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A case for making climate aid help small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa prevent land grabbing

And the would-be priorities of members of relevant NGOs

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the issues of land grabbing and climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Taking the situations of small-scale farmers – the dominant group of people population-wise and producers of 90 percent of the subcontinent’s food – as its focus, it also looks at how climate change might make land grabbing worse. It is argued that climate change will do so because of: decreased agricultural productivity both in land-grabbing countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa; the rise of the agrofuel industry; because of improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities; because of carbon compensation schemes; and because of risk diversification in the face of extreme weather events, among other factors. Agrofuels will likely play the largest part.

Therefore, the thesis also proposes a new type of climate aid to help small-scale farmers prevent land-grabbing. It argues that the chances for the proposed climate aid to become a reality are reasonable, foremost because of geopolitical struggles in general and for agricultural land in particular, but hopefully also because the international community realizes that helping small-scale farmers manage these double threats will gain the whole world. However, the aid will neither be called ‘climate aid to prevent land grabbing’ or the like, nor will it be disbursed through the UNFCCC platform and the Green Climate Fund. This is due both to the proposed climate aid’s controversial elements in the eyes of prospective land grabbers and to the current lack of climate aid.

Unfortunately, one of the two parts of the thesis suffered from a methodology come undone. This had major consequences for the main research effort, namely to learn from small-scale farmers, represented to some extent by members of relevant NGOs, about which priorities the proposed climate aid should have according to them, if it was to be implemented. Since the methodology broke down (a development discussed in the thesis) the thesis in large part is a call for further research.

NUMBER OF WORDS: 16997 (including footnotes and tables)

ORIGINALITY: The relatively unexplored connection between climate change and land grabbing is engaged. The priorities that climate aid should have according to NGO representatives of small-scale farmers if some of it would go to preventing climate change-induced land grabbing has not previously been explicated. The case justifying such climate aid and discussing its plausibility is also quite new.

KEYWORDS: land grabbing, small-scale farmers, climate change, climate aid, COP 18, NGOs

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background: land grabbing

After the food price hike in 2008 and the ensuing food riots in many places around the world, many governments harshly realized how their countries might be negatively affected by future instabilities or supply shortages on global food markets, driven by increased food demand because of population growth and dietary change (eating more, and eating more meat), and by urban expansion, irresponsible agricultural practices at home, and, most of all, agrofuels. A series of very large land acquisitions in developing countries followed, illustrated in the global media by a crop-hungry China buying up or leasing large swathes of land in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially Ethiopia – a country regularly suffering from famines. Transnational corporations and speculating investors also took part, such as in Madagascar where South Korean giant Daewoo signed a deal for a staggering 1.3 million hectares – half the country's arable area – with the government, which as a result was overturned by a massive opposition later cancelling the deal. (cf. Daniel 2011).

The concept of land grabbing is commonly understood as large-scale land buy-ups (or long-term leases) by investors, both private and public, usually at bargain prices. Investors can be both domestic and foreign (in Sub-Saharan Africa foreign investors are dominating; Hermele 2012: 188) and in most instances the local population is hardly consulted at all. The concept is very controversial. Opponents argue that such agricultural deals are much-needed investments. No one remains indifferent to the topic, especially not upon hearing about the low prices paid in Sub-Saharan Africa for what is often prime agricultural land (cf. *ibid.*, 188). My view is that some large-scale foreign investments in agriculture are needed in developing countries, for various reasons – ecological, historic, pragmatic – and that there are well-managed projects. The focus of this thesis, however, will be on malign projects. Hence, the definition of land grabbing used here precludes relatively benign agricultural land deals¹; this thesis looks only at the kind of large-scale land deals that are not benefitting the country as a whole, and that is especially harmful to small-scale farmers – i.e. land grabs.

What land grabbing really is about is a struggle over land already used in different ways, as well as a struggle over decision-making. Even though deals may be illegitimate and corrupt, they are not illegal since the land is almost always voluntarily offered by the governments (cf. *ibid.*, 187). Land grabbing is a kind of, to paraphrase David Harvey (2003), accumulation by dispossession, where the wealth of the public is centralized into the hands of the few – in other countries. The process works through privatization of public goods previously used collectively and customarily; through financialization of land resources; through state redistributions; and, as is implicitly argued throughout the thesis, through a sort of imposed management of a global brewing food crisis.

¹ For a discussion on the elusive border between benign large-scale land deals and land grabbing, see for example Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen 2010; Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, Keeley 2009; and Daniels 2011.

A list of countries in which land grabbing has occurred include: Angola, Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Senegal, Surinam, Uganda, and the Ukraine. The list of land grabbers is almost as long: Brazil, Cambodia, China, Egypt, India, Libya, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom². The biggest transnational corporations involved deserve separate mention: oil companies such as Shell and Petrobras, and food and agriculture companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, Du Pont, Deere, and Monsanto. (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012; Berkeley & Osvalde 2012; Hermele 2012; NAPE 2011; IFPRI 2012; Daniel 2011; Friis & Reenberg 2010). These lists are probably understated. The point is that land grabbing is a widespread phenomenon, a true land rush.

Land grabbing evidently happens in more places than Africa, but the phenomenon has been most widespread there (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012). Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are not more corrupt than other countries at the same income level were or are (Sachs 2005: 188–191, 311–314), but the subcontinent's low ranking in the current world system hierarchy, together with its fertile soils (often viewed as insufficiently used), turns its corruption and desperation into efficient matchmakers for investors and government officials. Without doubt, the latter group is sometimes only searching for development trajectories, but the result is often the opposite. It should be mentioned that there are cases where small-scale farmers are consulted prior to deals and actually are the ones selling, more or less by their own free choice. There are also examples of where dissidents are given compensation in some form if projects are pushed through in spite of their disapproval or if they choose not to take up employment on the land afterwards (which is only sometimes offered though: the jobs left after rationalizing are often filled with workers brought in by the investor). Such projects would be relatively good agricultural investments and as such they are not included in this thesis. However, bad cases of course include those where it can be discussed to what degree the promises made to small-scale farmers later are honored, and those where hand-to-mouth situations for small-scale farmers are exploited by a seemingly large check that in reality hardly represents the value of the transacted land.

What is driving land grabbing specifically? The food crisis was a direct wake-up call but also indirectly raised worries that food prices would now begin to rise after having stagnated during the last two decades. These worries have only grown larger as food prices again rose in 2011 and 2012. The trends of population growth and rising consumption as the global middle class grows in the image of the West are chiming in: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations projects that the global crop production will increase by 55 percent to 2030 and by 80 percent to 2050, compared with 1999 to 2001 (FAO 2005). In the eyes of countries dependent on food imports and with money to invest, these trends make more of these investments necessary. However, making up approximately a quarter of the land investments according to one study, food production only comes in second among the factors explaining land grabbing. The most important factor is actually agrofuels production, at about 40 percent of

² The list includes both public investments and private investors hailing from the countries implied. It is often also the case that investors are public-private joint or mixed ventures or even domestic firms acting as fronts for foreign firms; it is a complex mess, making understanding the issues and responding to it harder.

investments, which is of course highly problematic not least since it often displaces food production and thus puts further pressure on other land. Crops for livestock production and other non-food crops together make up less than one tenth. Non-farming areas such as forestry and carbon sequestration, mineral extraction, industry, and tourism³ together make up the remaining quarter. (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012). Of course, as mentioned not all investments are made by actors planning to use the areas productively themselves: in some cases speculators are simply responding to anticipated land value increases (ibid: 24–28; Daniel 2011). Just as for foreign actors, the favoured argument for governments putting up land for sale is that the deals will lead to development, the whole population included. Both groups of actors are also fond of portraying affected land as ‘marginal’ or ‘suboptimally used’ in an attempt to undermine the legitimate claims of current users (Hermele 2012: 212).

To understand the social impact of land grabbing, one must first understand their enormity: millions and millions of hectares (cf. Friis & Reenberg 2010) The consequences are many and harsh. The most overarching is the diminished ability of the developing country government to care for its population since big land grabs risk turning into large breaches of sovereignty, as the wishes of foreign investors take precedence over the needs of local people. The foremost direct consequence is decreased food security for affected countries since the agricultural produce almost always is exported. The population may therefore be turned into net food importers or become even more import dependent. It is extraordinary that massive agricultural investments can end up rendering an area less food secure. In the worst cases, no spillover effects at all may be realized development and money from the deals may be embezzled. For small-scale farmers the consequences are harsher still: as newly landless people, they often face increased poverty and forcible internal displaced or even being turned into refugees, if within-country migration is impossible for some reason (cf. Guttal & Monsalve 2011). In extreme events, violent conflicts cannot be ruled out, from both sides – e.g. military backing keeping peasants in check and peasants assaulting security personnel. Other negative impacts from land grabbing for the country as a whole but mainly for people living in proximity to bought/leased land, is diminished security of land tenure. Small-scale farmers not affected by land grabbing may still suffer from them for yet another reason: increased inequality between them and larger landholders as it often is only the latter who have the capacity to adapt to the new situation and take advantage of spillover effects of commercial association with the new enterprises (Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012: 42). Neighboring small-scale farmers may also be indirectly affected by the environmental degradation that follows in the wake of intensive industrial farming.

The worst victims of land grabbing are small-scale farmers, not least in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore this thesis is devoted to their cause and will make an effort to let their voices be heard. For as bad as the situation is right now, it seems poised to become much worse. In Kenneth Hermele’s dissertation *Land Matters: Agrofuels, Unequal Exchange, and Appropriation of Ecological Space*, in which he describes this new “scramble for Africa” as a new form of neocolonialism and claims that the world is entering a “new agro-regime”.

³ Perhaps most disturbingly of all, for example in Tanzania big game corporations are set to commit extraordinary land grabs to secure hunting areas for wealthy foreigners, threatening Maasai dwellings (Avaaz 2012; Nelson, Sulle, Lekaita 2012).

Hermele is backed by a clear trend showcasing both more hectares grabbed and more agricultural investments during recent years (Hermele 2012: 177f, 186f).

Unfortunately, in addition to the above mentioned pressures leading to more land grabbing, at least two economic trends might increase the speed of land grabbing even more: the terms-of-trade for primary commodities have long been deteriorating compared to industrial goods, but this pattern might be about to change due to the rise of new industrial giants churning out cheap manufactured goods, and since the extractive primary-commodity industry is running up against its own limits. These limits present themselves when new locations for extraction (cultivation) become harder to come by and transportation costs likely no longer can be lowered as a response, at least not on the massive scales that we have seen historically. If this results in improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities, it will make land grabbing seem like an even better deal for land grabbers since the price of agricultural products will be kept up or increase further. (cf. Hermele 2012: 117, 122). Such improving terms-of-trade might of course be a blessing for many developing countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. However, considering that land grabbing occurs already today more than this will likely be needed in order to stop land grabbers fuelled by even larger incentives. The natural resource curse seems set to stay in strength in a subcontinent unfortunately still too stuck in the bottom of the world system hierarchy to be able to use its resources for a welfare takeoff.

In addition, climate change looms over the horizon and threatens to make land grabbing an even more common phenomenon because of decreased agricultural productivity both in land-grabbing countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa, because of the rise of the agrofuel industry, because of improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities, because of carbon compensation schemes, and because of risk diversification in the face of extreme weather events, among other factors⁴. Small-scale farmers are arguably the most climate-vulnerable people. Therefore, it can be argued that the unwilling number one tool to make amends for global North exploitation of the South, foreign aid, must be one of the unfortunate paths of last resort also here. That is, should climate aid address land grabbing as it increasingly becomes a problem driven by climate change? It is an idea that likely will meet strong resistance from powerful countries already grabbing land or thinking about doing so in the future – but if climate aid should address this issue, we at least have to examine if it could.

