模朋

Language, Irony, and Resistance

Internet spoofing in China today

Miriam Tardell, Lund University
KINK11, Spring 2012
Supervisor: Michael Schoenhals

Abstract: This essay investigates the background as well as the present and potential functions of *egao*, Chinese Internet spoofing. It focuses on the forms *egao* assumes in writing and analyzes how its practice of playing with and inventing words influences the Chinese society. Discussing the emergence of new expressions in text-based *egao*, this essay concludes that this kind of spoofing pushes the boundaries of accepted language but should be seen as an indicator rather than a cause of political change, as it takes advantage of the relative freedom of speech provided by the Internet while remaining at least partially tolerated by the government. The main impact exercised by *egao* is that its ridiculing of official phrases forces the authorities to change their language.

Sammanfattning: Uppsatsen undersöker hur nya ord och uttryck uppkommer i kinesiska Internetskämt, *egao*, samt vilka funktioner den här typen av skämt fyller i dagens Kina. Uppsatsen behandlar främst skriftliga former av *egao* (såsom ordlekar, dikter och påhittade ord och tecken) och försöker ta reda på hur dessa påverkar det kinesiska samhället och vilka funktioner de kan tänkas fylla. Slutsatserna blir att även om *egao* tänjer på gränserna för accepterat språk bör det betraktas som en indikator på snarare än som en orsak till politisk förändring, då fenomenet utnyttjar den relativa yttrandefrihet som Internet erbjuder samt åtminstone delvis tolereras av regeringen. Dock kan det viktigaste inflytandet som *egao* utövar sägas vara att fenomenet genom att driva med de officiella fraserna tvingar myndigheterna att förändra sitt språk.

论文介绍了社会现象"恶搞"，讨论了它的来源与相关背景，明确了它主要的社会与政治功能。恶搞作为民间语言挑战官方语言的力量是巨大的。

1 Introduction

The character (made-up combination of four characters (不明真相), *bu ming zhenxiang,* meaning "do not understand the real situation") on the front page is an example of the creative use of language employed in Chinese Internet spoofing, or *egao* (恶搞). In this essay I will look closely at the how, who and why of *egao* and, in the process, seek to explain what Internet word games, character crafting and spoofing may tell us about China today.

1.1 Purpose

Although there are many examples of *egao* music and video clips, in this essay I focus on the form(s) it assumes in *writing*, more specifically by analyzing examples of linguistic engineering resulting in new word forms and phrases found in Internet forums and blogs. In a country where the government does not tolerate explicit criticism, citizens invariably come up with strategies to express discontent indirectly or implicitly, such as making up new words circumventing censorship while ridiculing the hackneyed officially prescribed phrases. By explaining *egao* in a social and political context, something that so far has not been done extensively, this essay will illustrate how in China today, despite the myriad ways in which the freedom of expression is curtailed, it is possible to criticize the system by using irony. My conclusions are of interest mainly for those who strive to understand the war of words in contemporary Chinese politics or who study the possibilities of ironic spoofing that the Internet brought with it. In this essay, I confine myself to addressing the following question: How do new expressions in *egao* emerge and what are their presently existing (and potential) functions?

1.2 Method

In order to answer this question, this essay relies largely on literature review. As the focus is on how *egao* is understood inside of China, I assess primarily Chinese academic publications and newspaper articles. Most of the articles used have been found by searching China Academic Journal Database (CAJ). As this essay has no intention of providing a quantitative analysis, I have chosen articles that express some different viewpoints to explain the general trend in the perception of *egao*. To support my analysis of *egao*'s political functions I use secondary material in English and Swedish. To encourage comprehensive understanding of how new expressions emerge and the functions of *egao*, I first briefly introduce the phenomenon and give an explanation of its historical background. Having understood how modern-day *egao* came into being, I then try to isolate any intrinsically "Chinese features" of *egao* not visible in spoofing in other cultural/socio-political settings, as well as analyze the characteristics of the Chinese language that may well determine much of the shape of *egao*. Following this, I discuss why it has spread and reached its current level of popularity by looking into its functions. Furthermore, I analyze the essential technological elements on which its existence *in its present form* is dependent and evaluate how *egao* is received and perceived in China today. Based on the information gathered, I finally draw some simple-yet-plausible conclusions about the causes and impact of *egao* and suggest how one may interpret this phenomenon in a wider contemporary Chinese context.

1.3 Definition: What is *egao*?

Being some kind of an underground phenomenon, the exact definition of *egao* is necessarily quite vague. However, there are three common characteristics to be found in most of the examples of *egao* that I discuss here. First, they all recycle familiar concepts or quotes to create entertainment, using satire.[1] Second, works of *egao* are making creative use of language, either by inventing new words by playing with homophones or assigning a new meaning to already existing words. Third, *egao* as we know it today depends largely on the Internet for its creation and dissemination.

2 Origins of *egao*

In an article in the Chinese movie magazine *Popular Cinema*, the origins of *egao* poems are traced all the way back to Aristotle and ancient Greece.[2] However, there is no need to search that deep in order to find examples of predecessors of *egao*. While *egao* is sometimes perceived as a completely new phenomenon, as Johan Lagerkvist points out, similar pranks have probably circulated throughout Chinese history, although ignored by official records.[3] Ingenious elaborating with words in order to say what may not be said (while all the time using *words* considered unproblematic) is nothing new in China.

Sometimes even the diagonal of a sample of written text has been used to convey sensitive messages. This is possible since modern Chinese is read from left to right but with equal spacing between characters both horizontally and vertically, hence allowing reading the diagonal as well. Bert-Jaap Koops explain in a book on coded language how this method was used in a poem called "Yuan Xiao", written by a Chinese student in the US and published in China's official Party newspaper *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) in March 1991. Seemingly innocent, this poem escaped the strict censors but on the diagonal of the paper expressed what most readers understood perfectly well as a call for the dismissal of then-Prime Minister Li Peng.[4] Two years earlier, protesting students had smashed small glass bottles, *xiao ping* (小瓶), to express discontent with paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.[5] Also in academic discourse there have certainly been ways to circumvent what is being proscribed, such as making your reader read between the lines, although this might not get your message across.[6]

However, it is possible that the emergence of *egao* at this moment is at least in part due to decreasing level of control of cultural expressions. The times have changed a lot since the song *Guangling San*, played on traditional Chinese string instrument *guqin*, was banned and condemned as subversive during the imperial era merely because of the strings representing

---

[1] Qiu Mingfeng, "Egao: Dangqian liuxing wenhua de huayu biaozheng", *Writer Magazine*, no.2, 2011, p. 133.

