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The Challenges of State-building

A study of the state-building process in Kosovo

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Abstract

After four years of independence, Kosovo continues to face severe social, political and economic challenges that pose several threats to the development and legitimacy of the new state.

A field study was carried out in Kosovo in January–March 2012 with the purpose of creating a deeper understanding of the state-building process and test Alan Whites's theory of responsive and unresponsive state-building. The theory suggests that there are three dimensions of responsive state-building; political settlements, survival functions and expected functions. To understand whether the state-building in Kosovo can be characterized as responsive or unresponsive, the thesis looks at five distinct areas of the process; the political landscape, democracy and rule of law, economic and social rights, civil society, and the role of the international community.

Semi-structured interviews made it possible to study how the state-building is proceeding and the challenges it is facing. Additionally to the empirical findings, various reports and articles have been used to support the outcome of the research.

Key words: State, Kosovo, State-building, Democracy, Sovereignty

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List of Abbreviations

AAK	Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo)
AKR	Aleanca Kosova e Re (New Kosovo Alliance)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FER	Partia Fryma e Re (New Spirit Party)
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICO	International Civilian Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo)
KTDP	Kosovo Turkish Democratic Party
LDD	Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanisë (Democratic League of Dardania)
LDK	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ORA	Partia Reformiste ORA (Reformist Party ORA)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDK	Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic Party of Kosovo)
SLS	Samostalna Liberalna Stranka (Independent Liberal Party)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	The UN Refugee Agency
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
VV	Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! (Self-Determination Movement!)

1. Introduction

Starting from zero, Kosovo, the so called “New born” state, has been facing a transition that still occurs today after four years of independence. February 17, 2008, was the day when Kosovo was declared an independent state which is currently recognized by 90 United Nations (UN) member states.

Kosovo is today often perceived to be a “success story” due to the recognition of statehood from 90 countries to date, and the admission of Kosovo to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Furthermore, the process of handover of Kosovo’s nascent institutions from UN control to the new Government of Kosovo is argued to be a notable success and has highlighted the young state’s growing maturity and capacity. The country has adopted a democratic Constitution, established a Constitutional Court, and held a number of elections (USAID 2010: 3). Yet, the state is facing many obstacles in its efforts in state-building. Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in the Balkans; issues such as poverty and unemployment are widely noticed and are among the main issues that Kosovo is dealing with. Creating a functioning state where there is a continuing of political and inter-ethnic violence, economic crises and corruption, is Kosovo’s biggest challenge.

Even though many countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence, Serbia, the UN, and a number of European Union (EU) members have not. Due to the lack of international recognition the rule of the government is limited. Since the war in 1999 Kosovo has been surrounded and influenced by a range of organizations from the international community with the goal to help Kosovo gain its status, restore the state, and at the same time bring new developments. There is no doubt that there have been various improvements in Kosovo over the last decade, however, there are plenty of downfalls which has put and continues to put constraints to the state-building mission.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

This thesis will discuss and analyze the state-building process in Kosovo and try to identify the challenges it is facing. The current situation in Kosovo is critical; even though the state has gained its independence one can clearly see that Kosovo still faces major social, political and economic problems.

I am aware of the wide range of research that exists in this area; however, my intention is not to bring up all the different debates on this topic. The purpose of the thesis is to test Alan Whites’s theory of responsive and unresponsive state-building on Kosovo. I am hoping to evaluate whether the state-building process in Kosovo can be characterized as responsive or unresponsive by asking the following research questions:

How is the state-building process proceeding in Kosovo?

What challenges can be identified to affect the state-building in Kosovo?

2. Theoretical framework

This section will describe the theory and approaches to state-building that will be tested in this thesis. Before discussing the different approaches to state-building it is essential to first clarify what state-building means.

2.1 Understanding state-building

State-building refers to the set of actions undertaken by national and/or international actors to reform and strengthen the capacity, legitimacy and the institutions of the state where these have seriously been eroded or are missing (Fritz & Menocal 2007:13).

Over the years the concept of state-building has changed significantly. The key goals of state-building include “provision of security, establishment of the rule of law, effective delivery of basic goods and services through functional formal state institutions, and generation of political legitimacy for the (new) set of state institutions being built” (Fritz & Menocal 2007:13). Today though the focus is not only put on building or strengthening formal institutions and state capacity, the international development community is now more aware that the state cannot be isolated and that state–society relations are essential to state-building processes. This means that state-building is not merely about ‘top-down’ approaches of institution strengthening (i.e. focusing on state actors and/or national elites) but about ‘bottom-up’ approaches as well, i.e. linking state and society by working through civil society (Menocal 2011: 1719).

According to Alan Whaites state-building is “the process through which states enhance their ability to function”. The goals of this so-called ‘functionality’ will vary as they may be influenced by factors such as government priorities, and may or may not put emphasis on areas orientated to the public good. Therefore state-building is a value neutral term; it takes place in all states, whether they are rich or poor, resilient or fragile. All states are trying to improve their structures and increase their capacities, but what is important to keep in mind is that members of the international community, collectively or individually, do not ‘do’ state-building outside their own borders. State-building is a national process, a result of state-society relations that may be affected by different external forces such as trade, media or aid, but which is first and foremost formed by local dynamics (Whaites 2008: 4).

2.1.1 Models of state-building

There are different models and approaches to state-building that explain why some states manage state-building better than others. There are particularly two contrasting models that show the complexity: responsive state-building and unresponsive state-building.

2.1.2 Responsive state-building

According to the ‘responsive’ state-building model state-building does not occur at a certain stage of development, instead it is a result of an extensive range of policy and non-policy factors that can occur in any state. Responsive state-building involves three compulsory areas of progress; political settlement, survival functions, and expected functions (Whaites 2008: 6).

In order for a responsive state-building to occur political settlements are crucial. As stated by Whaites (2008) political settlements are the “deeper, often unarticulated, understandings between elites that bring about the conditions to end conflict, but which also in most states prevent a violent conflict from occurring. Political settlements happen because of self-interest

(hope of greater benefit from a common state-building project) or due to a strong sense of shared ethos (such as religious or ideological conviction)” (Whaites 2008: 7). He also argues that in order for a political settlement to endure it cannot afford to be static, but must absorb social change.

