

“Babies as Bombs”

A Discursive Study of Israeli Population Policies

Sussie Egnell
Anne Gotfredsen

“The day is not far off when Netanyahu and his followers will set up roadblocks at the entrance to Arab villages to tie Arab women’s tubes and spray them with anti-spermicide.

*Ahmed Tyby ; Hadash Party; commenting on speech of Netanyahu.
(Alon & Benn, 2003)*

Abstract

Demography and security are two categories inextricably linked to each other in Israel. The fear of losing the Jewish majority has implications for the population politics, migration policies and above all, it affects the relationship with Palestine and the Arab minority within Israel's borders. With the help of discourse analysis and a theoretical tool the aim is to frame intersecting oppressions of gender and race. Demography with its associated practices can be used as a disciplinary tool to stratify its citizens. By studying political policy documents from the 1970s until today, this thesis examines discursive changes and similarities in the material, mainly concerning the Arab Israelis. The material deals mainly with issues of security and demography.

The overall picture is that the dominant racialized stereotypes have not changed in any fundamental way; the Arab minority is still perceived as a demographical and economical problem. We have found that women are only mentioned together with reproduction and unemployment. Women are the main target for a colonial modernization discourse, connecting essentialized ideas of "Arab culture" with high birth rates and poverty.

Key words: demography, Israel/Palestine, gender, race, biopower.

Words: 14974

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Aim and Query.....	3
1.2 Contextual Background.....	4
1.3 Earlier Research.....	5
2. Methodological Considerations	7
2.1 Discourse as Concept.....	7
2.2 Discourse Analysis - a Critical Journey.....	8
2.3 Framing the Discourse – some positional considerations.....	10
2.4 Material.....	11
3. Theoretical Framework	14
3.1 The State and the Community.....	15
3.2 The State and Statistics.....	16
3.3 Modernity and the Body.....	18
3.4 Demography, Gender and Race.....	19
3.5 Controlling Images.....	21
4. Analysis	23
4.1 The Koenig Memorandum.....	23
4.2 The Herzliya Series.....	29
5. From Koenig to Herzliya – similarities and differences	35
6. Controlling Images – Controlled Bodies; making the connections	36
6.1 Concluding Comments.....	41
6.2 Further Research.....	42
7. References	46

1. Introduction

We started this long and winding road with an article last spring in 2012. The title was “Save the Jews: don't have an abortion” (Rothschild, 2011). The reporter examined the anti-abortion movement in Israel, with focus on the two biggest organizations, Efrat and Be’ad Chaim, both based in Jerusalem. The title of the article was pregnant. We started looking into the arguments of these anti-abortionists and a new world opened up for us, filled with articles, opinions and books on the issue of Jewish and Arab birth-rates. The terms “demographic threat” and “Israel” on a preferred search engine generate an endless amount of more or less substantial information on the issue. The webpage of Efrat contains various arguments against abortion, most of them religious, but one section is devoted especially to “The critical demographic factor” (2005), where they argue that the Jewish State is under a “demographic threat” due to much higher Arab (Israeli) birth-rates. They then go on by stating that “Israel has lost more than one and a half million Jewish children to abortion since 1948” (Ibid.).

The discourse was not completely new to us, also in Europe it is not unusual to hear politicians talking about the numbers of babies that “Arabs” get. But it made us curious that there was in Israel, a country that since its creation has been involved in many external conflicts, a notion that the threat might actually be coming from the inside, from its own citizens, from babies. We wanted to know more. During our further reading, we slowly realized the importance of demography in the region, and its historical roots. At the same time, the feeling that women (and their bodies) were being used in a game of high politics, and not necessarily religion, grew stronger (many gender scholars have written about the relationship between gender and nation. See for example Cynthia Enloe 2007, Maria Stern 2001 and Caroline Moser 2001). We find the demographic argument of Efrat outrageous, because of the fact that it puts an enormous burden on the individual female, as if she has a duty towards the state to bear children no matter what. Luckily it seems like they are an exception. Abortion is legal in Israel only after the approval of a special committee, which consists of a social worker, a religious authority and a physician (Sperling, 2010, p. 369). In practice however,

the absolute majority of the applications are approved¹, and no real political debate exists to change that practice. Demography though, is severely discussed and plays a major role for both Israel and Palestine in the process of state-building. And demography is in the end about real people.

With this study we want to examine the ideologies behind the term “demographic threat” and how it is connected to the Israel’s identity project, and also how the colonial heritage effects the position of the Arab minority in Israel. This thesis is not about statistics, nor about actual demography. It is about the discursive role of state institutions and its function of organizing human life into categories. It is also about how demography became a vital national interest.

¹19,311 out of 19,575 applications were approved in 2010 according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/cw_usr_view_SHTML?ID=595 [2013-01-12]).

1.1 Aim and Query

The aim of this research is to show how racial and gendered images are discursively produced and reproduced in an Israeli political context. From an intersectional and postcolonial understanding of gender and ethnicity we want to examine how the Israeli Arab, as a member of a minority group, is constructed in political policy material concerning the matter of demography and national security. Our main queries for our study are;

- What kind of racial and gendered images are discursively constructed in our material?
- What discursive similarities and differences can be found, and what does this tell us about changes in Israeli society?
- How do these images correlate with the construction of a univocal national subject in our specific context?

1.2 Contextual Background

Israel was declared an independent Jewish state in 1948. The Declaration of Independence was then followed by the Israeli Law of Return which gives every Jew a right to Israeli citizenship, no matter where they are from (Yuval-Davis, 1987, pp. 61-62). The idea of Israel as a state for the Jewish people is a Zionist idea that developed in the second half of the nineteenth century in central Europe. Shlomo Sand describes it as a “part of the last wave of nationalist awakening in Europe” (2010, p. 252). Interesting enough, at the same time there were also a leftist Jewish movement who demanded cultural autonomy for the “people of Yiddishland” rather than a single independent state for all the Jews in the world (Ibid, p. 255). But in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Great Britain finally supported the Zionists idea of a homeland for the Jewish people in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine and opened up for European Jewish immigration (Fargues, 2000, p. 444). Today, after two wars and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza the borders of Israel together with the country’s demographic character have dramatically changed. A large part of the Palestinians has fled the country during the years, and nowadays the Arab minority (with citizenship) is currently about twenty percent of the total population in Israel.

The idea of a Jewish democratic state requires a constant Jewish majority within its borders. To uphold the majority there are two main conditions: control over reproduction and control over migration. It also requires control of the population “on the ground”; all Israeli citizens have both ethnicity and religion in their ID-cards. Israel has a pro-natal policy in many aspects, but so far immigration of Jews, Arab emigration during the 1948 war and refusal to completely annex the West Bank and Gaza has upheld the Jewish majority (Orenstien, 2004, p. 43). Israel's pro-natal approach has several historical origins, Zionism being only one of them², Judaism is another. With a long history of persecution and with the

² The first Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was a big fan of Jewish motherhood and called it a “unique destiny” (Abdo, 2011, p. 33). In 1949 he also founded a “Heroine reward” for every mother who delivered their tenth child. This was abolished after a few years when it became clear that the award-winners were mostly Arab women (Sperling, 2010, p. 365).

unimaginable genocide that followed with it, demography has shaped Israel's Jewish identity (Yuval-Davis, 1987, p. 83).

Our material is political policy documents written by the state or state-like institutions with focus on the Arab minority and internal/external threat to Israel. Our intention was to compare those with a report that came out in 1965 in the U.S. called the Moynihan Report (1965). It was written by an U.S. official at the Department of Labor, Patrick Moynihan, who wrote a seventy pages long sociological study on what he called "the Negro Family" and its dysfunctional structure. Also in this case, there was a claim that a poor minority with too high birth-rates posed a demographical "problem". Because of space and some methodological problems we decided not to compare them, but we found some of the theoretical tools from the Black feminist Patricia Hill Collins (2002) very useful. She has written about the Moynihan report and US White family politics, and even though our political and regional context is different, some aspects are similar.

1.3 Earlier Research

Our field of research that we position ourselves within has produced a severe amount of literature, spanning from minority rights, reproductive rights, nationalism, motherhood to violence against women and more. Another modern field of interest, though not relevant to our thesis as such but much discussed within the Israeli society, is the tradition of IVF-treatment³. Authors like for example Larissa Remennick (2000) and Daniel Sperling (2010) view the high numbers of IVF-treatments in Israel, and the subsidies given to people up to a late age, interconnected with the Israeli states tradition of pro-natal policies. So how is this relevant to us?

³IVF is short for "in vitro fertilization", a process where an egg is fertilized by sperm outside of the body. The per capita ratio of treatments in Israel is among the highest in the world (Remennick, 2000, p. 823).

When reading about the demographic question within an Israeli context, discussions about reproduction and (mostly) the female body come up. Although both Remennick and Sperling write about a subject that can seem quite narrow, the political and social context surrounding the practice of IVF is interesting to us, and it is directly linked to the “the demographic problem” discussed earlier.

Remennick describes it as follows:

The unique constellation of Jewish religious tradition, demographic competition with the Arab neighbors, fear of child loss in the military conflict, and children-centered everyday culture have sustained relatively high fertility level among Israeli Jews (2000, p. 822).

The politics of reproduction is in this sense important to our own research because it is connected to demographic concerns and a fear that the minority of the Israeli Arabs could at one historical point outnumber the Jewish majority. As the author above concludes this has an effect on governmental policies towards its citizens and can be perceived as an “invasion” of the private realm (Remennick, 2000, p. 837). Our chosen feminist theories on reproduction and population control will be elaborated in the theory section. Sperling similarly argues that:

Israeli women accept this order of priorities in which security, nationalism, and demographic superiority over enemies outweigh women’s issues, and they adhere to policy constraining their own choices and preferences (2010, p. 364).

Remennick’s research is interview based, using Goffman’s stigma framework, and she is mainly focusing on Jewish women. Sperling’s interest is in reproductive law and ethics in the Israeli society. With our thesis we want to capture the connections between state practices, demography, the national subject, race and gender, drawing upon authors like the ones above, but with a different theoretical framework. While we focus on the notion how the *idea* of demography shapes state practices, many of the studies above are anthropological or historical.

