Sustainable Development in a

Refugee Hosting Community

- A study of hindering and facilitating factors for an INGO in the host community around the Dadaab refugee camps

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Abstract

Title	Sustainable Development in a Refugee Hosting Community. A study of hindering and facilitating factors for an INGO in the host community around the Dadaab refugee camps
University	Lunds University, Campus Helsingborg. Originally written at Aalborg University
Level	One Year Master in Service Management (Social Science)
Key words	Sustainable development, international NGO's, host community, refugees camps, Dadaab Refugee Camps, NGO management.

Background	In the surroundings of the Dadaab Refugee Camps in Kenya lives a large pastoral population under less favourable conditions than the people inside the refugee camps. Many international NGO's have started to support the hosting community, but there seems to be a lack of long term oriented development work. This project is based on a wonder over why it apparently is difficult for an international NGO to engage in long term, sustainable development directed at the host community of the camps.
Aim & Research question	The aim of the project is to shed some light on the overall issue of sustainable development in a refugee hosting community. This is done through the research question: What hinders and facilitates employment of a long term, sustainable development approach in the host community around the Dadaab refugee camps for the Danish Refugee Council?
Methodology	The study is based on internal and external documents from DRC and other bodies as well as interviews with DRC employees and an employee under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The philosophy of science for this study is critical realism.
Theory	David Lewis' conceptual framework for NGO management with the four components: (i) context, (ii) activities (iii) organisation and (iiii) relationships
Conclusion	DRC has some facilitating factors when it comes to conducting sustainable host community (HoC) work. For instance the organisations regional perspective on the Horn of Africa and the overall participatory approach it employs. However, we have found that the hindrances DRC is facing are very structural and difficult to overcome. DRC is mainly a refugee organisation and conducting successful HoC work would mean changing the organisational strategy. There are also external hindrances that are difficult for DRC to change: lack of competent partners specialised in development work and absence of a leading body. In light of these insights about hindrances, we have found reason to question whether DRC and similar refugees oriented INGOs should actually be undertaking HoC development in a setting like Dadaab.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

ADEO - African Development and Emergency Organisation

ALRMP - Arid Lands Resource Management Project

CDRD – Community Driven Recovery & Development

Danida - Danish International Development Agency (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

DRC – Danish Refugee Council

FaiDa – Fafi Integrated Development Assistance

CSO – Civil Society Organisation

GoK – Government of Kenya

HoA – Horn of Africa

HoC – Host Community

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation

ISLP – In Search of Livelihood and Protection – a report (RDE et al 2010)

NCCK – National Council of Churches of Kenya

NGDO – Non-Governmental Development Organisation

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisations

OCHA – UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

RRDO – Relief and Reconstruction Development Organisation

ROI – The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative

UNHCR – United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

1. Introduction

This chapter will present the problem area of the project and the research question with which the study was conducted. It will be ended with definition of two central terms that are used throughout the project report.

1.1 Problem area & research question

The Dadaab refugee camps have existed since 1991 when the Somali regime broke down and thousands of refugees started to cross the border into Kenya. Today almost half a million Somalis live in the now 5 Dadaab camps approximately 80 km from the Somali border in the North Eastern Kenya. The number of refugees has grown profoundly the past year (per Jan 2012) because of the severe drought that has struck The Horn of Africa (HoA) and affected the weak Somalia the hardest (RDE et al. 2010; UNHCR 2011c). Although the situation for the refugees are not pleasant and many of the newcomers are in risk of dying due to starvation, there is actually a large refugee population that lives under more favourable conditions than the surrounding host community (HoC). Many refugees have better access to water, sanitation, food, health services and education. Because of the relatively large proportion of recourses being brought into the area through UN's High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international donors and international humanitarian and development agencies, the hosting community has ended up being underdeveloped in comparison to the refugee camps (RDE et al. 2010). This has created tension between the refugees and the host community and between the international NGOs providing for the refugees and the HoC, who feel that they are not getting their 'share of the cake' (RDE et al. 2010, HAP 2010).

Due to this inequality and tension, a growing number of the international NGOs working with the refugees have started to support the HoC as well (RDE et al. 2010). But the effort does not seem to be sufficient. A newly released report, *In search of protection and livelihood* (ISLP) from 2010 published by The Royal Danish Embassy, The Norwegian Embassy and the Republic of Kenya, states that the aid work being conducted in the host community is focussed too much on humanitarian assistance and too little on development (ibid). The report stresses that a development-orientated approach is crucial in a protracted situation like the one in and around Dadaab and recommends that humanitarian and development organisations apply a long term planning approach to the HoC work. The report also calls for a more context specific development approach to the HoC area that in some way or another takes into consideration the refugees' presence (ibid).

This project is based on an "empirical wonder" over why this long term, sustainable approach is missing in the HoC intervention around Dadaab, and why it apparently is difficult for the international NGOs to engage in it. During our search for literature, both theoretical (research papers, books etc.) and less theoretical (as for instance the ISLP report), we have not come across a single piece that deals with host community development and/or what we could call the 'host community - refugee camp development nexus'. Not apart from the above mentioned report. There is clear a lack of research in this area which aroused our curiosity and this project is an attempt to gain a bit more clarity on the topic. The aim of the project is therefore to shed some light on the overall issue of sustainable development in a refugee hosting community. Through looking at one of the active Danish NGOs in the Dadaab host community, The Danish Refugee Council (DRC), we dig in to the challenges and the facilitating factors for this NGO to employ sustainable development in the specific reality of Dadaab and surroundings. This will be done through the following research question:

What hinders and facilitates employment of a long term, sustainable development approach in the host community around the Dadaab refugee camps for the Danish Refugee Council?

1.2 Definition of central terms

Host Community (HoC)

In this project host community refers to a community hosting a large number of refugees. More specifically it refers to is the area around the Dadaab Refugee Camps in Kenya's North Eastern Province. The report ISLP defines HoC as 50 km radius from the Dadaab camps (RDE et al. 2010:14), so do UNHCR (UNHCR 2010c) and DRC (Smith 2011). It is not possible for this study to operate with a clear geographical defined area due to the various data sources. Apart from sources using the 50 km definition, we have analysed development plans on national and district level in order to find out how HoC is defined and addressed. On district level we are looking at the refugee hosting counties, Garissa and Wajir, as well as the smaller districts: Fafi, Dadaab, Wajir South and Lagdera (see appendix E-F). HoC in this project is therefore referring to at least a 50 km radius or a broader area, depending on the source.

International Non-governmental Organisation (INGO)

An NGO can be defined in multiple ways; the term is very broad and ranges from small, informal, community-based groups to larger international, bureaucratic organisations (Lewis 2001:56). When dealing with a country specific context as we do in this project, it is useful to distinguish between local NGOs

(Kenyan based) and non-local NGOs working in the Kenyan setting. For the purpose of this project, we call the latter group for international NGOs (INGOs), with inspiration from Robert Dibie (2008). Local and international NGOs usually have different missions and operational methods, they work under different circumstances and are faced with different challenges (Dibie 2008:2pp). To stress that we are studying the conditions for DRC as an INGO we will use the term INGO throughout the project.

2. Methodology

In this chapter we will go through our methodological choices of research design, research strategy as well as the data and our reading of it. Before touching on the research limitations, we do a small discussion on the projects external validity.

2. 1 Research design and choice of case

This project is based on a case study of DRC's work with the HoC around the Dadaab refugee camps in the North Eastern Province of Kenya. We will be looking both at internal and external factors in order to give a holistic view of possible hindering and facilitating factors for sustainable development in this setting.

Our initial interest for the Dadaab refugee area derives from the fact that is a both relevant and ongoing case because of the current famine that has increased the number of refugees significantly, along with the fact that the refugee camps have been situated in the area for 20 years now. Hosting 460,000 refugees obviously impacts a community, and reading the report *In Search for Livelihood and Protection* further directed our attention to the lack of long term development activities for the HoC. The Dadaab case is a quite unique one. Both because Government of Kenya's (GoK) 'encampment policy' means that host population and refugees are separated which is not the most common case in refugee affected areas. But also because the Dadaab camps constitute the largest refugee camp area in the world (UNHCR 2011c).

Apart from a geographical case, the study also consists of an organisational case. DRC was chosen as the analytical focus first of all because the organisation actually works with the HoC. DRC operates with a regional perspective for the entire HoA which includes the HoC around Dadaab. We also knew from the beginning that DRC had a humanitarian as well as a development focus. From this information DRC could be expected to work towards sustainable development for the HoC and therefore constituted a suitable and interesting INGO for us to study with the purpose of digging into what could possible hinder and facilitate success. Apart from this, DRC was also a fairly 'accessible' case for us since it is a Danish organisation with the Head Office located in Copenhagen. Doing a project with a relative limited time frame, this was a clear advantage in terms of collecting data and communicating with the organisation.

2.2 Research strategy and choice of theory

We view reality as something that we as researchers are able to approach, and we believe that empery to a large extent can be taken as face value, but at the same time we acknowledge the subjective nature of any

researcher's work. Our ontological stance is therefore one of realism, but with an epistemological view that recognises the unavoidable interpretation of the researcher and subjective filter of information sources. This is in line with critical realism, which is therefore the basis of our study. Critical realism implies that no method gives indisputable knowledge about the objective reality, which means that the researcher can only come close to reality. The theoretical orientation would say that we can attain 'reason to believe' that the reality is like this or that. In order to come close to reality, it should be understood and explained through the object field's ontology (Lawson 1997 in Fuglsang & Olsen 2007:140pp). The object field is in our case DRC's work with the HoC around Dadaab and the circumstances under which they work.

David Lewis[1] whom we have used as our main theorist throughout the project fits this scientific approach well. His theoretical framework is open-ended which allows us to be context specific and approach the objective reality with respect for the object field, which is one of critical realisms key points (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005). We use Lewis model on *three inter-related areas of the NGO management challenges* as the structure of the project, and through his division of the central elements we deal with the different findings from the data.

In accordance with critical realism, our scientific method has been one of retroduction, which means looking after a 'premise' on the basis of an observed phenomenon or act (a so called 'conclusion') – in stead of the other way around (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005:61). The initial phenomenon of this project, and the 'conclusion' on which we base our wonder, is the missing development in the HoC of Dadaab. The aim of the study is to find some of the premises behind this.

2.3 Analytical process & data

Through a dialectic research process we have alternated between the empery and the theory. We started out by simultaneously reading a broad selection of empirical documents from relevant actors as well as theory on NGO management. In this dialectic process we have read and re-read documents while at the same time gaining a more thorough understanding of our theoretical field. We ended up using David Lewis' NGO management framework as a prism for the categorisation of our empery. These analytic categories are Lewis' three management areas: organisational strategy, activities and relationships and with sub-categories for each area (e.g. government, INGOs, civil society and donors under relationships). The

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[1] Lewis is professor in social policy and development at London School of Economics. He has specialized in management and development, and has a special interest in civil society and non-governmental organizations (LSE 2009)

theoretical categories allowed us to apply the empery in a meaningful and organised manner and through them we have been able locate and code the most essential parts in each document, namely the parts that could help us paint a picture of hindering and/or facilitating factors for DRC and sustainable development work within each sub-category. After having collected and coded the documents we found that there was a need for complementing the data with interviews. Interviews were conducted with three representatives from DRC and one from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From communicating with various DRC employees in Denmark we realised that the majority of information on Dadaab issues lies in the regional office in Kenya. We tried hard to get in contact with more employees at the Kenyan offices, but with no luck. As with the interviews, the access to documents has also been a determining factor for what could actually be studied (more on this is the list below).

All texts (texts in a broad sense, both documents and interviews) have been analysed with the method of content analysis. The focus has been on the actual content which means that we that we have tried to remain loyal to the texts rather than over-interpreting them and that we are not going into the underlying structures of the language. Instead we have focused on a more practical interpretation layer and dug into what the actual information in the texts tell us about how internal aspects of DRC and contextual circumstances constitute hindering or facilitating factors. We are aware that in every reading of a document there will be a certain amount of interpretation which according to critical realists is an unavoidable factor for any researcher (Fuglsang & Olsen 2007:140pp). Critical realism advocates that the object field should be analysed with the most suitable method for that specific object field (cf. ibid). We have therefore chosen to focus on the analytical layers that give us the best outset for answering the research question.

The different texts – documents and interviews - have played together in what is called a *triangulation*. This method is suitable for case studies since it provides the case with data in a variety of forms which in turn gives the researcher a base for verifying the reliability of the information/knowledge (Tritter 1995 in O'Donoghue & Punch 2003:78). It is also helpful when researchers, as in our case, wish to give a holistic perspective on a case. As Tritter puts it: *"...by combining different perceptions of the same event (...)* [one can] *provide a more robust and holistic picture"* (ibid). Many of the areas we have studied were difficult to gather information on (civil society strength, government willingness etc.) and therefore triangulation has been a useful tool for us, as it has allowed us to draw on different sources in order to come as close to reality as possible under the given time frame for gathering data and our possibilities for accessing information.

Here follows a list of the analysed texts.

Strategic documents from DRC (in brackets is the abbreviation we will be using throughout the project)*:*

- *Vision, mission and value compass of DRC in 'Vision, Values and Standards'; Mandate in 'Humanitarian Accountability Framework for DRC'; '10 operations principles' and Assistance Framework of DRC' in 'DRC's Programme Handbook 2008' and 'Rights Based Approach Folder'.*
These documents are public and can be found on DRC's homepage. They are dealing with DRC's operational tools, values and principles. The documents are primarily used to analyse the overall organisational strategy of DRC.

- *Programme proposal to Danida for Horn of Africa 2009-11 (the Danida Proposal) and Strategic Programme Document for the Horn of Africa & Yemen 2012-14 (the Strategic Programme).* Both documents are internal and kindly handed out by DRC. These documents are helping us analysing DRC's activities in Kenya. As it has not been possible for us to get hold of any status reports or dig deeper into how the activities are actually carried out through field studies, the two planning documents is the foundation on which we draw conclusions on facilitators or hindrances within DRC's own Kenya/HoA programme. These conclusions are therefore based on DRC's intentions and strategic planning more than the actual carrying out of the activities.

