

Mandating for Peace

An analysis of two UN peacebuilding mandates through a
critical approach

Abstract

This essay examines the nature of contemporary UN peacebuilding mandates and the critique aimed at incorporating Western liberal ideas in postconflict peacebuilding missions. A critical discussion is provided to highlight the problems inherited in promoting liberal peacebuilding in peace operations, followed by an analysis and comparison of the mandates for UNAMSIL and UNMIS through an analytical framework of peacebuilding operations. The purpose is to assess if liberal peacebuilding strategies still are used in recent UN peacebuilding mandates, despite the critique raised against it. The study discovers that liberal peacebuilding still is visible in mandates issued for peace operations today, but appears to have greater recognition of some of the critique that is debated.

Keywords: The liberal peace, peacebuilding, statebuilding, critical liberal peacebuilding, UN mandates, UNMIS, UNAMSIL

Characters: 69 929

Abbreviations

UN	The United Nations
EU	European Union
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

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1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the nature of war has changed extensively from being conducted between states to within states. In the 1990's, civil war accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts in the world and the UN became the primary organization to deal with the task of solving this new type of conflict through post-conflict peacebuilding operations (Paris 2004, p. 1- 2, 16). But it has proven to be a difficult task with many lessons learned. Many of the early peacebuilding operations failed due to their heavy emphasis on rapid democratization and marketization and with mandates that had far too limited deadlines, and were primarily focused on holding elections as soon as possible, believing that this would solve the internal problems in the countries (Paris 2004, p. 3, 18-19, Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 6).

When it came apparent that this short-term approach was not successful, there was a shift in the peacebuilding discussion towards an understanding that in order to achieve a lasting and stable peace, political and economic liberalization had to be consolidated in appropriate institutions that could handle the destabilizing effects the liberalization process could cause (Paris 2004, p. 7, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 3, 7-8, Paris & Sisk 2009, p. 1-2, Chandler 2010, p. 147, Menocal 2010, p. 2-3). The deployment of the peacebuilding operations in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone in 1999 marked the beginning of a new generation of peacebuilding missions, with more focus on building conditions for basic stability together with liberalization. This was reflected in the mandates that were issued for these three missions, in that they were substantially more extensive than for previous peacebuilding operations and had clear statebuilding strategies incorporated in the objectives set out in the mandates (Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 7, Paris 2004, p. 212). Nevertheless, while this new direction towards liberal postconflict peacebuilding has dealt with many of the shortcomings of the first generation of peacebuilding, new critiques and dilemmas have arisen which question the legitimacy, effectiveness and appropriateness of contemporary peacebuilding, among others.

The critical debate around liberal peacebuilding is the starting point for this essay. I will, using a critical approach, account for the main problems and dilemmas that have become apparent since the advent of liberal peacebuilding in international peace missions. Through the critical approach and discussion of liberal peacebuilding, I will move on to focus on the mandates for the peacebuilding missions that were deployed in Sierra Leone in 1999 and Sudan in 2005. Sierra Leone was one of the first countries to experience this new approach to peacebuilding, something that was obvious in the mandate issued for the peacebuilding mission. The peacebuilding mission in Sudan was not deployed until 2005, and considering the critique that has characterized the liberal

peacebuilding debate since 1999, I believe it to be interesting to examine whether the critical debate has had any impact on peacebuilding missions that have been deployed more recently. I will analyze the two mandates and try to identify the core objectives. Further, I will compare the two and look for possible similarities and differences and explain in what way these mandates had a strong liberal peacebuilding agenda. Last I will assess if a liberal peacebuilding strategy still is used in UN mandates today despite critique raised against it.

1.1 Purpose and Research Question

The main purpose of this essay is to clarify the different critiques raised against liberal peacebuilding and, through this critical discussion, investigate if a liberal peacebuilding agenda is evident in different mandates issued for peacebuilding missions today, despite the critique raised against it. I am going to analyze the mandates that were issued for the peacebuilding missions in Sierra Leone in 1999 and in Sudan in 2005. By comparing these mandates I hope to establish similarities as to the peacebuilding components that may be evident and be able to answer my overall research question: Is liberal peacebuilding still used as a strategy in UN peace mandates today, despite the critique raised against it? In order to answer this question, I believe it important to answer the following questions as well:

1. What were the main objectives in the mandates?
2. Are there any similarities or differences in the main objectives in the mandates?
3. In what way did the mandates have a liberal peacebuilding agenda?

1.2 Theory and Approach

The practice of liberal peacebuilding is based on the idea of the liberal peace, which suggests that certain kinds of societies, that are liberally constituted, tend to be more peaceful, both nationally and internationally (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 11, Chandler 2004, p. 60, Newman 2009, p. 39, Paris 2004, p. 35, 41-42). Since this essay takes a starting point in liberal peacebuilding, it is the notion of the liberal peace that will constitute the main theory for this essay. The theory is also visible in the critical approach I will assume. I want to highlight the critique against liberal peacebuilding, as I believe it is important to question the nature of contemporary peacebuilding since these types of operations are often deployed in countries that do not necessarily respond to Western liberal ideas,

such as the liberal peace. According to Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) there are two schools of thought in the liberal peacebuilding debate, one of which is a critical approach. This approach aims to criticize liberal peacebuilding assumptions, such as the fact that liberal ideas can be promoted onto conflicted societies despite local differences. It further questions whether a universal image of conflicted or post-conflict societies really is possible, and emphasizes that to use liberal peacebuilding as a coherent concept in diverse contexts is highly problematic (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 23). In the critical discussion I will also mention other theories and approaches, stated in books and articles such as Francis Fukuyama “Statebuilding: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century” (2005), Paris & Sisk “Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding” (2007) and Bhikhu Parekh “The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy” (1992), among others.