We would also like to mention two contemporary Palestinian scholars that have influenced our work and thinking; Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh with *Birthing the Nation* (2002): *Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel* and Nadera Shalhoub-

Kevorkian with *Militarization and Violence against Women in Conflict Zones in the Middle East* (2009). Kanaaneh was one of the first authors we read, and even though it is more descriptive, framing the narratives of Palestinian women living in Israel. Her analysis of women's resistance while navigating through different discourses of gender and race is constructive. Shalhoub-Kevorkian on the other hand focuses on male violence against women in the Palestinian society. She identifies patriarchal structures within the society and its historical roots. Her work is interesting because it frames patriarchal notions as well as how these interrelate with the forces of occupation and how that strengthens power structures of gender. Our theses draw ideas from both of these authors, but our material differs from theirs. They draw upon narratives and interviews' while our material consists of policy material.

2. Methodological Considerations

2.1 Discourse as Concept

The concept of discourse is widely used in social sciences, and has a variety of meanings and orientations. Basically, it is a notion that our language is structured in patterns. Those patterns only have a meaning when they are put in relation to each other and in a certain context. We affiliate ourselves to the social constructivist approach that there is no objective truth. Michel Foucault states that truth is a discursive construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13). From this definition we can understand how language and discourse are related to power and different power structures. What is and can be said or written by whom in what context, limit our way in thinking and acting. However, text and discourse is not the same thing, and text is not power in itself but may reflect, reproduce or question power (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, pp. 306).

Language constructs patterns of social relations but also reconstructs them and in that sense it has a *constitutive* meaning. Brian Paltridge points out “...the ways in which what we say as we speak contributes to the construction of certain views of the world, of people and, in turn, ourselves” (Paltridge, 2005, p. 1). In between construction and reconstruction lies agency and through our way of using language in different situations we have a possibility to change our way in understanding the world and how the world make sense to us (Bergquist, Lövheim, Sveningsson, 2003, p. 121). Agency is also one well debated subject in discourse analysis, a discussion which concerns the question of how and to which extent language is a constitutive force and whether agency is accessible and to who in a given context. Our material, like all texts spoken or written, make their meanings against the background of other texts and things that have been said on other occasions. All texts are therefore in an *intertextual* relationship with other texts (Paltridge, 2005, p 13).

To study the relation between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains, we have decided to apply a critical understanding of discourse analysis. There were mainly two reasons for this decision; first of all critical discourse analysis does not understand itself as politically neutral, which will be discussed further on and secondly, because discourse functions ideologically. Critical discourse analysis claim that discursive practices contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups, for example between social classes, ethnic minorities and the majority and between sexes. These effects are understood as *ideological* effects (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 63).

2.2 Discourse Analysis – a Critical Journey

Discourse and ideology are crucial concepts in our study. We’ve decided to use Norman Fairclough’s definition of ideology as constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 63). Our focus for the thesis is governmental policy papers. Since the documents are more or less outspoken in

their ideological foundations our main focus is to apply a critical discourse analysis. Through this we aim to frame the sometimes less outspoken power relations between actors positioned in the documents, or in other words to “reveal” the “true face” of the ideological foundations.

When searching for ways and means to help us with this challenge we stumbled over Norman Fairclough’s discursive tools; *transitivity* and *nominalization*. Transitivity focuses on the events and processes that are connected (or not connected) with subjects and objects. In other words, which groups or individuals are phrased as active or passive agents? How are they described and how are they positioned? Are they subjects or objects? And what kind of characteristics are they ascribed with? Furthermore, Fairclough describes nominalization as another linguistic feature that reduces agency and hides the active agent. This can have the effect that the text signals “truth” and “common sense” with the causality and responsibility left unexplained. (Fairclough, 2001, pp. 103-105) These tools can become useful for us when analyzing our texts because we wish to examine what kind of discursive practice and knowledge are produced, and how these are used to maintain power structures and also potentially change them. Finally, to what extent ideological discourse becomes naturalized depends on the power of the social groupings whose ideologies and whose discourse are at the issue. In other words, what comes to be “common sense” is thus in large measure determined by who exercises power and domination in a society or an institution (Fairclough, 2001, p. 76).

When trying to outline our methodological considerations and especially when discussing the discourse analysis we find it hard to separate the methodological discussion from the theoretical. But as Jørgensen and Phillips stress; discourse analysis is not only a method for data analysis but rather a theoretical and methodological whole, a “complete package”. Researches must accept that theory and method are intertwined (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4). One example of this is our theoretical tool “Controlling Images” which we will use to identify discursively constructed images of the Israeli Arabs in our material. (The discussion about controlling images will be further elaborated in the theoretical

chapter). When analyzing our texts this theoretical tool will also function as a methodological tool, helping us to frame discursively constructed images.

2.3 Framing the Discourse - some positional considerations

Bergström & Boréus distinguishes five basic elements to consider when interpreting a specific text: the text, the social context in which the text has been produced, the sender, the recipient and finally the interpreter (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, p. 24). We have discussed the social context in our background section, and will further develop these elements in the coming material chapter, but we would like to take the opportunity to say something about the interpreter. As interpreters of the text we have to be clear on our own positioning. Our own assumptions in the matter influence our understanding of the text and the context in which it was written; just as we as well are historical and social subjects.

Even though discourse is defined and applied differently depending on the theme and among disciplines, discourses are often used in a sort of undefined, blurred sense, where both the author and the object can seem invisible when a text is in focus. Our standpoint is emancipatory and our critical discourse approach “aims to uncover the role of discursive practice the maintenance of an unequal power relations” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 64). Our choice of theories reflects in many ways our positioning and the general assumptions underlying our thesis.

Unavoidable, our analysis will be influenced of our contextual and intertextual understanding of the issue. Even if we possess contextual knowledge, it doesn't necessarily improve the study. Even though context knowledge is vital for a constructive interpretation, it does not decide the notions, ideas or ideologies in a text, but should rather be seen as assistance to set the frames for reasonable interpretations (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, p. 27). We argue that there is a risk that ambivalent notions, or contradicting ideas “gets lost” in the surrounding

social and political context, as if that is the material and not the actual text.

We want to clarify our position in relation to some critical issues. We both have an interest in the region and in the Israeli/Palestinian “conflict”. We have been engaged in solidarity work in the West Bank, travelled both in Israel and in Palestine. The small bits and pieces of contextual knowledge that we received during that time and the occupational violence that we experienced will of course influence our work in ways that are hard to foresee. But we are also of that opinion that the Palestinians living on the West Bank and the Palestinian minority in Israel with Israeli citizenship live under different conditions, they have a different modern history even though it is interconnected in many ways. They have different rights and obligations to the state of Israel, which shape their relation to the state and their political and social position. With that said, for the sake of the people we are talking about in this thesis, we want to comment on the question of *definitions*. We are aware that many Israeli Arabs identify themselves as Palestinians, even though they are Israeli citizens. This is not necessarily a contradiction. There are many words for this minority like Israeli Arabs, Palestinians, Israeli Palestinians, Palestinian Arabs etc., and this is for many a highly political question. We don’t want to impose any identity, but since our material refers only to the group as Israeli Arab and we have many quotes, we will also use this word, knowing that it is a discursive practice in itself.

For the purpose of this thesis, we take the idealist assumption that ideas and notions precede social actions and power relations and by analyzing our material we want to make underlying ideas about race and gender visible. Our aim is to try and not reproduce power relations that underlie identity categories and definitions, but rather to challenge them.

2.4 Material

Our research material consists of Israeli policy documents and reports, more specific the Koenig Memorandum and documents from the Herzliya conference.

When it comes to questions about security and demography in Israel and Palestine, there is plenty of material to choose from. These subjects have concerned the politicians, academics, media and the public for a long time. The Koenig Memorandum (Koenig 1976) is an 11 pages long (in)famous report which is frequently referred to as a major turning point in the relationship between the Israeli state and the Palestinian minority (Sa'di, 2003, p. 51). It was written by Yisral Koenig, then a Northern District Commissioner of the Ministry of the Interior in Israel, who in this confidential report presented several strategic goals and tactics aimed at reducing the influence and population of the Arabs in Israel. This report was leaked to the Israeli newspaper Al-Hamishmar and published on 7th of September 1976 (Ibid. p. 53).

Furthermore, to include more recent material on the subject we have chosen to examine the official documents from the Herzliya Conferences, an annual security conference hosted by the IPS, Institute for Policy and Strategy, in the Israeli city of Herzliya. Almost all of Israel's most important Jewish political and military leaders, as well as some of Israel's intellectual leaders together with international guests, assemble to produce ideas and policies that could help Israel become stronger and more secure⁴. Demography, being a question of security in Israel, is continuously one of the main issues. Steven Rousso-Schindler writes: "The continuing demographic problem was one of the reasons that led people in different sectors of the Israeli elite to convene the Herzliya Conference in 2000" (N/A, p. 12). This is how Herzliya present themselves:

The Herzliya Conference is a center stage for policy assessment and analysis on Israeli and Middle Eastern and global affairs, and a catalyst for policy implementation. The cumulative product of the Herzliya Conference Series – the proceedings, reports, and policy recommendations – frames national discourse and policy debates and provides timely input into policy-making in Israel and abroad, at times with direct involvement of the senior team of the Conference (Herzliya 2009, p.4)

⁴Some of the participants and main speaker over the years have been Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Olmert, Shimon Peres and Ariel Sharon. Some of the international participants are Nicolas Sarkozy, Jimmy Carter, Condoleezza Rice, José María Aznar, Carl Bildt, Li Zhaoxing, Franco Frattini, Salam Fayyad and Anders Fogh Rasmussen (IPS Herzliya, 2011).