[2] Zhou Tiedong, 'Egao! Egao! Egao yingpian yizhi dou shi yi ge yu zhuliu dianying chanye xiangban er sheng, xiangfu xiangcheng de shichang xingwei', *Popular Cinema*, vol. 22, 2010, p. 61.

[3] Johan Lagerkvist, *After the Internet, before democracy – competing norms in Chinese media and society,* Peter Lang, Bern, 2010, p. 150.

[4] Bert-Jaap Koops, *The Crypto Controversy: A Key Conflict in the Information Society*, Kluwer Law International, Zuidpoolsingel, 1998, p. 46.

[5] Nicholas D. Kristof, 'Privately, More and More Chinese Say It's Past Time for Deng to Go', *New York Times*, 17 April 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/17/world/privately-more-and-more-chinese-say-it-s-past-time-for-deng-to-go.html, retrieved 21 April 2012.

[6] Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics*, University of California, Berkeley, 1992, p. 125.

the people and the emperor were tuned at the same tone, thus seen as "the people surpassing the emperor".[7]

The word *egao* comes from the Japanese *kuso*, in Chinese *ke wu* (可恶), meaning repulsive and used as a general derogative word.[8] Wang Chengwen at the Henan University Department of Media Studies suggests the original *kuso* could be interpreted as several not very elegant words, such as "dung", "rotten" or "stool".[9] The character 恶, pronounced *wu* or *e* in Chinese, generally means malicious. However, as *egao* creator Hu Ge explained, *egao* signifies something exaggerated and extraordinary rather than malicious or nasty.[10] The roots of *egao* are also to be found in *mu lei tau* (无厘头), a genre of humor emerging in Hong Kong during the late 20th century. Literally "silly talk," *mu lei tau* was originally a Cantonese proverb describing a person who speaks in a vulgar and confusing way but whose thoughts nonetheless cannot be completely dismissed.[11] Although there are numerous examples of historical texts that could be considered *egao* in retrospect, most scholars agree that *egao* as we see it today (for technological reasons to be discussed below) has only existed since the early 2000s.

3 *Egao* and the Chinese language

Most of the forms *egao* assumes in writing emerging in China have in common that they all use the Chinese language. Does this imply that some special common features are visible in these forms, something which we might call "parody with Chinese characteristics"?

First of all, the Chinese language is, perhaps not surprisingly, different from Western language in many ways. For one thing, due to the relatively limited number of phonetic components (phonemes) used in Chinese, the language contains many homophones, that is to say, words that sound the same or very similar. This fact provides infinite possibilities of word plays and simple jokes. Moreover, as Chinese is an isolating language, "words are invariable and grammatical relations are shown mainly by word order".[12] Thus, adding or deleting a single word or even an in itself meaningless particle is enough to transform an appropriate formulation to an unacceptable one. From this also follows that Chinese remains heavily context-based, and that different understandings of a particular sentence could be made depending on the situation. Therefore, word plays similar to *egao* have always been an important part of Chinese humor.

Meanwhile, as mentioned in an article by Chen Changsong, all languages include certain grammatical elements without precise meaning of their own.[13] Also in Western alphabetical languages, the mere repositioning of a comma could have a crucial effect. Since Chinese characters are combinations of basic elements that could be separated and put

---

[7] Chen Yudan, 'Music and National Identity', lecture held at Lund University Centre for Asian Studies, 24 April 2012.

[8] Zhai Bofei and Xing Peng, "Egao wenhua' cong yule kuanghuan dao jiegou fankang de xianshi fenxi', *Journal of Xidian University (Social Science Edition)*, vol. 18, no. 4, July 2008, p. 154.

[9] Wang Chengwen, 'Egao wenhua de xushu jiegou yu shehui yuyi', *Zhengzhou qinggongye xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)*, no. 3, 2007, p. 23.

[10] Lin Longqiang, 'Egao – yi zhong wuxian zhuangtai xia de dianfu', *Southeast Communication*, no. 3, 2007, p. 48.

[11] Guo Yuxiu and Zhao Baofeng. "Egao" zuopin shengxing yuanyin de tanxi", *Wenhua jie*, no. 3, 2011, p. 226.

[12] Schoenhals, p. 7.

[13] Chen Changsong, "Lunyujing dui egao wenben yiyi de shengcheng yu zhiyue", *Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College (Social Science)*, vol. 29, no. 6, 2007, p. 814.

together in a myriad ways, is seems to be slightly easier to form new characters than to invent new letters of the alphabet. This is something *egao* creators frequently take advantage of, for example when abbreviating the official phrase "do not understand the real situation", *bu ming zhenxiang* (不明真相), into one single character (see front page). As argued in a Xinhua editorial, explaining all kinds of mass incidents saying that the protesters "do not understand the real situation" but are being used by mysterious powerful interests with ulterior motives is a practice so common that it constitutes a credibility problem for the government.[14]

3.1 How do new expressions in *egao* emerge?

It has been suggested that the ultimate reason for the emergence of the new word forms based on homophones frequent in *egao* is the computerization and the mode of typing Chinese characters on a keyboard using pinyin, as failure in choosing the correct homophone word could result in new word forms that can be spread online, for example when someone intended to type "giant shrimp", in Chinese *da xia* (大虾), but instead accidentally picked its homophone *da xia* (大侠) meaning "noble warrior". However, according to Liu Xiangjun, this is extremely unlikely since the pinyin typing software in computers are based on the principle of choosing the most common word in the first instance, which if anything should lead to a standardization of the Internet language, rather than to new words.[15]

According to Lei Weizhen and Cao Xiaojie, there are primarily two ways that new expressions emerge. The first one is that, facing an important incident in society, netizens will spontaneously gather around one point. In a sharp manner, they seek out the preposterous parts of the authorities' speech. One example is a traffic accident where in one of the cars involved, five died and three were injured. Immediately after the accident the chief of the local propaganda bureau said in an interview that he "did not know if the car had been overloaded". This statement of his figured in *egao* online in which the man was referred to as "bureau chief with brain damage". "Brain damage", *nao can* (脑残) is a new expression often used in *egao* and conveniently shortened into a single character, pronounced *nan*.[16]

The second method used to create new expressions is to question the established order or authority. An example of this is that since the notion of the "harmonious society" was launched in a speech at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007, the homophone of "harmony", *hexie* (河蟹), meaning "river crab" has figured in *egao* online. *Hexie* in this sense does not refer to the animal itself but is an allusion to the government and its censoring policies, used to mock and express discontent while avoiding censorship itself.[17] Later, in 2009 in response to the governmental campaign against pornography which cracked down on online discussion forums and blog host websites where sensitive issues were mentioned, a curious creature called the "Grass Mud Horse" appeared on the Chinese Internet, often in fierce battle with evil river crabs. The characters in "grass mud horse", *cao ni ma* (草泥马) are all perfectly innocent, thus able to dodge censors' computers and elude the government ban on "offensive behavior". Pronounced with different tones, however, *cao ni ma* (操你妈) is an irreverent expression. Another contributing factor to why these expressions emerge is that netizens address concrete problems in society and attempt to use public opinion

---

[14] 'Quntixing shijian zhong shao yong 'bu ming zhenxiang'', *Xinhua Wang*, 28 July 2009.

