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## “My way or the highway”?

A study of cooperation within the United Nations Security  
Council

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# Abstract

In this thesis I studied how the level of cooperation has changed in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the Cold War, as the international arena went from being a bipolar power structure to a unipolar one. My perspective on cooperation was based on the theory of realism. In order to answer these questions I analyzed veto usage and the resolutions as indicators of cooperation. Veto usage was studied through a descriptive method while the resolutions were analyzed based upon word-count, a quantitative text-analysis method. The method was applied on all adopted resolutions in 1983 and in 2010.

It was clear from the result that the cooperation level in the UNSC had increased since the Cold War, though the resolutions have to be studied more in order to draw further conclusions. Further research should be conducted in order to develop a better understanding of resolutions as an indicator of cooperation and negotiation within the UNSC.

Key words: United Nations Security Council, Resolutions, Cooperation

Words: 8669

# Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Background .....	1
1.2	Problem and purpose .....	3
1.3	Method and material.....	4
1.4	Limitations .....	6
1.5	Selection of cases and delimitations.....	7
1.6	Theoretical contemplation.....	8
1.7	Outline.....	8
<b>2</b>	<b>Theory .....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1	Realism and power-based cooperation.....	9
2.1.1	Hypothesis.....	10
2.2	Reasoning during negotiations .....	11
2.2.1	The median voter theorem.....	11
2.2.2	Logrolling.....	12
<b>3</b>	<b>Veto usage.....</b>	<b>14</b>
3.1	Results and Analysis .....	14
3.2	Conclusion.....	16
<b>4</b>	<b>The adopted resolutions 1983 and 2010.....</b>	<b>17</b>
4.1	Results and Analyze .....	17
4.2	Conclusion.....	23
<b>5</b>	<b>Summary.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>References.....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>27</b>
7.1	The resolution format .....	27
7.2	Conjugations “cooperate” and “decide” .....	29
7.3	Regression analysis .....	29
7.3.1	Word total and the presence of CD 1983 .....	30
7.3.2	Word total and the presence of CD 2010 .....	31
7.4	t-test.....	32

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

Since the Second World War, an increased level of cooperation in the world has been sought after (Dunne 2011, p. 106). According to Robert O Keohane cooperation is defined as “...when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.” (Keohane 2005, p. 51-52). There has been increased interdependence and reciprocity among nations with increased free trade areas and bilateral and multilateral agreements. Thus it could be concluded that cooperation in the world has increased. (Dunne 2011, p. 106-108) One of the facilitators of global cooperation is the United Nations (UN). Created after the failure of the League of Nations and the Second World War, the organization’s purpose was to make sure that the Second World War would not repeat itself. The shared threat of another war united countries around the world with common goals. These goals are summarized in the United Nations’ four aims:

- to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

(Taylor, Curtis 2011, p. 312)

The United Nations has six principal bodies. The most influential is the Security Council (UNSC). The Security Council’s aim is to maintain peace, security and stability in the world. The Security Council is the only institution within the UN that has power above national sovereignty. In this sense the Council is capable of making decisions that the nation in question does not approve of, such as imposing economic sanctions and ceasefires. Other organs of the UN, such as the General Assembly, only have power to advice member states. (Taylor, Curtis 2011, p. 312-313)

The Security Council has 15 members. Five of which (USA, France, UK, China and Russia) are permanent. The remaining ten members are not permanent and their seats in the Security Council rotate every second year. Only the permanent members are allowed to use veto. Veto is a “no” vote by a permanent member and

is often used when a resolution conflicts with the interests of a permanent member. The veto causes the resolution to be abolished, unlike a “no” vote by a non-permanent member. However, all members can abstain from taking part in the voting process. An abstention is a milder version of a “no” vote. One takes a stand against an issue, but not as strongly as choosing to vote against it. (Taylor, Curtis 2011, p. 312-313, 315, 317)

The UNSC is an international regime that conducts rule-based cooperation. An international regime is defined as an international institution dealing with a specific issue (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 11), which Keohane describes as “...sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” (Keohane 2005, p. 57). Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger discuss three perspectives on international regimes and rule-based cooperation in their book *Theories of international regimes*. The perspectives are interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based. These are based on three different international relation theories: Neoliberalism, Realism and Constructivism respectively. Constructivism is concerned with how knowledge and access to it structures the international arena, causing some nations to be more powerful than others. Neoliberals argue that cooperation in the world can be achieved through unification around common interests and can be facilitated through international institutions, where nations base their strategies on absolute gains. Realists argue instead that nations base their strategies on relative gains and that it is the distribution of power that structures the international arena. (2009, p. 1-2)

The realists explain that in the international anarchical arena there is a constant struggle for increasing and maintaining power. Power is seen as the amount of resources an actor has, and the strength of their bargaining position. Nations in the international arena are not only concerned about their own gain of power, but about their competitors’ degree of power as well. Since the international arena is anarchical, all nations have to assure their own power. (Waltz 2008, p. 78-79, 218) The power structure, or the balance of power of the international arena, clarifies who takes part in decision making: who sets the rules, and who benefits (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 106). There are three types of power structures: bipolar, unipolar and multipolar. In a bipolar formation, there are two great powers. These powers in this case balance each other out, and by facing external pressure there is an increased chance that international regimes based on a bipolar structure of the international arena are better-managed than other power structures. (Waltz 2008, p. 114)

During the Cold War the balance of power was bipolar. The two dominant powers were the United States and the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War the bipolar structure was followed by a unipolar structure, where the US became the dominant actor due to its success in the Cold War. (Waltz 2008, p. 213, 347) A unipolar structure is unstable, and increases uncertainty in the international arena,

due to the, weaker actors' aims to strengthen their positions (Waltz 2008, p. 215). It is therefore interesting to discuss what happens with the level of cooperation, when the international power structure changes from bipolar to unipolar.

A change in the balance of power from a bipolar to a unipolar structure would be most visible in the issue of security. Security is one of the most fundamental questions of a nation, and it is even more important according to realist theories than increasing their power (Waltz 2008, p. 79). The importance of the issue leads to a great amount of difficulty in finding cooperation among nations as each individual nation will focus on its own security regardless of the others. Therefore, if a security matter contradicts a nation's interest they are the most unwilling to cooperate. (Baylis 2011, p. 232-234; Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 117) Due to the visibility of security issues in relation to power structures the UNSC would be a great example of an international regime to study the change in the balance of power after the Cold War from bipolar to unipolar and its effect on the level of cooperation.

## 1.2 Problem and purpose

My research questions are:

- *Did the unipolar power structure of the international arena created after the Cold War have an increasing or decreasing effect of the cooperation level in the UN Security Council?*
- *Is the increased or decreased cooperation level reflected in the UN Security Council's resolutions?*

The purpose of my thesis is to test if the cooperation level has increased due to the change in the balance of power, when it went from a bipolar to a unipolar structure, after the Cold War. The cooperation indicators that will answer the questions are the veto usage and the resolutions. Veto usage will merely be used as a complement to the study of resolutions. By answering the second question the resolutions as possible cooperation indicators are being tested. I have not encountered any article or scientific material studying the resolutions regarding the cooperation level. The studies that I have encountered have been regarding why a specific decision was taken in a certain area and the consequences of that decision, and since it has not been studied before I will merely be able to suggest an answer. The first question on the other hand has been more researched and is possible to answer with a higher degree of certainty.