Many have stressed the importance of these conferences on the national policymaking, debate and discourse in Israel (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 5) and therefore we find these documents crucial for our study. The documents, called the Herzliya Series, consist of conference conclusions and executive summaries written by the IPS, and signed by the chairman of that year. We have included documents from nine conferences from the first in 2000 and until 2009 in our study. The 2005 document together with the three last documents, 2010, 2011 and 2012, haven't been published by IPS, and are therefore left out. The Herzliya Series is easy accessed for everyone (they are all translated into English) and each document consists of 60 to 80 pages.

Our material is comparable but not equal, which might have implications when analyzing them. The Koenig Memorandum was written in the framework of defining problems and proposing solutions by one Israeli department, the Ministry of Interior. As far as we know, it was never meant to be published and therefore we must assume that little has been left out in terms of "what the public shouldn't know". The intention was not debate, but action. The Herzliya documents on the other hand are reports from a public security conference with invited international and national speakers. Writing a summary means that certain part of the material is excluded, and when the Herzliya documents were composed, most certainly material from the conference was left out. The consequence for us as a reader is that the IPS decides what texts we are allowed to have access to.

Many official documents in Israel are of course written in Hebrew. As neither one of us understand the language, our selection of material was unfortunately narrowed down. The language was also an issue when we in the beginning of our research considered interviewing women from Israel and Palestine about their thoughts on family planning, motherhood and citizenship. If we were to manage without an interpreter, we feared that our result would be based on information from the English speaking women only, which in this particularly study could give an unfair picture. But due to the pages and time we had to our disposition in

this thesis we had to limit ourselves, and we therefore chose to focus on the above mentioned sources.

In the end, our chosen material turned out to be quite substantial. Therefore when reading the documents we focused on subjects relevant for our study, mainly demography. Further, as we mentioned before the interpreter has a crucial role when working with texts and discourse analysis. This thesis has two authors, two subjects with possible different understandings of the text and different assumptions. For that reason, we found it crucial that we both read the material individually and afterwards discussed our thoughts and opinions together.

3. Theoretical Framework

In this section we will frame our theoretical understanding underlying our analysis. It aims to clarify our own assumptions on matters and connections relevant to our thesis, such as theories on the nation-state and its link to demographical concerns, gender and race. Our starting point will be Benedict Anderson's (2006) concept of the state as an “imagined community”, moving on to discussing the role of demography as a state institution with the power to stratify and categorize populations, both historically and in relation to our subject. We apply a Foucauldian perspective on control and discipline applied within the state structure; the theoretical approach of “biopower”. This kind of exercise of power is related to many aspects of population control including different forms of body control such as policies of birth control (positive or negative). This part of the theory section aims to frame the control of the body within a national context, through processes of genderfication and racification. Our last section is devoted to Hill-Collins (2002) work on “Controlling Images”, a theoretical and methodological tool that we will use when analyzing our material.

3.1 The State and the Community

“A Nation...is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors.” - Karl Deutsch (in Sand, 2010, p. 1)

The aim of this chapter is to frame the concept of “community” within an Israeli/Palestinian context. When we discuss the state in general, and the Israeli state in particular we want to position that nation-state in a certain time and context. The nation-state is not an ahistorical entity and as Benedict Anderson writes, it is an “imagined political community”. It is a modern political and communal structure, imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members...yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). A community, a nation-state, is not more or less, false or true, there simply is no origin. What distinguishes nations is not *that* they are imagined but *how* they are imagined (Ibid.). As mentioned above, there are many different communities within a nation and people may have several ways of identifying themselves, but according to Anderson, what keeps it legitimate in the eyes of its members is a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Ibid, p. 7).

This is not to say that all the members of a state has equal emotional connection to a state, or that they feel as a part of the state on equal grounds as any other group. This is especially interesting in the case of Israel, not because it is unique in any sense, but because we argue that Israel is in the process of becoming a state, (in our view, this is a process that never ends though. Nation-states constantly re-define and re-event) at least in its relations to Palestine. Israel is a sovereign state but has no fixed borders, and the question of who belongs to the state under what conditions is still an open one. Israel, as a rather “new” state with a very diverse population, is in the process of writing its own narrative in constant negotiation with its many minorities, positioning them within a framework of different national identities. Balibar puts this formation into words: “No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them, are

ethnicized – that is, represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural community” (1990, p. 349). Further, Ania Loomba argues that nations are special communities created not only to shape certain relationships but also to construct and remember certain versions of the past or more importantly; to forget certain historical narratives (2005, p. 221). We would argue that this “struggle” over history is an important part of the political and social context of Israel and its minorities today⁵. The production of a historical narrative is deeply embedded in power structures and relations of dominance. From a postcolonial perspective we view dominance not only as an economic one, as important are the production of culture, language and history (de Los Reyes & Mulinari, 2005, p. 66).

3.2 The State and Statistics

Shlomo Sand describes the national identity as “a modern lens through which the state makes sense of a diverse population” (2010, p. 41). The body of authority needs disciplinary tools to stratify its citizen, something that a field of scholars refers to as “biopower”. One scholar that devoted several texts and talks about the body and discipline is Michel Foucault. Foucault described statistics and demography as the “science of the state”, facts generated in order to “identify problems specific to the population” (Rouso-Schindler, N/A, p. 3). It can be seen as an exercise of power in order to survey and/or control a population as a whole, or parts of it. Theories of biopower argue that the modern state needs an institution of national statistics in order to create “the Citizen”, and statisticians need the authority of the state in order to practice its profession (Leibler, 2004, p. 125).

Foucault argues that since the nineteenth century and onwards, much of the regulations imposed by authorities were (and are) directed at populations and bodies in both a practical and metaphorical sense (Mills, 2012, p 83). They are

⁵One significant example is the attempt of the Israeli Ministry of Education to remove all references to “the Nakba” (“the Catastrophe”, referring to the war of 1948) from Arabic textbooks (Abdo, 2011, p. 154)

observed, surveyed and counted; statistics about people are quantified and structured into categories already constructed by the authority responsible for data collection. In this way, knowledge and control is produced and reproduced.

Gathering statistics about a population is not a new phenomenon, and has for example been used to keep track of diseases, especially among the working classes in Europe. This is not only a way to improve the welfare of communities, but also has the effect of “tightening the discipline regime” among those on the margins, and as a result on the population as a whole (Ibid, p. 84). Hanna Herzog argues that “state practices of exclusion and hierarchisation *vis á vis* certain groups based on ethnic and national origin are no different than racism even if they hide behind the rhetoric of ‘belonging’” (2004, p. 54).

The idea that statistics and demography is only a tool in the hands of the state is not shared by everyone. Anat Leibler argues that this often is the case, but not always and that in fact, the demographic body sometimes is an authoritative entity in itself. In Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics was actually created before the state by a group of statisticians (Leibler, 2004, p. 121, 125), and with the legitimizing discourse of being a scientific, democratic and a-political institution it started an extensive population census with the help of the military. This census was the foundation for among other things, citizenship and identity card (Ibid., p. 122). The demographic data collected is still used today. We do not want to go further into this discussion, but we think it illustrates quite well the importance of statistics and demography in the creation of Israel and its population categories. In relation to this and our material and the statistics presented, we would like to stress the importance of an intersectional understanding of social locations in the way Yuval-Davis present it:

Social locations, however, even in their most stable format, are virtually never constructed along one power vector of difference, although official statistics – as well as identity politics – would often tend to construct them in this way (Yuval-Davis 2011, p. 13).

3.3 Modernity and the Body

Benedict Anderson states that governmental tactics such as census has special relevance in colonial and postcolonial societies. Taxing has historically been one reason to carry out national census (the Ottomans were keen on that in the Palestine region), but other motives might be equally important. Anderson argues that after mid-19th century the interest of the European colonial powers changed, and they sophisticated the means of population control and surveillance. This new topographic demography was carried out by a “feverish imagining” bureaucracy, “building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies” with the main purpose being ordering, classification and ‘othering’ as means of societal control (Anderson, 2006, p. 169). In the case of the people in the region of historical Palestine, several colonial powers before Israel (most recently the Ottoman, the British and the Jordanian Empire) had imposed their administrative legislation on their colonized objects. The imprint of these occupying powers on population count remains to this day, and to this must be added the organizing and dividing policies of Israel (Zureik, 2001, p. 208). In this way, the demographical practices enforced by Israel can be seen as a continuation of already existing patterns of colonialism and Orientalism.

In the nineteenth century demographical statistics was thought of as a liberal and democratic way of improving health and promoting equality among the citizens. In a colonial setting it got to signify the distinction between a traditional and a modern society, creating new, distinct social groups which could be compared and measured. This established new forms of inequality with certain groups labeled as a problem, or uncivilized (Leibler, 2004, p. 123). From this particular point of view, the (colonial) modernism has its own way of defining the “Orient”, the people and their habits. Quoting Said: “The Orient is infinite, uniform and lacks the capacity to define itself. Thus, one presumes that an extremely generalized and classified vocabulary to describe the Orient from a Western perspective is avoidable, even scientific “objective” (our translation) (Said, 1978, p. 443).

3.4 Demography, Gender and Race

Demography is a subject where statistics are the main source of analysis. People and their practices become numbers in diagrams and lists. These numbers are then used for several reasons, often to promote or prove a political point. Behind the language of demography lies a reality of people divided into groups, often distinguished through citizenship, gender, ethnicity or whatever category the collector of data finds important. In a nation-state perspective, demography is also about reproduction, mortality and migration. Gender is an important aspect in all three of these categories, and our focus in this chapter will be on reproduction. Theory in general and feminist theory in particular have through the years produced severe amounts of literature on the “politics of reproduction”, with much of its focus on the restrictions imposed on individuals when demography, and in the end reproduction, become a national or collective concern (Davis 1982, Kanaaneh 2002). These theories draw a connection between population control policies and exercise of power. The aim for many of these studies are to expose some aspects of how dominant regimes of for example gender, race or class effects reproduction policies (Portugese 1998, p. 1). Feminist scholars have linked the personal to the political by deconstructing the dichotomy of private and public spheres (Fouron & Schiller, 2001, p. 539). The main concern has been how patriarchal structures in different societies restricts women's right to choose their reproductive way of life, be it a state, a collective or individuals (Portugese, 1998, p. 3). That does not mean that only women are limited by population policies, so are men, but as Nira Yuval-Davis points out, “women especially are often required to carry this ‘burden of representation’ as they are constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivities identity and honor, both personally and collectively” (1997, p. 45). Ania Loomba discusses the role of women in relationship to nations and nationalism, arguing that women get to represent the “mothers of the nation”, i.e. reproducers of the nation (2005, p. 235). But in the eyes of states, not every woman is suitable to represent the nation, and definitely not to produce new citizens, as we shall see in the next chapter.

