

# EU Actorness and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Evaluating EU actorness in the context of Bosnia and  
Herzegovina

# Abstract

Today the phenomenon of actorness in international relations is perceived as important in portraying how influential and successful a state or an organization is in the international political scene. The aim of this thesis is to try to investigate the actorness of the European Union as a “sui generis” case in the world through the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country in the near neighborhood of the Union and an aspirant country for the Union membership. The thesis will use as theoretical framework the work of Bretherton & Vogler to determine actorness and EU actorness, as well as the concepts of power including civilian, military and normative power. The aspects of actorness and the concepts of power will then be examined in the context of EU – Bosnia and Herzegovina relations to empirically investigate the presence, and success, of EU actorness.

Keywords: European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, actorness, actor, power, regionalism

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# 1.Introduction

I have worked for a while now on my thesis on the European Union actorness in general, but also focusing and evaluating the Union actorness in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the issue of actorness is relevant in determining the significance of a unit in the field of contemporary international relations, I found the topic of EU actorness interesting due to its “sui generis” structure, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina as an interesting case due to its proximity to the Union and relations the two have developed for two decades now.

## 1.1 Objective, Research Question and Outline

The thesis has been designed in order to try to provide answers on the following two research questions:

Question 1: Is there a European Union actorness in general?

Question 2: Is there a European Union actorness in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

While question 1 focuses more generally on the phenomenon of actorness and the development of EU actorness, question 2 focuses more specifically on the actorness in the aspect of EU – Bosnia and Herzegovina relations, while drawing the theoretical framework from the first question. My objective is that the answers and analyses regarding the two research questions try to portray the “whole picture” of the issue of EU actorness and the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina altogether.

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the topic, including the objective, the presentation of the research questions and an outline of the work. Chapter 2 is also of an introductory nature where it describes the historical context of the Union and how it came to be. Chapter 3 focuses on the historical aspect of the development of the Union, how European regionalism was created and how it resulted in creating a possible powerful actor on the international scene. It then focuses on the theoretical aspect of EU actorness, as well as on the civilian, military and normative power. Chapter 4 introduces the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and relates it to the theoretical aspects of EU actorness. And finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings and presents final interpretations and conclusions.

## 1.2 Method and Material

As for the methodology I have chosen the explanatory case study method, focusing on EU actorness through the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The research was merely of a descriptive nature, and the theories to which I refer are used to analyze and interpret EU actorness and later on the actorness in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an aspirant country for the EU membership.

I have basically carried out my research mainly using secondary sources on the history of the European Union, work of other authors on the phenomenon of actorness, and EU's external relations, as well as the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina documents on the units of EU – Bosnia relationship such as association agreements, financial aid programmes and so on. The theoretical perspective has been based on the work of Bretherton and Vogler (1999) and Ian Manners and Francois Duchéne on the topic of power, which implies that it is a theory-consuming study. The empirical material consists of various EU official documents, as well as the documents provided by the Bosnian institutions and work of other relevant authors describing EU – Bosnia post-war relations.

The material will be interpreted with the assistance of qualitative text analysis in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex phenomena that constitute EU actorness, together with the EU-Bosnia relationship. Another important reason for choosing qualitative text analysis is that researchers try to capture what lies hidden beneath the surface and thus constructs it through intensive reading of the text. (Esaïsson, 2007; p. 234)

## 2. A new Actor?

When observing the nature of EU actorness it is important to observe the underlying historical events and phenomena that have led to its eventual appearance and what shape the Union took as a “sui generis” case in the world. The story of European integration is pegged to the period after the World War II and the basis of the integration process was set in the 40s and 50s with the goal of preserving peace and security in the war-torn Europe. As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008; p. 35) point out in their work this was achieved through the 1947 Marshall Plan and the Schuman Declaration of 1950.

The Marshall Plan, drafted by the United States Secretary of State General George Marshall, represented a long-term US assistance programme for the war-torn

continent. The Plan was driven by the fear of the US that the communist ideology would spread further west due to poor economic, humanitarian, political and security factors in Europe. The United States provided billions of dollars aimed at improving the socio-economic situation, to restore order and stability in Western Europe and to obtain rapid improvements in overall living conditions. However, the Marshall Plan was more than just an impressive economic assistance programme, it was additionally aimed at influencing and shaping ideas, norms and values that would govern Western Europe. The Marshall Plan was used by the United States as an instrument to shape and consolidate a whole set of political, economic and societal structures based on the principles of democracy, rule of law, and a free market economy, which affected not only individual states, but also the relationship between the European states, which paved the way for further integration and regionalization. (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008; pp. 36-38) One could also draw a parallel between the means applied by the Marshall Plan and the use of soft power and economic incentives from the side of the European Union towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will be touched upon throughout the paper.

In the meantime, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman presented its policy towards West Germany, which was considered to be the first positive French policy towards its back then enemy. In the so-called “Schuman Declaration he proposed that French and German coal and steel production should fuse, and be placed under a common High Authority, where control over these two major industrial sectors would be transferred to a supranational entity. It is said that the pooling of production of the two resources, coal and steel, should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe and make any new wars hardly imaginable and materially impossible between France and Germany. (Schuman, 1950) And indeed, this has paved the way for France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg to sign the Paris Treaty in 1951, and establish the European coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This represented a revolutionary new method in resolving hostility between states and in organizing interstate relations on the basis of equality as well as mutual solidarity and control. Furthermore, this marked the appearance of European regionalism, which was supported by further three founding treaties, and a number of amending ones.

