

# Normative Contention: European Union and Russian Federation

The Case of the Northern Dimension

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# Abstract

Vladimir Putin's accession to power after 2000s not just brought new era to the Russian Federation but also provided new bounds for the EU-Russian relations. By solving the problems of internal instability and changing its political trajectory, President Putin restored state prestige and Russia returned to world politics with immense ambitions not being just an energy superpower. Not surprisingly normative discussions became an important part of the EU-Russian relations. This thesis proposes to discuss the European Union and the Russian Federation as Normative Powers in the region apart from existing energy relations. Admittedly, in case of energy the Russian Federation is considered one of the normative powers of the world politics. The core of the current strategy of Vladimir Putin is understood as Moscow seems to be ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constituting their relations.

During this study qualitative research and its appropriate methods were utilized. Three pioneering scholars were interviewed and for exploring Russian normativism in trans-border cooperation the Northern Dimensions Initiative was selected as the single case. New institutionalism as a theoretical lens provided foundation to examine the current normative contention.

Subsequently, under Putin's governance Russia has moved away from being a 'norms-taker' to being a 'norms-maker' and accordingly has become very normative offensive in cooperation with the European Union.

*Key words:* Normative Power, EU-Russia, Trans-Border Cooperation, Northern Dimensions, Treaty of Lisbon, Russian Foreign Policy Concept

Words: 20231

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# List of Abbreviations

<b>BEAC</b>	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
<b>CCBR</b>	Council on Cooperation of Border Regions
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CIS</b>	Commonwealth of Independent States
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>CSD/BSR</b>	Committee for Spatial Development in the Baltic Sea Region
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>ECHR</b>	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
<b>ECPHR</b>	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
<b>EEAS</b>	European External Action Service
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FPC</b>	Foreign Policy Concept
<b>IDC</b>	Institute of Democracy and Cooperation
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>ND</b>	Northern Dimension
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>NPE</b>	Europe Normative Power
<b>OFP</b>	Overview of Foreign Policy
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and in Europe
<b>PCA</b>	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
<b>PPC</b>	Permanent Partnership Council
<b>RF</b>	Russian Federation
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty on European Union
<b>TFEU</b>	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization

# Acknowledgement

First and foremost I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Rikard Bengtsson who has supervised me during the work on the thesis. I also take this opportunity to extend my gratitude to all the professors and staff members of the Department of Political Science at the Lund University for their efficiency, support, professionalism and sympathy. Furthermore, I would like to express my special gratitude to the Caucasus Research Resource Centers' (CRRC) staff and particularly to the chairman Mr Gursel Aliyev for generous assistance. Finally, I would like to give my best regards and thanks to my family for being supportive and understanding during the entire period.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Research Background

The relationships between the Russian Federation (RF) and the European Union (EU) have been an actual topic over years and prominent scholars devoted numerous papers to the topic approaching to these relations in different terms, such as competition and partnership (Gomer and Timminis, 2009), confrontation and alliance (Karaganov and Yurgens, 2009) or conflict and cooperation (Prozorov, 2006). The central objective of the thesis is to investigate the Russian-European relations, in the context of the institutional structure of relations and mainly to discuss parties in the scope of normative power. A basic assumption is that fall of the Soviets and establishment of Russian Federation within ‘the values of Soviets’, caused disaggregation between sides. Within evolved relationships, as mentioned by Gomer and Timminis, there are three modes of cooperation between Russia and Europe: strategic, normative and pragmatic. The strategic mode refers to fundamental agreements between Russia and Europe where addressed to common agenda and the normative mode of cooperation the shared set of norms and values underpinning the relationships are implied. Finally, the pragmatic mode suggests cooperation being conducted in a short-term and with relevance, ‘tactical calculations’ (2009, p. XXV).

The Russian Federation and the European Union are close partners in all major fields, including economy, security (internal and external) and energy sector. Furthermore, cooperation also covers foreign policy and crucial security issues, mainly combating against illegal migration, organized crime and terrorism. In other words, in his Diplomatic Yearbook Sergey Lavrov, the current Foreign Affairs Minister of RF pointed out that, “Being the largest geopolitical entities on the European continent, Russia and the EU are interdependent in many spheres, linked by their common civilization roots, culture, history, and future. The agenda of our interaction is multidimensional and covers various sectors. We are willing to enhance it – on the basis, of course of equality and mutual benefit” (Russian Federation Diplomatic Yearbook<sup>1</sup> 2010).

The roots of the official relations between Russia and the European Union go to over 20 years ago when on 18 December 1989 the very first document was signed. The document that referred to regulating economic relation between the EU and the USSR (later Russian Federation) titled as Agreement on Trade and

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<sup>1</sup> Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Russia-EU relations, available at “<http://www.russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-relations>”, date of access: 11/02/2012

Commercial and Economic Cooperation. It was the principal historical agreement that was considered as the main grounding for cooperation establishment. Four and a half years later, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed (24 June 1994). It was a major document providing an enhance cooperation in political, trade and economic spheres as well as the in legal and humanitarian areas. This agreement was a significant step forward for establishing a solid cooperation. Next step in the development of relations was at the summit in St. Petersburg (May 2003) where sides agreed on the concept of four Common spaces: a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Common Space of External Security and a Common Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects. The implementation programme to Common Spaces conception was adopted in Moscow summit (May 2005) and was titled as 'Road Maps'. Later in London summit (October 2005), Russia and the EU stated on changes necessity in the legal foundation of the four Common Space concept and in Sochi Summit (May 2006) sides reached a political agreement and started work on the new basic document, aimed for establishment of new and more effective mechanisms for the implementation to Common Space.

Russia is one of the main partners of the European Union (EU) and has more agreements with the Union than with any other multilateral entity as from the perspective of Stephen White and Margot Light, "the intensity of contacts between Russia and the EU is greater than the regular contacts Russia has with any other organization" (White and Light 2009, p. 41). After the US and China, the recent year statistics analysis shows that the Russian Federation became the third trade partner of the EU. Figures (Eurostat) for the annual turnover between Russia and the EU member states for 2000-2008 exceeds 200bn Euros. It's important to note that though dropping after financial crisis in the Europe, figures are currently growing rapidly. The European Union is of the main importer of energy resources and following dependency making Russia the biggest supplier of natural gas.

Since end of the Cold War, the scope of relations defined as strategic partnership. The very first official treaty between the European Union and the Russian Federation signed in 1995, titled the 'Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)'. Since 1990s, the European Union has concluded ten partnership and cooperation agreements with Russia, countries of Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia (Council and Commission Decisions on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 99/602/EC; 99/614/EC; 99/515/EC; 99/490/EC; 99/491/EC; 98/401/EC; 97/800/EC; 98/149/EC; 99/593/EC; 2009/989/EC). The aims of these partnerships are, "to provide a suitable framework for political dialogue, to support the efforts made by the countries to strengthen their democracies and develop their economies, accompany their transition to a market economy and encourage trade and

investment<sup>2</sup>". The partnerships also cover legislative, economic, social, financial, scientific, civil, technological and cultural fields (ibid). The PCA plays an essential role in the creation of the necessary conditions for the establishment of a free trade area with Russia. According to Prozorov, starting from that period, "...strategic partnership became a staple phrase of the official discourse of EU–Russian relations..." (2006, p. 3). The Union's paper on Common Strategy with Russia has clearly drawn attention to several strategic goals for the relationship, described as follows:

"Maintaining European stability, promoting global security and responding to the common challenges of the continent through intensified cooperation with Russia. The Union remains firmly committed to working with Russia, at federal, regional and local levels, to support a successful political and economic transformation in Russia. The Union and its Member States offer to share with Russia their various experiences in building modern political, economic, social and administrative structures, fully recognising that the main responsibility for Russia's future lies with Russia itself. The European Council therefore adopts this Common Strategy to strengthen the strategic partnership between the Union and Russia at the dawn of a new century. The European Council recognises that the future of Russia is an essential element in the future of the continent and constitutes a strategic interest for the European Union. The offer of a reinforced relationship, based on shared democratic values, will help Russia to assert its European identity and bring new opportunities to all the peoples of the continent. The enlargement of the Union will further increase these benefits and opportunities" (1999/414/CFSP, 4 June 1999).

As regards to the Union's other documents such as Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on relations with Russia, solid relations with Russia are also indicated as:

"Russia is an important partner, with which there is considerable interest to engage and build a genuine strategic partnership on the basis of positive interdependence. Russia is our largest neighbour, brought even closer to the EU by enlargement" (COM/2004/0106 final).

The solid and closer relations also have been indicated in several Russian official documents such as Russia's Midterm Strategy towards the EU where it is identified as "the strategy is aimed at the development and strengthening of strategic partnership between Russia and the EU in world affairs and prevention and settlement, through common efforts, of local conflicts in Europe with an emphasis on the supremacy of international law and non-use of force. It provides for the construction of a united Europe without dividing lines and the interrelated and balanced strengthening of the positions of Russia and the EU within the international community of the 21st century" (Prozorov 2006, p. 3).

The problematic aspect originated in this kind of close partnership brings up the necessity for amity or enmity discussions. The discussions provide a specific approach entitled as "value gap" between sides, or as Gomer and Timminis put it forward, "...[a] value gap between Russia and the West was perceived to be widening with the latter facing a difficult challenge of balancing values against

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<sup>2</sup> EU External relations, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) available at [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/external\\_relations/relations\\_with\\_third\\_countries/eastern\\_europe\\_and\\_central\\_asia/r17002\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_central_asia/r17002_en.htm), date of access: 12/02/2012

interests in the pursuit of a strategic partnership with Russian Administration.” (2009, p. XX). After elections in Russia (2000), Vladimir Putin accessed to the power and implemented reforms and shift of political orientation that especially caused deterioration in the current relationships and the number of the problematic issues has retarded progress in relations.

### 1.1.1 Research Purpose and Scope

This thesis proposes to discuss the European Union and the Russian Federation as Normative Powers in the region. On the other hand, the ultimate goal of the paper is to analyze Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation that were ratified under Vladimir Putin’s presidency and titled by scholars (Sakwa, 2009; Makarychev, 2008) as, “Russia towards New Realism” or “Normative Offensive”. In other words, this study concentrates on defining Russia as Normative power, apart from existing energy relations between sides. Most pioneering and considerable scholars have argued over the decades on relations between European Union and Russia indicating the inevitability of divergences or competition between sides (Kanet, 2010; Haas, 2010; Haukkala, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Averre, 2009; Medvedev, 2008). As mentioned above, this study neglects energy relations between sides. Undoubtedly, the Russian Federation is (considered) a normative power that found its justification in the papers of considerable scholars of Russian or European studies (Romanova, 2011; Averre, 2009; Hopf, 2008). Normative power as a term acquired popularity during the last two decades and in international arena the United States and the European Union are considered normative powers because of their ability to establish normative principles and to apply them to different realities. Russian Federation also started playing an important role in the region since Vladimir Putin’s presidency (2000). Trajectory of state political system has been changed and Russia became a ‘normative offensive’.

### 1.1.2 Thesis Outline

This paper consists of the following chapters. *Chapter 2* gives an overview of global governance and conceptualization of power as well as defining of the notion of normative power. *Chapter 3* covers the understanding of institutional relations, in that stance institutionalism is discussed and indicated as a theoretical framework of this study. *Chapter 4* covers the utilized research methods, includes data collection and operationalization of research. *Chapter 5* reveals the discussion of the Europe Normative Power, includes concept, framework, norms spreading mechanism and limitations. Finally, *Chapter 6* examines Foreign and Domestic Policy Reforms of Russian Federation since 2000 particularly, provides elements of New Realism, profoundly approaches to reforms of Foreign Policy Concepts (2000 and 2007) followed by discussion of Russia as a Normative Power together with specifying the Northern Dimension initiative to examine Russia as a Normative Power.

## 2 Global Governance

### 2.1 Typology of Power

Russian Federation together with the European-Union are the major players in the region for formulating agenda of the global governance. In following chapter author shed light on the discussions of the global governance and as well as by exploring power typology is considered one of the main foundations for the conceptualization of the normative power per se. As proposed by Barnett and Duvall, “the intensifying connections between states and peoples, better known as globalization, are now frequently presumed to create the need for governance and rule-making at the global level” (2005, p. 1). Mentioned statement determines the fact that global governance existence provides main grounding to states and people for cooperating in different fields such as, economic, political, environmental and security matters and cooperation to be realized in the scope of common interests and values. Absence of global governance can provoke several dilemmatic situations, “global governance then is thought to bring out the best in the international community and rescue from its worst instincts” (ibid). Governance and power are interrelated notions where, “governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power” (ibid, p. 2). Analysis of power, “...must include a consideration of the normative structure and discourses that generate different social capacities for actor to define and pursue their interests and ideals” (ibid, p. 3).

Most of international relations researchers refer to framework of realism for defining and discussing power and mostly stand on the well-known definition by Robert Dahl where he indicates that relations between actors in which A has the ability to make ‘B do something that B would not otherwise do’ (1957, pp. 202-3). In other words, power refers to “one state’s capability to use its material resources to ensure the compliance of other states” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 40). According to Scott’s power as a general term is “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate” (2001, pp. 1-2). The notion of the power defined from different perspectives after review of researches in international studies. Lukes pointed out three aspects of the power. Initially, power is a concept which is primitive in that it cannot be defined by making reference to uncontroversial concepts. Secondly, it is essentially contested and always linked to individual positions and assumptions. Thirdly, power is performative - conceptions of power influence our thinking and actions in general (Lukes 2005,

p. 477). According to him “having power is being able to make or to receive any change, or to resist it” (ibid, p. 478).

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have developed the conceptualization of power and divided it into four forms (typology) and included two mechanisms (2005, pp. 3-4). Compulsory power refers “to relations of interaction that allows one actor to have direct control over another” (ibid). In other words, powerful state threatens another and forced to change its policies. Institutional power defined as “...when actors exercise indirect control over others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others” (ibid). Structural power was indicated as next fold and defined as “concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another” (ibid). As to Barnett and Duvall (2005), “this form of power is the workings of the capitalist world-economy in producing social positions of capital and labor with their respective differential abilities to alter their circumstances and fortunes”. Finally, Productive power defined as, “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 3). The mechanism which in they included, firstly refers to “how power works, either through interaction or through constitution”, and secondly, “how the social relations of power are specified, as direct or diffuse” (ibid, pp. 11-14).

**Table 1.** Types of Power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 12)

		<i>Relational specificity</i>	
		<i>Direct</i>	<i>Diffuse</i>
<i>Power works through</i>	<i>Interactions of specific actors</i>	Compulsory	Institutional
	<i>Social relations of constitution</i>	Structural	Productive

Understanding the notion of power is very essential to this study, especially for defining normative power notions based in that typology. In a nutshell, I’m willing to shed light on the above mentioned typology of power in diverse perspective. What is compulsory power? Does an international organization possibly act as compulsory power? Firstly, compulsory power is a good example of the realist concept focusing on the relations between states or actor and where one of them is able to directly influence actions of the other. It is significant to mention Max Weber’s famous definition of power where he defines it as “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability exists” (Weber 1947, p. 52). Sheer influence was explored by several scholars in this field. One of the main works here was done by Robert Dahl, who gives main concept and definition of power from realist perspective, as indicated above. The concept of Dahl is based on the following three defining features:

“First, there is *intentionality* on the part of Actor A. What counts is that A wants B to alter its actions in a particular direction. If B alters its actions under the mistaken impression that A wants it to, then that would not count as power because it was not A’s intent that B do so. Second, there must be a *conflict* of desires to the extent that B now feels compelled to alter its behavior. A and B want different outcomes and B loses. Third, A is successful because it has material and ideational *resources* at its disposal that lead B to alter its actions” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, pp. 13-14).