### 1.3 Method and material

The thesis is a case study of cooperation within the UNSC using their resolutions. A case study is when you have a case and two observations within the same context of that case. My observations are all of the adopted resolutions in 1983, and in 2010, which are the main materials used in this study (the motivation of the observations will be discussed in section 1.5). (Esaiasson et. al 2008, p. 108-110) The study is of a “most likely” character, which rests upon the idea that if the theory cannot be supported here, it is unlikely that it will gain support in other cases (resolutions in other years). The main weakness with a case study is that it is only based on one case and it is therefore difficult to make generalizations (Teorell, Svensson 2007, p. 154-155, 230).

The thesis will be divided into two parts, according to the two cooperation indicators, veto usage and the resolutions. The first part will be based on the veto usage as a cooperation indicator, and conclude if the cooperation has increased or decreased, answering the first question. The question is of a descriptive character, which means that the method will also be descriptive. A descriptive method is often used when you describe a change. (Esaiasson et. al 2008, p. 36-37) The change that will be studied is noted previously the change in the balance of power after the end of the Cold War. Veto usage was chosen due to my idea inference that, if the veto use has decreased, then the cooperation has increased. The veto right is within its function an expression of domination. In that sense by studying the veto usage you also study the level of domination. The opposite of domination is cooperation. Therefore if the number and percentage of veto usage has decreased, cooperation has increased within the Security Council. In order to save time and put focus on the second part of my thesis I will use veto statistics from Global Policy Forum that will constitute the result. Global Policy Forum is a non-governmental organization with the aim to analyze the UN and they have the most extensive website in the area of global policy (Global Policy Forum 3).

The second and main part of the thesis will be devoted to study the resolutions. The method I will use is a quantitative text analysis with the purpose to conduct a word-count. A quantitative study is often conducted by the formulation of a hypothesis. My hypothesis will be presented in section 2.1.1 along with the theoretical discussion. Word-count is a method included in content analysis that is conducted by counting one or several specific words. By studying the frequency of a word it is possible to see how much a certain value, attitude or idea is reflected in a text. A greater frequency indicates that the value is more emphasized, and that the value is of greater importance to the writer. I will conduct a descriptive analysis which focuses on analyzing differences and similarities between texts, which is as previously stated between the adopted resolutions in 1983 and in 2010. (Esaiasson mfl. 2008 p. 197-200) With a

quantitative method I am able to go through resolutions faster than if I would have chosen a qualitative text analysis method, such as a discourse analysis. A quantitative text analysis is a preferable option when generalizing about more extensive material. The more resolutions I am able to go through, the better generalization I will be able to make. (Boréus & Bergström 2005, p. 53-55)

When a quantitative text analysis is conducted one has to use an analysis scheme and have rules about how the frequency should be interpreted (Esaiasson mfl. 2008 p. 198, 200). Since there is no other study in this field I cannot use an existing scheme and will therefore create one. The analysis scheme will be presented in the results as a matrix. In the rows are the units (the resolutions) and in the columns are the cooperation indicators of the cooperation level in the resolutions. (Teorell, Svensson 2007, p. 92)

The indicators in my analysis scheme are:

- Frequency of the word “cooperate”; The more cooperation is emphasized in the resolution, the greater importance it constitute for the UNSC.
- Frequency of the word “decide”; The better you cooperate, the better you are at taking decisions. Decide is mainly used as an operative (action) word in resolutions, which are written in italics and tells what should be done. (UNSC 1, UNSC 2)
- The number of abstended or “no” voted resolutions; Note here that the “no” vote is only used by a non-permanent member, otherwise it would be a veto. If one or several actors have abstained or voted against a resolution it is a sign of less cooperation, since they could not approve of the content of the resolution. The other actors have in that sense failed to meet a non-approving actor half way. This cooperation indicator is a dummy variable which means that I have quantified a qualitative variable. This can be done only when there are two outcomes. Each of the outcome is given a number, either 0 or 1. (Körner, Wahlgren, 2006, p. 400)

In order to conduct the analyzsis I will convert the PDF files of the resolutions the UNSC provides in their database into Microsoft Word documents. With the aim of strengthening my results and testing their significance, I conducted a regression analysis and a t-test. The total amount of words must be counted and included in the analysis scheme. The regression analysis (to test the strength of a relationship) and t-test (to compare means) will be presented in appendix 7.3 and 7.4 respectively where I will provide thorough explanation of what a regression analysis and a t-test are, and why they are conducted. The regression analysis is hard to make without enough background knowledge, which is hard to have the first time something is studied. Though I have chosen to include it, I have given it lower relevance by placing it in appendix in order to provide as much information as possible from my data for further studies.

## 1.4 Limitations

The main weakness of a quantitative text analysis is the contextual problem. The contextual problem is that one word has in different contexts different meanings. For example, words can within themselves have different meanings, words could develop over time, and in different countries words could have different meanings. One word is also written in different conjugations. (Boréus & Bergström 2005, p. 53-55) In appendix 7.2 there is a list of the different conjugations of the words I have chosen. Further information on the resolution format provided by the UN will be included in appendix 7.1. This critique of the quantitative text analysis method questions “cooperation” and “decide” as possible indicators. I could have chosen other words as well, perhaps there are words that would be more suitable for the purpose. However, I have to make a decision based on what I presume, and I presume that they are acceptable cooperation indicators of the resolution. I chose those two words and I suggest to future researchers to use other words, and more words, to see if the trend is the same as I found. The resolutions could also be questioned, perhaps they cannot be regarded as cooperation indicators since they could be used by members to change the *perception of their* cooperation level rather than showing the true level of cooperation.

The abstention could be criticized in the sense that it is unclear why it is being used and how it differs from the veto. It does not indicate exactly why a permanent member chooses to abstain instead of using their veto. Another limitation of the thesis is the question of unipolarity. There are theorists who claim that a multipolar system was formed after the end of the Cold War and not a unipolar one (Buzan, Hansen 2011, p. 50-51). The theory I have chosen is based on the realistic view, which will be discussed in the theoretical contemplation. Since the realistic view suggest that the change of balance of power has gone from bipolar to unipolar I will base my thesis accordingly. A weakness with my study is that the year 2010 and 1983 could contain abnormalities.