Documents from governments and other actors:

- *In search for livelihood and protection, 2010* (ISLP): This report is the source of our initial wonder and inspiration of the study as made clear in 1.1. It is also used as a source of information about the contextual circumstances in the Dadaab area. As the study of the report is carried out by an independent consultant on behalf of the Danish and Norwegian embassy and is based on extensive empirical data from the area, we see no reason to doubt the reliability of this source and take its information as face value.

- *Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, Follow up Mission Report*, 2010 *(HAP-report).* The same goes for this report. It is an evaluation report of work carried out by different actors, among them DRC, following the Humanitarian Accountability Principles in the Dadaab camps and HoC. It is based on field work and provided us with valuable information about DRC's work in Dadaab as well as the general agency work in the area.

- *Denmark-Kenya partnership strategy for development cooperation 2006-2010:* This document is mainly used as a source of information about the circumstances for undertaking development work in Kenya. It is published by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Danida[2].

- *UNHCR status papers.* Providing information on the current situation in Dadaab.

- *Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI):* This document is published by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida and describes the guiding principles and strategic framework for Danish development assistance. We have used the document to analyse Danida's principles for donating.

- *Vision 2030 First Medium Term Plan 2008-2012.* This is a strategic document from GoK which we use to analyse GoK's intentions and strategies for development.

- *UNDP Country Programme Action Plan from 2009.* Used to analyse UNDP's strategies for development in Kenya.

- *Homepages of NGOs, INGOs and UN bodies.* Providing information on the organisation's strategies, mandate etc.

Interviews

- *Interviewee nr 1 (**from now on called Samberg)**:* DRC employee in Denmark that has previously worked with the Horn of Africa. Oral face to face interview on the 5th of December 2011 at DRC's Head Office in Copenhagen. Ca. 45 min.

- *Interviewee nr 2 (**from now on called Rosendahl**):* DRC employee in Denmark currently working with the Horn of Africa and donors for Horn of Africa. Oral face to face interview on the 6th of December 2011 at DRC's Head Office. Unfortunately the interview was conducted rather spontaneously and we did not know his title or actual job area prior to the interview which limited the possibilities for asking relevant questions. Ca. 25 min

- *Interviewee nr 3 (**from now on called Smith**):* DRC employee in Kenya with information on the host community work. E-mail-interview (see appendix D). Unfortunately, we came to know about his job title and this interviewee's existence rather late in the process. An e-mail-interview was the best option at that moment, but we received the answers only one week prior to hand in of the project. Therefore we did not have the time to fully incorporate the information in the report.

- *Interviewee nr 4 (**from now on called Madsen):*** Employee at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UM). Telephone interview on the 2nd of December. A very relevant source as she possessed

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[2] The Danish International Development Agency (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs). For the Swedish reader: This is the Danish version of SIDA.

information about the Dadaab context as well as Danida – which is an important donor for DRC. Ca. 35 min.

Since one of the interviewees wished to be anonymous we have chosen to anonymise all of the interviewees. We are aware that this is compromising the transparency of the data collection, but the information we could get from this interviewee was invaluable and difficult to access in another way. We do not think that the fact that the sources are anonymous influence the validity of the project or the conclusions. We as researchers know who all the interviewees are and what their job titles are, and we have of course taken this information into account when analysing the data.

The interviews were carried out with help from individual interview guides (see appendix A-D), and conducted in a semi-structured way. The advantage of this kind of interview structure is that it allowed us to do up-following and clarifying questions (Cf. Kvale 2009:133,159) which suited the study well. Partly because we did not know exactly what kind of information the respondent would be able to provide us with prior to the interview and partly because the purpose of the interviews was to get a clear as possible understanding on a range of different areas; mainly general information on DRC's work in the Dadaab area, relationships with the different stakeholders in the context and the respondent's view on HoC intervention.

Two of the telephone interviews were recorded after having cleared this with the interviewee. The interviews were not transcribed but listened to during the process of analysing short time after they were conducted. We do not think the lack of transcription is problematic for the validity of the analysis since we never intended to do an in-depth language analysis of the respondents' answers. The interesting thing in this kind of study is what was said and not how it was said.

2.4 External validity

A study's validity should, according to critical realism, be measured by its 'explanatory power' in relation to the research question. What should be explained is the empirical matter (the previous mentioned phenomenon or 'conclusion') that initiated the study (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005:58). Our investigation of DRC's work in the HoC of Dadaab will have a strong explanatory power when it comes to DRC's specific hindering and facilitating factors for conducting sustainable development work in the HoC around Dadaab. The fact that the empirical phenomenon of missing development in HoC of Dadaab[3] is not specific for DRC but a general observation for the area suggests that the findings also have a certain degree of explanatory

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[3] As stated in ISLP (RDE et al. 2010)

power in connection to hindering and facilitating factors for other INGOs working in the Dadaab setting. As we are not only analysing the internal elements of DRC but also the broader context of the geographical case - e.g. the different actors operating in the area - our findings are not only relevant for DRC but also for other development agencies working in the same setting.

For critical realists the impact of the context is crucial for the understanding of *how* general conclusions the researcher can make on the investigated material (Lawson 1997 in Fuglsang & Olsen 2007:149). As Dadaab is a quite unique case and our study is very context specific, the findings can not be generalised to all settings with a host community-refugee issue but are linked to the specific Dadaab setting.

2.5 Research limitations

This project is not a typical in-depth case study, as it serves more as an overall view on the issue. We are aware that we have not been able to paint a thorough picture within each of Lewis' areas (more on this in the theoretical framework) with the help of the data we have accessed and used. The aim of this project is instead to give a holistic picture of different hindering and facilitating factors for sustainable development work in the Dadaab HoC for a specific INGO working in the setting. The findings have opened up for additional questions on the issue[4], and this way our study may serve as a pre-study to further and more in-depth research of the tendencies and mechanism mapped out in this report.

We are aware that Kenya's invasion in Somalia October 2011 has a significant impact on the conditions in the Dadaab area. Because of limited time and because it is beyond the scope of this project to go into depth with such a complex element, this incident and the consequences was left out of the project.

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[4] See *Reflections* 6.3

3. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter we will start out by defining our understanding of long term sustainable development as well as what is understood as sustainable development in the specific context of the Dadaab HoC. David Lewis' NGO management framework, which will constitute the structure of the project report, will then be presented, and each area of the framework - organisation, activities and relationships - will be 'unfolded' with concern to what it means for sustainable development.

3.1 Long term sustainable development

Defining development is not an easy task as it is a both slippery and much contented term (Lewis 2001, Edwards 1999). David Lewis defines development as: *"deliberate efforts to secure positive changes in people's quality of life in economic, political and social terms"* (Lewis 2011:67). In this definition, development is not explicitly pointed out as having a long term perspective. However development is often seen as having long term objectives in contrast to humanitarian work. Lewis himself states that development is inherently long termed whereas relief is acute response to disasters with lifesaving as the foremost important goal and distribution of recourses as the means (Lewis 2011:67). Michael Edwards captures both the material relief and the more long term perspective, namely a change in people's (the receivers) ability, when he defines development as *"the reduction of material want and the enhancement of peoples' ability to live a life they consider good..."* (Edward 1999:4). A change in people's ability can also be considered a sign of *sustainability* in the aid actions, something that is often not a (possible) aim of humanitarian work. In line with Edward's notion of abilities, David Korten focuses on capabilities of people in his definition of development. But he also takes it one step further:

> *"Development is a process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce **sustainable** and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations."*

> (Korten 1990 in Carley & Christie 2000:27, emphasis added).

Where Edwards touches on the notion of sustainability, Korten spells it out explicitly in his definition; to him development is actions that create *sustainable* improvements. It is precisely the word sustainable, that we have devoted ourselves to in this project. The term sustainability is often used in environmental contexts. This also goes for 'sustainable development' which is often used in the definition presented by the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), better known as the Brundtland

Commission. Here sustainable development means *"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs"* (UN 1987). As we have a management perspective to the issue, our approach to sustainability will be a bit narrower, which means not so much concerned with future generations, but more with an NGO's ability to manage its activities in a way that is sustainable for the community in which they work. Here, Alan Fowlers definition is useful: *"To be sustainable, benefits of external inputs must be generated from change in economic, social, political, environmental and other processes – which continue once external assistance withdraws"* (Fowler 1997:162). In this definition, sustainability is present if the actions of a given actor create a change that is viable beyond its own presence in the community. Fowler goes on by saying that in order to achieve sustainability, the activities of the development NGO (NGDO) must *"...merge into ongoing processes rather than clearly stand apart from them"* (Fowler 1997:163). NGO work is a sum of mutable efforts from many actors, he argues (ibid). This underlines another of Fowlers points: *"NGDOs are not islands"* (Fowler 1997:93); they operate in a complex network, or aid chain, that puts high demands on them in terms of managing relations in the given context (ibid). Sustainability is therefore not something that is only interesting when talking about the activities of an NGO, the organisations relationships are also crucial to obtain sustainability in what they do and how they act in the community they are aiming to develop. For the purpose of this project, we use Fowler's understanding of sustainability in NGO work, namely as creating viable change for the community through the activities and relationships they employ in.

As stated above the term development can in itself be said to imply a long term perspective - at least in comparison with humanitarian assistance - and in Korten's understanding of the term, sustainability is always a crucial part of development. Depending on the definition of development it is understood as more or less long termed and more or less sustainable in itself. In this project we use the term *long term sustainable development* to be explicit and clear about our understanding of development when examining DRC's work in the HoC around Dadaab.

3.2 Sustainability in the Dadaab host community

What can be regarded as sustainable intervention in one context might not sustainable be in another context. Having outlined our overall understanding of sustainability, we now turn to issues of sustainable interventions in the specific context for this project, namely the HoC around Dadaab. This is done with the outset in the report *In Search for Livelihood and Protection* (ISLP) from 2010.

One of the concluding recommendations of the report is that any agency working with Dadaab HoC development should recognise the presence of the refugee camp and incorporate the impact of the

refugees in the local development approach. There should be a long term approach to the HoC intervention that includes support of HoC's production and trading with the refugee camp. Any support to the HoC should be with the specific circumstances in mind, namely the impact of the refugee camp on the infrastructure, natural resources, businesses and pastoral production in the area. The refugees and the HoC are inherently interlinked – not at least economically - and the report therefore highlights that *"...there is a further need to integrate the support provided to the refugees with that provided to the host community"* (RDE et al. 2010:79).

Another recommendation from the report is a coordinated approach to the development of HoC between the different actors (GoK, development agencies, refugee organisations and HoC). Without coordination there is a risk that the humanitarian agencies merely provide compensatory projects in the host HoC. An overall conclusion is that temporary, uncoordinated and ad hoc solutions should be avoided (ibid).

It is clear from this that the refugee camp is an important part of the HoC's context and reality – a factor that cannot be ignored. With the outset in the above, it is therefore reasonable to conclude, that sustainable development for the population around Dadaab means activities that take into consideration the presence of the refugees and the mutual impact the two populations have on each other by taking an *integrated approach* when working with the two populations. It can also be concluded that, *long termed* and *coordinated* intervention are keywords when it comes to sustainability of HoC work.

3.3 NGOs and management – Lewis' conceptual framework

Management is a huge research area with a vast amount of literature, but the management of NGOs as a distinctive form of organisation has only received little attention (Kanji & Lewis 2009:326). According to David Lewis, third sector organisations is a distinctive form of organisation and NGO management therefore requires an approach partly distinctive from the one of business sector and public sector management (Lewis 2001, 2003).

Lewis has developed a conceptual framework for NGO management in which he puts focus on both internal and external factors. The entire framework serves as an overview of important management areas[5] for NGOs and it consists of four components: (i) context, (ii) activities (iii) organisation and (iiii) relationships (Lewis 2001, 2003). As Lewis' model (Figure 1) on the left illustrates, the context is an overall factor that both impacts all of the three other elements and exists outside them. The context of which the NGO is

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[5] Lewis calls them "*management challenges*", but this does not necessarily mean that they are problematic. To avoid the negative connotation, we call them 'management areas'.

operating in is shaped by political, cultural and historical aspects, he says, and these aspects are unique for each location and can change over time (Lewis 2001:6). We will be outlining the most important contextual factors for the specific case in chapter 4 of this report. Lewis is not explicit about the four components' internal relation, but the overall division of management areas is very useful for this project. We have modified Lewis' model so that it reflects the way we deal with each area (see figure 2).


Figure 1: Lewis' model on the three NGO management areas (Lewis 2003:331)

Figure 2: Our modified model

Lewis' understanding of organisation includes the organisation's mission and vision as well as internal structures and processes (Lewis 2003:335p). It is simply too extensive within this project to study the internal processes, such as communication and relations. The organisational focus in this project will therefore be on the vision, mission and strategies, which we choose to call 'organisational strategy'. The context in this project is Kenya and the Dadaab area. As the organisational strategy lies *outside* this context, the 'ball' is placed outside the context. The context impacts and sets limitations both for the concrete activities deployed in the region and for the relationships which DRC engages in, and therefore activities and relationships lies *within* the specific context of Dadaab. Relationships and activities overlap, e.g. through partnerships on activities.

In his framework Lewis draws on different researcher's ideas of NGO management as well as consultancy work in the development and NGO field. It is not a theory with fixed prescriptions on how exactly NGOs

should undertake the management of the different spheres Lewis outlines. Lewis argues that since every NGO works under different circumstances and with different aims, no general set of management rules can be applied (Lewis 2001:8). What the framework can provide is a division of areas and themes relevant for development NGOs that all constitutes some kind of a management challenge (Lewis 2001:6).