In order to put the essay in its right context and get a comprehensive understanding of the peacebuilding strategies that were used, I will give a brief background analysis of my two cases.

1.3 Method

I am going to do a qualitative and comparative analysis of the mandates in the peacebuilding missions in Sierra Leone and Sudan, using a critical approach. My purpose is not to test any theory in this essay, but simply to understand and create more knowledge about the critique against liberal peacebuilding and current peacebuilding mandates, and how the critique may be reflected in peacebuilding mandates today. Therefore I am using a theory consuming approach, where I, through an already existing theory and approach, and with the help of one explanatory factor (the mandate), hope to answer my research question stated above (Esaiasson et.al. 2007, p. 42).

1.3.1 Comparative Case Study

I am using a comparative approach and have chosen my two cases based on the most similar system design. The cases have been chosen based on similarity in respect to that they were deployed in an era where liberal peacebuilding was an established idea for post-conflict peacebuilding. I also thought it to be an important criterion that the UN had been invited to help in the post-conflict situation, and that the peacebuilding mission was not deployed after an invasion. These choices will make it easier and possible to distinguish and compare the two mandates (Esaiasson et. al 2007 p. 112-114, Höglund & Öberg 2011, p. 116).

My hope is to achieve some sort of generalizability in this essay, and I concluded that a comparative approach would be the most effective one. To be able to draw some generalizations could give useful information to the critical debate of liberal peacebuilding, which could enhance our knowledge about

problems of liberal peacebuilding in general and see possible changes or improvements that can be done. However, the disadvantage which using two case studies is that you cannot perform a more extensive and deeper investigation and possibly examine how the liberal peacebuilding agenda was implemented in the ground, as might have been possible with only one case study. But to use a single case study-approach will lose the generalizability I hope to achieve and is therefore not an option in this essay.

1.4 Limitations

My reason for only examining the mandate is in part to narrow the scope of this essay, but also because the mandate is a very important factor in peacebuilding missions as it establishes the overall strategy and power of the peacebuilding mission. I have also limited this essay to one specific analytical framework, in order to identify the liberal peacebuilding components of the mandates. I am using Newman, Paris & Richmond's (2009) definition of what constitutes liberal peacebuilding. According to the authors, most contemporary peacebuilding operations have involved a combination of tasks related to promoting domestic security, development, humanitarian assistance and strengthening government and rule of law (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 7-9). By using these components, and see if they are highlighted in the mandates for Sierra Leone and Sudan, I hope to be able to answer my research question. A more precise presentation of these four components will be offered in the essay.

Regarding time limits, I am only examining the time period during which the peacebuilding missions were active in both countries, which was 2005-2011 for UNMIS and 1999-2005 for UNAMSIL.

While the choices and limitations I have made are necessary for accomplishing this essay, there are some disadvantages that come with. The two cases I have chosen have some similarities, but there are also several differences between the countries that can have an impact on my study. The contextual differences between the cases are the most prominent, as well as the cultural differences. While both countries have endured colonialism and civil war, their histories have had different impact and cannot be compared to each other in any historical way. Further, there can also be some discrepancy in the information I will retrieve. Sudan is a fairly recent case of peacebuilding and has received a lot of attention, not least in the last years, while the peace mission in Sierra Leone ended several years ago. However, the international involvement was very high in both Sierra Leone and Sudan, and the cases have received a lot of earlier studying and researching. While this has some advantages, such as extensive documentation, applicable theories and previous research, there are also some disadvantages that can affect a researcher, such as a certain mind set when dealing with this previous research, preconceptions and bias (Höglund & Öberg 2011). Nevertheless, I am aware of these disadvantages and will examine the previous research as critically as other documentation. Further, I have not found any

research that specifically has focused on a critical discussion around liberal peacebuilding connected to the mandates issued for UNAMSIL and UNMIS, which makes this an intriguing subject for my essay.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 What Is Peacebuilding?

What we today recognize as peacebuilding operations is based on the UN report “An Agenda For Peace”, issued in 1992 by the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In the report, Boutros-Ghali for the first time differentiated between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding and stated that peacebuilding aims towards strengthening societies and support structures within a country, in order to avoid relapse into conflict (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, Paris & Sisk 2009, p. 5, Paris 2004, p. 18, 55-56, Newman 2009, p. 28, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 2).

After 1988, post-conflict peacebuilding became the primary form of peace operations, and in the early 1990’s several peacebuilding operations were launched in Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia and Cambodia, among others. In these new types of operations, the United Nations Security Council issued mandates that were much broader than before, which meant that peace missions became more directly involved in bringing peace to post-conflict societies (Fortna 2004, p. 264, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 3) Another factor distinguishing these new peace operations was that they included the help from several other international organizations, such as NATO, UNDP, EU and IMF, which reveal the multifaceted nature of contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding operations (Paris 2004, p. 18-19, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 2). However, the missions now entailed complex tasks that were unfamiliar to the UN, mainly promoting liberalization through fast democratization and marketization, as a reflection of the high confidence in the liberal peace theory that was common in the early 1990’s (Bellamy & Williams 2004, p. 4-5, Parekh 1992, p. 160).