However, after a partial failure of the erection of the ECSC, mainly in terms of the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC), there has been a slight stagnation in the integration process. The process has been pushed forward with the 1957 Treaties of Rome, where the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were founded. This

represented a new dimension in European regionalism, pushing forward further economic integration, where the EEC Treaty committed the six members to create a common market within 12 years by gradually removing all restrictions on internal trade, setting a common external tariff for goods coming into the EEC, reducing barriers to the free movement of people, capital, goods and services, developing common agricultural and transport policies, and so on. In the meanwhile, as the EECs significance grew, other European countries expressed their desire to join, resulting in two enlargement rounds by the 1980s where Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain and Greece joined. (McCormick, 2008; pp. 52-57)

The period of 1980s marked an era of European economic and social integration launching the European Monetary System (EMS), which was designed to create a zone of monetary stability, to control fluctuations in exchange rates and paved a way for the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and a single European currency. Meanwhile, as the single market was handicapped by inflation, and unemployment, but also threatened by competition from the United States and Japan the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) was enforced. Its main goals were to complete all the requirements for full single market implementation by December 1992 through removing all remaining physical, fiscal and technical barriers. The deadline came, and even after all the laws being partially adopted, the effects of the SEA were multiple: creation of the single biggest market and trading power in the world; the Community institutions were given responsibility over new policy areas that were not covered in the Treaty of Rome such as environment, research and development; new powers were given also to the European Court of Justice, Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, legal status to the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was given, and so on. (McCormick, 2008; 58-60)

The above-mentioned EPC, which appeared as a result of the Luxembourg Report, adapted in 1970 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs represented a beginning of a slightly divergent path of the EC. With this act the members wanted to “emphasize the need to intensify political cooperation” and “to concentrate specifically on the coordination of foreign policies in order to show the whole world that Europe has a political mission”. (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008; p. 44-45) This intergovernmental body portrayed some positive movements in the EU sphere, it adopted the Copenhagen Report and a Declaration on a European Identity right at the beginning of its work, but also represented a significant shift from a merely economic Union, to a more political one.

In light of this, the crucial political integration occurred with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), or Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, shaping the Union in a form slightly similar to the one we note today. The changes the TEU brought into the EU architecture reflected the division between the supranational and intergovernmental spheres. This was done through the introduction of the so-called three-pillar system of the Union, whereas the first pillar or the Community pillar was consisted of the three pre-existing communities (economic, coal and steel, and atomic energy) and being the supranational one, and the other two pillars resembling more formal intergovernmental cooperation: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Setting up a timetable for the single European currency adoption, expanding EU competences into new areas, granting the Parliament new powers and creating “EU citizenship” were the new achievements of the TEU among others. (McCormick, 2008; pp. 60-62)

The period after the TEU was marked by two additional amending treaties, the Treaty of Amsterdam from 1997 and the Treaty of Nice from 2001, both expanding EU competences and pushing forward EU integration, as well as two rounds of enlargement the one in 1995, and the “Big bang” enlargement of 2004/2007, when ten new Eastern European countries joined bringing the total number of EU members up to 27. Furthermore, the contemporary integration process was “rounded up” with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 that was built upon the failed Constitution for Europe. The last Treaty abolished the three-pillar structure, giving the European Union legal personality, granting the Parliament more power, establishing a permanent European Council President, as well as the new position of a High Representative of the Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (Griller & Ziller, 2008; pp. 57-61)

### 3. From Regionalism to an Actor

As one may note, the European continent indeed has been a subject of regionalism through the integration process that occurred after the World War II and that is still ongoing. Hänggi et al. (2006; p.4) describes the process of regionalism as a conscious policy of nation states for the management of regionalization and a broad array of security and economic challenges originating from outside the region and it may adopt both proactive as well as defensive dimensions. It may also take an institutional form ranging from inter-state cooperation to regime building and the formation of intergovernmental or supranational institutions, or both. When compared to the European case it is clear that the factors underpinning the regionalism process were similar, if not

the same, beginning from integration based on security after the World War II, through economic integration that followed, as well as the supranational and intergovernmental institutional arrangement.

Another author that touched upon this phenomenon, and who described the regionalism process in stages was Bela Balassa. He suggested that the regional integration should evolve in five distinctive steps: primarily, a free trade area should be formed that would remove the internal restrictions and barriers; second, a customs union should be established in order to have a common external trade policy towards non-members; third, a common market with free movement of factors of production between the member states; fourth, an economic and a monetary union that would include a single currency, a monetary policy, a fiscal policy, and so on; and finally, a political union that would be comprised of policies which exceed the economic realm. (Hänggi et al, 2006; p. 239) Thus, one might conclude that the European Union on its regionalism path had similar, if not the same, features following the steps in a similar manner as portrayed previously: ECSC was formed by fusing the coal and steel industry which has later on been expanded to overall economy by creating a free trade area between the member states; the SEA established a common market with free movement; the European Monetary Union (EMU) was established and a single currency Euro was adopted, and finally the Treaty of Maastricht triggered the political notion of the integration process.

Having assessed the Union's regionalist nature one might ask "did this postmodern evolution of Europe have any significant impact on its closer neighborhood, or even broader international impact"? In order to determine this, a broader aspect has to be taken into consideration and besides merely observing the behavior of the entity itself, other factors are vital such as the interplay of internal political factors and the perceptions and expectations of the others, as well as the legal bases and day-to-day practices of external policy. As already mentioned, the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy after 1992 fell under the intergovernmentalist side of the Union, but apart from that obvious external reach of the EU the communitarian one indeed has its place here also. As Bretherton and Vogler (1999; p. 5) mention there are three categories through which this issue may be approached: presence, which conceptualizes the relationship between internal development of the EC and external expectations; opportunity, which includes factors in the external environment which enable or constrain actorness; and capability, which encompasses the capacity to respond effectively to external expectations and opportunities.

