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Europeanization of domestic civil society organizations

- Strategies employed by domestic CSOs in their interaction with the European Union

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Abstract

Europeanization has become a key concept to changes due to transfer of competences to EU level. While extensive research has been performed on institutional dynamics and also on the rise of private interest representation at EU-level, little is said about domestic civil society organizations (CSOs) and their integration in EU politics. By zooming out of Brussels we come to realize that also domestic CSOs are starting to recognize the importance of engaging in EU politics.

By applying two of the few existing theoretical frameworks dealing with Europeanization of domestic organizations on two cases where domestic CSOs are engaging in EU politics, namely **the debate over licensed hunt on wolfs** and the question if **non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted from paying and register VAT or not**, this study aimed at contribute to theory development.

From the cases studies we could see that domestic CSOs were using a multitude of strategies when engaging in EU politics taking place at both domestic and EU level. The study emphasizes that one must recognize both vertical and horizontal interactions. When doing this it becomes obvious that domestic CSOs can shape alliances with both institutional actors, other CSOs and EU based CSOs to compensate for lack of resources and EU competence. The CSOs are learning and building competences of how to engage in EU politics from a national level. By networking and using alternative strategies also domestic CSOs has proven important actors in EU politics in my two cases. Actions at both levels were intertwined and therefore when trying to predict the Europeanization of domestic CSOs one must go about such predictions carefully and with respect for the multitude of factors that come into play in such a process.

Keywords: Europeanization, European Union, National level, Civil society organizations (CSOs)

Wordcount: 19560

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1 Introduction

Member states entering the European Union (EU) has in many ways affected the coordination of public policies and could be seen as one of the most prominent political changes in our times (Lundberg 2012:7). Within academic research the transforming powers of EU are referred to as Europeanization and we are experiencing an ever growing interest in the subject. The primary focus within the Europeanization literature has been on how EU integration and transferred legislative competences affects policy adaption at the domestic level (e.g. Cowles, Carporaso & Risse 2001; Graziano & Vink 2008; Olsen 2002). In the ever growing literature on Europeanization there has also been a focus on what could be described as “the usual suspects” when dealing with policy processes. I am referring to governmental institutions, politicians and civil servants. By aiming our attention away from the most apparent targets of institutional change we will come to recognize also other actors that have taken place on the European political arena.

Simply by looking at the large representation of non-governmental actors in Brussels we are given a hint that what is going on in EU is not only a public institutional matter. The background to this rise of a European non-governmental sphere could be connected back to a crisis in democratic legitimacy that emerged within the Union in the 1990^{ths}. In 2001 the Commission launched a *white paper on European governance*. This was done mainly to find ways of increasing democratic legitimacy and gain support from European citizen for the European Project. EU wanted to improve the public image through better regulation, good governance, support of and partnership with civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) then become important collaborators to the Commission, both to increase legitimacy but also to provide competence and knowledge that were needed for the EU institutions to handle a larger administrative burden (Kröger 2008:5). The development of a non-governmental sphere at EU level existing of both private interest groups in EU and the birth of several EU based CSOs has caused an increase in research on private interest representation at EU level in Brussels (Smismans, 2003, 2008; Rumford, 2003; Trenz, 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008, 2009).

Actors that are not yet as present in the Europeanization literature are domestic CSOs, naturally because they are not as present in Brussels. However, just because are not particularly visible in Brussels does not mean they are not engaged in EU politics. As Ruzza and Bozzini (2008) describe it, domestic CSOs are too starting to recognize the importance of addressing the EU political environment, but not only by going to Brussels.

The empirical evidence for my statements above I have come to find in two cases of domestic CSOs involvement in EU related questions. The two questions I am referring to are both Swedish cases and include first **the debate over licensed hunt on wolfs** and second the question if **non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted from paying and register VAT or not**. Both these questions are closely linked and in some aspects dependent on the two EU directives, the Habitats directive and the VAT directive. The two debates have to a large extent been raised by Swedish CSOs acting either to resist the implementation of an EU-directive (the VAT-directive) or to use an EU- directive (the Habitats directive) to gain support for their cause to stop the hunting of wolf in Sweden. In the case of the wolf hunt,

conservation organizations are acting through the EU, against the Swedish government to prevent licensed hunt of wolfs in Sweden because of the unfavorable conservation status of the species. In the case of non-profit organizations exemptions from VAT, Swedish organizations are acting in alliance with the Swedish government to try to keep existing national legislation.

The two cases that I will use in this text to hopefully develop actor centered Europeanization theory, are quite unusual and unique so far. However as stated both in research and by my informants these are scenarios that surly will appear again in the close future. By addressing these domestic CSOs through Europeanization theory, I believe that we can discover a broader and more diverse set of possible routes to influence national as well as EU-level politics and better understand the possibilities the domestic CSOs have to Europeanize their lobbying activities.

As we are entering a possible new era of civil society – public institutional relationship in EU and its member states, where also domestic CSOs starts to engage in EU policy matters I believe it is relevant to use these cases as a way to describe what can happen when the power has gone to Brussels and domestic CSOs starts to recognize that and acts upon it.

1.1 Research aim

My ambition with this thesis is first to bring in domestic CSOs into the Europeanization literature. By making in depth case studies of two political processes where domestic CSOs are engaging in EU politics I hope to provide useful empirical observations on political actors that not yet have been addressed extensively in the Europeanization literature. Secondly I hope to contribute to refined theory on Europeanization of domestic CSOs by taking a stamp in two of the few existing theoretical frameworks of Europeanization of non-governmental actors and discuss those theories in relation to the empirical material in the case studies.

By seeing Europeanization from a CSO perspective while at the same time analyzing the CSOs in relation to a larger political context that affects their behavior, I can hopefully display those constrains the organizations faces when engaging in EU politics. I also believe I can point out the possibilities that arise when the CSOs interact with other actors to pursue their individual goals.

Discussing the CSOs strategies and factors that seem important to them when engaging in EU politics, in relation to theory, I hope to contribute to theory development within the Europeanization literature and clear the path for further research on a subject that seems to become more and more relevant as we speak.

1.1.1 Research question

What strategies are employed by domestic CSOs when interacting with the EU?

What factors are relevant for explaining the organizations actions and strategies in the different situations of interactions with the EU?

1.1.2 Definitions

In this text there will show up different appellations for those organizations that different researchers including myself are approaching. Klüvers theoretical framework which is the one I am deriving from is made up by studying a form of private interest groups namely agricultural groups, whereas I am studying Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are built on a non-profit ground. CSOs is used as to encompass various other terms that might be relevant in discussing civil society actors, such as civil association, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs), advocacy network, third sector, etc. As Kaldor (2003:15) puts it, the term Civil Society Organization has the advantage of stressing its identity in its own rights, in contrast to the terms that define these actors against governments or corporations. The term non-profit will be used in the VAT case to explain what kinds of organizations that are exempted from VAT. This is done because the non-profit term is what is used in public documents on the question.

2 Theory

This chapter starts with a presentation of the general conceptions of Europeanization. The debate concerning Europeanization provides an important context in which the focus of this research should be understood. Furthermore I suggest an incorporation of CSOs in the theoretical debate, explain why this is important and present the theories that this study will use. The chapter ends with a discussion of existing theory on Europeanization of CSOs and suggestions on how the subject can be approached in a different manner for more accurate results.

2.1 Introducing Europeanization

Increased European integration constitutes the basis for the more recently adopted concept of Europeanization. Because of its complexity Europeanization research has come to include a debate on whether to study Europeanization from a top-down or a bottom-up perspective. The top-down approach refers here to impacts of new EU institutions on member states political structures and process and the bottom-up approach refers to the European Union as the emergence of EU institutions that brings new norms, policies and practices (Börzel 2002:193).

One of the most prominent so called top-down approaches to Europeanization is developed by Caporaso *et al.* (2001:3). They propose to understand by Europeanization:

...the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules”.

Europeanization is seen as a process that brings in new layers of politics that interact with the already existing ones. Europeanization is thus about seeing the EU institutions and the EU legislation that is now interacting with domestic politics as well as making distinctions between European and domestic politics, policies and institutions.

Radaelli (2003) is another prominent Europeanization researcher. He presents a more comprehensive definition where he incorporates both mechanisms and effects of Europeanization, such as:

Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing’ things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2003:30).

Radaelli argues that the particularity of the domestic context must be considered to a large extent. He sees the effects of Europeanization but recognizes mediating factors that come into

play. He asks himself whether it is the national institutions, norms and ideas that make the Europeanization possible. Are the national institutions capable of infusing change, do they have the administrative and or economic capacity? However, Radaelli also recognize the bottom-up effects, that is the process of creating policies, politics and polities that are highly affected of member states preferences and policies.

Even though it is important to recognize the double nature of Europeanization most scholars including myself chose to focus on either the top-down or the bottom-up approach when studying the phenomenon empirically. The reasons for this will be discussed more when presenting the methodological challenges of this study.

I have chosen to derive from the definition of Europeanization presented by Caporaso et al (2001) as a process that brings in new layers of politics that interact with those already there. Many scholars before me have used this approach. However, I will use the concept to understand the position of a certain kind of political actors that has not previously been addressed extensively by Europeanization research, namely domestic CSOs. The reason for the lack of both empirical and theoretical considerations on Europeanization of domestic CSOs is what I now will turn to.

2.2 Research on actor centered Europeanization

As stated in the introduction, the rise of non-governmental sphere in Brussels has led to an increase in research on private interest representation at EU level (Smismans, 2003, 2008; Rumford, 2003; Trenz, 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008, 2009). While the non-governmental actors in Brussels have gotten much attention from researchers not as many have looked into possible changes in national interest representation in relation to European integration (for exceptions see e.g. Kendall 2010; Sanchez-Salgado 2007). As domestic CSOs generally have not considered themselves to be engaging with EU policy it is not strange that these organizations have not attracted the interest of Europeanization researchers. Because approaching EU institutions includes substantial constrains in terms of the effectiveness of these activities in comparison to what they cost (McCartyhy and Zald 1977:1220) research has also come to exclude domestic CSOs as organization as they often are considered weak in terms of resources.

It is too early to speak of an Europeanization of domestic civil society in EU member states since much evidence still show that the majority of civil society is not recognizing EU politics as relevant to them (Kendall 2010:57). This, however, does not mean that it is unimportant to investigate what transferred competence to EU means for domestic CSOs. Just like Ruzza and Bozzini (2008) describe and as my two cases will display, national CSOs are starting to recognize the importance of engaging in EU politics, if yet in another way than by establishing representation in Brussels which is what other non-governmental actors has done.

By broadening the picture and recognizing that civil society can be a critical voice towards both the national government and towards EU institutions also national civil society actors becomes an interesting group to pay attention to when studying Europeanization. As my two

cases show, domestic CSOs have engaged in EU politics not just by recognizing the relevance of EU policy but also by approaching EU institutions directly as well as acting towards the national government in order to encourage them to influence EU institutions in a way that promotes the opinions of the CSOs.

As I see it there is no theory today that can fully explain the Europeanization of national CSOs as displayed in my case studies. However, some first attempts have been made to map both the possible ways that national non-governmental organizations can try to influence questions where EU holds the legislative power and what mediating factors that are important to manage such processes. So instead of starting from scratch I have decided to make use of these theories in an attempt to develop them and hence get a better and more comprehensive understanding of Europeanization of domestic CSOs.


2.3 Europeanization of interest groups – A top-down approach

Heike Klüver's (2010) theory on Europeanization of lobbying activities is one of the few attempts made where research is connecting the Europeanization literature with non-governmental organizations as actors. Klüver argue that "an increased transfer of competence to European institutions due to the shaping of a single market, the Euro-system and an overall enlargement of policy areas that is now dealt with at EU level, all contributes to put *adapational pressure* not only on governmental institutions but also on interest groups. Interest groups cannot longer only address the domestic institutions to influence politics, but now has to face the EU level as well" (Klüver 2010:177). Even though many EU based umbrella organizations have showed up lately, the national interest groups cannot according to Klüver rely solely on them to speak for their cause. These EU based organizations and networks represents such a heterogeneous group of organizations that it is only very few questions that the members all have in common (Greenwood 2007:15) and therefore can rely on the EU organizations to act within (Klüver 2010:176). Nationally based interest groups therefore need to see for themselves that they address the EU institutions directly where it is needed. Klüver refers to this as Europeanization of national interest groups (Klüver 2010:176). The adapational pressure from EU seems however to affect the interest groups very differently. Not all interest groups are Europeanizing and how this variation should be explained is somewhat contested (Klüver 2010:176).