We will use Lewis' model as a systematic way of looking into possible hindering and facilitating factors for an INGO to employ sustainable development. Starting with the organisational strategy, we will go through each of Lewis' three areas. Since the framework is open-ended and Lewis himself draws on many different researchers' (sometimes opposing) views, we will be adding others aspects and researchers to each of the three areas when they are evolved below. The aspect of long term sustainable development will be applied to the framework and the meaning of the term will therefore be broadened in each of the specific areas. This way the understanding of sustainability that will be used throughout the project is clearly established for each area prior to the analysis.

As far as we are aware, Lewis' model has not received any critique from fellow researchers. One could however criticise the model for being too broad and too fragmented. Lewis is not offering a thorough explanation to all the empirical phenomenons that he brings up and in that sense the theory has some explanatory gaps. He has a set of theoretical points within each of his management areas, but not all of them are clearly and thoroughly presented or explained. Also, he is not being clear about how these different theories have been developed. For the purpose of this study Lewis' model serves us well as it offers a very structured way of looking at the different areas of NGO management. We do not take the model for more than it is, but use it as a conceptual framework with which we can categorise the empery. Lewis' model is flexible which is both good and bad. The flexibility of course makes the model appear vague in some senses, but we have taken advantage on the flexibility and added other theories to his model. By adding the aspect of long term sustainable development to the framework we are angling the model to suit our project better.

3.3.1 Organisational strategy

In the area of organisation Lewis draws in Fowler who operates with a 'capacity framework' for the internal elements of a development NGO (NGDO)[6] (Lewis 2001:174). Fowler is concerned with the often vague objectives of NGDOs and calls for more strategic planning and a greater consistency throughout the

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[6] Non-Governmental Development Organisations

organisation's different elements. According to Fowler it is a precondition for organisational effectiveness to have coherence between the NGDO's vision and mission, and that these in turn are linked to longer-term strategic choices, concrete goals and allocated resources in the specific programmes and projects. Through coherence in these elements, the NGDO will optimise the development work (Fowler 1997:45pp).

When studying the vision, mission and strategies of DRC, we will look at how these 'statements of intention' facilitate or hinder long term sustainable development in the HoC of a refugee camp. This will be done with outset in the earlier established understanding of sustainable development. With Fowler in mind, we will later be looking at the consistency between this and the activities (what he would call programmes and projects). According to Fowler's logic, good intentions (on for instance sustainable development) in the vision, mission and strategy is not enough, these intentions need to translate into concrete activities in order to be successful. On the other hand activities will also have difficulties being completely successful unless they are based on the vision, mission and strategy of the organisation, since that will mean lack of strategic coherence and guidance in the organisation (ibid). With this logic, the overall vision, mission and strategy of an (international) NGO is crucial to the success of sustainable development intervention. The next section will deal with the issue of sustainability in activities.

3.3.2 Activities

Lewis divides NGOs' development activities into three main categories: (i) *Service delivery*, (ii) *catalysis* of social, political and economic change and (iii) *partnership building*. These are overlapping and one organisation often engages in all three (Lewis 2001, 2003, Kanji & Lewis 2009).

The role of the service deliverer implies, according to Lewis *"...mobilisation of resources to provide goods and services"* (Lewis 2001:68). This can include providing healthcare, legal advise, education, micro-credit and emergency relief. This implementing role arises some managerial questions such as who to provide with the services and how to manage the relationship between the receivers and other service providers. In this way management of activities are interrelated with the relationships of the given NGO (ibid). The NGO can deliver services in three different ways according to Lewis: 1) It can be the direct implementing actor that directly delivers services to people. 2) It can work for strengthening of existing service delivery, e.g. through training of government staff in order for them to provide better for the people. 3) The NGO can assist people in influencing their own government or authorities and thereby claim their rights (Lewis 2001:111).

Thomas Carroll has another way of evaluating service deliveries: *"while service delivery has a strong **intrinsic** value, it should really be evaluated on the basis of its **instrumental** value as a catalyst for other development changes"* (Carroll 1992:66, original emphasis). Seen this way, a service delivery is sustainable if it creates breeding ground for other changes. Depending on the nature of the service delivered, it can have more or less catalysis effect. Carroll's notion of intrinsic vs. instrumental value can be applied to Lewis' three modes of service delivery mentioned above. The first mode might only have intrinsic value or at least a relatively low degree of instrumental value. The second mode will most likely have instrumental value and thereby be more sustainable since the NGO is strengthening structures in the society that already exist and therefore are likely to be maintained in the future. Lewis' third mode can be said to have the highest level of sustainability since it includes the right holders – the people of the community – who are then empowered to reach the duty bearers (authorities) and create change themselves. With this third mode of service delivery, the NGO's assistance can create capabilities that are perpetuated and can execute influence after the development project is ended.

When discussing sustainability in service delivery Lewis stresses that it is important *how* the services are delivered. Service delivery should not be devalued (Lewis 2001:69), and it is not necessarily non-sustainable. According to Lewis the level of *participation* in NGOs' service delivery influences both the quality of the service delivered and the sustainability of it (Lewis 2001:114pp). He sees empowerment and participation - that people should be involved in own development and be part of the decision making around it - as crucial in order for service delivery work to live on and have a positive impact after the end of the NGO's programme. Lewis' focus on empowerment and *how* aid is employed is in line with Korten's previous mentioned definition of development. Korten emphasises the *process* and the importance of involving the members of society by increasing the *"personal and institutional capacities"* - and thereby create sustainable development (Korten 1990 in Carley & Christie 2000:27).

The second major role of NGOs is the role as a *catalyst*, which in Lewis notion of it means: "...*an NGO's ability to inspire, facilitate or contribute towards developmental change among other actors at the organisational and individual level*" (Lewis 2001:68). This includes such things as lobbying, advocacy work, organising of grassroots, building social capital and creating empowerment (Lewis 2001:69p). Lewis puts special emphasis on the role of advocacy which can be defined as: *"any attempt to influence the decision of any institutional elite on behalf of the collective interest*" (Jenkins 1987 in Lewis 2001:123). Whereas service delivery is about meeting peoples' immediate needs, advocacy tries to change the status quo and Lewis therefore sees it as an important element in building sustainable development (Lewis 2001:123). Since advocacy aims at changing the underlying structures and rules in society by influencing an actor that is a

constant part of the society – namely the authorities – advocacy has a high degree of sustainability according to the previous outlined meaning of the word (see 3.1).

According to several researchers, building strong alliances is an important element in successful advocacy work (see e.g. Edwards 1993; Lewis 2001, Covey 1995 in Lewis 2001:125pp) and this way advocacy work (just as service delivering) is related to the management of relationships and partnerships with other actors. The third role that Lewis mentions under activities is *partnership building*. This is closely related to relationships and will be dealt with in this next part on relationships.

3.3.3 Relationships

Like Fowler, Lewis sees NGOs as part of an "*open system*" where the organisations are challenged to manage different relationships with stakeholders, funders, governments, other NGOs, the general public etc. Getting these relationships right is according to both researchers of crucial importance for the success of the development work (Fowler 1997:93pp; Lewis 2001:140). Biggs & Neame supports this when they state that *"...major achievements of NGOs come through operating as partners in formal and informal networks and coalitions involving other NGOs, government agencies and the private sector"* (Biggs & Neame 1997:16).

Lewis' understanding of *context* is extra closely related to his understanding of relationships, since relations are not only *impacting* the context but are actually a *part of* the context. The actors in what he calls the aid system are a crucial part of the external environment, he argues (Lewis 2003, 2009). Lewis divides the aid system into the following groups: (i) Local government/authorities, (ii) civil society and (iii) (other) international development agencies – among these the donors, and (iiii) business sector. We will follow Lewis division with two exceptions: First of all, donors will be dealt with separately as this relationship has a different nature and secondly, we have chosen to exclude the business sector[7].

Local government/authorities

The local government and local authorities are the duty bearers and therefore important actors for an INGO with the ambition of improving the conditions in a community. As Lewis notes, the government can be hostile towards NGOs, impose restrictions on them or even ban them and thereby make it difficult for the NGO to operate. But if the authorities on the other hand welcome NGOs through co-operation and

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[7] The business sector is excluded mainly due to the limited time frame of the project. Also, the Dadaab area does not have a lot of actual business and DRC's possible business relations are therefore limited.

partnership, NGOs will have a much easier working conditions (Lewis 2001:6,33pp). According to Bratton, government–NGO relations are expected to be most successful if the government meets the NGO with confident and capable governance and populist policies (that serves the interest of the people). If the government is weak and defensive, the relationship will most likely be less positive and fruitful (Bratton 1989 in Edwards & Fowler 2002:198).

From this it is clear, that the government's relative openness to INGOs as well as the governments strength, capabilities and willingness to fulfil its task as duty bearers influences the INGO's scope for performing its goals successfully and thereby for creation of sustainable development. These elements impact the conditions under which the INGO operates and they set the limit for a fruitful partnership between the INGO and the authorities. The success of advocacy work is much dependent on willing authorities and the sustainability of service deliveries is also heavily affected by the relative strength and willingness of the local duty bearers.

Civil society/community

Civil society as defined by Lewis includes *"...various organised entities (...)* [that] *negotiate and pursue diverse (...) social interests"* (Lewis 2001:201). As with the government, civil society is an important player when working for sustainable development. Robert Dibie puts it this way for INGOs: *"The success of INGOs operations in the African continent will greatly depend on their ability to maintain a cordial relationship with local governments and community based organisations"* (Dibie 2008:57), and Harry Blair suggests that *"a strong civil society can strengthen democracy by educating citizens to exercise their right to participate in public life, by encouraging marginalized groups to become more active in the political arena"* (Blair 1997 in Kanji & Lewis 2009:134). From Blair's quote it is clear that civil society can be the binding link between the INGO and the members of society, the right holders. This means that if the civil society is strong it is easier for the INGO to be successful with its advocacy work and its services. If there is a strong civil society to incorporate in the process and take over after the INGOs work, this work is more likely to have a sustainable impact. This is because it is grounded in the society itself and not in external structures and powers. As we stated earlier, empowerment and participation are important factors for NGO activities' sustainable character, and incorporating civil society is a way of ensuring participation of locals.

The role as a 'binding link' is also something Fowler stresses when he mentions the positive capacities of civil society, namely that it can mobilise interests, mediate between opposing interests/conflicting social

values, understand the social, cultural and religious needs of the members of society, minimise the misuse of power by the government and support the citizenship rights of a democracy (Fowler 1997:8). What Fowler articulates here is that the civil society groups/members have knowledge and insights about the context which INGOs operate in and about the people the INGOs target the development activities at – and this is something that INGOs can take advantage of. According to Edward, a strong civil society is both a goal to aim for when building a 'good society' and a means through which the building of a 'good society' can be achieved (Edward 1999:34). Seen this way, a strong civil society has intrinsic value as it is sign of a democratic, participatory and inclusive society, and simultaneously a strong civil society is a powerful vehicle (instrumental value) to reach the development goals an INGO might have. Therefore, civil society is both ends and means of sustainable development.

Other development agencies

For the purpose of this project we classify other development agencies as other INGOs and UN bodies. We already established in 3.1 that partnerships are making INGOs stronger. Partnerships between INGOs and other development agencies can create synergy and together the partners can obtain objectives that they were unable to obtain alone. This should according to Lewis be the aim that any partnership should measure its success against (Lewis 2001:74pp). Partnerships, he argues, is a very effective way for an NGO to "...*move out of purely intrinsic service delivery roles and into the areas of networking, campaigning and policy advocacy and entrepreneurship"* (Lewis 2001:160). In other words, partnerships and coordination can help an INGO to move from intrinsic service delivery to activities that, in Carroll's (1992:66) wording, have instrumental value and promotes more development.

When building up meaningful partnerships the attributes, capacities and efforts of both parts are of cause determining elements for the success of the partnership. Coordination between different NGOs is, according to Lewis, often crucial to the effectiveness of development work in a region. In fact coordination among the actors in the entire aid system is important (Lewis 2001:157; Kanji & Lewis 2009:164). As outlined in 3.2, coordination among the various actors are also identified as a crucial element for the specific context of Dadaab.

Donors

As donors constitute the financial funding of many programmes and development activities they are crucial partners to INGOs. Many scholars have pointed to the fact that because of donors' financial power over INGOs, there is a risk that the goals are set in accordance to donors' criteria. This way the accountability is

oriented upwards instead of downwards to the recipients (Edwards & Hulme 1994, Fisher 1994, Tandon 1994 in Edwards & Fowler 2002:196; Lewis 2001:118pp). Lewis notes that donors often want NGOs to deliver quick and measurable results rather than engage in activities like awareness rising or advocacy work that are less quantifiable (Lewis 2001:118p, 156) and in line with this, Hashemi and Hassan have found that funders tend to favour service delivery rather than empowerment-focused activities which in turn can lead to 'goal deflection' for the NGO who is pressured to meet donors' wants (Hashemi & Hassan 1999). As we established earlier (3.1), quick and measurable results are not necessarily the most sustainable activities. On the contrary, sustainable development is aiming at long term goals which are inherently difficult to measure on a short basis. If the (potential) donors of an INGO do not give funding on the basis of sustainable development activities and if they do not favour long-term approaches, it can be difficult for the INGO to find the recourses for such projects.

For each of the above aid system actors it is evident that the actors' individual strength and nature has an impact on an INGO's opportunity for creating sustainable development work. Furthermore, the relationship and partnership (or lack thereof) between the INGO and the actor is important for sustainable development intervention.