The second required area of progress for responsive state-building is “a set of core functions essential to the survival and strength of the institutional framework of the state” (Whaites 2008:7). Whaites stresses that all responsive state-building processes must develop capacity in relation to three areas; security (to be able to control the use of violence), revenue (raise funds, particularly through taxation), and law (the capability to rule through laws) (Whaites 2008: 8).

The third and the last area of essential progress is the realization of an “expected” level of functionality. Expected functions sees responsive states trying to keep up with the demands and the provision of basic goods and services (Whaites 2008: 9). These expectations are in other words about responsive governments attempting to perform on issues that are important to the citizens and external actors (such as donors) (Whaites 2008: 12).

2.1.3 Unresponsive state-building

With political settlements state structures become stronger, creating a path towards responsive state-building. In contrast some settlements ‘institutionalize’ more than others, which means that they develop and rely on formal institutions. Not all settlements lead naturally to stronger survival and expected functionality. Instead settlements can cause ineffective, oppressive and corrupt (unresponsive) states. Something that is emphasized is that settlements rely on satisfying the self-interest or core beliefs of elites that they belong to, and the reason of unresponsive state-building is often the “need to keep powerful constituencies on board”. The nature of state structures and political rules can make the unresponsive state-building worse. An institutional structure for politics that is poorly designed can make the process and development of a political settlement more problematic. An example of this is fragile democracies where constitutions might not be sufficiently adaptable.

Furthermore, a problem that is for the most part prominent in unresponsive state building is the question of ideology. A number of political settlements may be driven by an ideological or religious vision for the state and nation that hastens the capacity building of some state-structures, but at the same time places restrictions on the way in which the state will respond to public expectations. There may be periods of stability in unresponsive state-building as well, but these states will remain weak to significant problems, like for instance economic crises or an explosion of underlying conflict.

Many states will show signs of both responsive and unresponsive state-building, often as a result of geographical and historical legacies. The discussion of both these two models shows that the nature of the political settlements is vital to the effectiveness of the state and its functionality. In order to understand state-building one has to understand how governments are formed and operate, and these include electoral processes, Parliaments, political parties, cabinets and heads of state (Whaites 2008: 11-14). Moreover, the models clearly suggest that issues of prioritization and sequencing within each of the three areas of state-building (political settlements, survival functions and expected functions) matter a great deal (Whaites 2008: 21).

2.1.4 Complementary approaches

In order to design and implement state-building strategies one has to take into account all these different dimensions of the theory. However, there are some other approaches that are good to take into consideration as well. Approaches that complement Whaites's theory and give a further understanding of the state-building process are explained below.

Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, for instance, argue that lack of sovereignty is a fundamental cause of a state failure. According to them "the operation of the current international system must be reoriented towards a model where partnership and coproduction of sovereignty becomes the aim of both national leaders and international partners" (Ghani, Lockhart, Carnahan 2005: 13). Further they discuss how there are challenges across the wider international system that damage the creation of sovereignty. The actors in the international community have been operating in stovepipes, each having different priorities. For example, the UN focuses on political issues, organizations like NATO respond to security issues, international financial institutions address financial issues, and development agencies concentrate on social and development issues. In addition, every organization also has its own separate culture, incentives and rules of operation. This division has led to restricted and conflicting strategies that have contributed more to the diminishment of sovereignty than to its enhancement (Ghani, Lockhart, Carnahan 2005:11).

It is also more and more acknowledged that democratization plays a significant part in the state-building process, and is the only way for a state to survive. Nevertheless, the transition to democracy is very complex. Building a democracy in a post-conflict state is a major challenge for domestic and external actors.

To be able to start building successful state institutions and achieving democracy in a post-conflict state-building process there needs to be some levels of security. Although the term "security first" is an accepted paradigm of state-building, there is at the same time a recognition that "security only" cannot succeed in achieving peace and democracy after a conflict. Processes of democratization in a state that is divided and prone to conflict escalation requires a range of democratic and legitimate institutions in order to prevent the emergence of violent situations. By focusing on institutional choice the link between peace-building and democratic state-building will be enhanced (Wolff 2011: 1779-1780).

In sum, we can say that state-building is a process that is multidimensional. The central part of state-building though is the effective political process through which citizens and the state can negotiate reciprocal demands, expectations and obligations (Menocal 2011: 1719). As Whaites (2008) argues, state-building is always a state-society relation.

2.2 Analytical framework

Since state-building is such a complex and contested concept, I have chosen Alan Whaites's description and bring the essential parts of the theory in my empirical analysis. According to Whaites's theory about unresponsive and responsive state-building, political settlement must be established first, and then the state must fulfill the three areas of progress that are known as survival functions. Finally, the expected functions must be met.

One can argue that the distinction between responsive and unresponsive state-building is too simple and that there is more to the process than that. I have therefore, as mentioned above, also included some additional approaches which I believe complement Whaites's discussion

very well. Furthermore, I would like to stress that every country has its own history and challenges, and the degree of responsiveness or unresponsiveness change over time.

By looking at a case one can see what a state prioritizes and how this influences the state-building process as a whole. Security provision, that is part of the survival functions, may for instance be regarded as responsive and an important instrument, but only as long as it does not undermine the expected functions. A lot of efforts may be put on security, but when the expected functions are not included it will put the survival functions at risk. If rule of law on the other hand is lacking, it will have an impact on the security as the level of crime will increase. Rule of law is particularly weak in post-war countries, and is fundamental in order to combat corruption and create a democratic society.

The ability to hold the leaders accountable for the promises that have been made is crucial for the democratic process. Security and democracy are reinforcing factors. As indicated by Stefan Wolff, although it is important to first focus on the security in a post-conflict state, it is just as important for the democracy to consolidate in order to maintain the peace.

Another key element to state-building is to be able to raise revenues, and this should be done mainly through taxation. However, in order to collect taxes the state must gain the citizens' trust and be seen as legitimate. Lack of transparency and accountability, and issues like corruption hinders this ability of raising revenues. It is evident that economic growth is an important pillar in state-building, a responsive state-building process will enhance growth and the growth will strengthen the process of state-building.

Expected functions are simply things the citizens expect from their government, things such as service delivery (health, education, water and sanitation), economic welfare, employment and social rights. A government who is responsive will try to meet these demands. Some of the demands may be achieved by repressive states as well, what is therefore important to see in the theory is that all these dimensions, i.e. political settlements, survival functions and expected functions, are interconnected and must get equal attention in order for the state-building to be considered responsive.