3.4.1 Birth Control vs. Population Control – a question of class, race and gender

As mentioned before, Israel is far from the only nation to keep a close eye on the number of babies born in certain population groups and number of arriving immigrants from certain countries. The Moynihan Report is another example. The Afro Americans in U.S have a history of being monitored in different ways, especially when it comes to population growth. In the beginning of the 20th century, when the (White) women's movement in U.S started to stress the importance of birth control, and women's right to self-determination over childbearing, President Roosevelt accused them for promoting race suicide. He equated the falling birth rate among native-born Whites with a national death (Davis, 1981, p 209). But the presidents attempt to undermine the movement failed in that sense that it led to a greater support for its advocates. However, this controversy led to a greater separation between feminists and the poor working class. Firstly, the feminists were emphasizing birth control as a route to careers and personal goals, goals out of reach for the poor with or without birth control. Thus, the race-suicide episode was an additional factor identifying feminism with the aspirations of the more privileged women. Secondly, the pro-birth control feminists began to popularize the idea that poor people had a moral obligation to restrict the size of their families, because large families drain the taxes and charity expenditures of the wealthy (Ibid. p 210). In Israel, the government decided in 2002 to implement a policy which made severe cuts in child allowances, based on the size of the family. It was argued that reducing subsidies for children will ensure Palestinian economic prosperity. (Rouso-Schindler, N/A, p 8)

Many development theories and demography studies stress the importance of a low fertility rate to reach development and modernization of a society or community. For example, the Moynihan Report pointed out the benefits for poor Black women in U.S to have fewer children; the household economy would get better and the children would get a more promising future. This was the norm of a modern family, with the White middle class families in the States as the "successful" examples (Collins, 2001, 2002). Similarly, the modernization

discourse is strong when it comes to the fertility policies in Israel. One strategy employed in the 1990s by the government to reduce the gap between the Jewish-Arab birthrates was to deploy discourses of modernization in the form of family planning, as a way to convince Palestinian citizens of Israel that high rates of reproduction are backward (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 7).

3.5 Controlling Images

Power and power relations are a fundamental part of our theoretical discussion, but power is never just power. Power is complex and movable, visible and invisible. To be able to frame this ever changing concept we need a critical approach beyond class, gender or ethnic essentialism. When applying an intersectional perspective we widen the possibilities to identify discursive and material intersections which constitute power and perpetuate inequality. So how can we apply an intersectional view in our work? For this thesis we have included Patricia Hill Collins idea of so called controlling images, which is explained by her as an ideological system to justify intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, and sexuality. These controlling images are designed to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear to be natural, normal, and inevitable parts of everyday life (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 69). She mentions the importance of analyzing the particular controlling images applied to African-American women in order to reveal the specific contours of Black women's objectification as well as the ways in which oppressions of race, gender, sexuality and class intersect (Ibid. p. 71-72). We want to include this intersecting tool in our thesis because it can help us frame ideological discursive pictures of 'the other'. As interpreters we conceptualize those pictures in order analyze them according to our specific context and material. But when doing this, the discursive norm is also conceptualized and made visible. Hill Collins talks about dominant paradigms of assimilation and modernization, and how an idea about a standard family form was shaped. Against this model of the "Normal White Middle-class" family, all other family structures were judged (Hill Collins & Solomos, 2011, p. 359).

Our understanding of controlling images is undoubtedly related to hegemony and hegemonic discourses. Hill Collins discusses controlling images as examples of hegemonic ideologies which appear as taken for granted. These ideologies are used by dominant groups to create and maintain a popular system of “commonsense” that support their right to rule. As she points out; “In the United States, hegemonic ideologies concerning race, class, gender, sexuality, and nation are often so pervasive that it is difficult to conceptualize alternatives to them, let alone ways of resisting the social practices that they justify” (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 284). Even though Patricia Hills Collins doesn’t explicit connect controlling images and hegemonic ideologies with discursive power, we clearly see the connections. This system of “commonsense” which let some groups have a more hegemonic position over others is constructed and maintained through language and discourses, leading to actions and social practices. We apply a Foucauldian understanding of knowledge; it is never innocent and is always connected with operations of power (Loomba, 2005, p .42). ‘Knowledge’ generated about ‘the Orient’ in general and ‘the Arab’ in particular is an ideological accompaniment of colonial ‘power’. In this sense “Controlling Images” are produced and reproduced knowledge.

Finally, controlling images are not to be seen as static categories, and at times it is hard to separate them because they are constantly dynamic and changing. We thought about different ways of structuring our analysis, and found it hard for several reasons. Separating ideas, notions and categories such as race, gender or class might endanger the intersectional approach because even though “these vectors has a separate ontological basis, the intersecting oppressions are mutually constituted by each other” (Yuval-Davis, 2007, p. 566). But at the same time, the theoretical tool has a strength we find useful for framing controlling discourses that serves to legitimize and naturalize intersected oppressions. It is therefore important to keep in mind that ”since the images themselves are dynamic and changing, each provides a starting point for examining new forms of control that emerge in a transnational context” (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 72).

4. Analysis

In this chapter we will present the controlling images that we argue are the main intersecting representations in the material. These are structured as themes rather than the narrow gendered or racialized stereotypes, which is how Patricia Hills Collins tends to describe her controlling images. Our more wide understanding and implementation of this theoretical tool has the benefit of a more open reading of the material. We think that it allows a deeper and more dynamic understanding of stereotypical representations. However, our assumption is the same and we agree with Hill Collins when she's quoting Carby; "that the objective of stereotypes is not to reflect or represent a reality but to function as a disguise, or mystification, of objectives social relations (Carby in Hill Collins, 2002, p. 69). Our themes are based on different representations that we saw were constantly recurrent in our material. The narrative constructs patterns of social relations but also reconstructs them as we've discussed in our methodological chapter. We will start with an examination of the Koenig Memorandum followed by a similar analysis of the Herzliya documents. The third chapter is a summary of the differences and similarities of our material, and finally we will proceed with a deeper theoretical analysis.

4. 1 The Koenig Memorandum

4.1.1 Dis-loyalty

The report of Koenig begins with a claim that until very short ago, the Israeli Arab "had a high degree of identification with the state and had been drawn into its various frameworks", but that:

Recently certain phenomena have occurred which have challenged these assumptions and which have seriously question the loyalty of a large part of them to the state and to its very existence (Koenig, 1976, p. 190).

The term “drawn into” indicates that this was maybe not a mutual agreement, but was rather in the interest of the Israeli politicians. However, this integration is in danger because the Arab minority has gone from being passive to active, and is now according to Koenig dis-loyal to Israel. He also states that a large part of them wish for the elimination of the Israeli state. Koenig positions them as outsiders of the state with the ability to destroy the state without destroying themselves. This development was according to Koenig due to a failure of those dealing with the Arab sector, as they ignored:

...the social problems in the Arab sector on the one hand, and lacking a long-term plan for the creation of an identity of a loyal Arab citizen on the other. (Ibid. p. 191)

The reason for their dis-loyalty is interesting enough the fault of the Israeli government, they are in charge of and also capable of constructing the “loyal Arab” in their liking. Koenig concludes that the feeling of power among Israeli Arabs is a result of improved economy, and that power has been taken advantage of by “interested hostile elements” (Ibid, p. 194). The term “hostile elements” are not further elaborated by the author. He describes it more or less like a battle over the loyalty of the Israeli Arab, in which the object battled over has nothing to say. We argue that domination involves complex processes of objectification of a subordinate group where “identity narratives often constitute major tools of ethnic projects” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 44), and by creating collective boundaries and using identity narrative the world is divided between us and them (Ibid.). One controlling images of the Israeli Arab is the narrative of its naturalized disloyalty.

Loyalty is referred to throughout the report as a problem and resistance from the Arab minority is met with claims of dis-loyalty as a way of undermining their voices.

4.1.2 Fertility

Another critical point for Koenig is the birth rate of the Israeli Arabs and the fact that they have a higher natural increase than the Jewish population (Koenig, 1976, p. 191). In one section, he problematize the payment of “big family” grants to the

Arab population. He only mentions this shortly, not explaining why this is a problem but we assume that Koenig objects to the idea that the Israeli state should pay for Israeli Arab further reproduction. Quoting Koenig:

The government must find a way to neutralize the payment of “big family” grants to the Arab population, either by linking them to the economic situation or by taking this responsibility from the national insurance system and transferring it to the Jewish Agency or to the Zionist organization, so that the grant is paid to Jews only (Ibid. p. 195).

Koenig's suggestion of cutting off Israeli Arab families from the welfare system in order to lower their birth rates was not the only recommended measure at the time. Koenig's recommendation is a clear example of a racialized population politics; no Arab child can be of interest for the reproduction of Israel as a (Jewish) nation. Yuval-Davis explains this connection between racism and nationalism as a way to construct minorities into “deviants” and excludes them from important resources (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 11). Demographically and economically they are a problematic group, and their birth rates and poverty is perceived as a threat to the majority. The Israeli state sees itself as a subject, an active agent with the legitimacy and power to control the Arab fertility. Shlomo Sand argues that this is a result of the domination of Zionism and “its particular concept of nationality”⁶ (Sand, 2009, p. 21). One quarter of the citizens is categorized as non-Jews, and through the notion of Zionism they are not included in the nation and cannot contribute to the Jewish community.