Therefore, when observing the presence category the focus is on the ability to exert influence in the sense of shaping the perceptions and expectations of others, not as much through direct external action but rather as a result of processes and policies that derive from the entity itself. There are several aspects of Community's development that have affected merely unintended its rising international presence such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the creation of the Single Market. The enlargement process maximized the significance of EC through these two policies. For instance, in the case of CAP, the mechanisms of managing the agricultural policy as well as its success in supporting domestic agricultural production has had a strong influence on the world's agricultural markets but also triggered political reactions from the third parties to which the EC was obliged to respond. With the "Iberian" enlargement of Spain and Portugal, together with Greece the range of agricultural products covered by CAP increased, impacting negatively the export of Mediterranean products by the Maghreb countries which resulted in creation of a new relationship between the Union and those countries. Indeed, in this case the EC's presence triggered a process through which actorness was constructed. However, the impact of the Single Market has been even greater, it was reflected as a magnet for attracting foreign investments and in stimulating demands, from a wide range of third countries, for privileged access. The greatest achievement by the Single Market is considered to be the European Economic Area (EEA) and in the end the accession of three new members in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden. This expansion maximized the size and attractiveness of the Single Market and EC's presence internationally in the economic sense. Furthermore, new rounds of enlargement as well as new level of integration in this case in the economical sphere such as the establishment of the EMU and a single currency have had a similar effect. Still, internal problems such as the lack of legitimacy, efficacy and coherence persist and do threaten to undermine its position and presence. (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; pp. 5-6)

As far as the opportunity category is concerned, the external environment since the early 80s is in focus as this is the period when changes in perceptions of the international system and its operation have coincided with changes within ideologies that made a fertile soil to increase Community involvement in external policy. From the 1970s due to the rise of globalization the international economic system rested on the principles of interdependence, where the EC as a partially integrated regional policy system appeared as suitable to act on behalf of its member states to manage the interdependence. In the globalized world of production and exchange relationships individual, smaller, and fragmented states are perceived as relatively impotent in the face of bigger economic actors not bound by territorial boundaries, and this is precisely where

the EU finds it opportunity to act externally on behalf of its member states. Furthermore, the process of globalization has interacted with series of events by the end of the Cold War, which are crucial for the development of contemporary external roles of the EU and adding up to its actorness – the peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War brought new dimensions to European integration, as more or less previous fix boundaries of the European project had been diminished, allowing new countries to participate and contribute to it, but also the fall of the socialist regime that enabled dominance of neoliberal ideas and spread of democratic principles, “good governance” and other features towards non-Western countries by the EU. As the Union’s economic weight is increasing its preferred approach in influencing others and portraying its power is through the construction of networks of influence, where its own models such as cooperation, “partnership” and regional integration are heavily promoted. And finally, the last area where the end of the Cold war presents opportunities for actorness in the case of the EU, at least partially, falls outside the competence of the EC. As much as the stabilization of the Central/Eastern European region after the fall of the Soviet Union by the EU is considered a success, the Union has failed to “use the opportunity” and prevent the war in Yugoslavia in 1991, one of the largest atrocities committed on European soil after World War II. (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; pp. 7-8) This issue will also be addressed later on in the work.

The last stage concerning actorness is capability. As stated previously, the institutional complexity of the Union is mostly a function of its evolution through time. An important step of development in the external policy when the Community is concerned is the SEA which created the EPC, and despite it being an intergovernmental body marked a clear division of the political and economical notion within the external policy; also the SEA provisions granted the European Parliament with new powers in terms of ratification of Treaties and formal agreements with third parties. Also, the TEU is of great significance for the discussion on external policy when the European Union was created, both on the foundations of the EC but also supplementing it, with objectives such as asserting its identity on the international scene through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. The TEU also created a three-pillar structure (abolished by the Lisbon Treaty) where the first, Community pillar, was by far the most substantial of the three that included all the major internal policy areas that establish the ECs presence, but also Community’s external responsibilities including trade, aspects of environmental policy, and most areas of “cooperation” and “association” with third parties. Until the Lisbon Treaty, it was precisely the Community that enjoyed legal personality and was the one that could enter into formal agreements with third parties. In

the first, supranational, pillar the sole right of policy initiative has the Commission, combined with the Council's and EPs decision-making roles. A vital role here is played by the Council's Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and a number of working groups being ranked lower than COREPER in the hierarchical order and comprised of national experts and officials. Usually, policy documents are discussed precisely in the Working Groups and later on forwarded to the Council for adoption via the COREPER, whose recommendations are usually followed and agreed with by the Council. Also, the Commission possesses a structural position within the institutional framework that enabled it to obtain a "leadership position" within the first pillar both in the range of internal and external policies. The second and the third pillars have an intergovernmental nature, meaning that the policy formulation occurs outside the Community framework, and is central to the role of Council of Ministers and Pillar II Working Groups, where decisions are being made unanimously or through the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), whereas the Commission has no special rights of policy initiation and the role of a "policy entrepreneur". (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; pp. 9-12) The approach to the external policy from the intergovernmental side may result in some decision-making problems and thus harm the actorness of the Union, and will also be addressed later on in the work.