1.2 Purpose of thesis

Aware of the above complex of land grabbing problems, of how climate change will not make the issue easier, of the need to always be able to prioritize, and with the thought-provoking climate aid idea fresh in mind, I wondered:

Is it justified and plausible for climate aid to be disbursed to help small-scale farmers prevent land grabbing, and if it could, how should it be prioritized for small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa?

⁴ This argument is central to the thesis and is laid out in detail in subsection 3.2.

This thesis aims to discuss the former question in a broad manner and answer the last question in a narrow manner, including what the priorities are, how they should be ranked, and how context-dependent they are. Importantly, the thesis aims to draw considerably from the opinions and insights of small-scale farmers, who are the most fitting to describe their own needs. Since the thesis's angle is quite new, it is written as a normative account with the intention to make an attempt, albeit a quite delimited one, at shedding light on a big development issue and to suggest a complementary way to tackle the situation.

Having read an account (ILC, CICEPA, CCU 2011) on how Uruguayan small-scale dairy farmers were able to resist a wave of land concentrations, enriching a few largeholders to the detriment of small-scale farmers, one of the main rationales underlying the thesis is that the agricultural productivity of small-scale farmers is their main way to stay competitive enough to stand a chance of being able to resist land grabbing. By 'competitiveness', not only being able to compete well in global food markets is implied; being the one best able to feed itself is also included, since a major official rationale for land grabbing is that domestic food production is insufficient even to feed the own population.

The geographical dimensions of the thesis are many: displacement of people, changing ownership structure of land, local variations in the consequences of climate change and responses to them, competitiveness in agricultural productivity to survive predatory land markets, global north greenhouse-gas emissions as a weapon for neocolonisation of the global south, among others. The thesis aims to address all of these in various ways. As is discussed in subsection 2.2 and in section 5, the methodology partially broke down for one of the thesis's two parts. A sub-purpose is therefore to discuss why this happened and what the implications are, as well as discussing what was hoped to be accomplished by the unachieved methodological approach, so that future research can try to do the same.

2. Methodology

2.1 Research approach

The purpose of the thesis is operationalized through a two-folded approach. In the first part (section 3)⁵, the case for the proposed climate aid is presented in more detail. The aspects examined include basic arguments; the connection between climate change and land grabbing; how realistic the proposed climate aid is considering the low volumes of existing climate aid; geopolitical potentials; and the role of small-scale farmers for development in general. None is explored at depth but all are important in order to provide a more robust justification for the proposed climate aid⁶. Then, priority suggestions (not the finally identified priorities, some are later discarded) are proposed. This is interesting in itself but is mainly performed in order to make the thesis's second part manageable: (section 4) the asking of small-scale farmers of what they think should be the priorities – we always have to prioritize – for the proposed climate aid if it is realized (section 4), and (section 5) a closer discussion of the results, focusing on the ranking but also looking at the general applicability of the priorities. For pragmatic reasons the priority suggestions had to be quite broad and inclusive, a problem hard to get around, but they were divided into three groups: providing incentives for governments to implement favorable programs, specific local-scale projects for agricultural adaptation, and promotion of farming practices and food security strategies. The two first recommend specific actions while the latter is prescribing a more overarching focus for all actions.

Aiming at participation of local people (small-scale farmers) and at generating knowledge from them, an approach including Participatory Rural Appraisal, PRA (cf. Chambers 2008, 85–104), would have been enlightening and suiting the wish for participation, empowerment, sovereignty, demand-driven development, freedom of choice, and sustainability. Unfortunately it had to be deemed impossible for the scope of the thesis. Instead the plan became to use a triangulation of methods: questionnaires, interviews, and then follow-up interviews after initial analysis. Such an approach would diminish the errors generated by the methods on their own and complement each other well, thus making the results more trustworthy. Asking small-scale farmers for their opinions required finding good representatives for them: relevant, knowledgeable of the issue and accessible. The natural answer for the two first criteria was to find Sub-Saharan African non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in affected countries, preferably on the issue of land grabbing or together with people directly concerned with it. 'Knowledgeable' also included knowledge of climate change, aid, and, at its best, the combination of the two. The answer to the third criteria, accessibility, was to go to Doha for a week in the beginning of December, where last year's Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the United Nations

⁵ The first part can also be said to consist of subsection 2.6, which consists of discussions not central to the thesis but still of relevance, not least in order to put it in its context.

⁶ Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make a more thorough economic and political study of whether the proposed aid is a good idea or not, no attempt is made to adopt a method of measurement providing means to let this be more scientifically judged. The theoretical justification arrived at is therefore somewhat subjective and more of a justice-based case making a moral plea.

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held. This permitted time efficiency at a task involving talking to people ordinarily spread over a whole subcontinent, since members of sought-after NGOs coalesced in Doha.

Concerning the literature, the thesis draws upon a large host of secondary sources. The literature used is mainly Western due to its easy accessibility, but this might be problematic for the aim of giving voice to the small-scale farmers. Overarching aid theory is provided in large part by two aid theory giants, Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly, and their famous respective books, *The End of Poverty* and *The White Man's Burden*. The two Americans are in some matters each other's opposites⁷, but in the areas of most importance to this thesis they are in striking agreement: which aid that has worked best and the need for aid to help the extremely poor, small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa included, with their desperate needs, with the aim of kickstarting sustainable, self-propelled growth (cf. Sachs 2005; cf. Easterly 2006). When it comes to the consequences of climate change, the natural choice is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Even though there is more current research, the Fourth Assessment Report, from 2007, is used because of its authority. For some aspects, a 2012 follow-up report was of direct relevance to the thesis and hence was used instead. Apart from Hermele (2012), a few other sources were consulted repeatedly: Guttal & Monsalve (2011), Friis & Reenberg (2010), Daniel (2011), Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor (2012), and Crabtree-Condor & Casey (2012) – all from 2010 or later, which reflects the youth of the academic field on land grabbing (the two latter sources are from NGOs, though). The literature for coming up with priority suggestions is only synoptically read. This needs not be problematic, however, since the aspects covered are common features in the academic field and since the idea is mainly to identify choices for respondents. The remaining comment on the literature is on the lack of it: the thesis contains not a small degree of speculative arguments and qualified guesses. The reason for this is that the topic of the thesis is relatively unexplored.

2.2 A methodology come undone

The grand plan of triangulation soon collapsed. Almost immediately upon arriving in Doha, it proved impossible to set up interviews because of the chronically busy schedules during the conference and the lack of information on which NGOs were going to attend, making preparing beforehand a near impossibility, so this approach had to be abandoned⁸ in favor of focusing on gathering respondents for the questionnaires, a task not easy either. Thankfully, the questionnaire did its job well, because a month later, a week before this thesis was due, it was

⁷ The main contentious issues between the two are: foreign aid's general track record – Sachs more positive than Easterly; the areas where aid can do good – Easterly more pessimistic than Sachs; how quickly aid should be scaled up – dramatically according to Sachs, in piecemeal according to Easterly; the potential range of free markets in the international battle on poverty – Easterly more optimistic than Sachs; 'Planning' vs. 'Searching' – Easterly prefers the market- and entrepreneur-inspired searching approach to aid over, allegedly, Sachs's big government-oriented plans; and, seizing the historic opportunity to end poverty vs. irresponsibly standing idly by – according to Sachs the difference between him and people like Easterly.

⁸ The planned interview guide can be seen in Appendix 3.

clear that also the third leg had failed. Owing to the loss of the interviews and the difficulties in setting up teleconferencing, the follow-up interviews had to be conducted suboptimally over e-mail in a quite rigid, structured format in order to build upon the results from the questionnaire in an organized manner. All questionnaire respondents but one wanted to partake in the follow-up interviews and they were hence sent somewhat individualized e-mails. Despite several reminders, however, only one responded⁹. Instead of dedicating an own section to the follow-up interview, as planned, the further insights provided by the one respondent is incorporated into section 5.

In spite of realizing that the thesis lost a promising method and well aware of the big shortcomings of basing research solely on questionnaires, there was no other choice but to continue with only one leg intact of the three originally intended. Having only one method for generating primary data naturally carried with it negative implications for validity and reliability; the risk of missing what was really needed increased, and the risk that the questionnaires generated data too rough to be useful on its own increased as well.

Regrettably, validity and reliability are not the only issues concerning the sole use of questionnaires. Not that they could seriously be called ‘dinosaurs’, as Robert Chambers (2008) pointedly refer to the long questionnaires traditionally used in development studies, but some of his critique must be leveled also at the questionnaire used in this thesis: for one, it brought with it the concepts and categories of an outsider rather than giving the members of the NGOs a real chance to express their social realities and understandings thereof. Another weakness is its wide scope, which was not helped by another weakness, that of the short time respondents had available to put into the questionnaire. None of this needed to be especially problematic when complemented by the two other methods, but as it is now these weaknesses become of big importance. The questionnaire is discussed in more detail below.

Because of the breakdown of the methodology for the second part, both this methodology section and section 3 have received more attention than what otherwise would have been the case.

2.3 Respondents

Relying on NGOs of course brings with it its own problems, the main one being how representative they really are of the small-scale farmers: there is a big risk that NGOs get frustrated by slow progress on issues they care about and therefore try to speed things up by speaking or acting in their names of small-scale farmers without an actual mandate to do so, creating dependencies and diminishing local initiative (Holmén 2010: viii). In such cases,

⁹ See the structure of the follow-up interview in Appendix 2; perhaps it was too long, and in that case it can serve as an example of how not to perform similar tasks. Another possible error source is that the follow-up interview was not attached in the e-mails from the start but rather was incorporated into it. The rationale was that the trouble of downloading a document, filling it in, and then uploading it would be deterring for respondents, but in retrospect that would have been the familiar way to do it. Other plausible reasons for not getting any answers in spite of respondents showing much support for the research effort in Doha, were bad timing with the holiday season and lack of internet access for long periods of time, as expressed by one respondent.


representativity is badly wounded. Of course, this is the pessimistic viewpoint: in some ways and cases, certain NGOs can almost be considered to be an elected mini-parliaments deciding on a limited number of issues and with an electorate consisting almost exclusively of the people this thesis is interested in. Another challenge for representativity is the fact that the term ‘NGO’ is a complicated, all-inclusive concept engendering many different types of organizations, making the sheer number of NGOs almost unmanageable. Thankfully, the filter used by this thesis made it a simpler task, but many relevant NGOs were not present in Doha and it is certain that some NGOs on location were missed. In addition, a few could not find the time to participate. Yet another representativity issue is that in spite of careful choosing, there is a possibility that the participating NGOs are not free of vested interests looking beyond the needs of small-scale farmers. Neither is it necessarily the case that the NGOs are participatory in their own work (ibid: 10), no matter how much we would like them to be. Accordingly, one needs to view the results with skeptical eyes – but not too critically: the participants are confidently deemed to be of much value to the purposes of the thesis. However, there is one weakness that single-handedly diminishes the scope of what can be done with the results of the second part of the thesis almost as much as the loss of the interviews and follow-up interviews: in spite of the high number of relevant NGOs and the many days on location, and because of participants’ chronic shortage of time, the Doha stay only resulted in twelve usable questionnaires (see Table 1). This very low number is highly problematic, because even though the questionnaire never was intended for statistical purposes, when standing on its own it would have been good to be able to use it as such.