3.4 Summing up theory

As this chapter shows, many different aspects impact the sustainability of development work and the scope for INGOs' efforts to employ sustainable development. All three management areas contain possible facilitating and hindering factors for this. Some of them are in the hands of the INGO, while others are partly or completely out of their control. The organisational strategy is an internal affair that can be controlled by the INGOs; the activities are also decided internally but highly influenced by contextual environment in which they are conducted and the INGOs' relationships - and potential relationships - are also to a high degree determined by external factors and thereby more difficult to control. Although activities and relationships lies within the context (as illustrated in figure 2) and are determined by contextual factors, they are still very interesting in term of management. As Lewis argues, NGOs are dependent on recourses and events in the given environment, they need to manage the circumstances the best way possible (Lewis 2001:140pp). Similar to this stance, De Graaf notes, that the success of an NGO to a large extent depends on its ability to influence and appreciate (as in assess) external forces in the correct and clever way (De Graaf in Aubrey 1997:17). This means that the degree to which INGOs are able to manage external as well as internal factors is decisive for the level of sustainability it can achieve in its development work.

After a brief chapter with relevant background information, we will turn to the analysis, where the internal and external areas outlined in this theoretical framework will be dealt with in the case of DRC in the HoC of Dadaab.

4. Background

In this chapter the reader will be provided with some useful background information on (4.1) the historical context of the geographical region and the Dadaab camps, (4.2) the HoC around Dadaab, and (4.3) The Danish Refugee Council.

4.1 Historical context & the Dadaab camps

By the time of Kenya's independence in 1963, 200,000 Somalis lived in Kenya's territory. The North Eastern Provence was created within the independent Kenya, and this area is still today hosted almost entirely by ethnic Somalis. Ever since the independency, Somali refugees have been crossing the border into Kenya due to conflicts in Somalia (Milner 2009:83pp).

From 1989 (when the influx increased significantly) until the fall of the Barre Regime[8] in 1991, the Kenyan military to a large extent kept the refugees away from the borders with the use of forced returns and push-backs of boats carrying Somalis, but when the Barre Regime collapsed the number of refugees grew excessively and the military couldn't hold back the refugees any longer. At the same time Kenya was under international pressure to change the system and methods of the refugee handling. In 1991 the responsibility of handling the growing influx of Somali refugees was given to UNHCR (Milner 2009:86p). According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN convention) the primary responsibility for refugees lies at the host country, and the choice of abdication was the GoK's own decision (ibid).

From 1991 to 1992 over 400.000 refugees from Somalia arrived to Kenya. Despite pressure from the international donor community the encampment policy became a reality. The encampment policy focused primarily on two principles. (i) Abdication of responsibility for refugees to UNHCR and (ii) the containment of the refugee population on the periphery of the state. The policy also implies that refugees inside the camps cannot take employment and have limited freedom of movement – they must stay inside the camp to obtain assistance and those outside are found illegal (Milner 2009:84pp).

The Dadaab camps were established in 1991 and are located approximately 500 km from Nairobi and 80 km from the Somali border in Kenya's North Eastern Province. Today the Dadaab camps consist of five different

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[8] The Barre regime was lead by Mohamed said Barre who was the military dictator and President of Somalia from 1969-1991.

refugee camps. Three main camps (Dagahaley, Hagadera and Ifo) have existed since the early 1990s, and two extra camps (Ifo Extension and Kambioos) were established in July and August 2011 due to an overpopulation in the existing ones (UNHCR 2011a:9).

Since the beginning of January 2011 continuing insecurity and drought have affected nearly half of the population in Somalia and caused more displacement. The UN has declared famine in six regions of the southern part of Somalia. This has caused a new huge influx of refugees into Kenya. From January 2011 to the 15th of October 2011, 202,216 refugees have crossed the border into Kenya. Dadaab is currently home to more than 460,000 refugees, 95.7 % being Somalis (UNHCR 2011b:2, UNHCR 2011c:2).

4.2 The refugee hosting community

By September 2010 148,000 people were living in a radius of 50 km from the Dadaab camps. The area is arid to semi-arid and pastoralism is the main source of livelihood. Approximately 60 % of the host population live in settlements and 40 % are mobile. The settled host population live in 20 major villages as well as in Dadaab city. The host population is ethnic Somalis, and speak the same language as the refugees (RDE et al. 2010). The North Eastern Province has an overall population density of approximately 7 people/ sq.km, but within the radius of 50 km from the camps the density is double and the hosting population has been growing with an annual rate of 11,7 % compared to 3,7 % for the entire North Eastern Province. These numbers illustrate that the refugee camps serve as a pull factor.

The five Dadaab camps are located within the Garissa County and the Wajir County. Within these two counties four smaller districts each constitute a part of the 50 km radius area: Wajir South, Lagdera, Fafi and Dadaab (see appendix E-F) (RDE et al. 2010). These districts and North Eastern Province in general has always been the Kenyan province where fewest investments have been done and the area has only to a small extent contributed the national economy (Milner 2009:104).

4.3 Presentation of DRC

Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is a private Danish organisation founded in 1956. The NGO work on the basis of humanitarian principles and human rights, with all aspects of refugee cases and with the overall goal to help and create lasting solutions for refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities[9]. DRC operates in over 30 countries around the world with funding from private and institutional donors (DRC 2011b). DRC has worked in the Horn of Africa (HoA) since 1998, where a program for Somaliland was

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[9] For mission and vision, se Appendix G

established and operations where later expanded to include Kenya (2005), Ethiopia, Puntland and South and Central Somalia. DRC operates from 6 offices in this region, among them a Regional HoA office in Kenya and a local Kenyan office (DRC 2011b). In 2011 DRC received funds from over 15 donors, among them Danida, ECHO, SIDA, DFID, the UN and EU, for operations in HoA (DRC 2011a:4). The entire HoA region now has the largest budget of all regions DRC work in, namely around 200 million Danish kroner for 2011 (Samberg 2011).

5. Analysis

This chapter is divided into the three management areas: Organisational strategy, Activities and Relationships. For each area we will look at what hindering and facilitating factors DRC is facing in order to engage in sustainable development work in the HoC of Dadaab. The chapter is concluded with a section, 5.4, where the most interesting analytical points of the three management areas are analysed together.

5. 1 Organisational strategy

This first part, 5.1, of the analysis is not specific for the Dadaab context but focuses on DRC's internal organisational strategy including vision, mission, mandate and principles. The interesting question is to what extent these facilitate or hinder a sustainable developmental approach and a concern for HoC issues.

5.1.1 DRC and sustainability

Sustainability is one of DRC's 10 operational principles[10], which means that the organisation actually has a declared understanding of sustainability, namely *"...the extent to which overall objectives will be maintained after the activity has been completed in technical, organisational and financial terms"* (DRC 2008c:40). This fits very well to what we established as sustainability in 3.1, since it stresses the importance of viability of the impact after the INGO has finished its intervention, or as Fowler puts it *"...which continue once external assistance withdraws"* (Fowler 1997:62). DRC mentions that a sustainable effect is more difficult to obtain when it comes to humanitarian work compared to developmental work, but that it is essential for the organisation to integrate the sustainable element whenever possible. In the same text it is admitted that *"...certain types of interventions are not intended to be sustainable in their initial form"* (DRC 2008c:40). From the latter quotation it is clear that sustainability is sometimes under-prioritised depending on the aid modality. However, DRC does have a clear ambition of obtaining as high a degree of sustainability as possible in every work they conduct.

Apart from the principle of sustainability there are also many signs of sustainable approaches to find among DRC's other 9 operational principles as well as in the organisation's value compasses. One of these is *participation* – involvement of the targeted people/the civil society - which by DRC is both seen as a *"means"* and an *"end in itself"* (DRC 2008c:19). As established in the theoretical framework, participation is

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[10] The 10 operational principles are: Participation, Capacity development, Gender, Advocacy, 'Do no harm', Collaboration with local partners, Complementarity, General Replicability of methods and programmes, Sustainability, and Environment (DRC 2008b:18).

facilitating for sustainability and DRC's view on the matter is very well in line with Edward's view on the strength of civil society as both a means and a goal of 'good society' (Edwards 2009:69). Another principle, *capacity development*, refers to building up of skills and understandings on three levels: an individual, an organisational and an institutional, in order for these groups to "*achieve development over time*" (DRC 2008c:23). There is an obvious 'sustainability-mindset' behind this long term aspect, and the latter two levels, organisational and institutional, are also related to what Lewis understands as acting as a catalyst (Lewis 2001:68) as well as Carrolls' notion of *instrumental value* in development intervention (Carroll 1992:66) – something that has a high degree of sustainability. Impacting the institutional environment is closely related to advocacy work, since it implies reaching up to the duty bearers. *Advocacy* is another of DRC's principles, and again something that has a high degree of sustainability according to researchers such as Lewis (2001:123) and Korten (in Lewis 2001:123). This is also true for DRC's central concept, the *rights based approach*, which is concerned with support of right holders and duty bearers (DRC 2008a:1). Two principles related to DRC's relationships are *collaboration with local partners* (DRC 2008c:32) and *complementarity* (*"seeking strategic alliances with other agencies"*) (ibid p. 38). The former potentially strengthens sustainability through local participation and involvement of civil society and both are evidence that DRC values partnerships and see coordination as an important element in line with what was emphasised as facilitating for sustainable development in the theoretical framework on relationships. All these principles are evidence of a development approach that focuses on factors that are facilitating for long term sustainability.

However, there are also signs of a more relief oriented approach in DRC's work and as mentioned above sustainability is not a leading principle in all of the organisation's values. One of the value compasses[11] is the *Humanitarian approach* which implies that *"...peoples' right to a life with dignity takes precedence over politics and principles"* and furthermore that relief comes before advocacy (DRC 2009b:5). This indicates that the humanitarian focus is more dominant than the development focus, which naturally puts a limit on sustainability. Another of the value compasses, *independency and neutrality* (ibid), can also hinder e.g. advocacy, since advocacy work sometimes means being critical and pushy towards government or other authorities. Neutrality is a classic keyword for humanitarian work but not possible when doing development work.

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[11] DRC's value compasses are: Humanitarian Approach, Respect, Independence and Neutrality, Inclusion, Honesty and Transparency (DRC 2009b:5)

5.1.2 DRC and HoC

Neither DRC's vision nor mission contains any references to HoC work (see Appendix G). HoC is however mentioned as a target group in DRC's description of the organisation's mandate, where it is stated that DRC works with *"...providing direct assistance to conflict affected populations – refugees, IDPs and host communities in conflict areas of the world"* and that DRC must *"...recognise the dynamics between the displaced and other affected populations"* (DRC 2010:1). The latter also reflects a holistic perspective on the issues of displacement, something that is facilitating for the integrated approach to the HoC – refugee issues recommended in ISLP (RDE et al. 2010). Apart from this, DRC generally refers to *"conflict affected people"* in their organisational strategy (DRC 2008b, 2010), and this general awareness of not only targeting refugees is facilitating for the HoC focus in a specific setting – such as Dadaab.

DRC works according to what they call the *Assistance Framework*[12] that contents the organisation's overall principles for international activities towards conflict-affected people (DRC 2008b:2). The framework consists of three situations that the affected people typically move through; *acute crisis*, *displacement* and *durable solutions* (ibid)*.* This model illustrates that DRC works with both humanitarian relief and more long termed perspectives, with the sustainable approach mostly present in the latter phase. Although DRC states that durable solutions are also directed at the affected communities, the actual solutions for the HoC offered by the assistance framework are not as clear as for displaced people, and the term 'durable solutions' traditionally refers to solutions for refugees: repatriation, resettlement and integration (Christensen & Harild 2009). None of these are possible solutions for the affected host population. Since the assistance framework is used as the key tool for DRC's operations and the three phases is the organisation's way of defining the needs of the people targeted, the HoC is easily forgotten. The refugee oriented tool thereby constitutes a hindrance for finding obvious solutions for the HoC.

5.1.3 Summing up organisational strategy

According to Fowler (1997) it is important to have leading principles in vision/mission/strategy in order to successfully conduct specific activities. DRC has a sustainable development approach in many ways, but despite the many development oriented 'terms' and principles, DRC seem to prioritise the humanitarian approach above the development focus, which is an obvious obstacle for sustainable development work in a specific setting. Furthermore, DRC has identified HoC as one of the target groups, but it is not clear *how* the HoC should be helped, how the HoC work and refugee work should be balanced and there are no

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[12] See the Assistance Framework here: http://www.drc.dk/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/IA_PDF/relief_work/chapter_5.pdf

guidelines for how and when to engage in HoC work. Following Fowlers (1997) logic, this implies a risk for conducting activities in an ad hoc manner due to lack of strategic coherence. In the end, both the humanitarian approach as well as the lack of HoC principles constitute an organisational hindrance for long term sustainable development work in HoC. We will now turn to look at DRC's activities in the specific Dadaab setting.

5.2 Activities

Only by looking at the specific activities, is it possible to get a picture of how the organisational strategy impacts DRC's work in the Dadaab context. DRC has a regional strategy for all HoA, but our main focus will be on the specific activities that DRC employ in the HoC around Dadaab. The two main documents for this analysis are Strategic Programme Document for Horn of Africa & Yemen 2012-14 (from now on called the Strategic Programme) and the Danida Proposal for horn of Africa 2009-11 (from now on called the Danida Proposal).

5.2.1 The 50-50 principle

DRC has a declared objective of targeting both refugees and the affected HoC through a 50-50 principle introduced in 2005-06 with HoC defined as a radius of 50 km from the camps (Samberg 2011, Smith 2011). In the Danida Proposal it is written that "*DRC will continue to follow the principle of 50% support to the refugees in the camps and 50% to the local population*" (DRC 2009a:32), and the reason for it is expressed as "*...to avoid conflict over scarce resources...*" between the two populations (ibid). Regarding the initial phase of including the HoC back in 2005-06, Samberg admitted that: *"there is a lot you can do when it comes to thinking of dynamics… where you think of the area as a whole. We didn't do that by then. We just wanted to start some activities"* (Samberg 2011)*.* This indicates that there was no well thought out strategy behind the principles. This is backed up by the fact that neither Samberg (2011) (who worked in Kenya under the HoA programme in when the 50-50 principle was introduced) nor Smith (2011) knows of a strategic document made on the 50-50 principle. According to Rosendahl (2011), the 50-50 division is a bit "*exaggerated*" and he also referred to it as something they actually "*skipped*" (which according to Smith (2011) is not the case at all). To judge from these different sources, the 50-50 principle is not strongly anchored in the organisation's actual work and it does not seem to be a leading principle or something that has a high awareness among the staff. The specific Horn of Africa programme, however, has some elements of 50-50 in the pillar of livelihood (see 5.2.3).