### 3.1 Finding the EU Actorness

The question of actorness has always been central for the scholars of international relations and widely debated. Every time the European Union as a "sui generis" case was brought into the discussion, it would become more interesting due to its specific nature, triggering curiosity and challenging scholars worldwide. Depending on the viewpoints and personal expressions of individuals, the Union was defined differently or even discredited completely as an actor ranging from those seeking its basis in the Westphalian system, through those calling upon the legal perspective, to realist perceptions of the EU. Bretherton and Vogler (1999; pp. 20-23) when addressing this issue focus on some of them. They mention that actorness itself does more than just designate the units of a system; it possesses a certain degree of autonomy both from the external environment but also from its internal constituents, where the actor is capable of volition or purpose. Furthermore, they mention the work of Sibeon and the concept of "emergence" in sociology, where organizational and social actors, such as families or government departments can indeed exist alongside individuals, who are usually perceived as bearers of actorness. Other authors are also mentioned, stating that they might have divergent

viewpoints on this issue, especially when it comes to the question of autonomy, such as the realists, who claim that the EC is not an actor in international affairs at all, and that it is not likely it is going to become one. Still, concluding that by only observing one's behavior would not necessarily determine actorness, they continue on by questioning whether its external activities are the product of purposive action, or are they shaped or constrained by other, structural, factors. The other side of analysis, the one comprised of structural and constructivist perspectives, is led by the rationale that the units of a system, or actors, are subordinate to the operating rules and embedded practices, i.e. to the structure of the system.

The last aspect, the one where the constructivism reconciles the behavioral and structural approach is the one based on the sociological theory. This tries to resolve the issue of human beings inhabiting a social world that they have created, but are also being subject to it.

Thus, the authors stress that there are some differences between the two perspectives in terms of conceptualization of the relationship between the structure and the actors, and differences in the extent to which they base their assumptions on political, economical or sociological features. The first one, structural realism, possesses the political notion. Mentioned by Kenneth Waltz, structural realism represents an anarchical political system that determines the behavior of its units, in this case, states. As a result of this the states will behave to compete with one another and to adjust, in order to enable their existence and to develop further on, and with states' power being the only factor that made a difference between them. This means that structural realism, or neorealism, is a positional model in essence and where policies available to individual states are in a way determined by their position in the anarchical system based on power. When it is brought to the context of the European Community, it implies that the EC was created due to the Cold War bipolar structure that was created to abolish the importance of Western European powers and mitigate the conditions of anarchy which existed. However, when looking at the contemporary European Union, for the period after the World War II, the Cold War, this perspective enables only partial guidance, as the outcome in this case would probably be the dissolution of the EU with the end of bipolarity and renationalization of security by the member states; or the member states might seek to maximize their joint status by providing the EU with a credible military capability. (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; pp. 23-25)

As the neorealist approach fails to address the economic and ideological bases of power, being ones of more significance after the WWII, focusing mostly on political and

military power, those of economic structures appear more relevant. These derive from Marxist and neo-Marxist perceptions. Here the structure of a capitalist economy that has become increasingly integrated in its scope and extensive in its scope is central. The state still holds a large part of autonomy but is subordinate in various aspects to the needs and interests of capital, together with the strive for power, which is still existent, only in this case in terms of economic dominance or advantage. Also, here are two divergent views of the neo-Marxist perspective mentioned by Bretherton and Vogler (1999; pp. 25-28), the “world-systems theory” developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, and the neo-Gramscian approach by Robert Cox. The first one describes and explains the broad historical evolution of the world-system, portraying events such as the Cold War significant, in the context of phases of expansion and stagnation in the world economy. One of the key factors here is the decline of the US economy in the period, and a role for the EC emerges in increasing the role of Western European countries, both in challenging the US hegemony but also in gaining benefits from the hegemonic decline. As by the mid 1980s the Europeans and their companies have been losing the race for economic dominance to Japan and the United States, the Single European Market was created as a response. Similarly, focusing upon the economic structures on the highest level, the other neo-Gramscian view mentions that the emergence of a global capitalistic economy is of a temporary nature, and is still an incomplete phenomenon. Unlike the previous view, here Cox highlights the importance of difference between domestic political arrangements or between forms of state. The main concern is that state autonomy and the related ability to preserve alternatives to the neo-liberal state form has been minimized through a process of “internationalization”. In relation to the context of the EU, his view points out that the appearance of “macro-regional economic spheres” has been a necessary response to globalization and coincides with the period of establishment of complex, multilayered systems of governance which challenge the traditional Westphalian system of sovereignty and territoriality resulting in new forms of “international” states. What is particularly important here is the increasing division between the military/political power that remains territorially based, and economic power, which is more widely spread and less open to state-level regulation. In the EU case the costs of this division are serious due to two reasons. First, economic globalization has produced significant pressure for the transfer of economic management functions to the EU level where the tensions between neoliberal and social democratic forms of governance can be resolved in situations that are mainly far away from public scrutiny. This separation of the economic notion from the domestic political system is an important factor in disrupting a significant European tradition of political control over the economy and in consequence is likely to be maintained, meaning in our case that there would be no impetus towards the provision of

overall political direction for EU external activities. And second, the growing separation of the economic and military/political dimensions have made a clear cut on the international scene regarding the global management tasks when the EU and the US are concerned. The United States is often associated with the military policy decisions on a global level, while the EU is mainly involved in the humanitarian and economical aspect of policies, gaining thus little political advantage. This is evident for instance in the Middle East, and former Yugoslavia.

