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1

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# **From Sweden with Love**

Turkish Migrants in Sweden and their Social Remittances

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*Not only with your colourful springs,  
I loved you also with your white nighted summers,  
And your frosted winters.  
I shall miss you Sweden.  
Now I return.  
For now, farewell Sweden!  
Farewell Olof,  
Farewell Anna,  
Farewell Mona!  
Farewell all my beautiful friends!*

Kemal Burkay<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kurdish poet Kemal Burkay, escaping Turkey right before the coup in 1980, has found political asylum in Sweden and lived there for 31 years. He penned this poem in July 2011, as his return was permitted by the Turkish Government for the first time.

**ABSTRACT****Author:** Onursal Erol**Title:** From Sweden with Love: Turkish Migrants in Sweden and their Social Remittances**Supervisor:** Anders Uhlin

The aim of this thesis is first to contribute to the theorising of the so-called ‘social remittances’. This entails an attempt to put together the reasons that qualifies the flow of social goods from migrant destinations to sending communities as remittances, as well as an endeavour to contribute to definitional clarifications on what constitutes the different natures, levels and types of these remittances and remitters. Following the theoretical work, I investigate two main questions: 1) Do the Turkish social remittances from Sweden indiscriminately serve for social development goals within the sending communities? 2) Does existing categorisation of certain types of immigrants and their remittance levels within the social remittance theory hold for the Swedish-Turkish case? I propose an intense clarification of definitions to go about answering these questions. Furthermore, the empirical part of this study is designed as a case study, collecting the necessary data through discourse analysis of an anti-terror rally organised by the Swedish-Turkish Worker’s Federation in Stockholm, and 9 semi-structured interviews that served greatly in my own quest of understanding the phenomenon.

**KEYWORDS:** Turkish immigrants, Sweden, social remittances, normative concerns, correlational concerns, avoiders, pursuers

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL REMITTANCES

A major duty that this thesis assumes is to contribute to the process of theorising the so-called ‘social remittances’. It was Levitt (1998 & 2001) who coined the term ‘social remittances’ in her 1998 paper and her subsequential book ‘The Transnational Villagers’. She pointed to the fact that migrants remit back to their homelands ideas and behaviours as well as remittances in cash and kind (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011: 2). She identified this new category of remittances as: “...*ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that are transmitted through the migration circuit. Social remittances are carried by migrants and travellers or they are exchanged by letter, video, or phone. They travel through well-marked pathways – be they formal or informal organizational structures or during interpersonal exchanges between individuals.*” (Levitt, 1996: 6f).

One of the primary tasks at hand for making of this body of literature is to legitimise the necessity of two things. One is to carve an academic space for so called ‘social *remittances*’. Why try and carve a new lieu of debate while the flow of ‘things social’ across borders could as well be researched as globalisation? The global diffusion of ideas, behaviours and norms is already happening with or without the help of migrants (Cohen, 1999; Levitt, 2003). Technology, capital, media, styles and ideas flow far and wide through many channels (Appadurai, 1990; Featherstone, 1991; Robertson, 1992). Internationally popular television programs, borderless trends of music, clothing and food are some of the tangible examples of that very diffusion (Liebes & Katz, 1990). Regardless, if we can or should map a specific route of such a diffusion that has to do with migrants, there would be a second task to overcome: Why call them ‘*remittances*’? The orthodox definition of what remittances are, is obviously not to be changed. Therefore any adjective (like that of ‘*social*’) that is used with ‘*remittances*’ would still need to qualify as such, through sharing the core nature of the term in its original connotations.

### II. THEORISING SOCIAL REMITTANCES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Firstly, the main argument for specifying social remittances as a unique way of diffusion of ideas, behaviours and norms concerns the paths through which this diffusion takes place. Unlike global cultural diffusion, where the emergence and dissemination of *culture* is often difficult to determine, social remittances travel through distinguishable channels. Their

source, evolution and destination can be pinpointed. Migrants and non-migrants alike can indicate how they came to know about a particular idea or practice when these concern remitted social goods. Some cases that exemplify this specific path include non-migrants demanding better social programs or pressure a political party for greater participation upon getting acquainted with related stories of their migrant relatives elsewhere (Levitt, 1996: 20).

Secondly, why categorise this specific flow as remittances? There is a significant list of characteristics that this specific flow share with financial remittances. I shall outline four of these core characteristics that would qualify this social flow also as remittances.

First of these is the major role financial remittance debates have come to play within development literature. However if our definition and understanding of '*development*' has evolved to encompass a much larger scheme than economics, so must our understanding of remittance that affects that larger development. National development agencies, international institutions, academic debates, and political documents that bring the core values of development into life (such as the Millennium Development Goals) all have extra-economic aspects. In this study I employ, Sen's (1999) rather influential comprehensive developmental approach as the human capability to lead lives that *they* have reason to value and to enhance their own choices. This kind of a developmental scheme includes gender, democracy, health, human rights, social well-being, education, meaningful employment and such. In parallel with these slides in our understandings of development, an increasing necessity of developing approaches that do not tend to tackle migration and development issues purely in gross income indicators is felt (De Haas, 2007: 1). If we have spent the amount of energy and resources to understand the phenomenon of financial remittances, emergence of which historically coincides with an almost exclusively economic understanding of development, it is only logical that we should look into non-economic migrant remittances that affect the non-economic aspects of development in the sending countries.

Second characteristic these social flows share with financial remittances is the renewed importance they seem to have acquired due to the innovations that facilitate the flow of migrant remittances to the sending countries. A considerable part of literature on financial remittances focused on how gradually they must faint away and lose significance as the migrants get assimilated in the receiving countries (Agunias, 2006). Especially after the first comers, the consequent generations were expected to remit less and less, due to a loss of ties with the non-migrant communities back home. However research shows that remittances are

still of great significance and do not necessarily seem to lose validity among all cases. De Haas (2007, 3) and Goldring (2003, 1) addresses this current rediscovery of remittances in recent years as “*concomitant resurgence of optimism on migration and development*”. The effect of new and easier procedures of financial remittances keeps migrant communities in touch with their sending communities for more than one generation. Same can be argued for social remittances. Similarly today’s new technologies of communication and transportation allow migrants to sustain less expensive, more intimate and frequent connections to their sending communities (Levitt & DeWind & Vertovec, 2003: 569).

Third, the current literature on financial remittances widely agrees on the need for investigating the specific circumstances that surround unique cases in order to make sense of this phenomenon, very much like social remittances. During the revival of academic interest in financial remittances Durand (1994: 285) wrote: “*The problem is that opinions about remittances are made as if these were and meant the same thing in different places and over time.*”. This cautious stand against financial remittances was generally caused because of their complex and in some cases unexpected effects on the receiving communities. Financial remittances can definitely be blessings for receiving communities, households and individuals; however there is now, widespread academic belief that they are not a panacea for all development problems (De Haas, 2007: iii). Some of the primary concerns regarding the relationship between financial remittances and development for instance have been the ambiguous effect on inequality in the receiving community (De Haas, 2007: iii), causing microubanisation within migrant-sending regions (due to migrants not investing in their place of origin and prefer medium-sized regional towns) (Berriane: 1997), and also a strong tendency to treat received financial remittances as income to cover recurrent expenses yet not as investment (Goldring, 2003 ; Alper & Neyapti, 2006). Research on financial remittances and their non-economic developmental effects seem to yield a similar outcome. A study by Van Rooij (2000) on the financial remittance effects on gender roles in Morocco challenged this very argument that suggested migration contributes always positively to changing gender roles. Wives of non-migrants and migrants alike were found to be confined to housekeeping, child rearing or agricultural work as they were already used to. Other empirical data from Egypt (Taylor, 1984), Turkey (Day & Icduygu, 1997), Albania (King & Vullnetari, 2006), Yemen (Myntti, 1984) and Burkina Faso (Hampshire, 2006) produce matching outcomes that declared that migration and remittances do not necessarily cause a permanent shift in patriarchal family structures per se. Similarly social remittances are embraced by an

analogous ambiguity. They are not a panacea for the social aspects of development in the sending countries either. Also, once whatever is remitted is done so, there are no guarantees protecting their perception. This corresponds to the fact that there is no total control of the usage of financial remittances once they are remitted. Social remittances are also a slippery topic to research since their birth, travel, arrival and perception can significantly alter their intended purpose (Foner, 1994). Levitt (1996: 32) summarises this point ideally as follows: “*Immigrants do not absorb all aspects of their new lives unselectively and communicate these intact to those at home, who accept them as is.*”. Furthermore, looking at the gender issue as a good frame of reference that would accord with the unexpected financial remittance-gender roles relation mentioned above, there already are suggestions that in some cases (returning migrants to Egyptian and Yemeni communities) women’s position have even deteriorated due to the growing influence of conservative interpretations of Islam that migrants have developed within the specific conditions and survival strategies of diasporic culture making (De Haas, 2007: 20).

Lastly, we can list what I will refer to as ‘*harvestability*’ of remittances. As ambiguous forms as the outcomes of financial remittances can take, current academic and political debates leave little doubt that they are a power that can be channelled, organised, and with proper tools made use of, therefore a power that does not necessarily cure developmental ills automatically, but by all means is harvestable. One of the main concerns deeming financial remittances ineffective was their usage as ‘*income to cover recurrent expenses*’. Much of the recent literature that focuses on the financial remittances comes up with ways to battle this inefficiency. Some of these policy suggestions include channelling the majority of financial remittances as ‘*collective remittances*’ instead of individual ones (Goldring, 2003: 12); facilitating the procedures through reduction in transmittal costs; information on investment opportunities, attractive exchange rates, remittance banks and partnerships with money courier companies; taking into account that migrants might come from middle-class or elite groups therefore remittances might not look out for the interests of the poor or the oppressed (Ritzema & Puri, 1999). Similarly social remittances also possess an innate developmental power that is harvestable. The upcoming literature on the topic regards them as a potential human and social capital that can significantly contribute to the political and institutional development of countries of origin and suggests methods to facilitate the flow of information, innovative ideas, intellectual capacities, new technologies and democratic political processes (North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, 2006: 9), as well as easing travel and

communication, increasing the importance of roles played by migrants in sending countries, and encouraging sending country attempts to legitimise themselves by providing services to migrants and their children (Levitt, 1998: 928).

### AREAS OF CONCERN

I will look into the shortcomings of social remittance theory under three subheadings. These are three problems two of which are already uttered in the literature (mainly as responses to Levitt's work) and the last one is a problem I would like to raise. I will take the opportunity to give these subheadings the following names: Definitional, normative and correlational problems.

Let us start with the definitional problems. There seems to be some confusion concerning the borders of what constitutes social remittances. This is indeed to be expected in the early stages of any process of theory-making. Some of the few authors that do conceptualise and write about the topic include the social, cultural and political ramifications of financial remittances also as 'social remittances'. Goldring (2003) for instance, does point out to the political and social dimensions of economic remittances in her contributions to this body of literature and therefore chooses to ignore Levitt's warnings against this inclusive definition. Surely economic remittances have significant non-economic dimensions worthy of academic consideration. The possible release of poverty and the extra funds that become available towards education, health, political processes must be taken into account while investigating the remittance-development scheme. However I do side with Levitt's warning of not categorising these indirect social effects as 'social remittances'. This conceptual clarification would prove useful to both researcher and policy makers alike. To be able to pinpoint the birth, transfer, arrival and usage of social remittances as remittances of non-economic nature throughout the entirety of this journey instead of morphing them together with indirect effects of financial remittances would open up new foci for harvesting the specific opportunities of social remittances. This, by no means is to undermine the importance of the economic remittances and the social transformations they stir. It also does not necessarily attribute all social changes in a sending community to the powers of social remittances yet to be fully understood. Levitt (1996: 7) herself, recognises the partiality of the explanatory power of social remittances as such: *"Many of the changes that migration gives rise to do not result from social remittance flows. Other kinds of change catalysts are also at work. In some cases, the transformation of sending-country life is a social consequence of the economic fruits of migration. The monies villagers receive from their emigrant family members change social*

*patterns.*”. However, the academic urge to carve up a unique space for remitting ideas, behaviours, norms and social capital is still a legitimate one, not only to better understand, but also in order to define possible ways to trace, channel and harvest their developmental powers. Levitt (1998: 927) acknowledges this potential and defines social remittances as “...*a potential community development aid. Because they travel through identifiable pathways to specific audiences, policymakers and planners can channel certain kinds of information to particular groups with positive results.*”.

Of course “positive results” are not the only kind of possible results that can come out of migration. This brings us to the second area that attracts criticism, namely: the normative problems. A common (and fairly so) criticism to issues of transnational migration is precisely this issue that also naturally rises to the top when debating social remittances. The issue of an assumed ‘liberating effect’ of migration, especially of social remittances is tackled and criticised by many. It is rather comprehensible how this could be problematic while specifically dealing with behaviours, norms and identities. Criticism and warning against an unspoken assumption of value is proper. Review of the early literature on transnational migration reveals presumptions of this nature. These generally revolve around the belief that transnational lifestyles would equip migrants with necessary tools to challenge gender, race or class hierarchies that constrained them at their homelands. Recent research within the general sphere of transnational migration has adopted a more nuanced position, which asks fairer questions and investigates who benefits from transnational migration, why, and under what circumstances (Levitt & DeWind & Vertovec, 2003: 568).