5.2.2 DRC's HoA programme

Since 2009, DRC has had a regional perspective on their work in the Horn of Africa (HoA). This means that the programme proposals for Danida have been for HoA rather than separately for Dadaab and the other areas in the region as it were prior to 2009. In the Strategic Programme the vision for HoC is expressed as: *"To support and strengthen a regional protection framework for displacement – affected communities throughout the Horn of Africa and Yemen"* (DRC 2011a:8). This indicates that DRC is concerned not only with the refugees and the specific issues and needs in the camps but view the issue in a broader perspective. This is well in line with ISLP's recommendations about an integrated approach to the refugees and the HoC (RDE et al. 2010:79), and in this way DRC's holistic view is a facilitating step towards a sustainable development approach also for the HoC around Dadaab.

In the Danida Proposal as well as in the Strategic Programme DRC has designed the HoA strategy *"to reflect the DRC global Assistance Framework"* (DRC 2011a:8) (the framework mentioned in 5.1.2). This means a division of activities into three phases: 1) Protection of right to life, 2) Protection of right to livelihood and 3) Right to protection (DRC 2009a:10). In the following we will dig into the more specific activities under Kenya to see how DRC manages to include HoC in a sustainable way. The first pillar of 'right to life' has a humanitarian focus that does not aim at sustainable development. The two other pillars are more development oriented and therefore more interesting for us to dig into – which is exactly what we will do in the next section. This will foremost be with the outset in the Danida Proposal, since this document is more specific than Strategic Programme.

5.2.3 Sustainability for HoC under *protection of right to livelihood*

Under the pillar ´protection of livelihood' DRC has the following specific objectives in the Danida Proposal: health packages to 4 host communities and 2 camps including direct service delivery of water, sanitation, environmental infrastructure and training (DRC 2009a:36). Apart from training, which provides locals with skills they maintain after the project is over this health package is pure service delivery of Lewis first mode (Lewis 2001, 2003, Kanji & Lewis 2009) and therefore has a low degree of sustainable development. The rest of DRC's outcomes in the area of livelihood are related to various forms of education: vocational training, scholarships to secondary school students, education of artisans and training in business/dry-land-farming as well as in-grants to household. These education and training efforts are also first degree of service delivery but can to a higher extent be classified as sustainable development as it gives people durable skills they can use, build upon and pass forward to others in the community.

The livelihood activities have no mentioning of assistance to locals who wish to influence the authorities which means that it does not go into third mode of service delivery and it does not get to have substantive instrumental value, to use Carrolls (1992:66) wording again. Also, DRC does not go beyond service delivery and become catalyst for development, by for instance strengthening livelihood through advocacy work, which both Lewis (2001) and Korten (in Lewis 2001:123) sees as a crucial element for creating sustainable development.

Something however indicates that DRC has the potential of working more with advocacy and strengthening/incorporation of civil society. In Somalia DRC has implemented 'Community Driven Recovery and Development' (CDRD) which aims to *"strengthen local level governance and community based organisations to meet community development needs"* (DRC 2011a:14). This approach is very much in line with what is outlined as sustainable development work in the theoretical framework, since it includes advocacy work, participation, civil society involvement and "*social empowerment*" (ibid). In the the Strategic Programme it is mentioned that DRC in 2012 will expand the CDRD to Kenya as well. This indicates that DRC has the ambition of reaching the HoC in a more sustainable way.

The Danida Proposal has some evidence of the 50-50 principle under the pillar of protection of livelihood. The vocational training and household training is split 50-50 between the HoC and the refugees, and water, sanitation and education is also given to both camps and host villages, but nothing is mentioned about 50-50 in connection to the other activities (DRC 2009a:36). If this means that the principle is only applied for 3 out of 6 activities, then there is no continuous 50-50 split - only a 50-50 split within certain areas. Also, this is the only place the principle is evident in the entire proposal, and it is not mentioned at all in the Strategic Programme, so once again it does not seem to be a leading principle. It also seems that 50-50 means conducting the same activities for the HoC as for refugees, which may not be the most beneficial for the HoC. This 'equal' approach might be connected to the fact that the 50-50 principle was introduced in order to reduce conflict over scarce resources and therefore, supporting with the same activities gives a more fair impression. This logic in turn hinders a process of finding out what exactly the hosting population need in terms of sustainable development on their own premises.

5.2.4 Sustainability for the HoC under *right to protection*

This pillar is concerned with spreading knowledge and awareness about the refugee issue which is done by training of police officers and "*court users*" in refugee law, supporting the Kenyan Refugee Consortium in order for them to continue research and report writing on the refugee issue, building awareness among the refugees on their rights through radio programmes & theatre groups and supporting pro-bono lawyers in

giving legal advice to refugees (DRC 2009a:32). Most of these efforts are service deliveries of the second degree as they strengthen existing services and job qualification. These activities are sustainable on a certain level, however it would be more long termed and sustainable to influence government to provide these services. As with the above pillar, protection of right to livelihood, neither civil society strengthening or advocacy work is part of the objectives.

The above activities benefit the HoC indirectly as they provide education and job creation for the locals and it is also beneficial for both populations that the HoC has know-how and capabilities to deal with the situation and minimise the negative impacts that the refugees have on the area. But none of these activities are directly channelled at the hosting population, and it does not seem like a deliberate goal for DRC to benefit the HoC in this case, more as a bonus effect of the efforts to help refugees.

As Lewis stresses it is not only interesting to look at what is delivered but also *how* services are delivered and here he puts emphasis on the level of participation (Lewis 2001:69). DRC's activities seem to be conducted with a fairly high degree of participation - also participation of the HoC. First of all, Samberg said that DRC in connection with their "annual review" consults the local communities as well as other stakeholders in order to review the organisation's activities (Samberg 2011) and second of all the HAP-report praises DRC when it comes to creating connections with the HoC. The report mentions different situations where DRC has taken the initiative to incorporate HoC in their refugee related intervention, one example of this is a HoC youth group that DRC supported to make a computer-training facility in the Hagadera camp (HAP 2010:8). However, this is again involving HoC only in order to facilitate development for the refugees. Although an activity like this creating some interaction between the two populations and some ownership among the HoC members over the refugee work it is not really helping the development of the HoC as a whole. It does however indicate that DRC has the awareness and capability of building strong ties to the HoC. The organisation *is* working in participatory ways, which is facilitating for sustainable development.

5.2.5 Summing up activities

DRC's regional perspective on HoA potentially facilitates a sustainable and integrated development approach towards the overall HoC. But when it comes to the Kenyan activities, the Dadaab HoC is sparsely represented in the documents and many of the activities that include HoC are not mainly conducted for the sake of HoC development, but with the aim of creating better conditions for the refugees and this imply overlooking HoC needs. One reason that the HoC is not addressed in a clear way might be the division of activities into the three phases of the Assistance Framework. As previously mentioned, the Assistance

Framework is more geared for displaced people than for a HoC, and this seems to reflect the activities under both 'right to livelihood' and 'right to protection'. This way the organisational strategy - with the Assistance Framework – constitute a hindrance for targeting the HoC in a meaningful way through activities in the specific Dadaab setting.

The 50-50 principle is evidence of an overall awareness of the HoC. However, it seems that it is conducted in an ad hoc manner and without consistency. Not only is it not mentioned in DRC's overall organisational strategy, there is no strategic document for it within the specific Kenya context, which constitutes a hindrance for conducting it in a successful manner (cf. Fowler 1997:45). Apart from that, the 50-50 principle in itself might not facilitate sustainable development for the HoC. Supporting the HoC and refugees with the same activities/services and serving the HoC in order to *"avoid conflict over scarce recourses"* (cf. DRC 2009a:32) might mean that specific HoC needs are not assessed and met. This could be one explanation why there is a tendency towards a short term approach in DRC's work and a general low level of sustainability in the HoC work.

On the facilitating side DRC seems to have a participatory approach in their work and a good relationship with the HoC which is a positive element when creating sustainable development. It is however not clear to what extent this is used when it comes to involving HoC for the HoCs *own* development. The fact that DRC already has the experience of involving the HoC, however means that there is scope for more participation when it comes to activities directed at HoC development. Another facilitating element in DRC's HoA programme is the experience of CDRD in Somalia, which means that there is experience, capacity and knowledge within the organisation when it comes to sustainable development components like advocacy and involvement of civil society organisations.

5.3 Relationships

This section contents an analysis of the government/local authorities, civil society, other INGOs and donors in order to assess what these actors do for sustainable development in the HoC around Dadaab and how the nature and capability of them constitute hindering or facilitating elements for DRC when it comes to engage in sustainable development in the HoC.

5.3.1 Government/authorities

As outlined in the theoretical framework, capability, willingness and strength of the local government are important factors, since these authorities are the duty bearers. The possibility for fruitful partnerships with government/other authorities is also crucial for an INGO in order to fulfil its objectives. Since the HoC consists of Kenyan citizens, Government of Kenya (GoK) is the responsible actor for development planning for this group of people. When looking at GoK's Kenya Vision 2030, the overall aim of the plan is "...*to realize a higher and sustainable growth of the economy in a more equitable environment, accompanied by increased employment opportunities*" (GoK 2008:35) and one of the objectives within the political development perspective is *"to ensure that locally defined needs are met"* (ibid p 135). This sounds on one hand promising, but on the other hand the refugee camps and the Kenyan encampment policy is not mentioned anywhere in the entire plan. Taking in to consideration that the North Eastern Province accommodates almost half a million Somali refugees, GoK could be expected to acknowledge and address the special set of challenges that this area and the HoC contain.

Just as the Vision 2030 does not mention the refugees or address the area around the camps as being a refugee hosting community, the district plans are not addressing the issue either. We have not been able to access information on plans for the Wajir South or the relatively new Dadaab district, but in The Lagdera and the Fafi District Development plans of 2008, refugees are only mentioned in respect to environmental degradation (RDE et al. 2010:26pp). Again, it is noteworthy that the impact of the refugee camps is not taken into consideration, and that the specific needs, this arises is not addressed. It seems that the GoK is neglecting the Dabdaab camps as well as the HoC. At least the HoC is not addressed as being a HoC, and thereby the specific difficulties are overlooked by the duty bearers. This of cause is a big hindrance for an INGO like DRC. First of all it becomes more difficult to make service deliveries sustainable since the government will most likely not perpetuate the good work, second of all success in advocacy of HoC concerns becomes harder and third of all initiating and maintaining fruitful partnerships on HoC work is less likely to be successful.

In line with the above, Madsen expresses that GoK to a large extent neglects the Northern and North Eastern Kenya because the host population originates from Somalia and that the area therefore to a higher extent than other provinces is left to local power holders. According to Madsen (2011), these local authorities are not very constructive partners when it comes to HoC development, since they put pressure on UNHCR and NGOs and take advantage of the situation for their own benefit. They have become what Madsen calls "*good clients*" and many NGOs often feel obliged to give the local politicians something in

return - "*political sweeteners*" - for operating in the camps (Madsen 2011). This is not a picture of capable governance that serves the interest of the people and welcomes professional partnerships with INGOs, such as Lewis (2001:6,33p) and Bratton (1989 in Edwards & Fowler 2002:198) outline as positive conditions for an INGO to work under. The fact that the circumstances of the Dadaab camps is used by local authorities as an opportunity for serving own interests and exploiting the many NGOs, constitutes a clear hindrance for fruitful cooperation between the them and an INGOs like DRC, and it limits the scope for creating sustainable development in the area.

The absence of government leadership also makes coordination between the various actors difficult, since GoK is the natural responsible coordinator. ISLP recommends development agencies to have an integrative approach to the refugee-HoC issue (RDE et al. 2010), but for an INGO to take this approach is also a difficult task under the given circumstances. With GoK having the formal responsibility for HoC and UNHCR being responsible for refugees there is no obvious binding link or coordinating body for an integrated approach, and the GoK might be disinclined to initiate or cooperate on HoC initiatives that take into consideration the refugees since the government disclaimed the responsibility for this group of people.

A positive initiative from GoK is the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) which is supported by World Bank, EU and Danida. This project includes all arid land districts in Kenya and therefore also the Dadaab HoC districts, Garissa and Wajir. The project is according to the homepage *"...a longer-term development-oriented project..."* and it focuses on empowerment of communities and investment on community level (ALRMP 2009). This is a positive sign of sustainable development approach from the GoK's side and it gives scope for taking into consideration the specific local needs of the district. The project is carried out by District Steering Committees that comprises of government representatives, local leaders of the district as well as local NGOs and INGOs. This is a sign of coordination and interaction between different actors, and this is facilitating for a sustainable approach. When asking Smith about DRC's government relations, he mentions cooperation with the District Steering Committees. Unfortunately we have not been able to gain more information on the precise nature of this relationship, but the cooperation indicates that DRC *do*es have a connection with important authorities. Since DRC operates in what Fowler (1997:93) calls an open system, it is crucial for the organisation to manage the different relationships and maintain a cordial relationship with the government. A body like a District Steering Committee is a means for DRC to create and maintain a healthy relationship with both government and other stakeholders and manage these relations in a fruitful way. Furthermore, DRC can exchange knowledge and experience with the committee actors and this way create what Lewis (2001:74) calls synergy through partnerships. At the same time the cooperation is evidence of the, according to Lewis, important coordination, and the incorporation

of local NGOs shows a participatory approach to development. All these are facilitating factors for DRC's possibilities for creating sustainable development work in the HoC of Dadaab.

