

# Partner up!

A study of transnational public-private partnerships variation  
in effectiveness

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# Abstract

The world has during the latest decades seen the rise of transnational public-private partnerships. The political debate about the partnerships' role in global governance is often polarized. Some scholars state that partnerships are more effective than other type of state-centric structures and the argument is at present a major source of legitimacy for the occasionally criticised partnerships. However, partnerships effectiveness tends to vary in reality. This thesis has, from a rational choice institutionalist perspective, attempted to provide a possible explanation to the variation in effectiveness. The purpose of the study was thus to explain transnational partnerships variation in effectiveness. A comparative study was conducted on two cases selected on the basis of the explanatory variable. The result strengthened the hypothesis of the study and showed that a positive correlation could be identified between the partnerships level of institutionalisation and its level of effectiveness. It was further noted that different types of partnerships depended more or less on the partnerships level of institutionalisation.

*Keywords:* transnational public-private partnerships, global governance, effectiveness, institutions, rational choice institutionalism

*Words:* 9 998

# List of Abbreviations

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CCM:	Common Carbon Metric
CH:	Clearing House
EU:	European Union
GEA:	Global Energy Assessment
GHG:	Green House Gas
ISO:	International Organization for Standardization
MNC:	Multi-National Company
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
PCFV:	Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles
UN:	United Nations
UNEP:	United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP-SBCI:	United Nations Environment Programme Sustainable Buildings and Climate Initiative
UNFCCC:	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNEP-DTIE:	United Nations Environment Programme Division of Technology, Industry and Economics
WRI:	World Resources Institute
WSSD:	World Summit on Sustainable Development

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# 1 Introduction

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Countries are no longer the only actors on the global arena since non-state actors increasingly has entered fields that traditionally belonged to states (Bexell & Mörth. 2010; Seitanidi. 2010). This thesis will focus on transnational partnerships between the public sector (government) and the private sector (businesses, non-governmental organisations, and academics).<sup>1</sup> The partnerships have become a promoted method for non-state actors to participate in world politics, research related to transnational partnerships reveals that there are academics maintaining the argument that partnerships are crucial for a successful implementation of diverse projects (Brinkerhoff. 2002; Carter. 2007; Dienhart. 2010; Park et al. 2008; Wadell. 2005). A claimed reason for founding partnerships has been to increase the effectiveness when solving different issues. Some scholars suggest that transnational partnerships are a more effective alternative than having single actors operating independently (Keohane. 1984; Schäfferhoff, Campe & Kaan. 2009; Szulecki, Pattberg & Biermann. 2011).

There are however, also critical voices aimed towards partnerships. It has been proposed that the distribution of power is uneven and that more powerful actors, often suggested to be the business sector, are granted a higher level of influence (Crane & Matten. 2010. P. 478). The partnerships have also been suggested to create a democracy deficit since it gives power and influence to actors not elected by the people (Bexell & Mörth. 2010. P. 5). The critique aimed towards partnerships makes it an even more interesting phenomenon to study since the partnerships still have become such a widespread instrument (Bexell & Mörth. 2010; Brinkerhoff. 2002; Crane & Matten. 2010; Dienhart. 2010; Park et al. 2008; Selsky & Parker. 2005; Wettenhall. 2003).

The argument regarding effectiveness has been a major source of legitimacy for the frequently criticised partnerships (Bäckstrand. 2006. P. 191; Schäfferhoff, Campe & Kaan. 2009. P. 452; Szulecki, Biermann & Pattberg. 2011. P. 714). One critical point regarding the argument is however, that in reality, their effectiveness varies and it is currently open under what conditions they perform effectively (Schäfferhoff, Campe & Kaan. 2009. P. 469). At present, there is also relatively little research on why partnerships differ in their effectiveness (Szulecki, Biermann & Pattberg. 2011. P. 714). Since the effectiveness argument regarding partnerships has been made most forcefully and is at present the major source of legitimacy

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<sup>1</sup> The transnational public-private partnerships are from now on addressed as partnerships or transnational partnerships, indifferently.

for transnational partnerships, further research on what makes the partnerships vary in the effectiveness is vital. This thesis will hence focus on transnational partnerships variation in effectiveness.