Europeanization theory is often built on two assumptions: that impact of EU institutions on member states is varied (1) and that differentiated impact can be explained by mediating factors (2) (Börzel 2005) (Klüver 2010:176). Klüver also build theory on the assumption that national interest groups are maximizing their influence in order to achieve their goals. Hence, the organizations select the most profitable lobbying strategy. The organizations are however constrained by their amount of resources (McCartyhy and Zald 1977:1220). Since the organizations make rational calculations of whether Europeanizing lobbying activities is beneficial or not the choices made by the organizations, according to Klüver, also rely on the national institutional context and the possibility for the organization to get recognition for their cause at that level.

From these assumptions of Europeanization the following theoretical framework is presented by Klüver:

Figure 1: Theoretical framework presented by Klüver (2010:178) to explain Europeanization of interest groups lobbying activities.



2.3.1 Mediating factors

Interest groups want to maximize their influence but have limited resources. Lobbying is about exchanging goods between decision makers and interest groups (Klüver 2010:179, Bouwen 2002). Successful lobbying within in the EU could therefore be said to depend on the ability of the interest group to give the EU institutions the goods that they want. In order to do that three resource factors, previously mentioned in the figure, are necessary. Financial and personnel resources are needed to provide EU institution with the requested expertise. EU institutions are continuously understaffed and are therefore in need of expertise coming from the outside. The interest groups need to be able to handle tasks such as following a decision making process, elaborate statements and reports, and participate in hearings and consultations. It has also been proved that being present in Brussels matters when it comes to influencing the European decision makers (Klüver 2010:179). The third factor, representativeness, is important because of EUs will to increase the legitimacy of the union. Efforts have been made to increase democratic standards and therefore the Commission is particularly interested in listening to interest groups with large constituency, to be prepared

for the reactions of large parts of the stakeholders to certain proposals. Klüver concludes that the more recourse the interest group has the more likely they are to Europeanize their activities (Klüver 2010:179).

The national institutional context can be said to include two factors, namely distribution of power, which has to do with different levels of access points for interest groups to institutional environments and interest intermediation, which has to do with the system that is made up by corporatism, pluralism or statism (Klüver 2010:180). Corporatism is characterized by high levels of inclusion of interest groups in the decision making, pluralism is a middle way and statism offers the most closed system to interest groups. Klüver builds on these categories and argue that interest groups in a centralized state are more likely to Europeanize their lobbying activities than other states. This because of the compensation hypothesis which assumes that additional venues provided by the EU are especially attractive for those excluded from national policy communities (Richardson 2000:1013 and Beyers 2002). . The same goes for the intermediating conditions; the more open the domestic system, the less interested the interest groups are to approach the EU level and Europeanize their lobbying activities. (Klüver 2010:181).

2.4 Alternative routes to Europeanization of domestic CSOs

While Klüvers theory is useful to connect the Europeanization literature with non-governmental organization as actors and show what demands that are put on the organizations to Europeanize their activities, Ruzza and Bozzinis (2008) theory is helpful in providing alternative strategies that the CSOs can use to Europeanize their lobbying activities besides the strategy of establishing representativeness in Brussels as described in Klüvers model.

Ruzza and Bozzini present four possible routes for CSOs to approach EU policy that can perhaps help us broaden the view on Europeanizing activities. The routes are:

- a) The *Traditional route* where CSOs continue their political work only towards the national government and recognize EU only in terms of EU legislation. The organizations do not address the EU institutions or try to influence the EU policy process, but can if they want to refer to EU policy when claiming their cause at national level
- b) The *National route* where CSOs mobilize at a national level in order to influence EU policy through the national government. The CSOs lobby towards the national government with the purpose of having indirect influence on EU institutions and policy processes. This path is often chosen when CSOs sees potential in the national government to affect EU-policy.
- c) The *European route up* where the organization participates at EU level to influence EU policy. This route is seen by Ruzza and Bozzini as a route taken almost exclusively by EU based CSOs because it, like Klüver states, demands high levels of resources to achieve effective lobbying at EU level. Because of the demands on both sectorial and political knowledge it can only be pursued by organizations with constant presence in Brussels.
- d) The *European route down* which includes participation in EU based activities in order to influence national policy processes. This route is not obvious in Klüvers theory where Europeanization is seen as something that solely has to do with influencing EU policy. As the traditional route where EU policy could be used to influence the national government this is

another example of where EU can become a possibility for organizations to influence national policymaking by engaging EU institutions for their cause (Ruzza and Bozzini 2008:298-299).

2.5 Developing approaches to the Europeanization of domestic CSOs

Both Ruzza and Bozzini as well as Klüver all agree that European policy is recognized by national CSOs as something they need to deal with at the same time as the awareness does not correspond to the level of interaction with EU since this requires high amounts of resources and knowledge (Ruzza and Bozzini 2008:301, Klüver 2010:179). While Klüver elaborates on mediating factors, Ruzza and Bozzini are simply mentioning them in their study which is why Klüvers theory is needed for the purpose of this study, even though I will come to criticize her conclusions.

The differences between the theories is that Ruzza and Bozzini are taking a more overarching approach to Europeanization where they recognize Europeanizing activities at both national and EU-level. CSOs either use EU institution or policy to change national legislation or use the national government and/or EU-based CSOs to affect EU-policy. Since non-governmental actors are participating in EU-policy making and implementation it is important to consider both the horizontal (national level) and vertical interactions (EU-level with institutional actors when studying the Europeanization of these actors, as well as trying to distinguish between different explanatory factors in both ways (Saurugger 2005:305). By adopting Ruzza and Bozzinis alternative routes to EU the CSOs can be seen as separate units within a multidimensional political context. This makes it easier to understand what possibilities CSOs have and under what conditions the CSOs Europeanize their activities.

In the Wolf hunt case it becomes apparent that transferred competence to EU creates a possibility for the organizations to influence policy at the national level. In the VAT case we see that the relationship between the national government and the different CSOs becomes highly relevant for how the process is played out. However, Klüvers mediating factors will be challenged by relational factors that will prove important to understand the Europeanization of non-governmental actors.

Also Klüver recognize the interactions between CSOs and the national government, but she does it from a somewhat different perspective. Klüver is focusing on the compensations hypothesis where CSOs who are not recognized for their cause at the national level are more eager to pursue their goals at EU level. By focusing only on the vertical interaction Klüver ignores that even when the national government recognizes the CSOs wishes they might also need their help when working against EU institutions. Hence CSOs that get recognition for their cause at national level could also get engaged in Europeanizing activities by joining forces with the national government. Klüver dismisses all other activities than establishing representativeness in Brussels as effective in EU politics and therefore exclude actions at the national level or between CSOs and national representatives in Brussels. As my cases will show the two-way dependency that Klüver, with the help of Bouwen (2002), describes between EU institutions and non-governmental actors is not the only relevant relationship to

understand Europeanization. To clarify these statements the alternative routes presented by Ruzza and Bozzini are helpful.

What neither of the theories recognizes is how organizations can pool resources and thus get engaged in ways of Europeanizing their lobbying activities that are resource demanding. The *European route up* and *down* are for example not taken only by EU based CSOs like Ruzza and Bozzini suggest. Today there are both formal and informal ways for also national CSOs to approach EU institutions directly by allying with other national CSOs and share the resources.

Additionally both theories regard EU as one unit and explain CSOs lobbying towards EU as highly resource demanding and only open to experienced EU lobbyists. By separating the EU institutions one could perhaps get a somewhat different view on what is demanded from the organizations who wish to influence them. The European Parliament is for example supposedly more opened towards the public since they are politically elected and should thus be more accessible for organizations who wish to influence them.

Another aspect that the cases in this study show is that different strategies are used simultaneously. This makes it difficult to distinguish between them when investigating the processes since they are intertwined and affect each other. Separating the routes as done by Ruzza and Bozzini is helpful when presenting the CSOs strategies descriptively but in the analysis it must be recognized that actions taken at both the national and the European level interact with each other.

For the analysis of the two cases I will use both Klüver and Ruzza and Bozzinis theories in order to explain the actions taken by the CSOs in each case. Where the theories do not cover the empiricism I will try to complement the theories with factors and aspects that seem important for the understanding of Europeanization of CSOs.

3 Method

In this chapter I will present how the investigation has been conducted. I will explain my choice of cases and how the cases should be understood as well as discuss the methods used for gathering the empirical material. Additionally I will put effort into explaining those methodological challenges that research on Europeanization faces according to Saurugger (2005) and how these challenges has been handled in this investigation. At the end I discuss how the material will be analyzed and make some final remarks on what should be expected of this study.

3.1 Case study research – description of the process

I have conducted two within-case studies. As in most cases studies it has been an interactive process (George & Bennet 2005:89) that started in an interest in understanding what EU has meant for CSOs. The interest came from the increased focus put on civil society both in the EU context and at national level.

While searching through the example of CSOs engagement in EU related matters, a phase that George & Bennet refers to as “Soaking and Poaking” (George & Bennet 2005:89) it showed that some CSOs have started to incorporate EU in their work but that long term engagement in EU related questions are still quite rare. Two cases that stood out in the Swedish context were the question **on exemptions from VAT for non-profit organizations** and the questions **on whether or not approving licensed hunt on wolfs**. In both of these cases Swedish CSOs have engaged in EU related questions and actively tried to influence policy either at EU level or at the national level through EU Institutions.

Going through the literature on Europeanization, that has become a large research field for both political scientists as well as for researchers in other disciplines, I could see that the definitions of Europeanization was contested (Saurugger 2005:293). I could also see that most research performed on non-governmental actors were about those actors present and active in Brussels (Saurugger 2005:295). What I couldn't find to the same extent, were theoretical considerations on domestic CSOs involvement in EU related questions in the ways that had raised my interest in the two previously mentioned cases.

When I started to dig deeper in the involvement of domestic CSOs in European politics I begun to realize the complexity of such processes and I also experienced that I had problem explaining my cases theoretically and therefore saw a need to investigate it further.

3.2 Case selection

The important question to ask when choosing a case is *what is this a case of?* (May 2011:231). Instead of focusing on private interest groups with high levels of resources (those that according to Klüver (2010) are the most likely to Europeanize their activities) I have chosen cases that includes the engagement of domestic CSOs in EU related questions. These cases include both smaller organizations with low levels of recourse as well as bigger organizations with more resources but that still faces constrains when engaging in EU politics and thus not would be what Klüver would define as resource strong organizations.

Tabel 1: Possible relations between CSOs, the national government and the EU institutions in policies where legislative competences has been transferred to EU

	CSOs pro EU policy	CSOs against EU policy
Government pro EU policy	Q1 Consensus	Q2 Conflict government and EU against CSOs
Government against EU policy	Q3 Conflict government against CSOs and EU <i>Wolf hunt case</i>	Q4 Consensus government and CSOs against EU <i>VAT case</i>

As you can see in table 1 there are four possible scenarios for CSOs in EU related matters when it comes to CSOs relationship to the national government and EU. In Q1 there is consensus among all parts, in Q2 there is conflict situation with both EU and the government. This is an interesting scenario; however I have chosen not to address this in my investigation since I am interested in explaining how CSOs act when there is a disagreement between the national government and EU. It is fair to assume that the possibilities for CSOs to be successful in their demands when they are up against both EU and the national government are quite small. Therefore neither cases that fall into this category are suitable for investigating the resources that CSOs draw upon in relation to Europeanization. Further investigations on what happens to CSOs that now faces two institutional powers instead of one I leave for other researchers to take on. The cases I have chosen are from, those situations displayed in Q3 and Q4.

3.2.1 The cases

A more thorough presentation of each case will be done as part of the results of this study. Here I will point put what I aim to get out of the cases and explain some limitations. While the VAT case show us a situation where the CSOs are in consensus with the government against EU policy the Wolf hunt case displays a situation of conflict between the CSOs and the national government in a question where EU law rules. The VAT case is made up by the actions taken by four CSOs that have been more active than other organizations work to resist changes in regulations on whether non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted from paying and register VAT or not. The organizations are displayed in table 2 under informants. The VAT case will come to display Europeanizing activities at both national level and at EU level and it includes interaction with both the national government and EU institutions.

The Wolf hunt case includes the study of four organizations work towards the European Commission in order to achieve policy change at national level. The question stand over licensed hunt on wolfs where the Swedish government as well as other CSOs are pro such hunt but where the CSOs I will study are against. As in the VAT case these are not the only active organizations but they are those who have engaged in approaching EU institutions. This case deals mostly with the CSOs interaction at EU level. The cases should be seen as complementary to each other as they can explain different things because of the CSOs different relationship to the Swedish government and the EU.