[15] Liu Xiangjun, "Ye shuo 'beiju' lei wangluo xincixing", *Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)*, vol. 32, no. 4, 2010, p. 166.

[16] Lin Yan, "Huili xuanfu' – zhengfu weiji gongguan de yi ge fei dianxing yangben', *Sichuan Party Building*, 26 October 2011, p. 39.

[17] Lei Weizhen and Cao Xiaojie, 'Cong shengfa guocheng kan wangluo yufu de benzhi', *Guoji xinwen jie*, December 2009, p. 90.

to influence the way these problems are solved. Directly provoking the emergence of new expressions are the controversial incidents (poison scandals, corruption trials, unclear deaths in custody) frequent in a society in transformation, like China of today. Here, language and society are developing in symbiosis and changes in society may leave deep footprints in the language. The new Internet expressions of each year between 2006 and 2009 largely correspond to the main incidents that occurred the actual year.[18] Scholar Cao Xiuhua further supports this view, suggesting that it is the great number of "mass incidents" in recent years that have caused netizens to react.[19]. This theory is supported by the increase in both incidents and *egao* that has taken place over recent years. Ever since the Sun Zhigang incident in 2003, when a young migrant worker was beat to death in a detention center where he was taken for not having carried ID, there have been several large-scale incidents every year.[20] Incidents that upset many people do not always generate *egao* that includes the invention of entirely new words or characters. However, these forms of *egao* do add an additional significance or meaning to an already existing word. One example is the 2009 incident when a young man called Li Qiaoming died in custody in Yunnan and the policemen explained his death as caused by "crashing into the wall while playing hide and seek". Following this incident, frequent allusions to the risks involved with "hide and seek", or *duo mao mao* (躲猫猫) in the local dialect, were made on the Internet. In this context, *duo mao mao* functions as a symbol for police brutality rather than in its original meaning.[21]

In general, Lei and Cao see Internet language such as *egao* as the result of a contest between two sets of language bodies: the official language and the popular language. An example of when popular language challenges the authorities' language is netizen's use of *fu wo cheng* to refer to the incident where the son of a local official was "busy doing push-ups on a bridge when suddenly his girl friend jumped in the river". After a press conference where this formulation was given as an explanation, netizens started using it to express doubts regarding the investigation carried out by the provincial Public Security Office in Guizhou and the supposed cover-up of the murder of the girl. Shortly afterwards followed animated online discussions on whether push-ups, *fu wo cheng* (俯卧撑) should be made an Olympic sport. Before netizens' renaming of this incident, it was commonly referred to as the "6.28 incident" or the "Weng'an incident", because of the date and place where it occurred.[22]

3.2 Coded language

In addition, Zhou Xin, Zhang Wei and Fan Chunmei suggest Internet neologisms, including the ones created in *egao*, may function as a "secret language" or a way to convey a message to likeminded people without others understanding.[23] Herein lies perhaps part of the explanation for the rather vague nature of *egao*: Inevitably, as censorship catches up, words and methods must change in order to maintain the advantage of communicating using phrases incomprehensible to some people. However, the choice of coded language obviously implies great difficulties in getting your message across to a broader audience.

---

[18] ibid., p. 89.
[19] Cao Xiuhua, 'Guanyu wangluo liuxing saoyu minyi suqiu yanjiu de sikao', *Journal of Hunan University of Science & Technology (Social Science Edition)*, vol. 14, no. 3, May 2011, p. 129.
[20] Lei and Cao, p. 90.
[21] 'Duo mao mao' shijian', *Baidu baike*,
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2218094.htm, retrieved 27 March 2012.
[22] Lei and Cao, p. 88.
[23] Zhou Xin, Zhang Wei and Fan Chunmei, ''Bianwei' de wangluo wenzi', *RBLATS*, no. 3, 2008, p. 52.

4 Functions

When *egao* first emerged, it was perceived by many Chinese intellectuals as subversive as it challenges the state when circumventing the censorship by using seemingly innocent words to spell out discontent.[24] Although the autonomy of *egao* creators could be questioned, *egao* is a way for ordinary people (if maybe middle-class with Internet access rather than the rural poor) to mock the worthy and powerful, a punch from below. Briefly, according to Guo Yuxiu and Zhao Baofeng, *egao* could be described as a subversive, comical but subtle way to break down structures and norms in society.[25] However, when critically assessing the creators and beneficiaries of *egao*, determining its primary function may prove a complex issue. In order to find potential political significance of *egao*, I here assess the functions it might exercise primarily from a political perspective.

4.1 Resistance

Several Chinese intellectuals, among them Tsinghua University sociologist Guo Yuhua, have compared *egao* to the forms of everyday resistance engaged in by Malay peasants described by political scientist James C. Scott in *Weapons of the Weak*.[26] Some of the concepts provided in this book may well be used in assessing the significance of *egao*. For example, although *egao* like petty theft does not pose any fundamental threat to basic structures in society, it does represent some kind of negotiation between those who have power and those who do not, an ongoing pushing of the boundaries of this relationship, to "see precisely what can be gotten away with at the margin, and to include this margin as part of an accepted, or at least tolerated, territorial claim".[27] While *egao* might not be a real threat to the existing social order or the Party-state ideology, it could still be able to exercise a function of stretching the limits of the accepted further and further, as it is at least questioning dominant views and expressions, showing that other ways to speak and think are possible. Similarly, Scott argues that the "war of words", the refusal of the poor to accept the situation as defined from above and the malicious gossip and invented nicknames used to undermine the self-awarded status of the rich, is necessary, if not sufficient, for further (and more open) resistance.[28] This could be compared to how *egao* blames party and state officials for their greed by joking about them being corrupted. The motive behind creating and consuming *egao* may well be to have a laugh at the powerful, rather than any real intention to overthrow the current order. Scott suggests, however, that a combination of these motives is possible and claims that "[T]he English poacher in the eighteenth century *may* have been resisting gentry's claim to property in wild game, but he was just as surely interested in rabbit's stew".[29] In the same way, *egao* exercises two functions: the first one being entertainment and the second being resistance to people and procedures condemned as unjust as well as to the prescribed definition of the situation as seen from above.