The level of institutionalisation has proven to become one suggested explanation on why partnerships vary in its effectiveness (Biermann, Chan, Mert & Pattberg. 2007; Ruggie. 2003; Schäferhoff, Campe & Kaan. 2007). It derives from the theory of rational choice institutionalism, which earlier has focused on international cooperation between states (Keohane. 1984). According to this explanation that primarily is based on assumptions of rationality, actors that all would benefit from cooperation may sometimes be unable to do so due to lack of information and obstacles for communication (Keohane. 1984. P. 69). What the partnership can offer to increase the effectiveness is institutionalisation. Through the setting of a formalised structure and information, institutions can reduce uncertainty and hence increase effectiveness (Hall & Taylor. 1996. P. 943).

## 1.1 Purpose and Research Question

As stated in the introduction, the debate about the merits and flaws of partnerships is often intense and polarised (Bexell & Mörth. 2010. P. 22). It is indicated that transnational partnerships can perform more effectively than solitary stakeholders but there is relatively little research on the variation of partnerships effectiveness (Szulecki, Pattberg & Biermann. 2011. P. 714). In an attempt to contribute to this research gap, this thesis will try to answer why the effectiveness of transnational partnerships varies.

The purpose of the thesis is to qualitatively study the relationship between the two variables and explain transnational partnerships variation in effectiveness. In order to fulfil the purpose, the hypothesis presented in the introduction will be tested in order to see whether the theory of rational choice institutionalism is applicable on partnerships. The explanatory independent variable will therefore be the level of institutionalisation. The hypothesis is that a positive correlation between the level of institutionalisation within a partnership and its level of effectiveness will be identified. The partnership would in line with the theory of rational choice institutionalism be able to perform more effectively since the partnership provides a set framework in which volunteer partners can collaborate on the same premises. The outspoken rules, aims and action adopted by the partnership decreases the uncertainty and enables the partners to take action which would not have been possible if the partnership did not provide information on how all actors within the partnership will behave.

The study is interesting since it is an area that needs further empirical studies. It is vital as partnerships are a current phenomenon affecting societies across the globe; if they are to be a permanent part of an attempt to solve global issues, further empirical research is needed in order to identify what makes them effective. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the structure

of partnerships varies greatly, if a causal connection can be identified, this will enable future partnerships to arrange their structure according to empirical findings. It is also interesting from a theoretical perspective, an analysis to recognise whether rational choice institutionalism can broaden its scope and provide an explanation that is applicable on partnerships.

The study will build upon the following research question in order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis:

- *Does the level of institutionalisation affect the effectiveness of transnational public-private partnerships?*

## 1.2 Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical foundation of the paper originates from the theory of rational choice institutionalism. The theory has its background within economics and highlights the effectiveness of institutions that provide opportunity to lower transaction costs (Taylor & Hall. 1996. P. 943). Its focus is on institutions as a way of making cooperation possible (Keohane. 1984. P. 69). It might be applicable on partnerships since transnational partnerships are often regarded as an important institutional innovation. It is therefore interesting to test whether the theory can explain partnerships variation in effectiveness. It is a relevant theory as it highlights the problems of uncertainty, which is highly applicable on the field of global governance that is presently battling problems with adapting to new types of governance structures. As transnational partnerships includes several different types of actors, the internal uncertainty within the partnership can be assumed to be high and anticipated to be of higher significance.

## 1.3 Conceptual Definitions

### 1.3.1 Transnational public-private partnerships

It is acknowledged that the size, scope and purpose of transnational public-private partnerships varies, they can range from including only two partners to multiple and the time frame can differ from only a short temporary project to a more long-term period (Selsky & Parker. 2005. P. 853; Andonova & Levy 2003. P. 23). Transnational public-private partnerships can be defined as “institutionalised transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the provision of collective goods” (Schäferhoff, Campe & Kaan. 2007. P. 8). This definition of partnerships will be used in the thesis as it emphasises features of importance for this study; they are transnational, not depending on geographic



location, includes both public and private actors collaborating to provide the society with collective goods due to mutual interests.

### 1.3.2 Effectiveness

According to Oran R. Young and Marc A. Levy, "Effectiveness is a matter of the contributions that institutions make to solving the problems that motivate actors to invest the time and energy needed to create them." (1999. P. 3). However, according to the same authors, effectiveness emerges as a more elusive concept when taking a closer look. The scholars build on previous studies and recognise that effectiveness can have different meanings and therefore defines the concept along three dimensions; output, outcome and impact (Easton. 1965). Impact is defined as the measurement of the tangible result within the problem area, the positive changes of target indicators. Outcome is the changed behaviour of targeted communities while output is the actual activities performed by the partnerships (Young. 1994. P. 140).