And finally the last aspect that is to be mentioned, the one where the constructivism reconciles the behavioral and structural approach is the one based on the sociological theory. This tries to resolve the issue of human beings inhabiting a social world that they have created, but are also being subject to it. Here, structures are perceived as both providing opportunities but also constraints, but are not defined in material terms, they are rather intersubjective and consist of shared understandings, expectations and social knowledge rooted in international institutions, i.e. they give meaning to material structures, in terms of meanings that actors act. Furthermore, structures do not provide outcomes but enable “action settings” or distinct patterns of opportunity where the agency is displayed. Also, actors are to some extent aware about the settings within which they are positioned and are potentially able to change them. Actions made by the actors have intended and unintended consequences and structures evolve through the renegotiation and reinterpretation of international rules and practices. In this context, structures must logically precede and follow action and only actors or entities having the capacity to formulate goals have causal powers. However, actorness here is a function of external opportunities and internal capabilities that include the availability of policy instruments and the capacity and legitimacy of decision-making processes. Indeed, the constructivist approach is significant for determining EU actorness, which as a “*sui generis*” case has reflected the dynamic interaction between the innovative political actors and the opportunities and limitations afforded by changing international and domestic structures, together with its external policy. (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; pp. 28-30)

### 3.2 Prerequisites for EU actorness

Having observed different viewpoints and approaches for EU actorness, one should focus on its bases in order to determine whether it meets the prerequisites to be perceived as an actor in the first place. Bretherton and Vogler (1999; p. 37) draw upon the work of Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977) in order to portray this. Focusing on his complex scheme, they propose five basic requirements for actorness: first, shared commitment to a

set of overarching values and principles; second, the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; third, the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system; fourth, the availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments; and last, domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy.

The authors agree that the first of the requirements is not problematic as the values and principles of the Union and its member states are set in the TEU. They also mention that the ability to identify policy priorities and formulate coherent policies is not at stake, but rather the extent to which this ability is accomplished, varying according to issue area and policy sector. However, Union policy coordination is subject to difficulties being a complex decision-making system and does generate problems of consistency and coherence. In this case consistency marks the extent to which the bilateral external policies of member states are consistent with each other, and in accordance with the ones of the EU. This, as mentioned, varies depending whether there is full Community/EU competence or not, and usually those policies where there is, consistency is not a major problem. Coherence is attached to the internal policy processes of the EU, and the problems with coherence are characteristic to many pluralistic political systems. In our field of interests, the external policy is quite prone to problems with coherence mainly due to the previous pillar-system in the Union, i.e. the supranational and intergovernmental competence division, and the problem of coherence both between them and within those two approaches. When talking about the ability to negotiate with other actors in the international system it is the interaction between external and internal factors that prevail. Usually, it is an act of negotiation between legally recognized entities, and as of the Lisbon Treaty it is the European Union that possesses the legal personality and thus to enter into negotiations. The policy instruments that are available to the EU are mainly economic, when focusing on the fourth requirement for actorhood. The use of economic policy instruments by the EU has become a routine, mainly in the form of aid and trade agreements in fulfilling certain political conditionality set by the Union. Non-compliance has mainly led to full or partial suspension of those privileges. However, EU's lack of access to military instruments is considered by some to be a significant obstacle to actor capability. And finally, the inclusion of domestic legitimacy reflects a number of issues, such as the growing significance of policy-making at the EU level, both regarding internal and external matters. However, this occasionally raises a problem of legitimacy and might undermine the credibility of the Union and hinder its capacity to act externally. (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; pp. 38-42) These prerequisites as well as the three categories: presence, opportunity, and capability will be used in the

following part of the work in order to examine EU actorness in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### 3.3 The Three Powers of Europe

As it is known by now a certain actor has to possess certain power in order to exert its influence over another unit or party, and in international relations it is done through a certain policy. Traditionally, a way of pursuing power throughout history was in the military sense. However, when the EU is concerned from the very start a focus was on another type of power – civilian power. It was precisely this power, claimed by many, that was defining the actorness of the European Union. One of the first to bring the phenomenon of Europe as a civilian power was Francois Duchéne, at the time he was suggesting that Europe should not seek to replicate the US and the Soviet Union superpowers, but rather pursue its own unique way of power. In this case Europe could collectively exert a positive and stabilizing influence on the international system. Furthermore, he claimed that exactly Europe would be suitable for this, due to its European integration process, primarily based on economy when the EEC was created, transforming it from a historic domain of geopolitical conflict to a system where relations between its member states are regulated by a commonly agreed upon framework and a network of economic links. Thus, he describes that the Union's influence on its surrounding and the international system in general would be channeled through “functional spheres” of influence, such as trade, rather than those focusing solely on territory. Finally, Duchéne referred to civilian power as “domestication of international relations”, while Maull who focused on a similar issue mentioned the “transfer of the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system”. (Duchéne, 1973; and Kirste & Maull, 1996; cited in Bachmann & Sidaway, 2008; pp. 95-97)

The other rather traditional power previously mentioned is the military power. Being conducted throughout history and one of the most efficient weapons of all superpowers, military power was, however, a slightly hard-imaginable tool for the European Union. As Manners (2002; p. 236-237) points out the obvious indicator of failure of the military notion of the Union was the defeat of the EDC by the French national assembly in 1954 and it remained a taboo for decades to come, until the TEU in 1992. Whitman observed the shift occurring within the Union after the Treaty of Maastricht and also commented: “the TEU had signalled the intent of the member states of the Union to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to develop a defense dimension to the international identity of the Union” (Whitman, 1998; pp. 135-6; cited in

Manners, 2002; p. 237) And indeed, the legal basis for the security and defense notion was laid down in Article 11 of the TEU, where it was stated:

*“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:*

- *to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,*
- *to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,*
- *to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders,*
- *to promote international cooperation,*
- *to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”* (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006)

After the Treaty of Maastricht one might say that the Union has gained a momentum in the transformation towards a military power, as much the member states would allow it, considering unwillingness of some states to transfer this type of sovereignty to the Union, mainly due to the role of NATO in the EU. What followed later was the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 with the establishment of “rapid reaction forces” (RRF) by 2003, meaning that the EU should have 60,000 soldiers at disposal for rapid reaction within a short period of time. (Manners, 2002; p. 237) However, as the military notion of the EU is connected to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this aspect will be further touched upon in the analytical part.