Reinforcing the links between state and society can be done by bridging all these central state-building processes together. The international community can together with the civil society encourage this state-society relation that is of great importance to a successful and responsive state-building. Civil society actors can help remove the gap between the state and the society, yet it can also be a hinder if their approaches are not bottom-up. The international community can help to stimulate responsive state-building by helping states to prioritize, still there is a risk of repressiveness from their side as well as an unresponsive state-building may benefit their continued existence. The lack of sovereignty can therefore very much be, as stated by Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, an ultimate cause of a state failure.

The theory and approaches that have been discussed more thoroughly above help us see what should be observed when looking at a single state-building case, and could therefore contribute to an understanding how the state-building process is proceeding in Kosovo and what challenges can be revealed.

3. Methodology

In order to get the useful data that could answer my research questions I decided to go to Kosovo and carry out a field work. My ten weeks of field work was carried out between January and March 2012, and this chapter comprises an advanced description of the methods I have used and the possible limitations.

3.1 Research method

My research is based on a qualitative case study, which means that I have done a detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. The case study research aims to look into the complexity and particular nature of the case (Bryman 2008: 52). One can argue that comparing Kosovo to cases such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan or Iraq will create a better understanding of the state-building process that one can then generalize. However, Kosovo is a unique case in itself; the country's status is still a debatable problem that distinguishes the state-building mission from other countries. For that reason, I will not do a comparative study and try to compare it with another country since the purpose of the research is not to generalize to other cases.

I have chosen the qualitative research method because in comparison to the quantitative research method, the qualitative method gives a more detailed description and explanation of what is being investigated (Bryman 2008: 386). The method seeks to understand social reality in its own terms and how social order is created through talk and interactions (Bryman 2008: 367).

3.1.1 Sampling

Given that my research focuses on the state-building process in Kosovo I have included interviews with executive directors from different non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international workers, analysts, and people from various political parties that are also members of the Assembly of Kosovo (Appendix A). I made eleven individual interviews and one group interview. I used some kind of a "snowball" sampling technique, and with this technique I was able to get in contact with people I first believed was impossible to get hold of. This kind of technique relies upon the social contacts between individuals in order to trace additional respondents (Bryman 2008: 415, 459). The contacts that I created along the road definitely helped me to get in contact with the respondents I wished to interview. Most of these respondents were hard to get in contact with, especially in a limited time frame; therefore I had to use other peoples' contacts. Within that sample I tried to get in contact with people from a range of organizations, parties and ministries, which I thought will most likely increase the validity of the sample. This also helped me to get different standpoints and a better understanding of the research situation.

3.1.2 The interview method

During my field work I conducted semi-structured interviews and will use these as my main data source when discussing the state-building process in Kosovo. This method allowed me to ask a series of questions that I had prepared as part of an interview guide. At the same time I was able to let the people I interviewed decide how the interview was going to unfold which also made it possible for me to ask additional questions in response to what I saw as useful replies. This kind of interview method made the interview less formal.

The unstructured interviewing method is even more flexible than the semi-structured, but the reason why I did not use this interviewing method is because there is a risk that one can stray too much from the topic. The semi-structured interviewing allowed me to prepare more by creating a list of specific topics that needed to be covered. This way I felt more confident and well-informed during my interviews, while at the same time I was able to give the respondent the opportunity to express freely and give a more in-depth description and explanation of the research situation (Bryman 2008: 438-439).

Ten out of twelve interviews that I conducted were audio-recorded and transcribed. The reason for not recording two of my interviews is because one of my respondents (Edita Tahiri) sent me her answers via email at a later stage of my research, and the other person (Engjellushe Morina) I interviewed at a small and pretty crowded café and therefore decided to write down the replies instead. After transcribing my interviews I coded my data. Coding means that the data that is collected, i.e. transcripts and field notes, is reviewed and broken down into component parts that seem to be of potential theoretical significance (Bryman 2008: 541-542).

3.2 Material

Primary materials that I have used in addition to the interviews are; news from different media sources, newspaper articles, various reports and documents from different organizations. These have given me a deeper understanding and description of the case. Using this kind of data sources parallel with the qualitative interviews is a great method to employ when you want to get an underlying reality, however, it requires great interpretative and analyzing skills (Bryman 2008: 515, 522). Nevertheless, I have been aware of the importance to observe them with a critical eye since they are more or less written with a certain purpose in mind after all. I have for that reason used secondary material as well. The secondary material includes a variety of articles and books that help me build a stronger theoretical framework but also complete the different documents and the interviews that I have conducted.

3.3 Limitations

To return to Kosovo this time to carry out a field work and not visiting my “home” changed my positionality to some extent. My strong ties to this country where many of my relatives live and the way I interacted and communicated with the people I would say made me an “insider”. On the other hand, when presenting myself as a student from Sweden and telling people I have lived in Sweden my whole life definitely created an opinion that I am an “outsider” (Farnah 2007: 377). Being raised in another country makes me see things in another perspective, and this time I was here to judge from an outsider’s point of view. This is a common attitude that I believe some people that I have interacted with shared. However, speaking the language fluently, being familiar with the mentality and culture of the people has absolutely been to my advantage. First, it has helped me create relations with the people and gaining their trust in another level. Secondly, it has helped me to grasp details that would probably have been difficult to notice as an outsider.

It is often discussed by social scientists if it is possible to be objective and conduct a value-free research (England 1994: 81). Kim England for instance argues that “fieldwork is intensely personal, in that the positionality and biography of the researcher plays a central role in the research process, in the field as well as in the final text” (England 1994: 87). My biography as a researcher has without doubt affected my research. It is evident that my personal values, feeling and emotions have been involved in my research; from the very beginning they affected my choice of research problem. When doing the actual interviews

though, I believe that I have done a good job putting my personal views aside. I was very careful not to criticize or show much of my personal opinions during an interview. The biggest challenge has been to get the interviewees to tell me their true opinion instead of trying to tell me things that they think I want to hear, especially when they know that the information may be published.

The entire period of my field study was an on-going process of learning, and without any doubt the interviews made it possible for me to get an in-depth understanding and knowledge of the topic.

4. The state-building in Kosovo

What will now be explained and discussed below is the state-building process in Kosovo. In order to get a full picture of this process I will begin by first giving a short historical background. Then I will start to cover the somewhat contemporary state-building in the country and its challenges.