### 1.3.3 Institutionalisation

The used definition understands institutionalisation as a form of legalisation characterised by three components (Abbott et al. 2000. P. 401). The first one is obligation, meaning that actors are legally bound by rules or commitments (Ibid). The second is precision; it means that rules "unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorise, or proscribe" (Ibid. P. 402). The third component is delegation which means that third parties has been granted authority to "implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules" (Ibid). The definition was chosen as it can be identified in reality as informal norms and political pressure as well as legally bounding commitments. It further provided a clear classification scheme that allows a systematic analysis of the variable.

## 1.4 Methodological Foundation

A comparative study will be performed to fulfil the purpose of the study. Two cases will be studied using a qualitative text analysis in order to identify a possible correlation and to study the relationship more thoroughly. The cases will be elected based on the independent variable in order to ensure variation. The cases will also have to fulfil certain criteria in order to elect cases as similar as possible apart from on the studied explanatory variable. The analysis will focus on the dependent variable, the level of effectiveness, in order to study the nature of the relationship between the variables and whether a causal mechanism can be identified.. The empirical findings will conclusively be discussed more in-depth, applying the theoretical foundation of the thesis.

# 2 Methodological Approach

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## 2.1 Research Design

The study is executed in the attempt to test the applicability of rational choice institutionalism on transnational partnerships. To answer the question of the thesis and fulfil its purpose, to explain the variation in partnerships effectiveness, a comparative study was performed using a most similar design (Esaiasson et al. 2009. P. 113-115). When performing comparative studies, one should always strive for including as many cases as possible. However, when natural causes restricts the study and makes it impossible to include many cases, one should instead elect cases strategically (Ibid. P. 113). The deadline for the thesis is such a reason and the study therefore compared a few relevant and interesting cases. These cases were selected based on the value of the dependent variable, the effectiveness of the partnerships. When performing a study using the most similar design, much work is performed in advance before the actual study to make it possible to elect appropriate cases (Ibid. P. 115). In the strive to isolate the studied variable and find a potential causal mechanism between the independent and dependent variable, it is important to select cases that are as similar as possible in regards to different factors that can possible affect the dependent variable. That makes it possible to draw conclusions and easier to find a connection between those variables relevant for the study (Ibid. P. 113).

The study was executed in the following steps. First, relevant cases to compare were identified. The identification was performed applying three different criteria's. According to these, the partnerships had to be 1) transnational 2) include both public and private actors and 3) active within the same field. Succeeding the identification was the classification of the independent variable. Once the value of the independent variable was measured, the next step was to perform the study and execute the analysis. This was accomplished studying the dependent variable systematically in order to operationalize the theoretical definition of effectiveness. The operationalization of both variables is presented below in section 2.2.

## 2.2 Operationalization

### 2.2.1 The independent variable: the level of institutionalisation

A crucial step when conducting a study is the process of operationalizing relevant theoretical definitions. This is normally the section that receives most criticism by thesis opponents (Teorell & Svensson. 2007. P. 56). To operationalize the independent variable, the level of institutionalisation, three different indicators were used in order to systematically sample data necessary for the analysis. The indicators utilised are different factors related to how the partnerships are providing internal norms that can increase the level of institutionalisation and relates to the literature on legalisation (Abbott et al. 2000). The studied indicators are:

1. Obligation
2. Precision
3. Delegation

Obligation refers to legal obligations such as rules and commitments. Since partnerships are a voluntary commitment, the thesis will instead focus on aspects such as social commitments, contracts or various types of employed conditionality. Precision does instead focus on whether the rules and commitments clearly define the behaviour they require, authorise and proscribe. The level of precision is higher if there are fewer disputes on issues that can be interpreted differently. Finally, delegation relates to that third parties have been granted the right to implement, interpret and apply the rules, to resolve disputes and possibly, to make further rules (Abbott et al. 2000. P. 401-402).

	<b>Obligation</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Delegation</b>
<b>High</b>	Binding rules (e.g. contract between partners, conditionality)	Determinate rules: no or only narrow issues of interception	External monitoring + centralized enforcement
<b>Medium</b>	Contingent obligations and escape clauses	Areas of discretion and issues of interpretation	(Internal or external) monitoring and publicity
<b>Low</b>	No binding rules	Broad rules, impossible to determine whether conduct complies	No monitoring or confidential monitoring

*Fig. 1 Operationalization of institutionalisation*

The operationalization rests on previous studies on partnership effectiveness that mentions the indicators above as possible ways to increase partnerships effectiveness. According the authors, the indicators provide a structure and sense of security to the partnerships involved (Abbott et al. 2000; Hurd. 1999; Koremenos et al. 2001).