The Dahl’s concept provided three essential outputs (intentionality, conflict, resources) whether Barnett and Duvall determined, “...the relevant resources being an intrinsic property of actors or are better understood as a part of dependence relationship between two or more actors, the underlying claim is that identifiable resources that are controlled and intentionally deployed by actors are what counts in thinking about power” (2005, pp. 13-14). They pointed out that, compulsory power also exists “whenever A’s actions control B’s actions or circumstances, even if unintentionally” (ibid). As it also shown in the statement of Bachrach and Baratz, “...power still exists even when those who dominate are not conscious of how their actions are producing unintended effects” (1962, p. 952).

On one hand, the compulsory powers are playing an essential role in global governance. As Gilpin revealed, “states, and especially the great powers, are able to determine the content and direction of global governance by using their decisive material advantages not only to determine what are the areas to be governed but also to directly ‘coordinate’ the actions of lesser powers so that they align with their interests” (Gilpin, 2002). On the other hand, besides that states or great powers, multinational corporations have an important role in world politics. Barnett and Duvall indicated that, “multinational corporations can use their control over capital to shape the foreign economic policies of small states and global economic policies” (2005, p. 14). In other words, “[an] international organizations is also exhibiting compulsory power” (ibid). As sum, the compulsory power is not limited to material resources but also as shown by Barnnet and Duvall, “[it] includes symbolic and normative resources” (ibid). As an example, we could take Keck and Sikkink (1998) indicating, “transnational activists, civil society organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations have demonstrated the ability to use rhetorical and symbolic tools, and shaming tactics, to get specific targeted states, multinational corporations, and others to comply with the values and norms that they advance” (ibid, p. 15).

Unlike the compulsory power, institutional power is trying to control actors in indirect ways, as determined by Barnnet and Duvall “formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly” (2005, p. 15). Also authors’ evaluation and comparison on compulsory and institutional power shed light on the following different aspects of these typologies:

“Firstly, compulsory power is based on resources whereas A to exercise power directly over B, A cannot necessarily be said to “possess” the institution that constrains and shapes B. Secondly, the recognition of institutional arrangements whereas indicates that A and B are socially removed from– only indirectly related to – one another. Thirdly, institutional

power considers the decisions that were not made because of institutional arrangements which are the limit possible opportunities or some biases; it is particularly of collective action (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1975)” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, pp. 15-16).

For finalizing typology of the power discussion, in a nutshell, I will try to bring clarity on structural and productive powers as well. Main concern of the structural power is to determine social capacities and interests, in perspective of Barnett and Duvall who highlighted that, “structural power concerns the structures – or, more precisely, the constitutive, internal relations of structural positions – that define what kinds of social beings actors are” (2005, p. 18). Several scholars researched international relations and explored structural power in their analyses (Rupert and Smith, 2002; Murphy, 1994; Cox, 1992; Latham, 1999) and several of them specified structural power as ‘conceive structure as an internal relation’, where it refers, ‘A exists only by virtue of its relation to structural position B’ (Bhaskar, 1979; Isaac, 1987).

In several respects productive and structural powers coincide because they are not controlled by specific actors or in other words, as pointed by Barnett and Duvall (2005) “both are attentive to constitutive social processes that are” (p. 18). Both sides also indicate the processes of social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how a current process alters actors’ self-understandings and perceived interests (ibid). Only productive power differs from structural power in its subjectivity approach, because, “structural power concerns the constitution of subjects, it typically envisions hierarchical and binary relations of domination that work to the advantage of those structurally empowered to the disadvantage of the socially weak” (ibid). There are two important features for distinguishing productive power and structural power. As Barnett and Duvall (2005) argued that productive power “...related to discursive processes in which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed and from other perspective” and “productive power concerns the boundaries of all social identities and considers all social subjects to be equal individuals whose relationships are constituted by changing understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and social identities” (p. 55).

Consequently, by indicating the multidimensional nature of power, they provided us more clarity to better understanding of the notion of normative power, where the dimension of power often associated with the EU (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

## 2.2 Conceptualization of Normative Power

The term normative power was introduced to the EU literature by Francois Duchene who was the key adviser to Jean Monnet. Ian Manners is considered one of the pioneering scholars in this field who devoted one of his papers to normative ethics of the European Union in 2002. Before I commence discussing Manners’ studies on normative power, it is mandatory a review of other most prominent scholars on the concept of Normative Power as an alternative approach in the

subsequent lines. Starting from the last two decades various international relation scholars defined this notion from different perspectives. In political literature several definitions and concepts of normative power have been identified by scholars. I will try to shed light on mostly three considerable perspectives of EU and Russian studies scholars and will try to finalize it with Manners' five point perspectives on concept of normative power.

Derek Averre is one of the pioneering scholars of the Russian studies who mostly focused on EU-Russian relations in his papers, defining the concept as, "essentially, the power and capacity of a state to shape norms which are accepted by a critical mass of state and non-state actors in the international or regional system over a long duration of time" (Interview 1). Tatiana Romanova, specialized on Russian studies and she defined the concepts as, "the power which able to define norms basically, the power which able to define what is good and what is bad" (Interview 2). In other words, she analyzed and determined that normative power can also be defined as power that sets norms. Sergei Prozorov approach on normative power almost coincides with Manners' (2009) conceptualization perspective. Besides he indicates that, "aside from the caveat that normative power remains power and is irreducible to looser categories such as authority or influence" (Interview 3).

In recent years, the discussion within the concept of normative power became much debated, Ian Manners (2009) provided elements of Concept of Normative Power in world politics (the concept mostly refers to the European Union, but surely can be used as a measure for other cases as well). His conceptualization of normative power consists of the following elements: being ideational; involving principles, actions, and impact; as well as having broader consequences in world politics.

Being *ideational*, as he mentioned "normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than material or physical", and analyzed that, "[it should] involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force" (Manners 2009, p. 2) It is obvious that normative justification implies various timescale and form of engagement politics. Second argumentation is *involving principles*, as ideational non-material justification involves three part understanding, 'linking principles, actions, and impact' (ibid). Manners indicated 'normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted', and explained as 'if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way' (ibid). By underlining *actions* Manners encompassed the idea that normative power should be, "perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles" and underlined that, "if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame" (ibid, p. 3). Continued with the *impact*, noting as 'normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socializing in the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles' he brought clarity to the idea by arguing , 'if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must be involve socialization, partnership, and ownership' (ibid). Finally, by indicating

having broader *consequences* in world politics specified that ‘normative power has three broader consequences concerning the possibility of more holistic, justifiable, and sustainable world politics’ (ibid). He discussed more extensively the possibilities that “holistic thinking demands more thorough consideration of the rationale/principles, practices/actions, and consequences/impact of actors/agents in world politics” continued, “the prioritizing of normative power may help ensure that any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and utilized in a more justifiable way” and finally pointing out the fact that “normative power with its emphasis on holistic thinking and justifiable practices raises the possibility that a more sustainable world politics embraces both the power of ideas, the ‘thinkable’, and physical power, the ‘material’” (ibid).

Subsequently, normative power as mentioned above should be understood, as power of the form where power that is ideational and ability to use normative justification rather than to use ‘material incentives or physical force’ (Manners 2009a, 2009b, and 2010a).

# 3 Theoretical Framework

## 3.1 Institutional Structure of Russian-EU Relations

This chapter is dedicated to analyzing and discussing theoretical framework of my research and I will try to apply institutional theorist perspective. Certainly, the Europe-Russia relationship can be analyzed from different theoretical perspectives such as functionalism, neo-functionalism, institutionalism, regime theory and others. This study considers the Institutionalism approach particularly relevant.

Before commencing a discussion of Institutionalism it is important to review the Russian-EU relations' institutional structure. The relationship between Russia and the EU is on the base of a well-established institutional structure that enables sides to discuss global problems on different levels. Nutshell, the applied formats of the Russia-EU cooperation mostly base on Summits. The Summits play an essential role in institutional structure and define the strategic direction of relations. Generally, they are held twice a year, in the first half of the year it takes place in Russia and in the second half in Brussels according to the practice established after Lisbon treaty. The Russian Federation is represented by President and Ministers who are responsible for specific areas of cooperation with the Union. Representatives from the EU side are the President of European Council, the President of European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Since the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1997, Russia and EU have held a total 30 summits, the latest took place in Brussels on 20-21 December 2012.

The cooperation also covers the following dense meeting agenda such as, the meeting of the Russian Government and the European Commission (working on legal approximation, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement liabilities, etc.), the session of the Permanent Partnership Council at Foreign Ministers' level (including different spheres such as energy, transport, justice and home affairs, science and technologies, education, etc.). The Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) was replaced with the Cooperation Council in 2003 and was considered the main working entity of the Russian-EU cooperation. Also meetings at Political Directors' level (meetings between the Permanent Representative of Russia to the EU and the Chairman of the EU Political and Security Committee) are included. The regular monthly base meetings between Russian Permanent Representative to the EU and the leadership of the EU Political and Security Committee are another useful instrument of cooperation. During these meetings sides discuss and exchange views on wide range of international issues. Agenda of each meeting is based on the provided proposals from both sides and depend on the current international situation.

The senior officials and expert level political dialogue is organized in the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Political Directors' and the Russian Permanent Representative to the EU and the Chairman of the EU Political and Security Committee meetings. The expert-level consultation and discussions cover wide range of international and regional issues. The meetings between Russian and European parliamentarians in the scope of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee are important elements to the political dialogue between parties.

### 3.1.1 Definition, Formation and Changes of the Institution

The first and foremost fundamental question about each approach will be regarding its definition of an institution. During my study several questions rose concerning institutions (e.g. defining institution, formation and changes of institution) and gained importance for studying. This part aims to contribute answering below mentioned set of cases from the perspective of the new institutionalism. What is an institution? March and Olsen argued that “an institution is not necessarily a formal structure but rather is better understood as a collection of norms, rules, understandings, and perhaps most importantly routines” (Peters 2012, p. 28). They provided definition to political institutions as follows:

“Collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what obligation of that role in that situation is” (Peters 2012, p. 29).

They also provided definition of the institutions by the characteristics they display as, “political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations” (p. 28). Institutions as well are defined by their durability and their capacity to influence behavior of individuals. Peters (2012) discussed the main important feature of the March and Olsen conceptualization and argued, “...institutions [which] have a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that influences behavior more than a ‘logic of consequentiality’ that also might shape individual action” (ibid). Other most important feature of the March and Olsen conceptualization is that the Role theory is seen as a more general element of understanding of political institution (ibid).

The second question proposed was about the formation of institution. What is the base of the institution in the formation process? From the perspective of the new intuitionists (March and Olsen), argument, “Norms were assumed to be central to the nature of institutions” (ibid, p. 34). Where do the rules and norms that form institutions come from? March and Olsen’s discussion and initial approach towards mentioned question was “institutions derive a good deal of their structure of meaning, and their logic of appropriateness, from the society from which they are formed” (ibid). The other approach to the conception of formation was mentioned by Selznick (1957) as, “...institutions are created when an

organization is infused with values greater than would be necessary simply to achieve their formal purposes of the organization” (ibid).

The next, concern was about changes inside institutions. So it is clear that, obvious patterns within institutions are not constant, they are changing once they are formed. Changes in the institutions are a normal process, and as mentioned “... one of the strongest and most persuasive component (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). The March and Olsen’s arguments on institutions changes motioned in their famous "garbage can" approach to decision-making. The March and Olsen “garbage-can” approach conceptualizes solutions looking for problems. According to Boin and ‘t Hart (2000) institutional crisis should be counted as another means for conceptualizing changes.

Finally, I’m willing to discuss the operation of the institution. How does an institution work? By mentioning normative institutionalism this question is fully covered and responded. A set of norms for individual behavior is a crucial element in defining manner. Therefore normative compliance is a central factor to the institutions’ functioning from this theoretical perspective. In other words, Peters argued that, “...source of compliance then is derived from a normative commitment to the institution and its purposes” (2012, p. 41).

### 3.2 New and Old Institutionalism Perspective

After defining of institution and the structure of the Russian-EU relations, it requires profound explanation of institutionalism *per se*. In retrospect, the roots of political science go through institutions. Mentioned approach was criticized post-World War II by American scholars and their argumentations were based on more individualistic assumptions, indicating the existence of two theoretical approaches that political science stands on: behavioralism and rational choice (Peters 2012, p. 2). Peters discussed mentioned approaches as, “...assume that individuals act autonomously as individuals, based either on socio-psychological characteristics or rational calculation of their personal utility” (ibid).

New Institutionalism contains many features of the older approach in the respect of understanding politics but it also provides new theoretical and empirical directions. By that relevant example, I will try to explain the differences: the old institutionalist thinkers argued that, the presidential system is significantly different from parliamentary system based on its structures and rules (Peters 2012). The new thinker also argues that there are indeed differences but, “what ways do those two alternative ways of organizing political life differ, and what difference does it make for the performance of the systems” (Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Von Mettenheim, 1996).

New institutionalism is very board theoretical approach as argued by Peters, ‘the new institutionalism is not a single animal’, it contains the number of entities within it (2012, p. 3). The contrast between the new and old institutionalisms in political science has been discussed from various perspectives, for instance Philip Selznick (1996) pointed out that, “New institutionalism has certain

‘deconstructionist’ elements in it because of the focus on the multiplicity and complexity of goals” (ibid). On one hand, the word ‘new’ provides an idea of existence of the old institutionalism as well; on the other hand, it reveals that new version is quite different from the old one. Despite this fact as indicated by me in advance a number of coinciding features exist in these two versions. For providing a broad explanation and comparative perspective, it is inevitable to start my discussion from the old institutionalism and continue later with the new vision. A number of scholars (Carl Friedrich, James Bryce, Herman and Samuel Finer) produced number of work on old institutionalism, but Apter (1991) criticized old institutionalist thinkers, and he articulated that ‘they were simply utilizing different techniques for different purposes as against most contemporary social scientists’ (Peters 2012, p. 3).

The institutions were defined and analyzed by the world most well-known political-thinkers over centuries. Before turning to retrospect of political thinkers’ approaches, the question coming to mind first, is why designing political institutions is required, Guys Peters explained it by, “...mercurial and fickle nature of individual behavior, and the need to direct that behavior toward collective purposes” (2012, p. 3). As one of the first political philosophers Plato analyzed and identified the success of these institutions in governing and indicated the necessity of forming other institutions on base of that observation. The same tradition of the institutional analysis was continued during centuries. In other words for instance, Thomas Hobbes argued, ‘necessity of strong institutions to save humankind from its own worst instincts’, and John Locke argued that, “[to have] a public institutions and began the path toward more democratic structures”. The list can be extended, but the major point will almost be the same as mentioned in “political thinking has its roots in the analysis and design of institutions” (Peters 2012, p. 4).

According to Peters there are the following defining characteristics of the old institutionalism, firstly identified, “law and central role of the law” (Peters 2012, p. 8). As in most Continental countries, law is the essential element of governance and plays a significant role (ibid). Law constitutes the framework of public sector and provides privileges to affect behavior of its citizens. Therefore a political institution is to be concerned by law. A second dominating assumption was the structure, as Peters (2012) argued, “structure determines behavior” (ibid). In other words, structural characteristic of the old institutionalism emphasizes the institutional features of political systems, for instance, such as presidential or parliamentary, federal or unitary etc. He continued the comparativist approach of the old institutionalism and emphasized that formal-legal analysis required the usage of the other systems for finding new alternatives. The next characteristic feature of the old institutionalism is historical foundation and here analysis should refer to retrospect. Finally, the older institutionalists should have a strong normative element in their analysis, as noted, “political science emerged from distinctly normative roots” (p. 11).

Subsequently, old institutionalists developed a rich and important body of scholarship. Besides over the years’ critics directed on to their works but doubtless new institutionalism derived or developed from the root of the old

schools features, for that matter of understanding the new institutionalism understanding institutionalists and school thought between times is required.