The cases were chosen from a small population as cases like these are quite rare. This is also part of what makes them interesting. The rarity of the cases is confirmed by the informants in the study. Also in the media these two cases stand out and finally proof can be found in the Europeanization literature where, as previously stated, domestic organizations have not been observed Europeanizing their activities to a large extent.

Since I am not out to generalize my results but simply to broaden the perspective of Europeanization of domestic CSOs and deepening the understanding of what factors are important for the organization to Europeanize, I don't see picking Swedish cases as problematic. I would however like to point out the importance of recognizing the national institutional context when studying Europeanization of CSOs for as research has shown that there is a variance both in terms of how the civil society is organized in the member states (Wijkström 2004:7) and how member states respond to the transferred competence to EU (i.e. Klüver 2010, Saurugger 2007, Beyers 2002). Several scholars point out how different national structures and contexts affect the ability for non-governmental actors to Europeanize but the theories are contested. The discussion over how different national institutional contexts can affect the Europeanization of CSOs will not be addressed in this thesis. Other studies have also dealt with different policy areas and policy phases and even though they could prove to be of significance I will only comment on these factors briefly and leave up to quantitative studies to do such comparative research.

3.3 Data requirements and empirical material

As stated by Seawright and Gerring (2008) most case-selection techniques require in-depth knowledge of each case. Getting access to the right sources has thus been crucial for this investigation. The empirical material in this study have been collected through text and document studies as well as through semi-structured interviews with representatives from CSOs and other key persons such as politicians and civil servants at both national and EU level.

3.3.1 Documentary research

In order to present a reliable and complete narrative on the actions and argument's surrounding the two cases it has been crucial to look into letters, documents, investigations, news articles and formal comments that have been made by different political actors in each case. The documented material brings complementary information to the interviews and helps us to better understand the quite substantial political processes surrounding the questions. The documents I have used consist mostly of official documents such as press releases from both the Swedish government and EU institutions, public letters from and to the government, the Commission and the organizations. Because of the actuality of the cases some media texts have also been used for updated information and declaration of opinions.

3.3.2 Interviews

The main empirical source for this study has been semi-structured interviews performed with a total of 18 informants in 17 interviews, of which 12 were face to face interviews and four were phone interviews. As much of the interviews were about clarifying the background and the political process in the different cases, I asked somewhat different questions to different informants. The CSOs were primarily asked to tell me about their work and strategies as well as what has been important to them in their work. The civil servants and politicians have primarily been asked about the significance of the CSOs actions and what contact they have had with the CSOs. The semi-structured interview has been performed with the help of an interview guide instead of specific questions (Devine 2002:198-199). This open method is a good way of being able to capture and develop responses in greater depth since during the process the interviewer can clarify and confirm already said statements.

In each case the informants were chosen from a so called "snowball selection". My first informant was handed to me via contacts and from there I received tips on who to contact. All of my interviews ended with the question if there were anyone else the informant would recommend me to talk to. Because of the answers received on this question I feel quite confident that I have reached an empirical fullness.

The number of informants and who they are representing differs a little bit in the two cases. The explanation to this is that in the VAT case there has been cooperation and interaction between the more actors than in the Wolf hunt case.

The Swedish carnivore association (Swedish: Svenska Rovdjursöfreningen (SRF)) who has been a very active part in the wolf hunt question was requested to participate as an informant in the investigation but chose to decline the request. They had gladly participated when the question has been resolved but chose not to because of the fact that the infringement procedure against Sweden is an ongoing process and have not yet been settled. As SRFs participation in the study is desirable I believe that the other organization has provided me with enough information to be able to perform a comprehensive analysis of the CSOs actions and strategies, as well as what have been important to them in their work.

Information about the CSOs can be found in the appendix 2 and 3.

Two informants requested to be anonymous since both cases include ongoing processes. Otherwise the informants have agreed to display their names.

3.3.3 Informants

These are the organizations, politicians and civil servants that I have interviewed. Complete list of interview information can be found in appendix 1.

Tabel 2: Informants

Informants VAT case - CSOs		
Name	Organization	Position
Helena Carlsson	Swedish Sports Confederation (RF)	Sports policy advisor
Fredrik Rhode	Swedish Sports Confederation (RF)	Sports policy advisor
Mats Bernerstedt	Civos	Former Chairman
Christine von Sydow	Swedish Fundraising council (FRII)	Director-general
Annika Prine	Swedish Fundraising council (FRII)	Vice operations manager
Göran Pettersson	Forum	Director-general
Ariane Rodert	Forum and EESC	Member of the EESC
Informants VAT case – politicians, civil servants and EU networks		
Name	Party/organization	Position
Olle Schmidt	The Liberal Party (FP)	Member of European Parliament
Kent Johansson	The Center Party (C)	Member of European Parliament
Anonymous 1	-----	Assistant to Member of European Parliament
Eva Posjonov	The Swedish constant representation in Brussels (Swedish rep. in Brussels)	Civil servant
Maria-Elena Scoppio	European Commission (EC)	Member of cabinet Tax and Customs Union
Mikael Lindman	Swedish government, Culture department	Civil servant

Informants Wolf hunt case – CSOs		
Name	Organization	Position
Oscar Alarik	Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF)	Lawyer
Mikael Karlsson	Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF) and European Environmental Bureau	Chariman of SNF and Chariman of EEB
Anonymous 2	WWF Sweden	-----
Åsa Hagelstedt	Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet)	Director-general
Informant Wolf hunt case - civil servant		
Name	Institution	Position
Pierre Schelleken	The European Commission representation in Sweden (the EC rep in Sweden)	Director-general

3.4 Methodological challenges when studying Europeanization

As stated in the theory chapter Europeanization is a contested matter. One of the reasons to why approaches to Europeanization is so contested is that Europeanization is a process, as with other similar concepts like globalization and internationalization we cannot distinguish a clear beginning and an end, it goes on as we speak. What makes it even more difficult to study is the fact that it is not a linear process; instead actions taken at member state level as well as policy coming from the member states influence the European integration, create European ideas, values, laws etc. which in turn comes back and influence the member states in a circular movement (Schmidt 2002). This goes also for non-governmental actors actions. Put explicitly, when studying Europeanization you have to be aware and reflect upon the complex interdependence of the phenomenon (Saurugger 2005:292). Referring back to the debate over different approaches described in the theory chapter, many scholars even though recognizing the double nature of the concept chose to focus on either or to study the phenomenon empirically, which is also what I have done. This study is focusing on the effects of European integration on CSOs and how they need to adapt to participate in EU politics. The other side of the circular Europeanization process, the one where national actors can also be seen as agents of change in creating those policies, politics and polities that constitutes the EU (Radaelli 2003) I will leave for other researchers to address. While trying to approach the concept with a more overarching theory is desirable I believe that it is then easy to end up in theoretical incoherence.

Despite simplifying the approach for a better and more reliable investigation we still need to be aware of the interdependency between the multitudes of actors that interact in European politics. As non-governmental actors are participating in EU-policy making and or implementation when studying the Europeanization of these actors one must as put by Saurugger (2005:292) consider both the horizontal and vertical interactions with institutional actors and try to distinguish between different explanatory factors in both ways.

The theory that I am deriving from (Klüvers 2010) was tested in a large-N study on interest groups. The results of the study brought forward interesting and useful results on how transferred competence to EU changes the organizations behavior. To be able to capture the complex interdependency and to acknowledge both vertical and horizontal interaction I believe that studies like Klüvers must be complemented with in-depth studies like the one I am presenting. Ruzza and Bozzinis study is more similar to mine in the sense that it is made up by semi-structures interviews with both organizations and institutional actors. This study is also better at capturing both the horizontal and vertical interactions between organizations and institutions that can appear in Europeanization of CSOs.

Rather than testing existing theory with closed variables where a quantitative study would be more suitable, my aim is to develop existing theoretical approaches to the subject of Europeanization of CSOs and for that an in-depth case study on only two cases serves the purpose well (Ragin, 1987:17,24). I used Ruzza and Bozzinis routes to broaden the picture of Europeanization of CSOs and when doing that I have made an attempt to, without defining factors in forehand, inductively search for alternative explanations.

This in-depth study I believe shows us the need, as stated by (Saurugger 2005:292) to understand the interdependency among several actors. Trying to create an overall inclusive theoretical approach to this subject is very hard and I think that is one of the main points that my cases will show. I believe it is fruitful to try to map out factors that can explain organizations behavior but I still believe one must be very careful with making any generalizations. I therefore suggest when looking at the results of this investigation that you will see them as useful material in order to better understand the complexity of Europeanization of non-governmental actors and not as a new theoretical framework that claims representativeness.

3.5 How the analyze was performed

In the upcoming chapter I have presented chronological narratives over the political process taking place in each case. The actions taken by the CSOs are analyzed simultaneously as the story goes along, relating the events back to Klüvers as well as Ruzza and Bozzinis theories. In relation to the empirical material the theory's precision in different sequences of the process have been discussed and complemented where there were gaps that needed to be filled. At the end of each narrative I have summarized the strategies taken by the CSOs in each case and why they chose that strategy. After the two narratives are presented one by one I will bring the cases together and end up in a summarized discussion and final remarks of the study. As I stated earlier this study is not out to present a new theoretical framework but rather to discuss aspects of existing theory and complement it. Again I would like to point out that the case studies differ in length because of the less complex procedure in the Wolf hunt case.

4 Analysis

4.1 The VAT case

4.1.1 Swedish non-compliance with the VAT directive

Already when Sweden joined the EU in 1995, there was an EU directive in place that regulated Value Added Tax (VAT). Today it is the *Common system on Value added Tax* (2006/112/EG) (the VAT directive) that regulates VAT in the EU. Before describing further the background to this case I would already at this point like to make clear that the CSOs engagement in this question will come to include two policy phases, one implementation phase and one policy creating phase. The organizations both try to avoid an infringement procedure as well as working to affect a renewed directive on VAT. Another important clarification that needs to be brought up from the beginning is the fact that the VAT directive is containing many different areas related to VAT. I will continue to speak of the VAT directive even though I am only referring to a small part of the directive, namely article 132 (9) and the question of exemptions from VAT.

Since Sweden entered the EU, two public inquiries have been carried out (SOU 1994:88 and SOU 2002:74), stating that the Swedish VAT law (Mervärdeslagen, 1994:200) does not conform to EU law and that changes are needed in Swedish legislation. The conclusions from these inquiries have however been ignored by Swedish governments so that the exemptions from VAT for non-profit organizations that this case is all about, still exist in Swedish law today. The exemptions were implemented in Swedish law in 1968 to decrease the administrative burden for non-profit organizations (Ds 2009:58:80).

In 2008 the Commission addressed Sweden with a *formal notice* where it is stated that Sweden is not following the VAT directive and more specifically article 132 (9) and the question of exemptions from VAT (europa.eu 2008). The so-called “formal notice” from the Commission counts as a proceeding to what can become an infringement procedure. The infringement procedure is laid out in Art 226 of the EC Treaty and regulates how the Commission should proceed with suspected member states non-compliance with community law. If the Commission suspects an infringement, they hand the member state a *formal notice* where the member state is asked to submit observations. If the member state do not meet the Commission’s demands, the Commission continues with a “Reasoned opinion” that can be seen as the first official step in an infringement procedure. The Commission then sets up legal justifications for commencing legal proceedings and gives the member state a one-month time limit to respond. The next step is a referral to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and this is where the Commission tries to find a last minute solution before going to court. If this does not work out either the case will be taken to court and the ECJ gives a final judgment and possibly hand out fines if the verdict goes against the member state (Article 226 EC). An infringement procedure has not yet been raised against Sweden in this case.

As stated above, Sweden's non-compliance to EU law was acknowledged by the Commission in 2008 and the issue became a political question. Just as Klüver describes it, it put pressure on both the national government and concerned CSOs in Sweden to acknowledge EU policy and institutions.

Without going further into what exactly the Swedish law is not complying with we can conclude that Sweden is thought to have a too narrow definition of the term "taxable person". The result of this, the Commission states would be that too many organizations are exempted from paying VAT. This would in turn lead to distortion of competition and hinder Sweden to contribute to the EU's joint resources (europe.eu 2008). What else is problematic is that the VAT directive accepts exemptions from VAT, but only for certain kinds of transactions and not for, as in Sweden, an entire group of organizations (Ds 2009:58:84-85). In many other member state the use of a turnover limit to decide on who is exempted from VAT or not functions as a solution to remove smaller organizations from VAT (Ds 2009:58:88-89). The Swedish organizations do not however see this as a satisfying solution, for several reasons. A turnover limit is thought to increase the administrative burden anyway since organizations close to the limit would have to keep track of their incomes, tax agency would be overloaded with inadequate bookkeeping etc. The CSOs also claim the speciality of the Swedish civil society that is organized differently and therefore are more sensitive to regulations like this. The organizations are primarily afraid that increased financial costs and an increased administrative burden will threaten the existence of many Swedish CSOs. Non-profit organizations in Sweden often rely on voluntary work and with an increased burden on the administrative staff, CSOs are afraid that it will become harder and/or more expensive to recruit the professional help that would be needed.