2.2.2 The dependent variable: the level of effectiveness

The operationalization of the dependent variable was shaped through focus on the partnerships output, outcome and impact. This is a direct reference to previous research on

effectiveness by Easton (1965) and Young (1994). The technique of measuring effectiveness has been used in a previously performed study focusing on partnerships and can hence be supported (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann. 2011). Effectiveness can according to the authors be measured at the three different levels; output, outcome and impact (Easton. 1965). Impact is defined as the measurement of the tangible result within the problem area, the positive changes of target indicators. Outcome is the changed behaviour of targeted communities while output is the actual activities performed by the partnerships. Although impact is the most interesting dimension of effectiveness when it comes to political relevance, researchers usually focus on output and outcomes. This, as it is methodologically difficult to display a clear causal connection between the activities of institutions and the solving of a particular issue (Young 1999. P. 112). The output activities are of different variety and can include such things as producing reports, conducting research, organising meetings or issuing regulations. These core functions are similar for many different partnerships and are easier to operationalize and measure than the level of impact or outcome, since partnerships still are a relatively new concept (Szulecki, Pattberg & Biermann. 2011. P. 716-718). The effectiveness in this thesis focused on all three levels in the attempt to identify the level of all dimensions of effectiveness.

	<b>Output</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Impact</b>
<b>High</b>	Provision/adoption of knowledge, standards, services as envisioned in stated goals	Substantial change in behaviour of targets, wide implementation of knowledge, standards, services	Substantial contribution to solution of problem
<b>Medium</b>	Substantial policy papers and some provision of knowledge, standard, services but failure to achieve all stated goals	Some change in behaviour of targets, some implementation of knowledge, standards, services	Some contribution to solution of problem
<b>Low</b>	Mere paperwork and meetings with no/only some results	No/low changes in behaviour of targets, hardly any implementation of knowledge, standards, services	No/low contribution to solutions of problem

*Fig. 2 Operationalization of effectiveness*

### 2.3 Method: Qualitative Text Analysis

The study was performed as a qualitative text analysis. It is one of the methods most frequently used within the field of social sciences (Esaiaasson et al. 2009. P. 233). To be able to capture different dimensions regarding partnerships, it is vital to approach the study area qualitatively. Focusing on a few cases permits the thesis to fulfil its purpose and possibly identify a correlation between the studied variables. Further, the method results in a lot of material related to few analysis units which enables the study to more closely study the nature

of the relationship and how the causal mechanisms affect the performance of the partnership. The study is an important first step in order to establish the cause of the connection to enable further research to build on the understanding on how the variables are correlated. If another method were to be used, some dimensions of partnerships would be unrecognised. A quantitative study would for example have enabled the thesis to systematise data on many different cases but since partnerships are so varied, it was decided to be more appropriate to use a method that can capture different details regarding the studied partnerships. Another reason for conducting a qualitative text analysis was since it captures the sum of the text instead of the different units (Esaiasson et al. 2009. P. 237). This enabled the study to capture different activities performed by the transnational partnerships but also made it possible to uphold an overall perspective. This is important since the partnerships consists of more than one actor whose behaviour can affect the other participants in the partnership.

## 2.4 Limitations and Demarcations

The methodological foundation of the paper originates in a subjective epistemological perspective. It is important to be aware of the fact that the final result is affected by every decision made during the process of writing the thesis and that the interpretation of the result depends on the researchers background, values and prior knowledge (Esaiasson et al. 2009. P. 17). Hence, one must always strive for a transparent academic paper that enables others to understand and interpret the result of the study. The qualitative text analysis is an especially criticised method since it is based on the writers' interpretation of the text. It is therefore crucial for this type of studies to be conducted using a clearly defined analytical tool (Ibid. P. 251). This will however not entirely solve the issue since the analytical tool also can be constructed poorly, leaving out important aspects that might have been essential to include in the result of the study (Ibid. P. 243). This is one feature that contributes to why one of the aims for the thesis is to uphold an open and transparent writing process to strive for intersubjectivity.