To answer my research questions I have chosen to look into five main constructed areas which are as following; the political landscape, democracy and rule of law, economic and social rights, civil society, and the role of the international community. These categories that I have included are issues that were brought up and emphasized during my interviews, and are therefore the groundwork of my research. The order of the presentation of the different categories that I have chosen to include does not reflect the degree of importance of one issue over the other. I have chosen to order them in this way because it simply seemed relevant for the discussion.

4.1 Historical context

No one knows how the story will end in Kosovo. Possible final destinations include autonomy, partition, and independence, and the means of arriving at them range from peaceful negotiation or international imposition to civil disobedience, violent intifada and full-scale war (Malcolm 1998: xliii).

After the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 ended Serbian forces withdrew and were replaced by NATO-led force and a UN administration. Under the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UN took over the control in Kosovo and UNMIK (United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) was created as a result (Judah 2008: 91-94). The role of UNMIK was to help rebuild Kosovo and “provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (SCR1244).

The structure of UNMIK’s work was divided into four so-called pillars. One of the pillars was led by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and was dealing with refugees; however, it was phased out by June 2000. The other pillars, police, justice and civil administration were run directly by UNMIK, while reconstruction of the economy was under jurisdiction of the EU and institution building was managed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Judah 2008: 94).

Over the period of 2002-2003 so-called “standards” were developed that Kosovo had to live up to before any move to discussing the status. According to UNMIK, these “standards” were intended to improve levels of public performance, and form a more tolerant and just society. They covered eight fields: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members, economy, property rights (including cultural heritage), Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue, and the Kosovo Protection Corps (Judah 2008: 109).

This whole process led to the plan for Kosovo prepared under the leadership of Martti Ahtisaari. The central part of the plan was decentralization, seeing as the north of Kosovo and the Serbian enclaves were run and influenced by Serbia. The word independence was not used within the body of the plan, however, in a covering report Ahtisaari talked about “supervised

independence”. He argued that the only feasible alternative for Kosovo is independence that should be supervised by the international community for an initial period of time. Kosovo would get recognition from the EU states and support, including money, but had to agree to implement the main requirements of the Ahtisaari Plan into their law. As European and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions, two organizations were deployed; the International Civilian Office (ICO) and an EU mission called EULEX. Under terms of the Ahtisaari proposal, EULEX job was to “monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo”. Its purpose was to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes (Judah 2008: 113-114, 142).

On February 17 2008 Kosovo gained its independence, but because veto-vested Russia has set itself on the Serbian side and blocked several attempts at the UN to pass a resolution based on the Ahtisaari proposal, the independence of Kosovo has yet not been recognized by the UN (Nordlöf-Lagerkranz 2009: 24). In addition, five European member states (Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece) have not recognized the new European state, which means that the independence remains contested. Serbia in which Kosovo previously was an autonomous province refuses to accept Kosovo as an independent state, and the majority of Serbs in Kosovo still refuses to recognize the Kosovar institutions and authorities.

4.2 The ‘New Born’ state

The day Kosovo declared its independence a vast optimism was spread among the people who hoped for a better future in Kosovo. Currently Kosovo is recognized by 90 UN countries, including 22 EU member states. The final status process in Kosovo put for almost a decade aside the many issues Kosovo faced after the war and continues to face today.

4.2.1 The Political Landscape

Kosovo’s political landscape has changed profoundly over the last decade. In 2000, during the local elections, 89.5 percent of valid votes were cast for only three parties, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). No other parties were able to get more than one percent of the votes.

In 2009 local elections were held again, the first elections held since independence, but this time the three main parties gained only 71.3 percent of the votes. Instead five smaller parties managed to enter the political scene: Nexhat Daci’s breakaway party LDD, Behgjet Pacolli’s AKR, the Reformist Party ORA, and the Turkish party KTDP. They did not just win more than one percent of the votes each, but together they managed to get an important share of the entire vote (IKS 2011: 56).

In the parliamentary elections of 2010 the combined share of the votes for the three central parties remained stable without any major changes. However, the situation was considerably different for the smaller parties. The LDD’s and the AKR’s shares dropped, ORA disappeared as a political entity as it decided to join the LDK, and the Turkish minority KTDP remained the same. During this time two new parties entered the political landscape: Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! (The Self-Determination Movement!) who won 12.7 percent, while the FER (the “new spirit” party) received a disappointing 2.2 percent. Furthermore, the SLS, the Serbian party which participates in Kosovo’s institutions, jumped from 0.7 percent in the 2009 local elections to 2.1 percent. At this time the political landscape in Kosovo became more colorful, more ethnically mixed and also more decentralized (IKS 2011: 56).

What is significantly different about the new administration in Kosovo is that, for the first time a government has been formed by one of the big three parties, namely PDK, without one of the other two (LDK and AAK) in coalition. A new coalition government was formed by PDK, AKR, and minority parties (IKS 2011: 10, EC 2011: 8). However, the capacity of the administration is fairly weak and challenges such as corruption, socio-economic conditions, and issues on the political agenda continue to threaten the political stability (SDC 2009: 8).

Something that is widely noticed is the political tension that Kosovo is facing today. The parliamentary elections that were held in late December 2010 were expected to end the political crises in the country that became even more serious when Fatmir Sejdiu stepped down as president. In September 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled that he could not hold both the position of president and that of head of the LDK simultaneously. Sejdiu also ended LDK's coalition with the PDK which had contributed to a loss of support within the party, and this led to the fall of the government (IKS 2011: 33). Even though new elections were held the results were extensively questioned by some parties and NGOs, and so was the democratic legitimacy of the government that was formed. This has added to the conflict between the major political forces that exist in Kosovo today, all with a tendency to think in terms of their parties' interests. The lack of accountability and transparency from the government is widely discussed and criticized as well. Due to the questioning of the current administration and the elections that were held in 2010 the political situation has worsened (Interview with Petrit Zogaj 2012).

The focus today is more on the charismatic nature of the leader rather than the program of the party. As long as priority is given to party leaders instead of their programs, there will not be any political development in Kosovo (Ante 2010: 174). Kosovo has not seen ideological differences between the different political parties, with the exception of the Self-Determination Movement. The fact that the Self-Determination Movement, as a political entity, is now part of the assembly has contributed to the dynamism that exists today in the parliament of Kosovo. The governance is strongly opposed at all levels by the opposition party, and this is something that the country has not experienced before (Interview with Petrit Zogaj 2012).