---

[24] Lagerkvist, p. 154.
[25] Guo and Zhao, p. 226.
See also Zhou Enshuai, "Daodi shi tianshen haishi egui?", Consume Guide, no. 9, p. 234.
[26] Lagerkvist, p. 155.
[27] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985. p. 255.
[28] ibid., p. 240.
[29] ibid., p. 291.

Revoking these arguments previously put forward by Scott, Johan Lagerkvist suggests that *egao* might exert political influence in the future and sees in it the beginnings of an "alternative civility", indicating a generational change and building up more pressure against the system in the long run.[30] Mary E. Gallagher suggests that a civil society that develops in close connection to the state may exercise a great impact on society as it has the power to modify the state itself.[31] Swedish historian Hans Hägerdahl further supports this view in a recent book on Chinese political leadership, arguing that the regime is dependent on what is happening in the rapidly changing society and needs to negotiate with different economic and political interest groups.[32]

Nonetheless, Lagerkvist argues that as long as the Internet-based laughing mobs do not generate massive mobilizations on the streets, the actual overthrowing potential of *egao* is extremely limited. The likeliness of *egao* mobilizing people in the streets is in turn severely limited by the obvious difficulties of getting subtle messages across to the general public. For example, when a text about the "Grass Mud Horse" (草泥马, *cao ni ma*) first appeared on a website, many netizens did not at all realize that this was a fictional creature.[33] In addition, irony is not necessarily an expression of resistance, but rather a rhetorical tool that may be used by government and citizens alike.[34]

4.1.1 Examples of *egao* as resistance

As described by Lin Yan in the newspaper *Sichuan Dangjian* (*Sichuan Party Building*), local and provincial governments are often subject to *egao*. An expert on training low and middle-level government officials in public relations, Li Zhian, says one possible reason could be that these officials are still stuck at a stage where *saomang he xinao* (扫盲和洗脑), or "sweeping-up and brainwashing", are the natural methods of handling scandals, in comparison to the central government, which is arguably better at handling public opinion. When not allowing certain issues to be discussed publicly, it is easy to understand how rumors and conspiracy theories, sometimes in the shape of *egao*, may flourish.

Although their way of handling the media is better, leaders on the highest level have also often been subject to *egao*. At the time of writing, the Internet discussion ahead of the change of leadership scheduled for October 2012 includes several nicknames for current president Hu Jintao and the likely president-to-be, Xi Jinping. These nicknames function as a way of mocking the politicians while avoiding censorship. However, the Internet-regulating authorities are trying to keep up, why homophones to the politicians' names such as Hu Embroidered-Set (胡锦套) and Xi Forbidden-to-comment (习禁评) are now also blocked on the Chinese Internet.[35] Not surprisingly, this results in a never-ending race where *egao* creators come up with new nicknames as the old ones are banned by the government. An incident resulting in much *egao* as a way to express discontent with the authorities' handling of certain situations is the high-speed train accident in Wenzhou that took place in summer 2011. Shortly after Prime Minister Wen Jiabao called for a speedy investigation in order to

---

[30] Lagerkvist, pp. 152-154.

[31] Mary E Gallagher, 'The Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State' in *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space*, Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.), Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p. 422.

[32] Hans Hägerdahl, *Kinas ledare 1912*-2012, Historiska Media, Lund, 2012, p. 314.

[33] 'Shanzhai ban 'dongwu shijie' jieshao caonima zouhong wangluo,' *Nanjing bao yewang – Dongfang weibao*, 11 February 2009. http://news.ifeng.com/society/4/200902/0211_346_1006552.shtml, retrieved 27 May 2012.

[34] Lagerkvist, p. 156.

[35] Anne Henochowicz, 'Sensitive Words: Xi Cannot-Comment and More', *China Digital Times*, 5 April 2012, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/04/sensitive-words-xi-cannot-comment-and-more/ , retrieved 27 May 2012.

"give the people an explanation", reporting about the incident ceased and the whole thing was silenced down, which lead to netizens jokingly saying that what the government really wanted to do was to "give the people some tape" as both "tape" and "explanation" is pronounced *jiaodai* in Chinese, although its written with different characters.

Sometimes the criticism found in *egao* is subtler and less openly directed towards the authorities. However, it still questions the corruption and general lack of rule of law that is assumed to determine the judicial outcome of many incidents in China today. One example is a traffic accident in Hangzhou in 2009 where young Hu Bin with his car hit and killed Tan Zhuo, another young man. The traffic police claimed that Hu's car had only been going at 70 kilometers per hour, which many by-standers found very unlikely. As Hu Bin's family was well off while Tan Zhuo was from a worker's family, people soon suspected that the case was affected by connections and the police's unwillingness to trouble the wealthy. This caused a great amount of *egao*, coining the term *qi shi ma*, (欺实马) or "horse of deception", another mythical creature in the world of grass-mud horses and river crabs (although the latter actually do exist). Pronounced with other tones, however, *qi shi ma* could also be written 七十码, a colloquial term meaning 70 kilometers per hour.[36]

4.2 Anger-venting

As a young man in Beijing explained in an article in the New York Times on the example of smashing glass bottles to implicitly criticize Deng Xiaoping: "If you smash it in public, you might get arrested. If you smash it at home you just need to sweep it up".[37] Consuming, and to some extent creating, *egao* could function as a way of smashing the glass bottle at home, or as Johan Lagerkvist puts it, of "letting off steam while safely avoiding being steamrollered by the authorities".[38] A blog post cited by Tu Gang from Henan University further elaborates on this function exercised by *egao*: "Once you have watched it, your belly aches from laughter and you can't refrain from letting out an evil laugh. It is a little like why putting thumbtacks on the chair of that ideological education teacher that would never stop talking feels so good" *(my translation)*.[39] Ethnologists further support this view, claiming that since medieval times, jokes have prevented societies from exploding.[40]

4.3 Escape from reality

The Internet in general and *egao* in particular is not only a tool for spreading information but to an even higher extent functions as an escape from reality and one's own daily responsibilities. In addition, many people get a kick out of making their own views public. For young people in urban areas in China, creating *egao* is a way to express one's own thoughts and desires, which also serves to relieve the pressure at school or at work that this generation experiences, although largely spared from the hardships that fostered previous generations. In a society that is both more individualistic and more competitive, *egao* has