Table 1. Respondent info

Respondent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Nationality	Ghana	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	Kenya	Madagascar	South Africa	“southern Africa”	Sudan	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Gender	M	M	F	M	M	M	M	F	M	M	M	M

Among the respondents only two respondents were female, reflecting the gender ratio on location in Doha but nevertheless problematic for the thesis since half or more of all small-scale farmers are women. This is a large weakness. Another big weakness is the anglophone bias; due to a language barrier that proved to be insurmountable, only one (Madagascar) of the 17 French-speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is included in this thesis, as shown in Fig 1.

Geographical representativity turned out to be limited, which reflects both the small number of respondents and that four of them were from one country, Kenya. Eastern Africa is disproportionately featured while western Africa only is represented by Ghana, and central Africa is not represented at all. All respondents are from countries affected by land grabbing, but this is far from saying that all countries affected by land grabbing are represented – of the countries identified in the likely much-understated list in the introduction, many are missing. In addition, two respondents come from countries not currently experiencing land grabbing of the type or scale looked at here, South Africa and Zimbabwe – countries that definitely did so in the past, though. This of course does not preclude them from participation here; actually, it might make them more valuable because of the lessons learned from history. Further defending their status here is that their NGO involvements are with organizations working in larger geographical areas, comprising countries currently affected by land grabbing. The same goes for the respondent from “southern Africa”; he belongs to a similar NGO and therefore took up the offer of not divulging his nationality.



Map 1. Respondents' home countries
 Showing Sub-Saharan Africa, respondent nationalities and francophone countries.
 (Respondent with nationality "Southern Africa" is not shown.)

The respondents' opinions cannot be guaranteed to be the official stances of their respective NGOs. This is not necessarily negative since personal opinions also are valued (and may be less controlled by politics) while NGO membership can still be regarded as a sort of quality control. In total ten NGOs are represented (three respondents, of two countries, belong to the same continent-spanning NGO) and they have as their primary foci indigenous peoples, climate justice, biodiversity conservation, and food, agriculture and natural resources. Together with their relevant knowledge on the topic at hand as well as their close contacts with small-scale farmers, this makes them well-placed to participate in this thesis. Validity is hence secured. However, it is to be stressed that reliability is severely hampered by the respondents being so few. Unfortunately they cannot with certainty be said to be good proxies for small-scale farmers.

2.4 Design of questionnaire

The questionnaire, shown in Appendix 1¹⁰, is of a quite structured design. This may seem strange in view of my qualitative research approach, but it was designed before the triangulation failed and was envisioned to mostly result in hints to be explicated upon by the other methods. In order to avoid interview fatigue it was carefully designed not to exceed one front page and one back page in length, and even this is on the verge of being too much; the five minutes advertised to potential respondents always turned into ten or fifteen while they were actually filling it out, which on the other hand of course speaks well for the quality of the answers.

Since the short introduction on the questionnaire would not have been enough for the respondent to overcome their initial resistance towards performing the task asked of them, a careful presentation of the issue and the aim of the thesis was given before each interview. Even though they were started with a neutral “sales pitch”, these conversations invariably eventually revealed some of my personal opinions. In spite of not wanting to color the interviews, I do not regard this as a problem, as discussed below, and in most cases respondents themselves were the first to utter the phrase ‘land grabbing’. The definition of land grabbing used, precluding benign agricultural investments from the research, was stressed repeatedly. My own priority setting was not revealed.

Even after the two introductions and the filling out of personal details, initial resistance was still likely to be present to some degree in spite of respondents being highly engaged with the issues. For this reason the first page of the questionnaire featured an “easier“ multiple-choice question intended as warm-up; after having answered this first question, the respondent is more committed to the more demanding tasks awaiting: two spider charts, a set of three dichotomy scales, a “cool-down” question intended to rid respondents of information not interesting for this thesis before the last feature, an open question about what the questionnaire lacked. It also provided space for other comments. The principal intention of this open question was to identify big priority suggestions that should have been included but that I missed in my synoptic reading.

The spider charts and the dichotomy scales were chosen as features both for their immediate visual clarity of what is expected. They also provide an element of fun, increasing the likelihood of good-quality answers. The largest benefit of the spider charts is that this way of ranking everything at once, so to speak, better captures the respondents’ whole ideas of the field, including, importantly, potential synergy effects that according to them might exist. Note, however, that this brings with it a risk that individual priority suggestions would have received a different ranking if they had not been considered individually, i.e. if synergy effects had not been considered.

The spider charts and the dichotomy scales loyally follow what is produced in subsection 3.6 (on priority suggestions), but because of space constraints on the questionnaire and time

¹⁰ The appendix is also showing my priorities as they stand during the final phase of writing this thesis. They are shown since they potentially might be influencing the discussion.

constraints for respondents, the explanations for the priority suggestions are somewhat fragmentary and more priority suggestions could not be included. This leads to the risk that respondents may miss some of what is intended or, even more problematically, the opposite: imply only one aspect, or all but one. Disentanglement was supposed to be accomplished in the interviews and follow-up interviews. Another problem is that the ranking of some of the priority suggestions perhaps could be quite expected when subjecting them to members of NGOs dealing with social justice, the environment, and the situation for small-scale farmers. Assuming the respondents are as knowledgeable as believed and hence not as likely to let sentiments of past bad experiences overly influence their priority settings, this is deemed to be of small consequence, however. Also, the results actually turn out reasonably nuanced (for instance the answers to the dichotomy scales are not all the way to the left), and, of course, studies of groups not spanning entire political or economic spectra can still be of large value.

The biggest weakness of the questionnaire is that quite a few important topics are not covered. For example, judging by respondents' comments, it could have been clearer on technology transfer and capacity building (learned through the open question), i.e. having them be explicated rather than just being implicitly present in many of the priority suggestions. A missing priority suggestion that definitely should have been included in the questionnaire is implementation of early warning systems, reducing vulnerability and exposure to extreme weather events (cf. Sachs 2005: 283; cf. IPCC 2012: 19). Early warning systems are valuable to have on the local scale since there is big scope and need for custom tailoring. An inexcusably missed priority suggestion is that gender aspects and female equality are not included in the second spider chart. This is a big and honest mistake.

2.5 Theory of science

The personal science-theoretical view held by me and reflected in the thesis needs to be explicated. The thesis naturally champions an inductive approach since it is trying to bring to light new insights on a topic previously not directly explored. Nevertheless there exist certain preconceived notions, as always, not least in preparing the questionnaires. Therefore the thesis had an abductive leaning, which undoubtedly colors it. However, this may be of minor importance considering what is sought for is not so much a theory as an attempt at a 'wish list' that could be of use at once but chiefly would be built upon by further research.

Studying the complexities of society demands a hermeneutical approach, I believe. This suits the thesis's relatively intensive approach, based on personal opinions of respondents. Not only are respondents, as part of social life, meaningfully listened to because of the meanings of reality they perceive, they are also interesting as informants due to their positioning in a world full of different (but all valid) interpretations of the topic at hand. I advocate an anti-naturalist epistemology because of my belief that the complexities of social life, including the topic of this thesis, hardly can be captured fully by numbers or shallow empirics. That is not to say that there exist multiple realities, for as regards ontology, to some extent in opposition with the above, I am drawn to the idea of an independent 'world out there' that we can explore objectively, at least to the extent that the conclusions we draw from it do more good than bad; that is, I side with the realistic ontology over the anti-realistic, bridging the small but existing gap between this and anti-naturalism by cherishing the almost always valid objection of critical realism, namely that the concept of multiple realities is an utterly unproductive one, trivializing very real

social problems (cf. Flowerdew 2005: 20f, 29), This fits this thesis well since multiple realities would probably lead to no confidently identified priorities at all. Not-perfect priorities must surely be better than no priorities.

Out of this hermeneutical, anti-naturalist, and realist view of the world and upon research comes a sort of wide trust in the wisdom of the crowd. Following from this, I believe that the second part of the thesis accomplishes a synthesis of different perceptions, a group-correcting way of receiving a more informed picture, that still allows for individual insights to surface, somewhat like a focus group generating a sum larger than the addition of the individual replies. I am thus confident that much warranted knowledge could have been generated if the methodology had held. Had my outlook been positivistic (giving less space for individual insights) instead of hermeneutic, naturalistic (giving no space for underdetermined theories) instead of anti-naturalistic, or anti-realistic (in turn giving too much space for individual opinions, providing no ground for useful synthesis) instead of leaning towards realism – or all of these at once – the methodological approach would have had to be much more extensive for this to be achieved.

My standpoint is that researchers have a very hard time remaining objective to their research, both while conducting it and in framing it, as well as in relation to the individuals or groups that are part of it. It is my conviction that the researcher always to some extent influences the research by manipulating one or more aspects of it. It follows that self-critique and transparency is of utmost importance. Therefore, the research for this thesis is clear with where its sympathies lie – in text on the questionnaire, in conversation prior to handing over the questionnaire to the respondent, on these pages, and in the questionnaire appendix – and the aim is to be open about its every reasoning.

2.6 Delimitations, needed contextualization, standpoints, and concepts used

Time and space constraints as well as the need for focus necessitates many delimitations. The thesis only looks at how to protect small-scale farmers from land grabbers aiming to produce food crops or crops for agrofuels. However, it does not examine the worst case-scenario, namely having domestic or foreign forces seizing control of land through military invasion. Also, another plausible scenario is that of speculating land grabbers colluding with local gangsters, militias etc. in an effort to “convince” small-scale farmers of selling their land. The thesis does not look at this either and the proposed climate aid would do nothing to prevent it, but it would of course be good to get as much development as possible in before these two possibilities turn into likelihoods. Another delimitation is that the thesis does not consider the plight of pastoralists: even though they are the agricultural group most affected by the language of ‘marginal’ and ‘suboptimally used’ lands, they demand and deserve an approach of their own. However, one respondent actually was a pastoralist (though knowledgeable of the situations of small-scale farmers as well).

Since factors other than climate change contribute to the land rush, it certainly can be argued that regular foreign aid also should be directed towards this issue – and it should. The priority suggestions of this thesis overlap much with projects common for regular foreign aid. However, there is a bias for priority suggestions that address areas directly being impacted by climate

change. Areas of especially much overlap are discarded already here, even though history has shown that aid is effective at them: building roads and railroads (Sachs 2005: 289; Easterly 2006: 321f), electrification of remote rural areas (Sachs 2005, 282f), and health (Sachs 2005: 226, 237f; Easterly 2006: 116). Since it is seen to be nearly impossible to use aid as a way to reduce corruption, the part of land grabbing that has to do with corruption is not addressed even though climate change-induced societal disarray may well increase corruption and hence land grabbing. Likewise, a lot could be put in place in the international regulatory landscape to hamper land grabbing, but this is not examined in this thesis since it is not an aid question. The issue is raised shortly as an illustration in subsection 3.1, however.