4.1.2 Information sharing between the government and the Commission

When the *formal notice* to Sweden had been delivered, an extensive process of information sharing and exchange of letters was initiated. The Swedish government responded that they do not fully share the statement by the Commission but that they have agreed to look over the compatibility with EU law. Another public inquiry was initiated to further examine the Swedish legislation and its relation to the VAT directive (The Swedish Treasury 2008).

Grufberg and Hamberg, the authors of the 2009 inquiry, couldn't give any clear description of how new regulations would affect non-profit organizations financially. It is stated that the affects would vary a lot between different organizations (Ds 2009:58:232). The investigation also stated that other member states had adapted their legislation to the directive and that Sweden too should change its legislation (Ds 2009:58:82). The investigation also brings forward the possibility for national governments to put a maximum limit on turnover that exempts all organizations below that limit from VAT, which the VAT directive allows for (Ds 2009:58:190). The suggested limit was set to 250 000 Swedish crowns. But the recommendation was still to change the legislation so that also non-profit organizations should be included in the term "taxable person".

It is at this point that the organizations start to recognize the need to get involved in the question in other ways than just to be a part of public inquires or governmental hearings.

4.1.3 CSOs get engaged at the national level

In 2009, when the public inquiry on VAT had been released, The Swedish Sports Confederation (RF) went public in a press conference where the VAT question was brought up and presented it as a big threat to Swedish sports. RF noticed a great concern among their grassroots and therefore decided to go forward with the VAT question and start other lobbying activities (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). RF asked organizations to estimate what the removal of exemptions would mean to them, started to engaged their 21 districts, asking them to contact local organizations, politicians and local media, they started a Facebook group etc. (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). RF states that working with the districts was fruitful and when the question was brought up in an interpellation in the Swedish Parliament, politicians from every party brought forward their concerns to the responsible minister, Finance Minister Anders Borg. Everyone seemed to agree that this question must be handled so that no disadvantages would come to Swedish civil society sector (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).

From the statement by Bernerstedt, former chairman of Civil society organizations in partnership (Civos), we see that the VAT question was actually one of the reasons to why the organization was founded in the first place.

The start of the organization was preceded with a process regarding whether an organization like this is need or not. Civil society is so differentiated that it is difficult to represent the whole and have a common agenda. Not one voice, but then the VAT issue appeared [...] The VAT question was one of the first questions that we started working on. It was pretty easy to get along in the desire to preserve the current VAT exemptions as generous as it is today, and to avoid changes (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview).

Civos started cooperating with the Swedish Fundraising Council (FRII). They collaborated financially to hire experts who could write documentation on the consequences for non-profit organizations if the law would change (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview). Göran Pettersson, Director-general at the organization Forum, sat in the working committee of Civos at that time and thus worked together with FRII as well. Pettersson states that it is at this point that the organizations start to differ a little bit in their work.

The organizations realize more and more the significance of the question, but they were still not acting towards the EU institutions. The CSOs tried to affect the question by working nationally by engaging their grassroots to try to convince Swedish politicians the importance of this issue. As described by Ruzza and Bozzini all of the organizations initially took the *National route* to influence the question.

What the Finance Minister then did was to suggest a turnover threshold to the Commission, which was one of the suggestions in the inquiry from 2009. He submitted a request for a limit on one million crowns to the Commission, which is higher than the limit presented in the latest inquiry, but lower than most organizations had wished for. Rodhe says that “by doing this Borg however successfully killed the opposition and it did not become a question in the 2010 election (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). The *National Route* was partly successful but the CSOs did not get exactly what they wanted.

4.1.1 Doors are opened towards the EU

On the 1st of December 2010, the Commission announced a Green Paper on a new directive on VAT, which will replace the old directive when it is finished. The Green Paper was open until the end of May 2011, and was supposed to gather comments from whoever concerned with the subject. With this initiative, a formal opportunity emerged for the organizations to get the Commission to understand their cause. Two parallel processes were thus in action; one concerning the infringement procedure, where the commission had been handling a proposal on turn over limit from the Swedish government, and one related to the creation of a new directive on VAT.

Pettersson at Forum brought forward the question whether the organizations were working in the best way. Wouldn't it be smarter to work politically to change the conditions? It showed that this was the strategy RF had. Forum and RF agreed that they should start working together (Pettersson, Forum, 2012, interview).

Because of the Green Paper, RF decides to send a representative down to Brussels to monitor the VAT question, but also to build competence on lobbying strategies in Brussels for the future (Rodhe & Carlsson 2012, interview). RF had sent representatives to Brussels before, but now they saw a good chance to send someone there for a longer period of time, to both monitor the VAT question, but also to learn and build structures for EU related work in the future. RF had started to recognize that being in Brussels matters and especially now when there is an EU White Paper on sports (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). The transferring of competence to EU makes RF want to establish networks and competences at EU level, so far Klüver's theory fits well with RF's actions.

Bernerstedt further states that many private interest groups have recognized the importance of working in Brussels before, but now civil society has also recognized that. "Even if civil society is big in Sweden, we live in a larger legal context and we need to adapt to it" (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview). Civos therefore decided to act through those of their members who had European contacts, especially through Forum, which then came to include also RF since RF and Forum cooperated.

The recognition that it is important to influence Brussels can be referred to Klüvers theory on *adapational pressure*. Second of all the strategy to start to work in Brussels indicates the *European route up* described by Ruzza and Bozzini but with the modification that it is domestic organizations and not EU based CSOs who go there. We see that under the right conditions even domestic CSOs chose to lobby towards EU institutions directly.

Through the Green Paper, the EU invited organizations to comment on the future of the VAT directive, which could be seen as a formal opportunity for CSOs to get engaged. The *European route up* that the organizations now seem to be taking does not fully correspond to Klüver's compensation hypothesis, as the organizations despite good recognition for their cause at the national level, still choose to go to the EU. The organizations will to Europeanize seem to be a relevant factor as well.

When it comes to FRII's engagement in the question it looks somewhat different. To von Sydow at FRII it seemed clear that the Commission is going to harmonize this question and not allow exemptions, and that it is rather important for the organizations to try to lobby for compensations for those organizations that would be affected (von Sydow & Prine, FRII

2012, interview). FRII has a more pragmatic view on the question due to the fact that their member organizations are not as threatened as sports organizations, or other smaller organizations, because they already have administrative competences and a change wouldn't be as damaging to them (von Sydow & Prine FRII 2012, interview). As Civos, Forum and RF started to get engaged at the European level, FRII chose a different strategy.

FRII has not lobbied at the national level during the recent year, but they have instead aimed their work at the Commission and the new directive (von Sydow & Prine, FRII 2012, interview). FRII is represented in a European network called ECCVAT (European Charities' Committee on VAT). Through ECCVAT, FRII is trying to display the question as a European issue to get more weight behind their work, at the same time as they admit that it is hard when the solutions are different in different countries (von Sydow & Prine FRII 2012, interview).

FRII's engagement in ECCVAT could be seen as taking the *European route up* via an EU network. Klüver (2010) described how EU-networks often only get engaged in questions that are common for a large majority of their members and that are very internationally related. This seems to be the case also when it comes to ECCVAT. There does not seem to be a great influence or engagement from ECCVAT in solving the Swedish issue on exemptions from VAT, but instead a focus on influencing the new directive.

4.1.2 European Route up forces cooperation among CSOs

When the organizations decide to take the *European route up* and start lobbying towards EU institutions, the question of resources becomes important. RF is a financially strong organization and thus has the capacity to finance EU work. RF also is representing a very large percentage of the Swedish population. Representativeness is therefore also covered, which are exactly those resources Klüver describes as important to explain why organizations goes to Brussels or not. The question here is how successful RF could be without collaborating with other organizations and without establishing a political ally in the Swedish government, as well as how smaller organizations than RF could also follow along on the *European route up*.

Pettersson explains that RF favored from uniting with Forum because sports is not so big in the European context and that's why it was good for RF to unite with Forum that is active in social work, which is a much bigger area in the EU. What Forum gained from RF was that RF is a large organization with big resources. They are also on their own ministry and have good contacts with the Finance Ministry in Sweden, which is useful for Forum that are not as big on the national level (Pettersson, Forum, 2012, interview). Furthermore, Forum has the advantage of knowing their way around in Brussels by having a representative present. Ariane Rodert is representing Forum and another Swedish CSO, Famna, in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). By working from the inside of EESC, Rodert can easier get access to meetings, people, and documents than a lobbyist who comes from the outside (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).

We see here that the organizations have turned their attention to the EU and when doing so also see the need to try to adopt both strategies to be able to handle another political arena than the national one. We reckon that the organizations act strategically and that resources can be switched among each other. Resources, as put by Klüver, therefore need to be refined and put in context.

4.1.1 Working the National Route

Even though the organizations had now turned their interest towards the EU institutions, they continue their work at the national level, and a coincidence gave them some help on the way. On the 25th of March, 2011, the request from the Swedish government is turned down in a response by the Commission that only allowed for a 250 000 crown turn over limit.

The rejection in March put liquid on the fire. This meant that in the middle of the Green Paper process the question became very acknowledged and relevant all of a sudden. It upset both the Finance Minister and the grassroots organizations (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).

On the 31st of March 2011, the Swedish Finance Minister gathers Swedish CSOs to inform them that he will continue to fight against the Commission on this issue and will not allow changes in the Swedish legislation that would damage CSOs in Sweden (regeringen.se 2011). The question then goes back to scratch and now an informal alliance between the national government and the CSOs start to take shape, and actions are taken at all political levels simultaneously.

When the Commission ignored the response, Borg had the feeling that he had civil society behind his back. He said in a statement that he is dependent on that the local commitment is shown towards the Commission and that he needs civil society to be able to pursue the issue. You can see it as collaboration between civil society and the government to resist EU policy now that we have similar views (Bernstedt Civos 2012, interview).

At the national level the CSOs ran campaigns with the purpose of engaging grassroots to submit responses to the Green Paper, but also to put pressure on the national government to solve the question for them and not give in to pressure from the Commission. Through these campaigns the organizations were able to get many Swedish organizations to submit answers to the Green Paper. Out of the 1700 remittances that were handed in to the Green Paper on the future of VAT, 968 came from Sweden and most of them from Swedish athlete-organizations (European Commission 2011). Bernerstedt states that he understood retrospectively that these campaigns were important because they made EU become more aware that this is seen as a big issue in Sweden and that it is not only big organizations who think that, but locally rooted organizations as well (Bernerstedt, Civos, 2012, interview).

The organizations worked on the *National route* making sure that they keep the strong opinion that has been formed around the issues and that the Finance Minister doesn't give in to the Commission's demands. A representative at the Swedish representation in Brussels puts admits that the government was also affected by the mobilization (Posjonov, Swedish Rep in Brussels, 2012, interview). This issue was not particularly controversial at the Swedish level, everyone seemed to agree that Sweden is better off keeping the present rules. The organizations however wanted to assure that the politicians had to stick to their promises. As stated by Ruzza and Bozzini, the *National route* is often used when organizations see that the national government can have influence in the question. The organizations seem to think that the Finance Minister really could have influence in this question, but at the same time they realize that the question is just a small piece in the political game and that the VAT question can be traded as political goods for other bigger questions. If that would happen, Pettersson states that it would cost Borg a "substantial political price, for the media would jump on it" (Pettersson, Forum, 2012, interview).

In May, in a new interpellation debate, the Finance Minister even stated that he would be prepared to block a new VAT Directive by putting in his veto, unless the issue wasn't resolved. "Now he cannot back down, but on the other hand the Commission has also painted itself in the corner" (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF 2012, interview). Even if Sweden would not get the matter through in the Commission, the organizations have seen to it that it has become very hard for the Swedish Finance Minister to change his mind.

4.1.2 Working the European Route up

Simultaneously as work is being done in Sweden, RF and Forum are working the *European route up*. The lobbying work in Brussels can basically be divided in two. The more formal work like arranging round tables, talking to Members of Parliament and trying to get international recognition for the cause was performed by Helena Carlsson from RF, while the more informal work which included extracting information about the process in the Commission and knowing when and where to act, was handled by Ariane Rodert, representing Forum in the EESC.