4.1.3 Hostility

This controlling image tends to describe the Israeli Arab as an active agent, contrary to the other images discussed above. Here, the dis-loyalty is outspoken and explicit and the sole role of the subject, the Israeli state, is to “handle” the hostility in ways it finds suitable.

⁶ As already mentioned Zionism is the national ideology of Israel, which states that Israel is a nation for the Jews.

The Israeli Arab is no longer passive and has gone over to nationalistic manifestations – only verbal at this stage – which have seen light in a number of events (Koenig, 1976, p. 192).

The Israeli Arab minority is consequently associated with increasing hostile nationalism. We argue that Koenig uses the term nationalism in the document for different forms of resistance and these are described as opposed to loyalty. One can see this as a way to undermine and delegitimize social struggles, prevalent at that time. Koenig devotes a section of the report to the younger generations' social revolt and their participation in unions and the communist party, RAKAH (1976, p.192). What he doesn't mention is the fact that both the unions and RAKAH had members from both the Jewish and the Arab sector (The founding principles of the Communist Party of Israel, 2011). To repress nationalistic tendencies, Koenig has a few suggestions. For example, he argues for the government to “reduce the number of Arab students” and he strongly recommends to:

Encourage the channeling of students into technical professions, to physical and natural sciences. These studies leave less time for dabbling in nationalism and the dropout rate is higher (Ibid, p. 196).

He then continues to stress the importance of repressing uprisings through

...adopting tough measures at all levels against various agitators among college and university students (Ibid., p. 196).

There is an evident fear of the uncontrolled object (being the Arab) in the report. Communication is not an alternative and Koenig proposes in our view harsh methods to gain control, reproducing the dichotomy of the “the good Arab”, the ones who obey, and “the bad Arab” who refuses to obey and who therefore is viewed as a terrorist (Said, 1976, p. 453).

Further on, he recognizes the danger in “mixed arenas” such as factories, having Arabs together with the Jewish workers and suggests;

The increase of Arab worker in factories might accelerate the friction between Jews and Arabs and develop into uncontrolled incidents. The number of Arab employees should not exceed 20 % (Koenig, 1976, p. 195).

Apparently, Koenig claims that as long as the Arab is partly kept out from workplaces and universities, the likelihood of uprisings diminishes. He connects subversive practices to the Arab mind.

By the virtue of its Levantine⁷ character and due to social dynamics, this society will move from introversion to external manifestations and a possible move into organized violence is not be ruled out (Ibid., p. 196).

The adjective “Levantine” is essentialized as being a characteristic of Arab culture, mind and society in a negative way connecting it with state destroying practices. This description is a process of nominalization where certain groups are ascribed with certain features, in this case essential characteristics. We argue that this controlling image derives from a dichotomy between the free-loving democratic Western subject and the evil totalitarian Arab, which is although not stated in the document, in our view male. Further on, Koenig doesn’t discuss the reasons behind this hostility or that the state might have some responsibility. Neither does he acknowledge the agency in this form of resistance, which we interpret the hostility to be. As Said states, there is no reasons to actually hear the voice of the colonized object, because the Arab is just an agitator trying to make things difficult for the colonial power (Said, 1978, p. 104). It can also be seen as a way to legitimize policy of domination.

4.1.4 The Uncivilized

Koenig mentions the “Levantinistic character” in several places in the document without further explanation, but it has apparent negative connotations. It is referred to in the context of the failed integration of the Israeli Arabs:

⁷ The word 'Levant' refers to the area of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan. Usual it is mentioned as a variant of spoken Arabic in this part of the Middle East. (WIKIPEDIA, 12/12-12, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levant>)

The [integration] policy did not take into consideration the superficial and Levantinistic Arab character whose imagination tends to exceed rationality (Koenig, 1976, p. 193).

Also in this passage, Koenig rejects (by not speaking of it) any notion that the state has, or will have, responsibility for integrating the minority. The report adopts the notion of an irrational Arab mind and refers several times to the fact that the Israeli Arab is in need of guidance.

With the establishment of the state, the remnants of the Arab population in the country were left without a leadership (Ibid., p. 190)

Koenig is not satisfied with the present leadership, calling them “big-mouthed Arabs” and states that this “transitory society needs leaders who can provide personal examples and who are capable of giving appropriate answers to sincere nationalists leading them toward a reasonable personal and public solution” (Ibid. p. 194). By “transitory society” he refers to what he calls the passage from an agricultural society to an industrial one. It is an inevitable process of modernization that the Arab minority has to go through in order to be civilized, and the way that the report discusses the Arab leadership reflects the idea that they themselves do not know their own good. Said traces this idea back to the time of the British colonial rule, and underlying assumptions about colonial rule and imperialism; that it is in fact for the sake of the natives that the imperial rule upheld their own leaders in the region. The imperial rule has saved them from their own deprivation (Said, 1976, p. 106). Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh makes a similar conclusion (set to modern times) and argues that Israel’s self-Occidentizing have relied on the Orientalization of its Arab minority, and the state has specifically attempted to constitute the Arabs as the flawed and failed object of reproductive modernization (2002, p. 252).

The report concludes that this process is difficult but stresses the importance to learn from other countries':

One has to remember and learn from the experience of other states with national minority populations that exaggerated and uncontrolled liberalism does not achieve the intended end, but rather the opposite. And this rule applies particularly to the specific Arab minority in Israel (Koenig, 1976, p. 197).

Minority population and “uncontrolled liberalism” are according to this quote not compatible, but we can only guess what the report means by that claim, or which countries it refers to.

4.2 The Herzliya Series

4.2.1 Dis-loyalty

In the Herzliya documents we also find worries about the loyalty of the Arab and that the Arab still might be drawn between conflicting powers, fighting over its loyalty and identity. This conflict is perceived as followed:

The findings of the Patriotism Survey⁸ show the conflict in national identity prevalent among the Arab Israeli public and the moderate positions it seems to be taking: The number of Arabs who define themselves as "very patriotic" toward the Palestinian people (48 percent) is twice as high as those that defined themselves as "very patriotic" toward Israel (24 percent). (Herzliya, 2006, p. 52)

The Herzliya documents devote much time on elaborating on the statistical data from the survey, dividing them into numbers and categories. Worth noting is that in the actual survey, no figures are presented in one category but divided into Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. The quote above is interesting, not because of the data, but because it constructs an image of a conflict in national identity through simple statistics. We do not have a complete insight in how the survey is done, but presumably the question of divided loyalties is not asked to the Jewish majority, at least it is not submitted anywhere. The constant statistical separation of Jews and

⁸Every year, the Herzliya conference presents the annual survey on patriotism, conducted by the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS). “The database collected over the years facilitates studying changes in public opinion, prevalent attitudes toward symbols of the State of Israel, and the connection of both Jewish and Arab communities to the country” (Herzliya, 2009, p. 39).

Arabs, and the assumption that these numbers of patriotism are a conflict to the Israeli Arabs, discursively construct the Israeli Arab as “the other, not to be trusted”. It also supports the idea that hybrid identities and double loyalties are not possible, it is rather seen upon with suspicion. Elia Zureik states that when colonial states, is faced with hybrid identities, it tries to “reconstitute them as fixed and singular categories by means of its control over certain means of enumeration” (Zureik, 2001, p. 213).

Portraying hybrid identities as a conflict is also an effective way of delegitimize the Palestinian identity of many of the Israeli Arab, and denying them the dual identity of being both an Israeli and a Palestinian. The separation of these two identities by constructing them as opposed to one another is a strategy early implemented by the Israeli state. Nahlo Abdo argues that the state is trying to “Israelize” the Arabs by separating between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians (Abdo, 2011, p. 44). The exclusion and the separation lies at the heart of the colonial project, she stresses, and control over demography is central to the states’ citizen regime (Ibid., p. 40). To further strengthen the dividing discourse between the Israeli Arab and the Palestinians, the tactic of denigrating the Palestinians living outside of Israel is used.

It has also been claimed that Israeli Arabs have adopted the Palestinian national ethos, which denies the legitimacy of the State of Israel as a Jewish state and attempts to undermine its Jewish character, thus exacerbating tensions with the Jewish populace (Herzliya, 2003, p. 62).

The insinuation that this hostile “national ethos” presumably shared by every Palestinian outside of Israel is trickling over into the Arab sector inside Israel, can work as a way of preventing people to “become Palestinian”, in other words, a threat to the state of Israel. Again is the heritage that many Israeli Arabs still identify with constructed as the enemy, making those Arabs in Israel dis-loyal to the state per se. We argue that surveys with this kind of disposition presented in a manner like the one in Herzliya, reproduces the idea that ‘the others’ have predisposed features, such as dis-loyalty.

4.2.2 Hostility and Uncivilized

When analyzing the Herzliya documents we found that the images ‘hostility’ and ‘uncivilized’ were harder to separate (important to remember is that we view the images as not static, but dynamic and overlapping, why a separation is always hard). The image of the uncivilized Arab had become less visible and more “rational”. That is why we found it more fruitful for the analysis to emerge these two images. However, the image of the Israeli (male) Arab as a potential violent threat is a frequent theme in both the Koenig report and Herzliya. Sometimes the threat is initiated from the outside, through what Herzliya labels as “the Muslim rage”.

If the Muslims are capable of inflicting such harm upon each other every day in Iraq, for example, just think what they will do to those they perceive as enemies of Islam (Herzliya, 2007, p. 16).

The ideology behind the hostile acts is no longer Communism as in Koenig report, but Islam. This follows a general trend since the end of the Cold War and the documents continues with the following statement:

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of the clash of civilizations (Ibid., p. 31).

The collectivization and objectification of the Muslim Arab constructs Israel’s own Arab citizens as part of a cultural war between them and their state, picturing them as potentially hostile. ‘The other’ in this context is “perceived to express essentialist, innate traits deriving from the fact that s/he belongs to an ethnic, national, cultural or racial groups. S/he is marked as threatening to the social order, the dominant identity, and/or national security” (Herzog, 2004, p. 60).

Edward Said has historicized the “essential, innate traits” back to oriental images of the Muslim Arab, where they are perceived as revengeful, conform and only able to function in situations of conflict (Said, 1978, p.123).