New institutionalism emphasizes the importance of formal institutions in facilitating cooperation. In this study, the legal basis for relations of the European Union with Russia was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994) that set principles of the established the institutional framework for bilateral cooperation and dialogue in a number of areas. By focusing on the following argument, we can easily propose that the EU-Russian relations are institutionalized, but the institutions are not automatically working as main stream of the institutionalism propose.

In that case the new institutionalism approach stands out and should be discussed further. The new institutionalism is one well-matched theoretical perspective that provides a tool for analyzing European integration. The success of these two disciplinary revolutions, behaviorism and rational choice were the main background of the new institutionalism. New institutionalism has driven from the works of James March and Johan Olsen (1984; 1989; 1996; Olsen, 2006). The scholars indicated that, “political science, to some extent have been directing far too much of its theoretical and conceptual energies in directions that would diminish the centrality of the political values and collective choice” (Peters 2012, p. 25). In other words, the “centrality of values in political analysis was being replaced with individualistic, and largely utilitarian, assumptions and methodologies” (ibid). March and Olsen further argued that, “organizations and institutions are central for understanding the role of values and collective choices in politics” (ibid). The approach of March and Olsen’s solutions to the theoretical problems have been criticized by several political scholars (Jordan, 1990; Pedersen, 1991; Searing, 1991; Sened, 1991). Dowding (1994) argued that they are, “fundamentally misinterpreted rational choice theory” (ibid). Despite mentioned critiques, March and Olsen’s theoretical perspectives have significantly changed the nature of discourse of the contemporary political science.

There is a particular version or sub-field of the new institutionalism named as normative institutionalism. Normative institutionalism is one of the main theoretical frameworks of EU decision-making on foreign policy. This theory highlights two ways in which European Union’s substantive and procedural norms, provided opportunities negotiate on divergent policy preferences. Normative institutionalism refers to “central role assigned to norms and values within organizations in explaining behavior in this approach” (Peters 2012, p. 26). Normative institutionalism is sometimes seen as the new institutionalism, but not as a particular version. Selznick differentiated that “organizations as the structural expression of rational action and organizations as more adaptive and normative structures” (ibid). March and Olsen made a distinction between aggregative and integrative political processes. And as they indicated, “the former is in essence a contractual form for organizations in which individuals participate largely for personal gain and the latter form of organization comes closer to the idea of an institution as expressing a ‘logic of appropriateness’” (Peters 2012, p. 26). The logic of appropriateness is the central concept in the normative version of the new

institutionalism. Participation in integrative institutions is taken as the base of commitment to the goals of the organization. These distinctions between integrative and aggregative organizations discussed by Etzioni (1975) and he argued that, “organization had three types of power that they could manipulate over members, or perhaps three types of incentives, firstly coercive, remunerative, and normative and continued that the individual members of organizations had also three types of in those structure, alienative, calculative, and moral” (ibid, p. 27).

Accordingly, Peters analyzed that March and Olsen considered “normative basis more appropriate for political action than the calculative basis” (2012, p. 27). Normative institutionalism reflects an influence of the traditional forms of institutionalism that “rejects the full rationality of the autonomous individual assumed to exist in much of contemporary political science” (ibid). Subsequently, the March and Olsen perspective on institutions provided several important theoretical elements to the political discipline. First, going back to the roots of institutionalism, in the other words, as Peters noted, “...[in the] sense of the collective, as opposed to individual”, individuals are very important part of the normative institutionalism (2012, p. 45). The second element considered by March and Olsen is that “behavior in institutions is normative rather than coercive” (ibid).

### 3.3 Delimitation of the Theory

In this part of my study, I want to elucidate the limits of institutionalism that have been the subject of great deal of criticism. One most important critics of theory come through as “natural adversaries of the approach” such as rational choice theorist (Sened 1991, Dowding 1994). The critics was that “unlike their own more explicit assumptions about human behavior, there is little if any explicit argumentation about human behavior in the normative version of institutionalism” (Peters 2012, p. 42). The other most important critiques on the value-based new institutionalism is focused on the internal logic of the theory, while others theories focus on its capacity to explain the political phenomena (ibid). Another, most fundamental criticism of new institutionalism is that, it is not ‘falsifiable’, as mentioned by Peters, “the criteria for the existence of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ within an institution are sufficiently vague [it is not possible to say] they did not exist and ...did not influence the behavior of the members of the organization” (p. 43).

Finally, the role of institutions and "the logic of appropriateness" were in the center of discussions and as Dowding (1994) argued, “March and Olsen have removed human decision-making completely from the process” (ibid). The argument was on the base that even “if institutions do constrain choice there will be some opportunity in practice, if not in the theory, to violate norms, or to interpret institutional values differently, or otherwise to exercise individual judgment” (ibid).

# 4 Methodology

## 4.1 Qualitative Research Design and Data Collection

In this chapter the fundamental characteristics of selected qualitative research design will be explored. As suggested in the previous sections qualitative research methods and appropriate methods were utilized for this study. Generally as argued by Byman (2004) using of the qualitative and quantitative methods increases possibilities for exploring and defining more aspect of phenomenon, as in his words, "...[it] leads to a better result or a better understanding" (1992, pp. 59-61). There are several approaches on qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln approaches convey the ever-changing nature of qualitative inquiry and they define qualitative research as following:

"Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Byman 2004, p. 3).

According to Creswell (2007), "...qualitative research begins with assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of a theoretical lens, and the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem" (2007, p. 37). One of the main purposes of this chapter is to bring clarity to the characteristics of utilized quantitative research approaches and methodology for data collection. As Bryman (2004) revealed, "Quantitative research is associated with a number of different approaches to data collection" (2004, p. 11). To carry out this research, chosen method allows to collect data by using interview method as well as by selecting case study making topic manageable and provides important grounding for the Russian normativism, "researchers collect data in natural settings with a sensitivity to the people under study, and they analyze their data inductively to establish patterns or themes" (Creswell 2004, p. 37). Qualitative research design provides the following features to researchers such as "...appropriateness of methods and theories; perspectives of the participants and their diversity; reflexivity of the researcher and the research; variety of approaches and methods in qualitative research" (Flick 2009, p. 14). In other words according to Flick qualitative research is "...the correct choice of appropriate methods and theories; the recognition and analysis of different perspectives; the researchers' reflections on their research as part of the process of knowledge production; and the variety of approaches and methods (ibid).

The EU-Russian relations especially discussions of their power characteristic provide one of the main grounding for researchers to develop complex picture of the problem or issue under this study. Creswell (2007) indicated that qualitative research involves, "...identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and generally sketching the larger picture that emerges" however, "researchers are bound not by tight cause-and-effect relationships among factors, but rather by identifying the complex interactions of factors in any situation" (2007, p. 39). On the other hand, qualitative research provides a chance to make an interpretation of what: "they see, hear, and understand" (ibid). Creswell (2007) highlighted that the researchers, "interpretations cannot be separated from their own background, history, context, and prior understandings" (ibid).

To carry out this study multiple source of data is required that is considered as a key instrument for qualitative research. The qualitative researchers collect data through examining documents, observing behavior, and interviewing participants (Creswell 2007). On the other hand, qualitative researchers "typically gather multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, and documents, rather than rely on a single data source" (ibid).

Consequently, the chosen study method and research design can be thought as the main logic or the plan of a study. Takona (2002) indicated that the research design is "a logic in a set of procedures that optimises the validity of data for a given research problem" (p. 319). On one hand Mouton indicated that the research design serves to "plan, structure and execute" the research to maximize the "validity of the findings" (1996, p. 175). On the other hand, Yin emphasized that "colloquially a research design is an action plan for getting from here to there, where 'here' may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered and 'there' is some set of (conclusions) answers" (2003, p. 19).

## 4.2 Expert In-Depth Interview

In order to get a comprehensive data on Russian normativism or normative offensive within relations with the EU, three prominent Russian studies scholars have been selected and interviewed by different relevant methods. Selecting informants (experts) realized in the framework of their field. Russian studies experts solved the issue of collecting the necessary data on Russian normativism by means of the following way: two of them selected from Europe base Russian studies institutes (i.e. international experts). One of the experts was selected from one the Russian Federation universities (i.e. local expert) for the determining multi-vision. The logic behind multi-vision in-depth interview provided an opportunity to avoid being bias on different cases, especially on discussions of Russia being great or normative power.

As indicated by May (1997), "the interviews yield rich insights into people's experiences, opinions, aspirations, attitudes and feelings"... however, "...social researchers need to understand the dynamics of interviewing sharpen their own use of the method and understand the different methods of conducting interviews and analyzing the data, together with an awareness of their strengths and

limitations” (p. 110). Kvale (1983) defines the qualitative research interview as “...whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena” (p. 174). Meuser and Nagel (2002) discuss the expert interviews as a specific form of applying semi-structured interviews. Bogner and Menz provided a more clearly formulated definition of expert and expert knowledge as:

“Experts have technical process oriented and interpretive knowledge referring to their specific professional sphere of activity. Thus, expert knowledge does not only consist of systematized and reflexively accessible specialist knowledge, but it has the character of practical knowledge in big parts. Different and even disparate precepts for activities and individual rules of decision, collective orientations and social interpretive patterns are part of it. The experts' knowledge and orientations for practices, relevancies etc. have also - and this is decisive - a chance to become hegemonic in a specific organizational or functional context. This means, experts have the opportunity to assert their orientations at least partly. By becoming practically relevant, the experts' knowledge structures the practical conditions of other actors in their professional field in a substantial way” (Flick 2009, p. 166).

In-depth interview with selected experts was realized for this study. In different literatures we came across the fact that in-depth interviews can be used to achieve different aims. Bogner and Menz suggest a typology of in-depth interviews that includes three alternatives: “They can be used (1) for exploration, for orientation in a new field in order to give the field of study a thematic structure and to generate hypotheses. This can also be used for preparing the main instrument in a study for other target groups. Systematized in-depth interview (2) can be used to collect context information complementing insights coming from applying other methods. (3) Theory-generating in-depth interviews aim at developing a typology or a theory about an issue from reconstructing the knowledge of people working in certain institutions concerning the needs of a specific target group” (Flick 2009, pp. 166-67).

Development in technology provided new alternatives and innovations for realizing qualitative interviews. Researchers commenced using three main types of internet-based qualitative research methods: online synchronous interviews, online asynchronous interviews, and virtual focus groups (Meho 2006, p. 1285). Due to the request of experts, I have organized in-depth expert interviews in different ways, i.e. on the base of emails and as well as via an instant messenger. Questions that experts replied almost overlapped but analyses showed that results do not coincide and this diversity provided fruitful results to this study.

One of the main advantages of in-depth interviewing is the confidential atmosphere in which informants can share ‘sensitive’ information (Boyce and Neale 2006). Informants are able to provide details about their personal experiences, views, and behavior (ibid). On the other hand, the in-depth interview according to Boyce and Neale, “provides much more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys” (2006, p. 3).

Besides advantages, the in-depth expert interview has been characterized by the following limitations. One of the important limitations of the in-depth expert interview is to finding or identifying right experts in the appropriate field of study and also convincing them to give an interview (Flick 2009). On the other hand, as

Flick (2009) identified experts, “demand a high level of expertise from the interviewer - for understanding the relevant, often rather complex processes the interview is about and for asking the right questions and for probing in an appropriate way” (p. 168). Also confidentiality issue is always considered as an important case for expert in-depth interview, “...often, delicate issues for an organization, also in competition with other players in the market ...” (ibid).

Subsequently, indicated type of interviewing (e-mail and voice instant messenger) methods offer more opportunities for qualitative researcher, as Meho (2006) argued it is “providing access to millions of potential research participants who are otherwise inaccessible...” and “...method can be employed quickly, conveniently, and inexpensively and can generate high-quality data when handled carefully” (p. 1293). On the other hand, this method can be characterized by following limitations such as: “[not all] informants have access to the Internet [and] require skills in online communication from both interviewer and interviewees, etc.” (Meho 2006, p. 1292).

### 4.3 Qualitative Case Study and Case Selection

As Byman and Bell (2007) argued, “there is no one way to define case study method” but there are several available conceptions for defining case study. According to him “the basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” (p. 62). Creswell (2007) emphasized that qualitative approach case study is “...investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information and reports a case description and case-based themes” (p. 73). Stake (2007) states “case study research concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question (ibid). Hammersley, Gomm and Foster (2000) introduced three variations in case study: descriptive, explanatory and explorative case study options (pp. 118-125).

In this study, for defining and analyzing Russian normativism in the trans-border cooperation with the European Union, the Northern Dimensions initiative was selected as a single case study. By selecting this initiative as a case study and exploring the Russian Federation’s changed foreign policy enhanced scope of this study and provided profound grounding for analyzing RF foreign policy concepts since 2000s. According to George and Bennet, “a single study cannot address all the interesting aspects of a historical event” and also “it is important to recognize that a single event can be relevant for research on a variety of theoretical topics” (2007, p. 127). According to Donmoyer (2007) there are some advantages of case study. Firstly, “accessibility of case study enables us to get deep information about some phenomena, events, people etc.” and secondly case study “gives opportunity to see the phenomena or events from various frames” (ibid).

According to Creswell (2007) case studies are different and one main distinguishing factor is a size of bound of case (i.e. several individuals, a group, an entire program, or an activity). And he proposed that three variations exist in terms of intent by taking into consideration Stake’s (1995) writings. They are

followings: the single instrumental case study, the collective or multiple case studies, and the intrinsic case study". Initially in a single instrumental case study "the researcher focuses on an issue or concern, and then selects one bounded case to illustrate this issue and secondly, in a collective case study (multiple case study), "the one issue or concern is again selected, but the inquirer selects multiple case studies to illustrate the issue" (p. 74). According to him, the final type of case study design is an intrinsic case study where "the focus is on the case itself (e.g., evaluating a program, or studying a student having difficulty) because the case presents an unusual or unique situation" (ibid). There are several available procedures for conducting case studies (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; George and Bennet 2007), Creswell (2007) identified that "a case study is a good approach when the inquirer has clearly identifiable cases with boundaries and seeks to provide an in-depth understanding of the cases or a comparison of several cases" (p. 74). Creswell indicated that data collection in case study research is typically extensive and Yin (2003) provided six types of information to collect: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations, and physical artifacts (p. 75).

## 4.4 Operationalization

To carry out this study, I have chosen to utilize a single case method that enables profound analysis of Russian normativism in trans-border relations. Accordingly, in global governance Russia as well as other powers is characterized as normative offensive especially after 2000s Russia displayed its strong ambitions in all kinds of relations. The analyses consist of the following parts. As starting point, I have tried to analyze the global governance and in that stance, I have shed light on typology of power for conceptualizing normative power notion. The theoretical lens provided grounding to analyze the institutional relations between sides as well as to narrow down the scope of study. Following variables derived from theoretical lens of study: powerism, normativism, and institutionalized relationship. Exploring Russian political orientation and its foreign policy concepts became an essential element for this study because starting from 2000s Russian political trajectory has been changed and Russia has become one of the main powers of the world political arena and started pursuing normative foreign policy towards counterparts.

By analyzing foreign policy concept of the RF and other relevant documents as well chosen case study allowed me to evaluate and examine Russian normative foreign policy apart from the current energy relations. As mentioned above, Russia is considered as normative power in energy relations with the Union. In the next chapter, I'll provide analysis of the EU normative power concepts that enables comprehending different discussions over normativism per se. On one hand, I will touch upon Russian political transformations (2000-2008) that are considered as starting point for Russian normativism. On the other hand defined variables for this study will be examined in relevant chapters.