Regarding aid volumes and types of aid, the thesis does not look at the immediate size of the proposed aid or how big a part it would be of total climate aid, comprising also mitigation and 'regular' adaptation. In spite of this being of critical concern to how many priorities should be pursued or even to which priority suggestions that meaningfully can be pursued, it could not be managed. Neither does it consider the costs of the priority suggestions nor which of them might be easiest to raise aid money for. Closely tied to this, the thesis does not consider the number of priorities either, except for rejecting obviously unwanted priority suggestions. According to Sachs (2005: 255), "one of the weaknesses of development thinking is the relentless drive for a magic bullet". He stresses how success in any area inevitably hinges upon investments across the board. Even if he disagrees on the means to get there, Easterly (2006), agrees with this insight. It therefore confidently can be stated that the number of priorities pursued is of big importance. At the same time as almost-across-the-board acceptance of the priority suggestions not rejected of course would be preferable, the amount of money allocated to the proposed climate aid would decide much here.

How the proposed climate aid should be realized in practice, i.e. disbursed through the state or through NGOs or by donor agencies doing their own projects – the big debate (cf. Easterly 2006; Sachs 2005; Holmén 2010) – is not examined since it is too big a question (which donor agencies that would do the job best is not looked at either). However, this debate is incorporated to some degree since the thesis, through the spider charts, looks at both the scenario where donors influence governments through conditional aid and the scenario where NGOs or donor agencies themselves do local-scale projects (both scenarios could of course also be pursued simultaneously). For reasons of personal conviction about its potential if done right, conditional aid is included in spite of it being very controversial. Donors doing their own projects in recipient countries is not nodded approvingly at since the thesis embraces participation, empowerment, sovereignty, demand-driven development, freedom of choice, and sustainability as yardsticks for local development. These would not be doomed by dominant foreign presence, but well threatened. However, there are pragmatic concerns to take into account, such as that local capacities of various kinds may initially be lacking. Here it can be argued that foreign or international NGOs could step in, perhaps funded by the proposed climate aid. However, they have even lower incentives to create local capacities and to withdraw when opportunity is given than donor agencies do. In this context it should be mentioned that drawing from the opinions of NGO representatives for small-scale farmers does not necessarily mean that the proposed aid should be channelled through such NGOs.

Some concepts used in the thesis need to be clarified. Many prefer 'climate finance' to 'climate aid' since it showcases how it is more about a duty to help than a choice to help. For example, a man in Doha exclaiming "I see climate finance not as aid but as an obligation". This is

sympathetic and duly noted, but this thesis uses 'climate aid' since it is the more commonly used version and also connotes a clearer connection to aid theory and the history of aid giving. For the purposes of this thesis, possible reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions from small-scale farmer is deemed to be insufficient for even making an indent in the feared climate-change induced land-grabbing trend, and is therefore not considered. In the following 'climate aid' therefore does not, as conventionally, include aid for climate mitigation. Lastly, although many accounts consider Sudan and South Sudan as belonging to Sub-Saharan Africa, the United Nations does not. This thesis will join the former and include the two countries, since they are considered to be among the least developed countries (LDCs) (UNOHRLLS 2012).

3. Theoretical justification

3.1 *The connection between climate change and land grabbing*

For a long time we have heard warning bells chiming with projections of temperature increases larger than those warned of in the IPCC's 2007 assessment report. Now, even outlets traditionally regarded as climate conservative chime in with their own denunciations of the status quo: a couple of months ago the World Bank released its immediately widely spread *Turn Down the Heat* report, in which it stresses how crucial it is that we avoid the projected temperature increase of four degrees Celsius within this century. Adopting even more of new climate science, the International Energy Agency has now for over a year warned that current policies are steering us towards unfathomable six degrees of warming (IEA 2011). These two organizations making such claims is a good reflection of how almost all new climate science result in worse predictions: the consequences are going to be harsher than previously expected and the speed of change is faster than feared. Climate change also is increasingly understood as not being characterized by linear behavior, i.e. a given amount of climate forcing leading to a proportional amount of climate change, but rather by radical state shifts occurring after certain largely unknown thresholds (tipping points) are passed. At the same time, climate change is not a phenomenon of the future but is already happening, evidenced by a record-small Arctic ice sheet and highly suggested by the last few years' extreme weather events. All the while global emissions are steadily increasing, with for example China's emissions predicted to keep rising until 2030 (*Guardian* 2012a). The UN climate negotiations are not doing much to make the situation better, either.

For these reasons it is highly likely that the world will see major climate change take place, with large consequences. A short and simplified walkthrough of the projections for three of the land grabbers active in Africa follows. In China, climate change will probably mean more natural water availability, but rising temperatures will also mean counteracting increases in irrigation water demand. If the result is decreased or increased water availability for agriculture depends on which climate scenario will prevail, but it depends even more on the Chinese socio-economic trajectory (with industries in need of large amounts of water). However, the result is that there will be insufficient water availability for agriculture in the coming decades. The northern parts of the country fare better than the southern. (Wei *et al* 2010). The IPCC (2007: 297) reports potential consequences of a 2-degree increase to be a 5–12 percent decrease in rice production, but also that wheat production could increase 7–25 percent. It also notes that China is especially susceptible to increasing salinity of groundwater when salt water intrudes into over-exploited groundwater aquifers in coastal regions due to sea level rise (*ibid*: 483). For China it therefore is uncertain if climate change will increase the incentives for land grabbing or not, but it seems certain that socio-economic development will do so. For India, a 2-degree temperature increase could decrease wheat yields by 0.75 tons/hectare, and a 0,5–1,5-degree rise could spell a 5 percent yield decrease for maize and a decrease in gross per capita water availability by close to 40 percent until 2050. However, some studies suggest an increase in wheat production. Indian coast areas are also highly susceptible to salt water intrusion due to sea level rise. (IPCC 2007: 280f, 283 297). For Saudi Arabia global warming likely means a decrease in precipitation, having a major negative impact on its already small agricultural sector and on its water supplies (Alkolibi 2002). In sum, at least for these three land grabbers it seems more likely than not that

climate change will provide incentives for continued land grabbing, even though it is hardly clear-cut. By comparison, the 2007 (52, 547, 554f) IPCC assessment report projected net gains for European agriculture, suggesting that European countries may not become large grabbers of land for food production – at least not northern Europe: agriculture in the Mediterranean, the south-west Balkans and in the south of European Russia will suffer much more than northern parts.

A simplified account of the projections for Sub-Saharan Africa (not at all considering the sub-continent's heterogeneity or the different impacts on it) of course is required as well. The projected consequences in Sub-Saharan Africa include average declines for yields of rice (up to 14 percent), wheat (up to 22 percent), and maize (up to 5 percent) until 2050; worsened water supply reliability; decreased food availability of about 500 calories (equal to 21 percent) until 2050; and an increase in the number of malnourished children by over 10 million until 2050 (making it 53 million in total). (IFPRI 2009). But even if agricultural productivity worsens in Sub-Saharan Africa, it will not be the end of land grabbing, because the land is still highly farmable – in particular with the resources of wealthy investors. Rather, it means that the competitiveness of small-scale farmers decreases even more and hence that investors with the capacity to cultivate the land for a while longer than the small-scale farmers will want to do so.¹¹ Making countries in Sub-Saharan Africa even less able to resist the land grabbers is that the economies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are especially vulnerable to climate change owing to their poverty and relative lack of human and physical capital, as well as the agricultural sector's large share of GDP, export earnings, and employment opportunities (cf. *ibid.*). Increased disease prevalence due to climate change (IPCC 2007: 435) also decreases agricultural productivity and hence competitiveness, both directly and through financial strain resulting from prevention and treatment costs, taking away money meant for investments.

A development indirectly connected to climate change that without doubt argues in favor of the feared connection between climate change and land grabbing is the growth of the agrofuels sector. Hermele (2012: 192) claims that “[n]owhere is the conflict over land more pronounced than when it comes to assessing the possibility of substituting fossil fuels with land-based energy sources”. Perhaps this conflict is driven more by profit motives than climate sensibilities (also, the peak oil issue plays a part), but it is definitely legitimated by the threat of climate change. The enterprise is not only considerably ecologically harmful, incapable of replacing fossil fuels on any relevant scale, and partly responsible for global food price volatility since it replaces food production (FAO *et al* 2011), but the commonly held notion that agrofuels has a lower carbon footprint is also highly doubtful. (cf. Hermele 2012). The hard work of cheaply growing food crops to turn into agrofuels is often done in developing countries, directly leading to land grabs. One party accused for this is the EU, with its 20–20 target of having 20 percent of its energy supply come from renewable energies by 2020, causing agrofuel-related land grabs around the world, including in Sub-Saharan Africa (ActionAid 2011). Of course, the food production displaced needs to be resumed somewhere, putting further pressures on land, likely

¹¹ This of course assumes that climate change does not turn out worse than the projections upon which the studies base their calculations on. Indeed, if climate change results in the collapse of much of the agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, land grabbing of course is not an option (cf. Friis & Reenberg 2010: 5). However, this will then be of small comfort. Nonetheless, one cannot rule out this possibility, especially not in latter parts of the century.

leading to more land grabbing. This trend is widely believed to continue (cf. Crabtree–Condor & Casey, 2012; cf. Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75; cf. Friis & Reenberg 2010: 5; IRIN 2012). One example is in Sierra Leone, where an agrofuel project – actually supported by Swedish foreign aid! – led to land grabbing (cf. Sveriges Radio 2012). Another indirect land grabbing consequence of climate change is carbon trading – carbon markets created by carbon compensation schemes such as the Clean Development Mechanism to the Kyoto Protocol and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. There have been cases where projects tied to these carbon markets have amounted to land grabbing (Hermele 2012: 198ff; Miller 2012; Friis & Reenberg 2010: 5f; Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012).

Another factor at play is the threat of experiencing extreme weather events affecting agriculture, making countries diversify their risk. Related to risk diversification, speculators never quit speculating. Betting on various price changes resulting from climate change will probably become ever more common in the foreseeable future. (cf. Guttal & Monsalve, 2011: 73). Yet another factor is one related to what was discussed in the thesis's background, that another pressure threatening to lead to more land grabbing is the improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities. The part of the argument having to do with new locations for extraction rested upon transport costs not being able to be lowered further. The current trend is that oil prices steadily are moving upwards. Together with the transport sector being a top priority if we are to combat climate change efficiently, this of course provides an incentive to make the sector less polluting, but even with this taken into account transport costs will likely soar once we start addressing climate change seriously. Rising transport costs due to climate change is therefore another way that climate change might make land grabbing worse.

A factor of relatively marginal factor not necessarily leading to land grabbing in itself but nonetheless putting pressure on land, is that struggles to make agriculture more climate-friendly, for example by producing meat and dairy more organically – cattle farming has a large carbon footprint (cf. FAO 2006) – unfortunately mean that more land will be needed to produce the same amount of food. Lastly, climate change may also lead to domestic land grabbing, or open up to foreign grabs, if it makes unstable regions even more resource-scarce, thereby instigating violent conflict.

3.2 Basic arguments

Clearly, the moral thing to do would be to have climate aid help small-scale farmers prevent their own marginalization – with funds additional to those going to climate aid today. The essential moral case here is nothing new. The polluter pays principle is commonly invoked in discussions on climate change. It simply states the straightforward logic that more damage dealt equals more compensation, from those responsible for most emissions to those not responsible. This definitely speaks for the proposed climate since future and perhaps even current land grabbing seems to constitute more damage from climate change. Another basic moral argument for the proposed climate aid is the childhood intuition of how bullying does not constitute fair fighting; small-scale farmers need help in their unbalanced fight against rich-country governments, influential transnational corporations, and speculators who can afford to play these deals by the wind. Here, the word 'complementary' has to be emphasized. The proposed climate aid is naturally a measure of last resort, to be used only while and when other measures are out of reach. That criterion may soon be upon us. Since incentives to forcefully provide for

the own population grow ever stronger, we can no longer count on international law, global summits, and the hearts of decision-makers – increasingly belonging in the private sector – to stand with small-scale farmers. The efforts holding them responsible to do so must never quit, but in the meantime, a complementary route is needed. The proposed climate aid is no substitute for a more just world order, but it is better than nothing.