Israel’s fear of their own population is expressed in the Herzliya document from 2000:

The increase in the demographic share of the Arab minority in Israel tests directly Israel's future as a Jewish-Zionist-democratic state. The security and social challenges connected with Israel's Arab minority will probably worsen as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is still simmering. The sense of discrimination extant in the Arab population is a fertile ground for increasing tensions and inquietude. In conjunction with political estrangement and sustained frequently by incitement, it is liable to manifest itself in a series of dangerous and hostile actions in terms of law enforcement and public safety (p. 52).

The Arab minority is not only constructed as a threat to the state's Jewish character in terms of demography, but also as potentially violent, again in relation to Arabs outside of Israel. In other words, as long as there is a "conflict" with the Arab world, which is not defined, the minority inside of Israel can never be trusted and they may turn violent. Democratic (Jewish) values are in opposition to the hostile, aggressive Arab collective. Samera Esmeir argues that to understand Israeli use of the word security and how non-security issues like for example memory (the Nakba-Law explained earlier) and demography are now a security concern, one has to historicize and contextualize the use of the term. Esmeir means that the term security in Israel can be used "without a need to reference the reasons for any of its particular operations" (Esmeir, 2004, p. 3). This is a process that we continuously find in the material, how groups, or practices and situations are described as threats without any further explanation.

In this passage we have one of the few times where discrimination against the minority is expressed, but it is not presented as facts but as a "sense" in the Arab population – being 'the other' in this document deprives them of their agency and claims, a process of nominalization. In 2007 Herzliya comes back to the issue of in-equality but it is turned into a question of whether the minority will turn hostile towards Israel or not:

An increase in the level of de-legitimization of the State of Israel appears to be discernible among the Arabs of Israel. ././ Some believe that the essence of the debate is not the question of equality between Jews and Arabs but rather a challenge to the very legitimacy of the state. Thus, even if the state continued to work toward reducing disparities, it would not win legitimacy (p. 35).

Implying that the minority hides their agenda when they call for equality again undermines their agency, and their claims can be effectively dismissed as an

attempt to de-legitimize the state. It also insinuates that Israel is doing what it can to reduce inequalities, but that it might be a fruitless struggle because the Arab minority would never accept the state of Israel anyway. With this logic, equality is only of value if it benefits the majority and their security. Equality has no value if the main receiver/beneficiary is the minority, and it has no value in itself.

4.2.3 Fertility

As we've seen in the Koenig Memo the Arab woman was important for the demographic forecasts in Israel and this is still a fundamental topic in today's Herzliya Conferences. Actually, it is only when discussing the birth rates of the Israeli Arab that the woman is made visible. (In fact, the Jewish woman is also invisible until the question of demography is on the agenda.) The demographic race between the Israeli Arab woman and the Jewish woman is described several times in the documents. But in contrast to the discourse of Koenig, the fertile woman in the Occupied Territories (the West Bank and the Gaza strip) is now also being monitored with anxiety by the Israeli authorities. For example, when discussing the possibilities of reaching a possibly accord with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat it is stated that:

The Palestinian womb can triumph. So if this happens, we won't be able to reach a comprehensive agreement (Herzliya, 2001, p. 71).

Worries are expressed that the Israeli Arab "has adopted the Palestinian national ethos" and is now using their high birth rates to "deny the legitimacy of the State of Israel as a Jewish state and attempts to undermine its Jewish character." (Herzliya, 2003, p. 62) It is obvious that the motherhood of non-Jewish women also has a national meaning, but that of a threat to the ideological foundations of the Zionist state (Berkovitch, 1997, p. 616). Comparing the Koenig Memo with the Herzliya documents, we find that the latter explicitly discuss the Arab Israeli woman. There are numerous quotes concerning her unemployment which is connected with high birth rates. "Improvements in education will lead to more women in the workforce and lower birthrates" followed by the advice that the "numbers of day-care centers in the Arab population should increase in order to get more women in the workforce" (Herzliya, 2003, p.57). The Arab woman is

constructed as an uneducated object, reluctant of working. It is described in the documents as a cultural problem;

The employment rate among Arab women (around 17 %) is three times less than that of Arab males and Jewish women, probably as a result of the **unique characteristics** of Arab society (Herzliya, 2006, p. 51).

But there is no further explanation what these unique characteristics are, what they are based on etc. Nahla Abdo explains that the women's low rates of labor participation, and the related widespread poverty among this population, are often described in terms of religion/culture rather than structures and institutional factors. The Arab culture, patriarchy and religion are blamed for women's low status in general. Actually, in 2012 there was a survey concluding that more than 40 % of female Arab academics were unemployed (Abdo, 2011, p. 104, 111). In other words, a higher degree is no guarantee of a rewarding job. Another example in the construction of the passive Israeli Arab woman is when her unemployment rate is compared to the one of the Jewish Ultra-orthodox. Unlike the previous, the Ultra-orthodoxy's low participation is out of free choice (Herzliya, 2002, p. 60). The modernization discourse is noticeable when framing the picture of the passive Arab woman; uneducated, backward, controlled and with Third World high fertility. We argue that since women often carry 'the burden of representation' "as they are constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivities identity and honor" (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 45), they often become the target of governmental policies of modernization. They, and not the men, are made responsible for 'backwardness' or disapproved behavior or actions from the collective they represent. On the other hand, they can never get to represent the nation of Israel. Our main point is that their ethnicity disqualify them from being considered symbolizing the nation, instead they are producers of the population that threatens the national interest of maintain itself as a Jewish state.

5. From Koenig to Herzliya – similarities and differences

There is a similarity between the documents in that *gender* is apparently left out in the language. Unlike from the Koenig Memo, women are mentioned in the Herzliya documents, when discussing birth rates and employment. The women are in other words only mentioned as an exception, the unstated departing point is men until anything else is mentioned. Further, the Israeli Arabs are from time to time divided into sub-groups in Herzliya; f. ex in the so called Patriotic Survey where the Druze community is represented in a separate category. In the earlier Koenig document all Arabs were discussed as one *homogenous group*. In both documents the *loyalty discourse* is repeated, but we've noticed that over time the *patriotic discourse* tends to be more and more common. The same applies when it comes to the language concerning the *threat from Islam* and Islamic movements. In both documents Muslims are discussed as a threat or potential threat to the state of Israel. However, in the Koenig Memo written under the height of the Cold War, the “Red Threat” is constituted as the biggest threat against the national security, fearing the labor unions and youth movements in the country. The Herzliya documents, most of it written in the post-9/11 period, addresses terrorism and Islam as the main danger to Israel, and the Western world. Another discursive difference between the documents is that Koenig doesn't write about *modernization* or the quest to modernize the Arab population. On the contrary, Koenig is convinced that education and better economy increase the motives to engage in subversive activities and nationalism among the Israeli Arabs. Further, the Herzliya discusses the existence of *discrimination and racism* in the Israeli society (although they never talk about who is being subjected to the racism and by whom) something never mentioned in the Koenig Memo. Lastly, some concluding discursive similarities between our documents; the Israeli Arabs are at all times talked about as *a problem* for the state, never as an asset to the Israeli society. In addition, The Arab population is discursively situated in a cultural context, and their problems are explained in terms of “Arab culture”, and finally,

maybe the most crucial similarity is the *absent voice* of the minority which is evident in both the texts. They are objectified in a pathological way, talked about and ‘othered’.

6. Controlling Images – Controlled Bodies; making the connections

As we’ve seen above some discourses have changed, but it is our opinion that the main intersecting discourses of power are still prevalent. We think Netanyahu confirmed this at the Herzliya Conference 2003. "If there is a demographic problem, and there is, it is with the Israeli Arabs who will remain Israeli citizens" (Alon & Benn, 2003). Said states that “Arabs are still just counted in numerous terms, as family producers. They are not valuable to the state and as political subjects they are invisible” (Said, 1978, p. 460), something that we find evident in our material. In a way the disciplinary regimes and the controlling images are more subtle in the Herzliya material and the language includes words associated with an including, liberal democracy, like ‘equality’, ‘discrimination’, even ‘racism’ appears. However, we cannot see that the discursive position of the minority has changed in any fundamental ways in relation to the dominant society represented in Herzliya. They are still ascribed inherent features connected to their culture rather than their socio-economic status. They are presented as passive agents without the ability to change their situation. From a Foucauldian understanding of power we argue that the images in themselves reflect power relations; at the same time they reproduce knowledge and hierarchies (Foucault, 1995, p. 27). The knowledge about the Israeli Arab accumulated in our material establishes similar controlling images. Not many representations challenge the stable division between Jews/Arabs and we sense a high degree of objectification and ‘othering’ in the different images of the Israeli Arab. We think bell hooks has described the process of objectification in a way that is significant for our thesis (and indeed for many native minorities in different contexts and spaces):

As subjects, people have the right to define their own reality, establish their own identities, name their history. As objects, one's reality is defined by others, one's identity created by others, one's history named only in ways that define one's relationship to those who are subject (hooks in Hill Collins, 2002, p. 71).

These positions are connected to our methodological question of transitivity; not only who is the matter of the subject but also how they are talked about, and in relation to what or whom. This is a methodological question as well as a theoretical approach. 'Otherness' can be constructed through gendered processes as well as through racialized ones, and various processes intersect. The foundations of exclusions are double-edged where "invisibility is constructed through the notion that for example white women's experiences are taken for granted and given the status of the norm, they get to represent a specific category. Otherness on the other hand, is constructed through brutal visibility and racialized stereotypes, exotification and victimization (our translation)" (Mulinari in Mulinari, Sandell & Schörner, 2003, p. 26).