2.1.1 The Liberal Peace Theory

The notion of the liberal peace theory dates back to the eighteenth century and liberal philosophers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant. They were among the first to propose a link between protection of individual liberties, limited powers of the state and peace (Paris 2006, p. 425-426, Paris 2004, p. 41). Since then, the liberal peace theory has evolved along with the changing nature of the sovereign state, international relations and, most importantly, with the liberalization boom that occurred in the 1980’s, after the Cold War. After decades of sharp divisions between East and West, liberalism was on the rampage and the international community had a remarkable confidence in it as a way to foster

peace and cure social inequalities, such as poverty, corruption and conflict. Today, the liberal peace theory is grounded on the idea that societies that are based on democracy and market economics are more peaceful domestically (Chandler 2004, p. 60, Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 11, Newman 2009, p. 39, Paris 2004, p. 35, 41-42), a notion that, through a Western perspective, seems logical. As stated above, the liberal peace theory was highly influential in UN peace operations after 1989, which was reflected in the period of hurried democratization and marketization of postconflict societies (Paris 2004, p. 3, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 3, Bellamy & Williams 2004, p. 4-5, Parekh 1992, p. 160).

2.1.2 Statebuilding as Peacebuilding

However, over the 1990's the concept of peacebuilding expanded, due to the discovery that post-conflict societies did not respond well to the introduction of rapid democratization and marketization, as they could not handle the effects the liberalization project entailed. Many countries reverted to conflict, developed a dictatorial governmental system, experienced poor governance, deteriorated infrastructure and widespread corruption etc., (Call & Cousens 2008, p. 3, Krasner, 2004, p. 91, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 2-3, Paris & Sisk 2009, p. 1). What became apparent for scholars was that the institutions in these countries lacked the ability to handle the effects of democratization and marketization (Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 2-3, Paris 2004, p. ix, 6-7). The need for a re-conceptualization of post-conflict peacebuilding was recognized, and it was added that peacebuilding efforts not only should introduce liberalization in war-torn societies; they should also seek the root causes of conflict (Call & Cousens 2008, p. 2). This was further established in Boutros-Ghali's "Supplement to An Agenda For Peace" (Boutros-Ghali 1995) and in the mid-1990's a discussion began, revolving around the importance of broadening peacebuilding missions mandates to include the building or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions in post-conflict societies in order to effectively and appropriately introduce democracy and market economies and come to terms with the root causes of the conflict. This shift in strategy has become known as statebuilding in peacebuilding operations (Paris 2004, p. 7, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 3, Paris & Sisk 2009, p. 1-2, Chandler 2010, p. 147, Menocal 2010, p. 2-3), and it has been stated that statebuilding is "Actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding." (Call & Cousens 2008, p. 4)

Many scholars, such as Francis Fukuyama and Roland Paris, recognize statebuilding as a valid strategy in peacebuilding missions. For example, it is argued that statebuilding is one of the most essential matters for the international community, because weak states pose the biggest source of the world's most serious problems, such as poverty and terrorism (Fukuyama 2005, p. xvii). Further, it is suggested that post-conflict peacebuilding primarily should establish strong domestic institutions, capable of handling political and economic

liberalization, and secondly, introduce political and economic reforms in stages and over time (Paris 2004, p. ix). Moreover, introducing statebuilding strategies gives an incentive for the legitimization of the peace process, as a broader support among the population is achieved, which is necessary for the long-term aspect of a peace process (Menocal 2010, p. 5-6, Call & Cousens 2008, p. 9).

2.1.3 Liberal Peacebuilding

With this discussion in mind and the lessons learned from the previous decade, the peacebuilding missions sent out today have been re-shaped towards a more liberal peacebuilding agenda, including institution-building as well as liberalization (Richmond 2004, p. 87). According to Newman, Paris & Richmond (2009) liberal peacebuilding defines as follows: “[...] the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with ‘modern’ states as a driving force for building ‘peace’.” (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 1). Examples of these new types of peacebuilding missions can be seen in the cases of Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, where the mandates issued for these missions were extended widely to include statebuilding strategies, as well as promotions for democracy and market economics (Paris & Sisk 2009, p. 6-7, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 3, Paris 2004, p. 212, Menocal 2010, p. 3).

To conclude, peace missions has, since its beginning, gone through many changes to fit the need for post-conflict countries, and to learn the lessons from previous international peace operations. These changes have led us to today's contemporary peacebuilding, or more specifically liberal peacebuilding, as a common strategy for peacebuilding operations that are deployed. However, considering the intrusiveness inherent in the liberal peacebuilding agenda, as well as the longevity that institution building entails, further criticism has been raised against the idea and practice of liberal peacebuilding. This criticism will be examined closer in the next chapter.

2.2 Critical Liberal Peacebuilding

Unless we assume that liberalism represents the final truth about human beings, we cannot indiscriminately condemn societies that do not conform to it. (Parekh 1992, p. 170)

Through the previous discussion, I have outlined the main mechanisms which constitute liberal peacebuilding. Henceforth, when writing about peacebuilding operations, this is the definition I will assume. In this section I will account for the critical side of the liberal peacebuilding debate that has been put forward since the deployment of the first liberal peacebuilding operations. The critique is quite

extensive and overlapping, and strike at important tasks in peacebuilding operations.