Some of Levitt’s (Levitt & Waters, 2002) case studies show the difficult situations Dominican migrants can find themselves upon returning from the US. These range from being refused to be accepted in educational institutions back in the Dominican Republic, or be feared by the general non-migrant population as being tainted by foreign vices that are assumed to be intrinsic to the American society. These kinds of research findings do serve to undermine the assumptions that the non-migrant communities of countries of origin automatically appreciate all results that come out of transnational activities.

However, the critics of the novel concept of ‘social remittances’ raise this issue validly. Even though such research findings do serve to *undermine* the assumptions that suggest all ideas, behaviours and norms remitted are positive, Levitt and many others who base their work on her theoretical framework have not explicitly distanced themselves of this perception. Indeed,

to undermine an outdated vision and explicitly opposing it are not the same things. A 1916 article suggests: “*To stigmatize the alien who works in America for a few years and returns to his own land... is to ignore the cosmopolitan significance of this migration. It is to ignore the fact that the returning immigrant is often a missionary to an inferior civilization.*” (Bourne, 1916: 187). There is little doubt that Levitt’s valuable work does not equate itself with a vision that may have been unproblematic in 1916, but surely is today. However, the above vision is cited in Levitt’s (1996: 2) work, followed by a mere comment that puts forward how the issues Bourne raises still concern us. This lack of outspoken distance with assigning or implicating different values to different *civilisations* or *cultures* could be considered as the second shortcoming of current social remittance theory. I foresee that the social remittance literature building and theory making progress will increasingly call for an innate non-normativity (as possible as this gets in social science) on this issue, very much like the development debate has experienced in its making. The discourse analysis carried out for this research tackles this very question, attempting to investigate the possibility of *non-positive* social remittances.

The third area that I believe to see improvements at is a correlational one. This concerns the assumed correlations between the *type* of migrant and the intensity of social remittances. However to present such strict correlations as rules of thumb does not even hold within the financial remittance debates about which there is considerably more research. This debate includes evidence from a wide range of realities and repeatedly calls for unique considerations for a very complex web of migrant-country of origin relations. Levitt recognises this diversity while she investigates transnational practices in general. She presents research findings from Turkish and Moroccan migrant behaviour in Belgium, where between same generation migrants, Turks tend to engage in significantly higher intensity transnational relations with their communities of origin than Moroccans (Levitt, 2003: 852). This includes higher levels of home ownership in the country of origin, finding a marriage partner from the sending community, higher levels of transnational interaction observed in the children of the migrants who are born in Belgium. This difference is partly explained by the higher level of official Turkish state involvement in emigrant affairs than the Moroccan one. However that by itself does not mean that all Turkish emigrant communities in a myriad of destinations show the same characteristics regarding their interactions with their sending communities. Another study that compared the Turkish migrant communities of Norway and Sweden showed higher levels of integration, feeling of acceptance and pluralism, higher

levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction among Swedish Turks (Virta & Sam & Westin, 2004: 3-5). All these factors clearly would affect the nature and intensity of the social remittances transmitted back by these migrants. Therefore it is a complex web of interactions that needs to be taken into account to investigate remittances. This stance is well-established within the recent financial remittance debates. Then why not take the same cautions in relation to social remittances?

Part of the research undertaken for this study specifically focuses on two groups to test an assumption forwarded by Levitt that falls in this last category of correlational problems. Levitt (1998: 930) suggested that: “*Most migrants arrive strongly attached to their country of origin, which heightens the intensity of social remittance flows. In countries lacking such a highly developed sense of nationhood or in cases where migrants gladly abandon their homelands for fear of persecution or lack of economic opportunity, social remittance transfers will be weaker.*”. I aim to test this specific assumption through a comparison of nature and intensity of social remittances that are remitted by those Turkish migrants who did ‘gladly abandon their homelands’ (official political refugees or seemingly otherwise migrants who left for various types of concerns) and their regular migrant peers in Sweden.

### RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The literature review within the social remittance theory, as well as the direction that the financial remittance debates have taken increasingly call for consideration of remittances not meaning the same thing over time and place. That necessity of detailed investigation and diversifying our understanding of remittances, coupled up with a particularly sensitive Turkish migrant population in Sweden, provided me with the necessary motivation and tools for this research. Therefore my attempt and curiosity was focused on locating the Turkish-Swedish case in a greater puzzle, in order to derive possible findings about its compliance to the theory as well as its incompatibility. I believe such an attempt would serve the social remittance theory making process at its current stage.

### RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the light of the above discussions, I aim to answer the following research questions in this study.

*1- How do the Turkish migrant experiences in Sweden relate to the normative concerns within social remittance theory?*

2- How do the Turkish migrant experiences in Sweden situate in relation to the original correlational assumptions in social remittance theory?

### III. METHODOLOGY

This study is designed as a triangulation of qualitative methods. Under an umbrella case study, discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews are employed to see how the social remittance theory and some of the concerns that surround it applies to the case in point. This methodological triangulation as categorised by Denzin and Lincoln (2005) and further clarified again by Denzin (2006) is chosen to be employed for its powers in “*creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the problem*” (Thurmond 2001: 254).

#### 1. CASE STUDY: A CRUCIAL CASE

Conduction of a case study is the backbone of the empirical part of this study. This decision has been given rather easily for two main reasons. First of these is the nature of the theoretical stance that advocated the consideration of the uniqueness of different cases. As mentioned before, remittance related experiences have been found to diverse significantly. Therefore the mapping of a specific case could be academically more valuable than cramming infusible data together that does not point to a universal framework. Indeed, case studies can be theoretically exciting and rather data rich. Therefore it is important to form a practical guide on how to conduct and manage them (Hartley 2004, 323). This is why I find it necessary to clearly outline the reasons to conduct this particular case study in order to avoid spreading too thin. By employing a case study as a research strategy it is expected to locate the Swedish-Turkish social remittance experiences within the larger theory and stimulate a discussion with regards to its prospect of being a crucial case.

This brings us to the second reason to employ a case study design, the possibility of the case of Turkish migrants in Sweden to be a ‘*crucial case*’. In Harry Eckstein’s words a crucial case is defined as such: “...*Crucial cases provide the most definitive type of evidence on a theory. He defines a crucial case as one ‘that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or conversely, must not fit equally well with any rule contrary to that proposed’* “ (George & Bennett 2004: 120). The ongoing intuitive hypotheses in this study anticipate that the Swedish-Turkish data regarding social remittances

might provide evidence of both kinds. Case studies generally employ multiple methods, and case study researchers will deliberately use a combination of methods, mostly because complex phenomena can best be approached through multiple methods to improve or downgrade a theory (Hartley 2004, 324). For these purposes discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews are conducted to test the validity of the social remittance theory on predetermined aspects of the Swedish-Turkish case.

The empirical data that will be derived by discourse analysis aims to look into collective social remittances by Turkiska Riksförbundets (TRF). TRF is the federation of associations of Turkish workers representing 3000 Swedish companies and their 50000 Turkish workers. This umbrella organisation consists of 29 associations that include the individual committees of culture, education, public relations and citizenship. Some of these bodies are known to make official statements regarding certain controversial homeland issues such as the Kurdish and Armenian minority issues. The specific data derived from a TRF anti-terror rally for the discourse analysis might underline the importance of normative criticisms to social remittance theory, therefore closely fit with the currently widely accepted theory. On the other hand, the interviews that will compare the intensity of social remittance flows between different types of migrants could yield interesting results. Here, the intuitive hypothesis, which is shaped by the historical practices of the Turkish intellectual and political arena, and Sweden's safe haven status in recent Turkish history, calls for an academic curiosity to test if *'those who gladly abandon their homelands'* really do remit in a weaker manner. Here, the above mentioned intuition is derived from a common history and a long tradition of *'intellectual exiles'* as characterised by another Middle Easterner, Edward Said. Said (1994: 59-62) addresses these intellectuals, very much like himself, as possessing the quality of 'exile' as a condition in their making. He further suggests that this very condition of marginality enables the intellectual, not to respond to logic of the conventional, but to develop the audacity of daring, to represent change, move on and not to stand still (Said, 1994: 64). Similarly Turks also have a long tradition of attempting to change what home is, and what home does from outside. Therefore data relating to those who gladly abandoned their homelands might provide evidence pointing to correlational concerns which do not currently exist in the literature, consequently challenging the validity of the relating aspect of social remittance theory. For both these kinds of investigations, as warned by Hartley (2004, 329), I will try to provide *"a careful description of the data and the development of categories in which to place behaviours or processes"*.

Apart from the academical qualities that call for this case study, the study of Turco-Swedish case could prove useful for policy-making benefits as well. This idea is born out of the fact that for a group of traditionally migrant sending countries that today are of a certain economic calibre, the importance of economic remittances has largely faded<sup>2</sup>. Turkey fits well to that category, where economic remittances sent by the migrants have played an important role in the past yet gradually has lost that significance. By 2005 all inward remittances constituted only .02 of Turkish GDP<sup>3</sup>. Yet the country is considered '*developing*' in all other senses, and still has a large group of emigrants affecting the face of their communities of origin. Therefore it is timely to look into other aspects of development affected by these migrants in the Turco-Swedish case. This could serve as a point of reference and open up a debate or empirical comparison with similar cases that falls into this category of countries with large emigrant populations and a small percentage of financial remittance effects in their GDPs. The benefits of the case study method could be harvested this way as well, in creating an explanation that could be generalisable to similar cases as George & Bennett (2004: 5) foresees. Specific findings to clarify how the Turkish-Swedish case locates in the theory will be revisited after the investigation of the main research questions in this study through discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews.

## 2. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (CDA)

The discourse analysis part of the data collection process for this study is designed to put the normative concerns within social remittance theory to test. This specific concern uttered by many suggests that all social remittances are not 'positive' or 'liberating' or 'challenging gender, race and class hierarchies' back at home. This normative concern is obviously derived from the financial remittance debates where remitted financial goods are criticised to be assumed indiscriminately beneficial or development oriented. Because of this larger debate within the financial remittance literature this point is rather embedded within current social remittance theory as well. Scholars that deal with this topic almost automatically mention at least their awareness of the normative concerns. Therefore this set of criticisms and warnings can be considered well-established. Gathering data on collective social remittances of a Turkish organisation in Sweden (TRF) is expected to fit closely with the existent theory. The data required to see the validity of this expectation will be gathered

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix A.

<sup>3</sup> World Bank, Migration and Remittances Fact Book:

<http://www.developing8.org/files/storage/uploads/4thkwt107/remittances/migrant%20workers%20and%20remittances%20Turkey.pdf>

through discourse analysis of a much disputed TRF organised anti-terror rally in Stockholm. Video recordings<sup>4</sup> and a transcribed text<sup>5</sup> of the anti-terror rally and its main speech by the TRF Chairman carried out in Stockholm on July 23<sup>rd</sup> 2011 is at hand for the purpose of this particular test.

Discourse analysis undertaken in this study will focus on talk and texts as social practices, and on the resources that are drawn on to enable those practices (Potter: 1996). It will shed a light upon the meaning and structure of acts of communication in context and will explore the connections between language, communication, production and reproduction of knowledge, and power. Moreover, discourse analysis has an “*ability to reveal how institutions and individual subjects are formed, produced, given meaning, constructed and represented through particular configuration of knowledge*” (Jupp 2006: 74).

It is beneficial to bear in mind that this part of the study is specifically designed to test the normative concerns. In other words, the aim is to explore if the social remittances transferred to the homeland might be seen as nonbeneficial or maybe even detrimental with regard to development of the sending communities as defined earlier in this study. There is no doubt that the collective social remittances in their totality and in the specific TRF case investigated here serves greatly in the development of their destinations when the conditions are suitable. However, what I am looking for is the other side of the coin, when the remitted ideas, behaviours and norms do not serve for such a purpose, consequently fitting in with the normative concerns in social remittance theory. This is why; the nature of the data sought has become determinative while giving the decision of the method to look for it. A specific discourse analysis model, namely ‘*Critical Discourse Analysis*’, as defined by Norman Fairclough (1992), is chosen for this purpose. Fairclough’s method is a three-dimensional critical analysis method that underlines unequal power structures and relations, and how knowledge pertaining to these relations is produced and reproduced through discursive practice. The choice of this method by no means makes a statement that suggests no positive social things were remitted by individuals and organisations under question. However, this part of the study merely looks for data that confirms normative concerns, so solely focuses on social remittances that might be considered as nonbeneficial or detrimental. Therefore the data gathered that could possibly point out to these aspects do not hold the individuals and organisations mentioned in the study responsible for ‘*obstructing development*’ in general.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KM4cTB-m4Rg>

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix B & C

The CDA method brings together an analysis of three things. These are the chosen text, the discursive practice and finally the social practice (Fairclough 1992: 73). This three dimensional scheme requires the researcher to look into the text and study its characteristics; investigate how this text is produced, distributed, consumed and received; and how it relates to a larger social practice. Within this framework, this study will be taking into account such a text produced by TRF that do not necessarily seem to be derived from the pool of *positive* values and norms (that accord with social aspects of development goals at home), produced and distributed through specific ways in order to feed certain policies and political stances in Turkish domestic political arena.

Fairclough's model treats discourse as a social practice that has the capability to reproduce hierarchies and inequalities (say relating to gender, ethnicity or class) (Fairclough, 1992). With this method, it is hoped to locate a social remittance pumped from TRF in Sweden to the Turkish society that perpetuates existing hierarchies and inequalities at home, hence causing an adverse effect on social development in Turkey.