In our particular study, we argue that demography as an institution was and still is a tool in the hands of Israeli state and its associated administrations. With the use of statistics, populations are observed and bodies classified. It is not only a system that functions downwards, it is also a disciplinary force directed at the dominant society, creating the image of an ideal and homogenous group. Not only is demography a controlling tool for the state, but over the years it seems like demography as an issue has been removed from the academic realm to the daily discourse (Galili, 2002). Of course, the statistical categories of 'Jews' and 'Arabs' hides a reality of a very diverse society and the identities are not in any way stable, even though our material discursively constructs them as such. Derrida argues that "a colonized, ethnic minority [...] occupy a place of 'cultural undecidability'" and in a dynamic where these margins continually are being reconfigured, "the concept of the univocal national subject is undone" (Derrida in Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2009, p. 86). We can see that the categories of both Arabs and Jews are more diverse and pluralistic in Herzliya. The categories are still firm, but groupings are added such as Muslims, Christians, Druze, Diaspora Jews and Ultra-Orthodox Jews. The Israeli society has changed since the Koenig Report,

social groups are reconstituted and exhibits subjects with multiple loyalties and hybrid identities, and so the social ordering changes. To produce an image of a 'univocal national subject' is apparently not that easy. But as we will see, the adding of categories doesn't necessarily change the racialized and gendered discourse.

On the Herzliya conference 2002 it was stated that Israel was ranked 44th in the world when it came to minority participation in the work force. Together with the Ultra-orthodox (although not counted as a minority group) the Israeli government has expressed concerns for the dependence of welfare among the Israeli Arabs. However, it is clearly stated that the Ultra-orthodox choose unemployment, unlike the unemployment of the Israeli Arabs which is "culturally dictated" (Herzliya, 2002, p. 60). Here, the Ultra-orthodox community is described as active agents, with the ability to make a "free choice", compared to the unemployed Israeli Arab (woman) who is not in a position to make active decisions. By explaining the Arab poverty as a cultural problem, it is naturalized, a nominalization process which effectively excludes other plausible causalities. This effectively disguises inequalities and structural forces responsible are made invisible. In her research on racialized images of the Black family, Angela Davis illustrates how poverty among African American families is naturalized;

Creating the controlling image of the welfare mother and stigmatizing her as the cause of her own poverty and that of African-American communities shifts the angle of vision away from structural sources of poverty and blames the victims themselves. The image of the welfare mother thus provides ideological justification for the dominant group's interest in limiting the fertility of Black mothers who are seen as producing too many economically unproductive children (Davis in Hill Collins, 2002, p. 80).

Similarly, Herzliya associates the Arab family structure with social problems, reducing the problems of unemployment and poverty to a cultural one rather than consequences of inequality and structural socio-economic problems in the society as a whole.

When reading the Herzliya documents' proposals to promote increased access to the academic and employment sphere for the Israeli Arab women, it is easy to

think of it as a strategy to boost equality between women and men. But the tactic to reduce the time women spend in their private sphere is not once described in the documents as a strategy helping the women to increase their opportunities in life, only in terms of birth rates and taxes. Jacqueline Portuguese concludes; “Although these attempts have been cloaked in feminist rhetoric, they are more a reflection of the state’s anti-natalist fertility goals than of anything else” (Portuguese, 1998, p. 175). Thus, the state’s claims to modernize the Arab woman, to teach her and educate her can be seen from another perspective. As Portuguese notes; a lack of concern for other facets of the Israeli Arab women’s oppression contravenes the Israeli government’s equality claims (Ibid. p. 176). It’s worth noticing that neither in Koenig nor in Herzliya is there a wish for a modernization of the Israeli Arab man. Even though he is described as hostile, aggressive and presumably patriarchal, he is not the one to change according to our material. The discourse of modernization is in this case only targeting the female; the man is a static construction unable to change.

However, it is important to point out that the leaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement have not necessarily been reluctant participants in the discourse of the demographic race. Especially after the Koenig Memo was leaked to the public, the ‘war on the baby front’ became bitter. Slogans like “The Israelis beat us on the borders but we beat them in the bedrooms” was heard (Yuval-Davis, 1987, p. 80), and Arafat has been quoted saying “they [the Israelis] are concerned about our children and the Palestinian woman, who bears yet another Palestinian every ten months ... [the Israeli Arab woman] is a biological bomb threatening to blow up Israel from within” (Portuguese, 1998, p. 165). The construction of the Palestinian woman as a reproducer of national identity had effect, and many Palestinian families outside and within Israel (Israeli Arabs) who were aware of the politics of demography refused Israel’s modernization discourse. They continued and still continue to have more children than Israeli families (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 7). Refusing the modernization discourse, or at least refuse to make connections between birth control and modernization, can be a way to resist the pressure from the Israeli population policies and the orientalist controlling image of the Arab woman as a backward and passive baby producer. The Palestinian woman can be an agent, free to use her maternal role as a source of resistance. In any way, as Patricia Hills Collins importantly concludes;

Women are important within nationalist philosophies, whether the nationalism is forwarded by dominant groups who wield nation-state power, or by subordinated groups who use nationalist ideologies to challenge their oppression. Groups on both sides of state power view the women in their group in particular ways (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 230).

However, some women emerge as more worthy mothers of the nation than others. The Arab women are not of value for the reproduction of a Zionist nation. The negative controlling image of Arab motherhood work to disqualify them as symbols of the nation. Parallels can be drawn to how working class Black women are constructed in a U.S. context. “[They] have been constructed as the enemy within, the group producing the population that threatens the American national interest of maintaining itself as a ‘White’ nation-state” (Hill-Collins, 2005, p. 125).

One aim of our thesis is to look further, what these controlling images reflect. How do they shape the image, of what Derrida calls, the univocal national subject being the Jewish majority? The function of the images is to present an idealized reality that we argue doesn’t exist. They distort reality, and hides structures of gender and race. To reconnect to Balibar (1990) communities has to be naturalized through a presented narrative of stable identities. Herzliya and Koenig is a part of this stratification process by discursively constructing divisions and hierarchies.

As we said earlier the Ultra-Orthodox group is also pointed out as a problem (not in Koenig but in Herzliya) due to their poverty and high unemployment, and together with the Arab minority they score the lowest on every Patriot survey. They are not constructed as a threat to the Jewish state, but they are in a way 'othered' and seen as apart from the Zionist secular, dominate society. The difference from the Arab minority is though that they have major political representation and influence (Herzog in Herzog & Braude, 2009, p. 53). It is hard to say why some groups gain more discursive influence than others when they from a socio-economic perspective seem quite similar. But as Yuval-Davis says: “racism occurs when the construction of ‘otherness’ is used in order to exclude and/or exploit the immutable ‘other’” (1997, p. 49). Further, Mohanty argues that

the creation of the ahistorical and homogenous ‘Third World Woman’-discourse was necessary for Western women in order to uphold their image of themselves as free subjects (Mulinari in Mulinari, Sandell & Schöner, 2003, p. 26).

When comparing the Ultra-Orthodox with the Israeli Arabs a similar process is visualized. Even though the former group is, as mentioned before, discussed in terms of ‘unmodernity’ and ‘poverty’, they are seen as free subjects. In the end it is still the Israeli Arab who in a comparable way to the ‘Third World Woman’-discourse marks the boundary of the Jewish national identity.

At the same time, the Ultra-Orthodox group together with the Arab minority and the Diaspora Jews (people of Jewish origin without Israeli citizenship) are considered an “unsecure card”, the Arabs and the Ultra-Orthodox because of their low level of patriotism, and the Diaspora Jews because of lack of identification and solidarity with the state of Israel (Herzliya, 2003, p. 8). Maybe, the need for the state to survey its population (and indeed its potential population) has spilled over to the some Jewish groups. To be a “real Jew”, in the eyes of Herzliya, you have to feel solidarity with Israel. We would argue that we can see a “tightening of the disciplinary regime” (Mills, 2012, p. 83), conducted through constant counting and analyzing of not only the Arab minority but also other groups as well. This does not necessarily change the positions of Israel’s Arab minority. In our recent material they are still perceived as a demographical, economical and security threat and still needed for the reasons emphasized by Herzog that “it is at the intersection of the demand for assimilation and resemblance accompanied by rejection and labeling that the dominant groups construct their identity” (2004, p. 56). We argue that the controlling images in our material functions – among other things- in this particular way.

6.1 Concluding comments

Our methodological tools of nominalization and transitivity gave us an observant eye when working with the material. In every image there were traces of these processes and we have localized and analyzed them, finding that the most important and general processes of exclusion were still present in both the Koenig

Memo and the Herzliya Series. We could localize positions of the object/subject where the Israeli Arab in our images was described as objects without agency and with special characteristics, for example as in the image of the 'dis-loyal' and 'uncivilized' Arab. We have also highlighted how the process of nominalization can naturalize for instance poverty and construct causalities as "commonsense" that does not need further explanation.

The function of framing controlling images is to deconstruct an ideological system that justifies intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, and sexuality and as interpreters we conceptualize those pictures in order analyze them according to our specific context and material. The discursive changes and similarities in our texts give us knowledge about the gendered and racialized power structures in Israel. It also confirms the importance of state-associated institutions in the role of accumulating knowledge and power. It takes an immense amount of social ordering, nominalization and 'othering' to keep the national, unified subject intact, a subject in constant changing.

6.2 Further research

We have touched upon many interesting issues that were outside the aim of this thesis, and there were crucial concepts that were not included. Israel is a very diverse country with many minority groups. We have addressed issues of race and gender, but we think that one important aspect to fully understand intersecting hierarchies is class. Not once in our material are socio-economic structures mentioned, whether the topic were Jews or Arabs. Apart from race and gender, class is another structure that cuts through all groups and divides the society. Sometimes it follows racialized or genderized hierarchies, and sometimes not as with the Ultra-Orthodox groups. We think there is a need to 'classify' the analysis of the Israeli society. Most studies we have read so far focus, for obvious reasons maybe, on race and gender. We think Ania Loomba articulates the relationship between colonialism, racial boundaries and class in a way that would be interesting to develop.

She argues that “the ideology of racial superiority translated easily into class terms” (2005, p. 109) and she describes how these ideologies naturalize class positions and poverty in a society.