Our starting point for this discussion begins at the very core of contemporary peacebuilding missions, and brings us back to the theory on which peacebuilding operations are founded. More specifically, the liberal peace theory. Although Western countries have great confidence in this theory, and the promotion of liberalization that it entails, analysts and researcher suggest that there are problems with the inherent practices and values of liberalization, such as secular authority, capacity-building, centralized government, liberal democracy, market values and globalization (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 11-13, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 4-5). While these are values that the Western world is built on and, indeed take for granted, they may not be suitable in other parts of the world, especially in countries that recently have experienced conflict and war. Civil war is mainly fought in a specific cultural, social, political and economic context, and may therefore not be susceptible to the liberal values of the Western world (Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 4-5). Researchers have questioned Western international organizations' desire to promote liberalization as a universal solution for stable peace and development, which lingers since the end of the Cold War. In his article "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy" (1992), Bhikhu Parekh discusses and questions the universality of liberalization and stresses that the liberality the Western world is built upon is shaped by its history and culture, and is consequently not a universal political and economic system that can be promoted to other countries with different histories and cultures (Parekh 1992, p. 169, 172). Moreover, Chandler (2010) argues that not only is the idea of the liberal peace not always suitable for postconflict countries; it is, in some instances, actually used as a political and power-based Western policy, aiming at establishing its presence as a way to gain power and serve economic and geo-strategic needs (Chandler 2010, p. 139-140, Fearon & Laitin 2004, p. 7, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 11, Richmond 2004, p. 91, 95).

Further critique revolves around the inherent instability in liberalization processes. Many analysts propose that the introduction of liberal economics and politics in societies that are characterized by weak institutions, social inequalities and poverty, can contribute to more instability, polarization and volatility (Newman 2009, p. 39, Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 11-13). For example, to introduce democracy in societies run by powerful elites may cause them to violently resist the risk of losing their power and privileges. Further, political campaigning among local politicians can become characterized by sectarianism, which was the case in Bosnia, after the Dayton Peace Accord (Newman 2009, p. 39-40). In the same way, it is argued, can the promotion of a neo-liberal economic agenda be at odds with the goal of liberal peacebuilding. The modern view of welfare and the introduction of globalization in an unstable and divided society may not be appropriate and can, in the same way as democratization, exacerbate conflict and intensify social and economic tensions (Calls & Cousens 2008, p. 10, Newman 2009, p. 41, Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 12).

A second critique that has been raised against liberal peacebuilding concerns the incorporation of statebuilding strategies in peacebuilding missions.

Despite the many advantages with incorporating statebuilding efforts in peacebuilding operations (Menocal 2010, p. 5-6), the intrusiveness that statebuilding efforts entail have raised questions against the legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding operations today. One of the most prominent critiques refers to the complex combinations of international and domestic forms of governance structures that are said to be evolving in some postconflict countries where statebuilding efforts have been a part of the peacebuilding operation, for example Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. Fearon & Laitin (2004) argue that international organizations have had a significant amount of control over the political authority and economic institutions in these countries, and claim that this points to contemporary peacebuilding as a form of neo-imperialism, an argument that is shared by many researchers (Fearon & Laitin 2004, p. 7, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 11, Richmond 2004, p. 91, 95, Chandler 2010, p. 139-140).

Other critique that has been raised against statebuilding in peacebuilding missions suggest that statebuilding can actually be in tension with peacebuilding, and vice versa. One of the reasons for incorporating statebuilding as a part of the peacebuilding agenda was to come to terms with the underlying sources of conflict in a country. But doing this is a hazardous process, and is inherently long-term and tumultuous. By definition, this means that statebuilding may not always lead to peace, a factor that is directly in opposition to the peacebuilding operation. Moreover, while reaching a peace agreement in a postconflict country is a vital priority in a peacebuilding agenda, it can undermine statebuilding efforts in the long run. Since many peace agreements need to cooperate with spoilers and powerful national elites, in order to achieve immediate security and peace, this could weaken institution building and adding a risk to the sustainability of the state (Menocal 2010, p. 12-13, Calls & Cousens 2008, p. 10-11).

Furthermore, statebuilding have had the tendency to operate at a top-down level and can remain too focused on the official institutions at the central level of the state (Menocal 2010, p. 14). This lack of emphasis on community-driven statebuilding among the local population has led many researchers to again question the legitimacy and sustainability of liberal peacebuilding. However, a top-down approach can be necessary in peacebuilding in order to achieve cooperation and negotiation with local power holders and to reach stability and peace, a factor that is vital in every peacebuilding strategy, even if it entails working with power elites who without doubt had a leading part in the conflict and in many cases are extremists and exclusionary (Newman 2009, p. 37). Moreover, Newman, Paris & Richmond all raise the question of whether international liberal peacebuilding really is liberal, when the common statebuilding strategy of peacebuilding missions is top-down mediation, and tends to ignore grass-root communities and projects and, consequently, inclusivity. This further highlights the risk of not achieving one of the goals of contemporary peacebuilding, namely solving the underlying sources of the conflict (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 4, 13).

These tensions have taken the form of different dilemmas in liberal peacebuilding. In their article “Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding” (2007) Paris & Sisk defines several dilemmas that

peacebuilding operations face today. These range from the contradiction that peacebuilding missions are promoting national self-government through outside intervention, to the paradox that foreigners are involved in defining legitimate local leaders, among others. A heavy outside intervention can be necessary if the peace mission is deployed in an ongoing civil war, but can undermine the country's sense of ownership to the liberalization process. And allowing outsiders to be involved in defining local leaders can also be necessary if the country itself lacks the tools to conduct this task, but defies the very principle of legitimate local leaders (Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 4).