### 3. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The study of social remittances is rather infantile as it is. There is no doubt that quantified data would prove very useful to test different components of the theory in the future. However, at this point in the literature, this research requires and sees fit the flexibility and depth of semi-structured interviews. The guidance of some level of structure is seen necessary to be able to gather data that is focused on the remittance of social things as defined and bounded formerly by this study. That way it is aimed to avoid the loss of potential contribution of this study in a sea of unorganised transmigration related data. At the same time, the interviews are also desired to be somewhat flexible and not limited by the strict narrowness of close ended interviews. This desire emanates from an attempt to let the interviewees run the course of their flow of ideas, even though that flow is to be guided. This amount of flexibility during the interviews is anticipated to create a freedom for the researcher to be able to pinpoint what constitutes data regarding social remittances. To operationalise this process the researcher will hold an *interview guide*<sup>6</sup> that holds fairly specific topics and questions. Yet, the interviewees will be given a great deal of play in their responses. Questions that are not included in the interview guide might be posed if they seem to be beneficial during the interview.

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix D

The interview part of the research is designed to put correlational concerns mentioned before to test. This entails the assumed correlations between the *type* of migrant and the intensity of social remittances. For clarity's sake let us repeat that specific assumption: "*Most migrants arrive strongly attached to their country of origin, which heightens the intensity of social remittance flows. In countries lacking such a highly developed sense of nationhood or in cases where migrants gladly abandon their homelands for fear of persecution or lack of economic opportunity, social remittance transfers will be weaker.*" (Levitt 1998: 930). The data that will be drawn from the interviews with the Turkish migrants of both kinds is aimed to answer if this holds for the case in point.

### AVOIDERS AND PURSUERS

My primary concern is to define these different groups of migrants as clearly as possible before attributing any data to any specific group. The first group that is expected to engage in weaker social remittances is worded by Levitt as '*those who gladly abandon their homelands*'. These will obviously include Turkish political refugees in Sweden who feared persecution at home, however not only. De facto refugees will also be included in this group. De facto refugees can be defined as those who feared persecution, or were faced with serious and organised threats to their lives, livelihoods, cultures, languages and sexualities; however migrated to Sweden under extra-refugee statuses. Therefore officially non-refugee ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities (of Kurdish, Armenian, Jewish...etc heritage); LGBT people; and rarely people suffering from extreme poverty, all fall under this category in their common quest of *avoiding* the conditions at home. I will refer to this group as '*avoiders*' for the sake of simplicity. The extreme poor is an interesting addition to this list. Even though theoretically they share the aspect of desiring to avoid the conditions of origin, they are not many to be found, since the act of immigration itself requires a capital to invest. Although rare, it still is a possibility that fits with this first category of participants. Therefore we will frame the second group not simply as '*economic migrants*', but as '*those who merely preferred the abundance of better opportunities*', precisely for the sake of this theoretical clarity. These are *mainly* economic migrants, who had capital to invest in transmigration to start with. They traditionally come from middle class, and lower middle class origins, but not from extreme poverty. They can be seen as those who desired to *pursue* what they regarded better economic but also better educational, or even maybe cultural opportunities, yet originally were not in severely unfavourable conditions back home to want to avoid home all together. I will refer to this group as '*pursuers*'.

Regarding the sampling of the interviewees, a clear concern rises out of the nature of the data sought. The required data needs to be gathered from aforementioned two groups (avoiders and pursuers) in order to test the correlational assumptions in the theory. These groups are not defined as such in state records since the avoiders include extra-refugees to a great extent. Therefore it is impossible to enumerate the size and composition of these groups to draw a simple random sampling that is statistically representative. For these reasons it was decided to follow a purposive sampling instead of a random one, to purposively include the subgroups identified within the study itself. This choice fits rather well with so-called '*theoretical sampling*' within the social scientific methodology literature. This approach entails sampling interviewees until the employed categories achieve theoretical saturation (Bryman & Bell 2003: 324). The chief virtue of such a sampling technique is that the emphasis is upon using theoretical reflection on data as a guide to see if more data is needed. It therefore prioritises theorising rather than the statistical adequacy of a sample (Bryman & Bell 2003: 325). Upon successful implementation of this technique, the need for conducting statistically representative studies might and should arise in the future of research on this topic. However, at the current point within the making of social remittance theory, this level and kind of data collection is considered to be the necessary and most fruitful method by this study.

Within this framework, 4-5 interviewees from both groups (9 in total) were interviewed through a semi-structured interview process. For the sake of purposive sampling some 35 people were located, 15 were initially chosen and contacted, and eventually 9 were interviewed due to their diverse backgrounds to fulfil theoretical saturation. This is to point out that there has been an attempt to specifically locate individual pursuers separately from rural and urban origins, from pursuing abundance of better economic, educational, and social opportunities as well as locating avoiders from official and unofficial refugee statuses, ideological, ethnic, linguistic or sexual concerns. Also a special importance was given to originally choose 4 women and 4 men (2 each as avoiders, and 2 as pursuers) with the extra status of one interview (interviewee name: Ayse) as a second generation migrant, whose status will be explained later on. The interviews were carried out in Turkish and tape-recorded when allowed by the interviewees (8 out of 9). In the case of an interviewee refraining from being recorded, the interview was still carried out according to plan, and detailed notes were taken. All participants were assured that their responses would remain confidential and anonymous, and were given pseudo-names.

## IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

### 1. APPLYING CDA: THE TRF ANTI-TERROR RALLY

The choice of CDA offers the students of social science a close analysis of texts and interactions while allowing a way to move between those and social analyses. A clear objective of this approach to discourse analysis is to look into how language figures in social processes. Therefore it is a rather critical point in CDA to show non-obvious ways in which language is involved in social relations of power, domination and ideology (Fairclough 2001, 229). Social exclusion as a suggested topic is exclusively put forward to apply CDA to, and so serves the nature of the chosen TRF anti-terror rally well.

Although language is shown as the main element in analysing social processes, some analysts consider visual images and body language as well. Fairclough (2001, 229) therefore refers to a more general category of ‘semiosis’. Semiosis is making of meaning not only through language, but also through body language, visual images, or other ways of signifying. Consequently those signifiers that are found in this research will also be included in the analysis, even though language will be the main element.

CDA does analyse texts, interactions and other types of semiotic material, however it does not begin with these texts or interactions. CDA begins with social issues and problems (Fairclough 2001, 230). Therefore with regards to the chosen text for the purposes of this study, minority issues in Turkey in general, and the Kurdish issue in particular is the starting point of the analysis. However I carefully refrain from a detailed discussion on these issues, as I am interested only in the social remittance flows from the TRF to Turkey on the issue.

A major characteristic of this approach is that CDA is not only concerned with analysis per se. It is critical first, meaning it tries to put forward connections between language and other elements in social life that are not often transparent. This characteristic entails “*how language figures within social relations of power and domination; how language works ideologically; the negotiation of personal and social identities in its linguistic and semiotic aspect*” (Fairclough 2001, 230).

I will follow the 5 stages put forward by Fairclough (2001, 236) as my analytical framework for CDA. These are:

- 1- Focus upon a social problem that has a semiotic aspect.

- 2- Identify obstacles to the social problem being tackled.
- 3- Consider whether the social order (network of practices) ‘needs’ the problem.
- 4- Identify possible ways past the obstacles.
- 5- Reflect critically on the analysis

We shall start with focusing on the social problem at hand.

### 1.1 STAGE ONE

As a unitary secular state, Turkish republic does not officially recognise any ethnic or religious minorities. However, the last decade finally has witnessed the state-level uttering of the *‘Kurdish problem’*. The *‘problem’* as it now leaked its way into the bureaucratic terminology is obviously not one of naturally ‘being Kurdish’. Yet it is a problem that hides in social relations, hegemony, domination and discourse. Turkish state with a vast army of institutions is inescapably a part of this affair. TRF in Sweden however, is not. TRF is an independent organisation of Swedish-Turkish Worker’s Federations and other sub-associations and has been practicing a significant unifying power for the last 40 years. TRF is aware of its independent status, as mentioned on its own website<sup>7</sup>. They underline that they mainly serve those who arrived in Sweden via three big migration movements from Turkey. They outline the first labour migration in the 1960’s as the first of those massive movements and explain it as a result of unemployment in Turkey, and industrial offers in Sweden. 1970’s witnessed the second massive move by mainly the Christian populations of Turkey like those of Assyrians and Syriacs as the social costs of living in Turkey was on the rise especially for minority groups. And the third massive move is marked as the refugee immigration after the coup in 1980 that according to TRF consists of *“Turkish nationals, mainly trade unionists, politicians, and activists belonging to various ethnic groups”*<sup>8</sup>. A very careful choice of language (as the Turkish diaspora in Sweden requires more than anywhere else) dances around Turkish Christian populations, political refugees, unionists, a courteous choice of the term *‘Turkish nationals’*, and various ethnic groups. TRF’s independence from the Turkish state is not only an institutional fact, but also an obligation for its existence, for the Turkish diaspora in Sweden possesses a particularly sensitive composition. The problem however, starts when that obligation is disregarded.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.trf.nu/tarih-historik.html>

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

## 1.2 STAGE TWO

The TRF anti-terror rally takes place in Stockholm on July 23<sup>rd</sup> 2011. The timing is self-explained by the Chairman with three indicators. First of these is that the specific date falls on the holy month of Ramadan for Muslims around the world, and this is specifically mentioned in various places throughout the main speech. Secondly it is the aftermath of some 50 day conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army, coverage of which has dominated the Turkish media. Lastly and most strategically it is the day after the infamous Norway attacks when the global, and more so the Scandinavian media has focused on terrorism.

This second stage of CDA considers the discourse itself as part of the obstacles. This entails making sense of how the order of discourse – the TRF rally in our case – is structured and how the semiosis that surrounds this network of practices is structured. Discursive practices that damage racist, sexist or chauvinist representations of social life can all be parts of these obstacles within the discourse itself that reproduce certain stereotypes, deepen social disagreements, aggravate established tensions or arrest social development. This look on the discourse as part of the obstacle requires involving both structural and interactional perspectives into account, and it also includes the actual analysis of the text (Fairclough 2001, 237f). At this point a linguistic/semiotic analysis of the text will be accompanied by an interactional analysis where I concern myself with how the semiotic resources available to the people in the rally interact, that is “*the active semiotic work that people are doing on specific occasions using those resources.*” (Fairclough 2001, 240). Five main pillars were identified as significant characteristics of the TRF anti-terror rally. These are violence/hostility, challenge, race, religion and militancy as explained individually below.

### 1.2.1 VIOLENCE/HOSTILITY

An anti-terror stance need not always be one of a peaceful manner. It is proven globally by experience that this specific stance can also take up a hostile, violent rhetoric that tends to aggravate established tensions let alone solving them. An element of violence and hostility is what strikes us foremost in the TRF anti-terror rally. The Chairman’s speech opens not with a focus on those who chose to participate to the rally, but with a focus on what to do with those that did not:

*“Today, when we go back to our homes, when we go back to our neighbourhoods, when we arrive in our mosques it is our right to find who was not here today. Find them and tear their shirts, tear their pants! Do that! Today it’s within your right to do as you wish! Today, find*

*everyone and ask them why they didn't come to the rally. Find those that claim being busy, not being able, who claim that they fasted or they prayed, that it rained, or it snowed, it was winter or there was sun, find them and tear their shirts, tear their pants! They have deserved it!"*

No excuse is acceptable for Turkish migrants in Stockholm who chose not to participate in the rally. The list of possible excuses are all petit-lies, suggesting no one in their right mind might have chosen non-participation to the rally for valid political reasons. They could not have believed that this stance is not one of TRF's missions, and that TRF serves and exists for a particularly sensitive Turkish population in Sweden that consists of various ethnicities, religions, ideological stances and marginalities. They must only be those who 'deserve' all that is coming at them. Today they deserve being singled out and targeted.

Not only the language employed here but also the body language and mannerisms adopted echoes the same hostile stance. The problem however is the vagueness of that hostility. The rally does not seem to condemn 'terrorism' only. It also condemns those who, by no means are terrorists, but approach the issue via different angles, most of which also condemn the act of terrorism as well. The rally witnesses thunders of orders on who to find today, what to do with them, why they deserve what is coming at them. Mr. Chairman shouts in anger and determination, almost like a warlord calling out to his soldiers, preparing them for a coming war. It is indeed, that familiar and at times shifty position adopted by many leaders around the world, 'the war on terror'.

### **1.2.2 CHALLENGE**

Throughout the rally TRF adopts a formerly nonexistent mission to challenge states and institutions, stepping out of its independent status from the Turkish state. These challenges both form themselves around the Kurdish issue in Turkey, and the PKK terror, yet never about terror in general. First of these, is pointed out rather homogenously as the European media:

*"Europe and European media must correct itself on one issue. They must educate themselves. We have never, ever considered the PKK terrorism as guerrilla. And we shall never consider it so! European media must give up referring to PKK in its newspapers, and its magazines as guerrilla or a liberation front. PKK has never been guerrilla. PKK has always been a terrorist organisation."*

This obligation that TRF puts on European media, is about yet another discourse. In so doing, the federation makes it clear that it adopts the Turkish national stance against the production of a counter discourse. That counter discourse, has indeed its own ideological agenda even though it ranges in a wide spectrum. One extreme of this spectrum would be blurring all acts of terrorism. However that does not undermine the obstructer nature of the discourse put forward by TRF. The wrongfulness of the European media, its hidden agenda are shown as the reasons that push TRF to protest its depictions of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Nevertheless, that protest is done via the grammatical subject 'we'. What the speech refers to when it employs the subject 'we' ("*We shall never consider it so!*") is worthy of attention. Finding the other end of this reference, 'Turks', 'Turkish nationals', 'ethnic Turks in Turkey', 'anti-terrorists', 'anti-terrorist Turks'...etc. is disputable. Doubtlessly still, it is not the 'Turks in Sweden' for whom TRF speaks for.