Or is it? The debate on whether foreign aid even can do enough good to be justified is far from settled and there is not room enough here to recite it. However, Hans Holmén, writing on the aid industry in Africa, states:

“As long as this situation [of rich-country protection of their own agricultural sectors, and of rich-country unwillingness to deliver on debt cancellation] prevails, it seems rather meaningless to provide development aid – and it would be difficult indeed to maintain that aid aims at poor-country development. It is, rather, the case that aid is there to mask exploitative, neocolonial relations.” (Holmén 2010: 229)

This account is sympathetic and if land grabbing is added to the list a near-perfect recipe for disaster is in place. But since those practices are unlikely to end in the near future, since the proposed climate aid is decidedly anti-neocolonial, and since monitoring of the aid would constantly be on the minds of small-scale farmers risking to lose their lands as well as a top priority for NGOs fighting for their cause, the proposed climate aid is worth doing simultaneously to striving to end these unjust practices. There are many more arguments for the case at hand in opposition to Holmen’s reservation. For example, there are compelling, widely agreed-upon reasons to believe that simple interventions of the kinds focused upon in this thesis have a reasonable likelihood of success. For example, water infrastructure, power generation, regulation simplification, and soil management (Easterly 2006: 154–158; Sachs 2005: 282f, 289), could all help launch countries threatened by land grabbing into self-propelled progress by helping them climb the first rung of the ladder of development, to use Sachs’s words (2005). Thankfully, then, the proposed climate aid has a large degree of overlap with regular foreign aid as well as with regular climate aid. Hence, as a second best donors can disburse part of existing – or, preferably, enlarged – aid budgets to the identified priorities for the proposed climate aid.

Another argument for the proposed climate aid is consistency. Since we often speak of caring for refugees, the right thing to do would be to put our money where our mouths are and take the best approach to achieve what everybody wants: to make sure no refugees are created to begin with. An issue often raised in relation to climate change is that of climate refugees – people forcibly displaced, either because climate change has made making a living impossible for them or because of climate-change induced resource conflicts. Land grabbing thus threatens to create even more climate refugees. Even though the concept of climate refugees usually includes people internally displaced into urban centers (often slums) as well, many would become international refugees (in need of food). As a result, to stop this would be both the right thing to do and the wise choice for countries not wanting to receive more refugees. This choice is made even more prudent and morally imperative when considering how people displaced by land grabbing have been treated by its own government hitherto. For example in the Ethiopian region of Gambella, people evicted by land grabs are being installed in government-built villages. Under constant threat of violence and under the false lure of promised land, healthcare and education, they are wholly uprooted and moved far from their previous lands and villages into largely unfertile areas not seldom lacking water and any opportunities to make a living (Human Rights Watch 2012).

The arguments that have been presented so far are all more or less taking their starting-point in what will happen in the future. However, the countries largely responsible for climate change already have much to pay their dues for – including steps seemingly in the right direction. For example, by continuing to give large amounts of aid donors are indirectly nodding approvingly at land grabs currently taking place in several countries (cf. Human Rights Watch 2012), and there is no shortage of criticism towards the World Bank’s encouragement of procedures paving the way for more grabs by setting rules amounting to no more than “a checklist to destroy the global peasantry responsibly”, according to the UN special rapporteur on the right to food (quoted in Hermele 2012, 210). Also, the G8 has adopted guidelines for international land investments, but it has been criticized for being too weak and for not consulting recipient countries when they were set up. In the UN’s Committee of Food Security, governance of land tenure has been subjected to guidelines (mainly for governments) with a rights-based approach, including a gender focus. In spite of over 100 signatures from member countries, this is hardly a success. Rather, it also deserves the above quote since compliance is voluntary and free, prior, and informed consent of poor communities is not required. (cf. Friis & Reenberg, 2010; cf. Crabtree-Condor & Casey, 2012). Even though not directly related, the agricultural subsidy policies of developed countries also requires some amends-making to be made. Every year these are displacing about US\$40 billion in net agricultural exports from developing countries and are reducing the agricultural incomes of these countries by nearly US\$30 billion (IFPRI 2003]. Much of this would have befallen Sub-Saharan Africa, allowing the agricultural sector to develop.

3.3 Plausibility in the light of current climate aid

The connection between climate change and land grabbing may be clear and the case for the proposed climate aid unequivocal, but is this at all relevant in practice? Is there any pragmatic chance of launching an aid scheme such as the proposed? Despite all rhetoric rich-country donors are currently not even accomplishing the long ago agreed-upon target of giving 0.7 percent of their GNP as aid. This holds true even if climate aid is included, since almost none of it is new and additional, as agreed upon in the UN climate negotiations. The current process to scale up climate aid is the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It was established at COP 16 in Cancún and has since won its independence (developing countries feared it would become part of the World Bank), but developed countries are insisting that most of its money – to be scaled up to US\$ 100 billion per year by 2020 – shall come from the private sector. Public finance should merely act as a catalyst. Accusations of turning the GCF into a “greedy corporate fund” naturally follow. With the fund almost empty now two years later and a study overview done by UNFCCC (2012) that actually puts US\$100-400 billion as the estimated range of aid that developing countries will need per year just for adaptation (a number including mitigation could be as much as four to ten times larger), the situation looks bleak. It became even dimmer when no new money was put into the GCF during COP 18. The main outcome was an urge to continue to give approximately as much as today. Some new pledges came from European countries, amounting only to US\$ 6 billion in total until 2015, and as could be expected most of it is not additional funds. Another opportunity lost in Doha was the concept of loss and damage. Since climate aid has not delivered on its promises and obviously looks set to not do it for a long time, developing countries have spent the last two years working hard to implement a mechanism compensating them for the consequences of climate change. The proposal essentially meant that developing countries would be able to take developed countries to court and thereby be adjudicated fair compensation. However, developed countries naturally feared

this prospect and through hard and bitter negotiations, and some threats, they managed to turn loss and damage into just another area for climate aid. Loss and damage thereby marks an important official admittance of the historic culpability of developed countries, but it amounts to little new and risks facing the same fate as climate aid for adaptation and mitigation. Thereby it epitomizes developed countries' well-developed unwillingness to heed its global responsibilities.

The current lack of ambition is a sign not only of developed countries acting recklessly and short-sighted, but also of how infected the UNFCCC process has become. For this reason and since powerful countries for self-explanatory reasons would view the proposed climate aid as highly controversial, it probably has no future in the UN forum. We can therefore quite convincingly write off the UNFCCC as the platform for the proposed climate aid.

All of this seems to suggest that the proposed climate aid's chances are slim to none. Perhaps, though, countries are willing to do this kind of work on their own, bilaterally¹². Just because the UNFCCC is not the right forum for the proposed climate aid, the conclusion that no such forums exist may be overly pessimistic. In addition to all the climate aid already being given bilaterally, one event at COP 18 hinted at how powerful countries may harbor will to give climate aid but not so under the contentious UN umbrella: among the US\$ 6 billion pledged for climate aid during COP 18, the UK chose to keep its money outside of the GCF. Instead it is going to disburse it bilaterally through its own aid agency DFID, with the stated reason of the GCF not yet being stable enough. There are various reasons suggesting that countries potentially would choose to embrace the proposed climate aid. Countries not prospecting for land grabs perhaps would do it out of moral convictions and in an understanding of how development of poor countries will benefit the world at large. Countries in the land-grabbing business perhaps would do it for the below reasons (where giving aid multilaterally in small groups of powerful countries is of course also a possibility).

3.4 Geopolitical aspects¹³

Aid has always been given largely for political reasons. Given all the ways in which climate change may further destabilize the international system, there are reasons to suspect that there will not be much of a difference with regards to climate aid – but here this harmful and short-sighted practice may not be as problematic. Foreign aid volumes were at their heights during the coldest days of the Cold War when it provided 'allies' with assistance in exchange for votes and keeping ideologies in check. Likewise, the proposed climate aid could be a part of a strategy to prevent a geopolitical competitor from grabbing large chunks of precious land. Both countries engaged in land grabbing (or having corporations doing so) and those that are not might find the

¹² Still, it should be stressed that for self-explanatory reasons the proposed climate aid is never going to be called 'climate aid to prevent land grabbing' or the like, but rather go under a more traditional name.

¹³ Having spoken repeatedly of developed countries in the previous subsection, it must be stressed that the below account, just as the thesis at large, does not consider them to be equal to land grabbers; as the list of land grabbers in the background showed, they are in fact not and probably will not become the prime land grabbers (cf. the parts on Europe in subsection 3.1).

proposed climate aid to be of strategic importance. Therefore, a country (or a group of countries) could plausibly give climate aid bilaterally (or multilaterally) in order to stop another country (or group of countries) from grabbing land. This speculative but no less plausible development could potentially counter all of the above naysaying arguments. Seeing as how food security is the main concern for all governments, it can be expected that the competition for agricultural land will broaden from today's main rivalry between a rich country and the destitute inhabitants of a poor country, to a rivalry between rich countries for the agricultural land of poor countries. If land grabs result from this, poor countries lose sovereignty and colonialism accelerates, but this may not always become the case. Because as in all warfare, alliances will be built, quite possibly and hopefully with poor countries being able to take some advantage of the situation and negotiate help that is developing their agriculture, protecting small-scale farmers and leads to development – in the end helping the entire world. It is farfetched to think that all land grabs will be avoided for these geopolitical reasons –

“Power relations being what they are, it is not far-fetched to believe that such a new agro-regime will lead to an even greater strive by the Centre to appropriate ecological space, thus again making conflicts over land-areas and land-based resources the focal point of geopolitically driven land struggles.” (Hermele 2012: 173f)

– but some may. Of course, the big problem with this argument is why powerful countries would invest in measures protecting recipients from land grabbers rather than grabbing the land for themselves, as every single plot of land grows ever more important. For one, a further destabilized world, perhaps without the U.S. as a single strong leader, means rich countries might become more dependent on the support of poor countries, buying the latter leverage. Something else speaking against these alliances in turn becoming land-grabbing coalitions is that land, unlike ideologies and votes, must be physically controlled if it is to remain in the hands of outsiders – an immensely difficult task to perform on another continent, surrounded by a starving population. However, it is very much up to debate if the intelligence of leaders is stronger than populist temptations to more or less forcefully seize some of other people's land. It should also be stressed that even if geopolitical power plays result in the proposed climate aid, this would be far from only positive for countries affected by land grabbing, since geopolitical schemes often have substantial side effects for those caught in the crossfire. This is illustrated by the danger of history repeating itself: too often has foreign aid only gained the donor country and too often has it been badly disbursed and dishonestly evaluated. There is a risk that the proposed climate aid would not go to small-scale farmers but rather to local elites. Strong monitoring from other countries, from locals, and hopefully from the donor country itself should counteract this, but besides, if the proposed aid is coming, recipients better be ready for it – both in terms of absorptive capacity and in terms of what they wish of it. To turn such aid down may not even be an option, crassly speaking.

