjun and Zhu Shida and revised by Xie Zhenqing and Yang Dawu.
- Meng Fanhua was an associated research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Literature of CASS.²⁹² Meng Fanhua's article was published in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1999 (No. 6) and is translated by Zhu Shida and is revised by Su Xuetao.
- Meng Qinguo was an associate professor at the Law Department of the Guangxi University.²⁹³
- Qian Xuesen was deputy director of the Scientific and Technological Council under the State Commission for National Defence and Technological Industries.²⁹⁴ Qian Xuesen's article was translated by Feng Shize.

²⁸⁸ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1996, p. 192.

²⁸⁹ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1987, p. 233.

²⁹⁰ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1988, p. 238.

²⁹¹ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1995, p. 222.

²⁹² *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 196.

²⁹³ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994, p. 219.

²⁹⁴ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1983, p. 243.

- Wan Junren was a professor at the Department of Philosophy of the Qinghua University.²⁹⁵ Wan Junren's article was published in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 2000 (No. 1) and is translated by Zhu Shida and revised by Mike Liston.
- Wei He was an Associate Senior Editor of the *Jiaoyu Yenjiu*.²⁹⁶ Wei He's article was first published *Jiaoyu Yenjiu* in 1993 (no. 2) and is here translated by Li Huailin, revised by Xie Zhenqing and Su Xuetao.
- Xu Zongmian's article is translated by Jin Yongjian and Wang Youping. His article was not previously published in SSC Chinese edition.
- Yu Guangyuan was at time of writing his article the vice-president of CASS and the director of the Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought Research Institute of CASS.²⁹⁷ Yu's article is translated by Melissa Ennen.
- Yu Jianxing worked at the Department of Public Management of the Zhejiang University.²⁹⁸ Yu Jianxing's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shihui Kexue* in 2000 (No. 2) and is translated by Feng Yihan and revised by Mike Liston. In their digital versions Yu Jianxing's article "Marx and Liberal Humanism", Zhu Gaozheng's article "The Opposition and Interaction between Liberalism and Socialism", Gao Qinghai's and Yu Xiaofeng's article "Species Philosophy and the Modernization of Man", and C. L. Sheng's article "New Comments on Rawls' Theory, Particularly the Difference Principle" of the same issue have overlapping page numbers.
- Yu Keping was a deputy director and an associate researcher at the Contemporary Marxism Research Institute of the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.²⁹⁹ Yu Keping's article was first published in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1993 (No. 4) and is here translated by Jin Shaoqing and revised by Liu Ruixiang and Su Xuetao.
- Zhang Enhe was a professor at the Graduate School of the CASS.³⁰⁰ Zhang Enhe's article was first published in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* of 1987 (No. 1) and is translated by Huang Liang.

²⁹⁵ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001.

²⁹⁶ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994.

²⁹⁷ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1981, p. 233.

²⁹⁸ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001.

²⁹⁹ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, p. 224.

³⁰⁰ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1988, p. 241.

- Zhang Jianming was master's degree student at the Institute of Sociological Studies of the Chinese People's University.³⁰¹ *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* published this article in 1988 (No. 2) and is here in Ma Ji's translation.
- Zhang Jun was a professor at the Department of Economics of Fudan University.³⁰²
- Zhang Shichu's article was published in the English edition SSC in March 1986 in Zhao Qinghua's translation, but it appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* already in 1985 (No. 3). Because it is impossible from the given text to gather which notions belong to the author and which to the general symposium, I consider the whole article to represent Zhang's point of view.
- Zhang Xiong was a professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Shanghai Air Force Political College.³⁰³
- Zhao Fusan's article first appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1987 (No. 3) and is translated here by Wu Ming.
- Zheng Hangsheng was at the moment of the publication a professor and vice-president of the Chinese People's University, director of the Department of Sociology and director of the Institute of Sociological Studies.³⁰⁴
- Zhu Gaozheng was a chairman of International Research Institute of "Book of Changes".³⁰⁵ Zhu's article appeared in *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* in 1999 (No. 6) and is translated by Huang Shuqi and revised by Yu Sheng and Su Xuetao. In their digital versions Yu Jianxing's article "Marx and Liberal Humanism", Zhu Gaozheng's article "The Opposition and Interaction between Liberalism and Socialism", Gao Qinghai's and Yu Xiaofeng's article "Species Philosophy and the Modernization of Man", and C. L. Sheng's article "New Comments on Rawls' Theory, Particularly the Difference Principle" of the same issue have overlapping page numbers.

³⁰¹ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1988, p. 238.

³⁰² *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2000, p. 185.

³⁰³ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2000, p. 185.

³⁰⁴ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1988, p. 238.

³⁰⁵ *Social Sciences in China*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, p. 196.