The second entity challenged to correct itself is the Swedish state:

*"Friends, lastly, the Swedish government must watch its steps. Look, PKK supporter states are right and left. Today, it is not only us who rally in Stockholm. There are other rallies in the city like ours that support the PKK terrorist organisation. Why? They want to criticise the Turkish government, Turkish government's selfless decision. What is this decision? What does Turkey do nowadays? Turkey is trying to exterminate the supply outside of its territory in Northern Iraq, to prevent the border violations inside its territory. It is defending its rightful cause. That's why we are here. Once again, we condemn the Swedish government for not closing down the institutions, the houses, the associations of this terrorist organisation."*

This threat posed against the Swedish government to watch its steps by TRF is once again in line with the Turkish national stance. Here they involve themselves with Turkey's international politics, its army activities, the legitimacy of its causes and as a result of echoing the Turkish national responses to those issues they warn and condemn the Swedish government. This condemnation includes labelling the Swedish state a 'terror-supporting state' and that can apparently be proven by not prohibiting other rallies (a right that TRF is enjoying exactly then), and so-called institutions, houses and associations of this terrorist organisation. Officially, PKK is a terrorist organisation under the Swedish law, therefore there are no institutions or associations in Sweden directly linked to the organisation. What is referred to here is a dangerously sweeping list of television channels, radios, Kurdish language or culture associations, Kurdish newspapers, Kurdish Worker's Federation...etc. as

the ‘war on terror’ tends to do. This reference and its sweeping inclusion of a wide range of activities under the label ‘terrorism’ is indeed an obstacle within this familiar discourse that perpetuates established tensions in Turkey and more importantly not a natural mission of the independent TRF.

### 1.2.3 RACE

The issue of participants in the TRF anti-terror rally is one to be tackled both through language, and visual imagery. There are, as expected, Turkish flags flown by the ralliers. Turkish flags however, are not the only ones flying. The video coverage of the rally shows other national and ethnic group flags. This rather eclectic choice of flags is also uttered during the main rally speech:

*“I look around and there are our brothers from Eastern Turkestan, there are our friends from Azerbaijan, Turkmen brothers who come from Northern Iraq, brothers from the Balkans, Caucasus, Turkey and sisters from Somalia. One wishes to see the Swedes, our Swedish friends here too. One wishes to see people from all around the world in all colours. Terrorism has no colour, race, language, religion.”*

With the exception of the few Somalian ladies the participant profile is consisted exclusively of ethnic Turks and Turkic peoples. This is far from a coincidence. The participation of the Somalian ladies were later explained in an interview by Karima Tice, the President of the Swedish-Somali Aman Care<sup>9</sup> who talked about the recent Turkish aid to Somalia and how they mobilised for the rally out of gratitude. The rest of the participants however belong to a vast geography, some never touched by the Kurdish issue. There is a clear statement of ethnicity, namely Turkishness. The Azerbaijani group has no organic ties to PKK terror, but there is a negotiation under way. Their claims of Armenian brutalities in Nagorno-Karabakh as genocide of the Azerbaijanis is also shared as a national policy by the Turkish state, often pulled into light amongst Armenian genocide debates that Turkey increasingly has to deal with. The Turkic speaking Uyghurs of Eastern Turkestan in China are repeatedly forgotten when Chinese-Turkish relations prosper and remembered when they do not. Similar national policies surround the issue of Northern Iraqi Turkmens, and Turkish minorities in the Balkans and Caucasus all revolving around one common element, ethnicity. The statement that this specific profile of participants makes is that the PKK terror is not only worthy of condemnation per se, rather because it is a war waged against Turkishness, a race war if you

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<sup>9</sup> www.trf.nu

will. Such a statement creates a significant obstacle within this particular discourse damaging Kurdishness as an ethnic identity and draws clear-cut boundaries along ethnic lines of division. Despite statements like “*Terrorism has no colour, race, language, religion.*” a clear message signals certain ethnic origins as victims of terrorism and certain others as perpetrators. What is more, apparently religion also has something to do with it.

#### 1.2.4 RELIGION

Religious statements and innuendo constantly surfaces throughout the speech during the TRF anti-terror rally. The month of Ramadan, fasting, martyrs, mosques, Muslims are some of the concepts mentioned in the span of this short speech. Let us look into their contexts before we move on to the analysis.

The rally speech, as mentioned before, opens up with finding out those who did not participate in it. One of the possible locations to find the dissidents is explicitly shown as the mosque yet not any other place of worship: “*Today, when we go back to our homes, when we go back to our neighbourhoods, when we arrive in our mosques it is our right to find who was not here today.*” The Turkish army soldiers that recently lost their lives in conflict with the PKK are referred to as “*Sehit*”, roughly corresponding to the word ‘martyr’. Qur’an defines ‘*Sehit*’ as a Muslim who has died for Islam and therefore the degree of martyrdom is placed at the top of self-purification efforts. One other such example is the final part of the rally speech where the participants are praised for coming. That praise however, is somehow guaranteed to be divinely repaid in the hereafter by the TRF Chairman: “*I thank you all again and again, to those of you who came. I want your blessings, give me your blessings. Most of you are fasting today. Know that God will pay you back many times over on the other side. Bu sure of it.*”.

Having given those examples, the discourse analysis of the religious innuendo in the TRF anti-terror rally needs not travelling long distances. It is loud and clear: “*I mean terrorism does not pertain to Muslim countries like ours, it doesn’t pertain to Turkey. That’s why Europeans must act together with us.*”. Turkey, a constitutionally secular country, neither defines itself as a ‘Muslim country’, nor others think of various secular states as ‘Catholic France’ or ‘the Protestant Netherlands’. This coming from an organisation that outlines three big migration movements from Turkey to Sweden on their own websites, second of which reads: “*In 1975 began the second massive migration from Turkey to Sweden, of Christian*

*groups, mostly Assyrians and Syriacs*<sup>10</sup>.” makes it painfully clear, that they do not only discriminate ethnically in who they serve, they also discriminate religiously. Amongst the Turkish migrant populations in Sweden therefore, not many is left that they do serve and can speak in the name of.

### **1.2.5 MILITANCY**

CDA considers the analysis of written texts, television programmes as interactional as well, because they are written and produced with a specific audience in mind even though they practice a certain level of independence than conversations or interviews. In conversations and interviews however, the interactivity is very tangible since the participants are co-existent in time and space (Fairclough 2001, 239). A rally proved to be of a particularly high level of interactional importance. Where the participants cheered the most, what they did during the main speech and the final act to end the rally has marked three observations worth to mention.

In the beginning of the rally, during the targeting of the non-participants and what to do with them, a rush of joy seems to sweep the ralliers. This might also be a not-so-well thought reflection of the enthusiasm shown by the TRF Chairman when he advised the crowd to find ‘them’ and tear their shirts and their pants. However lynchings are seen to be caused by that mindless echoing of dangerous enthusiasms, therefore it is worthy to mark.

A second interesting point was the indifference that the few Somalian ladies seemed to show to the rally. The Somalian participants, who later said that they participated out of gratitude to the Turkish state, were the only group in the rally that can be assumed as non-Turkish speakers. If that assumption is correct, they have missed a significantly large portion of the communication since the rally took place entirely in Turkish except for some banners in Swedish. If indeed their participation to the rally was out of sheer gratitude and therefore partly hasty, that only goes to further complicate the issue of participant ethnic profile, making the deliberate participants entirely ethnic Turks. That, for a universal anti-terror rally, seems calculatingly uniform.

Lastly, after the main speech, the rally ends with a certain ritual. A list of names that belonged to the soldiers of the Turkish Army who recently lost their lives in conflicts with the PKK are called out by the presenter. These names are called out with their army titles still

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.trf.nu/tarih-historik.html>

intact (i.e. “Surgent Speacialist Nazir Elitok). After every name, the crowd chants “*Here!*”. This ritual serves to commemorate those who had lost their lives. It is also done in a way to create a certain feeling of militancy throughout the ralliers through making them identify with deceased soldiers whereas real empathy requires identifying oneself with multiple sides of social issues.

### 1.3 STAGE THREE

Stage three of the CDA method tackles if the social order ‘needs’ the problem. This is to ask if those who benefit most from the way that the social life is organised as it is have an interest in the problem not being resolved. This part of the CDA looks for the ‘necessity’ of racist, sexist or chauvinist representations (Fairclough 2001, 238).

The depiction of the Kurdish issue as one of ingratitude, unjust violence and engaging in a wide range of semiotic behaviour that blurs the line between Kurdishness and the PKK terror serves a wide social interest. It keeps potential democratic dynamics at a bay in exchange for the sustainability of relations between the authority or the elites and the rest of the society. Reproducing these already existing social divisions pave the way for strategies of domination for the Turkish state in its present status quo.

Keeping the issue isolated from a general discussion of ‘minority issues in Turkey’, helps to turn a deaf ear to a multiplicity of claims that would include a large amount of ethnic and religious groups. This isolation is achieved through various practices under the protection of rhetoric. When the TRF rally is concerned for instance, a rhetorically general anti-terror rally that in fact revolves almost exclusively around PKK terror, participants’ being almost exclusively Turkic peoples, inconsideration of Turks of many other faiths assures to pose the problem completely in isolation as a Kurdish-Turkish affair instead of a minority issue.

The two clearest deductions are the ‘need’ of Turkish national policy to feed the current discourse, and TRF’s newly adopted direction to duplicate that policy. So emerges a third question though, why does TRF need to duplicate the Turkish national policy? Clearly there are advantages and disadvantages for TRF down this new path. Its long established independent status in Sweden erodes away, along with its legitimacy and consequently its mobilising power it used to enjoy among immigrants in Sweden. On the other hand, by willingly stepping into the gravitational field of the Turkish state, they compensate for the loss of this internal influence in Sweden, by opening new channels of external influence in Turkey. This manifests itself in creation of more organic ties with the state, various

institutions, mainstream unions and pro-government big businesses in Turkey. This transformation can be seen as a result of the recently growing soft power of the Turkish state which manifests itself not only on institutions, but also on other states in the Middle East and the Balkans. The topicality of this transition is also apparent from the conservative tones adopted by the TRF which echoes the change of language that surrounds the Kurdish issue in the last decade following the conservative transformation in Turkey.

#### 1.4 STAGE FOUR

The fourth stage of the CDA requires looking for hitherto unrealised possibilities for change in how social life is organised around TRF and its approach to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. To do that I have decided to voice the storm of criticism that the TRF anti-terror rally stirred, further aiding the contextualisation of the text at hand.

Part of an open letter published by the Swedish-Turkish Solidarity and Culture Association, one of the 29 sub-associations under TRF, is as follows:

*“We have watched the TRF anti-terror rally in Stockholm in bewilderment and confusion. While you claim to have meant “contribute towards global peace”, we believe the exact opposite was achieved. A specific language was employed that could stir conflicts between various peoples from Turkey living side by side and in peace in Sweden.*

*The war that still continues in our country for 30 years has brought nothing but tears and pain. We have lost 40 thousand people. The experiences show that the Kurdish issue cannot be solved by guns and arms. However, bombardments and violence was championed in the rally as a solution to the problem.”<sup>11</sup>*

This point constitutes the first possible way past the obstacles within the discourse that surrounds the Kurdish issue, taking violence and hostility out of the equation. Many, who would like to see a change to this particular part of social life in Turkey, would like to see officials, institutions, and individuals adopt a language of peace and resolution. The constant reminder of the military technicalities, distorted warfare details on top of an overall language of violence and target indicating does a great deal of disservice to the possibility of resolution, therefore is seen necessary to be renounced by the TRF.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.harbigazete.com/kose-yazisi/163/teror-kiskirtma.html>

A second possibility that is currently unrealised is the independence of TRF. An independent status that the federation used to enjoy is once again craved for. The same open letter continues as such:

*“Before all else, the federation is a non-governmental organisation and contains people who came from various groups, ideologies in Turkey. The federation must consider this fact for all of the activities it organises. TRF had so far been independent of the Swedish and the Turkish states and had followed an honourable policy. Lately it has become a lobby organisation that champions Turkish state’s national policies.”<sup>12</sup>*

Kurdo Baksi, a Kurdish journalist and author in Sweden also mentions this shared concern in one of his articles:

*“Mr. Chairman has become the trumpet of the Turkish state. I accuse you Sir. I accuse you of propagating ideas that are package prepared in Ankara and sent off to embassies everywhere. I accuse you of creating hostility between Kurdish and Turkish people.”<sup>13</sup>*

A clear message is sent to TRF to re-assume its independent status from the Swedish and Turkish states, and stop propagating any national policies for that is not compatible with neither the mission nor the composition of the federation.