Carlsson explains that lobbying towards the EU institutions was easier than she thought. Carlsson states "it is impossible for the employees in EU to keep track of everything, which makes it quite easy to get access to the institutions" (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview). This is true both when it comes to the Commission and the Parliament and she believed it was quite easy to get in contact with representatives from both institutions. Carlsson however describes that working towards the Parliament was easier because the parliamentarians are elected and thus more interested to meet with the public. Also when it comes to influence the politicians are much easier to convince, she states (Rodhe & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).

I believe it is important to bring forward this discrepancy between the EU institutions. To get access to the Parliament was seen as less difficult. The Parliament is supposed to function as the European citizens' representatives and therefore needs to be more open towards the public. Since the Parliament is co decisive in some issues and in others a consultative body, they can also influence the two other EU institutions; the Commission and the Council. Taking the *European route up* could therefore be about going to the Parliament to indirectly influence the other institutions. I conclude that when anticipating the engagement of CSOs in Europeanized activities, one must separate between EU institutions.

While getting access to the institutions was easier than the CSOs thought, the national characteristics of the question made it hard to get recognition from other CSOs and political actors in other countries. Both Carlsson and Rodert brought up the question in their respective EU networks but without getting any bigger recognition. According to Posjnov at the Swedish representation in Brussels, it could be a matter of other countries having the same issue but not wanting to gain the attention from the Commission, because they are afraid that they would be initiated with an infringement procedure (Posjnov, Swedish Rep in Brussels, 2012, interview).

Along Carlsson's work in Brussels, Ariane Rodert, representing Forum and another organization Famna in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) tried to use her position to contribute to the matter. EESC is a consultative body of the EU that is supposed to

function as a bridge between the EU and the organized civil society (eesc.eu 2012). Rodert describes how her efforts were about open doors to the Commission and the Swedish representation in Brussels (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, Interview).

Rodert describes the initial meeting she had with the Commission as very pessimistic. “They had the impression that nothing could be done about this. But they asked for statistics and information from RF and the question still remains” (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, Interview). After this meeting Rodert contacted the Swedish representation in Brussels. Rodert describes it as if there was one picture presented on the outside and another one from the inside, where the inside picture offered a bit more optimistic view (Rodert, Forum and EESC, 2012, Interview).

The contact at the Swedish representation was an important one – he gave us tips on when we should act and when we should lie low. I got the times and dates of when the issues was discussed in the Council, so that we could time our efforts (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, Interview).

At one point Rodert asked the contact at the Swedish representation how the organizations should proceed and the contact thought it would be good at that point to not push too much but instead send letters to the Commissioner. Then Forum wrote a letter, passed it on to Civos who wrote a similar letter, then FRII wrote a letter and then RF wrote and then it showed up letters from five influential Swedish organizations to the Commission at once (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview). Pettersson describes why these contacts were crucial.

You could say that it is a kind of a backdoor lobbying. We have no resources compared to any other major player who can add millions of crowns on trying to make an impact within the EU. We try to use the trust and the contacts we have and they have been crucial in this case (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview).

Pettersson also mentions the importance of having good contacts with the Chairman and the Chief of Cabinet of the EESC, that are both Swedes (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview).

The organization could make use of the political knowledge that already exists among Swedish representatives in Brussels. Pettersson also states that they know a lot themselves, but that they don't know half as much as what those who have been working in Brussels for a long time knows (Pettersson, Forum 2012, interview).

Referring to Klüver's resources, these statements describes the fact that even smaller organizations can, by uniting with representatives from the national government in a question like this, get crucial information and thereby perform a better work than they would have been able to do on their own. By shaping alliances with representatives of the Swedish government, the organizations all of a sudden get access to much more information and knowledge than would have ever been possible to reach otherwise. The organizations do not only unite among each other to cover for lack of resources, but also unite with the Swedish government. Not focusing solely on the vertical interactions, but also seeing the horizontal interactions between the CSOs and the government, gives us a clearer view on what possibilities the CSOs have in Europeanizing their activities in a successful way.

I also believe it is relevant to speak of key persons within the EU context that have either EU competence and/or political power. This resembles Klüver's description of resources in terms of financial, personnel, and representation. Unlike a quantitative study, a qualitative study can recognize also single key persons that can compensate for lack of resources.

4.1.3 Results of working with the Parliament and the Green Paper

As I described the organization was successful in engaging their grassroots. However, when the Green Paper was closed on the 31st of May in 2011 the Commission stated that the responses coming from mostly Swedish sports organizations discussing exemptions from VAT for non-profit organizations were “the result of a misunderstanding” and that the responses were reacting against the existing directive from 2006 and not to the Green Paper that was about the future of VAT (European Commission 2010). The Commission therefore stated that these responses would be left unattended in the process of finishing a proposal for the new directive on the future of VAT (European Commission 2010). Rodhe explains that it was not at all a misunderstanding from the Swedish organizations’ side. This was an aimed action towards the new directive where the organizations requested a change in the new legislation (Rodhe & Carlsson RF 2012, interview). Even though the Commission rejected the answers, they did bring it up in the summary which makes it clear that the Commission has at least recognized the large interest in the questions from Swedish organizations (Rodhe RF 2012, interview).

The organizations and particularly RF chose to work towards the Parliament. The Parliamentarians think that RF and the rest of the CSOs have done a good job in analyzing the question and package it in a way that works in Brussels (Johansson, EP, 2012, interview; Schmidt, EP, 2012, interview) The parliamentarians state that they have been in much contact with RF and that they themselves are also a part of civil society. Johansson describes the importance of the organization’s engagement:

Yes it is crucial, because it does not work so that if you are interested in raising a question you could just send a press release to some Swedish magazines and then it is done. No, you have to analyze it, judge it from different perspectives, apply it to the correct paragraphs in the law, etc. and that has been done in this case. The organizations have done a god job in my opinion (Johansson, EP, 2012, interview).

Regarding the question whether what would have happened if the organizations wouldn’t have acted on this matter, Mikael Lindman at the Swedish Culture Department said that it is hard to answer, but that the government have nevertheless benefited greatly from the contribution from civil society (Lindman, Swedish Culture Department, 2012, phone-interview).

The work on the parliamentarians thus proved to be successful, not only in theory, but in practice. In October 2011 the European Parliament voted for the possibilities for member states to be able to decide for themselves whether to exempt non-profit organizations from VAT or not (European Parliament 2011). However, the Parliaments statement in this question is only to be considered as guidance for the Commission in their decision-making and the Commission chose to ignore also the statements from the Parliament.

4.1.4 Results of working towards the Commission and the Council

When it comes to strategies Rodert says that according to her it was better to focus on working with the Council and the Commission, and to try to teach them how important the question is to Swedish civil society (Rodert, Forum and EESC 2012, interview). The informal work towards the Commission and the Council is of course much harder to evaluate since the question has not been resolved and there are no clear answers to what will happen next. What

is clear from talking to a representative from the Commission is that the Commission is very well aware of how concerned Swedish organizations are about this question. Maria-Elena Scoppio at the Commission states that they have really tried to be flexible in this question and that she hopes that the Swedish organizations understand their point a view. She further states that it is extremely exceptional that the Commission has worked this hard to get to a solution that fits both sides (Scoppio, EC, 2012, interview).

Throughout the interview Scoppio stresses that the Commission has tried to cooperate on this issue and that they have been extraordinarily flexible and blocked the infringement procedure to find a solution. At the same time they cannot ignore an infringement procedure, she states.

It is impossible to say what will finally resolve the question but as the situation stands, it is important to note that the Commission has not proceeded with the infringement process against Sweden. There could be three possible explanations to this. Either the Commission is going to proceed with the infringement process and just hasn't done it yet, or they will drop the infringement process and thereby accept the Swedish claims to keep its existing legislation, or finally the Commission might wait to proceed with the infringement process until the new directive is in place (Rhode & Carlsson, RF, 2012, interview).

What could be relevant in the end is that the question seems ultimately to be about politics and not jurisprudence. If the Commission would bring Sweden to court and Sweden would be sentenced, it is still up to the government to decide how to act on the matter. The laws made up in the EU are only as relevant and correct as the member states choose to implement them. Therefore the hard work done by the national organizations to get recognition for their cause at the national level might as well be what determines the question in the end, even if the matter goes to court and Sweden is convicted.

4.1.5 Summary of strategies used by CSOs in the VAT case

To summarize, in order to achieve results in an EU related question the following strategies were used by the CSOs in the VAT case:

- Some of the organizations joined forces with other CSOs to share resources.
- All of the organizations took the *National route* working to convince the Swedish government to act on their behalf towards the EU. Some of the organizations also used the Swedish government as an ally who could share EU competence and knowledge, so that the CSOs could lobby more effectively.
- Some of the organizations took the *European route up* towards the Commission and the Council directly, working with lobbying activities to get recognition for their cause.
- All of the organizations took the *European route up* by engaging grassroots to sign the Green Paper on the new VAT directive.
- Some of the organizations *European route up* towards the European Parliament, working to convince the Parliament to consult the Commission according to the CSOs wishes.
- One organization took the *European route up via an EU network* , leaving the lobby work towards the new directive much up to them because of lack of resources.

4.2 The Wolf hunt case

4.2.1 Licensed hunt on wolfs in Sweden

In 2007 an inquiry on the conservation of Swedish predators was carried out. The inquiry led to a proposition that the Swedish Parliament voted for in October 2009 “en ny rovdjursförvaltning” (prop. 2008/09:210). The numbers in the chamber were 149 for and 107 against, 33 turned down their votes. The proposal states that the wolf population should, in the meanwhile, at least be decreased to a number of 210 individual wolfs with the help of licensed hunt and complimentary protective hunt in cases of wolf causing damage. These actions should contribute to rejuvenating the wolf population and the killed wolfs should be replaced with planted wolfs from outside of Sweden (prop. 2008/09:210). The goal was set to keep the number of wolfs to 210 individuals during a period of five years and to then evaluate the rejuvenation. Based on the national legislation, as well as the Habitats directive, articles 12 and 16, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket), which is the Swedish government’s agency responsible for proposing and implementing environmental policies, approved on January 2 2010, a licensed hunt of 27 wolfs. The hunt ended in February 2010, by then 28 wolfs had been killed.

Prior to this licensed hunt, the debate had been going on for some time regarding the proposition on a new conservation policy for predators. Conservation organizations were part of the inquiry and tried to affect the question, which they thought was going against the Habitats directive. The organizations experienced no recognition from the government and saw very little possibilities to influence and change the government’s attitude on the question. The question on wolfs in Sweden is very much contested and has become one of the most infected debates in Swedish politics in recent times. The question has engaged large parts of Swedish civil society, where it is mainly the hunter organizations and also for example Saamis standing on the government’s side in favor of licensed hunt on wolfs, and the conservation groups standing on the other side being against the hunt.

The conservation organizations addressed in this investigation state that they had been trying to influence the question at the national level by being part of the inquiry, having meetings with politicians, acting in different forums where the wolfs are discussed, but the organizations didn’t get anything through in this question. The organization worked the *Traditional route* at this point. This is where the EU is apparent only in terms of EU legislation, which the organizations pointed out, but got no recognition for. So far no attempts at engaging in EU lobbying activities had been performed.

Neither was there a possibility for Swedish conservation organizations to appeal on this question in Swedish courts, says Oscar Alarik, lawyer at Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF). Mikael Karlsson, Chairman of SNF states in a newspaper that they were ashamed that Sweden that has been a role model in this question is now killing animals from one of the most endangered species in Sweden (dn.se 2010). This is how the situation was laid out when four Swedish CSOs decided to bring the question outside of Sweden.

4.2.2 Final way out – EU becomes a possibility for CSOs

Once the licensed hunt had been approved, four Swedish conservation organizations: Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF), The Swedish Carnivore Association (SRF), World Wildlife Foundation Sweden (WWF) and Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet), asked themselves if there was a way to use the law to hinder additional hunts on wolves. According to the species protecting regulation, one must protect endangered animals whereas wolves are counted as such an endangered species. Alarik at SNF, tells us that the species regulation that could have given the organizations a possibility to bring the government to court and accused them for breaking the law, is disconnected by the hunting legislation (Alarik SNF, 2012 interview). Alarik further argues that Sweden has signed international conventions that environmental organizations should have the right to appeal in the case of serious cases of breach of law. However, the rule is not introduced into Swedish law, so there were no ways for the conservation organizations like SNF to pursue the matter in Swedish courts. Because of the political stalemate and the impossibility to pursue the matter in Swedish courts, the four Swedish conservation organizations mentioned above decided to gather forces and discuss an alternative plan where they would instead try to get the EU involved to change the national policy.