Kosovo is going through a deepening polarization, which has now led to accusations from both sides. These accusations continue to be about who is more patriotic and who the biggest traitor is. Currently Kosovo is in a debate where unfortunately the discussion is about the government, and the aspirations of this government. From the moment the government was created there has been a debate about whether this government is legitimate and elected with absolute democratic procedures. In addition, Kosovo has had a president, Behgjet Pacolli, who was elected but was forced to resign after 35 days in office as his election was declared to be unconstitutional. At present the country has a president who is considered to be the "president of envelopes" because the name of the president came in an envelope after an agreement was reached between three political coalition parties (PDK, AKR, and the main opposition party LDK) (Interview with Petrit Zogaj, 2012). President Atifete Jahjaga, the former deputy of Kosovo's police, was elected as Kosovo's president which was highly questioned since she had no political background. The "envelope" incident brought extensive critique and created different conspiracy theories that one can hear about everywhere.

One of the main problems in Kosovo is particularly the problem of legitimacy. The Government of Kosovo does not have full power to make its own decisions due to the fact

that international recognition of its status is still lacking (SDC 2009: 7). The government must therefore frequently answer to the international community, i.e. answer to their demands, and at the same time address the peoples' needs and wishes.

4.2.2 Democracy and Rule of law

A key element of any political system is the way in which individuals organize to develop their political aims. The main way they do this in a modern democracy, though not exclusively, is through the vehicle of political parties. There is little research about the political landscape in Kosovo and unfortunately it has not been made available to the public in a way that is understandable or useful. An important element in a democratic country is to provide the citizens with information about the changes in the political landscape so that they can make their choices about who will represent them and their interests in government based on the right information (IKS 2011 10, 12).

The Government of Kosovo is not accountable to the citizens, nor is it working in the service of the people. The political parties function as a clientelistic network: jobs, tenders and opportunities are provided based on loyalties. Authorities in Kosovo have over the past 12 years mostly been accountable to the international community, rather than their own community. The gap between the people and the state is a hindrance to the formation of a functioning democratic state, and is accordingly contributing to state failure (Hoogenboom 2011: 4-5).

One of the biggest challenges in Kosovo is that the democracy has not consolidated yet, in fact, some steps have been taken in the opposite direction which has damaged the process of democratization in the society. The basic components of a democracy, such as free and fair elections, have been damaged due to manipulations of results during elections. As a result the institutions and the government become illegitimate. As long as these issues exist and there is no institutional consolidation, Kosovo will not be ready to start the deep process of democratization (Interview with Burim Ramadani 2012).

It is widely known that rule of law is the cornerstone of a functioning and democratic state, but in Kosovo rule of law is not guaranteed. Although the new constitution was adopted in 2008 and important laws are being promulgated, their implementation is lagging behind (SDC 2009: 8). The judiciary does not have the capacity and staff to function well, the police, public prosecutors and courts are inconsistent performers and is often said to be a subject to political interference. Especially the North has specific issues concerning rule of law as it is a place where more than one system of law operates. Local leaders of that territory who are believed to have criminal ties are basically free to do as they like. Judges employed by the Kosovo Government are not allowed to be there, the only formal court authority in the northern part of Kosovo is the EULEX judges. EULEX, the EU rule of law mission, is investigating corruption at highest levels, but its efforts have shown gaping holes in regulation and implementation (ICJ 2010, Hoogenboom 2011: 5-6).

Kosovo has been very successful in the process of "taking the box"; there is a checklist that the country has received from the international community that must be completed. However, several laws that are a "copy paste" from various places in Europe do not coincide with the reality in Kosovo (Interview with Krenar Gashi 2012).

According to Krenar Gashi, the Executive Director of INDEP (Institute for Development Policy), there is an absence of public policy in Kosovo:

A major problem in Kosovo is that we do not have public policy. If you look at most of our laws that have been applied, which we have drafted and adopted, you will see that they are not laws that come from public policy, but laws that come from top-down (Interview with Krenar Gashi, 2012).

Creating public policy is very important in order to address public issues; clearly this is lacking in Kosovo and might be one of the main reasons why rule of law is not able to function properly. The public-policy process has to come from within where an idea is formulated and translated into reality, instead of being much influenced by external players and their interests.

4.2.3 Economic and Social rights

The economic situation is very dire. Despite slight improvements in economic growth, that is not sufficient to get the poor out of poverty, or generate new jobs (Interview with Qëndrim Gashi, 2012).

Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in the Balkans. Issues such as poverty and unemployment are widely noticed and are among the main issues that Kosovo is facing today. In 2009 the Labour Force Survey reported that around 45.4 percent of the population is unemployed, and only 5-6000 out of the 30,000 job seekers that enters the labor force will find employment. Around half of the women are out of work and youth unemployment can in some areas be as much as 72 percent. This is a huge problem considering that Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe (15-24 years old) which make up 20 percent of the population and 29 percent of the working age population (UNDP n.d.a.).

Without full and productive employment and decent work for all poverty reduction cannot be accomplished. About 45 percent of the population is considered to be poor, and about 16.7 percent of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line (UNDP n.d.b.). These numbers have been more or less the same over the years, without any noticeable enhancements, and are putting a constraint to Kosovo's economy. Kosovo continues to be isolated from the world economy and is therefore mainly dependent on remittances and foreign aid, with each contributing approximately 10 percent to GDP. This is obviously not a model for sustainable growth and of course not sufficient to create jobs for the roughly 45 percent unemployed (USAID 2010:10).

What is lacking in Kosovo is a bigger industry, the economy is very much focused on small scale industry, very often family owned, and this does not generate new jobs. Kosovo needs more foreign investment, but investors are most likely careful about coming into an area which has still high levels of corruption, violence, status issues etc. (Interview with Christian Palme 2012). Furthermore, there is a lack of investments in areas such as the agricultural sector and the mining industry. Kosovo has for instance large areas of fertile land that are in favor of the agriculture sector which is the largest employer in terms of numbers. However, Kosovo's productivity in the agriculture sector has failed to the point where the country is not able to feed itself. This is a result of old-fashioned agricultural practice and small parcels of land that provides low return (USAID 2010: 10, Sakerhetspolitik 2010).