The fact that I am the first to research the cooperation level using resolutions as an indicator gives that part of the thesis a lower reliability. Reliability is the repeated study of a subject by the same or several scientists that generates the same result. If the same method is used the repeated studies should have the same answer, otherwise there is low reliability. If the study is the first one the result has not been repeated and in that sense it has a low reliability. Logical contemplation is of greater importance in areas which are not previously researched compared to when theory and material are already well-established. The level of reliability is also negatively affected by the presence of unsystematic errors. (Teorell, Svensson 2007, p. 59) In my thesis a source of error could be that there were some

electronic obstacles when the resolutions in 1983 were converted from PDF files to Microsoft Word documents.

## 1.5 Selection of cases and delimitations

I will study resolutions adopted in 2010 and 1983. It should be noted that the ten non-permanent members are rotating every second year, thus the composition of members in the UNSC was not the same in 1983 as it was in 2010. I have chosen the adopted resolutions since they were agreed upon, and there is no point looking at the failed resolutions since cooperation has in those cases failed. I am going to study the operational text of the resolution, and not include any appendix of a resolution. The years 2010 and 1983 were chosen due to the level of veto in those years. As can be seen in table 1, there were no vetoes in 2010, which means that the level of cooperation was at the maximum according to my idea (if the veto use has decreased then the cooperation has increased). The year 1983 was randomly chosen from a decade which had, according to table 1, the highest veto usage since the Second World War and therefore the lowest level of cooperation. The reason to why I choose to have two extremes is because as discussed previously it should not be taken for granted that the cooperation level can be seen in the resolutions. If it is possible to see an increased cooperation level between 1983 and 2010, it is arguable that the trend can be seen in other years as well. By comparing the adopted resolutions of 1983 - the year from the period of time with the least amount of cooperation, and the year 2010 - where there was the highest amount of cooperation, I will be able to indicate over time how the cooperation level within the resolutions has changed.

I will not discuss the topics that are discussed in the Security Council or their degree of sensitivity, for example the reasons why a permanent member might use the veto, or if there are certain topics that are more frequently vetoed. Instead I suggest the degree of sensitivity for further studies. Another suggestion is that different reasons for veto usage could be studied in relation to the level of cooperation, for example the level of democracy, level of GDP and economical interdependence. I will also exclude any norm discussion, although a normative thesis could be done, discussing the change of cooperation through the normative change in the UNSC. This is also a suggestion for further studies. Research of the practical process behind resolution production is suggested and emphasized as a necessity for further research.

I could perhaps have conducted interviews but it would be difficult due to the lack of time and if I conducted the interviews it is unlikely that I would gain any true information since I cannot expect that the interviewees would tell me their countries' interests for a particular question. It would also be hard to make comparisons through the interviews between countries and over time. This would though be necessary for coming researchers in the area to do.

## 1.6 Theoretical contemplation

As mentioned in section 1.1 there are different perspectives on international regimes, or rule-based cooperation. In the book *Theories of international regimes* written by Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger they are naming three, power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based (2009, p. 1-2). I have chosen to analyze UNSC from a power-based perspective and therefore use the theory of realism. In addition to the aforementioned work, I will also use the famous realistic theorist Kenneth N. Waltz's book *Realism and international politics* (2008). Gordon Tullock's book *The Vote motive* (2006), first published 1976, could be used as a critique for my theory, since it is more concerned with interest-based and a neorealistic view of cooperation, though it will in this case be used as a complement. A resolution is a result of a negotiation process, thus in order to study resolutions one has to use theory based on negotiation, and Tullock's book offers deeper understanding of negotiations than Waltz and Hasenclevers' books does. He is, together with James M Buchanan, one of the most famous public choice theorists. (Tullock 2006, p. 9-10)

The thesis will be a combination of theory testing and theory developing. Theory-testing means that you try a theory on empirical material in order to reject or accept a hypothesis. The hypothesis will be in section 2.1.1, according to the theory of realism. Theory developing is conducted through developing new explanations to what is studied. As mentioned previously I have not encountered any theories or articles/journals/books about the cooperation level in resolutions. This means that I am discovering new ground and have to choose a theory I consider relevant, taking the theory one step further. It is important here to note that there are no pure theory testing or theory developing methods since they cannot exist without each other. One cannot conduct a research without having any sense of which theory is relevant when the hypothesis is formulated, and it is not possible to develop a theory without knowing what the outcome will be and what the theoretical limits are. (Esaiasson mfl. 2008, p. 40-42)

## 1.7 Outline

The theory and hypothesis will be presented in chapter 2. The veto usage will be presented in chapter 3, together with the results, analysis and conclusion. The result and analysis, and conclusion from the resolutions will be presented in chapter 4. The final chapter, chapter 5 is a summary of the analysis and answer to my research questions. In the appendix, which is chapter 7, the format of the resolution writing will be included, as well as the conjugations of "cooperate" and "decide", the regression analysis and the t-test.

## 2 Theory

The theory of realism and power-based cooperation will be presented in section 2.1 based on the book by Kenneth Waltz (2008), and the book by Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (2009). These two books and the theory of realism will be the base from which a hypothesis will be drawn. Section 2.1 will be complemented with 2.2 reasoning during negotiations from Gordon Tullock's book *The vote motive* (2006). Tullock's book will support the discussions of the resolutions.

### 2.1 Realism and power-based cooperation

After the end of the Cold War the bipolar system was, due to the US success and Soviet Union failure, transformed into a unipolar structure (Waltz 2008, p. 213-214). A unipolar structure, as mentioned in the introduction, causes an insecure and unbalanced international arena. The unipolar situation is unbalanced since the dominant power will take on too many responsibilities, for example, maintain regimes and help to protect weaker nations. When a nation has a lot of power there is a tendency for other nations to mistrust its intentions, and the mistrust will cause conflicts to break out. In order to balance the power the weaker nations will cooperate with each other against the dominant nation. Therefore the balancing of power is a result of their struggle for survival. (Waltz 2008, p. 87, 214, 215, 222, 348) A multipolar system will emerge since the nations will rise in power due to their struggle for increasing their power, and the dominant nation will decline in power due to the too heavy burden to maintain regimes and being used by weaker nations. (Waltz 2008, p. 216, 221)

Hegemonic stability theory explains more thoroughly the unstable situation in a unipolar structure and the advantage for the international regimes it creates "... the theory of hegemonic stability which links the existence of effective international institutions to a unipolar configuration of power in the issue-area in question." (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 84) A hegemonic nation is one that controls resources, markets, capital, and has a comparative advantage in the trade of high-valued goods (Keohane 2005, p. 137-138). The dominant power in a unipolar structure is a hegemony, and they cause the international regimes to be effective since they force the members to comply with the rules, and therefore the regimes will be more inclined to achieve their objectives than when it is a multipolar formation. The members would not abide by the rules if the hegemony would not force them to, because they would rather see to their own interests than the regime's interest. (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 86)

The fact that the dominant nation spends time and energy to unite the regime, increases its already high amount of responsibilities, and in this sense their own interests would be harder to achieve. Stability in the global arena can be seen as a public good. That is a good which everyone is free to consume without exclusivity. The fact that you cannot exclude anyone from using the public good creates a problem, since it is possible to use without paying for it. This gives the other actors fewer incentives to pay and contribute for the good, which is called the free rider problem. The weaker nations on the international arena become free riders: they expect the dominant power to provide stability and do not feel bound to contribute to its existence. The dominant nation can be more or less successful in causing the other members to contribute, but even though it is powerful it will eventually become a too heavy burden for them to bear, and they will eventually lose their hegemonic position. (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 86, 88, 91)