Since the EU has legislative competence in this area and the Swedish predator legislation is highly regulated by the Habitats directive, the organizations now had an opportunity to bring the question outside of the national political arena and into another playing field where other rules determine the game. It should however be stated that all the organizations would have preferred to resolve the question at national level, had there been a possibility to turn to national courts, but there was simply no alternative than to move the question outside of Sweden. “We were obliged to pursue this through the EU, with all that comes with that. We are not used to do this and we would much rather resolve this question at a national level” (Alarik, SNF, 2012 interview).

Then how can the organizations make use of the fact that the EU holds the competence? One way to settle the question is to let the European court of Justice (ECJ) determine the issue and decide whether Sweden is breaking the law or not. However, the organizations themselves cannot take the matter to the ECJ, since private persons or organizations are not allowed to do so. Instead the way forward in situations like this is to convince the Commission that the matter needs to be reviewed by the European court and then it is the Commission that takes the matter to the ECJ, if they see the need of it. Before the Commission takes the matter to court there is a long process of trying to reach an agreement with the concerned member state (Alarik, SNF, 2012, interview).

By Europeanizing their activities the organizations could use EU policy and institutions to achieve policy change at the national level. Taking the *European route down* means here that the organizations can try to shape an alliance with the European Commission, which could dramatically change the preconditions for the outcome of the question.

4.2.3 A written complaint - the question is brought outside of Sweden

The organizations decided to take the question to the Commission, even though none of the organizations had done something like this before, at least not in this way (Alarik SNF, 2012 interview). Åsa Hagelsted, Director-general at Djurskyddet describes how they had tried the usual lobbying activities without success, but now they could jointly make use of the EU. Hagelstedt says, that at least for Djurskyddet, it is often the other way around “that we are trying to back up the Swedish government when they go down to the EU, since our animal welfare policies are much better than the EU’s, but you use what you can” (Hagelstedt, Djurskyddet, 2012, interview).

The organizations contacted the Commission for some questions and went down to Brussels for a meeting to discuss the possible complaint with the Commission. It stood quite clear from the beginning that the Commission thought this was a serious matter and that they were very puzzled about Sweden doing something like this, when they had the picture of Sweden being a success country when it comes to environmental issues. After the meeting the organizations started to compile material for the notification, which Alarik described as “only the first step in a long chain of correspondence between the parts” (Alarik, SNF, 2012 interview). The complaint was submitted to the Commission in March 2010 with the wish of stopping licensed hunt on wolves in Sweden (CSOs: 1, 2010). According to the four organizations, the Swedish wolves have an unfavorable conservation status, mostly because of inbreeding due to geographic isolation, which should make licensed hunt of this species illegal according to the Habitats directive. The organizations also pointed at some other facts that they thought were problematic, for example that the hunt itself was handled very poorly (CSOs: 1, 2010).

By taking the *European route down* and address the Commission with such a complaint, the organizations engaged EU institutions in national policy matters with the hope of getting more political, or ultimately juridical power behind their cause.

Before a formal infringement process starts it is praxis that the Commission raises questions to the concerned member state, giving them an opportunity to respond before any formal actions are taken. The first formal notice from the Commission arrived in June 2010, where the Commission asked questions to Sweden, according to regular procedure. This case was part of a pilot project where the Commission tried out a more formalized preprocessing where there is a standardized correspondence with a member state that has received a formal notice by the Commission (ec.europa.eu infringements/EU pilot, 2012). There are quite a few different rounds of information sharing that are then being evaluated by the Commission and then it is a preprocessing before the actual treaty-driven process (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview).

4.2.4 CSOs and the Swedish government battle over recognition from the Commission

During the coming month the government tried to convince the Commission that no laws had been broken and that the hunt is perfectly legitimate together with other conservation actions, such as planting of new wolves, etc. (i.e. Blücher (2010)). I asked the organizations if they thought it would have been possible to just report the matter to the Commission and leave it to

them. The answer from all of the organizations was no, rather a quite extensive effort by the organizations has been needed to achieve results. Alarik at SNF explains that there are historical examples of complaints from private persons that have ended up in court, but this question is very knowledge intensive and they are dealing with very sophisticated argumentation that the Commission needs to be supplied with in order to know what is happening and what they should do about it. Alarik further states that the government has tried to come up with dozens of different arguments as to why the hunt is legitimate, but the organizations have been able to reject all of them. One example of the government's attempt at convincing the Commission, when the organizations countered and was able to put down the governments argumentation, was when the government tried to point at the fact that the number of wolfs that were about to be shot were so low that it would be below the exemptions in the directive. The organizations countered by saying that 10–15 percent of a whole population is not a small amount. The organizations could also point at earlier juridical cases were just a few percentage of, in that case a bird species, was seen as a significant amount. The government then tried to say that one cannot compare wolfs to birds and the organizations responded that these birds actually live longer than wolfs and it is therefore even more important to not shoot this amount of wolfs. The organizations won the argumentation. "There was a wide range of such arguments, which we, with the help of researchers, facts and official statistics, often quite simply could manage to falsify" (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview).

The organizations submitted their own argumentation to the Commission, but also analyzed and commented on the government's argumentation (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview) Alarik further explains the importance of providing this material, since the Commission has no opportunity to collect the information themselves (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview). An active complaining part seems to be important in this case.

Pierre Schelleken, Director-general at the European Commission representation in Sweden, explains that about half the infringement procedures that are raised against the EU are initiated by the Commission itself, and half of them spring from complaints from organizations like the ones in this case. "It is possible that we wouldn't have done anything if we wouldn't have acknowledged this issue in Sweden on our own" (Schelleken, the EC rep. in Sweden, 2012, phone-interview). Schelleken further states that the Commission needs information in order to decide if EU law has been broken. "It is common that we also meet with both the complaining part and the government which is subject to the complaint. The counter organizations have also visited the Commission in Brussels" (Schelleken, the Commissions representation in Sweden, 2012, phone-interview).

These statements exemplify the need of the Commission to engage CSOs in their work when acting as guardians of the Treatises. The Commission use organizations to provide them with information and expertise, just as Klüver discusses. When CSOs have the right knowledge that the Commission needs, they are also allowed access to that institution. As in the VAT case where the CSOs could exchange goods with the government, we here see how the CSOs exchange goods with the Commission.

The organizations europeanized the question by explaining to the Commission that a favorable conservation status for wolfs should be decided in the EU, since it's also of importance to potential upcoming cases (Anonymous 2, WWF, 2012, interview). As in the VAT question it seems important for the organizations to adapt their message and to present it in a way that functions in the EU context. In this case the organizations seem to have been

more successful in doing so. This seems quite natural as environmental issues are of a more international character.

Given that Sweden is traditionally recognized as a prominent country in these issues, it would mean that the Commission would not judge Sweden harshly and this becomes problematic in terms of the reliability for the entire Habitats directive (Karlsson, SNF and EEB, 2012, interview). Karlsson at SNF and EEB argues that there is a big risk that other countries will look at the outcome in the Swedish case and say, if Sweden can do this, then it must be okay, since Sweden is very good on environmental issues. Karlsson states that if Sweden is not sentenced in proportion to their crime then it would send out the wrong signals to other member states and then other cases of violation towards the Habitats directive might surface (Karlsson, SNF and EEB, 2012, phone-interview).

As described in the VAT case, EU regulation only functions the way it is implemented by the member states, therefore individual countries' actions matter. Karlsson puts it like this:

Given that all campaigning is based on storytelling and that it is personalized, it becomes extremely important with national examples to point out errors in conservation policy. In this case Sweden has personalized the issue (Karlsson, SNF and EEB, 2012, phone-interview).

By presenting the question in this way and seeing it as a European question and not a solely Swedish question, the organizations can better succeed in getting the Commission to act on the matter. Europeanizing the question seems to be a success factor in this case.

4.2.5 How to manage the processes?

As I have described, much efforts are needed from the organizations to cope, these processes are costly and labor intensive for conservation organization and they have a hard time finding resources for it. Therefore all the organizations point at the benefit of cooperating with other organizations. Alarik explains the difficulty in standing against, in this case two ministries that have a lot of resources, which they could for example spend on research that suit their cause (Alarik, SNF, 2012, interview). The organizations have complemented each other in different ways, even though the responsibilities have not been clearly defined. Since SNF for example is the only organization with juridical experts, they handled much of the correspondence with the Commission. SRF, even though being a smaller organization than for example SNF and WWF have extensive knowledge of the wolf issue, including management, scientific and legal aspects on hunting and thus contributed with expertise on these issues (Alarik SNF, 2012, interview). WWF Sweden is part of the international organization WWF that is very well recognized, also within the European context. Thus, they could function as provider of legitimacy towards the Commission. Djurskyddet has been the least active organization in this cooperation and has mostly functioned as an additional actor that can bring even more weight behind the organizations joint comments (Hagelstedt, Djurskyddet, 2012, interview). The representative of WWF believes that if it had only been SNF and SRF, it might not have been given the same weight. SRF is a much smaller organization, while WWF focuses on the whole world. "We provided legitimacy in relation to the Commission and when we work together we represent about half a million Swedes" (Anonymous 2, WWF, 2012, interview).

The organizations did obviously not manage to convince the government in Sweden where they competed with lobbying groups such as Swedish hunting associations, as well as the national government with their entire secretariat. By joining forces and making use of the EU, the organizations were however able to achieve results. Otherwise small organizations with low levels of resources have engaged extensively in EU related work. The case proves that on a general basis Klüver's theory surely helps us depicting that resources are important in order to be successful when choosing to lobby in the EU. However, on an individual basis organizations can form alliances to compensate for lack of resources and thereby use EU institutions, despite the difficulty of managing such processes. The organizations play on the Commissions duty to ensure that EU law is correctly implemented in the member states and get the political leverage they need to change national policy from there.

When talking to the organizations, their international cooperation also seems to be important. The chairman of SNF is also the chairman of an EU network called the European Environmental Bureau (EEB). Alarai explains that SNF has had a long and strong role among environmental agencies in Europe and the fact that they also now have their chairman in the top of the EEB sees to that the organization has a good knowledge of how the EU works. WWF and SNF also describe the importance of having EU competences related to the organizations. The questions were run from the national level, by the organizations themselves. Furthermore, for example the WWF European policy office simultaneously had monthly meetings with the Environmental Commissioner Janez Potocnik, where this otherwise national question could be brought up at the European level (Anonymous 2, WWF, 2012, interview).

Karlsson at SNF and EEB describes that EEB has been helpful partly because it is not easy to find your way around in the EU, and being part of a network like EEB can help you with that. Furthermore it also gives them the opportunity to bring attention to the Wolf hunt question at various meetings with the Commission and the Parliament whenever new things have happened regarding the issue. EEB has also written individually to the Commission stating the seriousness of this question, which puts more pressure on the Commission (Karlsson, SNF and EEB 2012, phone-interview). As I pointed out earlier, the organizations tried to Europeanize the question and for this Karlsson's presidency in the EEB proved to be helpful. SNF created an online petition where they collected signatures to a letter addressed to the Commissioner, and through EEB and the international contacts even organizations from other member states signed the letter and thereby Europeanized the question.

By using EU networks, the organizations take the *EU route down* via EU based networks that try to influence EU institutions that hopefully in turn will influence national policy. In Klüver's theory she dismisses the importance of EU based CSOs and states that these organizations often only deal with international interests and questions regarding joint issues for organizations in more than one country. The Wolf hunt case shows, just like the VAT case, the importance of having key persons within the EU context, holding either EU competence and/or political power. In the VAT case the Swedish Chairman in the EESC gave weight to the organizations demands and having a representative working in the EESC offered a way in to the EU institutions, as well as knowledge about the political processes. Likewise, a Swedish chairman in the EEB, could be expected to contribute to lifting the Wolf hunt question higher on the EEB's agenda, as well as offering important knowledge on political processes within the EU. The EU based networks are important both in terms of providing knowledge and competences, but also to make sure the question is internationally recognized.

4.2.6 The question heats up

On the 7th of November 2010, the Environmental Commissioner Janez Potocnik sent a personal letter to the Environmental Minister in Sweden, at that time Andreas Carlgren, stating that he was concerned about that the Swedish Wolf hunt was not compliant with the Habitats directive, and that he should not allow the next licensed hunt on wolfs that was planned for the winter of 2011, before sending relevant information and proof of the accuracy to the Commission (Potocnik 2010). On the 17th of December 2010, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency decided on a second licensed hunt on 20 wolves starting on the 15th of January 2011, without the minister having replied to the letter from Potocnik. This time it was the question of 20 wolfs that were to be shot without any translocation being done, as the government had stated that they would do. Therefore the organizations handed in their concerns to the Commission again, in a new letter. They were concerned about that the government had not fulfilled its promises on planting new wolfs and that they now had allowed for a second licensed hunt, and that this hunt just like the first one, was not compliant with the Habitat directive and that it would hurt the wolf population in Sweden (CSOs: 2, 2010). On the 22nd of December 2010, the Swedish minister Andreas Carlgren finally responded to the letter by Potocnik, saying that the Swedish wolf population is fragile to bad publicity and that licensed hunt was needed to get support from locals to plant new wolfs from outside of Sweden (Cargren 2011).