However, the ALRMP and the District Steering Committees are still operating with individual plans for each district and a HoC across the districts is not defined. This is symptomatic for the GoK's lack of HoC focus and puts a hinder on DRC's scope for taking an integrated approach.

5.3.2 Civil society

According to The Kenya Denmark Partnership Strategy (KDP), Kenya has a relative strong and alive NGO-environment, which is recognised – also by the GoK itself - as playing an important role in the developmental work and encouragement of good government management and respect for human rights (Danida 2006:17). Madsen agrees that Kenya generally has a strong civil society, but in the area around Dadaab she says - and generally in the fringe areas - there are not a lot of civil society organisations (CSOs) operating. ISLP is backing up this picture. The report lines up the actors working for the HoC, and here only three local NGOs are mentioned, namely the African Development and Emergency Organization (ADEO), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Fafi Integrated Development Assistance (FaiDA) (RDE et al. 2010). For an INGO like DRC this means that there are not a lot of actors that can be the binding link between the HoC and the external intervention DRC constitute. As outlined in the theoretical framework, a strong civil society can contribute to a community rooted and participatory approach that takes into consideration the specific needs and wants of the HoC. There are only few organisations to take over DRC's work and be a catalyst for further development and sustainable impact beyond the DRC activities, and this constitutes a hindrance for sustainable development work.

One problem is the number of CSOs; another is the nature of them. Of the previous mentioned CSOs active in the area, FaiDA is only working with environmental issues (FaiDA 2011), ADEO has health, malaria, and HIV as core areas (ADEO 2011) and NCCK has health, sanitation and education on the agenda (NCCK 2011). These are first of all mainly humanitarian oriented activities and second of all, for AEDO and NCCK, the HoC is only one component of their work, refugees being the main target group. In line with this, Madsen says that the few CSOs active in the Dadaab district typically build latrines for schools, provide schools with new tables, bore wells, and the like (Madsen 2011). These types of activities create little breeding ground for further development as the services are delivered without ensuring that right holders or duty bearers are influenced and capable of perpetuating the services. When the CSOs are not engaged in development work and are not used to take a development approach to the community work, it makes it more difficult for DRC to find competent partners for sustainable HoC activities. This also means that DRC can not draw on

the civil society's strengths, capabilities and experiences when it comes to development work in the area and how it might be conducted successfully. The low number of CSOs and the lack of knowledge and know-how among the CSOs constitute a serious hindrance for DRC's possibilities for being successful with sustainable development intervention in the HoC.

A third issue with the CSOs in the Dadaab district is that they, according to Madsen, to a large extent are allied with and controlled by the local district. In order to operate as a local NGO in Kenya, each organisation needs a permission and registration from the local authorities to whom they also pay taxes (Madsen 2011). According to Madsen, the local parliamentarian in the Dadaab district has even more power than a person in his position normally has, as he is simultaneously deputy speaker in the central government and the owner of the largest transport company in the area. This makes him an extremely powerful person and it also leads to a mix up of business interests and politics (Madsen 2011). These power relations of cause puts a limit to what the CSOs can do in the community and not least puts a limit to the possibilities and effect of possible advocacy work. This means that the CSOs are not only few and focusing too little on development work, they are also relatively weak.

The lack of a strong civil society puts a limit to sustainability in service delivery work and to successful advocacy work for DRC. CSOs in the Dadaab region could be strong advocacy partners because they are locals and therefore have a natural good will/trustworthiness in relation to other local bodies. As Fowler (1997:8) notes, CSOs have the potential of being good mediators and they can minimise the misuse of power from authorities. But under the above described circumstances, the CSOs in the Dadaab district are not in a good position to minimise power misuse of local or central authorities. Nor are they strong mediators or advocacy partners since they lack those activities in their current programmes.

It has been a bit difficult to find information on DRC's actual relation with the civil society in Dadaab and the only source we have on this matter is Smith (2011). According to him, DRC work closely together with local NGOs as for instance Relief and Reconstruction Development Organization (RRDO) and FaiDA. With these NGOs they coordinate the different activities, share plans and combine resources so that they can avoid duplications and complement each other (Smith 2011). DRC also works together with Community Development Committees that represents the communities in all matters between agencies and the HoC (Smith 2011). But we do not know to what extent DRC draws upon the experience and knowledge from these committees. To all appearances DRC cooperate with some local NGOs in the best way possible under the given circumstances.

5.3.3 Other development agencies

There are many actors working with the refugees in the camp setting of Dadaab, but not as many working with the HoC. An indication of this is the unbalanced funding; in 2009 USD 82 mill was given by funds to refugee operations compared to USD 5.5 mill that was given to operations in the HoC (RDE et al. 2010:9). This in itself means that there are fewer potential partners for an INGO like DRC. As argued in the theoretical framework partnerships with other INGOs can create synergy and facilitate instrumental value of service deliveries, and therefore engaging in partnerships is more sustainable than operating alone. For DRC, successful partnerships on sustainable HoC development work requires capable potential partners that aims at HoC development. When looking at the list over HoC initiatives provided in ISLP, many of the organisations are focussing solely on the environment and others are almost purely giving humanitarian assistance (RDR et al. 2010). All of the INGOs on the list are working primarily for refugees and secondarily for the HoC, which indicates that these INGOs' expertise lie within the refugee issues. This is backed up by ISLP, where it is stated that many humanitarian agencies that become involved in development work in the HoC do not have the right competences or skills among the staff to deal with the different approaches that development work demands. This means according to ISPL that these agencies continue doing what they know how to do, which in turn leads to too much focus on humanitarian hand-outs where long term development is actually more needed (RDE et al. 2010:66p). The HAP-report calls many of the programmes deployed by the agencies in the HoC "*reactive*" and "*fire fighting*" (HAP 2010:19). Several members of the HoC said that implemented projects lacked real impact and sustainability and they complained over duplications of efforts between the agencies (HAP 2010:19). Another source adding to this picture is Madsen (2011). According to her, the INGOs working with the refugees sometimes want to "*buy indulgences*" for the HoC (since they are often more disadvantaged than the refugees) by performing some support to the host people as well. The problem is that this often means duplications of what is done for the refugees, even though these two groups generally do not have the same needs (Madsen 2011).

It seems to be a general issue that short term relief intervention for the refugees is transferred directly to the HoC work, that the agencies working in the HoC is actually not specialised on development work, and that the agencies are not there to help the HoC in the first place. As already established, humanitarian assistance has a lower degree of sustainability than development intervention, and as the majority of the INGOs are taking a humanitarian approach to the HoC work it is difficult for DRC to work with a more development oriented approach alone. If there are few other agencies to cooperate with, the possibilities for creating synergetic activities and sustainable projects are limited.

UNDP is a large, capable and clearly development oriented organisation, but in UNDP's Kenya Country Programme Action Plan from 2009-2013 there is no mentioning of the refugees or a HoC with special needs. The Action Plan is led by GoK and anchored in the development priorities of Vision 2030 (GoK & UNDP 2009). What UNDP can do is therefore strongly limited by GoK's plans, and as we know, Vision 2030 has no mentioning of refugees or a HoC with special needs.

One of UNHCR's three pillars under their Dadaab operation is HoC, but we have not during this study seen any evidence of UNHCR work in HoC (for instance UNHCR is not on ISLPs list over HoC initiatives and actors), and according to Smith, UNHCR has for many years *"ignore*[d] *the plight of the host community (...) concentrate*[ing] *on refugees saying their mandate in Dadaab is to serve refugees forgetting that 80 % of the well being of a refugee depends on their relationship with the host community"* (Smith 2011). It is clear that Smith is not satisfied with UNHCR priorities, and the absence of UNHCR in HoC work could be seen as a hindrance for of successful HoC coordination. UNHCR is a relatively strong body with the ability to take the lead, and because of its knowledge on the refugee issues it could potentially facilitate an integrated approach to refugee-HoC concerns. UNHCR is not only an implementing agency but also an important donor for most of the INGOs working in the Dadaab area, which means that UNHCR's priorities impact the overall INGO work in the area. This suggests that HoC is being under-prioritised by many INGOs due to the dependency on UNHCR funding.

When it comes to HoC work, many sources have identified a lack of coordination between the various actors. ISLP found that both humanitarian and development agencies involved in HoC programmes often manage their own individual programmes with little or no coordination with other actors (RDE et al. 2010:66p). According to Madsen no one has the overview over what actors and donors are actually working with in the HoC (Madsen 2011). This means that no one knows what is actually done and how much money is donated, which makes a coordinated response to HoC needs very difficult. In lack of a formal coordinating mechanism, DRC took the initiative in 2010 to host monthly HoC coordination meetings for both local NGOs and INGOs who could then share information and experiences and in a coordinated manner collaborate with GoK and local officials (HAP 2010:6). In Smiths words "*DRC was recognised* [by other international agencies] *as the lead agency in host community issue"* (Smith 2011). It is interesting that an INGO specialised on refugee issues with a relatively low capacity on development coordination - compared to a typical coordinating body like UNDP - is recognised as the most capable actor for this job. From the HAP-report it is understood that, after the initial meetings, DRC advocated for OCHA (UN's Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) to take over the HoC coordination which means that these meetings are now being held by OCHA (HAP 2010:6). OCHA is, opposite DRC, a natural coordinating body.

On the other hand it is – as the name reveals – a humanitarian agency which means that they are disinclined to take a long term development approach in the HoC work.

In line with the general picture outlined in this section, DRC - according to Smith (2011) - experiences a lack of other INGOs when it comes to HoC work. To start with, DRC's HoC support was implemented by CARE who had been present in Dadaab since 1991 and already did some HoC work there. But from 2009 and on, DRC decided to implement itself (DRC 2008). According to Samberg this decision was made because CARE was too focused on humanitarian work; *"they did what they are good at, and that is working with refugees",* he says, and they did similar things for the HoC such as building schools and wells (Samberg 2011). This makes sense in relation to the general picture outlined above, where there is a lack of potential development oriented partners working in the HoC. According to Smith DRC's main INGO partners are World Concern, Samaritan Purse and Horn Relief with whom they coordinate through *"...sharing work plans and gaps so as to combine resources and avoid duplication at the same time to complement each others' efforts"* (Smith 2011, sic)*.* This approach is potentially facilitating for sustainable development as it creates synergy in the partnership. DRC also seems to be aware of avoiding duplication and other negative outcomes of bad coordination mentioned in the above. However, all three INGOs are mainly focussed on humanitarian assistance and therefore – like CARE – do not constitute proper partners in long term development oriented work for DRC.

5.3.4 Donors

In the Danida Proposal 2009-11, under the pillar of *protection of right to livelihood*[13], the following donors are listed: SIDA[14], ECHO[15], FAO[16], UNHSTF[17], IFAD[18], OFDA[19], and UNHCR[20] (DRC 2009a:33). These donors have different foci; some are more humanitarian oriented and others have mandates that go hand in hand with sustainable development[21]. From this we can conclude that among DRC's current donors there are

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[13] We have chosen to leave out the donors under the pillar of *protection of right to life* since these can be expected to be more humanitarian oriented donors. Under the pillar of *right to protection* no donors are listed.

[14] Styrelsen för Internationellt utvecklingsarbete

[15] European Commission's Humanitarian Office

[16] UN's Food and Agriculture Organization

[17] UN Human Security Trust Fund

[18] International Food Distribution Association

[19] OFDA (USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

[20] UN High Commissioner of Refugees

[21] Source: Homepages of the donors, see bibliography

values and mandates that can potentially facilitate sustainable development and others that will most likely not constitute a willing donor for this kind of long term aid. An important aspect is, that all of DRC's funding is short term with ECHO's funds e.g. running 6-12 months and the Danida sponsored programmes normally running for maximum two years, which is the general maximum time (Samberg 2011). It is most likely the donors' own principles that determine the time frame for funds (i.e. nothing that DRC can influence), and this short term funding suggests that the donors are focused on quick and measurable results. At least the short time funding cycles encourages proposals focussed on these elements. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the donors' criteria are often determining an NGO's goals and their choice of intervention which can lead to 'goal deflection' - away from the NGOs own objectives. Therefore, the criteria and principles of DRC's donors are crucial for DRC's scope for working towards long term sustainable development, and the short term funding is a clear hindrance for this.

Danida is not the biggest donor for DRC, but according to Samberg, it is the most important one. "*We exist for them*" Samberg (2011) says about DRC's relation to Danida, and he emphasise Danida's role as DRC's "*core donor*" (Samberg 2011). It is therefore interesting to look at Danida's priorities more closely in order to get a picture of what values and principles this donor operates with. A very important tool for Danida is the Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI). These principles for Danish development aid have a regional perspective (Danida 2008), which fosters an integrated view on the issues as well as a HoC concern and is therefore a facilitating step towards funding for regional approaches. DRC also has this regional approach to the entire Horn of Africa (HoA) and according to Samberg the 50-50 principle was actually introduced partly because it fitted the ROI (Samberg 2011). This way, the ROI has been a huge facilitating factor for DRC when it comes to defining the HoC of Dadaab as a target group in the first place.

One of ROI's guiding principles is to follow the OECD Paris Declaration 2005 (Danida 2008:4), that contents a practical action plan for how to improve the quality of a given aid and the outcome on the development (OECD 2011). Madsen also mentions the declaration and she stresses that support of the government's own priorities is one of the key points in it. According to her, this means that the Danish Embassy in Kenya is a little reluctant to impose own priorities that are different from the GoK's (Madsen 2011). As we know GoK is to a large extent ignoring the North Eastern Province and is not addressing specific HoC issues, which means that GoK's priorities are then somehow setting the limit for DRC's opportunities for receiving funding for HoC intervention from Danida. On the other hand, following government priorities are more sustainable than running parallel programmes that are not founded in a body that is part of the Kenyan society. Aligning priorities with the government can therefore not be criticised as a non-sustainable move,

but as long as GoK is not prioritising the Dadaab HoC it does constitute a hindrance for DRC to receive funding for it.