---

[36] '2009 niandu shi da xinci', *Southern Metropolis Weekly,* 24 December 2009.
http://past.nbweekly.com/Print/Article/9353_0.shtml, retrieved 27 May 2012.
[37] Nicholas D. Kristof, loc. cit.
[38] Lagerkvist, p. 158.
[39] Tu Gang, "Egao' dui chuantong sixiang jiaoyu moshi de xiaojie yu chonggou', *Zhengzhou qinggongye xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban),* no. 3, 2007, p. 26.
[40] Björn Gadd,'Tio tröttsamma jobbskämt: En allvarlig historia', *City,* 20 April 2012, p. 2-3.

emerged as a method to show one's personality and to get noticed by the rest of the world.[41] In other words, experimenting with new expressions on the Internet could be viewed as a way to impress others and leave a trace in the flow of information.[42] Moreover, when *egao* creator Hu Ge explains his intentions, he describes himself as a "rebel against the serious" rather than as having any political motives. "Why do you climb mountains? Because mountains exist. Why do you make *egao*? Because the dignified exists." Hu Ge further explains the collages he creates as the results of the clashes between different incidents and phenomena in society taking place in his head.[43] *Egao* in this sense appears to be some kind of way to handle the enormous amounts of information flowing into our minds every day. Moreover, perhaps it is precisely the "dignified" that *egao* is rebelling against, rather than authorities or powerful people.

The primary function of *egao* may be just to have a good laugh, nothing more but certainly nothing less. However, the examples above suggest that *egao* may well function as *both* entertainment and resistance, having a good laugh while venting one's anger or discontent. Therefore, e*gao*'s functions may well be viewed in a broader perspective. In an article in Dongnan Chuanbo, *egao* is said to be subverting not only current phenomena in society such as corruption but also on a deeper level questioning the values of modern Chinese society.[44] Therefore, netizens seemingly often make a fuss over a rather insignificant issue in order to express discontent with a more important problem: In a study of what people actually talk about in Internet forums in China, Lei and Cao found that although discussions began by commenting the causes of a certain incident or a certain person, they most often ended up revolving around general problems in society.[45]

5 *Egao* and the Internet

5.1 Technological preconditions

"星星看来比月亮小得多，但可爱的是它发射着自己的光"

"The stars appear much smaller than the moon, but in contrast, they do emit their own light".[46] (Liu Binyan, journalist who was purged during the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign and who emerged after the Cultural Revolution as a major proponent of reforms of the press regime)

This quote could help us understand the way the Internet has revolutionized the way information is being disseminated, which is vital for assessing the emergence of *egao*. One reason that should not be overlooked when analyzing the creation of *egao* is obviously the technological progress of recent years, providing hundreds of millions of Chinese people with Internet access. Naturally, the advent of the worldwide web brought with it new possibilities for ordinary people to "speak one's mind". Digital applications and the arrival of new media

---

[41] Guo and Zhao, p. 226.
[42] Zhou, Zhang and Fan, p. 52.
[43] Lin Longqiang, p. 48.
[44] ibid.
[45] Lei and Cao, p. 89.
[46] Qian Gang, *Zhongguo chuanmei yu zhengzhi gaige*, Cosmos Books, Hong Kong, 2008, p. 20.

have made it very easy to reproduce and manipulate text as well as audiovisual material.[47] Lei and Cao suggest that also in the society of the past, there were groups of people challenging the official language, but that their calls could not reach out since there was no channel equivalent to the one provided by Internet in the modern society. Nowadays, netizens' diffusion of these expressions has surpassed regional, spatial and cultural borders as the spread of information could happen with a speed previously unseen and in a state of anonymity.[48] Furthermore, Guo and Zhao suggest that as the interactive character of the Internet has expanded the possible ways of spreading information, *egao* has emerged as an important channel in disseminating new ways of thinking. The fact that more people now participate in information sharing on the Internet has blurred the boundaries between transmitter and receiver. In contrast to daily life where positions and perspectives are fixed around a well-defined core, the virtual Internet sphere provides pluralism and an equalizing effect on the relation between center and periphery.[49] Just like a carnival where for one day the usual boundaries between male and female, subordinate and master, are forgotten, the Internet serves as a playground for experimenting with behavior normally frowned upon. This makes the Internet a space where people can free themselves of their everyday lives and where conventions regarding gender, identity or status are constantly challenged.[50]

Meanwhile, it is also significant that Chinese *egao* developed in one of the world's most censored Internet spheres.[51] In a situation where using the "wrong" words could ultimately cause you a great deal of trouble, Chinese netizens have developed a whole new language to get their messages across without being censored, often also mocking the authorities in some way. Internet censorship has been tightened since the riots in Tibet and Xinjiang in 2008 and 2009 respectively while the number of Internet users in China has soared to more than 400 million.[52] However, as explained in an article in *Southern Metropolis Weekly*, simply blocking part of the Internet is not really possible since people will always find solutions to be able to access the websites they want.[53] Further elaborating on this topic, Johan Lagerkvist argues that following the development of the Internet that has taken place in China in recent years, the Party-state has had to give society more freedom of speech in order to maintain social stability, which creates a particular dynamic in which both freedom and control increase.[54]

5.2 Internet and the process of inventing new words

The Internet has been crucial for the emergence of new expressions in *egao* as it enables enough people to use and read the word for it to be understood outside of the circle where it was first created. This explains the quick spread of the Internet language and separates it from other kinds of jargon, such as those conceived in a smaller group along occupational lines or in sub-cultures. In general, what characterizes the netizens inventing new expressions on the Internet is that they want to be allowed to express themselves more freely and participate more actively in society. Netizens may share some common characteristics but are still a rather heterogeneous body. The groups they form to create new expressions are open,

---

[47] Wang, p. 24.
[48] Lei and Cao, p. 90.
[49] Guo and Zhao, p. 260.
[50] Lei and Cao, pp. 90-91.
[51] Chen Wanying, Qian Gang and Zhai Minglei, *Zhongguo mengbo*, Cosmos Books, Hong Kong, 2009, p. 3.
[52] ibid., p. 4.
[53] '2009 niandu shi da xinci', loc. cit.
[54] Lagerkvist, p. 265.

multilayered and without strings attached. From this follows that there is some initial ambiguity regarding the meaning of a new expression until netizens reached consensus. However, as Lei and Cao suggest, organizing is essential for the emergence and spread of new expressions. In fact, for every individual Internet user, the impact of creating and spreading new Internet expressions is negligible, but as a whole body of netizens, it is possible to achieve miracles.[55]

6 How is egao perceived?

Although the benevolent stand of the authorities towards *egao* suggests that it is not presently perceived as a threat by the government, numerous articles have been written regarding its bad influence, primarily on young people. In these articles, a fear of a total disintegration of all moral standards when nothing is holy anymore is clearly visible. In an article in the newspaper *China's Militia* (Zhongguo Minbing), the impact of *egao* is said to be bad because it weakens the control mechanisms in society and lowers the general morale. Even worse, it eliminates the differences between rich and poor and between people of low and high social status. This will, according to the article, lead to mental illness and make people inverted and deprived of their collective identity.