Finally, in January 2011, the European Commission addressed Sweden with a reasoned opinion (which is the first formal step in an infringement procedure), for not following EU Environmental legislation and more specifically the Habitats Directive, 92/43/EEC regarding the hunting of wolfs. According to article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission urged Sweden to respond within two months and declared its own right to open up an infringement procedure against Sweden if the answers would be insufficient (the Commission, Reasoned Opinion, 2011).

4.2.7 The next hunt is stopped...

During the summer it became increasingly clear to the government that this issue was going to be taken to court by the Commission, if the government didn't do anything about it. Everything culminated in a press conference on the 17th of August 2011. At the press conference, Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren and Agriculture Minister Eskil Erlandsson declared that the planned licensed hunt was going to be stopped, but only temporarily (jagarforbundet.se 2011). All of the organizations seem to be agreeing on the fact that the government would be too embarrassed to be taken to court on this matter, and that is why they changed the policy at that time. Therefore it is the Commission that has stopped the hunt, not the public opinion in Sweden.

The organization had been successful in achieving their goal and Hagelstedt states that even Swedish CSOs often are against the EU, Hagelstedt can consider to use EU again if it is needed (Hagelstedt, Djurskyddet 2012, interview). All of the organizations further state that this has been a learning process.

Learning about political processes in the EU will naturally make it easier and more accessible for the organizations to engage in EU questions in the future. Together with the increased

focus put on civil society institutions it could therefore be expected that the Europeanization of national CSOs will continue.

4.2.8 ...but the question continues

When the hunt was stopped in 2011, the government only declared a temporary stop and in October 2012 the new environmental minister Lena EK (C) declared that the wolf population should have a limit of 180 wolves, far below even the earlier limit that conservation organizations thought was too low. The organizations think that the issue of Favourable Conservation Status, i.e. how many wolves there should be, is not resolved yet, and that the issue needs a broad scientific review before the number of wolves in Sweden can be determined. However, before any such hunt had been decided on, the EU Commissioner Potocnik, recently addressed Minister Ek with a letter where he clearly stated that a new licensed hunt would not be in line with the obligation Sweden has due to the Habitats directive (Potocnik 2012).

The question is thus not over yet and it is therefore too early to evaluate the outcome of this case but it stands clear that at least one planned licensed hunts on wolves in Sweden has been stopped due to the Commissions comments on the government's policy. Even though the case haven't been resolve yet the Commissioner has clearly stated that he does not agree with Swedish policy in this case.

Apart from the VAT case where the government seems to have no moral difficulties to break EU law, in the case of licensed hunt on wolves the Swedish government seems to be more concerned with their reputation as good environmentalists and implementers of EU law. The government has stopped one hunt on Wolves due to the Commissions statements, what will happen next we will have to wait and see, but it at least seem clear that the government has a harder time on getting complaints from the Commission in this case than in the VAT case.

4.2.9 Summary of strategies used by CSOs in the Wolf hunt case

To summarize, in order to achieve results in an EU related question the following strategies were used by the CSOs in the Wolf hunt case:

- They joined forces with other CSOs to share resources.
- They took the *Traditional route* where they lobby towards the national government but use EU policy to strengthen their argumentation.
- They took the *European route down* by sending in a complaint to the Commission. They followed up the complaint by providing the Commission with expertise knowledge and updated information and analyzes, building relations with the Commission's staff in order to get them to act toward the Swedish government.
- They took the *European route down via EU networks* to get access to EU competence and knowledge, legitimacy and help in the lobbying work towards the Commission and to Europeanize the question for influence towards the Commission. The work towards the Commission is ultimately aimed at getting the Commission to act against the Swedish Government

5 Conclusions

The following section will summarize the previous chapter and provide a holistic account for what the case studies have shown in relation to actor centered Europeanization theory. The discussions bring forward both acknowledgements of the existing theories' usefulness, as well as their inability to explain certain aspects of the cases. Hence, my intention is to fill in the gaps of the existing theories and provide relevant suggestions on how to refine and further develop the theories within the field. The final remarks emphasize the contributions of this study and suggest prospective research.

5.1 Summarizing discussion

Klüver approaches Europeanization of national non-governmental actors as transferred competences to the EU, which puts adaptional pressure on national organizations to lobby towards EU institutions. However, arguing that such activities are constrained by lack of resources. Therefore, Klüver concludes that the organizations that Europeanize their activities, are those with high levels of resources in terms of personnel, representativeness, as well as financial resources, and organizations that are not granted as much access to the national institutions. Ruzza and Bozzini provide a broader definition of the Europeanization of CSOs, than Klüver does, by describing alternative routes to influence EU politics. By recognizing both horizontal and vertical interactions between CSOs and institutional actors, one can make more accurate analyzes on how CSOs can engage in Europeanizing their activities. By using two case studies on domestic CSOs in EU related matters, I have made an attempt to point out both the relevance of these theories, as well as their gaps when studying Europeanization of CSOs.

The empirical material has revealed the complexity of the processes and the multiple actions and strategies taken by the organizations to achieve their goals. The narratives have shown that engaging in EU politics is demanding in terms of resources, but at the same time it has proved to be easier than most of the organizations had expected. We have also seen that resources are not only internal to the organizations, but rather something that can be shared with other actors, both institutional and other CSOs, which suggests adding relational factors to the analysis. If we look at CSOs as parts of a multidimensional political landscape we will, compared to Klüver, have somewhat different thoughts about what is important in terms of resources for CSOs to engage in Europeanizing activities. The two cases I have studied are the VAT case and the wolf hunt case.

Klüver only refers to Europeanized activities as lobbying work being performed at EU-level. In the VAT case it is not fruitful to distinguish actions performed at EU-level as the only Europeanized activities, as Klüver does. In the VAT case actions performed at national level

are intertwined with work at EU-level and should therefore also be seen as Europeanized work.

By taking the *National route*, the CSOs in the VAT case try to convince the government to act on their behalf. The CSOs also engage their grassroots to visualize a larger representativeness towards both the government and the EU institutions. The organizations did not only get the government to stand up for their cause towards the EU institutions, but also received informal help from Swedish civil servants, which enabled a better and more effective lobbying towards the EU institutions. Where the organizations lacked competence and experience in working with EU related questions, they could compensate by allying with the government, as well as with Swedish key persons within the EESC.

It also seems important to lobby on the national level in order to influence EU policy, since it is ultimately the member states that decide if policies are implemented or not. In the VAT case the national government could be willing to pay potential fines if Sweden was to be sentenced in the ECJ, and thus not change the legislation. Despite the fact that EU holds the legislative competence in a policy area, it is ultimately the national government that must be convinced. Important to notice is however that there seems to be a difference between different policy areas, regarding what the Swedish government can accept to be accused of. In the Wolf hunt case we rather saw the opposite. The national government was addressed with strong accusations by the Commission and chose to change the policy, in order not to be taken to court and risk conviction.

In the VAT case the organizations took somewhat different paths depending on their believes. While FRII that seemed to be focusing more on the upcoming directive chose to act through a EU network, RF, Forum and Civos chose to lobby both nationally and at EU level. The *European route up* can be divided into different types of lobbying, i.e. lobbying towards different institutions: the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Neither Klüver, nor Ruzza and Bozzini consider this division, however it does seem important for the CSOs, in terms of their possibilities to get access and influence. We have seen that the Parliament seems easier to get access to compared to the Commission, and perhaps even more compared to the Council. Hence, when predicting levels of Europeanization when looking at lobbying directly towards the EU, one should differentiate between the institutions for more accurate analyses.

In the Wolf hunt case, where there was a conflict between conservation CSOs and the national government, the organizations could make use of EU policy to strengthen their argumentation at the national level. This refers to the *Traditional route* where the EU is recognized only in terms of EU legislation. The organizations could also take the *European route down* where they could play on the Commission's responsibility for ensuring that EU law is applied throughout all member states, since that makes them dependent upon information and competence from outside of their secretariat. In the case of wolf hunt, where the organizations saw no political openings at the national level, they were instead able to make the Commission understand the seriousness of the question and to induce the Commission to threaten Sweden to stop licensed hunt, in 2011. Hence, the organizations had to engage in costly and time consuming work to be able to provide the Commission with knowledge, updates and analyses. Their work was even more challenging by the fact that both the national government and the counter organizations did what they could to convince the Commission that licensed hunt on wolves in Sweden does not breach EU law. Standing against strong lobbying organizations and especially the government with all of its ministries, the

organizations had to find ways to cope with their lack of resources and competences. This case shows us how resources can be shared and how dependencies can open up for cooperation between CSOs and institutions. I believe that Klüver offers a somewhat misleading picture when stating that EU networks are only concerned with “European issues”, and that domestic CSOs therefore have to establish representativeness in Brussels themselves. In the wolf hunt case, organizations describe the importance of having EU competences related to the organizations, without necessarily leaving the question up to the EU networks. The issue was run from the national level by the organizations themselves, but they were offered help from EU networks in several ways. Partly for competence, partly for additional lobbying activities at EU level where the EU networks also used their channels to communicate and try to influence the Commission. The EU networks were also helpful in Europeanizing the question by offering contacts to political actors in other countries. Making it a relevant question in the European context could make the Commission more interested in handling the case, since it also made the question more important.

While the case studies have demonstrated different kinds of Europeanization of CSOs, some observations bring forward joint conclusions. What neither of the theories recognize, but that both my case studies show proof of, is how organizations can pool resources and thus make it possible even for smaller and resource weak organizations to Europeanize their lobbying activities. The cooperation takes different forms and includes the sharing of both personnel and financial resources, as well as joining forces for better representativeness. This relates also to those key persons that could be found in each case. Having representatives within the EU context offers both crucial EU competence and a way into the EU sphere.

5.2 Final remarks

Concluding the statements in the summarizing discussion, I would like to point out the benefits of Ruzza and Bozzini’s theory of alternative routes to EU politics, since they are very useful in helping us recognizing both vertical and horizontal interactions, seeing also the national level as an important arena for Europeanization. When dealing with Europeanization processes we need to recognize what the CSOs can benefit from, having institutional actors on their side. I hope to have made clear that the roles of CSOs and explanatory factors for their Europeanization are intertwined. Therefore, when trying to predict how CSOs will act in European policy matters or how those actions will be perceived, we must carefully consider those predictions, keeping in mind the multitude of factors that come into play in such a process.

I believe the case studies have showed that in-depth case studies of Europeanization of CSOs is a much needed task, as it can bring up alternative explanations and provide a more comprehensive picture, than what would be possible in a quantitative study.

Apart from previous theories on Europeanization of CSOs, I suggest that relational factors must be considered in order to explain the CSOs behaviors, since it enables also domestic organizations with fewer resources to engage in Europeanizing activities. I also suggest that we need to differentiate between the EU institutions when predicting what is needed from the organizations to get access and influence. Finally I point out the importance of recognizing the actions of domestic CSOs in Europeanization research. Even though these domestic CSOs

are not as visible in Brussels as private interest groups and EU networks, they are learning and building competences on how to engage in EU politics from a national level. By networking and using alternative strategies, even domestic CSOs have proved to be important actors in EU politics.

I believe there are several factors that are relevant in explaining why and how domestic CSOs Europeanize their activities. To gather additional explanatory factors I suggest both more in-depth studies that can inductively search for variables, as well as quantitative studies that can use comparative methods to test explanatory factors.

I also see the need to approach the bottom-up effects of Europeanization where national political actors are seen as independent agents of change. It is important to recognize that a changed civil society can also come to affect the EU in itself and not only the other way around. In the VAT case we experienced the start of an umbrella organization that thanks to this EU matter could join together, otherwise being a very diverse civil society. Also in the Wolf hunt case individual organizations that had not cooperated before joined forces to cope with the EU policy processes. One of the problems with civil society is that there is a perception of organizations being unable to cooperate among diverse interests. In relation to these findings I would therefore suggest that further research also pays attention to the possibilities the EU can bring to domestic CSOs to legitimize their organizations and to unite an otherwise divided civil society. By analyzing these case studies we can see that by putting time and effort into these questions, the organizations learn and build EU competence. The organizations believe that this knowledge and competence will become useful in the future and that engaging in EU matters is not something that will end with these questions being resolved. Hence, my suggestion for future research within the field of Europeanization, is to continue investigating the Europeanization of domestic CSOs, and when doing so considering actions that take place outside of the Brussels sphere and keeping the mind open to what incentives may lie behind the organizations' Europeanization.