# 5 Europe Normative Power

## 5.1 Historical Approach

First, it should be noted that the European Union has been characterized in a very broad sense. Most prominent scholars named the EU differently, Wallace's (1983) approach should be considered as the most important where he characterized the EU as "less than a federation, more than a regime" (Jupille and Caporaso 1999, p. 429). One of the major characterizations of the EU as a power was on normativity that caused discussions and debates over two decades. A concept of normative power concept refers to the place where states (organizations) started playing an important role in other actors' actions, such as productive or structural powers, "power nearly becomes an attribute that an actor possesses and may use knowingly as a resource to shape the actions or conditions of action of others" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 45). Before I start discussing of Europe Normative power (NPE), it is mandatory to note that the concept of NPE conception has attracted much excitement among scholars worldwide, as Bickerton (2007) indicated scholars started describing the EU in some 'adjectival prefixes'. In this regard, what capacities the EU possesses, and to what extent the capacity possessed has an impact in the world politics should be defined in advance. Characteristics of the power possessed by European Union can be enumerated in the following order - civilizing or civilizational power (Duchêne 1972; Sjørnsen 2006a, 2006b), quiet superpower (Moravcsik 2002; 2004), ethical power (Aggestam 2008), postmodern superpower (McCormick 2006), responsible power (Mayer and Vogt 2006), vanishing mediator (Nicolaidis 2004) and gentle power (Merlini 2001; Paddoa-Schioppa 2001). After this brief introduction to the characteristic of the power possessed by the EU, it will be interesting to sum up provided different characteristics and define the main routine of the EU External relations starting with Duchene's approach. The table below presents the summary of the EU power scope.

**Table 2:** Characteristic of power by year

Concept	Period	Point of Reference	Author (selection)
Civilian Power	1970s	Resources/Institutions	François Duchêne
Military power	1980s	Capabilities	Hedley Bull
Normative Power	2000s	Norms	Ian Manners
Legitimate Power	2000s	Legitimacy	Helene Sjørnsen
Ethical Power	2000s	Values/ Ethics	Lisbeth Aggestam

Source: Huelss 2008, p. 7

The ideational dimension of the European Union's external policy is one of the most significant subjects of European Studies. Over the years it was widely discussed and debated to grasp Union's role in world politics, or in other words "a history of the attempt to understand the European Community/Union's place in the international system" (Doidge 2008, pp. 33-34). For grasping and understanding "what the EU is doing" it is required to move beyond the Westphalian concept of state order toward a "post-ontological" stage (Caparaso 1996). The post-modern notion of "actorness without an actor" vividly explains to what extent the European foreign policy continues to be "less than a state, but more than a conventional intergovernmental organization" (Hill 1993, p. 309). That is why, Manners argued that, "think[ing] of the ideational impact of the EU's international identity/role as representing normative power" (Manners 2002, p. 238). As Manners indicated the presence of the EU's manifest in the international arena is 'productive power' or the 'power over concept' (Manners 2002, p. 239).

Research in the context of the 'normative power' in Europe was debated over two decades, Ian Manners counted one of the pioneering and prominent scholars of European Studies, where he has started the prolific debates over the visions, ideations, values and principles of the Union. Firstly, Manners introduced the concept of the Normative Power Europe as the 'ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations' (Manners 2002, p. 239). He noticed the fact that besides the previous conceptualizations of the EU within narrow confines of military versus civilian power, the EU should be counted as a normative power. The European Union is normative power, because "it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity" (2002, p. 46). Therefore, the EU should be learnt according to 'what it is' rather than 'what it does or says' (Manners 2002, p. 252).

The idea of NPE goes with its roots to Duchêne's (1973) 'idée force' and Galtung's (1973) 'ideological power'. Duchêne (1972) defined the EU as a civilian, i.e. 'special international actor whose strength lies in its ability to promote and encourage stability through economic and political means' (Duchêne 1972; Sjursen 2004) rather than physical coercive force. Manners' augmentations of characterization of civilian power are based on three central dimensions. He indicated that civilian power should be characterized by the followings, 'diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems' (multilateralism); 'centrality of economic power' (nonmilitary); and 'legally-binding supranational institutions' (international law) (Manners 2000a, p. 26; 2002, pp. 236-7). And finalizing it can be concluded that the civil or civilizing power concept is much more relevant to "Eurocentric (neo) colonial perceptions of the rest of the world and the importance of state and physical power" (Manners 2006c, p.184).

Even, Manners in his well-known paper (Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in Terms?) indicated that "the idea of normative power in the international sphere is not new – Carr made the distinction between economic power, military power and power over opinion" (Carr 1962, p. 108). For differentiating the concept of normative power from military power (Bull 1982) and the concept of civilian power (Duchêne 1972), Manners (2002) placed the identity and nature of the Union into a different framework in which he aimed for

replacing “the state as the centre of concern and refocusing on the ideations and power of norms as the substantive basics of the EU studies” (2002, p. 236).

Manners defined the European Union and normative power according to three sources that normative power derives from. Those are historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitutionalism (2002, pp. 240-1). As explanation, he argued about the legacy of two destructive wars for historical context. Hybrid polity is a feature of the Union from Westphalian order with supranational and international institutions and political-legal constitutionalism from his perspective come through elite-driven, treaty-based legal nature of the Union (ibid). Aforementioned three features are the main grounding for actors to assemble under the same framework with common principles and values. Lucarelli and Manners (2006) finalized it by mentioning that common principles and values constitute ‘the EU as a political entity’ and ‘EU’s aim of setting standards for the others through means of spreading norms rather than being powerful with either military or economic sources’ (Diez and Manners 2007, p. 175). The legitimacy for the EU norms comes from framework of ‘cosmopolitan law’ and ‘European social preference as the basis for the legitimacy of the EU’s normative’ (Sjursen 2006a, pp. 244-8, Laïdi, 2005; 2006).

Unsurprisingly, the EU’s norm-driven behavior brought tremendous success in sharing and spreading democracy and prosperity not only for member states but also for the rest of the world. Subsequently, the Union is doing system change, not regime change. The Union is doing it slowly and on the basis of partnership. As Bickerton (2011) defined Normative Power Europe can be understood as part of a wider effort to find for the EU’s foreign policy a clear source of legitimacy (2011, p. 25). Whitman (2011) noted that, “normative and value-driven features of the EU can be surely predicated upon the developments in the area of foreign policy cooperation and the accompanying emphasis on the importance of values and norms for conduct of external relations by EU policy circles”. Huakkala affirmed that, for the Union the linkage between norms, values and foreign policy is very obvious and incontestable (2009, p. 133). Certainly, norms and principles are the main ground the EU identity and it stands and also it shape Union role in international arena as one of the main foreign policy actor as stated in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.

Also, the European Security Strategy (ESS) shed light on aforesaid values that are as well the core principles of the EU’s external relations:

“Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”.

According to Manners, there are *nine* substantive normative principles of the Union, and he highlighted that five of them are ‘core’ norms (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms)

and in addition there are four ‘minor’ norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance) and all of these values (norms) grounding are based on the Union’s treaties (i.e. European Economic Community of 1957, also known as the Treaty of Rome and Treaty on European Union of 1993 (TEU)) and also in other relevant declarations and/or policies.

### 5.1.1 Norm Spreading Mechanism

Meanwhile, before commencing the discussions of aforesaid substantial nine normative principles, I’m willing to shed light on the mechanism of norms spreading. As Manners (2002) purposed six factors were drawn by Whitehead (1996), Manners and Whitman (1998), and Kinnvall (1995). Firstly, spreading norms can be thought as a *contagion*, in other words norm diffusion happens unintentionally or EU leads by ‘virtuous example’ and other actor just imitates it. Secondly, it is *informational* as this is the result of the strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives and declaratory communications. Third, the mechanism is *procedural* to the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, as Manners mentioned “inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU itself”, and as an example we can mention the inter-regional dialogue with the Southern African Development Community or the membership of the EU in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2002, p. 244). Fourth is the *transference* that happens when the EU exchanges goods trade or technical assistance with the third party. The existing conditionality, including economic sanctions and financial rewards can be shown as an example for aforesaid type of mechanism. Manners indicated *overt* as a fourth factor as it appears as a result of physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations, in other words through Commission’s monitoring missions. The final mechanism indicated is, *cultural filter* that affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms (Kinnvall, 1995, pp. 61-71). As an example for cultural filter the diffusion of democratic norms in China and human rights diffusion in Turkey (Manners 2002, p. 245) can be noted. The presented mechanism helps the Union, to “define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” as said by Manners (p. 253).

## 5.2 Normative Norms of the European Union

The EU is an important organization that promotes a series of normative principles not only among members but also within the United Nations system for being universally applicable. As Manners evaluated “[the] EU is a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance” and “act[ing] ethically good way” (Manners 2008, p. 45). Backing to external actions, Manners and other most prominent scholars indicated

that the European Union is a normative power of the world politics, because of its constitutive elements and values-driven base that made the Union one of the main international actors. Article 3-5 of Treaty of Lisbon presents the executive objective of the Union's as follows:

“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”.

The core values and principles illustrated in Articles 3-5 where it is indicated that the Union seeks to promote in the wider world. The rest of this section is dedicated to discussing the nine normative principles that are as indicated by Manners “substantiated in EU law and policies, and which it seeks to promote in world politics” (2008, p. 48).

The important principle is *peace* as indicated in Article of 3-1 of TEU as “the Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”. Promotion of peace is reckoning as first objective and as determined by Manners “sustainable peace addresses the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war ‘becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’” (Manners 2008, p. 48). The Union's policy should be based on development, aid, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. The extract from treaty peace is of a most prominent value, the European Union inside initially intended itself to ensure that the *status quo* sustained peace over the years and continued into the foreseeable future investing for that through membership, close and peaceful relations or cooperation with its neighbouring countries (see also Union Policies and Internal Actions Art. 26-27). Peace and international security are also promoted through the Union's external actions for strengthening peace and security in the rest of the world, the relevant example for this is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), (See Article 43: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization).

The second core normative principle is *social freedom* and as illustrated in Article 3-2, “the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.” Freedom is a very essential and adorable principle of the Union, and operates, “within a distinctive socio-legal context” (Manners 2008, pp. 49-50). Manners also determined that freedom is “always just one of several rights, held alongside other equally important principles such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (ibid). An extraction from the Union's treaty illustrates the fact that, the Union should offer its citizens freedom and provided five freedoms of persons,

goods, services, capital and establishment are promoted within the EU (See Art. articles 39–60, Functioning Treaty) and other types of fundamental freedom illustrated in Article 6-3 as, “Fundamental freedoms such as freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association are promoted through the 14 articles of the freedom title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) and EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECPHR) and Fundamental Freedoms”.

The third normative principle of the EU is *consensual democracy* where main grounding is indicated in Art.21-2, as “the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to ...consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law”. It operates within the EU member states and includes proportional representation of electoral systems and power-sharing among parties. As shown in another extraction from treaty, democracy should be promoted within the following ways. First internally, through the provisions of democratic principles set out in Article 8 (including democratic equality, representative and participatory democracy, and the role of national parliaments), secondly, via the solidarity clause, which the EU and its member states can invoke to protect democratic institutions from any terrorist attacks (see more in Art. 222) and finally through enlargement and accession, for example during accession process of the Eastern and Central Europe countries the EU shared consensual democracy as part of transition.

The fourth is *human rights* and it is one of the most important principles of the Unions that is also main conditionality for the partnership or cooperation illustrated in the Article 6-2 of Treaty of Lisbon as, “the Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties” where treaty article 6-3 refers to member state obligation and defined as “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. The term human rights refer to individual and collective human rights and the associative nature of human rights, roots are based on, Declaration on European Identity (1973), Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on Human Rights (1986) and the Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development (1991) (Manners 2008, p. 50). As Manners indicated, the abovementioned documents highlight “universality and indivisibility of these associative human rights with consensual democracy, the supranational rule of law and social solidarity” (p. 51).

The fifth normative principle of the Union is *supranational rule* of law also shown in article 21-2 of the treaty as, “the Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”. The principle of law was explained by

Manners (2008) in the following ways: communitarian law (“the supranational rule of law inside of Union”), international law (“assisting participation Union and members in supranational law above and beyond the EU”) and finally, cosmopolitan law (“[refers to] advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals”) (2008, p. 51). Union is ‘exporting’ i.e. sharing its laws through partnership with countries all over the world over decades and partners intentionally or unintentionally import those laws made by the EU.

The sixth normative principle of the EU is inclusive *equality* that found its justification in Article 3-3 and as noted there, “It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.” Within the base charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU that came into force in 2000 it is clearly indicated that, “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation” are prohibited. Manners (2008) has drawn attention to the equality promoting inside of Europe and he provided three dimensions. First, the identified principles by treaty are fundamental principles of the Union; all members should maintain those principles. Secondly, he refers to treaty and aforesaid charter has shown forms of discrimination that member states should be fighting against. Finally, promotion of equality indicated in Charter should be with the attention of that to the cultural diversity, gender, the rights of children and the elderly, and the integration of persons with disabilities (Manners 2008, p. 53).

The seventh normative principle of the EU is identified as social *solidarity* and it also found its justification in Article 3-3b treaty as “the Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment”. The social solidarity is a clear reference to, ‘balanced economic growth’, ‘social market economy’, ‘full employment’ and combating ‘social exclusion’, it also promotes ‘social justice and protection’, intergenerational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and between) member states (Manners 2008, p. 53). As mentioned above I have drawn attention to promotion of equality (by referring to Art.3-3), social solidarity (also includes, intergenerational solidarity, interstate solidarity and labour solidarity) to should be kept together with promotion. Social solidarity is going to the beyond of intra-Unions relations and formulates Union’s development and trade policies. Intergenerational solidarity refers to, “the role of the families and the state in providing practical, financial and social support across the generations” and interstate solidarity to, “involves a spirit of mutual solidarity between member states in order to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion” and finally labour solidarity concerned with “promotion of labour rights and protection (includes labour standards and fair trade)” (ibid).

The eighth normative principle of the EU is embodied in the treaty as a sustainable development and expressed in article 21-2 as, “the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to ... help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development”. Sustainable development is emphasized on the two obstacles and those are balance and integration. Union seeks to promote balanced sustainable development, balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis (Manners 2008, p. 53). Promoting sustainable development is realized through enlargement, development, trade, environmental and foreign policies and also by encouraging “international environmental protection and the sustainable management of global natural resources” (ibid). As expressed in aforementioned article of treaty, balanced internal economic growth should care for protecting environment. On the other hand, another main goal of this principle is eradicating poverty in member countries as well as in other third parties.

Finally, the ninth normative principle of the EU is defined as good governance, that finds its justification in Article 21-2h as “the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to ... promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance”. Good governance stress on, quality, representation, participation, social partnership, transparency and accountability in the democratic life of the Union. Manners indicated that good governance has two distinctive elements, namely, the participation of civil society and the strengthening of multilateral cooperation which both of them have important internal and external consequences (2008, p. 54). By involving participatory democracy, promotion of good governance can be achieved by the followings ways: first, openness and transparency, second multilateralism; and finally good global governance.

As sum, it should be said that indicated principles are core values for the Union and main grounding to illustrate the Union as normative power playing an essential role in international arena, as stated in his interview (2007) by the president of Commission Manuel Durão Barroso:

“We are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative power in the world. (...) The candidate countries were adapting their norms to our norms. There is not another case, I’m sorry, where the United States or China or Russia, has been able to have so many other countries following their patterns. We have gone from originally six countries and now we are 27. It means that all those countries completely adhered to our standards and our norms. First of all, can you show me any other entity that has achieved this?”<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission interview with John Peterson, transcribe available at “<http://www.eu-consent.net/library/BARROSO-transcript.pdf>”, date of access: 28/05/2012.

As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) affirmed “promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is both one of the major objectives of EU foreign policy and one of the constitutive elements of the EU as a values-driven international actor” (2008, p. 223). Therefore, European Union and the United States (US) are without any suspicion significant powers of the world and both play essential role in the political arena, “the EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics” (Manners 2008, p. 45).