Nevertheless, as to what measures that should be taken to stop the bad societal influence coming from *egao*, caution is recommended in order to assure the future support and trust of the Internet generation. Therefore, the solution is not as simple as to just wipe out these jokes. Tightly controlled and kept with care to limit its potentially harmful effects, the Internet may prove to be a useful tool in guidance of the public opinion and in raising the general knowledge levels.[56] Well-known Shanghai comedian Zhou Libo seems to support some of the views expressed in *China's Militia* regarding the dangers of an uncontrolled Internet. After a tragic fire took many lives in Shanghai and online rumors had it that the human factor was to blame and wanted to find the culprit, Zhou posted the following comment on his own blog:

> The Internet provides a virtual public platform that is borderless, class-free and status-free. On the Internet, everyone can express their [sic.] views without accepting any responsibility. This creates a virtual space for anarchy! Please imagine this! If the Internet environment were replicated in the real world, would we want such a world? Perhaps it's fine for the sake of entertainment, but if applied outside the virtual world it would be miserable! If the government were to simply follow the will of the netizens, it would be a form of 'self-castration'![57]

Shortly thereafter, perhaps surprisingly, Zhou removed this post, resulting in netizens giving him the nickname "Zhou Self-castration", as he had done exactly what he had stated the government must not do, given in to online public opinion. In an article in Henan University Press, Tu Gang, while acknowledging that *egao* does not distinguish between right and wrong, suggests that it should not be shunned, but instead used in ideological and political education to reach out to young people. From this new and subtle way of expression that is *egao*, much

---

[55] Lei and Cao, p. 89.
[56] Tian Jingbo, 'Liuxue de lishi, qirong egao? Egao jingdian, women daodi yishi le shenme?'. *Zhongguo Minbing*, no. 10, 2010, p. 6.
[57] 'Zhou Self-castration', *China Digital Space*, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Zhou_self-castration, retrieved 27 April 2012.

can be learned. Using more casual language, *egao* appeals to bigger audiences while it touches upon themes vital to the construction of harmonious society. As to the subversive and structure-dissolving nature of *egao*, Tu suggests that this might also prove useful as it could help modernizing the ideology education to fit today's society by breaking down patterns of thought often taken for granted as we are so locked in our traditional ways of thinking. The discontent with the current society present in *egao* does not use upright in-your-face criticism and instead expresses itself through a seemingly praising and approving surface, which is the complete opposite to the old "whenever you come across something bad, you need to criticize it"-attitude prevailing in the traditional ideology education.[58] According to Cao Xiuhua, many things can be learned from online expressions of discontent as sometimes the public opinion expressed there is truer than the one possibly found in "real life". Therefore, in Cao's opinion, the government should let *egao* serve as a warning, highlighting current problems that the public is most concerned with, such as corruption.[59] Johan Lagerkvist supports this view, suggesting that this may in fact be the reason why *egao* is generally tolerated by the central government, especially when highlighting corruption on low to middle levels. In Lagerkvist's opinion, this could also be compared to the conditional autonomy enjoyed by the media. By allowing some, you give the impression that freedom of speech is less restricted than it is. When also taking into account its metaphorical and vague character, Lagerkvist concludes that "online irony is neither performed to be, nor perceived as, a direct threat against the Party-state".[60]

In an article in *Southeast Communication* (Dongnan Chuanbo), Lin Longqiang refuses to see *egao* as merely a way to ridicule the authorities and refers to its "constructive factors" and "social responsibility awareness".[61] Also Wang Chengwen at Henan University sees both good and bad things about *egao*:

> Through Internet in general and egao in particular, people have received full freedom of speech. However, this *egao* also to a certain extent constitutes a violation of intellectual property rights.

Like many other scholars, Wang worries that the moral values of today's youth may be undermined by *egao*. Furthermore, the impact of *egao* on Chinese society as a whole in the years to come will not be favorable, according to Wang, who fears the fundaments of the entire Chinese nation might be threatened:

> The value notions and esthetic ideals imbedded in the prominent traditional Chinese culture have been eroded and distorted by Internet *egao*. When young people come into contact with these esthetic ideals and value judgments in new shapes, they are influenced. This will in the long run produce incorrect views on life, value judgments and the world.

However, Wang does not specify what these "incorrect views" might be but calls for vigilance faced to "verbal violence", especially that kind of verbal violence that is "seductive, sexual or rejects one homeland, certain ideas or people", something that pretty well sums up what *egao* is. Moreover, Wang claims, bypassing the authority on discourse possessed by society's elite, *egao* constitutes a fierce attack on the traditional, mainstream voice. Scientific Research Department of the State Institute of Administrative Studies responsible Xu Yaotong

---

[58] Tu, p. 26.
[59] Cao, p. 130.
[60] Lagerkvist, p. 159.
[61] Lin Longqiang, p. 48.

goes even further, claiming *egao* belong to "evil conduct".[62] Luckily, though, the authorities are taking action: Due to the non-appropriate character of *egao*, mainstream discourse has actively implemented measures to ensure orderly Internet media and sound Internet civilization.[63] As is emphasized, this is endorsed by the majority of the population since "many netizens also say they do not approve or cannot identify themselves with this kind of spoofing".[64] Nevertheless, this phenomenon seems to be some kind of a challenge for the law. This is especially true for the forms of *egao* that are not direct parodies but merely "mischievous distortions" that are not violating copyright laws but might be persecuted on basis of that they harm the interests of society, the state or specific persons.[65]

Egao is controversial and many people have opinions about it. However, as Cao Xiuhua points out, not much research has so far been undertaken in this field. On the rare occasions when it has actually happened, the focus has been on linguistics rather than on social sciences.[66] As to the impact exercised by *egao*, this essay shows that many Chinese scholars who have assessed this phenomenon express a fear that it might distort the value judgments of Chinese youth. This criticism is by no means unique to China or to *egao*, but has probably occurred every time the young engage in something the elders are not familiar with or do not understand. New kinds of music or styles of hair and clothing have all been initially condemned as bad or immoral. In China, however, in this particularly interesting time of transformation, worrying that the young and pure at heart will be affected negatively by *egao* could be seen as part of a general fear of a moral crisis visible among many intellectuals in China today. This is something that young people with an interest in problems in society frequently discuss and that is subject to public debates. In my opinion, worth noting is that these intellectuals often take an extremely elitist perspective, looking down upon the immoral behavior of "the populace" and condemning their low, filthy and boorish cultural expressions, such as *egao*. Here lies probably some of both the potential and cause of *egao*: What it revolts against is perhaps the highbrow, intellectual perception of art and the so-called refined taste.