Further limitations relates to the nature of the study. Trying to find homogenous analytical units is very difficult and within political science studies it is almost certain that it will not be possible to find several cases that are identical (Esaiasson et al. P. 115). In order to reduce the flaw, several parameters have been used in order to find comparable and similar cases. Another limitation of the study is practical. The fact that it only captures the activities performed by two transnational partnerships makes it more difficult to generalise the results to the overall population but also to find a strong correlation between the studied variables. This study does however not aim to deliver results that can be generalised to the overall population. Instead the purpose is to contribute to the field by focusing on a few selected cases and propose one way to study the research area. Studying the variables in-depth with the purpose to asses whether a correlation can be identified enables the study to examine the nature of the relationship more closely.

## 2.5 Material

Material, consisting of data, is the basis for the analysis derived from reality (Lundquist. 1993. P. 95). The study is built on secondary data that derives from selected material that has been used in order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis. Of course, it would have been ultimate to gather all relevant data related to the thesis. However this is not possible even in a study focusing on a few cases and therefore a crucial step in the process has been to evaluate what material that is suitable in regards to the purpose. Since written material always is designated for a certain purpose it is important to gather documents describing the purpose from all the involved actors perspective and always question in what context and with what purpose it was created (Bryman. 2008. P. 526-527).

The material is partly gathered from the website [www.business.un.org](http://www.business.un.org). The website provides an overview of UN-business partnerships that can be categorised according to several categories such as UN organisation, partnership type, location etcetera. By using the categorisation tool and base the search on the category 'UN organisation', relevant cases could be identified. The data gathering has also been executed by browsing the websites of the partnerships elected as a case and the websites of those actors involved in the projects. The webpages are categorised in chapters, sections and sub-sections that simplify the process of finding relevant data. Other articles, studies and evaluations of the partnerships, as well as the partnerships annual reports and newsletters have also been important material for the study.

## 2.6 Validity & Reliability

Validity is to which extent the theoretical definition that we claim to test is correlated with what we are studying empirically (Teorell & Svensson. 2007. P. 55-58). One way of avoiding critic due to low validity can be to make the definitions more precise and focused and to thoroughly discuss abstract terms to capture the terms substance (Esaiasson et al. 2009. P. 63). Since this study primarily builds on theories and concepts that are both contested and debated, it is vital to give an account for the theoretical foundation of the study as well as present the process of operationalizing the latter. Through discussion and reasoning, the work of the thesis will be made visible and the thesis can hence live up to demands on social sciences research referring to intersubjectivity (Teorell & Svensson. 2007. P. 280). Another aspect related to validity is the possibility to generalise results to the overall population. Focusing on only a few cases decreases the validity of the study and its ability to generalise the results. However, as previously mentioned, this study does not aim to deliver results that can be generalised to the overall population.

Reliability refers to the absence of unsystematic errors. If a test lacks unsystematic errors it means that its reliability is high (Teorell & Svensson. 2007. P. 59). To be able to avoid unsystematic measuring faults, the written material will be re-read several times in order to avoid that type of mistakes. It will further be avoided by having a clear structure for the analysis so that the partnerships investigated will be examined and analysed in the same way. However, it is important to again note that the writers' interpretation cannot fully be objective.

# 3 Transnational Partnerships

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## 3.1 Selection of Case

To narrow down the field of research, this thesis will focus on the environmental field. It is notable for the great scope regarding partnerships and further, it was within the environmental field that partnerships began to be used. This allows the thesis to study a field in which partnerships have been a part of the politics for a longer time, the partnership structure can therefore be argued to be more established. The concentration on one issue also enables a deeper comparison since the external conditions can be argued to be more similar within the same field. The elected partnerships are also especially relevant as both cases involve the UN, a global institution which progress reflects the development of overall global governance. This since the institution increasingly has engaged in partnerships with different actors.

Browsing different databases makes it obvious that partnerships are a ubiquitous phenomenon. Numerous transnational partnerships can be found addressing different tasks. For example, on the website [www.business.un.org](http://www.business.un.org), that was used in order to find cases, 297 hits was identified focusing on the environment and climate change issue. When filtering the results, 51 partnership stories were left to elect cases from. To elect cases, criteria's was set up related to the definition of partnerships used in the thesis.<sup>2</sup> These served as the primary screening tool since only nine cases fulfilled all three criteria's. After the first screening a pre-study was performed and two cases were elected based on the independent variable. The reason for electing cases based on the independent variable is to make sure to get variation regarding the level of institutionalisation as to be able to find whether there is a connection between the studied independent variable and the effectiveness of partnerships.