And finally, the last power contains the recently brought up, normative power. Also mentioned by Manners (2002; pp. 238-) the concept of “normative power Europe” is an attempt to refocus the analysis away from empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions or policies and towards inclusion of cognitive processes with substantive and symbolic components, i.e. the process is idea-driven. Still, normative power as such should not necessarily be separated strictly from the civilian or military power, but it is rather in some cases complementary or intertwined. Manners claims that EU’s normative differences are a result of history, a hybrid polity and a political-legal constitution. Precisely this accelerated a commitment to establishing universal norms and principles at

the heart of its relations with its member states. The Union now uses the norms based on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), through the principle of conditionality, in order to channel them through its external relations. These foreign policy objectives are built upon consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the TEU. According to Manner, the norms are diffused in six different ways. First is contagion, the diffusion of norms results from unintentional diffusion of ideas from the Union to other actors, such as in the case of Mercosur, or the African Union more recently. The second is informational diffusion, being the result of a variety of strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU. Procedural diffusion concerns the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as an interregional cooperation agreement, membership in an international organization, or even the EU membership. This may be seen, for instance, in the Union's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the EU enlargement process towards South-Eastern Europe. The fourth factor, transference, portrays the diffusion through EU's exchange of goods, trade, aid, or technical assistance with third parties with substantive or financial means, which can be reflected through export of Community norms and standards, economic sanctions, and the "carrot and stick" approach in terms of financial rewards. One of the examples is the Phare programme of assistance to Eastern Europe. Procedural and transferable diffusion are both facilitated now by the conditionality principle that is required with all EC agreements with third parties. Overt diffusion is a result of physical presence of the Union in other states and organizations, and this is done, for instance, through various embassies and delegations. And finally, the sixth factor is the cultural filter that affects the impact of international norms and political learning in other states and organizations leading to adaptation, learning or rejection of those norms.

## 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country located in the southeastern part of Europe. It has proclaimed independence on April the 5<sup>th</sup> 1992 from Yugoslavia after a referendum on independence, when relations between the country and the European Union begin to develop. Soon after a war erupts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region, leaving hundreds of thousands dead, wounded and misplaced and resulting in enormous material damage. The war ended with the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995, when fertile ground was established for the continuation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – EU relations where ultimately in 1997 the EU establishes primary political and economic conditionality for

the development of bilateral relations. (Delegation of the EU to BiH, 2012) Few years after Zagreb, during the Western Balkans<sup>1</sup> – EU Summit held in November 2000 when the Stabilization and Association Process started and a Road Map was presented with 18 key conditions that are to be met in order to begin the preparations for the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations. This is the year when Bosnia and Herzegovina among other countries in the region was recognized as the “potential candidate country” for the EU membership, but also the year when the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programme was launched. In the year 2003, a crucial meeting for the Bosnia and Herzegovina – EU relations was the one in Thessaloniki, where the EU perspective of the Western Balkans countries was once again confirmed and the membership was promised to the countries once they meet the Copenhagen Criteria for accession. (BiH Directorate for European Integration, 2009) Two years later, in 2005, the Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations were finally launched and shortly after that the visa facilitation negotiations and the Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). In 2008 the Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed between the two parties, and in 2010 Bosnians were finally granted visa-free travel to the Schengen states. However, the SAA did not come into power yet despite the ratification of all EU member states, as Bosnia and Herzegovina has failed to meet the last criteria, to implement the Sejdic-Finci judgment<sup>2</sup>. This is also the last condition to be fulfilled by the country in order to file an application for the official EU membership and by doing so, open a new chapter in Bosnia and Herzegovina – EU relations.

## 4.1 Aspects of actorness in the Bosnian context

Focusing on the three aspects mentioned by Bretherton and Vogler (1999), this chapter will try to evaluate the presence and opportunity of the European Union through the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the capability aspect will be more thoroughly approached.

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<sup>1</sup> Western Balkans, a term brought up for the first time at the European Council meeting 1998 in Vienna, having a political connotation in order to denote those Balkan countries that are not yet EU members: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (Petrović, 2009)

<sup>2</sup> Case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, a case brought before the European Court of Human Rights by Dervo Sejdic and Jakob Finci, members of Roma and Jewish national minorities in the country, due to a discriminatory decision in the state Constitution, that only Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats may be elected for the top state functions. The court has ruled that the Constitution is in breach of Articles 1, 3 and 14 (ECHR, 2009)

As far as presence of the Union is concerned, there is no doubt that the European Union has drawn attention worldwide on its presence all the way from the first ECSC through EEC and EC to the contemporary EU. As noted previously in the work, policies such as the CAP and Single Market and their internal and external influence made it very well visible and present in the world, especially in its nearer neighborhood – the Balkans. Even back in the period of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, which Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of, the EU (back then EEC) was perceived as an important partner from the economical aspect. Yugoslavia, considering itself non-aligned and not wanting to take sides when the West and East were at stake, decided to initiate a trade agreement with the EEC in the early 70s for a trial period and later on in 1978 expressed a desire to negotiate a new economic and trade cooperation agreement. (Archive of European Integration, 1977) There are even claims that by being attracted by the benefits of closer ties with Western Europe, such as in terms of technology, and management skills it would develop, as well as placement of its products on foreign markets and the mobility for its workers in the Community on the Yugoslav side, and the attractiveness of the Yugoslav geostrategic position on the EEC side, a merger between the two was one of the back-then option, paving a way for the thirteenth EEC member. (Getter, 1990; pp. 790-791) Also, focusing on the contemporary Union, and having in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country aspirant for the membership, ever since the Big Bang enlargement of 2004, the enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania of 2007, and the newest future enlargement of neighboring Croatia in 2013 that will “bring” the Union to the very borders of the country, it is evident that the EU presence will be greater than ever before.