Another dilemma that has become evident in liberal peacebuilding missions is the approach peacebuilders take when promoting liberal politics and economics. Paris & Sisk (2007), as well as Newman (2009), identifies two different approaches: the light-footprint approach and the heavy-footprint approach. As indicated, the light-footprint approach focuses on encouraging local responsibility and capacity-building at a bottom level in order to create sustainable national institutions and increasing the sense of local ownership in the peacebuilding process. This approach is also more sensitive towards the context into which it has been put, in regards to politics, economics and culture. But the example of Afghanistan reveals the weakness of a light-foot print approach: it can allow possible spoilers to remain. Further, it can achieve the wrong results in a political and economic liberalization process if local institutions and ownership are abusive or fragile. In contrast, a heavy-footprint approach implicates a larger international involvement and can address the problems of the light-footprint approach, namely remove remaining spoilers and offer a stronger sense of stability, which was the case in Kosovo. But using a heavy footprint can end in a problem of dependency, lack of local ownership, local opposition against the international presence, and create the impression of a stable peace that will not endure after the departure of the peacebuilding mission (Newman 2009, p. 32-33, Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 4-5).

The purpose of this critical discussion was to highlight the main problems and dilemmas of liberal peacebuilding today. As you may have discovered, many of the appraisals I have accounted for overlap, for examples the tensions between statebuilding and peacebuilding and the dilemmas of liberal peacebuilding. What can conclude this section is the overall assessment that due to this critique and the variety of outcomes we have seen from earlier peacebuilding missions, liberal peacebuilding is still in need of adjustments. Researchers suggest that liberal peacebuilding has taken on the form of an enormous experiment (Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 1, Paris & Sisk 2009, p. 1), partially because of its need to improvise and be context-sensitive, and partially because of its persistent promotion of political and economic liberalization and institution-building as a universal solution to war-torn societies. A more pessimistic view of this discussion, and one that many analysts share, is that postconflict liberal peacebuilding is failing, due to the lack of appropriateness, sustainability and legitimacy of introducing the elements of liberalization in conflict-divided societies (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 11-13).

2.3 UN Peacebuilding Mandates

As stated above, the responsibilities in UN peacebuilding mandates have evolved during the last decade and the mandates have become much broader as a response to the growing recognition of long-term peacebuilding (Paris & Sisk 2007, p. 3, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 16). Current mandates for peacebuilding missions are mainly issued from the main body in the UN which is responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the world, namely the United Nations Security Council (The United Nations 1).

Mandates are based on resolutions from the General Assembly and express the will of the Member States in the UNSC in how to act in different international situations. It further gives the authority and responsibility to the Secretary-General to implement the requests from the Member States. According to the UN, the purpose of mandates is to establish new international norms, offer policy directions in different issues, and request specific activities, operations and reports. This definition of UN mandates is quite loose, and indeed, there does not exist any concrete legal definition of mandates (The United Nations 2, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 16). However, in a mandate review report from the United Nations, mandates are defined as follows: “Legislative mandates express the will of Member States and are the means through which they grant authority and responsibility to the Secretary-General to implement their requests. For the purposes of this report, a mandate has been defined as a request or a direction for action by the United Nations Secretariat or other implementing entities in the system, which originates in a resolution of the General Assembly or one of the other organs.” (The United Nations 2)

Today, the mandates issued by the Security Council include different tasks, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding and have resulted in the current deployment of more than 70,000 uniformed personnel and around 15,000 civilian staff in 15 peacekeeping operations, in addition to 30 special political missions around the world (The United Nations 3, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, p. 16). More specifically, the tasks that entail UN mandates include maintenance of international peace and security, sustainable development, promotion of human rights, humanitarian assistance, promotion of justice and international law and disarmament of former combatants (The United Nations 2).

Due to the definition from the UN and the authority the Secretary-General receives when a mandate is approved by the UN Member States, it is quite clear that a mandate is a powerful recommendation for how a postconflict situation should be handled, and consequently grants the peacebuilding mission extensive powers and guidelines in how the mission should be carried out.

2.4 Components of Liberal Peacebuilding

In addition to the previous discussion about the expansion of UN mandates, Newman, Paris & Richmond argue that most postconflict peacebuilding missions that have been deployed after the Cold War contain four different components: security, development, humanitarian assistance and governance and the rule of law (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 7-8). Here, I will briefly explain the contents of the four components, which will serve as my analytical framework and then move on to see if they are present in the mandates issued for the peacebuilding missions in Sierra Leone and Sudan.

2.4.1 Security

Within the realm of security, the following tasks are often included in a liberal peacebuilding mission: supporting a ceasefire or peace process, demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants and provide for their re-integration into society, collecting and destroying weapons, withdrawal of foreign forces, addressing regional sources of instability and conflict, and last, achieving security through different means, such as security sector reform (SSR) and police enforcement capacity-building.

2.4.2 Development

In this category, many of the following responsibilities for peacebuilding missions are often found: addressing property and land ownership disputes and reaching settlements, stabilizing the economy, securing natural resources, addressing social inequalities among different identity groups, employment creation and basic welfare.

2.4.3 Humanitarian Assistance

As humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding missions work for repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons and develop programs that can respond to food insecurity and severe health concerns.

2.4.4 Governance and the Rule of Law

In this last category, we find tasks such as strengthening law and order, democracy and governance assistance, resuming and strengthening public service delivery - for example health care, education and transportation - human rights,

reconciliation, transitional justice, land reforms and constitutional drafting (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, p. 8).

These four components is a clear reflection of the multifaceted nature of contemporary liberal peacebuilding operations, including both short-term and long-term objectives. Since it is argued that these components are common in peacebuilding operations today, it is a safe assumption that they have to have been addressed in the mandates issued for the operations. Indeed, as stated in the previous discussion about the power of mandates, it was argued that contemporary mandates issued by the UNSC entail tasks such as humanitarian assistance, maintenance of security questions, promotion of human rights and international law (The United Nations 2).