On the facilitating side, all of DRC's donors for the HoA programmes, apart from UNHCR, are not particularly specialised on refugee issues, which means that they *potentially* also prioritise HoC issues and an integrated approach. This potential of cause has to be combined with willingness from DRC's side to actually take advantage of these donor values and prioritisations. When chatting informally with Rosendahl after the end of the structured part of the interview, he remarked that our choice of HoC as the focus for a project was "*weird*" and he busted out the words "*host community – who cares!?*" (Rosendahl 2011). It is noteworthy that an employee in his position – he is working with the donors - has this attitude towards the HoC. This does not mean that this is the overall approach of the HoA team, but it is questionable how high a priority HoC intervention can be, when an employee like him 'does not care'.

5.3.5 Summing up relationships

The Kenyan government is to a large extent neglecting the North Eastern Province and especially the HoC around Dadaab is not addressed in various development plans. At least the area is not treated and defined as a HoC with the specific needs this implies. There are however positive initiatives from the GoK's side, e.g. the ALRMP that has a long termed development approach to the arid land districts, among these the refugee hosting counties Garissa and Wajir.

When it comes to civil society, this is relatively strong in Kenya, but around Dadaab there are not many CSOs operating and the ones that are operating, are mainly focussed on humanitarian assistance. Apart from this CSOs are, at least to some degree, controlled by local authorities. This makes it difficult for DRC to find capable civil society partners in the HoC and this in turns constitutes a hindrance for using CSOs as a means for creating sustainability in the HoC work. When looking at other development agencies, the picture is similar: There are only a few INGOs working in the HoC in comparison to the camp settings and the focus is more on humanitarian assistance than on long term development. Furthermore, all of the INGOs are operating in the area *because* of the refugees, which seems to result in "fire fighting" activities for HoC that are not addressing this populations' specific needs. Again, this means that DRC's possibilities for creating fruitful partnerships on long term sustainable development in the HoC are limited.

One of the main hindrances seems to be that no actor is taking the lead when it comes to coordination of the operations in the HoC. Although being the natural leader, GoK is not taking on the job, UNDP is barely present and UNHCR seems to be neglecting the HoC issues in favour of the refugees. It is a positive sign

that DRC recognises the importance of a coordinated effort in the HoC area and therefore organises meetings, but DRC is not the ideal coordinator since it does not have the capacity of for instance UN or GoK. If an INGO should be in charge, it would ideally be one with a clear developmental perspective that could facilitate the needed long term development approach. As we have seen in both the organisational principles and the specific programme for HoA, DRC does not have this clear development perspective.

5.4 Bringing the components together…

In the following we will bring up some of the most interesting insights this study has given us. This part will allow us to elaborate on what the three different components of the analysis can tell us when brought together before concluding in chapter 6.

DRC is both a humanitarian and a development organisation. This is evident from the organisational strategy. This fact is also clear in connection to the specific programme for Horn of Africa (HoA) where both relief intervention and more development oriented activities are conducted. In the host community around Dadaab, DRC has a lack of development oriented activities such as advocacy, strengthening of civil society – and an initiative like Community Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD) has not been conducted in the Kenya setting up until now. These are clear internal hindrances for long term development approach within DRC which suggests that DRC is not the most qualified coordinator for HoC development work. Another interesting thought is that DRC might not even be the right organisation to conduct HoC activities. After all they are present in the area because of the refugees and DRC is specialised in refugees. Despite good intentions, the 50-50 principle does not seem to be a leading and thriving principle and the 50-50 approach might not be the best way to go about HoC prioritisation, since doing the same things for both parts means overlooking specific needs in the HoC.

DRC decided not to use CARE as an implementing partner in HoC settings because CARE *"did what they are good at, and that is working with refugees"* (Samberg 2011) which in turn, according to Samberg, resulted in an over-focus on humanitarian aspects. This seems to a large extent to be true for DRC as well and actually for all INGOs in the area. This is most likely due to the fact that all INGOs, including DRC, are present in the area in the first place because of the refugees. DRC works according to the Assistance Framework where a 'durable solution' is the ultimate outcome. But what is a durable, sustainable solution for a HoC? This is not defined by DRC in the organisational strategy which means that there are no clear guidelines for how to work with HoC and no organisational experience. This is a hindrance, and it seems to be true not only for DRC but also for other INGOs. The INGOs that work with refugees are operating in accordance to UN's Refugee Convention, which means that there are some minimum requirements (for refugees) that have to be fulfilled and some clear guidelines for how to act and fulfil their tasks. When it comes to the HoC there are no binding rules for how to treat people that host refugees.

The Dadaab area is full of international agencies working with the refugees but this part of Kenya has traditionally not gained a lot of attention. The attention the area gets now is from actors that are experts in refugee issues and not specialised in development work. This naturally leads to a focus on humanitarian

intervention and solutions tailored to refugees. UNHCR is coordinating refugee work but seems to neglect the HoC – and after all UNHCR might not be the best coordinator as it is also refugee-specialised. Since UNHCR is the leading actor in the Dadaab area and a major donor for most of the INGOs operating in the area, many INGOs might be disinclined to take the HoC focus as long as UNHCR is not doing it. UN's Development Programme (UNDP) would be a more obvious coordinator when it comes to facilitation of development work - or maybe a collaboration between UNHCR and UNDP since this combination of knowledge and expertise might facilitate an integrated approach to the HoC – refugee issues.

Under normal conditions the Government of Kenya (GoK) would be the responsible actor for HoC concerns, and if GoK could take the lead, this would be the most sustainable solutions; GoK the duty bearers and a steady actor in the Kenyan context. Different historical and political circumstances, such as the area being populated with ethnic Somalis, the North Eastern Province's low contribution to the national economy and a high degree of decentralisation of power to district leaders has led to lack of government coordination on development work in this area. Agencies could try to put pressure on the GoK to prioritise the North Eastern Province and acknowledge and address special needs of the Dadaab HoC. But we know that doors such as Danida work under the Paris Declaration which means that they follow government priorities - and then we are back at 'square one' where GoK is the definitive responsible actor. And at the same time there are of course other areas in Kenya in need for development attention and in the light of this, it might not even be justifiable to advocate for more resources to the North Eastern Province and the Dadaab HoC. However, for the government to take a HoC approach to this part of the country is not necessarily a matter of recourses, but could be just a question of changing the perspectives and mind-set. At the moment the GoK has different development plans for each refugee hosting district. Changing this to a more integrated approach would allow a focus on special HoC needs and it would also be facilitating for employment of further development work in the HoC by other actors – for instance DRC.

The encampment policy in Kenya means that the issues in this setting are different from the ones in most other refugee settings. In countries where refugees live among the host population, it is in some ways easier to embrace all different vulnerable groups simultaneously and have an integrated approach to the different populations. In the Dadaab area the separation of refugees and host population requires a separate action plan for each group. This makes an integrated perspective and finding the right balance in help between the two populations complicated. DRC's 50-50 principle is an honourable attempt to deal with this problem of balancing the two populations, but the principle seems to result in duplication of refugee activities for the HoC - and doing the same thing in two different settings is not the same as taking an integrative stance. 50-50 might work if it meant devoting an equal amount of recourses to each group

but with focus on differentiated needs that simultaneously took into consideration the impact that one population has on the other. This in itself is a complex task and again it raises the question about whether DRC is actually the right kind of actor to undertake HoC development work. In a broader perspective we could ask: is it an ideal solution that *any* INGO with a refugee oriented approach - which at least in the Dadaab setting primarily seems to mean a humanitarian approach – engage in HoC development work? On one hand an INGO working in both settings (HoC and camps) can facilitate an integrated perspective, on the other hand the mandate and values of these INGOs might hinder sustainable HoC work. This seems to be exactly the current case in the Dadaab context. But if these INGOs do not take on the job, who will? It might not be possible to attract clear development oriented INGOs to the area as long as there is a vast amount of agencies in the near vicinity, as long as many other areas in the world are in need for development work and as long as the GoK is not advocating for INGOs to prioritise this part of the country.

6. Concluding, discussing, reflecting

In this final chapter of the report we start out with a conclusion that outlines on the most interesting findings of this project (6.1). After this follows a discussion of these findings in a broader and more general perspective and how they contribute to the overall issue of development in host communities (6.2). We end the report with reflections on the study's strengths and weaknesses as well as possible further research avenues that the findings open up for (6.3).

6.1 Conclusion

The aim of this study was to shed some light on the overall issue of development in refugee hosting communities. This has been done through the specific case of DRC in Dadaab. We asked the question: *What hinders and facilitates employment of a long term, sustainable development approach in the host community around the Dadaab Refugee Camps for the Danish Refugee Council?*

The following key findings have evolved:

Facilitating factors

On the facilitating side, there are many development aspects in DRC's organisational strategy and host community (HoC) is addressed as a target group in DRC's mandate which is facilitating HoC focus in a concrete setting like Dadaab. The regional perspective in DRC's Horn of Africa Programme and the existence of a principle of dividing support equally between the HoC and refugees in the Dadaab area is evidence of an awareness of the need to focus on the HoC and to the need take an integrated approach to the issues of the area. The regional perspective is also in line with the principles of DRC's most important donor, Danida, which is facilitating for DRC's possibilities to attract funding for HoC work. It is clear that DRC has an overall participatory approach in their Horn of Africa work and an organisational experience of community based development work and advocacy (currently employed in Somalia but not in Kenya) which also facilitate possibilities for a more sustainable approach to the HoC of Dadaab.

Hindering factors

On the organisational level sustainable development work in a HoC is for DRC hindered by the fact that the organisation is specialised on refugee issues and have no guiding principles for HoC work in the organisational strategy. This in turn hinders successful HoC activities in the specific setting around Dadaab. DRC's 50-50 principle is not clearly followed by the organisation and the principle seems to imply

supporting with the same activities in the HoC as in refugee camps whereby DRC is overlooking the HoC's specific needs. The uncommon setting of a clear separated refugee and HoC population constitutes a hindrance and a challenge in itself when it comes to conducting a meaningful, integrated approach to this issue. DRC's lack of clear development focus and the short term funding cycles also puts a natural limit to the scope for taking long term perspectives. Furthermore, DRC is facing external hindrances. There is a lack of capable, willing and experienced partners - among authorities, civil society as well as other INGOs and UN bodies - in HoC development work as well as a critical lack of coordination on HoC intervention. This makes it difficult for an INGO like DRC to contribute to a broader development plan for the HoC and create synergy with other development actors. Thereby the leadership vacuum constitutes a hindrance for sustainable HoC work around Dadaab

So...

DRC faces both hindering and facilitating factors for employment of a long term, sustainable development approach in the HoC of Dadaab. However, we find that the hindrances are very structural and difficult to overcome. DRC is mainly a refugee-assisting organisation and conducting successful HoC work would mean changing the organisational strategy so that HoC concern is a more continual principle throughout the organisation. But since most HoC-refugee situations throughout the world are different, it is difficult to see this being done in a meaningful way. However, there are elements within DRC's organisational strategy and the capacity on the Horn of Africa that could potentially lead to a more long termed development oriented approach in the HoC of Dadaab than is currently the case. The big "but" here is that there are also external hindrances that are difficult for DRC to change: the lack of competent partners specialised in development work and the absence of a leading body. As long as DRC is not more development oriented and HoC focussed then is currently the case, the organisation needs a partner that is. As it is now, all other INGOs are also present in the area in the first place due to the refugees and are therefore not HoC-specialised. In light of these insights about hindrances, we find reason to question whether DRC and similar refugee-oriented INGOs should actually be undertaking HoC development in a setting like Dadaab.

6.2 A general picture?

Having outlined the findings of the study it is interesting to now devote a bit of attention to the question of whether some of the findings are more general and not just true for DRC in Dadaab. The aim of the project was to shed some light on the *overall* issue host community development, so the question is to what degree this has been achieved with this specific study.

To start with the geographical case, the study has a high degree of external validity *within* the Dadaab setting. The findings are in other words not only relevant for DRC but can also be generalised for other actors in the same setting. In the chapter about *relationships* (5.3) we have been analysing a variety of general conditions for conducting sustainable development work in the HoC of Dadaab. Due to their contextual nature, many of these findings are relevant not only for DRC but also for other international NGOs. We have many analytical points throughout the report that are general for all INGOs working in the setting, and we have many times identified hindrances and facilitating factors for 'an INGO *like* DRC'. Of course the extent to which the findings can be generalised depends on the degree of similarity between another given INGO and DRC.

When it comes to question of generalising the findings of the project to other settings than Dadaab the picture is more complex. The Dadaab case is in many ways unique and on a scientific level the conclusions of this project can not be generalised. When that is said, *every* refugee camp – HoC setting is unique and has its own set of challenges with different historical, political, social, economical and cultural circumstances as well as an individual set of actors which in turn have different agendas, corporations etc. (In other words: No matter what refugee hosting community we had chosen to study, the findings could of course not be completely generalised.) Despite of this, many of the worlds' refugee camps naturally share some of the same attributes. Also, every refugee camp has a host community that has to be taken into consideration some way or another. There is consequently also a high likelihood that many of the same problems and issues that we have pointed out in the project will be present in other refugee – host community settings as well. The picture that we have been able to paint about problems with development focus (instead of 'fire fighting' focus) in the host community, the absence of a leading coordinating body, overlapping activities etc. will most likely be similar or akin to problems in other settings. There is a need for further research in order to assess to what degree this is actually the case. Either way this study contributes to the research area of development in refugee hosting communities. Due to the lack of research in this area we dare to claim that our findings are a valuable contribution despite the limited empirical data and the study's relatively small scale. The conclusions could constitute a small stepping stone towards a further theorising on this area.