### 5.2.1 The Limits of the EU’s Normative Power

Over the last few years, some of international relations scholars (Sjursen, 2006a; Aggestam, 2008; Mayers, 2008; Dunne, 2008) had criticisms and concerns about the normative power concept, the debate was around defining and judging the merits of the EU’s normative and the main criticisms was on the base that normative prefix do not automatically make the EU a legitimate actor in international affairs. The most specific concern was on close correspondence between normative power and the Union’s visions of itself, and as indicated by Sujursen’s (2006a) ‘the fact that [Normative Power Europe] corresponds very closely to the EU’s own description of its international role could be enough to set the alarm bells ringing’ (p. 235). Later, Hyde-Price affirmed Sujursen’s argumentation and added another problem with normative power that was shown by him as ‘when the object of study is seen as embodying the core values one believes in, it is difficult to achieve any critical distance’ (2006, p. 218). As sum, the problem is evident, and as argued by Whitman “EU’s normative power to put themselves forward not as analysis but as policy prescription” (2011, p. 29).

Other important concerns were based on the growing militarization of the EU, mostly after the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy (now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)) military missions outside of Europe and outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Smith (2005a) highlighted it as a main signal for ‘the end of the EU’s normative project’. In this regard, definition of normative power also became very contentious, and as Whitman (2011) asked, ‘does normative mean civilian power?’ and “If normative power is not synonymous with civilian power, what it means exactly?” Sjursen (2002, 2005, 2006a) suggests that there is “an inevitably coercive aspect to normative power, that is, the ‘power’ part must refer to something” and Whitman (2011) indicated as “formulations of the normative power concept, needs to combine military and civilian power [which] has been fully assimilated”. Mayers’ (2008) argument about ‘responsible Europe’ is explicitly referred to the EU’s image. In his words, “a careful consideration [of the principles of responsibility] could guide the EU foreign policy-makers, political leaders and publicists alike when deciding on the practical form of any involvement with global politics” (2008, p. 62). Aggestam (2008, p. 3) in her papers suggested to use ‘ethical power Europe’ rather than ‘normative’, in her words, “the distinction between civilian and military instruments so central to the concepts of civilian and normative power does not capture more recent

developments within the EU that have led to the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)” (ibid). The concept of normative power ‘ruined’ after the United States’ last several brutal interventions, and this criticism also was relevant to Russian case. In the next chapter I will thoroughly review and try to illustrate the flexibility of the normative power concept. Concluding statement of Diez was that “the US was as much of a normative power as the EU, but if the US is a normative power, then normative cannot be synonymous with force for good” (Diez 2005, p. 29).

As sum, criticisms and concerns mostly directed to legitimization of the EU’s chosen norms, as Aggestam argues, presently the EU needs to ‘focus on the ethical dilemmas involved in choosing either the military or civilian instruments in foreign policy; that is, on the justifications behind the exercise of power’ (2008, p. 3). In other words, “deficiency in the normative power debate is the existence of a set of objective standards against which the EU’s norms could be judged” (Whitman 2011, p. 30). Aggestam (2008) indicated that “a charge often levelled at academics who seek to evaluate the EU’s international role is that they fail to agree on a set of explicit methodological rules by which to analyse EU foreign and security policy”, as a result, “they run the risk of simply confirming political, subjective assumptions, rather than opening up their analyses to the possibility that their findings can be refuted by empirical evidence” (Aggestam 2008, p. 5)

# 6 Russia Towards New Realism

## 6.1 Multidimensional Approach

The central objective for this part of study is to investigate the current stage of the Russian-European relations and provide argumentations for formulating the *façade* of Russia as normative power in relations with the Union apart from energy cooperation. According to Richard Sakwa after fall of the Soviets, world politics has been changed, ‘bipolar world has given way to a more concentric version that lies at the basis of the post-communist neo-imperial approach’ (2009, p. 5). Russia moved from periphery to the core in the world politics and started playing an essential role in global governance. Russia improved relations with the NATO and the EU but unsolved problems still remained in the country such as economic problems, corruption, criminality, etc.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as another major international actor of world politics. During these two decades Russian Federation has undergone major restructuring in its domestic and foreign policy, especially after Vladimir Putin’s first term. Putin in his speech in December 1999 set out the broad direction which prioritized “the establishment of internal stability and, in the process, rekindle national pride and identity at and abroad<sup>4</sup>”. During the first term of the presidency not only he brought changes to Russian political route but also he became one of the most recognized political faces in world politics and achieved almost his core objectives where, Russian economy has recovered from 1998’s shock and living standards improvements became much more visible (in comparison with the former government). As sum, in political arena, Russia rediscovered its voice and started playing a significant role in formation of the international agenda. Putin has made considerable progress in establishing Russia as a ‘normal’ state (Gover and Timmins 2009). In their words, “Russia’s [internal] recovery and international influence has been based very much on its energy resources and the much-needed revenue provided rather than broadly based economic growth” (2009, p. XXII). The changes formulated a new outlook of Russian politics and economics that Kanet named as ‘hybrid’ and to him it ‘combines aspects of electoral democracy with top-down management of both the political and the economic system’ (Kanet 2010, p. 1)

After reforms, most prominent scholars named Russia in the power characterization by different titles or terms such as ‘great power’, “normal

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<sup>4</sup> Vladimir Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium Speech, 31 December 1999, available with translation at: [http://www.government.gov.ru/english/statVP\\_engl\\_1.html](http://www.government.gov.ru/english/statVP_engl_1.html), (accessed 25.03.2012)

power”, ‘normative power’, ‘superpower’ and ‘regional power’, etc. There are a number of other power characterizations which can be easily appropriated to Russia such as nuclear power, military power, etc. In that sense, Derek Avvere characterized Russia as a power, where the governing elite and the majority of political elites certainly believe that ‘Russia is a fully-fledged normal great power, playing a substantive global role and being the main regional power willing and capable of acting a security and development provider’, increasingly in recent years, this has involved a role as a normative power (Interview 1). Tatiana Romonova added that, Russia can be identified as normal and also normative power, because two concepts don’t exclude each other (Interview 2). As it was clearly indicated in Vladimir Putin’s speech as well and was stated that:

“The only realistic choice for Russia is the choice to be a strong country, strong and confident in its strength, strong not in spite of the world community, not against other strong states, but together with them.” (Vladimir Putin, state-of the-federation speech, 8 July 2000)

President Vladimir Putin’s first and foremost purpose in his first term (2000) was on the base of the normalization of Russia’s foreign policy. During those years, Russia couldn’t be considered as ‘normal’ great or ‘normative power, because of domestic problems. Government was mostly in charge of stabilizing internal conflicts (i.e. the Second Chechen War). By Putin’s successful attempts internal conflicts has been solved and by pursued policy the state achieved remarkably quick and effective results in different fields. Russia stands in the same line with the other world powers, most considerable example is second Iraq war (2003) where Russia also treated as other countries but afterwards shift in pursued global regional policy became very obvious. In 2000s Vladimir Putin signed a new edition of Russia’s very important major security documents (i.e. National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept - See appendix 1, the main entries of the security documents of 2003, 2007 and 2008). The list of documents is as follows:

**Table 3:** Chronology of Putin’s major security documents and statements (2000–2008)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Policy document</i>
10 January 2000	National Security Concept ratified by presidential decree
21 April 2000	Military Doctrine ratified by presidential decree
28 June 2000	Foreign Policy Concept ratified by presidential decree
2 October 2003	MoD publication ‘The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’
27 March 2007	MFA publication ‘Review of foreign policy of the Russian Federation’
8 February 2008	Speech by President Putin on ‘Strategy for the development of Russia until 2020’

Source: Haas 2010, p. 15

After 1993 the Foreign Policy Concept was the first document that brought normalization towards Russia’s foreign policy. As indicated in the document certain tendencies of international politics compelled that Russia altered and

revised its foreign and security policy. Furthermore, Haas stated regarding the main principle of Russian foreign policy that ‘the RF was a great power, that Russia’s influence in international politics was to be strengthened and that political, military and economic cooperation and integration...’ (2010, p. 17). Majority of the security documents signed in 2000 were an assertive attitude towards the West. Briefly 2000s’ Security Papers displayed negative attitude towards Western security policy papers. As clear an example for this is that NATO used force towards Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) and not only ignored Russian security policy but also disregarded the UN and the standards of international law. During Vladimir Putin’s second term (March 2004), the regime, the condition of the democracy and its level became more salient issue and was criticized by the West.

Under Putin’s foreign policy state policy changed its routes towards new realism and as Sakwa (2009) stated, “new realism has not given up the notion of Russia as a great power, but the definition of what it means to be a great power has changed as well as die way it should behave” (2009, p. 7). Vladimir Putin dedicated considerable attention to the state’s image abroad and improved and resorted international prestige and also particular attention was paid to keeping Russian role over Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). Certainly, after bigbang enlargement of the Union, CIS considered the Russian Federation as one of the important regions and areas of interest.

Subsequently, I would like to note that Vladimir Putin’s implemented policy reforms were concluded by Richard Sakwa (2009) as the fact that Russia push passed to new realism in the Foreign Policy and characterized this by following seven key features. First, he identified as *economization* of foreign policy, on 26 January, 2001 Vladimir Putin’s keynote speech at the foreign ministry, he stressed that ‘Russia’s strategic aim was integration into the world community, and for this the priority task of Russian diplomacy was the promotion of Russia's economic interests abroad’ and also in September, 2002 during meeting with staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russian) he insisted that ‘advancing Russia's business interests was equal to traditional political reporting’ (2009, p. 8-9). Subsequently, the economization became key priority in the Foreign Policy under Putin’s government.

The second key feature of Putin’s foreign policy was *Europeanisation*. As Sakwa explained even during earlier periods of Russian independence, Boris Yeltsin’s policy advisor, Gennady Burbulis mentioned that, “...none of the problems facing the country could be solved without learning from the European experience” and later Putin during his interview mentioned that “We are a part of Western European culture, in fact, we derive our worth precisely from this. Wherever our people might happen to live - in the Far East or in the South we are Europeans” (2009, p. 9). In the first EU-Russian summit in May 2000 Putin also insisted that “Russia was, is and will be a European country by its location, its culture, and its attitude toward economic integration” and one of other example for Europeanization in Russian foreign policy, Putin’s 26 January 2001 speech where he indicated, “European direction is traditionally the most important for us” (ibid). The Europeanization is a major key feature of Putin’s foreign policy which

totally differentiates from Yeltsin's. President Yeltsin's pursued policy towards West might be considered soft and keeping in distance but Putin's is closer but very tough.

The third key feature is identified and named as *securitization*. Sakwa highlighted that "security in the post-Cold War era is less about direct threats than about the perception of risk, with the concept of risk defined rather more strongly than general threats or problems" (2009, p. 9). This mentioned feature was also one the major points of foreign policy. The policy towards dealing with the global security threat resolutely inside or outside the country became predominate in the political manners (Russian policy during the second Chechen War might be a good example).

The shift from alternativity to *autonomy* is illustrated as fourth, and as indicated by Sakwa the "[debates over] multipolar globalism, under Primakov was based on the notion of Russia as an alternative pole balancing that of the West, and indeed working as a competitive actor in the international system" (2009, p. 9). Under Putting governance this thinking level has been completely changed and Russia became an autonomous actor. In other words, as Igor Ivanov (former Foreign Affairs Minister of Russian Federation from 1998 to 2004) stated, 'Russia would defend the idea of a democratic, multi-polar system of international relations, and concluded that 'Russia is by no means looking for a pretext for rivalry' (ibid).

*Bilateralism* is determined as the fifth aspect of Putin's reformed foreign policy. During his first presidency term, Russia improved its relations with multilateral organizations such as the EU, NATO, and UN, state policy based on broader international multilateralism (ibid, p. 21). The aforesaid multilateral organizations were cooperated with Moscow and tried to amplify Moscow's approach towards the world and also with other organizations (i.e. Organization for Security and in Europe) because Cooperation there were several difficulties between Russia and OSCE (withdrawal Russian forces from Transdnistria and Georgia and also criticizing Russia's conducting in the Chechen war). Bilateralist elements were indicated in the below keynote of the Igor Ivanov:

"One of the fundamental tenets of Russia's European policy is the expansion of bilateral relations with individual countries... Over the past decade, Russia's relations with virtually all these countries have been taken to a qualitatively new level. We have become privileged partners in our cooperation efforts with such countries as Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain and others. We feel this is exceptionally valuable."<sup>5</sup>

The sixth element of new realism, was named constrained great *powerism* and it is in a way was explained that after restoring its status in power relations, Russia became a major international power that was accepted to cooperate with the West and established a robust relationships with political and economic institutions, as in word of the Skawa (2009), "this is conditioned by the shift from alternativity to autonomy" (p. 11). Russia became very confident and has started pursuing policy

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<sup>5</sup> Igor S. Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p. 95

toward Central Asia and South Caucasus, despite the presence of national interest of other powers in the region.

The final element of the new realism is a combination of all aforementioned elements and is named as ‘*normalize*’ which refers to relations with the West. During Putin’s first term he had several attempts to overcome Russian isolations and to establish robust relations with the West, particularly with Europe. Therefore, during Putin's presidency there was a visible shift towards European orientation rather than American. In other words, Foreign Policy Concept of Russia (2000) vividly emphasized the importance of the Europe to Russia as “... an important resource for Russia's defense of its national interests in European and world affairs, and for the stabilization and growth of the Russian economy”. (OFP 2000, sec. IV Regional Priorities<sup>6</sup>)

Herewith, it should be indicated that after mentioned reforms and rediscovery of its power, Russia put forward its normativism and Moscow-Brussels partnership became very uneasy and with that confident Russia started normative competition (offensive) with Brussels.

## 6.2 Russian Normative Inclinations

### *The Foreign Policy Concepts (2000 and 2007)*

This chapter is mainly focused on the Foreign Policy Concepts (FPC) of the Russian Federation for grasping normative power discourse and analysis of ratified concepts (overviews). Also in this part author attempt to answer to the following question - to what extent Russia became ‘normative offensive’ and/or started ‘normative rivalry’.

Shortly after ratification of the National Security concept in 2000, Russian government lead by Vladimir Putin also revisited Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept; on 28 June 2000 President Putin signed a new FPC. In the preamble of revised document it was indicated that, the tendencies were during that period compelled Moscow to review its FPC. According to Haas (2010), the basic principle of the mentioned FPC (2000s edition) was to show Russia as great power and that it has “... influence in international politics [and] strengthened [in] political, military and economic cooperation and integration ...” (2010, p. 17). Certainly, Russia as always is considered as one the great powers of international politics and has the key importance to the European security. As implied above, after Vladimir Putin’s presidency Russia became very ambitious in the region mostly in economic, political, security issues and put its own manners, or as Oldberg (2010) noted “assertive thanks to its growing economic power and concentration of political power, at the same time as changes in the world offered

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<sup>6</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, June 28, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>, (accessed 13.04.2012)

opportunities that Russia could exploit” (2010, p. 30). Second overview of Foreign Policy (OFP) was approved on 27 March 2007 by Vladimir Putin. According to Haas, it was possibly used as foundation or base for Medvedev’s Foreign Policy Concept in 2008. He also put forward five following elements that OFP is based on (MID - 2007a - Ministerstvo Innostrannykh Del Rossiyskoy Federatsii - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation):

- multilateral diplomacy: UN, G8, threats, disarmament and crisis management;
- geographic directions: CIS, Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and other regions;
- economic diplomacy: liberalization of trade, energy diplomacy;
- humanitarian diplomacy: protection of rights, protection of Russian citizens abroad, cultural and scientific cooperation;
- ensuring foreign policy: diversification of policy instruments, regional cooperation.