Moving on to the opportunity aspect of actorness, one may claim that by observing the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina – European Union relations the opportunities on the EU side were multiple. From the very start, the independence of the country in 1992, and the three and half years war that broke out shortly after, the European Union had an opportunity to position itself as an influential actor and influence the region and the situation it found itself in. However, as previously mentioned in the work even from the very beginning with the failure of the EDC, later on with the weak EPC and finally newly established CFSP just as the war erupted, the Union clinched and found itself non-prepared for the situation that was occurring in its immediate neighborhood. The military aspect of the Union will be covered more in detail in the following, capability part. With the end of the war by putting a signature on the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 and the stabilization of the region primarily the two countries that had direct influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croatia and the victory of the Social Democratic Party in the country and the fall of Milosevic in Serbia, and with a

strengthened CFSP the Union gained a genuine opportunity in stepping in the field as an important and influential actor. (Cameron, 2007; pp. 129-130) The immediate post-war period the EU saw as a chance to step in with its economic assistance in rebuilding the war-torn country and this was done through the Phare programme, a pre-accession fund primarily established for the 10 Eastern European countries that joined in 2004, but was also used by the former Yugoslav countries until the year 2000, when the CARDS programme was implemented. (European Commission, 2010) Furthermore, after the Zagreb Summit in 2000, and the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, where the EU clearly had stated and promised an “EU perspective” for the Western Balkans countries once they meet the accession criteria, the countries in the region, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, have clearly stated that their main foreign policy goal is the European integration, and finally becoming a full-fledged EU member. This goal was restated by the country officials numerous times throughout the last decade, including the newly formed Bosnian government and its foreign affairs Minister Zlatko Lagumdžija. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012) One might also perceive the last economic crisis as an opportunity aspect for the EU to prove itself as a powerful and significant actor. This may be seen through the example of another non-EU member, far more prosperous than Bosnia & Herzegovina, Iceland. Namely, Iceland was a European country mostly unwilling to join the Union for a long period, until the 2008 economic crisis occurred. The EU membership seemed as a “way out” for the Icelandic government, and the largely EU-opposed population of Iceland began to express their desire of Iceland joining the Union. In 2009 Iceland finally applied for official EU membership during the Swedish EU presidency. (BBC News, 2009) These recent events as well as the long-term process of European integration ensure the EU a firm position and an opportunity to present itself as an influential actor.

#### 4.1.1 The Capability of the European Union

The last aspect of EU actorness, capability, in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be covered through the previously mentioned three powers of Europe. EU has been proven largely incapable of tackling the burning problems in former Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 90s mainly due to the back-then recent establishment of the CFSP in 1992/3. One of the major obstacles for its effective acting at the time (and even today) was the problem of coherence. Indeed, the problem has been recognized in the Treaty of Maastricht, which stated “the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”. But the Treaty was not clear on how this

consistency was to be achieved. The process was finalized with the member states agreeing to support the CFSP actively “in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”, and stated that they would refrain from any action that would be contrary to the interests of the Union or that is “likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (Cameron, 2007; pp. 35-36)

As mentioned, the problem of coherence was evident during the eruption of violence and war in the former Yugoslavia. At the European Council meeting in Luxembourg, which took place on the day the war broke out, the so-called “troika” of foreign ministers, current, preceding and succeeding presidencies left to Belgrade, the former Yugoslav capital to report back to EC leaders before the end of summit. The back then Luxembourg Foreign Affairs Minister Jacques Poos mentioned a memorable phrase “This is the hour of Europe!” stating readiness of the EU to act coherently and efficiently during the Yugoslav crisis. (Rupnik, 2011, p. 18) The instruments available to the European Union at the time were arbitration, inspection, diplomatic recognition or non-recognition and economic sanctions and inducements, so every possible action had to be approached with great caution. The Union itself possessed no military capabilities to take action in that course, but individual states and the back-then Western European Union did. (Dinan, 2005; pp. 589-592) However, in practice deep divisions between member states were obvious, immediately portraying the weaknesses of the CFSP, and the Union as a whole. As Dinan (2005) claims, while for instance many members sympathized with Croatia and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the atrocities that were occurring in those countries, Greece sympathized with Serbia, with which it had close cultural and religious ties.

The failure of the CFSP in relation to the Yugoslav wars became even more obvious in April 1994 when the Contact Group was established by: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Russia and the United States, to “manage” the Yugoslav situation. Even though the three EU members supposedly represented the Union as a whole, they were included only due to their size and impact and represented themselves. The exclusion of other EU countries (especially the Netherlands, which had a sizable number of troops in Bosnia), from the Contact Group resulted in resentment and disagreement between the members. The peak of the Bosnian war was reached during 1995, when the Srebrenica genocide was committed and the atrocities in Sarajevo during the siege, which resulted in the end with heavy NATO bombing of the Serb forces in the country, led by the United States. (Dinan, 2005; p. 591) Yet again, this showed great incapability of the Union to tackle the issues in the field of the CFSP, especially if taking into consideration that the crisis was occurring in its immediate neighborhood.