Another issue that can be further developed is power relations within the Jewish dominant groups. It also, of course, intersects with class. Nahla Abdo (2011) has done a comprehensive study of the racialization within the Jewish community that we found very interesting. She argues that the so called Ashkenazi Jews, Jews with Europe origin, dominate all aspects of the society also within the feminist field of research. Her main point is that the feminist writing in Israel conceptualizes gender structures from an ethnocentric notion that all women share similar experiences and that it does not conceptualize the racialized oppression of Mizrahi women, Jews with an Arab or North African heritage. In relations to that we read an article about Ethiopian Jews in a transit camp in Ethiopia (Nesher, 2012). The journalist had interviewed some of the women who claimed that they were required to take quite dangerous contraceptives in order to be admitted in to Israel. The contraceptives were given by Israeli social works in the camp, in collaboration with the government. It would be interesting to dig deeper into this issue, in relations to racialized Jews in Israel. Which other groups are given free contraceptives? Why bring this group of Jews into the country if their future children are not desired? What challenges does this pose to the Israeli feminist movement?

Another point of departure could be the image presented in our material of the groups of Ultra-orthodox Jews and the Diaspora Jews. As we discuss in the analysis, these groups are not unproblematic to the Israeli politicians meeting in Herzliya. They are talked about in different ways in the material, but the two groups are differentiated as Jewish groups that need to be dealt with, or “upgraded” as the material states. The Ultra-orthodox Jews because of their low participation in the workforce and the diaspora Jews because of their (presumed) lack of solidarity with Israel and their “assimilation” into their own countries of birth. In our more recent material it is mentioned several times that the assimilation of Jews in the world is a problem, a statement that surprised us for many reasons but mainly one. How can a social development that accepts Jews as

parts of a society on equal terms be a bad one? We would argue that this shows an inherent conflict of interest between Israel's struggle for the individual welfare of all Jews around the world, and the state's survival as a Jewish state with a Jewish majority. As we stated in our background chapter, the immigration of Jews has been vital to the demographic character of Israel. Due to the state's historical creation as a refugee state for persecuted Jews, what happens when immigration of Jews declines, implying that Israel is no longer needed for the particular reason of "rescuing Jews"? Does our material point to an identity crisis, where Israel finds itself in a position where more non-Jews than Jews are searching for its protection? Or a position where Jews from poorer countries like Ethiopia are the ones immigrating; welcomed under certain conditions?

“If I as an Arab woman do an MA and succeed in work, etc. ...I become the subject of a study ...in fact, [what] ever I do becomes a subject for anthropological research...” (Herzog, 2004, p. 78)

7. References

- Abdo, N. (2011). *Women in Israel: Race, Gender and Citizenship*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Alon, G. & Benn, A. (2003). Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs are the real demographic threat. [Electronic] *Haaretz*. Available: <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-israel-s-arabs-are-the-real-demographic-threat-1.109045> [2012-11-01]
- Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd edition, London: Verso.
- Balibar, E. (1990). History and Ideology. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, Vol. 13, No.3, pp- 329-361
- Bergquist, M., Løvheim, M. & Sveningsson, M. (2003). *Att fånga nätet: kvalitativa metoder för Internetforskning*. Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Bergström, G. & Boréus, K. (ed.), (2005). *Textens mening och makt: metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys*. Lund: Studentlitteratur
- Berkovitch, N. (1997). Motherhood is a National Mission: The construction of Womanhood in the Legal Discourse in Israel. *Women's studies International Forum*, Vol. 20, pp. 605-616
- Davis, A. (1982). *Women, Race and Class*. London: The Womens Press Ltd.
- de los Reyes, P. & Mulinari, D. (2005). *Intersektionalitet*. Malmö: Liber AB

Derrida in Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2009). *Militarization and Violence against Women in Conflict Zones in the Middle East*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Enloe, C. (2007) *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.

Eldén, S. (2005). Att fånga eller bli fångad i diskursen? Om diskursanalys och emancipatorisk feministisk metodologi. In Lundqvist, Å., Davies, K. & Mulinari, D. (ed) *Att utmana vetandets gränser*. Malmö: Liber AB.

Esmeir, S. (2004). In the Name of Security. [Electronic] *Adalah's Review*. Vol. 4. Available: <http://www.adalah.org/eng/Articles/1383/Adalahs-Review-Volume-4---In-the-Name-of-Security> [2012-09-24]

Fairclough, N. (2001). *Language and Power*. 2nd edition, Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

Fargues, P. (2000). Protracted National Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the Twentieth Century. *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 441-482

Foucault, Michel. (1995). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison*. [Electronic], Westminister MD: Vintage. Available: Ebrary [2012-12-14]

Fouron & Schiller. (2001). All in the Family: Gender, Transnational Migration and the Nation State. *Identity* 7, pp. 539-582.

Galili, L. (2002). A Jewish Demographic State. [Electronic] *Haaretz*. Available: <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/a-jewish-demographic-state-1.41134> [2012-06-09]

Hashash, Y. (2010) In: Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli and Yoram S. Carmeli,(ed.) *"Medicine and the State. The Medicalization of Reproduction in Israel"* Kin, Gene, Community: Reproductive Technologies among Jewish Israelis, Berghahn Press.

Herzliya Series: Conferences, conclusions and executive summaries. Reports 2000-2009.

Available:

<http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/?CategoryID=161&ArticleID=1009>
[2012-10-03]

Herzog, H. (2004). "Both an Arab and a Woman": Gendered, Racialized Experiences of Female Palestinian Citizens of Israel. *Social Identities*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 53-82

Herzog in Herzog & Braude (ed.), (2009). *Gendering Religion and Politics: Unteangeling Modernities*. Palgrave MacMillons

Hill Collins, P. (2001). *It's all in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race and Nations*.

Hill Collins, P (2002). *Black Feminist Thought*, 2nd edition [Electronic], New York: Routledge. Available: Taylor & Francis e-Library. [2012-09-20]

Hill Collins, P. (2005). Producing the Mothers of the Nation: Race, Class and Contemporary US Population Policies. In Yuval-Davis, N. & Werbner, P. (ed.) *Women, Citizenship and Difference*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Hill Collins, P. & Solomos, J. (2011). The Family as a Race Institution. [Electronic] *The Sage Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies*. Available: DOI: 10.4135/9781446200902 [2012-10-09]

hooks, b. (1986). Sisterhood: Political Solidarity between Women. *Feminist Review*. No 23, pp. 125-138.

- Jørgensen, M., Phillips, L. (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Kanaaneh, R.A. (2002). *Birthing the nation: strategies of Palestinian women in Israel*. London: University of California Press, Ltd.
- Koenig, Y. (1976). Memorandum Proposal – Handling the Arabs of Israel. [Electronic], Report. *Swasia*, Vol. 111, No. 41. Available: http://issuu.com/joeexample1/docs/koenig_report
- Leibler, A. (2004). Statisticians' Ambition: Governmentality, Modernity and National Legibility. *Israel Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 121-149.
- Loomba, A. (2005). *Colonialism – Postcolonialism*, 2nd edition. London: Routledge.
- Mills, S. (2003). *Michel Foucault*. [Electronic], London: Routledge. Available: EBSCO. [2012-12-28]
- Moser, C. & Clark, F. (ed.), (2001). *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Moynihan, P. (1965). *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. [Electronic] Report. USA, Office of Policy Planning and Research, Department of Labor. Available: <http://www.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe/Moynihan%27s%20The%20Negro%20Family.pdf> [2012-10-01]
- Mulinari in Mulinari, D., Sandell, K. & Schörner, E. (Ed.). (2003). *Mer än bara kvinnor och män. Feministiska perspektiv på genus*. Lund: Studentlitteratur

Nesher, T. (2012). Why is the birth rate in Israel's Ethiopian community declining? [Electronic] *Haaretz*. Available: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/why-is-the-birth-rate-in-israel-s-ethiopian-community-declining.premium-1.483494> [2012-12-09]

Orenstein, D. (2004). Population Growth and Environmental Impact: Ideology and Academic Discourse in Israel. *Population and Environment*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 41-60

Paltridge, B. (2006). *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.

Portugese, J. (1998). *Fertility Policy in Israel: The Politics of Religion, Gender, and Nation*. London: Praeger Publishers.

Remennick, L. (2000). Childless in the Land of Imperative Motherhood: Stigma and Coping among Infertile Israeli Women. *Sex Roles*, Vol. 43, Nos. 11/12, pp. 821-841.

Rothschild, N. (2011). Save the Jews: don't have an abortion. [Electronic] *Spiked*, 21. July. Available: <http://www.spiked-online.com/site/article/10913/> [2012-04-22]

Rouso-Schindler, S. (N/A) Israeli Population Politics and its Impact on Policy and Palestinian Human Rights. Available: http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Population_Politics/PopPolitics/Rouso-Schindler.pdf [2012-10-03]

Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. Stockholm: Ordfronts Förlag.

Sand, S. (2010). *The Invention of the Jewish People*. London: Verso.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2009). *Militarization and Violence against Women in Conflict Zones in the Middle East*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sperling, D. (2010). Commanding the “Be Fruitful and Multiply” Directive: Reproductive Ethics, Law, and Policy in Israel. *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp 363-371

The critical demographic factor. (2005). [Electronic] *Friends of Efrat*. Available: <http://www.friendsofefrat.org/critical-demographic-factor.php> [2012-04-22]

The founding principles of the Communist Party of Israel. (2011). [Electronic] *The Communist Party of Israel*. Available: <http://maki.org.il/en/documents/11096-the-founding-principles-of-the-communist-party-of-israel> [2012-12-23]

Youmans, W. (2002). Israel’s Demographic Obsession. [Electronic] *Counterpunch*, 7. July.
Available: <http://www.counterpunch.org/2002/12/07/israel-s-demographic-obsession/> [2013-01-03]

Yuval-Davis, N. (1987). The Jewish Collectivity. *Women in the Middle East*. pp. 60-94. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender and Nation*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Yuval-Davis, N. (2007). Intersectionality, Citizenship and Contemporary Politics of Belonging. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 561-574

Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). *The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Zureik, E. (2001). Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 205-227