Executive Summary

Europeanization has become a key concept to explain one of the most prominent changes in the coordination of public policy in our times. Member states entering the European Union (EU) and the transfer of competences to EU level that comes with it, affects both public institutions as well as non-governmental political actors. The primary focus within the Europeanization literature has been on how EU integration and transferred legislative competences affect policy adaptation at the domestic level (e.g. Cowles, Carporaso & Risse 2001; Graziano & Vink 2008; Olsen 2002). But due to the development of a non-governmental sphere at EU level, existing of both private interest groups in the EU and the birth of several EU based CSOs, an increase in research on private interest representation at EU level in Brussels has also appeared (Smismans, 2003, 2008; Rumford, 2003; Trenz, 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008, 2009).

Little is however said about domestic CSOs and their integration in EU politics. By zooming out of Brussels one comes to realize that also domestic CSOs have started to engage in EU politics. Two cases that display such behavior from domestic CSOs is **the debate over licensed hunt on wolfs** and the question if **non-profit organizations should be allowed to be exempted from paying and register VAT or not**. By making in depth case studies of these two political processes I have tried to provide useful empirical observations on political actors that not yet have been addressed extensively in the Europeanization literature. Secondly I also have made an attempt at refine and complement the theories that actually existed on the subject of Europeanization of national non-governmental actors.

The actor centered theory which I have used as a basis for the development of theory is Klüvers (2010) theory on Europeanization of interest groups lobbying activities. Klüver approaches Europeanization of national non-governmental actors as transferred competences to EU which puts adaptional pressure on domestic organizations to lobby towards EU institutions but that such activities are constrained by lack of recourse. Therefore organizations with high levels of resources in terms of financial, personnel and representativeness and organization that are not granted as much access towards national institutions are the ones that Europeanize their activities.

To broaden the view on what strategies CSOs can use besides lobbying towards EU institution I have used Ruzza and Bozzinis (2008) theory on alternative routes to EU for domestic CSOs. By recognizing both horizontal and vertical interactions between CSOs and institutional actors by the help of Ruzza and Bozzinis theory more accurate analyzes over how CSOs can engage in Europeanizing activities were made possible.

Even though complementing Klüver's theory, and especially the resource part of it with Ruzza and Bozzini's alternative routes to EU there were still aspects of the two cases that could not be explained and I have therefore tried to complement existing theories with my own suggestions.

The two case studies revealed the complexity of the processes and the multiple actions and strategies taken by the organizations to achieve their goals. The narratives have shown that engaging in EU politics is both demanding in terms of resources but that it is also easier than most of the organizations had expected. It has also shown that resources is not something that

only exist inside the organizations but can be shared with other actors both institutional and other CSOs which suggest adding relational factors to the analysis.

I also wished to bring forward that if we view upon CSOs as parts of a multidimensional political landscape we will have somewhat different thoughts about what is important in terms of resources for CSOs to achieve their goals and when and why they start to engage in Europeanizing activities. In the VAT case it is not fruitful to distinguish actions aimed at EU-level directly as the only Europeanized activities, as Klüver does, for as we saw the organizations work at the national level is intertwined with the EU work. By taking the *National route* the CSOs try to convince the government to act on their behalf. The CSOs also engage their grassroots to visualize a larger representativeness towards both the government and towards EU institutions.

The organizations in the VAT case did not only get the government to stand up for their cause towards EU institutions but they also received informal help from national governments which enabled a better and more effective lobbying towards the EU institutions. Where the organizations lacked competence and experience in working with EU related questions they could compensate that lack by ally with the government as well as Swedish key persons within the EESC.

The national level also seems important to lobby towards to influence the question since it is ultimately the member states who decide if that policy is implemented or not. Important to notice is however that there seems to be a difference in policy area and what the Swedish government can accept to be accused for and not. In the wolf hunt case we rather see the opposite that the national government has when been addressed with strong accusations from the Commission chosen to change policy in order to not be taken to court and risk conviction.

In the VAT case the organization took somewhat different paths depending on their beliefs. While FRII who seemed to be focusing more on the upcoming directive chose to act through an EU network, RF, Forum and Civos chose to lobby both nationally and at EU level. The *European route up* can be divided in lobbying towards different institutions, the Commission and the Parliament. This divided that is being done by neither Klüver nor Ruzza and Bozzini seems important in terms of the possibility to access and influence for the CSOs. Recognizing that there might be a difference in how accessible the institutions are to CSOs seems to be important. When predicting levels of Europeanization as in lobbying directly towards EU we should separate between the institutions for more accurate analysis.

In the wolf hunt case where there was a conflict between conservation CSOs and the national government the organizations could by taking the *European route down* achieve policy change at the national level in a question where they saw new openings at the national level. The organizations could use the fact that EU holds the legislative competence in that policy area. Getting the Commission to understand the seriousness of the question in turn made the Commission threaten Sweden to stop licensed hunt both in 2011 and 2012.

To be able to achieve their goals the organizations in the wolf hunt case had to engage in costly and time consuming work to be able to provide the Commission with expertise, updates and analyzes. Standing against strong lobbying organizations and especially the government with all of its ministries the organizations had to find ways to cope with lack of resources and competences. This case also points at the importance of recognizing the CSOs as actors in a

multidimensional political landscape where resources can be shared and dependencies opens up for cooperation.

I believe Klüver offers a somewhat misleading picture when stating that EU networks are only concerned with “European issues” and that domestic CSOs therefore have to establish representativeness in Brussels themselves. In the wolf hunt case organizations describe the importance of having EU competences related to the organizations without necessarily leave the question up to EU networks. The questions was run from the national level from the organizations themselves but was offered help from EU networks in several ways. Partly for competence, partly for additional lobbying activities at EU level where the EU networks also used their channels to communicate and try to influence the Commission. The EU networks were also helpful in Europeanizing the question by offering contacts to political actors in other countries. Making it a relevant question in the European context could make the Commission more interest in handling the case since it becomes also principally important.

While the case studies explained different kinds of Europeanization of CSOs some observations brought forward joint conclusions. What neither of the theories by Klüver and Ruzza and Bozzini recognizes but that both my case studies shows proof of is how organizations can pool resources and thus make possible even for smaller and recourse weaker organizations to Europeanize their lobbying activities.

The cases have showed that in-depth case studies of Europeanization of CSOs is a much needed task. It can bring out alternative explanations and provide a more comprehensive picture than what would be possible in a quantitative studies. Apart from previous theories on Europeanization of CSOs I suggest that relational factors must be considered in order to explain the CSOs behaviors for it enables also national organizations with less recourse to engage in Europeanizing activities. I finally suggest that we need to divide between EU institutions when predicting what is needed from the organizations to get access and influence.

Concluding the study I pointed out the benefits of Ruzza and Bozzinis theory of alternative routes to EU politics for they are much useful in helping us recognizing both vertical and horizontal interactions, seeing also the national level as an important arena for Europeanization. When dealing with Europeanization processes we need to be aware of how EU is affecting CSOs abilities and possibilities to function as counterparts to the public institutions at both EU-level and nationally as well as recognizing what they can benefit for having institutional actors on their side. I hope to have made clear that the roles of CSOs and explanatory factors for their Europeanization are intertwined. When trying to predict how CSOs will act in European policy matters or how those actions will be perceived, we must therefore go about those predictions carefully and with respect for the multitude of factors that come into play in such a process.

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Appendix 1 - List of Interviewees

- Alarik, Oscar. [Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF), juridical advisor] Interview 2012-11-19 Stockholm
- Anonymous 1. [European parliament, political secretary to MEP] Phone-interview 2012-08-29
- Anonymous 2. [World Wildlife Foundation Sweden (WWF)] Interview 2012-11-19 Stockholm
- Bernerstedt, Mats. [Civos, former Chairman] Interview 2012-08-23 Stockholm
- Hagelstedt, Åsa. [Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet Sverige), Director-general] Interview 2012-11-19 Stockholm
- Johansson, Kent. [European Parliament, MEP the Center party] Interview 2012-09-25 Brussels
- Karlsson, Mikael. [Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF), Chairman and European Environmental bureau (EEB), Chairman] Phone-interview 2012-12-17
- Lindman, Mikael. [Swedish Culture Ministry, civil servant] Phone-interview 2012-11-22
- Pettersson, Göran. [Forum, Director-general] Interview 2012-08-21 Stockholm
- Posjnov, Eva. [Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, civil servant] Interview 2012-09-26 Brussels
- Rodert, Ariane. [Representing Forum and Famna in European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)] Interview 2012-09-26 Brussels
- Rohde, Fredrik & Carlsson, Helena. [Swedish sports confederation (RF), Sports Policy advisors] Interview 2012-08-21 Stockholm
- Schelleken, Pierre. [the European Commission's representation in Sweden, Director-general] Phone-interview 2012-11-27
- Schmidt, Olle. [European Parliament, MEP the Liberal party] Interview 2012-09-25 Brussels
- Scoppio, Maria-Elena. [European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and Anti-Fraud Commissioner Algirdas Semetas cabinet, Member of cabinet] Interview 2012-09-25 Brussels
- von Sydow, Christine & Prine, Annica. [Swedish fundraising council (FRII), Director-general and vice operations manager] Interview 2012-08-20 Stockholm

* All interviews other than the phone-interviews were done in person. Two of the interviews were not recorded for practical reasons, only handwritten notes are accessible. Otherwise all interviews have been digitally recorded and transcribed.

Appendix 2 – CSOs in the VAT case

Brief description of basic features of the organizations included in the investigation – VAT case

	Forum	The Swedish Sports Confederation (Riksidrottsförbundet (RF))	Civos - Civil society organizations in partnership	Swedish Fundraising Council (Frivilligorganisationernas insamlingsråd (FRII))
Key description	Forum is an umbrella organization for Swedish NGOs involved in social work. Their aim is to improve the opportunities for voluntary social work within Sweden through influencing public opinion, facilitating the exchange of knowledge and introducing new methods of work.	RF is the umbrella organization of the Swedish Sports movement. They speak on behalf of the united sports movement in contacts with politicians, the government and other institutions/organizations, coordinate the sports movement in fields like research and development, provide and in certain areas act in place of the government, i.e. through distributing governmental grants to sports.	Civos consist of collaboration between organizations from different sectors of society. Civos goal is to “strengthen civil society and non-profit organizations' common interests” Civos was founded to gain more influence by cooperating among the organizations. One of the reasons was also to be able to better connect with civil society organization at an international level. Forum is a member of Civos.	FRII is an interest group working for secure fundraising. FRII is working to increase the credibility for fundraising organizations through working with quality assurance, training and running their structures to reduce barriers to data collection and to promote and market the sector towards donors, agencies and organizations.
Members	35 member organization with the right to vote and 8 associated members	3 million individual members in 22 000 clubs.	18 member organizations	145 member organizations
Funding	Member fees	Public grants	Member fees	Member fees and activity incomes
Organization/size	Staff of 12 employees	Staff of about 100 employees	Civos has no own secretariat, instead the work in this organization is carried out by the board members themselves with now salary from the organization.	Staff of 2 employees
Established year	1993	1903	2009	

Source: Official websites of the selected organizations

Appendix 3 – CSOs in the Wolf hunt case

Brief description of basic features of the organizations included in the investigation – Wolf hunt question

	Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Naturskyddsföreningen (SNF))	World Wildlife Foundation Sweden (Världsnaturfonden (WWF))	Animal Welfare Sweden (Djurskyddet Sverige (Djurskyddet))
Key description	SNF is a national CSO working with nature and environmental issues. SNF is aiming at strengthening the sense of nature in parallel with political influence. SNF is also working to strengthen consumer power. SNF is often a consultative body towards the government.	WWF Sweden is part of the international non-governmental organization WWF that is working with nature and environmental issues. WWF works politically and often function as consultative body towards the government.	Djurskyddet Sverige is a national CSO working to improve animal welfare. Djurskyddets mission is to spread knowledge about how to handle different kinds of animals in the best way and advise the people of various animal welfare issues. Djurskyddet also works politically and often function as consultative body towards the government.
Members	24 counties and 270 municipal circles, about 190,000 individual members	190,000 individual supporters in Sweden	60 local clubs and approximately 14,000 individual members
Funding	Mostly from voluntary donations, membership fees and public grants	Mostly from voluntary donations and public grants.	Mostly voluntary donations and membership fees.
Organization/size	Staff of 90 employees	Staff of 70 employees	Staff of 10 employees
Established year	1909	WWF 1961 and WWF Sweden 1971	The precursor to Djurskyddet was founded in 1897. Became Djurskyddet Sverige in 2004

Source: Official websites of the selected organizations