One other unrealised possibility advised by those who have criticised the way that the social life is organised around the TRF is one of inclusion. It seems, there is a legitimate call against the isolation of the Kurdish issue, and also the labelling of ‘terror’ as a Turkish-Kurdish affair which consequently silences the say of all other groups from different ethnicities and faiths. This call repeatedly suggests an inclusive consideration of the issue under a ‘minority issues’ umbrella, opening a larger area of discussion for all minorities in Turkey, ethnic or religious, as to not limiting the affair to two specific groups. Some internal criticism within TRF concurs this stance:

*“Our observations show that the Federation is not considerate about its independent status. We sincerely wish that if there is any policy that you would like to follow about the Turkish, Kurdish, Syriac and Armenian groups in Sweden, it must be a policy to promote friendship instead of following the official state policy.”*

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.mynewsdesk.com/tr/view/news/kurdo-baksi-kurtlere-dusmanlik-yaparak-baris-saglanamaz-30394>

*President Nevin Kamilagaoglu & Board Member Mehmet Yucel*”<sup>14</sup>

As well as some of the concerned members:

*“The federation has entirely stopped paying the slightest attention to valid issues and instead started doing groundwork for conflict between Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Syrians who should instead strive together.*

*Murat Kuseyri/Stockholm*”<sup>15</sup>

These requests put together various ethnic and religious minorities in an attempt to hinder the detrimental effects of the strategies adopted for the Kurdish problem on all minorities. They would instead like to see TRF tackling those ‘valid issues’. This takes us to the next possibility that is currently unrealised by the federation.

Painfully simply, the federation might be doing its job as discussed ideally by a concerned member’s criticisms after the anti-terror rally debacle:

*Europe is affected by a severe economic crisis. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost their jobs. Unemployment hit the immigrant workers the hardest. The immigrants suffer the effects of privatisation, limitation of social rights, unemployment and eroding health rights. Consequently, all these have strengthened racist and xenophobic sentiments. The opinion polls show that the Swedish Democrats will pass the 4% threshold and enter the parliament. Where is the federation? At the anti-terror rally!*”<sup>16</sup>

If realised, this possibility could take TRF’s legitimacy back to its golden days, help migrants tackle problems that directly involve them, and would serve as a unifying power for migrant rights instead of a divisive power that echoes national policies. This lack of efficiency in fighting for social rights of the migrants bring us to the last criticism against the TRF rally posed by the Swedish Social Democratic Party, where the TRF Chairman and the main speaker at the anti-terror rally is also a parliamentary candidate.

*“The Social Democratic Party has received a large amount of complaints about TRF’s Chairman who is also a parliamentary candidate of our party. We are taking this issue very seriously, and think that this stance shadows Mr. Chairman’s social democratic perception.*

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.seyfocenter.com/index.php?sid=10&aID=149>

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Ibid

*We have ordered a complete translation of the rally speech and will start an investigation about it.*

*Socialdemokraterna First Secretary Olle Burell*<sup>17</sup>

Therefore the last possibility towards social change put forward by the reaction that the rally stirred is a call for consideration of social rights. If realised this could pull the Federation back on track with regards to benefitting the migrant communities from Turkey. It would also mean a federation truer to its mission and composition of the people it exists to serve for.

### 1.5 STAGE FIVE

The last step of the CDA is reflecting critically on the analysis. This step is explained by Fairclough (2001, 239) as “*requiring the analyst to reflect on where s/he is coming from, and her/his own social positioning*”. I have chosen the TRF anti-terror rally for a chance to explore the normative concerns as mentioned before. To reiterate, the normative concerns that surround social remittances suggest that all social remittances are not ‘positive’ or ‘liberating’ or ‘challenging gender, race and class hierarchies’ back at home. I conclude through Fairclough’s CDA that this part of the study corresponds to existing concerns in the literature. TRF anti-terror rally is neither positive nor liberating for those at ‘home’. The social goods remitted back to Turkey by TRF obviously do not challenge the operative gender, race and class hierarchies, rather perpetuates them. The ‘why’ of it, as discussed above, goes to show that a specific area of remittance production in the hosting country is not bounded by its own dynamics. TRF’s newly acquired characteristics of echoing Turkish national policy at the expense of the immigrant profile in Sweden, and their enthusiasm to contribute to the dominant ideologies in Turkey is an example. Therefore individuals and institutions can as well derive the social goods that they remit independent from, or incompatible to the seemingly dominant values, ideas and norms of the hosting country. This justifies the normative concerns and suggests that social remittances do not automatically contribute to social development in the sending communities.

## 2. CONDUCTING THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The semi-structured interviews and the data collected from them was first organised topically. However, this was later changed. The main reason that led to the creation of the

<sup>17</sup> <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2200&artikel=4717002>

correlational concerns in this study was the hunch felt about the possibly misleading consequences of homogenisation as in claiming all avoiders would socially remit weaker than all pursuers. One of the primary findings in this research through the interviews refutes this correlation, yet does not claim the opposite making the very same mistake. Therefore while claiming that avoiders do not have to remit less or weaker, I also intend to show the diversity within these groups. This is why the integrity of the participants' stories was kept intact. Also the individual interviews have massively contributed in my own quest of understanding social remittances which is a chance I would not want to deprive the reader of. This is why the plan to topically organise the data is abandoned in order to adopt an individually organised presentation of the data in an attempt to give as much voice as possible to the participants.

## 2.1 PURSUERS

### *SEVAL*

Seval has come to Sweden 27 years ago from a Kurdish village in Turkey, following her fiancée. She got married with her fiancée in Sweden and started a family with four children, yet she thinks of herself as utterly lonely.

*"I was perfectly comfortable in the village. In Sweden I am lonely. We first moved to Gothenburg which was a bit better than where I live now (She lives in a small town in Skane). In Gothenburg my husband's relatives were around, his cousins, his uncle, brother, their families, other Turks... If you were sick they would take care of your kids, you could share troubles, visit each other. Now I'm left completely alone. It's really bothering me. You can't really contact with the Swedes. They're not like us."*

Seval says her Swedish language skills are below average. She doesn't hope that she would improve her language skills much further after 27 years. Living in a small town, cut off from other immigrants, and relatives, also unemployed, majority of her life is confined to a very private sphere where she feels loneliness. Before Gothenburg, she misses her village back in Turkey.

*"There'd be weddings in the village. There'd be circumcisions, deaths; there'd be get-togethers where the women produce something. Here...nothing. Who got married, who died, I am informed of absolutely nothing. At least in Gothenburg they go to meetings, to organisations. I'm really jealous. There is nothing like that where I live."*

Feeling isolated, she believes she does not accumulate much social goods to remit back home. She's in touch with a large number of relatives in her village, and last 5 years she visits them every year and stays at least a month. The first two decades of her stay in Sweden, she was not able to visit the village as often, because of financial matters, and raising her four children. And no one, except for her mother-in-law has come to Sweden to visit them. When they do get to visit each other, and when she talks to them otherwise she has one general topic she talks about and that is her loneliness. Her real story that she gets to tell is why she does not have one.

*"I could never merge in Sweden. I have no life memories here. I'm always lonely. I was away from all the weddings (in the village). I couldn't share anything with them. I have no memories. Now I can neither share my joy nor my sorrow."*

Her being confined to a life that is almost untouched by the public sphere, or even the private spheres of others in Sweden, she does not get to derive much to talk about. The rare times she does, she's generally ignored back in Turkey.

*"I talk about how the social life is dead in Sweden. They don't get it. They think we make a lot of money, live very comfortably, we eat and we drink and we travel."*

Same ignorance applies for when she derives from the positive experiences she had in Sweden, like that of a superior health service. Yet her visit to a Turkish hospital stamps her as the 'European', and her spontaneous social remittance falls on deaf ears.

*"The doctor was going to examine me with the same gloves he used for the previous patient. I asked him to change it. I told him this would be illegal in Sweden. He wouldn't. Then I stormed out, I didn't let him touch me with those gloves. I had some relatives with me from the village. They all said I was really stuck up, that I was too European now. You go to the village and you're a European, you come here and you're an immigrant."*

To my surprise, the ignorance of social remittances back home or the seemingly unalterable perceptions and ideas of people was about to emerge as a peculiarly obvious pattern among the pursuers.

### **KAAN**

Kaan, unlike Seval, is from an urban background with a high education. He came to Sweden following his girlfriend. They first considered living in Turkey about 5 years ago and they

even made some preparations for it including some job and graduate study applications. He had no reason to try and avoid what is back home. However, eventually their plans have not panned out as originally planned. He now lives and works in Sweden, in order to be able to pursue a better life together with his girlfriend. However, very much like Seval, he feels isolated.

*“Here I fell in between the Swedes and people who had to flee Turkey. When you talk to the people who fled Turkey they treat you as if you’re the Turkish state itself. Because you didn’t have to escape from the country like they did. When you talk to the Swedes they treat you as a ‘Turk’, and they have a predetermined idea of what that is. I guess I feel I belong to the most disadvantaged group here. All the rest, people escaping Turkey, Middle Easterners always hold on to each other. They help and protect each other. I feel I’m the only one left out. Let me put it this way, I feel really very lonely.”*

His isolation, and the reasons that he believes lie behind it is his most common topic during interactions with his family and friends in Turkey. However it is not his only complaint. He explicitly states that he talks about Sweden and his life experiences almost exclusively through criticism and complaint with the people in Turkey. I ask him if I could hear some of these complaints that he talks about the most.

*“There is no diversity in Sweden. You get the same response on every issue from everyone. There is a very high level of nationalism. But of course that nationalism is not so crude as ours, it’s much more sophisticated. A much finer nationalism... It’s never ‘We are so great’ or anything. Everything that’s done is very sophisticated. If nationalism is done, it’s done in such a way that you don’t get to label it as nationalism in the end. If racism is done, it’s done in such a way you that you end up unable to call it racism. For instance Sweden gives the Nobel prize together with Norway. They get to award the world on peace. Yet Sweden is also the country that has the most per capita weaponry export.”*

Kaan reminds back how and why he thinks the Swedish society does not work. Consequently he warns people back home about the negative sides of social or political life experiences in Sweden. However, when asked if he thinks the receptors are affected by his remittances he bursts into laughter.

*“I talk about these issues with my father all the time. He came to visit me here. Maybe all these stories I tell to my father become somewhat meaningless when compared with the*

*reality of Turkey. (Imitates his father) 'What are you even talking about son? At least people don't die, they are not imprisoned, at least people stop at the red light, they aren't crushed at a crosswalk, at least some stranger doesn't come and stab you in the middle of the street.' Obviously all the things I'm complaining about lose meaning for my father. Because he came here, he looked around. There are parks, gardens, people stop at the red light, the buses come on time. 'It's good here son' he said. 'Don't complain so much, it's better than Turkey.'"*

Kaan produces a certain level of a social remittance flow. He does so not necessarily deriving from what Sweden gives him, but on the contrary from what Sweden holds back from him. His isolation and self-defined loneliness determines the type of social goods he remits. Faced with the fact that none of his social remittances are received and accepted as intended, he turns to empathy in an attempt to make sense of this incomplete transfer of ideas.

*"Families consider the issue much more pragmatically of course. I mean, this and that complaint, maybe you're not spiritually satisfied, maybe you feel lonely. Of course your family won't understand it. They would neither understand, nor listen really. They care about how much salary you earn, if you have vacation days, if your employer fires you or not, if the police beats you on the street, if somebody stabs you or not. They care about the simple, material things."*

### **HAKAN**

Hakan came to Sweden as a teacher. He's been working in Sweden for almost 5 years. He says his initial move was to *"better see the opportunities"*, and now he thinks he's likely to stay.

He is mostly in touch with his family back home. When asked what and how much of his experiences and ideas he passes over to Turkey he says not much is done so. He takes his time to think of some.

*" I sometimes talk about the traffic here, about how much better it is. I talk about the tolerance, the stress-free life, the economic welfare (I make three times what I would as a teacher in Turkey), the weather... And how Sweden is not the same as Switzerland"* He adds jokingly.

Working with children as a professional in Sweden does not stop him to volunteer his free time for them as well. He says when he thinks about it he has valuable experiences worthy of remitting. However, he is not sure that the reception would be as eager.

*“No I did, I’ve initially tried to talk to my family about what I do, what I see. But my family doesn’t give much importance to that sort of information. What I’m eating, what I’m drinking, whether or not I’m sick...That’s what they want to know. That’s the Turkish family. Or maybe just mine, I wouldn’t know.”*

Compared to the other pursuers interviewed, Hakan remits lower levels of social goods. He has a rather limited number of people in Turkey that he is in touch with and they are not exactly very eager to accept much push to their ideas, behaviours or norms. Hakan himself also, has not had a clear agenda of any kind to remit any social good so far. This was never a purpose so to speak. However he thinks he might in the future.

*“I was raised in a religious family. I consider myself somewhat religious. You want to experience your religion, but sadly you didn’t have that chance in METU (METU is an elite public university that Hakan has attended back in Turkey. It is known for its generally left-leaning student body). You cannot be openly religious. If you do, there can be trouble. You don’t have to be a headscarved woman to have such a problem; you could as well be a man. Let’s not say you’re considered a second class citizen, but there clearly was a problem. I’ve enjoyed this freedom in Sweden. It is a great freedom to be able to live life as you wish. Here the system doesn’t push you to hypocrisy. In Turkey my ideas and my life were two separate things. The system pushes you from one corner, the family does from another. Your personality is shattered. I’ve put my personality together when I came here. Now I get to live life as I believe and believe what I live. You can go and pray on a Friday, you can fast during Ramadan, nobody intervenes. The borders between different groups aren’t drawn as thick as Turkey. I would definitely want to come up with a way to bring this freedom there too.”*

Hakan’s future plans, although vague, have constituted one of the two pursuers who wished to remit some of the social goods they had come to produce in Sweden in an organised way in the future. Even though I was more interested in what has already been done as solid frames of reference, in the lack of such greater flows of social remittances in the past, the future plans and wishes were also noted. The only other pursuer with plans of carrying her level of social remittances above the interpersonal level was Defne.