After ratification of OFP, Russia considerably strengthened its position, Haas (2010) argued that “...now powerful Russia had become an important element of positive changes in the world [and] an important achievement of recent years was that Russia had regained its foreign policy independence” (2010, p. 23). First (2000) therapy and followed by changes provided an important privileges such as over self-confidence and Russia became very independent actor of international politics. As an example we can indicate the fact that during formation of the independent state of Kosovo, Russia acted independently and did not support European attitudes and claimed that it can be a reason of de-stability inside Europe. Besides OFP, the other major documents were also revised and by that Russia became an active global power that not only participates in realizing the international agenda but also formulates this agenda. Therefore, the claimed normative power notion or ‘normative offensive’ doubtless stands on documents approved during Putin’s presidency, “...documents published during Putin’s presidency provide a rendering of the development of Russia” (Haas 2010, p. 34). A comparison of Putin’s first term approved document (the 2000 National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine and the 2003 Defence White Paper) with the second term documents (Overview of Foreign Policy 2007 and Strategy 2020 which approved in 2008) offered solid consistent developing and new entries.

Presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev’s as the third President of Russia (2008 to 2012) contained the same policy path and visibly close cooperation with Putin as a Prime Minister. After accession to power, president Medvedev just like Putin launched a new Foreign Policy and new National Strategy Concepts (See appendix 2, Medvedev’s key security documents compared with those of Putin (2000–2009)). They are in the following order:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Policy document</i>
12 July 2008	Foreign Policy Concept approved by RF President
31 August 2008	Statement by Medvedev on principles of foreign/security policy
18 September 2008	Principles of policy on the Arctic approved by RF President
12 May 2009	National Security Strategy until 2020 ratified by presidential decree

**Source:** Haas 2010, p. 83

Ingmar Oldberg (2010) identified six main objectives of Medvedev on the base of above mentioned documents and they are followings (Kanet 2010, p. 31):

- Safeguarding the security of the country, strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its position as “one of the influential centers in the world;”
- Creating good conditions for Russia’s modernization, raising living standards, consolidating society and securing the competitiveness of the country;
- Promoting a “just and democratic world order” based on collective principles and the supremacy of international law;
- Creating good relations with Russia’s neighbors and eliminating hotbeds of conflict in the adjoining regions and other parts of the world;
- Seeking consensus with other states and international organizations; Defending the “rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad” and promoting the Russian language and the cultures of Russia abroad;
- Creating “an objective perception of Russia in the world as a democratic state” with an independent foreign policy.

Approved concepts are directed to Russia’s state interest and its position in international politics and multipolarity callings on paper are vivid attempts against the dominance of the United States. External security became priority during Medvedev’s presidency and was placed before economic development. Oldberg (2010) argued that there is a risk of “conflict between promoting the primary goal of strengthening Russia as one of the strong centers in the world and defending the Russians abroad on one hand, and territorial integrity and the seeking of consensus with other states on the other (ibid, p. 31)”. As a sum it must be noted that president Medvedev formulated five short leading principles proclaiming the primacy of international law, advocating a multipolar world, expressing interest in friendly relations with all states, giving priority to protecting Russians everywhere, and talking of regions of ‘privileged interests’ (statements after Georgian war, Medvedev, August 31, 2008; September 2, 2008).

Therefore, Putin and Medvedev’s FPC provided clarity to the idea that Russia became more normative offensive than during Yeltsin’s period. Generally, Putin Russia’s earliest policy trajectory has been characterized and usually accepted as either fundamentally pragmatic or a realpolitik type. As Makarychev (2008) affirmed the analyses of the Putin’s presidency, “surprisingly enough, Russian foreign policy discourse became – at least rhetorically - increasingly normative” (2008, p. 12). This normative inclination formulated a foundation to Moscow not only to accept normative challenges put down by Brussels’s but also start “politically counter-attack in the normative battlefield” (ibid).

The most visible normative reaction from Moscow was put forward during ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine and as Makarychev (2008) indicated State Duma had a statement (October 2, 2007) proclaiming that new government in Georgia is “violating the principles of democracy and abusing human rights, including tightening control over opposition, the media and dissidents” (p. 12). On the other hand, regarding the case with the Ukraine Russia put forward a key normative argument referring to, “the security decisions taken without due account of public opinion as ‘non-democratic’ action” (ibid). By that statement, the State Duma reflected, the application of the Ukraine to the NATO. One of the

other well-matched examples of Russian normativity is the creation of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) with two headquarters (Paris and New York) since 2008. Makarychev (2008) entitled it as a “new in the tradition of Russian foreign policy” (p. 12). The creation of this Institute might be interpreted as a direct response to the European and American foundations’ activities in Russia and as stated by, the key member of a Kremlin-created civic organization, Public Chamber and founder of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation Anatoly Kucherena “We’re not just planning to criticize the West” (Chicago Tribune<sup>7</sup>, March 27, 2008).

Russia’s key normative approach of discussion is widely debated and should be discussed from the following perspectives. On one hand some scholars defended Russian normativism and on the other hand, some of them indicated that invasion of Georgia (2008, Russo-Georgian War, also known in Russia as the Five-Day War) was the end of the Russian normativism. For instance, Averte touched upon case more broadly and put forward Russian normative approach by following statement “at the international level, Russia is a firm advocate of an international system made up of strong sovereign states, with the primary locus of decision-making being in the UN Security Council and the main principles rooted in state sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality among states, indivisible security and peaceful resolution of disputes by the international community” (Interview 1). On the other hand, Romonova argued on Russian normativism by discussing one of the present cases and stated that “... look to Syria case, Russia is a normative power; Russia is trying to be a normative power” (Interview 2) and finalized that “... any country which considered ‘power’ tires to lay normative foundation in its actions” (ibid).

Accordingly, Makarychev (2008) discussed political logic of the Russia’s normative offensive foreign policy and provided three modalities. First he indicated that, Russia has always been admitted to a certain degree of “political *decisionism* in a normative type of foreign policy” (p. 13). The argumentation splits into twofold, the first perspective as Makarychev pointed out is ‘in the likely cases of collision between different norms it is a political decision that prioritizes one over another’ (ibid). As an example, for the Kosovo case, Putin admitted that there might be ‘a conflict between the two constitutive principles of international society - territorial integrity vs. peoples’ right to self-determination’ (ibid). As result, according to him the first constitutive principle has to prevail. Second aspect is that some cases norms or decisions (solutions) used in one case might be irrelevant to others, even if the cases are very similar. As continuation of the Kosovo case, Russian side argued that, “global politics are defined not by shared rules of the game but rather by sovereign decisions on the part of the pivotal actors ...” and Makarychev concluded that the European Union and the United States tends to act in ‘*decisionist way*’ (ibid). Secondly, as defined the effects of

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<sup>7</sup> Citing U.S. hypocrisy on rights, Russia takes lectern, Chicago Tribune , March 27, 2008, available at [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-03-27/news/0803260749\\_1\\_human-rights-kremlin-backed-human-rights-watch](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-03-27/news/0803260749_1_human-rights-kremlin-backed-human-rights-watch) (accessed 16.04.2012)

norms is the perspective of “exclusion looming large behind their implementation” (ibid). Subsequently, presupposes of normativity is an ‘interplay between inclusion and exclusion: certain norms are referred to as ‘constitutive’, while others are ignored or marginalized’ (ibid). Finally, the normative international policy behaviour always leaves behind ‘normative disagreements’, in other words, as indicated by Makarychev “contestation and re-definition of key normative signifiers” (2008, p. 14).

Therefore, after re-formation of the Russian foreign policy concept normative elements and behaviors became very visible and as Makarychev finalized, “[the] Russia’s newborn normative zeal is a crucial tool in her attempts to be accepted as a legitimate and constitutive member of the international community which, by and large, might be equated with the West” (2008, p. 17). Russia is always trying to be recognized as an equal partner in the Europe for norm-setting. Makarychev stated that this attempt or ambition of the Russian Federation not should be understood as if Russia is trying to possess its ‘own’ norms. Subsequently, the Russian Federation is trying to lay a normative foundation for its actions, ‘Russia seems to be ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive of European identity...’ (ibid). But, definitely it doesn’t means that to substitute those norms or values with some kind of ‘Russian’ ones.

The criticism of the Russian normativism is discussed by Prozorov and as stated by him, ‘Russia does not have a strongly normative orientation either in domestic or foreign policy, opting instead for opportunistic ‘pragmatism’” (Interview 3). He also added that the one normative approach that Russia defended with some consistency from early 1990s until 2008 was the principle of state sovereignty and the consequent imperative of non-intervention in domestic conflicts. Therefore, after invasion of Georgia this ‘normative principle may no longer be invoked with any consistency, further diminishing the normative component of Russian foreign policy’ (ibid).

### 6.3 The Northern Dimension

Russia has displayed its normative foreign policy by participation in a series of trans-border initiatives and the Northern Dimension (ND) considered one of the most important. The Northern Dimension, adopted by the EU in 1998 and its policy was drawn up in 1999, aiming to promote economic development stability and security in the Northern Europe among four partners: the European Union, Norway, Iceland and the Russian Federation. The initiative is mainly addressed to cross-border issues and is a way to “contribute to narrowing disparities in living standards, ward off threats originating in the region and contribute to reducing environmental and nuclear threat” (White and Light 2009, p. 49). According to authors’ the Union and the initiative partners cooperate in dealing with these issues “by drawing on existing regional policies and financial instruments and specifically reinforcing positive interdependence between Russia and the Baltic Sea region and the European Union” (ibid). The initiative alleviated many

problems that occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union in the Northern Russia. The economic, ecological and governance problems of Kaliningrad region were covered in the scope of the programme. Herewith, according to liberal deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov, “it has turned increasingly into a declaratory programme, and today, as before, it is difficult to discern any concrete results” (White and Light 2009, p. 50).

By involving trans-border cooperation with Europe, Russian government put forward its normative basis. Of course, one cannot discard Russia’s economic interest in trans-border cooperation, but self-confidence and being an independent actor in the world politics provided Russian government to act normatively. On one hand, being a member of the international border initiatives became an important element for Russia in the path to Europeanisation. According to Makarychev, “Russia has committed itself to strengthening institutions in this shared neighborhood through a variety of initiatives aimed at promoting mutual confidence and human exchange” (2008, p. 4). On the other hand, as Arunitov stressed (2000), the ND was as an excellent opportunity for the Russia to join ‘democratic space’ where the main values are human rights, the protection of minorities and a healthy environment (p. 259).

Within two decades Russia concluded a set of cooperative agreements with the European Union and started pursuing normative foreign policy in its trans-border cooperation. The political values driven from ND considered as “transparency, egalitarianism, and consensual democracy” (Schumacher 2000, p. 11). At the beginning of 2001 Russia approved the Concept of the Trans-Border cooperation. In 2002, the State Duma ratified the European Framework Convention on Trans-Border Cooperation. Thereafter, these legal frameworks, Russia enrolled a variety of trans-border organizations for state-to-state interaction. For instance we can show the Council on Cooperation of Border Regions (CCBR), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Committee for Spatial Development in the Baltic Sea Region (CSD/BSR). Institutional mechanisms also included Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum. By participating in these initiatives Russia’s policies shifted from “realpolitik, semi-isolationism and unilateralism to multilateral cooperation” (Makarychev 2008, p. 5).

The Northern Dimensions has following problems that should be discussed. On one hand, the ND doesn’t have a specific budget but according to White and Light (2009), the ND intended to “...serve as an umbrella to ensure complementarily and coordination between existing regional initiatives” (2009, p.49). Being an independent player Russia has equal contribution to ND and often puts forward normative foreign policy discussions. The second problem of ND according to the authors’ is “revolving presidency of the EU as the Northern Dimension receives more attention when , a North European member state holds EU presidency and less when the presidency moves on alter six months” (2009, p.50). After presidency of Putin Russian government contributed to the ineffectiveness of the ND. The first term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency coincides with the adoption of the first action plan of the initiative. Assisting in solving the ineffectiveness ND also can be considered another factor by means of which Russia tries to show its normativism.

Inside of the initiative partners reacts in some cases very normatively, especially between European Union and Russian Federation. Russia acted normatively in several spheres of trans-border relations with the European Union. From the perspective of security as indicated by the Makarychev “the trans-border cooperation altered the balance of priorities between hard and soft security issues ...” (2008, p. 6).

Makarychev (2008) divided and explained Russia’s normative foreign policy in trans-border with the EU into following contexts. Initially defined as normative foreign policy in trans-border cooperation, it actually is “interplay between different levels of government of Russian” (ibid). There are two approaches that collided in Russia’s trans-border relations. According to the author the first approach was very dominate in 1990s which was based on “the interpretation of Russia’s European choice as a policy of re-building Russian domestic rules under the influence of EU trans-border programmes” (Makarychev 2008, p. 7). Consequently for the core partners border relations provide incentives rather than posing threats, certainly finding liberal solutions for border territories became very normatively discussable between sides. The second collided approach is considered to be the ‘conservative approach’. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB - Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) issued that ‘The Rules of Border Regime’ which reflect conservative essence. By issuing mentioned document Russian government has changed and complicated procures for entering Russian border areas. According to Makarychev (2008) by collision of these approaches Russian government has failed to elaborate a vivid a set of policy instrument towards trans-border regions, and he also determined that complicated procedures are considered as a part of normative foreign policy of Russia towards Baltic and Northern regions as well as the European Union.

Therefore, the last important factor for explaining the Russian normative policy in trans-border regions is defined as an external environment. Makarychev (2008) argued that “a strong normative pull from the EU coupled with internally divided Russian approaches to border regions balanced against weak internal capabilities, leading to an overall normative result”. The Union was very effective in trans-border cooperation that “sees the involvement of a variety of regional governing agencies open to external influences” (Friis and Murphy 1998, p. 16).

Subsequently, the case study provides several approaches that are considered essential grounding for explanation of the normative inclination of the Russian foreign policy. Most Russian authors (Makarychev, 2008; Tsygankov, 2005) affirms that Russia besides multilateral cooperation with Union, pursued foreign policy at least rhetorically increasingly normative.

## 7 Conclusion

One of the main objectives of the study was to examine Russia and the EU as normative powers in the region apart from the current energy relations. In case of energy, the current mutual interdependence provides a foundation for building a solid partnership despite sides' mutual disappointments. By underlining differences and comparing the Russian Federation with the European Union in the same horizon as normative powers is not a very easy task, due to the lack of empirical data.

The enlargements of NATO and the EU have inevitably had a strong negative impact on the geopolitics of the region and this led to detailed review of Russian reforms since 2000s and Foreign Policy Concepts in chapter five that provided an important foundation for the idea that current Russian's political trajectory is normative offensive in most major relations with the West. Perhaps, it is considered as one of the main negative factors for Europe to share its values and balance its own interests in the region. According to the study, developing normative partnership between sides has become impossible due to insufficient set of shared norms and values. One of the main outputs of this study is fact that Russia and Europe are not enthusiastic to make it possible because both sides have their own realities and very different approaches over the major cases. Both sides continue preferring following current institutionalized strategic partnership. As mentioned preliminarily Russia and the EU have achieved cooperation over the past two decades, but still there are mutual disappointments. Thus, from the EU's perspective one of the biggest disappointments has been the fact that after 2000s Russia chose a wrong way for developing and the path selected by Russia was against the EU's hopes. In recent years the political and economic reforms affirmed that Russia is trying to build up its own model rather than to follow European. Also, there is very less enthusiasm over the legal approximation process. The model that has been formulated by Russia (since 2000s) has its own normative approach that resulted in new bounds and very tough negotiations with the Union. According to Averre (2007) in relations with the EU, Russia promotes its own normative agenda. Not surprisingly, under Vladimir Putin's government new approach appeared towards cases where the values driven by Moscow are against to the European type of leadership and governing.