Though the unipolar structure is an unbalanced and insecure state for the international arena to be in, it can increase the level of cooperation in the international regimes due to a “modern realist perspective” as Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger calls it. (2009, p. 113) This new perspective of realism argues that the nations’ struggle for own relative gains can be ignored as they are much more concerned with preserving their power rather than increasing it at the expense of others, as defensive positionalists. If there is increased insecurity it can create a reason for cooperation in case there is a reasonable distribution of gains and losses. A regime is effective when the members comply with the rules, and then it is easier for states to accept relative losses, because they would understand that what they lose in one question they would gain in another. Therefore due to the modern realists increased insecurity could increase cooperation if the international regime is well managed. (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 2009, p. 117-120, 123, 125)

### 2.1.1 Hypothesis

The modern realists propose that the cooperation level in international regimes can increase due to increased international insecurity, which in turn increases nations’ defensiveness. The insecurity that follows gives a reason for cooperation, and if the international regimes are well managed the level of cooperation might increase. According to the hegemonic stability theory a unipolar structure with a dominant power increases the effectiveness of international regimes, and combined with the insecure international arena, caused by the unipolar power structure, the level of cooperation would increase. My hypothesis is therefore that *a unipolar power structure, in the international arena, causes an increased cooperation level in an international regime.* The independent variable is the unipolar power balance, and the dependent variable is the level of cooperation.

## 2.2 Reasoning during negotiations

A resolution is the result of one or several discussions and negotiations. Therefore in order to study the resolutions we have to use theory concerning consensus, negotiation and cooperation. The theory consists of two sections 2.2.1 (The median voter theorem) and 2.2.2 (Logrolling), based on Gordon Tullock's book *The vote motive* (2006).

### 2.2.1 The median voter theorem


“Voters and customers are essentially the same people” (Tullock 2006, p. 37). Both of them will choose the best bargain in order to maximize their profit. A customer is the buyer of a good or service. The voter is the buyer of a common solution, from which he contributes by giving up the optimal solution. Everyone has different optimal solutions on how to distribute common resources and the government (the distributor of the common resources financed by taxes) is merely the result of the majority and foresees the individual optimal solution. When people vote, it could be considered how much they think about other people's optimal solutions and how much they are willing to sacrifice their well being for someone else's. (Tullock 2006, p. 37-38, 41-47)

Even though Tullock discusses voters on a national level it is still applicable to the UNSC since they fundamentally have the same purpose. The UNSC has common resources, just like a national government. They manage these resources through their vote. A common resource could be economic sanctions. The UNSC consists of members with different interests. A resolution could therefore mean that some members will receive negative consequences. (Taylor, Curtis 2011, p. 313-314) Tullock states that voters do care about others well being though their sacrifice will have a price. Voters care most about what concerns themselves and only occasionally what concerns others, depending if they receive something in return and in that case how much. (Tullock 2006, p. 61)

An example of a problem where different actors have different optimum solutions could be the tax level. In diagram 2 it is explained how three different voters have different optimum tax preferences. The higher tax results in a greater police force. The more likely you are to be the victim of a crime the more willing you are to pay a higher tax. In other words, your tax preference and sacrifice depends on your personal closeness to the issue. The greater you feel in an issue the more interest you have. It comes to a point where you do not feel that the greater police force is worth paying a tax for. According to diagram 2 person A is the median voter. Tullock defines the median voter as “The voter in the middle, i.e. the voter who has many voters on either side of him. In multi-dimensional applications, the

median voter has to have the same number of voters on either side of him by all directions.” (Tullock 2006, p. 29). B prefers a lower tax and smaller police force and C prefers a higher tax and a larger police force. The tax of A will be adopted since A covers the majority. The two extremes B and C have to give in for the median. In theory and in the practice the average man’s solution will always be adopted since his solution is a compromise of the extremes. (Tullock 2006, p. 49-51) The average man is also powerful since he will always get his will through. “If a number of voters with different views on an issue choose by majority voting, the outcome will be the median voter.” (Tullock 2006, p. 50).

Diagram 2: Voting pattern



(Tullock 2006, p. 49)

The median voter theorem assumes that everyone feels equally about an issue. In practice that is more or less impossible. There will always be different feelings and different interests. Furthermore, the more you argue and persuade others, the more likely you are to get your will through. The argument has to be stronger the further it is from the median voter. In real life it is difficult to know what the median solution is, but if there is two strong opinions the median would be as previously stated the compromise between the two, which both extremes could, according to the median voter theorem agree upon. (Tullock 2006, p. 53-54, 59)

## 2.2.2 Logrolling

Tullock defines logrolling as “I agree to vote for something you want in return for your agreeing to vote for something I want.” (Tullock 2006, p. 77) Logrolling takes place when an agreement shall be decided upon but there are parties having different interests and feel different intensively about different questions. In many cases logrolling is conducted indirectly behind the curtains. (Tullock 2006, p. 79-81, 83)

Assume there are two decisions, which have to be either accepted or rejected. The two actors feel strongly about one subject each. The differences cause them to negotiate until they either amend the different solutions in favor of the other actor's interest, or they agree to vote for each other's topics. In some cases there could even be in one solution, for example in my case a resolution, other non-relevant topics included, due to bargains. If logrolling were not possible both of the decisions would fail, since they would not find a common ground and survive after voting. Bargain and mutual trust provides the solution where you offer something in return for the other part to agree with you. In that case both parties would gain the support of each other. The issues are accepted, but not as perfectly as their optimal solution, if they would be amended. Logrolling becomes explicit in the way the actors vote. The closer to consensus the better the cooperation is. Logrolling is all about compromising in order to please the majority and persuade the median voter. The better you are at logrolling the more support will you gain. (Tullock 2006, p. 83-87)

The benefit of logrolling is that decisions and resolutions will be enabled that would not have been enabled otherwise. Instead of voting against a decision actors bargain and agree to vote for each other's proposals based on the other actors doing something in return. The defects of logrolling are increased costs for example, the bargaining cost. Bargains are harder the more actors take part, because the more actors you have to convince that your idea is the best option, the longer time it takes. The more actors that the lobbyist wants to support the idea, the more time and effort it will take. Consensus would be the most time consuming. The cost is created by you not solving the problem and the time you could have spent solving other problems. The sacrifice you make voting for something other than your optimal solution is also a cost. The decisions are perhaps not near the optimal decision, but still it is a decision because there is a cost of no decision and solution to a problem. (Tullock 2006, p. 42, 43, 45, 88-92) An example is the UNSC when they cannot agree upon a humanitarian intervention in a country. There is a cost in human lives where people suffer more than if the UNSC would have adopted a resolution that could have saved them. Perhaps it would not be the best way to conduct the operation but still they would do something. Logrolling costs time and effort but, as noted, a decision is better than no decision at all.