**DEFNE**

Defne came to Sweden as a graduate student, while she had two other offers from Turkish universities. She thinks she could have as well studied in Turkey, however she felt like the experiences she would derive studying abroad would be beneficial for her. Her prospects back in Turkey as an educated young woman were also substantial, yet as many others, she preferred to pursue her education in Sweden and it presented her with better opportunities.

*“Why did I decide to stay?”* Defne asks herself. There are many reasons she says, but the main one was her job. She stayed in Sweden after her studies and started working professionally with refugee children. Her job, and her newly developed interest in refugee issues were initially foreign to her. During her work years she got to know to these children personally, and the issue academically. This awareness has opened up as a completely new area in her life that did not exist before she arrived in Sweden despite the subtleties that come with living in Western Turkey, where refugees pass in tens of thousands.

*“Before I came to Sweden, I never met a refugee. I only vaguely read about them. They even pass from my city, where my parents still live. To meet all these people here, to listen to their stories... I have met a lot of refugee children under the age of 18. I have also learned about the asylum system in Sweden, about how an NGO works, how it finances itself.*

*I have a great story about this. It was years ago, I think I was in high school. I have only remembered this story when I met the refugee children here. My father one day returned from the mosque with two young foreign men. Apparently they were asking for help from anybody in the mosque. My father just brought them home. Apparently they wanted to go to Izmir (A port city by the Aegean with relatively easier access to Greece). They were trying to say something, and always repeated “Izmir, Izmir”. We didn’t know who they were, we didn’t know where they came from. My father bought tickets and put them on a bus to Izmir, and my mother made some sandwiches for them. I remember they kissed my father’s hands. I remembered this story when I met the children here. Back then we didn’t even think about who these people were and why they were there. I was young of course, but neither my father, nor my mother has questioned it. Of course these issues are widely unknown in Turkey unlike Europe, because politicians cannot score votes on this issue. We do not know so many people are passing through Turkey to go to Europe. We do not know so many of them actually stay. I want to do something to hold a light to this.”*

Defne has never questioned this story during her undergraduate studies as a political scientist in Turkey. She feels safe to conclude that her knowledge and experiences in refugee issues are a result of her life in Sweden. However she does not plan to work with refugees in Sweden in the long term. Instead she plans to work on the issue in Turkey. She's interested in the dangerous and often brutal voyage people go through in Turkey in hopes of getting into Europe, as well as those unseen masses who did not plan for it but stayed in Turkey and built a life for themselves. This goes to show how a social remittance can be born incidentally. Defne's experiences in Sweden made her aware of a mass of refugees struggling to pass through Turkey, and in increasing numbers stay for the last decade. This awareness is much needed for Turkish policy-makers and academics alike, since both tend to be amazingly blind to the issue despite its severity. As we're conducting the interview she's getting ready for her return to Turkey. I ask her about her plans.

*"Now I am doing my PhD applications in Turkey about this issue. In general it will be about refugees, and transmigration to Europe. I suppose what I have learned and experienced in Sweden will affect my academic work."*

Her future plans are based on this newly opened sphere of knowledge. Interestingly this new sphere was not derived from the Swedish society in general. It was rather derived from its outskirts. She ended up accumulating a great deal of ideas and norms about potential refugees passing from Turkey. For her, the lack of awareness about the issue back home was only shed a light on in one of the final destinations for successful refugees.

### **AYSE**

Unlike the four original pursuer interviewees, Ayse was born in Sweden to an immigrant family who used to have a rural background in Turkey. She was interviewed somewhat as an extra with a curiosity to open a window to the social remittances of second generation migrants. Determining her stance as a pursuer or an avoider hits a definitional wall. She herself, neither pursued, nor avoided anything, she simply 'was'. Consequently her stance in the flow of social remittances with regards to the correlational problems was kept separate.

However at some point in her life, Ayse moved to Istanbul in her adult ages and continued a part of her education there for a while. It is hard to believe her with her current skills when she says that one of the main reasons for this move was that she felt her language skills were incompetent in the Turkish language. She also wanted to make another connection with Turkey, feed her own curiosities about the urban life there. So now, after years, she has two

separate spaces of connection with Turkey. She still goes to the ‘village’ in Konya to visit her relatives and the villagers, and she separately visits Istanbul and all the friends she had made there. She’s frequently in touch with both these spaces.

She remembers a specific year out of her childhood that she was sent to visit the relatives in the village.

*“I was a child and all was fun every summer when I visited the village. Until when I was 13 or 14 years old... suddenly I was faced with limitations. They didn’t want me to walk by myself from the village square, because all the men sit around the square in the cafes, chatting, smoking. And I protested of course. “*

The difference she experiences in the gender regime in Sweden and in her village is vast. She is rather outspoken about this specific problem with her relatives. She explains them how life is in Sweden in an attempt to gain more freedom during the summers she passes in the village. And that she does, yet very interestingly, a specific space for action is opened for her and her only, keeping her behaviours, ideas and norms quarantined.

*“I did gain much freedom in the village. I kind of dress in the midway, it’s neither what I wear in Sweden nor what they would have me wear in the village. And that’s tolerated for me. I’m the only woman for instance who can drive by herself from the square. First I got a thousand complaints, everybody tried to get involved. Everybody said “you’re too fast, you’re not careful”. But then they got used to it. When you come from Europe they give you some special rights, as well as getting a lot of special criticisms.”*

On the other hand, her life and experiences in Istanbul differ. She’s been visiting Istanbul and keeping in touch with her friends there regularly for last 5 years. She does not explicitly remember much passing of social remittances there. *“There is just too much to do in Istanbul to think about anything else”* she says.

## **PURSUER ANALYSIS**

### **UNEXPECTED BIRTHPLACE**

One significant finding in the analysis of the pursuer data is the possibility of unexpected birthplaces for the social goods remitted. The pool of ideas, norms and behaviours that migrants derive from, is not bounded to the dominant forms of these social goods in the hosting community. Much that is derived by the participants does not come from what is

expected to be the stereotypical Swedish norms or ideas. Migrants derive new social goods from their unique experiences in relation to the hosting community. Therefore this larger pool of social goods come to include experiences like being isolated (resulting in remitting ideas as vices of individualism), loneliness, exclusion (remitting concepts of a Swedish nationalism, racism, hypocrisy), unanticipated freedoms (such as being able to enjoy life as a Muslim better in Sweden than Turkey) or ironic awarenesses (realising the scale of the refugee traffic in Turkey only in Sweden). All these contribute to our understanding of the necessity to consider social remittances in relation to the unique circumstances and the complicated networks of relations that surround them.

### IGNORANCE & QUARANTINE

The level of social goods remitted by pursuers seems to hit two lows in the beginning and at the end of their voyage. Initially, pursuers do not have access to a great network of ideas, norms and behaviours to derive from to produce the social goods they might remit. Therefore the social flow that they create tends to be limited to an interpersonal level, which sporadically manifests itself in contact with family and friends in their sending communities. This corresponds to the concerns that surround individual financial remittances, the tendency to treat the financial remittances as income to cover recurrent expenses (Goldring, 2003: 12). Similarly this individual level remittance flows as opposed to the collective ones result in lower levels of impact in their destinations. Secondly, there are also mechanisms naturally employed by the sending communities to minimise the effects of foreign ideas, norms and behaviours. Two significant ones that surfaced in this study are ignorance, and quarantine. Having pursued an abundance of better opportunities the social goods remitted by the pursuers can be ignored on basis of being too negative or too positive (Castles & Miller, 2009). Social remittances that aims to transmit ideas, norms and behaviours in an attempt to warn the sending communities of foreign vices (higher levels of individualism in Sweden, loneliness, claims of nationalism, xenophobia and hypocrisy... etc.) can easily be ignored of being too negative, after all the pursuers have left to pursue, and if it really was that bad they would have already come back. However remitting examples of positive nature in an attempt to claim similar rights and comforts back home (requesting a better health service) also does not automatically perceived as intended, and can as well be ignored on grounds of being too arrogant, forgetting one's roots, having become '*too European*'.

Apart from the power of ignorance that the sending communities employ to minimise the effects of foreign social goods, they also make use of a certain quarantine mechanism. The

existence of a different set of ideas, norms and behaviours, like that of Ayse's clothing style, and her spatial freedom in the village that no other woman gets to enjoy, are quarantined. This opens up a specific sphere of action for the remitters, where they enjoy a different set of rules than those binding the locals. The duality of these realities quarantines the foreign social goods and does not necessarily trigger a change in established hierarchies.

## INTENTIONS

Even though lacking in actual experience, some pursuers do wish to remit on a collective and an organised level. I have put greater importance in the collective remittances that actually had been remitted, however the existence of a plan or even a wish for the future still marks a difference in the lack of past experiences of collective remittances. Defne's plans for academic work on refugee issues would achieve a higher level of social remittances, and is exclusively derived from her life in Sweden. Hakan's wish of one day carrying the religious freedom and personal integrity he got to enjoy in Sweden to Turkey, although being vaguer, still suggests an intention for collective and more affective remittances.

Nonetheless, this goes to show that the pursuers do tend to remit on an interpersonal level, and most are aware of its ineffectiveness compared to collective remittances.

## 2.2 AVOIDERS

### MUSTAFA

Mustafa has been in Sweden for 30 years, escaping the 1980 military coup in Turkey. The atrocities that drove him and tens of thousands like him are vivid in his memories.

*“Destroying the Turkish left and erasing it from history was the sole reason of the military junta. It was a project to suppress these voices through torture, through death and imprisonment. I think they succeeded greatly.”*

His first attempt in escaping was to enter Germany and try to build a life there. He did stay for a year and half, however eventually had to leave. He explains this leave as such:

*“Back then, they didn't allow political asylum seekers from the 'Revolutionary Left' in Germany. Up until a young man from the organisation has killed himself. He jumped off the building where the court was held right after his asylum application was revoked. So in my time if I had stayed in Germany, I would have been sent back to Turkey. I would have been*

*taken into prison. Many of my friends were in prison, so I knew. That's why I left Germany and came to Sweden with a fake passport.*

Arriving in Sweden he neither had friends, nor relatives in the country. This attempt was purely survival. After his first year in Sweden his political asylum application is revoked once again. However he was provided a 'Framling Pass', therefore given residence permit on humanitarian grounds instead of political ones. He could not legally enter Turkey with this passport for another 14 years. He knows people who tried, some successfully, yet many others arrested at the airport and immediately imprisoned. So even though he officially never made a de jure political refugee, indubitably he was an avoider.

He reminisces the first decade in Europe when the collective spirit of the de facto and de jure Turkish political refugees and their organised attempts to direct Turkish politics were all too real.

*"We constantly tried to create a network around Europe between these people. I remember I went to Frankfurt to join a demonstration in front of the Turkish consulate. There were 20.000 of us. Following years as well, we have protested the coup every year, on its anniversary. Never were there less than 10.000 people."*

Mustafa has been involved in major social remittances. The scale of some of his social remittances dwarf his interpersonal social remittances through writing and talking to his friends back home, keeping touch with his family, and visiting them 2-3 times annually after the Turkish state has buried the hatchet in 1993 and lit the green light for his entrance to the country. He talks about some of these greater remittances that targeted not only family and friends but masses, that aimed for major changes, and were as ambitious as to involve international politics:

*"We have made radio programs in Sweden to make people hear about the tortures in Turkey. We relentlessly informed people of the conditions of the prisons, and the torture. We worked for months and succeeded to send an official Human Rights Commission from Sweden to Turkey. They went to Diyarbakir and checked the prison there. Of course when a European Commission goes up to the Turkish bureaucracy there and says 'We're coming from Europe' a certain pressure is achieved. We've brought the president of TAYAD (Association for Solidarity with the Families of Prisoners and Convicts) to hold important meetings here in Sweden"*

Before anything else, being in Sweden has kept Mustafa alive. The social goods he managed to remit back home are of a great scale as a result of his well-being first, and the strong urge he possesses to better Turkey according to his beliefs. That organised response to Turkish politics from abroad that Mustafa took part in has scaled down in the last decade. He cracks a broken smile and talks about how all that is in the past: *“The Revolutionary Left is gone completely, dissolved, disbanded. That potential is no more. They finish you. They finish you politically, they finish you with the police...”*

The change in Mustafa’s life as to what and how he remits back to Turkey does have more global resonances. He finds himself leading a more individualistic life these days. However he does not stop remitting on a personal level. He has very strong ties with his family, friends, and political ex-prisoners.

His future plans include moving back to Turkey to live there for good that he hopes to open channels of easier access to his home and to people in it. Many who live abroad dream about moving back home when the time comes, however only a few get around to it. Mustafa though, is serious about it. He has already done it once:

*“I did move to Turkey for good. In 1998, after 18 years in Sweden, I sold my house, I sold my business and moved to Turkey with my 7 year old daughter. I always said I wanted to send my daughter to school in Turkey. We could hardly remain there for 6 months because of her. Every day was such a challenge to take her to school. She insisted we come back to Sweden, and I caved in. But now I’ll be retired. And when I do I won’t stay here. The kids will be done with school. They can stay if they want. I will leave.”*

### **FATMA**

Fatma is another relentless social remitter and an avoider. She looks all the way back to her childhood to make sense of the reasons why.