Nevertheless, several Chinese scholars have found certain good things to say about *egao*. It is said to provide the people with full freedom of expression, or is interpreted as a potential tool for the government in reaching out to young people by using popular and youthful language, a warning signal to raise awareness of current problems in society such as corruption or a way to modernize the old-fashioned ideology education by releasing it from the burdens of set phrases and strictly regulated language. Meanwhile, perhaps rather contradictory for advocates of freedom of expression, they all stress that the benefits of *egao* are possible to achieve only through strict control and regulations to minimize the negative effects.

---

[62] Wang, p. 25.
[63] Wang, p. 24.
[64] Wang, p. 25.
[65] Guo Linhu, 'Egao xianxiang zhi falü toushi', *China Law Info*, 2007.
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=36657 , retrieved 27 May 2012.
[66] Cao, p. 129.

7 Conclusions

In this essay I try to answer the question of how new expressions in *egao* emerge and what functions this form of Internet spoofing may exercise in today's China. As my examples show, new expressions in *egao* emerge either as a reaction to a controversial incident in society or as a way of questioning authorities in general. Two things explain the large-scale emergence of *egao*: First, the Internet with its participatory character has been vital to the creation and distribution of *egao* as it has decentralized and facilitated the dissemination of information. Second, certain features of the Chinese language, such as that it includes many homophones, has favored this kind of spoofing. Although parodies exist in all countries and languages, *egao* appears as distinctively Chinese in *what* is parodied (Chinese authorities' statements and current issues in Chinese society) and *how* this parody is achieved (mainly using homophones and made-up words and characters).

On basis of examples of *egao* as we see it today, determining its main function appears somewhat more complex. However tempting it may be to assign a great importance to *egao* in its political function, causality may prove a tricky question. For example, even if *egao* could be interpreted as expanding freedom of speech by widening the scope of what is considered acceptable language in public, it might as well work the other way round in the sense that it is precisely because of increased freedom of speech that this big-scale spoofing is possible as *egao* undoubtedly is created and understood in an existing framework of social norms, although, in China and elsewhere there have always been attempts to push the boundaries of the accepted. Therefore, *egao* should perhaps be regarded as an indicator rather than a cause of political change. This said, it is still likely that *egao* could play the role of an annoying little fly buzzing around and commenting the governmental representatives' sayings and doings.

Perhaps more importantly, in a society practically devoid of checks and balances outside of the Party, *egao* might well exercise a control function by drawing popular attention to problems such as corruption. Also, the notion of *egao* as an anger-venting mechanism might be more plausible than as resistance with a purpose as the former could explain the fact that *egao* is often being tolerated by the Chinese government. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that *egao* could be completely suppressed by the government. How language develops and new expressions emerge appear to be out of reach of the government's control. It may be possible to ban words considered subversive, but it is impossible to prevent people from expressing discontent. This is true especially since netizens are now able to establish new meaning of words to criticize the authorities using *egao* while dodging the censors in a pace the authorities simply cannot keep up with.

Furthermore, the use of irony is forcing the government to change its own use of language, as in the example where officials are told not to use *bu ming zhenxiang*, as this will just be mocked by netizens frequently using this phrase creating *egao*. When also party slogans such as "Long live the great Chinese Communist Party!" can be used to express the opposite, censorship becomes inefficient. Also, since *egao* is not using words condemned as inappropriate, it might be hard to regulate through legal measures as long as it cannot be proven to violate copyright laws or harming the interest of the nation or specific persons. As to what impact egao could possibly have in the years to come, it seems like it could bring about new ways to express discontent with the powerful and wealthy. This way, *egao* may well be a contributory factor in a broader process of political change.

In addition, as more people gain access to the Internet, *egao* might get even harder to regulate. However, tightening control may not be in the government's interest, since its benevolent stand towards *egao* could also be interpreted as allowing anger-venting in order to ensure future social stability: By giving some freedom of expression while relieving the

pressure from discontented groups, the government might be able to decrease pressure and keep frustration off the streets, at least in the short run. Therefore, merely focusing on whether *egao* is likely to overthrow the Chinese regime probably misses the point, as that is perhaps not the way change will come about in China.

References:

'2009 niandu shi da xinci', *Southern Metropolis Weekly,* 24 December 2009.
《2009年度十大新词》,南都周刊.
http://past.nbweekly.com/Print/Article/9353_0.shtml, retrieved 29 April 2009.

Cao Xiuhua, 'Guanyu wangluo liuxing saoyu minyi suqiu yanjiu de sikao', *Journal of Hunan University of Science & Technology (Social Science Edition)*, vol.14, no.3, May 2011, pp. 129-132.
曹秀华,《关于网络流行骚语民意诉求研究的思考》, 湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2011 年 5 月第 14 卷第 3 期第 131-132 页.

Chen Changsong, 'Lunyujing dui egao wenben yiyi de shengcheng yu zhiyue', *Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Science)*, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 814-817, 824.
陈长松,《论语境对恶搞文本意义的生成与制约》,哲学社会科学版淮阴师范学院学报, 2007 年 29 卷 6 期第 814-817、824 页.

Chen Wanying, Qian Gang and Zhai Minglei, *Zhongguo mengbo*, Cosmos Books, Hong Kong, 2009.
陳婉瑩、 錢鋼、 翟明磊,《中國猛博》， 天地圖書有限公司 :香港.

Chen Yudan, 'Music and National Identity', lecture held at Lund University Centre for Asian Studies, 24 April 2012.

'Duo mao mao' shijian', *Baidu baike*, 躲猫猫事件, 百度百科,
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2218094.htm, retrieved 27 March 2012.

Gadd, Björn, 'Tio tröttsamma jobbskämt – en allvarlig historia', *City*, 20 April 2012, pp. 2-3.