The discussion of the Europe Normative Power projection elucidated different perspectives of the EU's external relations. The EU's norm-driven behavior in its external relations and last decade the Russian normative inclination put forward discussion of the normative contention between sides in the region. The one of the main findings is that since 2000s i.e. the presidency of Vladimir Putin, foreign policy and state political trajectory of the Russian Federation has changed

radically. Those changes are considered as the main base and limelight of this study. Accordingly after stabilizing economy and solving internal problems, the President Putin paid major attention to state pursued foreign policy for restoring their role in global governance. As mentioned in the previous chapter, under Putin's governance the state foreign policy changed its routes towards new realism. The new realism elements derived from Russia's revised foreign policy concepts (2000 and 2007) are considered the followings: economization, europeanisation, and securitization, the shift from alternativity to autonomy, bilateralism, great powerism and generally normalization state policy. Besides those elements, President Putin's pursued state foreign policy discourse on the base of those above mentioned factors became at least rhetorically very normative and it should be considered as another major element of Russian's new realism that finds its justification in recently ratified documents. According to the most careful analysis that has so far been conducted in this study, this normative inclinations determined new bounds for the EU-Russian relations. This new born normative zeal put forward by Moscow is characterized Russia's return to global governance with very immense ambitions and being a self-styled energy superpower provided an excellent opportunity to lay normative foundation to pursued foreign policy.

After often chaotic years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency the Putin era has been characterized with its stability and during these years by restoring its global prestige Moscow put forward its strong ambitions to be active in global governance not only by participating in realizing the international agenda but also in formulating this agenda. Particularly during Putin's presidency, Russia reoriented the agenda of the EU-Russian relations to very tough debates. In other words, according to Derek Averre the notable development in the EU-Russian relationships in recent years has been a move away from the idea of "Russia as a 'norm-taker' to be 'instructed' by the EU, towards being a 'norm-maker', especially in the post-Soviet space" (Interview 1).

Backing to selected case study outputs, the Northern Dimension was one of the excellent opportunities to enhance the cooperation between the EU and Russia on different issues such as energy, environment, etc. Nonetheless, the EU's Normative Power projections and its very fast enlargement established new bounds in trans-border cooperation as well. Moscow's reactions and pursued foreign policy put forward the discussion of Russia trying to lay a normative foundation in trans-border cooperation at the same level as they formulated it in energy relations with the Union. Finally, the Northern Dimension initiative case also provided an output that Russia returned to global governance not just as a great power or energy superpower of the region and at the same time in the world politics but also is trying to be very normative in relations with the West apart from energy relations.

# Executive summary

## I Research Problem and Aim of the Study

Generally, the relationships between Russia and the EU were the most researched and approached topic over the last decades. Since years, the normative discussions have been considered as one of the important parts of the Russia-EU relations. Besides, Russia and the EU have achieved to cooperate almost the past two decades under this difficult condition. After 2000s, the conditions totally changed, due to the fact that political trajectory of Russia and pursued policy towards West was reshaped and new foundation prepared for the Russian-European relations after Valdimir Putin accessed the power.

After a number of chaotic years of president Yeltsin's government Putin brought new era to the Russian Federation. Moreover, during Boris Yeltsin's period Russian Federation political orientation was not characterized normative offensive towards the West. Certainly, those years are characterized by internal instability such as the Chechen Wars (First Chechen War - December 1994 to August 1996 and Second Chechen War - August 1999 to May 2000) and other major economic issues. This thesis is aiming to study Russian Federation's new era by discussing political and economic reforms that helped to restore Russia's internal stability and as well as state its prestige worldwide after the fall of the Soviets.

## II Scope of the Study

After analyzing several concepts and overviews of the Russian Federation's (the 2000 National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine and the 2003 Defence White Paper) ratified under Putin's government since 2000s, I have become very enthusiastic to study profound state of the new reformed foreign policy towards the Europe. On the other hand, it was very interesting to research Russian alternative and reactions to the Normative Power Europe (NPE) projection. Furthermore, the idea of studying partial derived from mine NPE projection research. The research shed light on different aspects of NPE projection including Union's norms and values as well as its spreading mechanism. Inspired from that study I decided to analyze normative contention between Russia and the Europe apart from the existing energy relations. Why to neglect current energy relations? By ignoring energy relations I tried to find out the Russian normative approaches in different fields of the current relations. Admittedly, the Russian Federation is considered as an energy superpower of the world and can easily be determined as a normative power in the field. In other words this research concentrates on defining Russia as Normative power by neglecting its existing energy relations. Particularly, under Putin's governance Russia became very normative offensive and Moscow started pursuing normative foreign policy towards the West that aimed to be active participation in the global governance.

### III Methodology

To carry out this research, qualitative research design and its appropriate data collection methods were utilized. Qualitative research design provided foundation for the examining Russian-EU relations in scope of normative contention. Chosen research design provided as well as grounding to put EU-Russia in the same line for discussing their in scope normative powers (see 4.1).

During data collection period, due the lack of empirical data on Russian normativism, expert in-depth interview has been selected and realized. Three prominent Russian studies scholars interviewed by relevant qualitative expert interview methods (see 4.2). During study period, the feedbacks of experts transcribed and deeply analyzed. Thus, analyzed feedbacks provided the main foundation for discussing normative contention from different perspectives. The logic behind selection of three different experts is, to avoid being biased on normativism discussion and also these interviews provided an opportunity to manage scope of this study. The interviews realized with internet-based qualitative interview methods. Accordingly, organized in-depth expert interviews through internet realized in a followings ways: Two of them were on the base of email and one of them implemented via an instant messenger. Questions that experts replied almost overlapped but only via an instant messenger the scope was very broad. The diversity of feedbacks provided fruitful results to this study.

*Examining EU and Russian normativism:* In this study, for examining EU and Russian normativism in the trans-border cooperation, the Northern Dimensions initiative was selected as a single case study (see 6.3). Defining Russian normativism apart current energy relations, this case study provided solid foundation to explore Russian Federation's changed foreign policy and its enhanced scope. The case study enabled to diverse perspective of the Russian pursued foreign policy (see 6.1).

Furthermore, to operationalization of this study following variables selected: *powerism, normativism, and institutionalized relationship*. On one hand, the analyses consist of initially to define global governance and Normative Power Europe which are considered one the main foundations of the *powerism* (see 6.2). On the other hand, analyses of the Russian political transformations (2000-2008) that are considered as starting point for normative contention.

### IV Theoretical Framework

This study considered the institutionalism approach as theoretical lens of study. The selected theoretical framework provided grounding to understand the main institutional structure of the Russia and European Union relations. As according this chapter current relationship between sides is on the base of a well-established institutional structure where this environment provides grounding for discussing global levels problems. The applied format for the strategic cooperation mostly base on Summits (see 3.1).

Accordingly, new institutionalism emphasizes the importance of formal institutions in facilitating cooperation. The starting point of the institutionalized EU-Russian relations is coming through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which signed 1994 and came into force 1995. The PCA sets principles of the established the institutional framework for bilateral cooperation and dialogue in a number of areas.

On the other hand, the new institutionalism is a main theoretical perspective that provides a tool for analyzing European integration. Normative institutionalism is a sub-field of the new institutionalism and considered as one of the main theoretical frameworks of EU decision-making on foreign policy (see 5.1). This theory shed lights to European Union's substantive and procedural norms, which provided foundation to negotiate on divergent policy preferences (see 5.2).

## V Empirical material

The empirical material divided into following parts. The first part is an outline of the global governance and the defining power and its typology as well as conceptualizations of normative power as found its basis mainly from prominent scholars' writings which dedicated over the themes during years. The second part present Normative Power Europe discussion and its substantive normative principles as found its basis Union's treaties (i.e. European Economic Community of 1957, also known as the Treaty of Rome and Treaty on European Union of 1993 (TEU)) and also in other Union's relevant declarations and documents.

## VI Conclusion

One of the main finding of this study is that after normalization of Russia's state internal policy, under President Valdimir Putin state foreign policy also reformed and by this revision Russia put forward its normative ambitions to Europe in all major fields. Since the fall of the Soviets the value gab between Russia and Europe sides became very clear but after 2000s Vladimir Putin presidency the value gap began very widen. Not surprisingly, normative cooperation between sides became impossible because there too many uncertainties and future potential conflict of interest which undermine this hopes. Taking into consideration current Russian normative ambitions the Moscow seems is ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive of European identity.

Although after last bigbang enlargement of the EU have had a huge impact towards the region geopolitics where potential conflict of interest is inevitably. Those changes compelled Moscow to revise and reform state policy document. Subsequently, the Northern Dimensions case bring clarity that Russia is retuned back to world politics not only as one of great powers or superpower in energy relations but also considered as a normative power in all major cooperation with the EU. Despite, that Russian normativisim, the future perspective of the current relations will continue only in strategic partnership mode.

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# 9 Appendices

## Appendix 1:

### The main entries of the Russian Federation security documents of 2003, 2007 and 2008

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Defence White Paper October 2003</i>	<i>Overview of Foreign Policy March 2007</i>	<i>Strategy towards 2020 February 2008</i>
<b><i>Russia in the world community</i></b>			
<i>Destabilizing factors for the military-political situation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The current stage of global development is noted for acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions</li> <li>• Security is shifting from questions of war and peace to complicated political, financial-economic, ethnic-national, demographic and other problems</li> <li>• The significance of military power in the post-bipolar world has not diminished, since a number of international security institutions are in grave crisis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia has regained a balance of power and competitive international position lost after the Cold War</li> <li>• Force as a factor to solve international problems has increased</li> <li>• Focus on disarmament has dropped</li> <li>• Attempts to form a unipolar world</li> <li>• Victory in the Cold War' results in unilateral responses</li> <li>• Continuous enlargement with new members is aimed at broadening Western influence</li> <li>• Iraq has demonstrated the myth of a unipolar world</li> <li>• The US withdrawal of the ABM Treaty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under the pretext of liberty and open society the sovereignty of states and complete regions is destroyed</li> <li>• A fierce battle is taking place on energy resources. Many armed conflicts carry the smell of oil and gas</li> <li>• There is a growing interest by the outside world in Russia and Central Asia because of their energy</li> </ul>

*continued*

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Defence White Paper October 2003</i>	<i>Overview of Foreign Policy March 2007</i>	<i>Strategy towards 2020 February 2008</i>
<b><i>Russia's national interests</i></b>			
<i>International</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening of the Russian armed forces may prevent the final dissolution of the system of international relations, based upon international law</li> <li>• The Russian armed forces can ensure global stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An important achievement of recent years is that Russia has reinstated its foreign policy independence</li> <li>• Russia as an active global power not only participates in realizing the international agenda but also formulates this agenda</li> <li>• Energy diplomacy is gaining weight due to Russia's leading role in it</li> <li>• The energy factor is increasing in Russia's foreign policy</li> <li>• Relations with the CIS countries are a key priority in RF foreign policy</li> <li>• Russia has an interest in having friendly, flourishing, democratic and stable states at its borders</li> <li>• Russia does not intend to give up its natural competitive advantages nor to damage its national interests</li> <li>• Russia conducts an active policy towards the millions of ethnic Russians living in the near abroad (za rubezhëm). Protection of their interests and encouragement to resettle in Russia are priorities of RF foreign policy</li> <li>• Russia should expand its current economic cooperation in the BRIC format (Brazil, Russia, India and China) with energy and counterterrorism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The expenditures for new weapon systems must be in line with the possibilities and not contrary to the priorities of the social-economic development</li> <li>• Strengthening of national security demands a new strategy towards 2020 for the build-up of the armed forces</li> <li>• Russia has an active interest in global and regional integration processes</li> <li>• For the accomplishment of its national tasks Russia strives towards peaceful and positive stance of international relations</li> </ul>

*continued*

## *Threats to Russia's security*

### *External threats*

- International terrorism
- Drug trafficking
- Organized and cross-border crime
- Deployment of foreign troops in the territory of new NATO members and states aspiring to join the bloc
- Unilateral use of military power without UNSC mandate
- Armed force used by ad hoc coalitions
- Cold war stereotypes
- Proliferation of mass destruction weapons
- Armed force is increasingly used for protecting economic interests, which enlarges foreign policy requirements for using violence
- Reducing the role of the UNSC is a dangerous tendency
- Renationalization of security policy of states in Central Asia, the Far East or elsewhere in the CIS will compel Russia to consider the regions as potential sources of conflict
- Interference in internal RF affairs
- Demonstration of military power close to the borders of Russia
- Expansion of military blocs
- Strengthening of Islamic extremism close to Russian borders
- Infringement on the rights and interests of Russian citizens in foreign states (za rubezhëm)
- International terrorism
- Extremism
- Narcotics
- Regional conflicts
- Independence of Kosovo would cause a serious deterioration of stability in Europe and would serve as a precedent
- Georgia intends destroying the existing peacekeeping and negotiating formats complicating the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- On Afghanistan, a failure and subsequent withdrawal of the USA and NATO would confront the Central Asian states and Russia with the Afghan threats of narcotics, terrorism, fundamentalism and destabilization
- The USA and other Western states try to use the OSCE as an unilateral instrument for ensuring their foreign and security policy objectives
- NATO's refusal to sign the adapted CFE Treaty, further enlargement, possibly including Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the deployment of US troops in Romania and Bulgaria deteriorate the relations with Russia
- The planned US missile defence shield in Eastern Europe
- A new arms race is unfolding, caused especially by developed states, leaning on their technological superiority
- NATO refuses to sign the adapted CFE Treaty, but demands from Russia a one-sided compliance
- NATO further enlarges, taking its military infrastructure towards Russia's borders
- The USA is establishing new military bases in Romania and Bulgaria and a missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic
- Because of the abundance in energy resources Russia is faced with a recidivist policy of deterrence resulting in unfair competition, as well as with actors that try to get access to Russia's energy reserves

*continued*

Appendix 1: *continued*

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Defence White Paper October 2003</i>	<i>Overview of Foreign Policy March 2007</i>	<i>Strategy towards 2020 February 2008</i>
<b><i>Ensuring Russia's Security</i></b>			
<i>Fundamental and objectives</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear and large-scale wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions are no longer probable</li> <li>• Russia expects cooperation with the USA and other industrialized countries to grow in ensuring stability and dismantling the Cold War vestiges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multilateral diplomacy is the fundamental method of regulating international relations</li> <li>• Russia as an active global power not only participates in realizing the international agenda but also formulates this agenda</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia is back in the international arena as a powerful state, which has to be taken into account and which can stand up for itself</li> </ul>
<i>Foreign policy objectives</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NATO–Russia partnership is maintained despite major differences on issues of enlargement of the alliance and its foreign military operations</li> <li>• The main international obligations of Russia are related to the UN, the CSTO, the SCO and Belarus</li> <li>• Russia expects that the anti-Russian entries will be removed from military planning and political declarations of NATO members</li> <li>• Economic relations with EU countries will further develop</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The EU is Russia's principal partner in Europe</li> <li>• Russia expects two-way politics from European actors, such as the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO</li> <li>• The relationship with China and the cooperation in the triangle Russia–India–China are vital policy points</li> <li>• Russia conducts an active policy towards ethnic Russians living in the near abroad (<i>za rubezhëm</i>)</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>

*Ensuring military security*

- If NATO is preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes will be undertaken in Russia's military planning and development of the Russian armed forces, including its nuclear strategy
  - Russian armed forces will contain military and political threats
  - Russian armed forces will ensure Russia's economic and political interests and its territorial integrity
  - Ensuring the security of Russian citizens in armed conflicts and situations of instability
  - Fight against international terrorism, political extremism and separatism
  - Preservation of a strategic deterrence force potential aimed at preventing power politics or aggression against Russia and allies
  - Russia promotes international peace through the UN and regional organizations such as OSCE, CSTO, CIS and SCO
  - CSTO and SCO can play a positive role in the fight against narcotics and terror and in promoting stabilization around Afghanistan and in Central Asia on the whole
  - Russia repeatedly offers NATO cooperation with the CSTO around Afghanistan. NATO and CSTO could jointly guard the Tajik-Afghan border with Russia and Tajikistan, possibly also involving Iran
  - The Russia-NATO Council has become an important factor for stability and prediction of the relations with the Alliance
  - In the coming years Russia will produce new weapon systems which will qualitatively be at least equal or even better than those of other countries
  - Due to the demands of modern technology the strategy for the build-up of the armed forces must be reviewed to acquire an army which can cope with the most sophisticated demands
  - Such a modern army requires solving the current problems in prestige, salaries, social security and housing
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**Source:** Marcel de Haas: 2012, p. 25.