3.5 Role of small-scale farmers for development

What is the wider development rationale of focusing on small-scale farmers – why is this the best option for their countries, and for them, in the long run? The proposed climate aid could instead aim at intensifying farming, at concentrating domestic land ownership in a sustainable

way, or at achieving this from above through comprehensive agricultural reforms launched with the help of foreign aid. Three reasons are given as to why this would not be in the best interest of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

First, the overarching debate is provided by the choice between development from below and other alternative accounts contra classical development approaches. To simplify, the debate is about whether development should be bottom-up, with the participation, self-reliance and wishes of small-scale farmers and rural communities as the focus, or top-down, industrial, with the steering of bureaucrats and elected politicians as the focus. Here it is not necessary to delve deeper into the issues; it suffices to say that history shows that the development path suitable for a given country hinges upon many factors. (Potter *et al* 2008; Easterly 2006; Sachs 2005). Of large relevance here to Sub-Saharan Africa are five simple statistics: 90 percent of food in Sub-Saharan Africa is produced by small-scale farmers, around 95 percent of farmers are small-scale farmers farming less than five hectares (IFPRI 2001; IAASTD 2009), with the average being around half of that. And, crucially, small-scale farmers make out close to 60 percent of all working adults (Global Agriculture 2012). Even though all countries have started out in similar ways, these numbers show a huge reliance on the farming sector and makes clear the importance of the small-scale farmers for all kinds of development. Taken to its extreme, attempting development without including small-scale farmers – for example through domestic agricultural enterprises likely having some of the same negative effects as foreign land grabbing – risks resulting in major instability. Fundamentally, what both land grabbing and domestic development initiatives not putting small-scale farmers at its center are doing is to lose out on the potential inherent in the knowledgeable and skilled small-scale farmers.

Second, and arguably of most importance, is that the economies of scale characterizing agriculture in other parts of the world is more elusive in Sub-Saharan Africa. While it is true that industrial monocultures have the highest yields per unit area of a single crop, it is equally true that small-scale farmers doing polyculture farming have higher total output per area unit (Daniel 2011: 39; Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75). This makes small-scale farmers the wiser approach already today and many times wiser if we do see improving terms-of-trade for primary commodities.

Third, given the challenges lying ahead and given that large-scale industrialism has always been the dominating attempt to transform agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, with little to show for it, a reconsidering away from the traditional rationale is needed. Trying to make African agriculture into the image of Western farming by imposing every single aspect of it, no matter the local ecological or social contexts, has not been especially successful. Rather, the big role that the many small-scale farmers can play needs to be encouraged. Small-scale farmers already are the literal breadwinners for the sub-continent. Giving them further opportunities to help meet global food demand, create employment, reduce poverty, and promote sustainable livelihoods, should be widely promoted. (cf. Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, Taylor 2012: 63f).

3.6 Priority suggestions

Before being able to present questionnaire respondents with an adequate choice of priority suggestions from which to rank priorities, a general picture of potentially relevant, efficient, effective, and feasible interventions has to be painted. It turns out that climate aid lot could do a

lot. As mentioned, priority suggestions are divided into three groups: *Providing incentives for governments to implement programs favorable for small-scale farmers*, *Specific local-scale projects for agricultural adaptation*, and *Promotion of farming practices and food security strategies*. The last group consists of three dichotomies and is representing a more overarching choice of focus for all actions. The first two recommend specific actions and come with inherent preferred disbursement methods: channeling aid through government or NGOs, or not at all – donor agencies doing projects directly themselves.

Keep in mind that the priority suggestions are results of synoptic reading, that they are quite general, and that they consciously have been kept short. None of this matters much, though, since the real work befalls the respondents.

3.6.1 Providing incentives for governments to implement favorable programs

Table 2 lists priority suggestions that have a focus on incentivizing governments through conditional aid, but they could of course also be applied to large NGOs doing work in many areas. The headings correspond fairly well with those in the questionnaire.

Table 2. Priority suggestions for spider chart one

<p>a) Push for programs developing drought- and flood-resistant crops</p>	<p>The IPCC (2012: 7f, 18f, 175ff, 235) expresses fears that both droughts and flood will become worse for Sub-Saharan Africa. This increases the need for developing drought- and flood-resistant crops, low-regret options that reduce exposure and vulnerability. (Here no differentiation is made between traditional plant breeding and genetic modification, which is featured in in Table 3.)</p>
<p>b) Push for programs preparing rural communities and infrastructure for weather disasters such as floods, storms, and heat waves (droughts)</p>	<p>The consequences for small-scale farmers if weather disasters increase will be major. Since 1980, climate change-related weather disasters have caused approximately 1.3 million deaths, of which two-thirds befell the least developed countries, of which almost three-quarters of countries are from Sub-Saharan Africa (<i>Guardian</i> 2012b). The many floods across Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 (WFP 2007) warn of the potential scales of damage, not to mention the frequent droughts in the Horn of Africa and that Africa will see the largest percentage increase in physical exposure to tropical storms (<i>ibid</i>: 241). Preparing rural communities and infrastructure therefore is crucial.</p>
<p>c) Push for subsidy programs for private-sector loans to small-scale farmers and for other needs of theirs</p>	<p>Small-scale farmers often have trouble gaining access to loans, and if they do the interest rates are usually high. State subsidies, especially to microfinance institutions, could improve the situation, just as they can with regards to inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and seeds. In the end, microcredit schemes may not have resulted in the hailed super-boon for rural people, but state subsidies could keep also those interest rates down and increase geographic coverage. (Morduch 1999). The subsidies would need to be long-term and predictable (Armendáriz <i>et al</i> 2011).</p>
<p>d) Push for land reform programs, including predictability regarding the tenure rights of small-scale farmers</p>	<p>The majority of small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have secure access to their land, deterring investments and making land grabs easier. Land reforms aiming to give small-scale farmers property rights (or making sure that the law recognizes commonly held land as private property) are therefore integral both to bolstering the agricultural sector's competitiveness and to protect it. (Daniel, 2011: 32f; IFPRI 2012: 40–43; Sachs 2005: 321). However, it should not be done as the World Bank has done, enabling large-scale investments to easier be made (Hermele 2012: 212 –214).</p>
<p>e) Push for programs enhancing water rights and water quality for</p>	<p>Not only is water supply and quality a precondition for agricultural productivity, it is also a major rationale behind land grabbing. This is both an issue water for crops and of wanting the water in itself, in fact the main motivator behind many deals (Oakland</p>

small-scale farmers	Institute 2011). Small-scale farmers need to be guarded for example from their water resources being portrayed as unused. Water demand management and improved irrigation efficiency measures are much-needed (cf. Sachs 2005: 282f; cf. IPCC 2012: 19). In terms of quality, groundwater salinization is vital to avoid, which can be done by moving drinking water and irrigation wells away from coasts.
f) Push for programs implementing beneficial land-use change	Small-scale farmers could use help to gain access to knowledge, capital and inputs needed to change the way the land is cultivated and increase yields, for example through crop diversification. Other examples are conservation tillage in order to reduce input needs and fight soil degradation and erosion, and changing dates for sowing, irrigation, and harvesting. (cf. Mertz <i>et al</i> 2008; cf. Ochieng Adimo <i>et al</i> 2011; cf. Pretty (2008). Agroforestry, for example with nitrogen-fixing trees, is another option (Sachs 2005: 229).
g) Push for programs retaining, spreading and making use of the traditional agricultural knowledge of rural communities	Related to the above but not entirely overlapping is that the diversified cropping practices of traditional agricultural knowledge may be lost if current farming practices continue (Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75f; cf. Ochieng Adimo <i>et al</i> 2011). Organic fertilizers and (crop combination) pesticides are examples of knowledge that the proposed climate aid could incentivize the conservation of.
h) Push for programs for livelihood diversification	If climate change decreases agricultural productivity, small-scale farmers could pursue secondary income possibilities in order to increase their ability to stay by their land. The proposed climate aid conceivably could do this through increasing the mobility of small-scale farmers, for example by providing transportation possibilities. (cf. Mertz <i>et al</i> 2008). Another, more concrete, example is to help small-scale farmers mill and pack their own produce instead of having to sell to agents.
i) Push for programs stressing gender considerations and participation of women	Securing women's land rights is crucial to the agricultural competitiveness of Sub-Saharan Africa (Crabtree–Condor & Casey, 2012: 9ff), not least since women farmers invest more of their incomes into the farm. Women are responsible for around 70 percent of food production in Africa (Canadian Food Security Policy Group 2007) but could and want to do more.
j) Push recipient governments to implement regulations protecting small-scale farmers and requiring consultation with them prior to land deals	Respecting the rights of small-scale farmers and making it a requirement that they are consulted and effectively listened to prior to deals would be a great stride forward (Crabtree–Condor & Casey, 2012). The democratic principles of free, prior and informed consent, and effective, efficient and free participation in decision-making should be heeded. If deals are struck, local employment should be made a requirement. (cf. Friis & Reenberg, 2010).

3.6.2 Specific local-scale projects for agricultural adaptation

The priority suggestions listed in Table 3 would be carried out by NGOs or by donor agencies themselves. They will probably work better if small-scale farmers are participating. The same on-the-ground functions could conceivably be performed by domestic semi-autonomous or fully government-operated organizations and agencies, in addition to NGOs, depending on the state apparatus in question, the local people's confidence in the government etc. However, this is not considered in more detail since the thesis is aiming at as much local participation as possible. It is carefully included into the NGO umbrella, though. Where cells in Table 3 refers to Table 2, remember that the local-scale scenario amounts more to actually doing work on the ground. The priority suggestions' headings and order differ somewhat between the spider charts (and tables) in order to have respondents think about the second spider chart more than to just apply the same ranking in the same general area of the spider chart as in the first.

Table 3. Priority suggestions for spider chart two

Projects distributing and educating about genetically engineered crops	Genetically modified crops are argued to be able to both improve yields and to protect harvests from harsher weather conditions due to climate change. At the same time they are widely controversial. Official investments, possibly through aid, would be especially important here since private businesses face low incentives to meet the specific challenges for small-scale farmers (cf. Sachs 2005: 282f).
Projects aiming to implement beneficial land-use change	See Table 2 f)
Projects supplying chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides	Many argue that the way forward for agriculture in Sub-Saharan African is a “New Green Revolution”, using modern technology to bolster agriculture in a way mimicking the previous green revolution in Asia. The foremost representative of this movement is AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa; www.agra.org), which especially promotes the use of chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides.
Projects working to retain, spread and make use of the traditional agricultural knowledge of rural communities	See Table 2 g)
Projects concerning water supply and irrigation	See Table 2 e)
Projects to protect communities and infrastructure from weather disasters such as floods, storms, and heat waves (droughts)	See Table 2 b)
Projects to help accomplish livelihood diversification, i.e. secondary income possibilities	See Table 2 h)
Projects to empower small-scale farmers in terms of rights, land titles, and decision-making	See Table 2 d). However, on the ground it would for example amount to educating about legal rights and helping with land registration procedures (cf. Daniel, 2011: 34). This approach is important since it has been widely established that it is not possible to fully institute and enforce property rights from the top down (Easterly, 2006: 79).
Projects to help creditors and microcredit schemes to serve small-scale farmers	See Table 2 c). On the ground this can be done by educating small-scale farmers about their possibilities and by providing links between creditors and villages, for example.

3.6.3 Promotion of farming practices and food security strategies

The priority suggestions listed in Table 4 represent more overarching priorities for the agricultural sector as a whole. Of course, they are not clear-cut dichotomies in reality (hence the scales in the questionnaire).