3 Analysis

3.1 Background: Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone is a country with a troubled and violent past, starting already after its independence from Britain in 1961. However, the civil war that started in 1991 and lasted over a decade is the most violent period in the country's history, due to the thousands of lives that were lost and displaced, and the dictatorial governmental system that lingered since its colonial past (Kieh 2005, p. 165-166, The United Nations 4, The World Bank & UNDP 2010, p. 11). The civil war soon became an urgent point on international and regional organizations' agenda and the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) all tried to negotiate a settlement between the Sierra Leonean government and the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). But it was not until 1998 that the democratically elected regime of Sierra Leone could be reinstalled, and in 1999 the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, the fighting continued until 2002, due to that the rebels failed to keep to the agreement (Kieh 2005, 166, 170-171, The United Nations 4). It was at the point of the Peace Agreement the UN thought it necessary to vote for a mandate for a peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone, to monitor and assist the upcoming elections and to secure the situation in the country.

3.2 The Mandate

The new peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL, was established in October 1999. From the beginning, the mission had a maximum of 6 000 military personnel, including 260 military observers (The United Nations 4). UNAMSIL's mandate was further revised, extended and prolonged several times until the maximum strength of military personnel landed on 17 500 and the deadline for UNAMSIL was prolonged until 2005 (UNSC 2001/1346, UNSC 2005/1610). In the revision of the mandate UNAMSIL was authorized increasing involvement in the civil affairs and civilian police as well as a higher degree of administrative and technical personnel in the peacebuilding mission (UNSC 2000/1289/12).

3.2.1 UNAMSIL and Security

The component of security is heavily mentioned in the mandate as a reflection to the previous civil war and the continuing security threat that prevailed in spite of the Peace Agreement. UNAMSIL was given great authority to try to address and handle the security issues that still posed a problem for the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to the continuing peacebuilding efforts. The peacebuilding mission had a mandate to establish its presence at important locations throughout Sierra Leone, to assist the Sierra Leonean Government in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in the society. Further, they were to facilitate the implementation of the Peace Agreement and ceasefire agreement through cooperation with all the parties of the agreements (UNSC 1999/1270, The United Nations 5). Moreover, paragraph eleven and twelve of the mandate highlights the multifaceted nature of the security efforts that were outlined in the mandate for UNAMSIL. These paragraphs emphasize the importance of close cooperation between UNAMSIL's security forces and ECOMOG, and encourage joint operations and headquarters to achieve security at important locations and to continue the demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants (UNSC 1999/1270/11/12). Additionally, the mandate stressed that the Sierra Leonean Government was in need to establish professional and accountable national police and armed forces, with the support from the international community, in order to achieve long-term stability, reconciliation and reconstruction of the country (UNSC 1999/1270/23).

In the 2000 revision of UNAMSIL's mandate, further security details were added and emphasized, such as for UNAMSIL to provide security especially in Freetown and at Lungi airport, at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration centers, as well as being responsible for the guard and destruction of collected military equipment (UNSC 2000/1289, The United Nations 5). In paragraph thirteen of the revision it was further added that a landmine action office was to be established within UNAMSIL, which would be responsible for awareness training of UNAMSIL personnel and for the cooperation of mine action activities carried out by NGO's and humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone (UNSC 2000/1289/13).

3.2.2 UNAMSIL and Development

The notion of development is not specified or distinctly expressed in the first mandate for UNAMSIL. One can only assume that the situation in Sierra Leone was so unstable that the need for appropriately addressed actions for security, humanitarian assistance and governance and the rule of law was at the time more important than taking development into consideration. Indeed, the hope may have been that through addressing these components first would lead to development of the country, or at least facilitate opportunities for development. However, in the revision of the mandate the concept of development is mentioned. While it does not grant specific authority to UNAMSIL to conduct any duties in this field,

paragraph 21 emphasizes the need for imperative and extensive international assistance to the Sierra Leonean people in order to achieve the long-term tasks of peacebuilding, economic and social recovery and development as well as reconstruction of the state (UNSC 2000/1289/21).

3.2.3 UNAMSIL and Humanitarian Assistance

Like the concept of development, humanitarian assistance is not as heavily expressed in the mandate as the notion of security. The mandate simply states that UNAMSIL had the authority to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This statement is supported by paragraph nineteen, twenty-one and twenty-two in the mandate, which brings up the importance of enabling refugees and internally displaced persons to return safely to their homes and encourages international organizations to support and assist in this matter (UNSC 1999/1270/19). The paragraphs further urge all parties of the Peace Agreement not to disturb in the provision of and access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Sierra Leone, which include the guaranteed safety and security of humanitarian personnel, and respect for human rights (UNSC 1999/1270/21/22). With the revision of the mandate, it was additionally stated that UNAMSIL had the mandate to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified intersections, for example Lungi airport (UNSC 2000/1289, The United Nations 5).

3.2.4 UNAMSIL and Governance and the Rule of Law

UNAMSIL had quite clearly a mandate that authorized the strengthening of government and the rule of law. According to the mandate the peacebuilding mission was to provide support to the national elections that were to be held in Sierra Leone, to support the parties in their running and encourage the creation of confidence-building mechanisms within the parties functioning (UNSC 1999/1270, The United Nations 5).