*“I’ve known at a very early age that I was not normal. That is ‘normal’ in Izmir. I’ve tried with everything I got to find a way but it was simply impossible. As a lesbian woman in a conservative family and society, there was absolutely no way for me to reconcile with them. I was depressed for a good 20 years with this secret. There was no way to talk to anyone; there was no way to start living my real life. There was only starting over. I only wanted to go somewhere, anywhere.”*

She has moved to Sweden 12 years ago and married her current wife. The personal ties of her past in family, childhood friends, neighbours and relatives are largely cut through. However a correlational assumption that she would engage in weaker social remittances holds completely incorrect.

*“I might not have much personal connection to Turkey. But I’ve never stopped being of Turkey. I live my life here but I think and I act for Turkey.”*

The reasons that made her conclude her birthplace was unliveable are the exact same reasons behind an incredible amount of effort and time she spares to connect with the very same place. She speaks proudly of her website, dedicated to LGBT issues in Turkish that she, by herself manages voluntarily.

*“Not being able to live there doesn’t mean not wishing to live there. I don’t mean that I want to move back, but I want to contribute to its change so that it’s liveable for others. So I’m constantly collecting LGBT news and videos, I translate them from Swedish and English to Turkish, I make subtitles for them, I engage in discussions with people who comment on them. It is magical really to touch so many lives. Last year I had around 97,000 people looking at my site. Okay, maybe they aren’t all reading it thoroughly, but I feel like I’ve sat down and talked with 97,000 people. And I go to bed with a smile on my face every night. “*

Fatma has not started her website right after she made it to Sweden. She says the first 9 years she was more concentrated on getting used to be able to enjoy her life. However, at some point her freedoms, that she realises not shared by many others living in Turkey, have become an urge to contribute to change at a mass level.

*“Last 3 years, I go to bed and I wake up with this agenda in my mind. I tell myself, ‘Okay Fatma, last Sunday you went to a picnic, this Sunday you will sit down and translate and subtitle a video.’. Some days when I have only 15 minutes to spare, I find someone on the internet who commented on LGBT issues in Turkey, I respond to their comments so that they could follow me and find my site. And I tell myself: ‘Okay, you’ve done at least one thing for change today’.”*

Fatma has organised her ability to create a constant flow of social remittances to change the things that had made her leave. The scale of this flow is gigantic compared to social remittances at an interpersonal level thanks to its organisation and the passion that drives the remitter. Apart from the website, she has also organised her friends in Sweden to contact and

contribute to an independent documentary movie being shot by personal funds and experiences about parents with LGBT children in Turkey. Without her in the equation, some of the the connections that have been built between Turkish and Swedish LGBT people and organisations would have most probably ceased to exist.

### *DICLE*

The claim that suggests avoiders not having to comply to a correlational assumption that would require them to remit less, does not intend to make the opposite mistake of turning the tables yet still homogenise the entire group. Avoiders like Mustafa and Fatma might indeed cause impressive levels of social remittance flows. These social remittances tend to revolve around the original problems that had driven them away in the first place. However, the reasons that seem to be sufficiently severe to drive someone away might lose their significance in a new environment.

Dicle, is not a mere immigrant from Turkey who happens to be Kurdish. She defines herself as such consciously and also has Kurdish as her mother tongue. However she believes it is wrong to label this personal definition as ‘ethnic’, and argues that it is rather ‘political’.

*“Being Kurdish in Turkey has always been a problem for me back home. It didn’t matter that I lived in Izmir, it didn’t matter that I spoke Turkish pretty well. None of these have stopped the problems for me on being Kurdish, on not being allowed to speak Kurdish. It was hard. I felt the constant pressure. You feel the pressure constantly because the issue is constantly discussed. And when it is, you just can’t get to slip yourself away. You belong to that problematic group that is always discussed. You can’t slip away because you can speak Turkish well. Maybe you’ll fool others, but you always carry around the inner conflict. Here in Sweden for instance, how to go to space is a problem (she smiles in irony) and there in Turkey being a Kurd is a problem.”*

Her look and political stance in Turkey has made her believe not only the pressure was unliveable but also it was dangerous. So she sought another venue to exist. She has made her way into Sweden through commercial deals she engaged in, however this was only a way for securing her residence permit. Otherwise she does not financially fare better than before. Nonetheless she leads a less stressful life with regards to her concerns back home.

*“The Kurds have always had troubles, the problem is that they’ve always been a hot issue. This is true all the way from my childhood. Therefore I felt this very much. And Sweden*

*helped me much about this. Not because it's Sweden, but because it's not Turkey. I used to be a highly political character in Turkey. And I mean highly! But I somehow stopped this in Sweden. I have problems here too about being a migrant. But I've lived all these in Turkey as a Kurd, and I'm very bored of it. I've sat down and think on these issues for years. And now I'm going to sit down and think over being a migrant? Kurd in Turkey, migrant in Sweden, and then what?"*

I ask her what she means.

*"I mean... Being Kurdish was something of utmost importance, something that I advertised greatly in Turkey. I was constantly talking about it, advocating it, supporting it. When I came to Sweden I stepped outside of 'being a Kurd', because I don't feel the same pressure. When I'm asked where I'm from, I end up responding 'I'm Turkish' sometimes. I don't always feel the necessity to specifically say 'I am from Turkey'. Here, you get to be more objective really. You understand the importance of not making mistakes that could cost you your life, or that politics isn't necessarily always ethical."*

As such, Dicle has stripped herself from her previous concerns to a degree. This transformation has affected the type and scale of her social remittances. She is highly in contact with a large family and an even larger group of friends, and makes frequent trips to visit them up to four times a year. Even though her arrival to Sweden categorises her as an avoider, the process of distancing oneself with the original reasons to avoid pushes her to remit like a pursuer. This entails the type of remitted ideas, norms and behaviours as her main remittances revolve around her social problems in Sweden, and also their scale as she is transferring these social goods only to family and friends at an interpersonal level. More interestingly, this process makes her encounter a familiar problem of non-reception as other pursuers tend to address.

*"I'm talking about Sweden to everyone back home! Always bad! Nobody believes me, and absolutely nobody is affected. They all think it's heaven here. They don't believe you! I mean they sit down and listen to you. They of course don't think you're lying to them or anything. They don't perceive all this information as lies, but a minute later all is completely lost on them. They keep believing that everything is perfect here. So I'm talking about Sweden all the time, and I talk about the negative mostly, but nobody is affected."*

## MEHMET

As the hypothesis for this research argued the irrelevancy of correlational assumptions within the social remittance literature instead of their inaccuracy, some very valuable data was sought to show a wide range of social remitter avoiders. Along those who remit social goods at a mass scale with a clear agenda, there are those who distance themselves with the original reasons to avoid and start echoing pursuer characteristics and complaints with regards to their social remittances. However there are also those who indeed would comply with the original correlational assumptions. Mehmet is one such example.

Mehmet has escaped Turkey in an attempt to avoid persecution for his political crimes. He's been in Sweden for 29 years, however he's been around before.

*"We escaped to Syria with the 'Revolutionary Way' and then went on to Lebanon. We stayed with the Palestinians there. International revolutionism and what not... The next plan was to sneak back into Turkey through the Black Sea. Then the Israel-Palestine War started, the 1982 War was really serious. We didn't have a place to take shelter anymore. We went back to Syria to Damascus for another 6 months. However it became obvious that we weren't going to be able to go to Turkey. And that's how we came to Sweden."*

Mehmet shrugs his shoulders reminiscing he did not have a choice, that they simply had to avoid the junta regime at all costs. It is obvious that he had to spend a good deal of time and effort in acquiring the skills to keep him alive, that is to say away from his homeland.

*"When I made it to Sweden I didn't know a soul. But they taught us everything in Palestine. They taught us how to make passports, how to print money, how to make a bomb out of shit. There were Soviet instructors to teach these, who came from Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. So we were able to make really good passports. All you needed was a file and a potato."*

Mehmet is a most obvious avoider considering the fears that drove him away, the clear lack of will to pursue life anywhere else for better opportunities, and on top of everything the official status of a political refugee. After making it into Sweden, Mehmet gains his political refugee status in a short time. He wasn't able to set foot to Turkey for the first 22 years of his stay. Only last 7 years he has been visiting his family members annually, some of which he does not get along well with. He thinks, throughout the years he spent in Sweden, he is individualised, and does not have much to do with what happens back home, as those at 'home' does not hold much connection to him either.

*“Now I only go to Turkey like a tourist. I do what a tourist does. Those at home do not wonder what I have to say about Sweden. They wonder if I have money. I don’t have much connection to them. So many friends of mine died. All the people I loved are dead. Coming to Sweden had only one advantage for me and that’s surviving itself. Otherwise it isolated me. Disorganisation is like being a fish out of the sea. Your mouth open...You don’t get to do anything. “*

As Mehmet shows an obvious detachment to his homeland, his social remittances are kept to a minimum, let alone having a clear agenda for collective remittances of social goods. As he points out the disorganised state he had found himself to become has also distanced him to the infrastructure and channels through which some social remittances flow at a mass level. He has accepted that detachment and feels this is the way it will ever be.

*“I swear I can’t go back. After 30 years, it’s just not possible. You can’t really get involved with home from here either. I mean what are you even going to do? Are you going to organise the Swedes? Are you going to march them to Turkey to change anything? Is that even possible?”*

Mehmet would be the only avoider among the people participated in this research that would echo the original assumptions as put forward by Levitt. As assumed, he does remit significantly less than pursuers since his ties with Turkey were severely cut. However, there is a range of possibilities within this heterogeneous group of people where that severe cut of ties only fuels the passion, effort and level of organisation to drastically enlarge social remittances, where it renders the reasons invalid therefore altering the type and scale of the remitted social goods, or where it successfully minimises them to next to nothing as Mehmet’s apathy serves as an example.

## ***AVOIDER ANALYSIS***

### **COLLECTIVE SOCIAL REMITTANCES**

The very first and most important finding of the avoider data was the expected irrelevancy of the original correlational assumptions. Having avoided the conditions at the sending communities does not automatically translate to weaker levels of social remittances. The scale of the flow of social goods remitted by avoiders might as well be greater than, or equal to pursuer remittances. Similarly to the financial remittances literature, a greater efficiency of collective remittances was also a clear finding.

The avoiders that tend to remit at significantly higher levels than pursuers did so through collective channels. They derived the ideas, norms and behaviours that they would remit collectively as well as engaging in its transportation collectively, and aim for masses or general social change in their destinations. Mustafa's involvement in radio programmes, newspapers, working and succeeding in sending an official Human Right's Commission to the Diyarbakir prison in Turkey, Fatma's website where she reaches tens of thousands of people, her efforts to mobilise individuals and institutions in Sweden for social change in Turkey, her contributions to a documentary film project are all prime examples of these collective remittances. The scale of this flow of collective remittances is incomparably great to interpersonal level remittances that tend to be employed by pursuers.

#### AVODIER BY ORIGIN / PURSUER BY ACTION

The process of defining a migrant as an avoider or a pursuer relies solely on the origins of leaving one's country. Attempting to avoid or pursue anything lies with the reasons why someone decides to leave. One of the important findings of this study is the necessity to understand the subtleties that surround a specific migrant while keeping the structural forces as frames of reference. Dicle was a good example of these subtleties.

She was an avoider by origin, yet found to be acting like a pursuer through a complex process of transformation and distancing with the original problems. Her case, firstly aided in showing that the correlational assumptions might not hold as this transformation definitely did not mean remittances at a weaker level on her part than pursuers. On the contrary, the flow of social goods that she engaged in strongly resembled to the pursuer social remittances in their scale, nature, and perception. Having somewhat switched to be a pursuer by action, she also remitted at an interpersonal level, did not have a clear agenda for social change, and constantly met with familiar defence mechanisms in the perception of her remitted ideas, norms and behaviours.

#### DIVERSITY

The diverse ways that the avoiders engage in social remittance activity underlines the importance of understanding the subtleties within this group. Mehmet's participation in the research as the only avoider to comply with the original correlational assumptions was valuable in order to show how vast a spectrum that the avoiders might range at. The existence of refugees with virtually no flow of social goods; obvious avoiders distancing themselves with the problems that made them leave and remit at a very similar level to pursuers; and

others causing social remittances of a calibre that requires a huge amount of investment in both time and labour is proof enough to make up for this diversity.

## V. LIMITATIONS

One of the main limitations that surfaced in this study was to deal with the generational question. By definition working with avoiders and pursuers presupposed intent. First comers were rather easy to be determined as having pursued or avoided certain conditions. However second generation migrants, like Ayse, have lacked the opportunity to decide for themselves to stay or go, they simply were born to their families' choices or obligations. Although Ayse, as a second generation migrant, remitted like a pursuer at an interpersonal level, facing resistance, the main quest to test if the avoiders remit less/weaker than the pursuers had to be carried out among first generation migrants. Even though it is important to acknowledge this limitation, the original assumptions, that were to be tested, were obviously made within this paradigm.

Another limitation was working with binaries of avoiders and pursuers. Regardless of the academic interest to clarify a presupposed dichotomy (therefore having to work with the same dichotomy) it must be noted that such a clear-cut view restricts a full comprehension of the complex web of migrants and their social remittances. This is why, having answered the last research question in this study has only become satisfactory for the researcher with a constant need of reminding the audience of the diversity and the flexibility within these binaries.

## VI. CONCLUSION

### REVISITING THE CASE STUDY MODEL

At this point after the presentation and the analysis of the data gathered through CDA and semi-structured interviews, we shall revisit the prospective 'crucial case' status of the Swedish-Turkish social remittance experiences. The case at hand indeed surfaces as a crucial case as initially expected.