The Government of Kosovo has mainly focused on economic development in urban areas rather than rural areas, and this has stimulated further migration from rural zones (Montanaro

2009: 13). Kosovo has therefore a very much import-dependent economy, with exports covering less than 10 percent of GDP (USAID 2010: 10). As a result, the agricultural sector can not function properly and contribute to any sustainable development in the country. Albin Kurti, the leader of the Self-Determination Movement, for instance, argues that the economic development in Kosovo must be based on productivity. What Kosovo needs is a developmental state, where development comes from inside. The development may be assisted from outside, but it cannot begin from outside and be dependent entirely on that (Interview with Albin Kurti 2012).

Some would argue that Kosovo is gradually improving. In spite of the economic problems, Kosovo has during these four years also seen a lot of improvements when it comes to building roads, water supplies, sewage systems, schools and hospitals. Considering that it has emerged from a war, where more than 60 percent of Kosovo was destroyed and damaged (Interview with Avni Kastrati 2012). This is very apparent when comparing Kosovo today and 12 years ago and should of course not be overlooked. However, at the same time, there is a lack of quality control which is important to be aware of. All the factors that are involved in the production and building of roads, hospitals etc., are not revised properly and therefore there is no quality assurance either (Interview with Engjellushe Morina 2012). This has of course affected the quality of the things being built and constructed, which causes issues since they will not be able to function properly in the long-term and will then need further investments.

Improvements like new labor laws and modest corporate taxes that are certainly praiseworthy, yet issues such as education for the workforce, developments in basic infrastructure from electricity to water and sanitation, access to finance, a consistent legal framework and implementation of rule of law are not resolved (SDC 2009: 8, 10).

The tax system that has been created from scratch in recent years has introduced modern European taxation standards and practices and is the least troublesome and simplest system in the region. Nevertheless, the overall tax level in Kosovo is considered to be low and is not enough to live up to the economic needs in the country. According to the European Commission progress report, over 65 percent of Kosovo's public revenue continues to be collected at the border (ECIKS 2010, EC 2010: 32). Higher tax revenues would most likely improve public services such as education, health care, and infrastructure in the country, but if tax revenues are produced by charging the people even more it will create more problems as the poverty level is high.

In a post-conflict state like Kosovo, where people have been oppressed by the state for a long period of time, it is difficult for the citizens to understand that the money which they call "public money" is actually their money. The citizens are indifferent to the money that the government is spending as if that were the government's money rather than the citizens' money. The revenues that the Government of Kosovo gets have been collected through taxes in one way or another. This lack of awareness about the "public money" is due to the fact that most people have not been able to fully embrace the state yet (Interview with Qëndrim Gashi 2012). Consequently transparency and accountability will continue to lack and those will create even more mistrust between the government and those whom it governs.

4.2.4 Development from within: the role of Civil Society

The civil society is an important pillar when it comes to creating a state-society relation, and there is no doubt that a skilled and confident "third sector" is crucial to the functioning of a healthy democracy (UNDP 2008:11). There should be a democratic relationship between the

state and its citizens, and the state and civil society. This relation implies the involvement of civil society in building the vision and the making of the state. Edita Tahiri, the Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, argues that civil society in Kosovo is very active and contributing to the democratic state-building, but that there is always room for a greater activation and improvements. According to her, Kosovo needs to activate the community so that their needs and requirements are reflected in the public policies of the government (Interview with Edita Tahiri 2012).

Although civil society organizations (CSOs) in Kosovo have started the process of transformation in various ways, from forming codes of conduct to finding better ways to work and collaborate with each other and with the government, they still have a lot of work to do. Challenges they are facing are: the still debatable legal status, ethnic divisions, public mistrust, internal tensions caused by competition for foreign funding, and a lack of focus that has left too many organizations willing to reshape themselves to donor priorities. Despite these challenges, the civil society can play a significant role both as a watchdog, but also give input on policy and providing social services. Moreover, they can contribute to Kosovo's path to European integration (UNDP 2008:11).

It is evident that the civil society can fill a variety of roles, however, the question remains: how well are the CSOs in Kosovo filling these roles? When I asked Albin Kurti, the leader of the Self-Determination Movement, about his thoughts on the civil society in Kosovo, he answered:

I believe that the civil society has damaged the society. There are 4000 NGOs here, and they have been more focused on creating friendships with the government rather than with the citizens. In other words, they are not representing the people by fighting for their rights. Also, most of them are created by the donors and are project-based (Interview with Albin Kurti 2012).

In the beginning of the war, in 1999, there were a great number of international non-governmental organizations pouring in, and after the war ended one could see a visible increase in the number of NGOs that registered with the UN. The local NGOs that emerged were dependent upon and induced by the abundance of donor cash, and therefore often lacked a clear social mission and organizational capacities. As the funds became scarcer, Kosovo's immature political culture hindered the development of a process in which civil society organizations would be listened to for political and social advice. After the independence Kosovo have seen many civil society personalities considering their role and moving into politics by joining existing parties or creating their own (IKS 2011: 48).

A lot of civil society organizations in Kosovo are not transparent and accountable to the public, they are often criticized for representing their own interests and for not being open to public participation (UNDP 2008: 13). Then there is also another part of the civil society, which is the Mass media. A huge number of the Medias in Kosovo are politicized, they are politically influenced, and sometimes they do not play a positive role (Interview with Ismet Beqiri 2012). This of course contributes to a greater mistrust between the public and the civil society which is bad for the creation of state-society relations.

4.2.5 The International Community and its impact on state-building in Kosovo

Today Kosovo is still very much dependent on the international community which is argued by many of my interviewees as being an obstacle to its state-building process. Kosovo spent almost a decade-long period of international administration by UNMIK that left a number

of negative results. Even though we can see an amount of progress achieved in Kosovo under the leadership of UNMIK, the progress has been achieved as a top-down approach. One of the major failures of UNMIK was the matter of no administration in the northern part of the country, and tolerated actions of illegal parallel structures in Kosovo. This failure of UNMIK was added as a huge burden on the state building agenda in Kosovo. Today the establishment of sovereignty and law in the northern part of the country under the Ahtisaari Plan is one of the major challenges that the government together with the international community in Kosovo are facing (Interview with Edita Tahiri 2012).

Until 2008 there has been no state-building process in Kosovo, this is due to the fact that UNMIK was not there to build a state, but to play the role of the state. This is a very big difference, because the moment UNMIK defined itself as a peace-building mission, the development of the Kosovo state was not on their agenda, instead it was to maintain the peace. In the absence of a development agenda, Kosovo has lost 9 years of state-building (Interview with Krenar Gashi 2012). In a way UNMIK froze the development, and for this reason one can say that Kosovo started from scratch in 2008.