The median voter theorem and logrolling explains how the different parties reason when they write the resolutions. They will follow the median voter's opinion, which encompasses the majority, and there are often ideas lost and sacrificed in order to make a decision everyone can agree upon through logrolling. The theory of logrolling and the median voter theorem is important to have in the back of the mind when the resolutions will be analyzed, since a resolution is the end product of a negotiation.

### 3 Veto usage

The study of veto usage will be conducted according to my idea, which was that if veto usage decreases there is an increased level of cooperation, due to the decline of domination by the permanent members. The results will be received from Global policy forum and presented in one table and two graphs. Graph 1 is derived from the values of table 1, which explains the veto usage from 1946 to 2012 and which permanent member who used it. Graph 2 visualizes the relation of the number of resolutions, the number of vetoes and the percentage that the veto usage constituted each year 1946-1991.

#### 3.1 Results and Analysis


Table 1: Number of times Veto were cast by the permanent members

Period	China*	France	Britain	US	USSR/ Russia	Total
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>269</b>
2012	2	-	-	-	2	2
2011	1	-	-	1	1	3
2010	-	-	-	-	-	-
2009	-	-	-	-	1	1
2008	1	-	-	-	1	2
2007	1	-	-	-	1	2
2006	-	-	-	2	-	2
2005	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	-	-	-	2	1	3
2003	-	-	-	2	-	2
2002	-	-	-	2	-	2
2001	-	-	-	2	-	2
2000	-	-	-	-	-	0
1999	1	-	-	-	-	1
1998	-	-	-	-	-	0
1997	1	-	-	2	-	3
1996	-	-	-	-	-	0
1986-95	-	3	8	24	2	37
1976-85	-	9	11	34	6	60
1966-75	2	2	10	12	7	33
1956-65	-	2	3	-	26	31
1946-55	(1*)	2	-	-	80	83

*\*Between 1946 and 1971, the Chinese seat on the Security Council was occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan), which used the veto only once (to block Mongolia's application for membership in 1955). The first veto exercised by the present occupant, the People's Republic of China, was therefore not until 25 August 1972.*


(Global Policy Fourm 2)

Graph 1: Changing pattern in the use of Veto



(Global Policy Forum 2)

Graph 2: Security Council resolutions passed and vetoed 1946-1992



(Global Policy Forum 1)

From table 1 and graph 1 we can make the following observations:

- The number of vetoes has declined, especially after the end of the Cold War in the 90s. After the year 2010 the veto use has slightly increased again.
- China's veto usage has increased rapidly since 2007. Their veto usage during the period 2007-2012 is the same as 1946-2006.
- Russia and the USA are the ones who have used veto the most.

- A weakness with table and diagram is that the early years are displayed in decades, while recently years are shown year-by-year, which makes it hard to say exact which year in 86-95 the vetoes began to decline.

Graph 2 shows the relationship between the number of cases in the UNSC, and the cases that have been vetoed. The percentage of vetoed resolutions has declined from around 30% in 1986 to almost 0% in 1991. In the early 90s we can see how the number of resolutions dramatically increases while the veto use at the same time dramatically decreases. This is due to the end of the Cold War. The weakness of the graph is that it ends at 1992.

From 1946 to the beginning of the 1990s it can be seen from the result that there was a high amount of veto usage. In section 1.1, the theory was introduced and it was said that the bipolar power structure have more effective international regimes than other power structures. This can be questioned due to the decreased level of veto usage. The US and the Soviet Union used the vetoes in order to make sure that a resolution would not benefit others at their own expense. Due to the idea that if the veto usage decreases the cooperation level will increase, it can be concluded from the result that the cooperation level has increased. This is supported by the modern realism theory, saying that the cooperation level in a international regime can increase in times of increased insecurity if the regime is well managed, which it is according to the hegemonic theory when it is a unipolar power structure. Thus the increased insecurity caused by the shift in the balance of power from a bipolar to a unipolar structure after the Cold War increased the level of the cooperation in the UNSC.

## 3.2 Conclusion

As modern realism theory indicates, the cooperation level has increased since the Cold War. This can be seen in the results due to the dramatic decline of veto usage. Therefore the answer to the question: *Did the unipolar power structure of the international arena created after the Cold War have an increasing or decreasing effect of the cooperation level in the UN Security Council?* Is that the cooperation level in the UNSC has increased and the hypothesis *a unipolar power structure, in the international arena, causes an increased cooperation level in an international regime*, is therefore accepted.

## 4 The adopted resolutions 1983 and 2010

In chapter 3 it was concluded that the cooperation level in the UNSC has increased since the end of the Cold War. Through the analysis scheme discussed in the introduction I will see if the same trend can be seen in the resolutions focusing on the second question: *Is the increased or decreased cooperation level reflected in the UN Security Council's resolutions?*

### 4.1 Results and Analyze


The result of the resolutions using the analysis scheme will be presented in the matrixes below. The variables are: if the resolution was abstained or voted “no”, the presence of the word “cooperate” and the presence of the word “decide”. Note that CD is the name of “cooperate” + “decide”, and that “cooperate” and “decide” in the presented result includes different conjugations. For the list of conjugations see appendix 7.2. All the calculations are answered with an accuracy of two decimals.

Table 2: 1983

1983									
Resolution number	Word total	Abstention or "No" voted resolution	Cooperate	Decide	CD	CD%			
545	359	1	0	1	1	0,28			
544	179	0	1	0	1	0,56			
543	84	0	0	1	1	1,19			
542	218	0	0	0	0	0,00			
541	348	1	1	0	1	0,29			
540	407	1	1	0	1	0,25			
539	563	1	1	1	2	0,36			
538	200	1	1	1	2	1,00			
537	34	0	0	0	0	0,00			
536	206	1	1	1	2	0,97			
535	207	0	0	1	1	0,48			
534	236	0	0	0	0	0,00			
533	197	0	0	0	0	0,00			
532	285	0	1	2	3	1,05			
531	92	0	0	1	1	1,09			
530	407	0	1	0	1	0,25			
529	156	1	1	1	2	1,28			
Sum	17	4178	7	9	10	19			

(Resolutions received from UNSC 1)

Graph 3: The percentage of “cooperate” and “decides” presence in each resolution 1983 (CD% 1983)