Still, the “Yugoslav mission” did not end as a complete fiasco from the EU side. Having in mind the growing role of the United States in the region, the Union had to reach for rapid action in order to preserve its place as a significant actor in the region. According to Jones (2007; pp. 123-131) in the light of this, and in order to settle the parties at war in the region, the Union had launched a series of diplomatic actions and peace proposals: the Carrington-Cutiliero Plan, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, and finally the EU Action Plan. The peace proposals were enhanced with a graduate series of economic sanctions in the region, which may be seen in Table 1.

| Date                    | Type of sanctions  |
|-------------------------|--|
| July 1991               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arms embargo</li> </ul>   |
| September/November 1991 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trade concessions</li> </ul>  |
| November 1991           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Textiles imports</li> </ul>   |
| November 1991           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic aid</li> </ul>   |
| May 1992                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partial trade embargo</li> </ul>  |
| May 1992                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Export credits</li> </ul>   |
| April 1993              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scientific and technological cooperation</li> </ul>                               |
| April 1993              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial assets of Yugoslav government</li> </ul>                                |
| April 1993              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transshipment of goods through Yugoslavia</li> </ul>                              |
| April 1993              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transit of vessels registered in Yugoslavia</li> </ul>                            |
| September 1994          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusion of Bosnian Serbs</li> </ul>   |
| September 1994          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some sanctions lifted, such as the ban on sporting and cultural events</li> </ul> |
| November 1995           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sanctions lifted except for “outer wall”</li> </ul>                               |
| November 1995           |  |
| November 1995           |  |
| November 1995           |  |
| November 1995           |  |

Table 1. *EU Sanctions Against Yugoslavia, 1991-1995, Source: Jones (2007)*

After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in 1995, the Union was determined to take the leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region. After the Zagreb Summit in 2000, where it was stated that the democratic forces have started prevailing in the region, the European Union has started conducting its financial assistance and exercising its civilian and normative power. After the Phare programme, the EU has started implementing a specially dedicated CARDS programme for the countries in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina being one of its largest beneficiaries. With the goals of reconstruction, democratic stabilization, harmonization with EU norms and approaches and so on, the EU has invested in the region €4,6 billion in the period 2000-2006. (European Commission, 2010) The IPA programme superseded the CARDS programme as the country advanced on its European integration path, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 2007 and 2014 had a sum of more than €600 billion on its disposal.

(European Commission, 2012) Furthermore, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) launched in 1999 is considered to be one of the most powerful tools in the domain of civilian and normative power of the EU, as it is supposed to assist the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria norms in the country, through a set of trade concessions, economic and financial assistance to the country, and a contractual relationship through the SAA. (Delegation of the EU to BiH, 2012)

As one may note, primarily in the case of the 12 Eastern European countries that have joined in 2004 and 2007, and now in the case of Western Balkans, the Union's civilian and normative power is considered as a success story. However, the "military aspect" of EU's actorness is rather peculiar when addressing to it in the Bosnia and Herzegovina context, as one may claim that it had actually developed together with the EU – Bosnia relations. Indeed, the Union began with taking over the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, when the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established. It was the first mission ever that has been launched under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and has replaced the UN's International Task Force in the country. The main objective of this civilian mission was to establish sustainable policing arrangement under Bosnia's ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. (Council of the European Union - EUPM, 2003) A year later, with the decision of the Council of the European Union, also under the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy, EU military mission ALTHEA replaces the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deploying 6,300 troops in the country. Some of the main objectives of this mission included ensuring previously established peace and stability in the country in the light of the Dayton Peace Agreement and providing assistance in fulfilling the obligations from the Stabilization and Association Process. Today, as the country made significant progress towards stabilization and the EU membership, the number of troops decreased down to roughly 1,600 troops. (Council of the European Union – Althea, 2004)

## 5. Conclusion

The purpose of the thesis was to investigate actorness of the European Union, primarily portraying its historical development and how European regionalism actually led to a possibly important and strong actor in the international political scene. Determining EU's actorness through the theoretical framework of Bretherton and Vogler and exploring the various powers that are on disposal to the European Union in

conducting its actorness, the thesis focused on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its relation to the Union to empirically assess its actorness.

It is inevitable to note that the Union actually had a strong engagement in the country ever since Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed its independence in 1992 and the two started developing the mutual relationship. Being primarily economy-oriented and experienced in conducting civilian and normative power, the EU was seen unready to tackle the issues in Yugoslavia in 1992, having the United States take the position of a leading actor. However, being unwilling to be completely perceived as unimportant the Union has launched a series of economic sanctions as well as diplomatic action in terms of peace negotiations to position itself as an actor at the moment. As the period of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995 was also the period of creation of the CFSP, which in one way might justify the failure of the EU in the beginning, the EU stepped in the post-war period again focusing on its civilian and normative power as may be seen through various programmes for financial assistance, association agreements, and the promise of eventual full-fledged membership. Also, in relation to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one might claim that its military power, and therefore one “side” of its actorness, had developed together with its engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the first ever EU-launched military and police missions was precisely there.

In all, there is no doubt that in the contemporary international relations the EU is a significant actor having in mind the aspects of actorness portrayed by Bretherton and Vogler. However, as they state, one of the elements of actorness is also external expectation of a third party which might lead to a conclusion that despite being an important actor when looking through the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if not the most important one, it still should not be definite if other cases, such as less economically and military dependent states, were taken into consideration.

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