## 3.2 The UNEP-SBCI Initiative

The first case elected is the United Nation's Environment Programme's Sustainable Building and Climate Initiative (UNEP-SBCI). The partnership was founded in 2006. Some actors

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<sup>2</sup> See page 4 for definition and page 6 for criteria's.



within the partnership includes the United Nations Environment Programme, businesses such as Skanska, Hydro and Lafarge, research organisations, cities, professional associations, NGOs, government and local authority. The mission of UNEP-SBCI is to present a common voice for stakeholders from the building sector on sustainable buildings and climate change (UNEP-SBCI). The activities performed by the UNEP-SBCI are guided by four key objectives. The key objectives are to:

1. Provide a common platform for dialogue and collective action among building sector stakeholders to address sustainability issues of global significance, especially climate change.
2. Develop tools and strategies for achieving greater acceptance and adoption of sustainable building practices throughout the world.
3. Establish baselines, which are globally recognised and are based on a life cycle approach. Focus has initially been concentrated on establishing baselines for energy efficiency and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, but is now expanding to account for additional indicators such as materials and water.
4. Demonstrate through pilot projects and inform policy developments of the important role buildings have to play in mitigation and adaptation to climate change at local, national and/or global levels. (UNEP-SBCI)

The actual activities performed by the partnership are advocated by the advisory board. The board meets twice a year to define work program on focus areas and to monitor progress. The board reports to and receives its mandate during the annual general meeting. The secretariat is the organ that carries out the day-to-day management of the UNEP-SBCI. It is hosted by UNEP and is responsible for communication, administration and other coordination tasks (UNEP-SBCI.1). There are further different working committees within the partnership that promotes certain tasks or projects. These are the advocacy committee and the sustainable buildings steering committee. A third committee, the technical advisory committee, supports the latter. The advisory board and the committees consist of volunteering partners. The partnership is also involved in several networks and collaborations with other organisations promoting the similar missions (Ibid).

### 3.3 The Partnership for Cleaner Fuel and Vehicles

The Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV) is a global initiative to promote and support better air quality through the introduction of cleaner fuels and vehicles in developing and transitional countries. It was founded in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). The partnership consists of both public and private actors including international organisations such as the UNEP and the European Union (EU), governments, industry partners such as Honda and TNT, NGOs and other actors (PCFV). The key objectives of the partnership is to:

1. Assist developing countries in developing action plans to complete the global elimination of leaded gasoline and start to phase down sulphur in diesel and gasoline fuels, cocurrent with adopting cleaner vehicle requirements
2. Reduce motor vehicle transportation fuel (in particular diesel) sulphur levels to 50ppm or below. The timeline and roadmap for this objective is country dependant.
3. Support the development and adoption of cleaner fuel standards and cleaner vehicle requirements by providing a platform for exchange of experiences and successful practices in developed and developing countries as well as technical assistance.
4. Develop public outreach materials, educational programmes, and awareness campaigns; adapt economic and planning tools for clean fuels and vehicles analyses in local settings; and support the development of enforcement and compliance programmes, with an initial focus on fuel adulteration.
5. Foster key partnerships between government, industry, NGOs, and other interested parties within a country and between countries to facilitate the implementation of cleaner fuel and vehicle commitments. (PCFV)

The partnership has worked towards reaching its objectives through three campaigns; (1) the Lead Campaign, aimed at eliminating lead<sup>3</sup> in fuel; (2) the Sulphur Campaign, aimed at reducing levels of sulphur in diesel and gasoline; and (3) the Clean Vehicles Campaign, aimed at promoting the adoption of cleaner vehicle technologies (UNEP. 2010. P. ES-1). The study will foremost concentrate on the Lead Campaign as the partnership mainly has focused on this campaign so far.

The PCFV have an advisory group that is a representative group of all partners. It was established to facilitate partnership activities and consists of voluntary members. The advisory group further works closely with and support the Clearing House. It consists of UNEP staff and enables PCFV to operate by performing the day-to-day management. The main tasks for the Clearing House have been administrative and related to coordination, advising and supporting partners. From time to time, the partnership also established working groups to implement its mission. These can only consist of the partners although consult experts may be consolidated from time to time. (UNEP. 2010. P. 33-35)

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<sup>3</sup> Lead is a metal and a former popular additive to gasoline. It was used to increase the octane level in engines and causes severe air pollution. It is dangerous for the environment as well as humans.