## Appendix 2:

### Medvedev's key security documents compared with those of Putin (2000-2009)

<i>National Security Concept January 2000</i>	<i>Foreign Policy Concept June 2000</i>	<i>Overview of Foreign Policy March 2007</i>	<i>Strategy towards 2020 February 2008</i>	<i>Foreign Policy Concept July 2008</i>	<i>National Security Strategy May 2009</i>
<b>Russia in the world community</b>					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominance in the international community of developed Western states led by the United States This is especially aimed at applying unilateral solutions, including the use of military force, to key problems in world politics, flouting the fundamental principles of international law</li> <li>• Efforts to weaken Russia's position politically, economically and militarily, as well as in other fields</li> <li>• Attempts to ignore the interests of Russia in solving major problems in international relations</li> <li>• Terrorism poses a threat to world stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unilateral actions can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and religious strife</li> <li>• The use of force in violation of the UN Charter is unlawful and poses a threat to the stability of the entire system of international relations</li> <li>• Attempts to introduce into international parlance such concepts as 'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty' in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the UNSC are not acceptable</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia has regained a balance of power and competitive international position lost after the Cold War</li> <li>• Force as a factor to solve international problems has increased</li> <li>• Focus on disarmament has dropped</li> <li>• Attempts to form a unipolar world</li> <li>• 'Victory in the Cold War' results in unilateral responses</li> <li>• Continuous enlargement with new members is aimed at broadening Western influence</li> <li>• Iraq has demonstrated the myth of a unipolar world</li> <li>• The US withdrawal of the ABM Treaty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under the pretext of liberty and open society the sovereignty of states and complete regions is destroyed</li> <li>• A fierce battle is taking place on energy resources Many armed conflicts carry the smell of oil and gas</li> <li>• There is a growing interest of the outside world in Russia and Central Asia because of their energy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia exerts a substantial influence upon the development of a new architecture of international relations</li> <li>• The reaction to the prospect of loss by the historic Western global monopoly is expressed in the policy of containing Russia</li> <li>• Unilateral action strategy destabilizes the international situation, provokes tensions and arms race, and exacerbates interstate differences</li> <li>• Strategic stability issue cannot anymore be addressed exclusively within the framework of Russia-US relations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RF energy potential provides opportunities to strengthen Moscow's influence in the international arena</li> <li>• Russia is on the way to becoming one of the leading powers in terms of technological progress, standards of living of the population and influence upon world processes</li> <li>• A new European security architecture should be formed, based upon an open system of collective security and a clear legal foundation</li> <li>• International politics will be aimed at acquiring energy resources from the Arctic and Caspian regions and from Central Asia</li> </ul>

### ***Russia's national interests and priorities***

- Realizing Russia's national interests is possible only on the basis of stable economic development. That is why the national interests of Russia in this field are the crucial ones
- Eliminating the causes and conditions contributing to political and religious extremism, ethno-separatism and their consequences, i.e. social, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts and terrorism
- Strengthening Russia's position as a great power, as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world
- Developing mutually advantageous relations, especially with the member states of the CIS and Russia's traditional partners
- Preventing military aggression against Russia and its allies
- Developing relations with the members of the CIS, and developing integration processes within the CIS are in Russia's interest
- Keep up a deterrence capability in the interest of preventing aggression on whatever scale, including when nuclear arms are used against Russia and its allies
- To achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the RF as a great power, as one of the most influential centres of the modern world
- A priority area in Russia's foreign policy is multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the member states of the CIS
- A priority task is to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia as the highest, at this stage, form of integration of two sovereign states
- Through the CIS Collective Security Treaty the development of cooperation in the military-political area and in the sphere of security
- Relations with European states is Russia's traditional foreign policy priority
- Of key importance are relations with the European Union (EU)
- The intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance with key clauses of the NATO-Russian Founding Act of 1997
- Respect by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of Russian interests, including in the key question of respect for the rights of the Russian-speaking population (za rubezhem)
- An important achievement of recent years is that Russia has reinstalled its foreign policy independence
- Russia as an active global power not only participates in realizing the international agenda but also formulates this agenda
- Energy diplomacy is gaining weight due to Russia's leading role in it
- The energy factor is increasing in Russia's foreign policy
- Relations with the CIS countries are a key priority in RF foreign policy
- Russia has an interest in having friendly, flourishing, democratic and stable states at its borders
- Russia does not intend to give up its natural competitive advantages nor to damage its national interests
- Russia conducts an active policy towards the millions of ethnic Russians living in the near abroad (za rubezhem) Protection of their interests and encouragement to resettle in Russia are priorities of RF foreign policy
- Russia should expand its current economic cooperation in the BRIC format (Brazil, Russia, India and China) with energy and counterterrorism
- The expenditures for new weapon systems must be in line with the possibilities and not contrary to the priorities of the social-economic development
- Strengthening of national security demands a new strategy towards 2020 for the build-up of the armed forces
- Russia has an active interest in global and regional integration processes
- For the accomplishment of its national tasks Russia strives towards peaceful and positive stance of international relations
- A new Russia, based on a solid foundation of its national interests, has now acquired a fully-fledged role in global affairs
- Strengthening of the international position of Russia
- RF possesses a real capacity to play a well-deserved role globally
- Being the biggest European state,
- Russia stands ready to play a constructive role in Europe Russia will make itself more fully engaged in its dialogue with its traditional partners, the Troika (Russia, India and China) and BRIC
- The development of friendly relations with China and India forms an important track of Russia's foreign policy in Asia
- Promote in every possible way the CSTO as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS
- Further strengthening of the SCO The OSCE should be a framework of supremacy of collective intergovernmental bodies' prerogatives
- Create favourable conditions for establishing a Union State of Russia and Belarus
- Russia is to become a global power, maintaining strategic stability and mutually advantageous partnerships in a multipolar world
- The first priorities for Russia's national security are national defence as well as state and civil security
- Subsequent priorities are a stable development of the quality of life, economic growth, science, technology, education, health care, culture, environment and strategic stability/equal partnership
- Maintain parity with the USA on strategic nuclear weapons
- There is interdependence of a stable development of the nation and its security Social-economic development is a priority on par with traditional areas of defence capability and national security
- Russia will enhance mutual cooperation in multilateral formats such as G8, G20, CSTO, SCO, Russia-India-China and BRIC

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<i>National Security Concept January 2000</i>	<i>Foreign Policy Concept June 2000</i>	<i>Overview of Foreign Policy March 2007</i>	<i>Strategy towards 2020 February 2008</i>	<i>Foreign Policy Concept July 2008</i>	<i>National Security Strategy May 2009</i>
<b><i>Threats to Russia's security</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Attempts by separate states and intergovernmental organizations to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for the maintenance of international security, primarily the UN and the OSCE</li><li>• The danger that the political, economic and military influence of Russia in the world will be reduced</li><li>• The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all the expansion of NATO eastwards</li><li>• The possible presence of foreign military bases and large military contingents in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders</li><li>• The weakening of the processes of integration in the CIS</li><li>• The development and escalation of conflicts close to the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the CIS</li><li>• International terrorism has unleashed an open campaign to destabilize the situation in Russia</li><li>• NATO's practice of using</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Growing trend towards a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States</li><li>• Stakes are being placed on Western institutions and forums of limited composition, and on weakening the role of the UNSC</li><li>• Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs</li><li>• NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with Russian security interests and occasionally directly contradict them</li><li>• This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new strategic concept, which do not exclude the use of force outside NATO's Treaty zone without the sanction of the UNSC</li><li>• Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO</li><li>• The protracted conflict in Afghanistan creates a real threat to security of the southern CIS borders and directly affects Russian</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• International terrorism</li><li>• Extremism</li><li>• Money laundering</li><li>• Narcotics</li><li>• Corruption</li><li>• Regional conflicts</li><li>• Independence of Kosovo would cause a serious deterioration of stability in Europe and would serve as a precedent</li><li>• Georgia intends destroying the existing peacekeeping and negotiating formats complicating the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia</li><li>• On Afghanistan, a failure and subsequent withdrawal of the USA and NATO would confront the Central Asian states and Russia with the Afghan threats of narcotics, terrorism, fundamentalism and destabilization</li><li>• The USA and other Western states try to use the OSCE as an unilateral instrument for ensuring their foreign and security policy</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• A new arms race is unfolding, caused especially by developed states, leaning on their technological superiority</li><li>• NATO refuses to sign the adapted CFE Treaty, but demands from Russia a one sided compliance</li><li>• NATO further enlarges, taking its military infrastructure towards Russia's borders</li><li>• The USA is establishing new military bases in Romania and Bulgaria and a missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic</li><li>• Because of the abundance in energy resources Russia is faced with a recidivist policy of deterrence resulting in unfair competition, as well as with actors that try to get hold of Russia's energy reserves</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Coercive measures with the use of military force in circumvention of the UN Charter and UNSC undermines international law and enlarges conflict space, including the area around Russia</li><li>• RF opposes unilateral actions in the field of strategic anti-missile defence that are destabilizing international situation</li><li>• Integration processes, including in the Euro-Atlantic region, are often of a selective and restrictive nature</li><li>• Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole</li><li>• Attempts to lower the role of a sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations</li><li>• Military and political rivalry of regional powers</li><li>• Terrorist and drug trafficking</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The policy of a number of leading countries, aimed at military supremacy by building up especially nuclear but also conventional strategic arms, unilateral development of anti-ballistic missile defence and militarization of space, which may trigger a new arms race</li><li>• NATO's expansion near Russia's borders and attempts to grant the military alliance a global role</li><li>• The present Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which is only oriented at NATO</li><li>• Non-compliance of international arms control, limitation and reduction agreements</li><li>• Actions aimed at unbalancing the systems of state and military control, missile warning, outer space monitoring, the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, the nuclear armaments storage facilities, nuclear power plants and atomic and chemical industries and other potentially dangerous facilities</li><li>• Competition for energy</li></ul>

military force outside the bloc's zone of responsibility without UNSC sanction, now elevated to the rank of a strategic doctrine, threatens to destabilize the entire global strategic situation

- The under-funding of national defence leads to a critically low level of operational and combat training in the armed forces and other troops
- Religious extremism and ethno-separatism
- Linking of government organs with criminal organizations

interests

- The growth of separatism, ethnic-national and religious extremism
- The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons
- The implementation of the plans of USA to create a national missile defence system will inevitably compel the RF to adopt adequate measures for maintaining its national security at a proper level

objectives

- NATO's refusal to sign the adapted CFE Treaty, further enlargement, possibly including Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the deployment of troops in Romania and Bulgaria deteriorate the relations with Russia
- The planned US missile defence shield in Eastern Europe

threats emanating from Afghanistan and prevention of risks of destabilization of the situations in Central Asia and Trans Caucasus

- Spread of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery
- Terrorism, separatism, ethno-national and religious extremism
- Drug trafficking
- Organized crime
- Illegal migration
- Infectious diseases
- Regional conflicts
- Demographic problems
- Global poverty, including energy poverty
- Climate change

resources in key energy-rich regions creates tension which may escalate into the use of military force near the borders of Russia and its allies

- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Terrorism, separatism, radicalism and extremism
- Cyber crime, transnational organized crime (narcotics, illegal immigration), corruption
- The international financial crisis
- Epidemics and pandemics
- Lack of fresh water

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### *Ensuring Russia's security*

- Overcoming the RF's scientific, technical and technological dependence on external sources
- Raising the military potential of the state and maintaining it at a sufficiently high level
- Defending the legal rights and interests of Russian citizens resident abroad (za rubezhem)
- All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other means have been exhausted

- To protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad (za rubezhem)
- To promote elimination of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the RF
- Russia shall collaborate with other states in combating drug trafficking and organized crime
- Partnership with all CIS member states to take into account in a due manner the interests of the RF, including guaranteeing rights of Russian

- Multilateral diplomacy is the fundamental method of regulating international relations
- The EU is Russia's principal partner in Europe
- Russia expects two-way politics from European actors, such as the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO
- The relationship with China and the cooperation in the triangle Russia-India-China are vital policy points
- Russia promotes

- Russia is back in the international arena as a powerful state, which has to be taken into account and which can stand up for itself
- In the coming years Russia will produce new weapon systems which will qualitatively be at least equal or even better than those of other countries
- Due to the demands of modern technology

- RF strengthens strategic partnership with leading producers of energy resources and dialogue with consuming countries and transit countries; assuming that reliability of energy supplies is supported by activities on ensuring stability of demand and secure transit
- To protect rights and legitimate interests of the
- Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad (za rubezhem) To consistently create conditions to assist in

- The conditions of national security depend in the first place on the country's economic potential
- Energy resources can be applied to support strategic deterrence
- prominent task in strengthening national defence is modernization and restructuring of the armed forces and of the military industrial complex
- Protection of Russian citizens in the 'near abroad' (za rubezhem)
- To become the world's fifth

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the most important strategic objectives of military security is the interaction and cooperation with the member states of the CIS</li> <li>• The interests of Russia's national security may require a Russian military presence in certain strategically vital regions of the world</li> <li>• The stationing of limited military contingents (military bases, navy units) in these regions should ensure that Russia is ready to help establish a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions, and should enable the state to meet its foreign policy goals</li> </ul>	<p>compatriots (za rubezhem)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia is prepared to consent with the USA to a further reduction of its nuclear potential</li> <li>• Russia shall seek preservation and observance of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- 1 Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) - the cornerstone of strategic stability</li> <li>• Russia intends to further promote the strengthening of regional stability by participating in the processes of reducing and limiting conventional armed forces</li> </ul>	<p>international peace through the UN and regional organizations such as OSCE, CSTO, CIS and SCO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSTO and SCO can play a positive role in the fight against narcotics and terror and in promoting stabilization around Afghanistan and in Central Asia as a whole</li> <li>• Russia repeatedly offers NATO to cooperate with the CSTO around Afghanistan NATO and CSTO could jointly guard the Tajik-Afghan border with Russia and Tajikistan, possibly also involving Iran</li> <li>• The Russia-NATO Council has become an important factor for stability and prediction of the relations with the Alliance</li> </ul>	<p>the strategy for the build-up of the armed forces must be reviewed to acquire an army which can cope with the most sophisticated demands</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Such a modern army requires solving the current problems in prestige, salaries, social security and housing</li> </ul>	<p>the voluntary resettlement to the RF of compatriots Russia together with CSTO, SCO and others makes consistent efforts to prevent export of terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional collective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region, in such a way as not to allow its new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in the European architecture dating from the Cold War</li> <li>• RF is prepared to negotiate a reduction of strategic offensive weapons to a level sufficient to maintain strategic stability</li> </ul>	<p>largest economy in terms of GDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintaining nuclear parity with the USA in reply to its European missile shield and the US nuclear strike doctrine</li> <li>• A gradual development towards a world without nuclear weapons</li> <li>• Deployment of military contingents in conflict areas promoting strategic stability and equal strategic partnership</li> </ul>
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National Security Concept 2000 (SCRF 2000a); Foreign Policy Concept 2000 (SCRF 2000c); Overview of Foreign Policy 2007 (MID 2007a); Strategy 2020 (Kremlin 2008a); Foreign Policy Concept 2008 (MID 2008); National Security Strategy 2009 (SCRF 2009b)

**Source:** Marcel de Haas: 2012, p. 98.