When Kosovo declared its independence after years of international diplomacy and negotiations, it promised to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by UN diplomat Martti Ahtisaari. The document, or the so called Ahtisaari plan, includes requirements aimed at protecting the rights of ethnic Serbs and other minorities, and calls for six Serbian-majority municipalities to be given expanded powers over their own affairs. The plan has been incorporated into Kosovo's new constitution and an International Civilian Representative (ICR), heading an International Civilian Office (ICO), oversees Kosovo's implementation of the plan.

ICR has the authority and power to void any decisions that might be in violation of the settlement and remove Kosovo government officials who act in a way that is inconsistent with the settlement. Its mandate will last until it is decided that Kosovo has implemented the settlement, and as for the ICO, it is expected to close at the end of 2012. ICO's role is today reduced; instead the role of European Union Special Representative (EUSR) will become more prominent. EUSR will play an advisory role and help Kosovo move closer to eventual EU membership and integration.

KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, has the mission of providing security. KFOR plays the leading role in overseeing the training of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) called for by the Ahtisaari plan. Tasks previously undertaken by KFOR, such as guarding Kosovo's borders and key Serbian cultural and religious sites, have been gradually handed over to the Kosovo police (Woehrel 2012: 1-2).

When discussing the role of the international community in Kosovo one must be aware that there is a wide range of actors that have been involved and still are involved, and all of them play a different role. Each of these international organizations has a specific focus. The ICO's focus is just to implement the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (CSP), to ensure that there is a basis in law and in the government. The goal is to make sure that the equities of the CSP are guaranteed, to have a life beyond the ICO, and to bring those values outside of the book and into the broader world of Kosovo. If you look at EULEX, they are just rule of law. There is a lot in the book like decentralization, or religious and cultural heritage, which they are not concerned about, and there is a lot of what they do, like policing, that other international actors do not do (Interview with Megan Kossiakoff 2012).

EULEX monitors and advises the Kosovo government on all issues related to the rule of law, specifically the police, courts, customs officials, and prisons. EULEX task is to ensure that these institutions work effectively, and to intervene in specific criminal cases, by referring them to international judges and prosecutors. According to EULEX, it has 350 ongoing criminal investigations and its judges have handed down 220 verdicts, including 15 on organized crime and 20 on war crimes. However, critics have accused EULEX for not moving quickly enough on organized crime and that its efforts, especially in the area of witness protection, have been relatively incompetent. EULEX has undergone significant reductions in personnel and funding, most of the cuts have come in the police side of the mission rather than the judiciary, where the need for assistance appears to be greatest. This has made EULEX very unpopular among the citizens of Kosovo (Woehrel 2012: 1-2).

When I asked Megan Kossiakoff, who is the Deputy Head of Legal Unit at the International Civilian Office, whether the international community is focusing on the right things, and if she believes some things have been forgotten in the process, she responded:

I think everything has been focused on, we may not all have the same focus, but we all have different areas where we spend our time, efforts and resources. Has anything been forgotten? I think maybe, this is just my personal opinion, but the economic development I believe has been disappointing to the citizens of Kosovo. There is an awful lot of effort in rule of law and democracy, but from what I have heard around is that there is some feelings that economically Kosovo is in the drags (Interview with Megan Kossiakoff 2012).

Although the international presence has been important for guaranteeing for instance minority rights, it is important that the international actors do not aim to deal with all of Kosovo's governance problems. Local politicians must take responsibility for these problems themselves, and it must be up to the Kosovo people to elect politicians who have the vision and energy to push Kosovo's development forward. But then again, it is up to the international community to give Kosovo a real chance (IKS 2008: 21). Otherwise, the country will not be able to operate independently, but must continue to seek help from the international community and gain their approval before making any major decisions. The way Kosovo is formed today as a state is often said to be a "copy paste" of different countries where the international community still has the leading role in the county's internal affairs (Interview with Valdete Idrizi 2012). Kosovo has had so much international presence that it has not been able to properly develop its institutions. To remove the so-called supervised independence and change the role of the internationals so that they can function more as advisors is an important step that needs to be taken in Kosovo, i.e. get full sovereignty of the territory.

In the following chapter there will be a discussion that will compare all these different challenges of Kosovo's state-building that have been identified above with the theory and approaches. This will likely answer the question whether the state-building process can be characterized as responsive or unresponsive.

5. Responsive or Unresponsive?

Generally when I compare the situation with other countries in the Western Balkans and the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo today stands out as an example that can well be seen as a modern model to other states emerging from conflict in other parts of the world. Certainly Kosovo is still a poor country, certainly infrastructure is still missing in some places, but when you take into account what Kosovo has emerged from, I do not think that it is very surprising that these matters are still missing (Interview with Christian Palme 2012).

Some of my respondents have been very careful to stress that Kosovo is a new state, and that it is important to take this into account. I agree that although there are fewer developments in various areas it should not be taken as a surprise considering the country's history, nevertheless, I think it is important not to focus so much on the past. To be satisfied with the situation because it is better than other states emerging from conflict, or because it is "better than it was before" is one part of the problem. Kosovo needs to get over past issues that prevent the country from moving forward.

Alan Whaites argues that states often show signs of both unresponsive and responsive state-building, and this has shown to be the case in Kosovo as well. However, when looking at the responsive approach we can see that there are many elements of the model that are lacking in the state-building process in Kosovo.

Firstly, one can say that the existing political tension in Kosovo has put a stop to the development, which is most probably the reason why actual issues such as poverty, unemployment, rule of law are not getting the attention in the political debate as much as it should. Instead the focus on what is really important has turned and in a way confuses the citizens as well.

The political parties function as a clientalistic network, and with the purpose to protect their positions and interests, the political elite in Kosovo has contributed to a more static political settlement. This is not to say that Kosovo has failed completely in this aspect, we can see that improvements have been made over the decade in the political system where new opposition parties have entered the scene and a more diverse administration have been created, but the ideological ideas are missing. The political elites are currently lacking coherent political programs and are for that reason not able to pursue any program-based policies. The politics in Kosovo still seems very personal; the parties seem to be focusing on people rather than issues. If in another country you know what the green party stands for and what the social democrats stands for, it is not completely clear what for instance the LDK stands for or what the PDK stands for. The capacity of the country will continue to remain weak and unresponsive if the political parties are divided and do not show any kind of interest to develop political programs and to cooperate and reach common goals for the sake of the state-building. The leadership in Kosovo has to be clear on what it wants in order to fulfill any development goals.