Table 4. Priority suggestions for dichotomy scales

Farming practice/food security strategy	vs	Farming practice/food security strategy
<p><u>Subsistence farming</u></p> <p>Many small-scale farmers in Africa only grow subsistence crops. Perhaps, therefore, the proposed climate aid should not try to transform them into market actors. Perhaps it should also help cash-crop farmers convert to subsistence crops, thus being able to feed themselves and rid themselves of dependences on the unjust global market. Crudely speaking, ‘bottom-up development’ and ‘alternative development’ theorists are of the conviction that such self-reliance is needed for development, eventually ending up in a few farmers feeding a whole country and even exporting food (cf. Potter <i>et al</i> 2008). (Prioritizing subsistence farming of course does not necessarily amount to the radical parts of these ideologies, however.)</p>	vs	<p><u>Cash-crop farming</u></p> <p>Many argue that denouncing world markets as a way to development. Pointing at the bad experiences from attempts at Import Substitution Industrialization, commentators argue that turning from globalization is among the worst mistakes possible. If countries instead stay open to the strongest development tool, truly free markets (Easterly 2006; Sachs 2005), the welfare for small-scale farmers will be the largest, is the argument. Competitiveness follows. In any case, global markets are here to stay so it is better to be a strong part of it than to try to stand outside of it. Also, a side effect of casting away globalization may be to alienate oneself from further aid.</p>
<p><u>Low-technology, traditional-knowledge farming</u></p> <p>Intercropping, crop rotation, livestock incorporation, organic fertilizers and crop combination “pesticides”, among many other practices. What Pretty (2008) identifies as sustainable agriculture, able to fix the paradox of humanity achieving major agricultural progress but still seeing millions going hungry: to integrate biological and ecological processes, to minimize the use of non-renewable inputs, to use traditional knowledge, and to cooperate to solve agricultural and natural resource problems. (ibid: 166). The benefits are self-explanatory.</p>	vs	<p><u>High-technology, capital-intensive, high-input farming</u></p> <p>High usage of technologies for intensive agriculture, such as machinery, chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides. In order to increase agricultural output, a Western mode of agriculture should be pursued. Genetically modified crop are a self-evident choice and other inputs can be tailored after them. The rationale is a renewed version of what the international financial institutions have championing for many years, with the new aspect being the focus on the small-scale farmer. (cf. Daniel 2011: 37ff).</p>
<p><u>Polyculture farming</u></p> <p>As shown in sub-section 3.5, small-scale farmers fare well in terms of food output par area unit – even better than industrial monocultures, meaning that for small-scale farmers to turn to monocultures bears with it large consequences. Also, a strong case can be made for the environmental advantages of polyculture farming over monoculture farming. Especially relevant here is that the need for industrial inputs decreases. (Guttal & Monsalve 2011: 75).</p>	vs	<p><u>Monoculture farming</u></p> <p>Food output per area unit is of smaller importance than being able to grow as much of the crop with the highest returns as possible. Monoculture farming is the start on the route towards a large-scale agricultural sector where a few farmers provide for the rest of a productive economy. Some amounts of environmental degradation has always been inherent in the first steps of development.</p>

4. Results from questionnaire

To start with, on the question regarding if land grabbing is going to become more common with climate change (cf. Appendix 3), three respondents put down that climate change ‘probably’ will increase land grabbing and nine responded ‘definitely’. This agreeing upon the issue at hand suggests that the respondents took the questionnaire seriously.

4.1 Incentivizing governments to implement programs

Fig 1a and Fig 1b feature the results from the spider-chart question on which priorities the proposed climate aid should have if it is used to incentivize governments to implement programs beneficial to small-scale farmers. Fig 1a shows the average priority setting while Fig 1b shows all priority settings.




Fig 1a. The first spider chart (average)

The priority suggestions were all received favorably. Considering this and the low number of respondents, it is impossible to discard any priority suggestion. It is difficult to say with confidence which priority suggestions are more favored than others. There seems to be three groups though, where drought- and flood-resistant crops, disaster preparedness, land reform and regulations make out the top one. Of the remaining six, traditional knowledge, water and gender considerations make out the group coming in second. This provides suggestive evidence for further research.




Fig 1b. The first spider chart (all answers)
Each color corresponds to one respondent.

4.2 Local-scale projects

Fig 2a and Fig 2b feature the results from the spider-chart question on which priorities the proposed climate aid should have if it is used to support local-scale projects beneficial to small-scale farmers. Fig 2a shows the average priority setting while Fig 2b shows all priority settings.




Fig 2a. The second spider chart (average)

Most priority suggestions were received quite favorably. Among these priority suggestions it is very difficult to confidently discern a useful ranking. The suggestive evidence here is that empowerment projects and drought and flood protection are the two top priorities, but again there are too few respondents for this to be truly meaningful. What is clear is that genetically engineered crops and chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides were unfavorably received; in fact, so much so that they (without further analysis) seem to be outliers and hence probably can be confidently discarded, i.e. considered not to be priorities at all.

What should be the PRIORITIES for climate aid donors' local-scale projects with the aim of benefitting small-scale farmers in the light of potential land grabbing?

[ALL RESPONDENTS]




Fig 2b. The second spider chart (all answers)
Each color corresponds to one respondent.

4.3 Farming strategy dichotomies

Fig 3a and 3b show the results from the dichotomy-scales questions on which overarching farming practices the proposed climate aid should promote. Fig 3a shows the average priority settings while 3b shows all priority settings.




Fig 3a. The dichotomy scales (average)

The averages are quite straightforward, in fact too much so: the seemingly simple marks come with big uncertainties due to the low number of respondents. But they still do provide some suggestive evidence.




Fig 3b. The dichotomy scales (all answers)
Each color corresponds to one respondent.

5. Discussion on priorities

5.1 Ranking of priorities

Owing to the low number of respondents and the collapsed methodology, there is little possible to do with the results from the questionnaire. Concerning the spider charts, it should be noted that respondents might have interpreted the ranking numbers differently, which results in the variations for individual priority settings probably being either somewhat smaller or somewhat bigger. Actually, this weakness may influence the averages as well, making the ranking even less trustworthy. Had there been more respondents some statistical exercises could have been performed to work around this, for example by looking at the relative rankings, i.e. if a ranked priority suggestion is consistently being ranked higher or lower than another one across all priority settings. Such an analysis on this material for example shows that if any, livelihood diversification would be the priority suggestion to be discarded in the first spider chart, since it has an average share of the rank sum for each priority setting that is lower than that of subsidies and access to loans (this can be seen in Fig 1 but is easier calculated with the raw data). On a larger data set similar analyses, of course also incorporating tests of significance with confidence intervals etc., could determine rankings more exactly.


Insofar as we can trust the dichotomy scales, their results are quite expected. This may deter digging deeper, but it should not. Since the dichotomy scales do not suffer from the same interpretation confusion concerning ranking as the spider charts do, for example the variations in the respondents' answers may be quickly analyzed. In so doing we see, among other things, that in addition to being the one best balanced, the subsistence farming–cash-crop farming dichotomy scale also exhibits the greatest variation, suggesting perhaps that this is an issue where especially much further research is needed since respondents are especially unsure there – or simply resulting from the fact that the agricultural sectors of respondents' countries differ in needs more in this respect than in the other two.

Since statistical methods cannot be used to make up for the lost interviews and follow-up interviews, perhaps a return to the literature could. A framework for analysis could be developed for example, perhaps mainly drawing from the combined wisdom of Sachs and Easterly. A longer literature study could of course be done too, trying to evaluate the priority suggestions by looking at which interventions have proven to be most viable. However, this strays from the purpose of the thesis of learning from representatives of small-scale farmers, and is therefore not pursued.


5.2 General applicability of priorities

Even if the rankings had been more clear-cut there still would have been a need to evaluate the general applicability of the findings, since Sub-Saharan Africa is a very heterogeneous subcontinent. One method to do so that would have been possible with more respondents (preferably also having better geographical representativity) is for example to search for patterns by comparing respondents' answers with their geographies of expertise, their home countries' projected climate change, and their income levels. Many other parameters could be included as

well. None of this is done here, because it suffices to look at climate forecast maps to realize that the different contexts will wreak havoc with the rankings. But climate forecasts come with notorious uncertainties, making choosing one individual map scientifically meaningless and choosing a synthesis map too unclear for our illustrative purposes. It then suffices to exemplify with current rainfall, Map 2, and the vegetation zones of Africa, Map 3, to get an idea of how general applicability might be limited.



Map 2. Average annual rainfall in Africa 2003–2007
 Note that the borders of South Sudan are not included in map
 Source: UNEP 2010 (borders of respondents' countries by author)



Map 3. Vegetation zones of Africa
 Note that the borders of South Sudan are not included in map
 Source: UNEP 2010 (borders of respondents' countries by author)

6. Concluding remarks

Pertaining to the thesis's first part, the case for the proposed climate aid is deemed to be strong enough for it to be both justified and plausible. Justifying factors are mainly those indirectly connected to climate change that likely will make land grabbing worse, driven primarily by the rise of the agrofuel industry. These factors are believed to be of larger importance than the negative effects on agriculture both in land-grabbing countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa; the messages seem to be strengthen the case but they are too mixed to be certain. There are many arguments speaking for the proposed climate aid's plausibility, foremost among them the geopolitical aspects (the aid will most likely be given bi- or multilaterally rather than under the auspices of the UN) and the cold fact that the small-scale farmers are so vulnerable to climate change that development without this kind of aid will be highly difficult to accomplish and will come with bad implications for the world as a whole. Hopefully, moral convictions can also add momentum. Of the arguments speaking against the proposed climate aid's chances to be realized, the most important are the current lack of climate aid funding and the traditional unwillingness of donors to prioritize development led by small-scale farmers.

The second part of the thesis is something of a failure, because of the capsized methodology and the lack of enough respondents to do an honest attempt to make up for this. In short, for having the proposed climate aid incentivize governments to implement programs beneficial for small-scale farmers, the highest ranked priorities are drought- and flood-resistant crops, disaster preparedness, land reform and regulations. For having the proposed climate aid support local-scale projects, the top-ranked priorities would be empowerment projects and drought and flood protection. The suggestive evidence also almost strikes a balance when it comes to if the proposed climate aid should promote subsistence farming or cash-crop farming, while it seems to be in favor of low-technology agriculture over high-technology agriculture, and even more in favour of polyculture farming over monoculture farming. However, under no circumstances can these results be taken at face value or be trusted as more than hints at what further research may uncover (not even the seemingly apparent drought- and flood-adaptation). Extra caution applies to the questions in the spider charts, where the only aspect remotely close to being considered worthy of exhibition is that, as expected, small-scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa, represented at least to some degree by the respondents, do not want genetically engineered crops. The same goes for chemical fertilizers and chemical pesticides.