6.3 Reflections

With this study we have been trying to draw a holistic picture of the important elements that exist in the specific context around the Dadaab refugee camps. However, we are aware that the picture is not complete, and that not all elements have been touched upon. The internal organisation of DRC has been left out due to limited time and the methodological approaches this would have required (access to organisation, long termed field studies/observations, in-depth interviews with numerous employees in both Denmark and Kenya etc.). The leadership, internal processes, communication, employee values, power structures etc. would have been interesting to dig into, and these elements could have told us something about how internal factors hinder or facilitate sustainable work when it is carried out in the specific context. Throughout the study there have been indications that these factors are important. For instance the differences in attitude towards HoC concerns between employees in Denmark and the employee in Kenya clearly shows differences in value and priorities. Another component that the holistic picture could have benefitted from is a more thorough contextual analysis. We have focussed mainly on the stakeholders of the context and not so much on the historical and cultural issues that constitute the setting that DRC work in. Another important contextual circumstance that we have not touched upon is security. We new from the beginning that security level influences humanitarian and development work conducted in the area, but only after interviewing Smith (a week prior to hand-in) we realised to what extent this actually hinders long term development in the area. According to him: *"...currently most project have been freeze except live saving activities in the refugee camps..."* (Smith 2011, sic).

In the process of doing this study, we have realised that not only security and history plays a big role, but that the entire contextual setting is extremely complex. Painting a holistic picture that includes all relevant components (historical, political, cultural, security related etc.) as well as all the different actors of the setting including their different values, priorities, interrelated power structures and so on would be an extremely extensive study. Even more extensive than we initially thought. In order to create a truly holistic picture we would have need more time and resources. Having interviewed more employees and different employees –such as the ones working in Kenya – probably also would have resulted in a more thorough picture. Interviewing more relevant employees could in principle have been done within the research's timeframe, but we did not manage to do so under the given circumstances. Despite these "buts" regarding the lack of exhaustiveness we do not regard the final conclusions of the project to be less correct. In other words, we have not concluded on more than what can be justified on the basis of the given data. Although the picture is more complicated than outlined in this report, we do believe that the tendencies and broader lines we have been able to identify are valuable. By virtue of its holistic nature, this study can serve as a

pre-study to further research. It would fro instance be possible to do more in-depth studies within each of Lewis' three management areas. Of the three areas, we find that our findings on *relationships* and the elements that lie beyond specific DRC affairs are particularly interesting. The many different actors working in the Dadaab setting form a complex mosaic of interests that are very determining for the overall work in the area. A more extensive stakeholder analysis of all relevant actors and their mutual power relations could provide some answers in terms of what actor(s) are the most appropriate and capable for conduction of long term sustainable development work, and also what actors are actually willing to take on this job. This broader question of accountability in the geographical case is something that really has evoked our interest which is also reflected in the conclusions of this report, where we end up questioning whether DRC and similar refugee-oriented INGOs should actually be undertaking host community development in a setting like Dadaab.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Interview Guide

Interviewee: Madsen

Date: 2nd of December 2011

Interview form: Telephone interview

Regarding development work in and around Dadaab:

1) The report "In search for protection and livelihood" concludes that there is a lack of long term development focus and too much humanitarian focus in the host community work around Dadaab. Does this fit your perception of the situation? If yes, how does this show?
2) How would you describe the nature and strength of the civil society in Kenya in general and in the host community around Dadaab? (Civil society being both formal CBOs and more informal structures like e.g. clan leaders).
3) Are there many CBOs/local NGOs working with development in the host community or with the "refugee–host community issue" (the "issue" being inequality in living standards, unbalanced service delivery, tension etc)? Any major ones you can mention?
4) How would you characterise the aid/development intervention of international NGOs in the host community area and their work with the refugee–host community issue?
5) How is the government contributing to and dealing with the host community development and the refugee – host community issue?
6) How would you characterise the coordination between the different actors (donors, international NGOs, UNDP, UNHCR, civil society, government/local authorities) when it comes to host community development and the refugee – host community issue?

Regarding the Danish embassy's role as a donor:

7) With what criteria does Danida distribute funds and decide whether to support or reject a programme proposal? With what criteria does the Danish Embassy of Kenya distribute funds for projects in Kenya?
8) What role does the "region of origin plan" play when Danida donates money? Are there other documents with principles on what Danida/Danish Embassy of Kenya supports?
9) Does the Danish Embassy of Kenya have any policies/general stands on how the following should be handled by your implementing partners: (i) host community intervention and (ii) the host community – refugee issue?

Regarding DRC/international NGOs' work with host community:

10) How would you characterise DRC's work in the host community around Dadaab?
11) What general challenges/obstacles do you see in your "daily work" for international NGOs to engage in long term development work in the host community that has a sustainable (long term) impact on the community? What are the challenges when dealing with the host community-refugee issue?

Appendix B: Interview Guide.

Interviewee: Samberg

Date: 5nd of December 2011

Interview form: Face to face interview

General:

1) Do you look at vision, mission, principles, mandate, right based approach etc. when you do the proposals? How?
2) How big is your presence on HoA. Resources?
3) Who are your main donors for Horn of Africa/Kenya?

The 50-50 principle

4) What are the principles behind the 50-50 system?
5) How do you define host community (km?)?
6) Why was it introduced?
7) Is there a strategic document on it?
8) Is it only for Kenya/Horn of Africa?
9) Similar situations in other countries DRC operates in?

About the proposal:

10) Where were the mentioned activities conducted?
11) How does DRC decide what activities to engage in and who to help?
12) Why is there no community driven recovery and development (CDRD) in Kenya as in Somalia?
13) There is nothing mentioned in the proposal about advocacy towards government/local authorities in Kenya – why is that?

Relationships:

1) How do you cooperate with International NGOs/UNHCR/OCHA?
2) How do you cooperate with civil society org/local ngos?
3) How do you cooperate with Government/local authorities?
4) Who are your main partners when it comes to refugees & HoC?
5) How is the coordination generally around the Kenyan host community work? (Who is in charge?)
6) Clan-leaders in the area seem to have a lot of power and facilitate interaction between refugees and host population. How do you see their role and how does it influence DRC's work?

Appendix C: Interview Guide.

Interviewee: Rosendahl

Date: 6nd of December 2011

Interview form: Face to face interview

About the proposal and strategic document

1) What is done in the HoC within each programme pillar?
2) What concrete CDRD community driven recovery and development activities on Kenya?

Relationships

3) Who are your main partners when it comes to HoC?
4) How do you cooperate with civil society org/local ngos?
5) How do you cooperate with Government/local authorities?
6) How do you cooperate with International NGOs/UNHCR/OCHA?
7) How is the coordination generally around the Kenyan HoC work? (Who is in charge?)
8) Clan-leaders in the area seem to have a lot of power and facilitate interaction between refugees and host population. How do you see their role and how does it influence DRC's work?

Interviewee: Smith

Date: Answers received 12nd of December 2011

Interview form: E-mail interview

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1) *What does DRC do in the HoC around Dadaab? What activities/advocacy etc?*

   DRC offers WASH activities as package e.g. water sanitation and hygiene promotion

   a. construction of elevated water tanks to institutions like schools, health facilities as well as communities that do not have water supply despite them being in an area that have permanent source of water e.g. Boreholes .
   b. Improve sanitation level both at institutions e.g. schools ,health facilities and communities e.g. construction of latrine to increase coverage to acceptable level according to sphere standard so DRC constructed 201 latrines (both at institutions and community level).
   c. Hygiene promotion activities – capacity building and training of CHAST (children in school) and PHAST (community) for both communities and school pupils.
   d. Support to livelihood groups e.g. women or youth groups have being given capacity building in the field of business development skills and group saving and loans then after the trainings a start up kits are given to the specific groups in a form of material grants.
   e. Support to livestock and agriculture –according to an assessment done by Danida agriculture is not really viable in Dadaab therefore the report advice paradigm shift from agriculture to support in livestock production and other livelihood support as such DRC trained community animal health workers NO 25 to help the vetinery department who severely under staff and therefore after the training a start up animal kit were given to kick start the project which is intended to act as a livelihood project and sustained its self since the service is charge at an affordable fee.
   On the same note DRC constructed No 10 new livestock troughs for four areas in the host communities as a measure to support livestock production.
   f. DRC has a live saving component where we support emergency situation like for example the main source of water in the area are boreholes and in the event that there is a mechanical breakdown in one of the boreholes the effect is felt before people get response so DRC occasionally purchase some pare parts for few boreholes to intervention during such a period.
   g. Distribution of non-food items (NFI's) – occasional support are offered to both new arrivals refugees and pastoral drop out people from the host community by distributing NFI's like tarpaulin, sleeping mats, 20ltr Jerrycans, to help them stabilize get used to their new environment

2) *How do you define HoC?*

a. According to UNHCR definition of host community area: its 50kilomitters radius around the refugee camps, but this restriction is mainly due to the scarce resource the UNHCR and its implementing partners vases the huge demand from the host, but according to DRC this rules does not apply we stretch depending on our resource even more than 50km radius.

3) *Who are your main partners when it comes to HoC?*

This questions can be answered in two fronts a. partners in terms of implementing partners e.g. other agencies that do some work in the host community e.g. World Concern, OXFARMGB,RRDO,FAIDA, Horn Relief etc.

b. Partners in terms of our beneficiaries e.g. those focal people that we deal with in the process of implementing our activities in the host community e.g. Community development committee (CDC) representing the communities in all matters between the agencies and the host community while the District steering committee representing the government and the District development committee in charge of developmental agendas in the whole district.

4) *How do you cooperate with civil society org/local ngos on HoC work?*

We work closely with local NGO's like Rapid and reconstruction development organization (RRDO) and Fafi by coordinating our activities together share our work plans and gabs so as to combine resource and avoid duplication at the same time to complement each other's efforts.

5) *How do you cooperate with Government/local authorities on HoC work?*

 This question is partially answered by question 4 Where I mention working closely with government representatives e.g. the district steering committee and the district development committee both chaired by the district commissioner or district officers in his absence (his deputy)

6) *How do you cooperate with International NGOs on HoC work?*

again partially answered by question 4 again, we work closely with international NGO's like World Concern, Samaritan purse, Horn Relief and other who have projects in the host community by coordinating our activities together through host community inter agency coordination forum and share our work plans and gabs so as to combine resource and avoid duplication at the same time to complement each other's efforts.

7) How is the coordination between the different actors generally around the HoC work – is any organisation/authority taking the lead?

At the beginning of 2010, there were no many international agencies working within the host community areas except DRC and most of the agencies in Dadaab were interested in working in the refugee camps with the support from UNHCR, since 2011 partly because of the server drought in the region and the increasing pressure/hostility from the host community and the government joining later due to the insecurity forced many agencies to start some few project for the host community and thus DRC was recognised as the lead agency in host community issues.

8) What role does UNHCR when it comes to HoC work (they have HoC as one of their "pillars")?

For many years UNHCR use to ignore the plight of the host community and use to concentrate on refugees saying their mandate in Dadaab is to serve the refugees , forgetting that 80% of the well being of a refugee depends on their relationship with the host community e.g. donating the land to settle refugees, using the natural forest for their sustainers e.g. collecting fire wood for sell or domestic consumption, security of the refugees, and therefore needless to say that the more cooperation and mutual understanding with the host the better life for a refugee, as this will create coexistence and harmony among the two communities.

9) Clan-leaders in the area seem to have a lot of power and facilitate interaction between refugees and host population. How do you see their role and how does it influence DRC's work?

Naturally in the greater Somali community clan elders are the backbone when it comes to decision making, and host community in Dadaab is not exceptional what we are saying is how do we influence their decision so as to minimise negative impact on our programmes, and the only and the best way is to have cooperation and open discussion with the local leaders who are very helpful once put on board and are very understanding.

10) What challenges are there in working with these different actors? There are many challenges e.g.

Challenges from the host community

1. Illiteracy
2. Competing interest among the local leaders
3. Clan differences

4. High demand for essential services like water, sanitation, health facilities, education, and poor living standards
5. Generally under development of the host community areas due to negligence from successive regime of governments

Challenges from UNHCR and other international NGO'S

1. UNHCR mostly focuses on the refugees and same for many international NGO's operating in Dadaab mainly because UN is their main donor and therefore have little to offer the host community
2. Though there is some improvement there was lack of or poor coordination of agencies working in the host community areas since UNHCR coordinate only refugees projects.
3. Varied interest/mistrust and lack of proper coordination and cooperation among agencies
4. Scarcity of resource vases the demand.

Challenges from the refugees

1. High population of refugees in each camp more than the recommended population of refugees in each camp, according to international sphere standard (one camp 30,000 people)
2. Insecurity
3. Environmental degradation e.g. deforestation, depletion of the underground water levels.
4. Clan/tribal differences among the refugees
5. Constantly sneaking to other part of the nation e.g. Nairobi without valid documentation.

11) *How is the security situation impacting work with the HoC? Situation after Kenya has entered Somalia?*

The security situation before the invasion could be term as good to fair, but with the invasion the situation has deteriorated, the security personnel and agencies staffs being the target and the planting of improvised explosive device on strategic roads commonly used by the agencies has complicated matters and currently most project have been freeze except live saving activities in the refugee camps.

Almost all the insecurity incidents happen in the refugee camps yet activities in the host community have also been affected simply because allocation of security personnel is mainly UNHCR mandate and therefore gives little consideration to host community project since they regard it as not live saving.

Appendix E: Map over Kenya's Districts. OBS, the Dadaab district is new and therefore not on the map. It is carved out of Lagdera.

Source: Werk 2010

Appendix F: Map over Dadaab camps & the host communty area

White = HoC villages, green = the three older camps, yellow lines = Divisional borders (Sebule is in Wajir South, Dadaab and Liboi is in Lagadera and Jarajila is in Fafi District), straight yellow line = international border.

Source: RDE et al. 2010:15

Appendix G

DRC's mission: *"We want to be the best problem-solver in regard to displacement and integration"* (DRC 2011b).

DRC's vision: "No refugee must be in want of help to find protection and durable solutions. And nobody who wishes to be integrated into Danish society must be in want of help to do so. We want to be the best problem-solver with regards to displacement and integration" (DRC 2011b).