In the revision of the mandate, UNAMSIL's tasks within governance and the rule of law were further expanded, in that they were to coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leonean law enforcement authorities in the release of their responsibilities (UNSC 2000/1298, The United Nations 5). UNAMSIL's tasks were again emphasized in several paragraphs of the mandate. Paragraphs fifteen and seventeen in the mandate stressed the importance of including personnel with training and experience in international humanitarian, human rights - and refugee law in the peacebuilding mission. This also included personnel with child and gender-related requirements, negotiation - and communication skills, cultural consciousness and civilian-military coordination, which reveal the multifaceted nature of the mission. Moreover, the paragraphs underlined the importance of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, which were established under the

Peace Agreement, for the promotion of accountability and respect for human rights in the country, as well as for the fostering of peace and reconciliation (UNSC 1999/1270/15/17, UNSC 2000/1289/17).

3.3 Background: Sudan

The separation between the Arab dominated North Sudan and the African dominated South Sudan became an issue already during the country's colonial period, but was further highlighted after the liberation from British-Egyptian rule. The fighting, which occurred mainly in South Sudan, continued until the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement between the government and the separatist movement in 1972, but the peace lasted merely a decade, and in 1983 war broke out again, this time with the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the forefront.

Between 1985 and 2000 the situation in Sudan deteriorated heavily, but in 2001 peace negotiations between SPLM/A in the south and the Sudanese government in the North intensified and resulted in an inclusive peace agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which ended the longest civil war in Africa (The Swedish Embassy, The United Nations 6). The Peace Agreement gave the inhabitants in the Southern part of Sudan the right to a six year transitional period, after which they were to decide to the future status of the region; as a part of Sudan or as an independent country. In 2011 a referendum was held and a clear majority voted for the separation of Sudan. However, in 2005 the UNSC voted to send a peacebuilding mission to Sudan, to monitor the transitional period, assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the forthcoming elections (The United Nations 6).

3.4 The Mandate

By its resolution 1590, the UNSC decided in March 2005 to establish UNMIS (The United Nations 7, UNSC 2005/1590). The peacebuilding mission, which was extended several times over the coming years, consisted of 10 000 military personnel and 715 civilian police and would work in several areas, including good offices and political support for the peace process, security, governance and humanitarian and development assistance (UNSC 2005/1590, The United Nations 6, The United Nations 8).

3.4.1 UNMIS and Security

Since the situation in Sudan still was considered a threat to international peace and security, many of the tasks mentioned in the mandate for UNMIS included the

notion of security. The mandate for UNMIS encompassed monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, as well as monitoring armed groups. Moreover, UNMIS was to assist in the creation of the disarmament, - demobilization - and reintegration program of former combatants, with special attention to women – and child combatants, as required in the Peace Agreement. UNMIS was further authorized to destroy the weapons and military equipment that was collected from former armed groups. The mandate also sanctioned UNMIS to assist in the restructuring of the Sudanese police service, towards democratic policing, and develop police training and evaluation programs, and to assist in the training of the police (UNSC 2005/1590, The United Nations 7).

Evident in the mandate, as well as in the comments from the Security Council, is the emphasis on the issue of gender and violence against women as a tool for warfare in the conflict. In paragraph 15 of the mandate, The Security Council stressed the significance of including UN personnel with appropriate expertise and experience in gender-related issues in postconflict peacebuilding, and urged UNMIS to aggressively address this question during its time in Sudan (UNSC 2005/1590/15).

3.4.2 UNMIS and Development

The notion of development, as specified by Newman, Paris and Richmond, is not specifically articulated in the mandate for UNMIS. However, the mandate authorized the peacebuilding mission to conduct some tasks which in the long run may have led to long-term development in Sudan. For example, UNMIS was recognized to assist in the need for including all identity groups of Sudan, such as women, towards reconciliation and peacebuilding. UNMIS was also authorized to assist in the promotion of the understanding of the peace process and the role of UNMIS in Sudan, which was planned to be done through a public information campaign, directed towards all sectors of society, in coordination with the African Union (UNSC 2005/1590, The United Nations 7). Paragraph 13 of the mandate the Security Council also expressed the need for donor organizations, such as the World Bank, to continue their efforts to prepare for the provision of an assistance package for the reconstruction and economic development of Sudan. This assistance package included official development assistance and trade access, and would be put into practice as soon as the Peace Agreement was implemented (UNSC 2005/1590/13).

3.4.3 UNMIS and Humanitarian Assistance

The duration of the conflict in Sudan, and especially in Darfur, had had terrible consequences for the people living there, and the increasing number of refugees was great concern for UNMIS, and it was stated in the mandate that the sustainable return for refugees and internally displaced persons was of great importance for the consolidation of the peace process. The mission was granted quite extensive authority within the field of humanitarian assistance, with special

attention to refugees. Through establishing the necessary security conditions, UNMIS were to coordinate returning refugees, provide demining assistance, technical advice and coordination of international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with special attention to vulnerable groups within the society, such as refugees, women and children (UNSC 2005/1590, The United Nations 7). In paragraph nine of the mandate, the Security Council further emphasize the full and unrestricted access of relief personnel and delivery of humanitarian assistance, to all persons in need and in particular to refugees (UNSC 2005/1590/9).

3.4.4 UNMIS and Governance and the Rule of Law

In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed in 2005, a six year transitional period was established for the Southern part of Sudan, which would end in a referendum where the South Sudanese was to decide on the future for South Sudan. Due to this establishment in the Peace Agreement, UNMIS was accredited, together with other international actors, to provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties of the Agreement to support the preparations for the elections that were to be held in 2011.