Even if the second part came out wanting, it can be of some value through showing how much factors integral to a methodology but largely beyond the researcher's control (compounded by a big measure of naivety and over-ambition in the methodology) can decrease the possibilities to analyse generated data. For what it is, the thesis is positioned well to be part of the start of an important area of scrutiny and action. In laying out the case for the proposed climate aid it contributes to framing the issue of land grabbing in a new and, I believe, useful way. Also, the thesis consistently points the way to further research, which for example could:

- remake and refine the study but with the whole methodology and more respondents
- look at the number of priorities to be focused on for various budgets
- examine the priority suggestions individually rather than as a package, disregarding synergy effects
- do a more thorough economic and political study of whether the proposed aid is a good idea or not, including a specifically designed methodology
- Investigate which of the two aid disbursement scenarios that would fit the proposed climate aid best
- Try to find out how to best make use of the overlap with regular foreign aid and regular climate aid

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APPENDIX 1 Questionnaire (including my own subjective priorities)

Introduction

It can be argued that climate change will make land grabbing – large purchases or leases of agricultural land by private companies or foreign or domestic governments – more common because of biofuel cultivation and decreasing agricultural productivity in countries that can afford to make land acquisitions. Some commentators consider land grabbing to be beneficial for the host country as much-needed agricultural investment. Others see the risk of local communities and small-scale farmers not being considered in the deals and therefore becoming doubly adversely affected by climate change when they also face growing incentives to sell land with declining productivity. Forced displacement of people when land rights are not codified or respected is another often-seen consequence of land grabbing.

This questionnaire is part of an undergraduate-level thesis aiming to identify what priorities relevant non-governmental organizations would like climate adaptation aid to have if it is to be used to prevent land grabbing negatively affecting small-scale farmers. The portion of climate aid that would go to this issue is unspecified in the thesis but the need for adaptation aid is considered to be large. *The voices of NGOs are wanted because they are, in the scope of this thesis, considered as representatives for the climate-vulnerable small-scale farmers.* Therefore, your participation would be much appreciated. The data will not be used for advanced statistical analysis. The aim is to identify preliminary priorities, which can then be zoomed in upon for further qualitative analysis.

Name: _____ NGO/CSO affiliation: _____
 Optional. Will not be published. Your organization. Optional. Will not be published.


Nationality: _____ E-mail address: _____
 And/or country of NGO/CSO work. Optional. Optional. For distribution of the final study

Do you think land grabbing will become more common as a result of climate change?


Please indicate to which degree you think this will be the case.

- No Probably not Conceivably Yes, probably Yes, definitely


What should be the PRIORITIES that climate aid donors push for in terms of programs favorable for small-scale farmers in the light of potential land grabbing? Please indicate how important the aspects are in relation to each other by drawing lines as in the example to the right.



What should be the PRIORITIES for climate aid donors' local-scale projects with the aim of benefitting small-scale farmers in the light of potential land grabbing?



Which farming practices and food security strategies should be promoted by aid agencies, do you think? Please indicate, anywhere on the respective lines, what your preferred balance is.



The above "pushes" and promotions should be realized in practice through...

- ...conditions that must be required by the recipient government for the aid to be given
- ...establishing research facilities (in the country receiving the aid) that look into these issues
- ...donors supporting NGOs and opinion makers striving to influence government policy

What is missing?

Please comment if you consider something important to be missing in this questionnaire. Also feel free to clarify something if needed or to suggest people or organizations you think might be good for me to talk to.

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING!


Follow-up interview

When all questionnaires have been analyzed and COP 18 is over I might like to conduct short follow-up interviews over e-mail or Skype. Would you consider taking part?

- Yes, I would consider taking part
- No, I would rather not take part

APPENDIX 2 Follow-up interview 12 questions, approximately 20 minutes

Here are the results from the first spider chart (your own priorities setting and the average one from all 12 respondents). 4 related questions follow below.



Question 1

Note in the average how the different priorities have been the average spider chart are relatively evenly spread. This makes it hard to choose the number of priorities. Regarding political (donor-side and recipient-side) and economic realities (donor-side), how many priorities would be your suggestion and why?

Answer:

Question 2

Your own priorities setting differs somewhat from the average one. Are there any results in the average spider chart that you object to especially much? Please indicate if your objection is general or due to your specific geographical or sociopolitical context (and if so please specify in what way).

Answer:

Question 3

Having seen the average spider chart and chosen the number of priorities, would you rank these priorities in

- the same way as in the average spider chart,
- in the same way as you ranked them originally (if you gave suggestions the same rank, please try to rank these as well),
- or in some other way (if so, please elaborate)?


Answer:

Question 4

Of your now chosen priorities for climate finance programs if aimed at benefitting small-scale farmers facing potential land grabbing due to climate change, are there any aspects that are more important than others, that are missing, or that should be left out?

Answer:

Here are the results from the second spider chart (your own priorities setting and the average). 4 related questions follow below.



Question 5

Note how the proposals in the average spider chart are relatively evenly spread, apart from genetically engineered crops and chemical fertilizers and pesticides, which we therefore discard. However, it is still hard to choose the number of priorities. Regarding political (donor-side and recipient-side) and economic realities (donor-side), how many priorities would be your suggestion and why?

Answer:

Question 6

Your own priorities setting differs somewhat from the average one. Are there any results in the average spider chart that you object to especially much? Please indicate if your objection is general or due to your specific geographical or sociopolitical context (and if so please specify in what way).

Answer:

Question 7

Having seen the average spider chart and chosen the number of priorities, would you rank these priorities in

- the same way as in the average spider chart,
- in the same way as you ranked them originally (if you gave suggestions the same rank, please try to rank these as well),
- or in some other way (if so, please elaborate)?


Answer:

Question 8

Of your now chosen priorities for climate finance if some of it was to go to local-scale projects for small-scale farmers facing potential land grabbing due to climate change, are there any aspects that are more important than others, that are missing, or that should be left out?

Answer:

Here are the results from the scales (your own choices and the average choices). 3 related questions follow below.



Question 9

Your own choices differ somewhat from the average ones. Is there any average choice that you object to especially much? Please indicate if your objection is general or due to your specific geographical or sociopolitical context (and if so please specify in what way).

Answer:

Question 10

Is there anything that you would like to nuance about the three choices on how climate finance should be prioritized if some of it would promote overriding farming practices and food security strategies for small-scale farmers facing potential land grabbing due to climate change?

Answer:

Question 11

How would you rank the importance of the three choices if you had to?

Answer:

Question 12

Is there anything else you would like to share regarding my research? It could be anything and criticism is highly welcomed.

Answer:

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING
AND SORRY FOR TAKING UP SO MUCH OF YOUR TIME**

APPENDIX 3. Interview guide Half-structured, half semi-structured

Interviews will be audio recorded unless interviewee wishes them not to be.
Estimated time requirement: 30 minutes.

INTRODUCTION (can be broadened or narrowed depending on situation):

It can be argued that climate change will make land grabbing – large purchases or leases of agricultural land by private companies or foreign or domestic governments – more common because of increased biofuel production and decreased agricultural productivity in countries who can afford to make land acquisitions. Some commentators consider land grabbing to be beneficial for the host country as much-needed agricultural investment. Others see the risk of local communities and small-scale farmers not being considered in the deals and therefore becoming doubly adversely affected by climate change when they also face growing incentives to sell land with declining productivity. Forced displacement of people when land rights are not codified or respected is another often-seen consequence of land grabbing.

This interview is part of an undergraduate-level thesis aiming to identify what priorities relevant non-governmental organizations would like climate adaptation aid to have *if* it is to be used to prevent land grabbing that negatively affects small-scale farmers (this is a controversial issue but seeing as how climate change is ever looking worse, I argue that climate adaptation aid should both be enlarged and that it should take land-grabbing issues into consideration). The portion of climate aid that would go to this issue is unspecified in the thesis. *The voices of NGOs are wanted because they are, in the scope of this thesis, considered as representatives for the climate-vulnerable small-scale farmers.* The aim of this interview is to be a part of a group of interviews and a questionnaire survey that together will identify preliminary priorities, which will then be zoomed in upon for further qualitative analysis.

TECHNICALITIES:

1. Do you wish to remain anonymous or may I publish your name, and possibly some professional details about you, together with possible quotes and with the interview appendix (all interview transcripts will not be appended to the thesis)? This would lend the thesis extra credibility.
2. If agreeable, would you please share the name of your organization?
3. On what topics does your organization work? Are land grabbing issues something you give a lot of attention?

WARM UP:

1. Do you think land grabbing will become more common as a result of climate change?
2. If so, do you believe this to be a large threat to climate-vulnerable people, in relation to other climate threats, or can it be properly managed so as to be of net gain to small-scale farmers?

TURNING TO CLIMATE AID AND LAND GRABBING :

– Giving climate adaptation aid in order to prevent land grabbing from small-scale farmers, or at least to prevent its worst consequences for small-scale farmers, is poised to be a controversial issue. Seeing as how powerhouses such as China, Saudi Arabia, and multinational companies have a lot at stake, talks about using climate finance to impede land deals will probably be welcomed with anxiety and strong blowback. The Green Climate Fund therefore will hardly become the chosen platform for this kind of climate aid. Perhaps national donors could do important work of this kind on their own, however. Would all of this be an accurate statement, in your opinion?

– Which goal do you think would be most fruitful to pursue for climate adaptation aid: the altogether prevention of land grabbing from small-scale farmers or the prevention of the worst consequences of such land grabs for the farmers?

– My thesis is looking mainly on land grabbing directly from small-scale farmers and not as much on deals on uncultivated land (which often is not entirely unused). In the latter case, fighting corruption in government and promoting good governance might be slightly more important for climate adaptation aid to address than in the former case, while the opposite relationship rings true for local-scale adaptation measures and work to ensure that small-scale farmers and local communities are consulted in the processes leading up to land deals; these take on a bigger importance when land already being cultivated by small-scale farmers is grabbed. I have not said anything about any approach being more important than another – but will you? Can we say something general about which approach is more important?

– An international code of conduct, or a set of guidelines, ensuring the rights of small-scale farmers and that they will benefit from land deals through *adequate* compensation or by enjoying new job opportunities would be a welcome first step. The G8 has adopted guidelines for international land investments, but it has been criticized for being too weak and for not consulting recipient countries when they were set up, and in the UN's Committee on World Food Security, governance of land tenure has been subjected to guidelines (mainly for governments) with a rights-based approach, including a gender focus. The guidelines have been endorsed by over 100 of the Committee's member countries. This is a significant development, but since compliance is voluntary, it is hampered. Free, prior, and informed consent of non-indigenous poor communities is also not required. Codes of conduct and guidelines largely fall outside of climate adaptation aid as we usually picture it, but do you think such finance could go towards helping small-scale farmers lobby for their sake and put pressure on their governments – and other actors on the international arena – to put more consideration into their plights? Or is such an approach doomed?

WALKTHROUGH OF QUESTIONNAIRE:

Everything in the questionnaire, except the first question, is discussed in an open fashion together with the interviewee, who gives his or her view on the topics at hand. The same order of the spider charts, the striking of preferred balances between the farming practice dichotomies, and the question on practical realization, will be attempted but cannot be guaranteed for obvious reasons. In addition to providing insights and identifying priorities, the aim for the walkthrough is to both provide a visual help for structuring of thought and inspiration, and to make interviews a bit more compatible with the questionnaire respondents' answers. At the same time, free thought is valuable for the thesis and seeing as how the interviewee already is committed to the interview and hence will not be as deterred by an open question prior to receiving named visual help, he or she will be asked the below question before the walkthrough begins.

If we suppose climate adaptation aid will be disbursed to address issues of land grabbing implications on small-scale farmers in developing countries, which three or four top priorities would you set for it?

ROUND OFF:

1. When all interviews and questionnaires have been analyzed and COP 18 is over I might like to conduct short follow-up interviews over e-mail or Skype. Would you consider taking part?
2. If yes, or if you would like to have the final thesis sent to you: what is your e-mail address?

Thank you very much for participating!