The findings of the CDA on the TRF anti-terror rally improve the validity of the social remittance theory with regards to the embedded normative concerns. Migrants and migrant organisations do not necessarily remit positive social goods to their sending communities. This is to say that the social remittances might as well be nonbeneficial or detrimental to the

social development goals back home. Therefore all remitted social goods are neither derived from a positive pool of ideas, norms and behaviours, nor must they reflect the dominant ideologies of the hosting community.

Adversely, the findings of the semi-structured interviews downgrade the validity of the relating side of the social remittance theory. Avoiders do not automatically socially remit in a weaker manner than pursuers. Within a complex web of relations their contributions to the flow of ideas, norms and behaviours might be very much similar to those of pursuers. More importantly these contributions might as well be of incomparable sizes to interpersonal level pursuer remittances thanks to the deliberate, organised and collective nature they might possess. Therefore the assumptions that foresee weaker levels of avoider social remittances are undermined, creating a challenge for the validity of the social remittance theory. In return, this very challenge serves to be the second argument that makes the Swedish-Turkish case a crucial case, with hopes of contributing to the future of the theory. As the researcher of this study I bear the responsibility that comes together with the interpretation of the research findings. With that in mind, I rely on my belief to have presented a verifiable set of data for the prospective audience to agree with the interpretation or otherwise.

## **OTHER RESULTS**

Apart from reaching to answers for the targeted questions, other results have also surfaced along the way. One of the fundamental findings that was not deliberately sought for in this research was the flexibility of the network where ideas, norms, and behaviours of the migrant community is produced. The underlying factor here is that migrant communities do not necessarily derive the social goods that they would remit from what is available to them in the host communities. This manifests itself in TRF's importing Turkish national policies to their migrant destination, and remitting them back to further obstruct resolution in homeland politics. The phenomenon is also visible at an interpersonal level. Many of the pursuers did not derive their most remitted social goods from what is available to them in Sweden, but rather from what is not available to them. Exclusion, xenophobic and racist sentiments in the host countries, language barriers, loneliness or even one's becoming aware to one's sending country's realities elsewhere can all be other types of sources for this indirect process of idea, norm and behaviour production.

Another welcomed outcome of this research was the realisation of a clear pattern of resistance in the sending communities to social goods remitted from outside. Ignoring the

flow of values from outside or quarantining them to only those who carry the foreign *vices* with them emerge as strategies that sending communities employ for that resistance. Moreover this pattern was observed largely in pursuer type individual social remittances as opposed to collective ones.

A third finding worthy to reiterate is the fluidity of borders when it comes to categorise and cage people in binaries. The existence of avoiders who gradually have lost connection with the reasons that pushed them to avoid what is back home and therefore started echoing pursuer characteristics is a prime example. Even though understanding some patterns to challenge a validity of a theory is clearly beneficial, the plasticity of borders must be kept in mind in order to fully appreciate the diversity amongst groups.

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
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## APPENDIX

**Appendix A:** Inward remittances to Turkey compared to inward remittances to all Upper-Middle Income Countries, and to the Euro area.

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### Appendix B: TRF ANTI-TERROR RALLY ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT

Sunucu: Sevgili arkadaşlarım, sevgili gençler... Şimdi sizlere hitap etmek üzere İsvec Türk İsci Dernekleri Federasyonu Genel Başkanı Sayın Hasan Dolek Bey kardesimi arz ediyorum. Buyurun efendim.

Hasan Dolek: Hepimizin bugün hakkıdır eve donduktan sonra, mahallenize gittikten sonra, akşam camiye vardikten sonra bugün buraya gelmeyenlerin yakasını pacasını yırtmak. Yapın onu! Bugün sizin hakkınızdır her şeyi yapmak. Bugün mahallenizde arkadaşlarınız, dostlarınız isimiz vardı, gücümüz vardı, gidemedik, oruçtu, niyazdı, yağmur yağdı, kar vardı, kıs vardı, güneş vardı diyenlerin yakasını pacasını yırtın! Hak ettiler!

Değerli arkadaşlar, bugün burada sadece PKK terörünü lanetlemek için burada değiliz. Norvec'teki terörü, İsvec'teki terörü, dünyanın her tarafındaki, İspanya'daki ETA terörünü, İngiltere'deki IRA terörünü ve hepsinden önce Türkiye'deki PKK terörünü lanetlemek için burdayız.

Değerli kardeslerim, değerli kardeslerim... Avrupa ve Avrupa basını bir konuda kendini artık düzeltmesi lazım. Kendisini eğitmesi lazım. Hiçbir zaman, hiçbir zaman biz PKK terörünü

gerilla olarak gormedik. Gormeyecegiz de! Avrupa basini, PKK'ya artik gazetelerinde, mecmualarinda gerilla, kurtulusu orgutu demekten vazgecmelidir. PKK hicbir zaman gerilla olmamistir. PKK her zaman terror orgutu olmustur. Ve goruyorsunuz terror Norvec'i vurdu dun. Daha onceki gunler Isvec'i vurdu. Daha onceki gunler Ispanya'yi, Ingiltere'yi, Fransa'yi vurdu. Yani terror sadece bizim gibi musluman ulkelerine, Turkiye'ye has bir olay degil. O yuzden Avrupalilar da bizimle beraber birlikte olmalidirlar. Sebebine gelince bakiyorum sadece bize destek veren Dogu Turkistan'dan gelen kardeslerimiz var, Azerbaycan'dan gelen dostlarımız var, Kuzey Irak'tan gelen Turkmen kardeslerimiz var, Balkanlar'dan, Kafkaslar'dan, Turkiye'den gelen kardesler var ve Somalili bacilarimiz var. Yani burda gonul isterdi ki Isvecliler, Isvecli dostlarımız da olsun. Dunyanin her tarafindan her renk insan olsun. Terorun rengi, irki, dili, dini olmaz. Terror terordur. Iste Turkiye'de goruyoruz. Onlarca gencimiz son 45-50 gun icerisinde, 19-20 yasinda bunlar arkadaslar, 19-20 yasinda gencler. Bunlardan bir tanesi de sizlerin yakinindaki kardesleri, yegenleri, kuzenleri, cocuklari olabilirdi. Gerci orada sehit olanlar hepsi bizim cocugumuz ama... Ates dustugu yeri yakar arkadaslar! O yuzden birlik ve beraberlik olma zamanidir. Terore hayir mitingleri genelde 1-2 gun icerisinde hazirlanir. Gunlerce hazirlik yapilmaz. Gunlerce hazirlik yapamayiz. Gunlerce hangi gun olsun, hangi saat olsun, karda mi kista mi olsun tartisamayiz. O yuzden demir tavinda dovulur. 2 gun icerisinde organize olunur, ve mitingler yapilir. Sizlerden rica ediyorum. Bu isvec'teki, Isvec tarihindeki ikinci terore hayir mitingimiz. Bundan sonra devami gelecek arkadaslar. Insallah terror Turkiye'de ve dunyada durur, biz devamini getirmeyiz. Farkli mitingler yapariz. Ama eger, terror durmayacaksa bizler de mitinglerimize devam edecegiz.

Arkadaslar son olarak, Isvec hukumeti de ayagini denk almasi lazim. Bakiniz PKK'yi destekleyen devletler sagimizda solumuzda mevcut. Bugun Stokholm'de sadece biz miting yapmiyoruz. Bizim gibi sehrin baska taraflarinda PKK terror orgutunu destekleyenler de miting yapıyor. Ne diye, onlar da Turk hukumetini, Turk hukumetinin almıs olduğu ozverili karari elestirmek istiyorlar. Nedir bu karar? Turkiye ne yapıyor kac gundur? Turkiye sinirlarinin icerisinde olan tecavuzu engellemek icin sinirlarinin disinda, yani Kuzey Irak'taki mevcudu kurutmaya calisiyor. Hakli davasini yurutmeye calisiyor. O yuzden biz de buradayiz. Biz de Isvec hukumetini bu terror orgutunun derneklerini, evlerini, ocaklarini kapatmadigi icin de kiniyoruz bir kez daha.

Hepinize, gelenlere tekrar tekrar tesekkür ediyorum. Hepinizden helallik istiyorum, hakkinizi helal edin. Bir cogunuz orucsunuz buradasiniz, Allah karsiligini obur tarafta fazla fazla verecek. Emin olun, sagolun, var olun.

Sunucu: Sayin Baskan Hasan Dolek'e cok tesekkür ediyoruz. Degerli kardeslerim yine diyorum...

Uzman Cavus.... (tek tek catismada hayatini kaybeden askerlerin adi okunuyor)

Katilimcilar: Burda!

### **Appendix C: TRF ANTI-TERROR RALLY TRANSCRIPT (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)**

Presenter: Dear friends, dear youth... Now I give you Mr Hasan Dolek , Chairman for Sweden Turkey Swedish Turkish Worker's Federation. Here he is.

Hasan Dolek: Today, when we go back to our homes, when we go back to our neighbourhoods, when we arrive in our mosques it is our right to find who was not here today. Find them and tear their shirts, tear their pants! Do that! Today it's within your right to do as you wish! Today, find everyone and ask them why they didn't come to the rally. Find those that claim being busy, not being able, who claim that they fasted or they prayed, that it rained, or it snowed, it was winter or there was sun, find them and tear their shirts, tear their pants! They have deserved it!

Dear friends, today we're not here to only condemn the PKK terrorism. We're here to condemn the terrorism in Norway, in Sweden, all around the work, the ETA terrorism in Spain, the IRA terrorism in England and before all else to condemn the PKK terrorism in Turkey.

Dear brothers and sisters... Europe and European media must correct itself on one issue. They must educate themselves. We have never, ever considered the PKK terrorism as guerrilla. And we shall never consider it so! European media must give up referring to PKK in its newspapers, and its magazines as guerrilla or a liberation front. PKK has never been guerrilla. PKK has always been a terrorist organisation. And you see, terrorism hit Norway yesterday. It hit Sweden in days prior. It hit Spain, England, France before that. I mean terrorism does not pertain to Muslim countries like ours, it doesn't pertain to Turkey. That's why Europeans must act together with us. You know why? I look around and there are our brothers from Eastern Turkestan, there are our friends from Azerbaijan, Turkmen brothers

who come from Northern Iraq, brothers from the Balkans, Caucasus, Turkey and sisters from Somalia. One wishes to see the Swedes, our Swedish friends here too. One wishes to see people from all around the world in all colours. Terrorism has no colour, race, language, religion. Terror is terror. We see it in Turkey. Tens of our young men in the last 45-50 days... These are 19-20 year old young men my friend, 19-20 year old young men. One of them could have been your brother, your nephew, cousin, child. Although, all those who have been martyred are our children. An ember burns where it falls! That's why it is time for unity and solidarity. Anti-terror rallies are generally prepared in 1-2 days. You don't prepare for many days. We cannot prepare for many days. We can discuss for days on what day to do it, what hour, what weather. We must strike when the iron is hot. We organise in 2 days, and do the rally. I ask of you. This is our second anti-terror rally in Sweden, in Swedish history. The rest will follow, my friends. If god permits, terror will stop in Turkey and in the world, then we'll stop our rallies. We'll rally for other things. But if terror continues, then we continue with our rallies.

Friends, lastly, the Swedish government must watch its steps. Look, PKK supporter states are right and left. Today, it is not only us who rally in Stockholm. There are other rallies in the city like ours that support the PKK terrorist organisation. Why? They want to criticise the Turkish government, Turkish government's selfless decision. What is this decision? What does Turkey do nowadays? Turkey is trying to exterminate the supply outside of its territory in Northern Iraq, to prevent the border violations inside its territory. It is defending its rightful cause. That's why we are here. Once again, we condemn the Swedish government for not closing down the institutions, the houses, the associations of this terrorist organisation.

I thank you all again and again, to those of you who came. I want your blessings, give me your blessings. Most of you are fasting today. Know that God will pay you back many times over on the other side. Bu sure of it. Thank you, may you live long.

Presenter: We deeply thank the Chairman Hasan Dolek. Dear brothers and sisters...

Speacialist Sergeant ..... (here, names of the Turkish army soldiers who have lost their lives in recent conflicts are called out one by one)

Ralliers (Chant all together after every name is read): Here!

## **Appendix D: INTERVIEW GUIDE**

## GENERAL QUESTIONS

- 1- What is your name?
- 2- How old are you?
- 3- When did you migrate to Sweden?

## AVOIDER/PURSUER RELATED QUESTIONS

- 4- How and why did you migrate to Sweden?
- 5- How were your life conditions before?
- 6- How are they now?
- 7- What has changed in your ideas, behaviours, norms during your time in Sweden?
- 8- Have you experienced any political/cultural/social changes?
- 9- What do you think would be different if you haven't migrated to Sweden?

## SOCIAL REMITTANCES RELATED QUESTIONS

- 10- Who are you in contact with in Sweden? How? How often?
- 11- Who are you in contact with in Turkey? How? How often?
- 12- How frequently do you visit Turkey?
- 13- How do you compare Sweden and Turkey?
- 14- What do you mention most when talking to your friends/family back home?
- 15- Any ideas/behaviours/norms that you find to be positive in Sweden?
- 16- Can you remember any anecdotes of you talking about these?
- 17- Any ideas/behaviours/norms that you find to be negative in Sweden?
- 18- Can you remember any anecdotes of you talking about these?
- 19- In what other ways do you think you have attempted/caused a change in people's ideas/norms/behaviours in Turkey?