Moreover, through a comprehensive strategy, UNMIS was to assist in the promotion of the rule of law, including an independent judiciary and the protection of human rights of all the Sudanese people. In the mandate, UNMIS was also allowed to assist in the development and consolidation of a national legal framework, through which the mission would contribute to long-term peace and stability. The importance of ensuring a sufficient human rights presence, with the right capacity and expertise, within UNMIS was also recognized, as well as working together with other United Nations agencies, related organizations and NGO's, in the effort of protecting civilians, with special consideration of vulnerable groups, such as women, refugees and children (UNSC 2005/1590, The United Nations 7).

3.5 Comparison

What becomes clear when outlining these mandates according to the components common in peacebuilding missions is that they both had a strong liberal peacebuilding agenda. Indeed, the mandate for UNAMSIL contained many of these components as it was one of the first missions that were deployed after the shift in the peacebuilding debate, towards a liberal state – and peacebuilding agenda, and before scholars and researchers had realized the many problems this alignment could and would entail. However, considering the extensive critique that has been raised since then, and discussed in previous chapters in this essay, it would be understandable if more recent mandates for peacebuilding missions would have taken this criticism in consideration. Nevertheless, the analysis of the mandate for UNMIS points rather in the opposite direction. As for UNAMSIL in

Sierra Leone, UNMIS had quite an extensive presence in Sudan. It appears as though the question of security and governance and the rule of law were the main objectives both for UNAMSIL and UNMIS, which may be comprehensible considering the contexts into which the peace missions were deployed. In both countries the security threat was still assessed as a high priority and the military forces that were present contained a large number of personnel and covered large areas, such as demobilization and reintegration of combatants.

Moreover, both countries were to face elections when battling weak or non-existent institutions or an insufficient political and judicial system. The mandates clearly stated that the missions had extensive authority in assisting the governments and judiciaries in rebuilding and strengthening institutions, developing new legal frameworks and establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, as well as assisting in the holding of the up-coming elections, which they also did. Further, the mandates were quite clear in their description of what the peace mission was authorized to do in these two areas, whereas within the notion of development and humanitarian assistance, the guide lines were not so clear. Indeed, in the mandate for UNAMSIL, development and humanitarian assistance were only mentioned briefly and with no specific clarity in what the mandate authorized the peace mission to do.

However, here lies a difference between the mandates. While the mandate for UNAMSIL lacked some specifics in the areas of development and humanitarian assistance, the mandate for UNMIS took these extents in mind more clearly, although not as clearly as for security and governance and the rule of law. Within the realm of humanitarian assistance, UNMIS had quite an extensive mandate, probably due to the pressing question of refugees and internally displaced persons. In the area of development, specifics are not established in the mandate, but UNMIS were authorized to conduct a series of tasks that that would enhance the understanding of the peace process on a grass root level among all groups in the society. Further, the Security Council brought up the question of donor organizations, trade and economic aid as a way of facilitating development and economic reconstruction in Sudan.

4 Conclusion

The overall purpose of this essay has been to clarify the critique raised against contemporary peacebuilding and assess if liberal peacebuilding still is used as a strategy in UN mandates today. Below, I will conclude the findings I have made in this study.

When comparing the mandates between UNAMSIL and UNMIS, based on the foregoing discussion about the liberal peace theory, statebuilding and critical liberal peacebuilding, I believe it to be quite clear that the content of UN mandates have not changed dramatically despite the critique raised in recent years. Indeed, the liberal peace along with statebuilding still seems to be central in mandates today, and a heavy footprint appears to be the dominant approach, considering that both missions had quite and extensive authority within the area of governance and the rule of law, and were to promote democracy, through assisting in holding elections, and to help strengthen and build institutions, such as building a stronger judiciary, etc. Security also emerged as one of the main objectives in the mandates, which is reasonable considering the context into which the missions were to be deployed. The UNSC also seem to have considered humanitarian assistance as a vital question in the mandate for UNMIS, which is comprehensible considering the large amount of refugees.

However, there are some differences relating to the question of development. In the mandate for UNAMSIL, this is not addressed in any extensive way while in the mandate for UNMIS there seem to have been a larger recognition to the importance of including society and other groups in understanding the peace process. UNMIS was actually authorized to assist in the need for including all identity groups of Sudan, such as women, towards reconciliation and peacebuilding. This phrase may seem quite loose, but points nevertheless, I believe, to a recognition in the mandate for the peacebuilding mission to be more inclusive and use a bottom-up approach, in contrast to before. As a matter of fact, one of the critiques that were highly emphasized in the critical discussion about liberal peacebuilding was that contemporary peacebuilding missions used a top-down approach instead of including important groups in the society. To authorize UNMIS to assist in the need for including all identity groups of Sudan towards reconciliation and peacebuilding may indicate that recent mandates take the some of the criticism outlined earlier in this essay into consideration. However, more mandates have to be examined in order to further verify this generalization. Nevertheless, I argue that considering the firm belief in liberal peace theory, the incorporation of statebuilding as a means in peacebuilding missions, and most importantly the critique against liberal peacebuilding, it is relevant to take this case into consideration when studying mandates, and the guidelines therein.

My findings in this essay have led me to conclude that liberal peacebuilding is still used as a common strategy in UN peace mandates today. Most tasks in the mandate for UNMIS were consistent with the components that have been common in since the deployment of the first liberal peacebuilding operations. However, in the case for UNMIS there seem to have been a recognition of the critique raised in the last years, considering the emphasis on including the society and marginalized groups in the peace – and reconciliation process. Nevertheless, the critique against liberal peacebuilding is extensive and even though it has gained some acknowledgement in the case of UNMIS, there are still many questions to be addressed.

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