Tabel 3: 2010

2010							
Resolution number	Word total	Abstention or "No" voted resolution	Cooperate	Decide	CD	CD%	
1966	769	1	3	13	16	2,08	
1965	187	0	0	1	1	0,53	
1964	2190	0	1	11	12	0,55	
1963	2378	0	12	2	14	0,59	
1962	1605	0	3	6	9	0,56	
1961	1393	0	6	5	11	0,79	
1960	2234	0	2	1	3	0,13	
1959	1563	0	1	1	2	0,13	
1958	888	1	0	1	1	0,11	
1957	469	0	1	3	4	0,85	
1956	809	0	0	7	7	0,87	
1955	643	0	0	4	4	0,62	
1954	506	0	0	4	4	0,79	
1953	1317	1	1	2	3	0,23	
1952	2101	0	4	6	10	0,48	
1951	156	0	1	2	3	1,92	
1950	2898	0	14	2	16	0,55	
1949	1493	0	1	2	3	0,20	
1948	2348	0	11	1	12	0,51	
1947	208	0	0	1	1	0,48	
1946	1540	0	3	8	11	0,71	
1945	1417	1	4	4	8	0,56	
1944	2227	0	1	3	4	0,18	
1943	2138	0	8	2	10	0,47	
1942	239	0	0	2	2	0,84	
1941	1333	0	0	2	2	0,15	
1940	301	0	2	2	4	1,33	
1939	1065	0	1	3	4	0,38	
1938	1261	0	1	2	3	0,24	
1937	1009	0	3	2	5	0,50	
1936	1082	0	0	3	3	0,28	
1935	2258	0	1	2	3	0,13	
1934	184	0	0	1	1	0,54	
1933	3676	0	3	4	7	0,19	
1932	910	0	3	5	8	0,88	
1931	999	0	1	5	6	0,60	
1930	1252	1	1	2	3	0,24	
1929	4946	1	9	24	33	0,67	
1928	263	0	1	2	3	1,14	
1927	956	0	1	2	3	0,31	
1926	117	0	0	1	1	0,85	
1925	3297	0	9	7	16	0,49	
1924	156	0	0	3	3	1,92	
1923	3078	0	4	8	12	0,39	
1922	119	0	0	2	2	1,68	
1921	1031	0	1	3	4	0,39	
1920	939	0	2	2	4	0,43	
1919	2333	0	6	2	8	0,34	
1918	952	0	1	1	2	0,21	
1917	4699	0	27	2	29	0,62	
1916	1667	0	2	5	7	0,42	
1915	375	0	0	3	3	0,80	
1914	117	0	0	1	1	0,85	
1913	127	0	0	2	2	1,57	
1912	1827	0	4	2	6	0,33	
1911	1738	0	1	3	4	0,23	
1910	1856	0	1	2	3	0,16	
1909	1004	0	1	3	4	0,40	
1908	195	0	0	2	2	1,03	
<b>Sum</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>80838</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>372</b>	

(Resolutions received from UNSC 2)

Table 4: Equations

1983		2010	
% CD 1983	0,45	% CD 2010	0,46
% Abstention or "No" voted resolution 1983	41,18	% Abstention or "No" voted resolution 2010	10,17
Average of Cooperate and Decides presence in each resolution 1983	0,53	Average of Cooperate and Decides presence in each resolution 2010	0,62
Average word /resolution	245,76	Average word /resolution	1370,14

Firstly we can see that the number of adopted resolutions has increased, from 17 in 1983 to 59 in 2010. This is a percentage increase of about 347%, which is quite a high increase. On one hand, it could be reasoned that it is due to an increased cooperation level causing the UNSC to be more capable of taking decisions. On the other hand the increased percentage could be due to increased responsibilities of the UNSC, rather than an increase in the cooperation level. Even though the cooperation level is not the underlying variable it is indirectly since the UNSC would not get increased responsibilities if they could not cooperate and be capable of taking decisions. In both cases the international regime would be stronger (more capable of making decisions and achieving their objects), which the hegemonic stability theory describes will happen if it is a unipolar structure. An interesting observation is that the number of words has increased from 4178 in 1983 to 80838 in 2010, which is an increase of 1940%. It is hard to draw any conclusions regarding the cooperation level, because the amount of words could be dependent on many things for example the language, where a change in the language could mean a change in the amount of words.

“%CD” is the total use of CD divided by the word total that year. In other words it is the probability that “cooperate” and “decide” is present in a resolution for that year. In table 4 we can first of all see that the % CD difference between 1983 and 2010 is an increase of 0,01%. At a first glance 0,01% is a very slight increase, but when one calculates what an increase of 0,01% means in terms of “cooperate” and “decide” usage, the increase is more visible. If we take 0,01% times 4 178 = 4, 178 (the total amounts of words used 1983) we can see that the increase means that “cooperate” and “decide” would be present in the resolutions 4, 178 more times. In percentage this is an increase of the CD usage 1983 by  $(4, 178/19 \approx 0, 22 = 22\%)$  22%. However, the result from the t-test (which compare means) explains that the change of means is not statistically significant (See appendix 7.4) which means that a comparison cannot be made.

Even though the t-test concludes that the difference is not statistically significant it does not mean that the use of “cooperate” and “decide” has not increased. It says just that, based on the result, a conclusion cannot be drawn with certainty, and more research must be done. In graph 3 it can be seen how the percentage of the words “cooperate” and “decides” occurs in each resolution of 1983 (CD% 1983) where they are displayed together with the average in each year. It can be

seen that the average in 2010 was notably higher than in 1983 (0,62 and 0,53 respectively). Due to the increase of average % of “cooperate” and “decides” presence in each resolution it can be said that their presence has increased in 2010. The increased presence of “cooperate” could be argued to exist due to an increased importance of the UNSC in 2010. The increased presence of “decide” could be present because the UNSC is more capable of taking decisions in 2010. By the increases of “cooperate” and “decide” the cooperation level could be argued to have increased. From the theory in section 2.2 one can argue that the earlier a resolution is written to the median voter, and the more ideas of different actors are incorporated, the more likely it is that the resolution will be adopted. To write to the median voter saves time, since there is no need for longer discussions later on because other actors’ ideas are already incorporated, though this will not be reflected if one analyzes the usage of “cooperate” and “decide”.

There is a sharp decrease of abstained or “no” voted resolutions in 2010. It had fallen from 41,18% to 10,17%. The decrease in abstained resolutions is an interesting decrease due to the fact that the adopted resolutions also had increased with 347%. If the resolution is abstained or voted against it shows breaches in cooperation. The fact that it has decreased indicates increased cooperation.

A critique to the study of the presence of “cooperation” and “decide” in the resolution is that their presences might be based upon the word total, instead of indicating cooperation. In order to contradict this critique I conducted a regression analysis (see appendix 7.3) to see how strong the relationship between the total amount of word and the presence of “cooperate” and “decide” is. The dependent variable was “cooperate” and “decide” (CD), and the independent was word total. The result was that in 1983 there was no relationship between the variables, while in 2010 it was a fairly strong relationship. This means that the total amount of words can explain why “cooperate” or “decide” was present in 2010, while not in 1983. It is hard to interpret why this could be. An idea is that “cooperation” and “decide” are present in 2010 due to a possible development of the language in the resolutions. The development of the language would rather concern “cooperate” than “decide” because “cooperate” could be argued to be a word which is harder to interpret, since “decide” is an operative word. The operative word “decide” can only be interpreted as “decide”.