Gallagher, Mary E., 'The Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State' in Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.), *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, pp. 419-452.

Guo Linhu, 'Egao xianxiang zhi falü toushi', *China Law Info*, 2007.
郭林虎, 恶搞现象之法律透视, 北大法律网:法律在线,2007 年.

Guo Yuxiu and Zhao Baofeng. "Egao" zuopin shengxing yuanyin de tanxi', *Wenhua jie*, no. 3, 2011, pp. 226, 260.
郭玉秀、赵保峰,《"恶搞"艺术作品盛行原因的探析》, 文学界, 2011 年第 3 期第 226、260 页.

Henochowicz, Anne, 'Sensitive Words: Xi Cannot-Comment and More', *China Digital Times*, 5 April 2012, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/04/sensitive-words-xi-cannot-comment-and-more/ , retrieved 27 May 2012.

Hägerdahl, Hans, *Kinas ledare 1912-2012*, Historiska Media, Lund, 2012.

Koops, Bert-Jaap, *The Crypto Controversy: A Key Conflict in the Information Society*, Kluwer Law International, Zuidpoolsingel, 1998.

Kristof, Nicholas D., 'Privately, More and More Chinese Say It's Past Time for Deng to Go', *New York Times*, 17 April 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/17/world/privately-more-and-more-chinese-say-it-s-past-time-for-deng-to-go.html, retrieved 21 April 2012.

Lagerkvist, Johan, *After the Internet, before democracy – competing norms in Chinese media and society,* Peter Lang, Bern, 2010.

Lei Weizhen and Cao Xiaojie, 'Cong shengfa guocheng kan wangluo yufu de benzhi', *Guoji xinwen jie*, pp.87-93, December 2009.
雷蔚真、曹小杰.《从生发过程看网络语符本质, 国际新闻界, 2009 年 12 月第 87-93 页,.

Lin Longqiang, 'Egao – yi zhong wuxian zhuangtai xia de dianfu', *Southeast Communication*, no. 3, 2007, pp. 47-48.
林隆强,《恶搞-一无根状态下的颠覆》, 东南传播, 2007 年第 3 期第 47-48 页.

Lin Yan, "Huili xuanfu' – zhengfu weiji gongguan de yi ge fei dianxing yangben', *Sichuan Party Building*, 26 October 2011, p. 39.
林衍,《"会理悬浮"—— 政府危机公关的一个非典型样本》, 四川党建, 2011 年 10 月 26 日.

Liu Xiangjun, 'Ye shuo 'beiju' lei wangluo xincixing', *Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)*, vol. 32, no. 4, July 2010, pp. 166-167.
刘香君,《也说"杯具"类网络新词形》, 广西民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2010 年7 月第 32 卷第 4 期第 166-167 页.

Qian Gang, *Zhongguo chuanmei yu zhengzhi gaige*, Cosmos Books, Hong Kong, 2008.
錢鋼,《中國傳媒輿政治改革》, 天地圖書有限公司：香港.

Qiu Mingfeng, 'Egao: Dangqian liuxing wenhua de huayu biaozheng', *Writer Magazine*, No.2, 2011, p. 132-133.
邱明丰,《恶搞：当前流行文化的话语表征》, 作家杂志, 2011 年 2 第期第 132-133 页.

'Quntixing shijian zhong shao yong 'bu ming zhenxiang", *Xinhua Wang*, 28 July 2009.
《群体性事件中少用"不明真相"》2009年07月28日。新华网。
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07-28/content_11788078.htm, accessed 2012-03-27.

Schoenhals, Michael, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics*, University of California, Berkeley, 1992.

Scott, James C,. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985.

'Shanzhai ban 'dongwu shijie' jieshao caonima zouhong wangluo,' *Nanjing bao yewang – Dongfang weibao*, 11 February 2009.
《山寨版动物世界介绍草泥马走红网络》, 南京报业网-东方卫报,
http://news.ifeng.com/society/4/200902/0211_346_1006552.shtml, retrieved 22 March 2012.

Tian Jingbo, 'Liuxue de lishi, qirong egao? Egao jingdian, women daodi yishi le shenme?', *Zhongguo Minbing*, no. 10, 2010, p. 6.
田经波,《流血的历史,岂容恶搞?恶搞经典,我们到底遗失了什么?》, 中国民兵,
2010 年第 10 期第 6 页.

Tu Gang, "Egao' dui chuantong sixiang jiaoyu moshi de xiaojie yu chonggou', *Zhengzhou qinggongye xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)*, no. 3, 2007, pp. 25-27.
涂刚,《"恶搞"对传统思想教育模式的消解与重构》, 郑州轻工业学院学报(社会科学版),
2007 年第 3 期第 25-27 页.

Wang Chengwen, 'Egao wenhua de xushu jiegou yu shehui yuyi', *Zhengzhou qinggongye xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban)*, no. 3, 2007, pp. 23-25.
王成文,《恶搞文化的叙述结构与社会寓意》, 郑州轻工业学院学报(社会科学版), 2007
年第 3 期第 23-25 页.

Zhai Bofei and Xing Peng, "Egao wenhua' cong yule kuanghuan dao jiegou fankang de xianshi fenxi', *Journal of Xidian University (Social Science Edition)*, vol. 18, no. 4, July 2008, pp. 154-157.
赵伯飞,邢鹏,《"恶搞文化"从娱乐狂欢到解构反抗的现实分析》, 西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）, 2008 年 7 月第 18 卷第 4 期第 154-157 页.

Zhou Enshuai, "Daodi shi tianshen haishi egui?", *Consume Guide*, No. 9, 2009, p. 234.
周恩帅,《到底是天使还是恶鬼?》, 消费导刊文化研究 , 2009 年第 9 期第 234 页.

'Zhou Self-castration', *China Digital Space*.
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Zhou_self-castration, retrieved 27 April 2012.

Zhou Tiedong, 'Egao! Egao! Egao yingpian yizhi dou shi yi ge yu zhuliu dianying chanye xiangban er sheng, xiangfu xiangcheng de shichang xingwei', *Popular Cinema*, vol. 22, 2010, p. 61.
周铁东,《 恶搞!恶搞!恶搞影片一直都是一个与主流电影产业相伴而生 相辅相成的市场行为》, 他山石, 2010 第 22 期 61 页.

Zhou Xin, Zhang Wei and Fan Chunmei, "Bianwei' de wangluo wenzi', *RBLATS*, no. 3, 2008, pp. 52-53.
周鑫,张伟,范春梅,《 "变味"的网络文字》, 法治与社会, 2008 年 3 期第 52-53 页.