There is obviously a weak legal and policy framework in Kosovo when it comes to the promotion of transparency, accountability and integrity. In order for the citizens of Kosovo to hold their government accountable they must be able to get the information about what it is doing, and this can only be done if the government is transparent. When there is no transparency and accountability, the high level of corruption that has become a form of a disease in the country will continue have an impact on the development. This has a negative impact on the state-society relation as well, which is argued by Whaites to be crucial in the

responsive state-building model. The state and society can be linked by working through civil society, but the civil society in Kosovo is still immature, many of the existing Civil Society Organizations lack focus, capacities, and a clear social mission. They are not playing their role as watchdogs and are not bringing the development from below by including the public.

In the second required area of progress for responsive state-building, i.e. survival functions, Whaites talks about three important areas; security, revenue, and law. The first area, security, is something I would say has been the most successful part of the state-building process in Kosovo as the state has managed to maintain the peace. A lot of efforts and money have been put into this area and it has been and still is prioritized. Nevertheless, although focusing on the security is a vital part of the responsive model and important for the region considering the ongoing conflict between the Serbs and Albanians, I would at the same time argue the “security only” practice that has been used mainly by UNMIK for a long period of time, especially prior to independence, has slowed down the other parts of the state-building process.

Raising funds, particularly through taxation, is the second area that needs to be included in state-building model, but due to the high level of corruption, poverty and the lack of economy growth the taxation system cannot function properly. Developing a well-functioning taxation system is a great challenge in Kosovo since the revenues are mainly from remittances and foreign aid, and not so much from the development within.

The third and the last area, rule of law, is the foundation of a state, but unfortunately this factor has failed in many aspects. Many laws are lagging behind, they have been implemented from top-down and as a consequence the judiciary does not have the capacity and staff to fulfill its functions. The police, public prosecutors and courts are unreliable and are criticized for being a subject to political interference. The rule of law is primarily lacking in the northern part of Kosovo, Mitrovica, due to the fact that the territory is for the most part controlled by Belgrade and thus largely not included in the state-building process.

The lack of responsive state-building in Kosovo becomes even more apparent when looking into the “expected functions”. The provision of public goods and services, and keep up with the demands of the citizens’ is clearly not evident as all inhabitants do not have access to good infrastructure, education, water and sanitation etc. Failing to develop capacities to answer these demands over the last decade has put a constraint to the creation of state-society relation that is key ingredient in the responsive state-building model. Not being able to answer the demands causes instability in the country, and is a threat to the security.

All these components in the responsive state-building model are important for a successful state-building; however there is one element that is particularly essential to have in order to have a proper state-building process of any kind. This element is the sovereignty of the Kosovo state. The wide international presence in Kosovo demonstrates the absence of political legitimacy and the restricted authority of the Kosovo state over its territory. In addition, the international actors are focusing on different areas and have different priorities. For instance, the ICO’s focus is to implement the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal, EULEX is to assure rule of law, KFOR has the mission to provide security, and so on. This division among the actors has damaged the sovereignty of the state and has led to restricted strategies.

An important thing to keep in mind, which is stressed by Whaites, is that the international community does not actually 'do' state-building, state-building is a national process. This means that the Government of Kosovo needs to start addressing the challenges in order to gain citizens' trust and build a state-society relation. Then again, as long as Kosovo does not have full sovereignty over its territory the number of challenges will continue to grow and the state-building will show merely an unresponsive side. A vicious circle has been created, where one issue drags down another, and it will keep doing that as long as there is no clear view on where the leadership wants the state to go, and how they will go about achieving the specific development goals.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to study whether the state-building in Kosovo can be characterized as responsive or unresponsive by looking at how the state-building process is proceeding and the challenges it is facing.

The state-building process in Kosovo has a long road to go. Challenges such as poverty, unemployment, political turmoil, and a lack of state-society relation are among the main challenges that can be identified. As long as these issues persist and are not properly addressed, it will not be possible to achieve the important elements of the responsive state-building. Currently there is a very thin line between the responsive and unresponsive state-building process in Kosovo. Taking into account what the county has emerged from, it is not surprising and there is a lot that can be applauded, but from the moment of independence till today there is a level of stagnation in many development areas.

On the other hand, this thesis is convinced that with full sovereignty of the territory these matters will be pushed towards a more responsive stage, and only then will the unresponsive actions start to dissolve.

6.1 Further research

After studying the state-building process in Kosovo and evaluating whether it is unresponsive or responsive, a further study about Kosovo's road towards a successful EU integration would be insightful. It could give additional understanding of the challenges and issues that the country is facing and how this might affect its European future.

Appendix A: Interview List

Albin Kurti, Leader of the movement for self-determination (Lëvizja Vetvëndosje!), Prishtina, February 10, 2012

Avni Kastrati, The mayor of Mitrovica (Political affiliation - PDK), Mitrovica, February 10, 2012

Burim Ramadani, Deputy of the Kosovo Assembly, Secretary general of Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK), Prishtina, February 16, 2012

Christian Palme, Spokesperson and Head of Press Public Affairs Unit at the International Civilian Office (ICO), Prishtina, March 7, 2012

Edita Tahiri, Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, Prishtina, May 13, 2012

Engjellushe Morina, Executive Director of Iniciativa Kosovare për Stabilitet / Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS), Prishtina, February 6, 2012

Ismet Beqiri, Deputy of the Kosovo Assembly, Head of the Parliamentary Group of Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Prishtina, February 16, 2012

Krenar Gashi, Executive Director at the Institute for Development Policy (INDEP), Prishtina, February 2, 2012

Megan Kossiakoff, Deputy Head of Legal Unit at the International Civilian Office (ICO), Prishtina, March 7, 2012

Petrit Zogaj, Executive Director of Lëvizja FOL, Prishtina, February 1, 2012

Qëndrim Gashi, Professor at the University of Prishtina and former Foreign policy advisor to the President of Kosovo Atifete Jahjaga, Prishtina, January 19, 2012

Valdete Idrizi, Executive Director of CiviKos Platform, Prishtina, February 1, 2012

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