The use of “cooperate” could have been developed into normal and standard language, used on a basis of normality rather than to emphasize cooperation. In this sense to use “cooperate” as an indicator of the cooperation level UNSC would be of no value. “Cooperate” would be a word as any other word and it would not emphasize cooperation as a value, rather the formality of the language in the resolution. This reasoning diminishes the idea that the level of cooperation is visible in the resolution 2010. A sign of a development in the language is that, previously in 1983, cooperation was spelled “co-operate” while in 2010 it was spelled “cooperate”. It is though impossible to say if this could indicate any

contextual difference, but if the usage of “cooperate” has normalized the word of cooperation would have lost its meaning and be taken for granted.

What is written in the resolutions could also give a false sense of cooperation. Just because the resolutions indicates cooperation does it not mean that they are cooperating, because resolutions are official documents, and the UNSC members perhaps want to give a sense to the rest of the world that they do. In the theory it was noted that the logrolling often proceeds behind the curtains, since not all of the aspects of the discussions are known to the public. This causes contextual conclusions to be difficult to draw.

As members attempt to achieve cooperation and consensus, they will according to the theory have to agree upon the decision and idea of the median voter. The question then is: who has to give up their interests in order to reach consensus? And who is the median voter who gets their idea through? If the same group of actors meet as they do in the UNSC they will learn each other’s strengths and weaknesses, and also how they reason in different issues. They will use this experience in their favor in order to push through the idea from which they benefit the most. The experience creates a predictability that can prevent the effort of lobbying for an idea different from the median voter. If the settled matter only involves the median voters, it would be a waste of time arguing for another option. In this sense they would give up trying to cooperate and give in for the median instead. This would indicate a false sense of cooperation and would not be visible in the study of resolutions. In 1983, it is possible that they did try to cooperate, and it was easier to make your point and abstain.

During the Cold War the cooperation was perhaps unpredictable, since the hegemonic powers of the US and the Soviet Union did not cooperate and frequently used their veto. The unpredictability created discord and an unstable situation, which could make it easier for smaller actors to raise their voice, and have an opinion different from the median voter. One might then argue that the pushing for consensus could instead be a push away for some actors’ opinions in favor for the powerful median voter. The median voter is powerful since it theoretically represents the majority. In this sense, when cooperation was mentioned in a resolution in 1983 it truly meant cooperation and was not a standard formulation. It could be an achievement in 1983 if cooperation was emphasized compared to the standardized usage of “cooperation” in 2010.

Even though cooperation could have reasonably been standardized and formalized since 1983, there is too little information in the area to conclude anything. The level of cooperation in the resolutions has to be researched further, and also the negotiation customs within the UNSC.

## 4.2 Conclusion

The increased percentage of adopted resolutions and the decreased percentage of abstentions and “no” votes, clearly indicates that the cooperation level has increased in the resolutions. The presence of “cooperate” and “decide”, indicates a positive answer to the question *Is the increased or decreased cooperation level reflected in the UN Security Council’s resolutions?*, but not necessarily answer it. The subject has to be studied further since we know too little about the language used and the negotiation procedure to use the resolutions as cooperation indicators in the UNSC. It can therefore not be concluded with a high degree of certainty that the cooperation level has increased, but it is clear that there is a change in the resolutions since the Cold War. Whether, this is due to an increased cooperation level cannot be concluded, only inferred.

## 5 Summary

This thesis studied the cooperation level in the UNSC with the regard to the following two questions: *Did the unipolar power structure of the international arena created after the Cold War have an increasing or decreasing effect of the cooperation level in the UN Security Council?* In that case: *Is the increased or decreased cooperation level reflected in the UN Security Council's resolutions?* The aim was to understand whether the cooperation level increased due to the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar formation in the international arena that followed by the end of the Cold War. Theories based on realism and power-based cooperation fostered the hypothesis this has indeed been the case, and it is clear from the result in the first part, which was conducted through a descriptive method, that the cooperation level in the United Nations Security Council has increased since the Cold War. The second part aimed to answer the second question, and was conducted through a quantitative text analysis method. The result could indicate a positive answer to the second question, but does provide a conclusive answer. In order to increase the reliability of this scientific area, further studies of the resolutions in the UNSC must be conducted.

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# 7 Appendix

## 7.1 The resolution format

United Nations Editorial Manual Online  
Instructions for the preparation of documents

### Length of reports

Reports originating in the Secretariat must not exceed 8,500 words (32 double-spaced pages) in length. A waiver must be requested for reports that exceed the limit.

### Format

For technical specifications on format and media to be used in preparing documents, see the editorial directive *ST/CS/SER.A/44/Rev.1*.

Text, including footnotes, must be double-spaced (2.0). Font size must be no smaller than 12 point.

Main headings and subheadings should be in bold print. Initial capitals are used only for the first word and words normally capitalized. For more detailed instructions, see *Format/Headings and subheadings and Mastheads and cover pages*.

Italics and bold print are not used for emphasis, except where the General Assembly has requested the use of bold print for recommendations.

Manuscripts should be transmitted for processing in electronic form (see *ST/CS/SER.A/44/Rev.1*).

### Revised texts

If a text is a revised version of a previously issued document (such as a draft resolution), or is the final version of a report already submitted in draft form for advance editing/translation, all changes, including deletions, must be clearly indicated, by means of (a) Microsoft Word track changes; (b) bold text and strike-outs; or (c) handwritten additions and deletions.

### References and quotations

Manuscripts should not include lengthy quotations from texts previously circulated as United Nations documents, such as General Assembly resolutions

and earlier reports of the Secretary-General, nor should such texts or excerpts therefrom be attached as annexes.

Internal cross-references should be carefully checked in the final draft, as the paragraph numbers may have changed from those in earlier drafts.

Necessary quotations and references should be carefully checked for accuracy. In the case of United Nations documents, paragraph numbers, not pages, should be cited.

For more detailed instructions, see [Editorial guidelines/Style/Quotations](#).

#### Abbreviations and acronyms

Abbreviations and acronyms should always be explained. The full name should be spelled out the first time it occurs in the text, or a complete list should be provided.

Abbreviations and acronyms are not used for the names of Member States, most commissions, committees or other subsidiary bodies, major United Nations offices, Secretariat departments, or in document titles or internal headings.

Names of subsidiary bodies, major United Nations offices and Secretariat departments should be given in full the first time they occur in a text. Short titles (e.g. "the Council", "the "Commission", "the Department") are used thereafter.

For a list of abbreviations and acronyms used in United Nations documents, see [Editorial guidelines/Style/Abbreviations and acronyms](#).

#### Names

For countries, see [UNTERM](#). From Lotus Notes, follow the links [Databases/UNTERM](#); search on all records or specify "country name".

For cities, provinces etc., follow an official United Nations map, when one exists. For individuals, corporations etc., verify correct names or most commonly used spellings or transliterations, and use consistently throughout.

When general terms such as president, representative and so on are used, it would be helpful to the translators to indicate the gender of the person.

When animal or plant species are mentioned, the scientific (Latin) designation should be included in addition to the common or vernacular name, as the latter may not provide sufficient information to allow an accurate translation.

#### Additional guidelines

For further guidelines on drafting and format, see [Editorial guidelines/Basic documents and Format](#).

(United Nations Editorial Manual Online 1)

## 7.2 Conjugations “cooperate” and “decide”

List of the conjugations in 1983 and in 2010: (note that the cooperation was spelled co-operation in 1983, therefore the list is according to the spelling in 2010)

Cooperate  
Cooperates  
Cooperated  
Cooperation  
Decide  
Decided  
Decides

## 7.3 Regression analysis

A critique to the analysis scheme I have created is that, the more words a resolution has, the more times would naturally the words “cooperate” and “decide” be present. If that is the case then their presence could not fully be explained as indicators of cooperation. In order to tackle this critique I will conduct a regression analysis. Regression analysis is a statistical method used to test how strong a relation is between two variables, and how much the change in one variable is dependent on the change in another. In order to use this method you have a dependent variable (y) and an independent variable (x). In my case I will use the Word total as the independent variable, and CD (the times “cooperate” and “decide” were in a resolution) as the dependent variable. (Körner, Wahlgren 2012 p. 151-157; Körner, Wahlgren, 2006 p. 362)

Note should be taken that the regression analysis is merely an attempt and will be used as an indication rather than considered a truth, due to the fact that this is in the early stages in this field of study. It is important when you do a regression analysis that the variables are quantitative and that you have enough background knowledge of the analyzed variables. It is not hard to find a statistical relationship between variables, but just because you find a mathematical and statistical relationship does not mean that it exist in the reality. Regression analysis assumes that the variables are normally-distributed, and that there is a linear relationship ( $X \rightarrow Y$ ). There are other relationships as well e.g mutual relationship ( $X \leq Y$ ) or non-relationship ( $X \neq Y$ ). There is a risk when you do a linear regression for the first time with not much background knowledge that it is a non-relationship. I will do a simple linear regression testing the strength of ( $X \rightarrow Y$ ). A multiple regression analysis, testing several variables effect on Y is suggested for further studies. (Körner, Wahlgren 2012, p. 151-157, 158-161, 167)

There are different figures that will be highlighted in the two regression analyses in subsection 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. First it is the determination-coefficient (r squared), which explains how much of the change in Y is explained by a change in X. Secondly, it is the coefficient it tells what the value of Y is when the value of X is 0, and is the average increase for ever increased unit of X. Thirdly the standard error is a percentage. The higher standard error the higher is the uncertainty. It is a higher standard of error the smaller population it is. Finally the significance level of 5% represent a hypothesis test, testing if there is a linear relationship between X and Y. The zero-hypothesis is that there is not a linear relationship and the one- hypothesis is that there is a linear relationship. If the significance level is below 5% the zero-hypothesis is rejected, which means that there is a linear relationship. If the significance level is above 5% the zero-hypothesis is accepted and there is not a linear relationship between X and Y. When there is not a linear relationship between X and Y it means that the change in X cannot explain the change and presence of Y. (Esaiasson et. al 2008, p. 381-384; Körner, Wahlgren 2006, p. 360-363, 366-367, 370-373)

### 7.3.1 Word total and the presence of CD 1983

	Coefficient	Standarderror	sig.
word total	0,002	0,002	0,278
N	17		
R square	0,078		
Modell	OLS		

*The dependent variable is CD. A constant is included in the regression, but excluded here.*

*\*\* indicates a significance level at 1 %, \* indicates significance at 5 %.*

Table 5: Regression analysis word total and the presence of CD 1983

1. The determination-coefficient is 0, 078 = 7.8% this means that 92, 2% of the variation in Y is not explained by X but other variables instead.

2. The coefficient is 0,2%. Put in its context, if the resolution increased with one word there would be an increase of CD with 0,2%

3. There is a high degree of standard of error since it is the same as the coefficient.

4. The significance is 0, 278 > 0, 05 and therefore we accept the zero-hypothesis and concludes that there is no linear relationship between X and Y.

In all we can say that it is a weak relationship between total word and the presence of CD, and due to the significance it is not a linear relationship. This could be due to the small amount of N. The relationship is stronger and more significant the higher degree of N there is, which the standard error also explains.

### 7.3.2 Word total and the presence of CD 2010

	Coefficient	Standarderror	sig.
word total	0,004	0,000	0,000**
N	59		
R square	0,619		
Modell	OLS		

*The dependent variable is CD. A constant is included in the regression, but excluded here.*

*\*\* indicates a significance level at 1 %, \* indicates significance at 5 %.*

Table 6: Regression analysis word total and the presence of CD 2010

1. The determination-coefficient is about 0, 62 = 62% this means that only 8% of the variation in Y is not explained by X but other variables instead.
2. The coefficient is 0,4%. Put in its context, if the resolution increased with one word there would be an increase of CD with 0,4%. This is twice as much as in 1983.
3. There is a low degree of standard of error in relation to the coefficient.
4. The significance is 0, 000 > 0, 05 and therefore we reject the zero-hypothesis and concludes that there is a linear relationship between X and Y.

In all we can say that it is a fairly strong relationship between total word and the presence of CD.

## 7.4 t-test

A t-test is conducted in order to test the significance of the change in the average %CD in 1983 and in 2010, since the difference in the average %CD in 1983 and in 2010 was only 0,1%. The t-test is conducted as followed. When the t-test is performed, the significance level is 5%. 5% is the standard significance level. The significance level of 5 % means that 5% of the cases are irrelevant. In the context of the t-test the significance level or the p-value as it is also called means that in 95% of the cases the means shows a difference. In 5% of the cases there is no difference, and a percentage higher than that is not acceptable since that would mean that it is above the accepted level of marginal errors. The significance level can only say if there is a difference in the mean or not, and not how much the difference is. (Esaiasson et. al 2008, p. 390; Kröner, Wahlgren 2006, p. 184, 204-205, 207-208)

I coded the average % CD: 1 = 1983 and 2 = 2010

As we can see from the independent sample t-test, which was done since the resolutions 2010 and 1983 are different years and independent from each other. The test was not statistically significant with 0,411. This means that we have to look at the column "Equal variances assumed" The test is not significant when the variances are the same. We can see this also by looking at the Standard deviation where they are similar. When the equal variances are assumed there is then a great chance the difference of the means are not significant. The significance of the difference of the means (Sig. 2-tailed) are 0, 507. Since  $0, 507 > 0, 05$  the means 1983 and 2010 are not significantly different, according to the 5% level of significance. (Esaiasson et. al 2008, p. 390; Kröner, Wahlgren, 2006 p. 184, 204-205, 207-208)

Table 7: T-test testing the significance of change in the average %CD in 1983 and in 2010

	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Percentage_CD	0,507	-0,0849	0,12750
N 1983	17		
N 2010	59		
Modell	Independent Sample t-test		