# 4 Theoretical Framework

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## 4.1 New Institutionalism

The focus of new institutionalism is on stronger global institutions as a way to structure the world order (Hague & Harrop. 2010. P. 253). The theory argues that institutions are central to liberal democratic politics and view institutions as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation in the international system. This since the institutions contributes to the governing of an anarchic international system and requires cooperation and multilateralism (Lamy. 2008. P. 133). Neo-institutionalists argue that high compliance rates can be achieved in the absence of a centralised coercion (Keohane 1984. P. 94). According to new institutionalism, institutions affect policy processes by determining certain aspects of the agency dynamics, thus, reducing the uncertainty and risk through different stages of policy processes. This since institutions shape the influence and behaviour of those actors included in the institution (Scott. 1995. P. 43).

Since its origins, the theory has been divided into at least three different analytical approaches. These are historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism (Hall & Taylor. 1996. P. 936). As the name suggests, historical institutionalism states that history matters. One key feature of this approach is path dependency, which means that where we go next depends not only on where we are at the moment but also on where we have been (Ibid. P. 937-938). Sociological institutionalism is focusing on developing a sociological view of institutions, for example the way institutions interact and affect the actors involved in the institutions but also how they affect the overall society (DiMaggio & Powell. 1983. P. 154). The last approach will be presented further below.

## 4.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism

The final approach is rational choice institutionalism. Williamson (1975) argued influentially that the creation of institutions could be explained as a result of an attempt to reduce transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without the institution. In other words, the usage of institutions makes activities more effective. While the theory of rational choice institutionalism at first was found within economics, it quickly spread to political science.

Today, the theory has for example been used to study the development of political institutions, cross-national coalition and ethnic conflicts. Other scholars within the field of international relations use for example the theory to study the rise and fall of international regimes.<sup>4</sup>

The rational choice institutionalism differs from other types of new institutionalism as some central assumptions of the theory can be linked to realism. Taylor & Hall (1996) summarises the four characteristic features of rational choice institutionalism. The first feature is that it is assumed that actors have a fixed set of preferences and acts rationally as to maximise the attainment of these preferences (Ibid. P. 942). Secondly, politics is viewed as a series of collective action dilemmas; action taken by one actor is assumed to be beneficial or harmful for at least one other actor. This means that institutional arrangements are necessary to guarantee the same type of behaviour by others. Often, game theory is used by scholars to illustrate the difficulty of international cooperation in order to prove why institutions matter. Robert Keohane explain this view in his prominent book *After Hegemony – Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* from 1984. According to Keohane, the difficulty of cooperation is best illustrated not by either purely conflictual games or fundamentally cooperative ones (Keohane 1984. P. 67). The first game is solely determined by the structure of interests while the latter will lead inevitably to cooperation. Instead, so-called mixed-motive games that is characterised by a combination of mixed and mutual interests illustrates this the greatest (Ibid). Examples of this type of political situation are several classical models, such as the prisoners' dilemma or the tragedy of the commons (Hardin. 1968; Ostrom. 1990). The models prove that in situations calling for collective action, cooperation can be obtained if each member's contribution is smaller than the gain. Keohane argues further that these models are advantageous as they focus the attention on important issues for world politics. Mostly important, it draws our attention to ways in which obstacles to information and communication in world politics can encumber cooperation and create discord even when common interests exist (Ibid. P. 68-69). The third feature focuses on institutions origins. The rational choice institutionalists believe that institutional creation is a voluntary action by those affected and involved due to the benefits of the institution to the relevant actors. The structure is thus explained by the way it minimises production, influence and transaction costs (Williamson. 1975. P. 78). The fourth and final feature is one of rational choice institutionalisms most prominent contributions to the study of politics. The rational choice institutionalists emphasise the role of strategic interaction as to determine the political outcome of institutions. They believe that actors are driven by their strategic intentions and their expectations regarding other actor's behaviour using strategic calculus. By using institutions, the strategic interaction can be structured as to ensure the best possible result. This reduces uncertainty and allows actors to act collaboratively to receive maximum output. The contribution of institutions is with other words, a framework for collaboration. Using institutions as a mean for collaboration allows rational actors, with interests unknown for each

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<sup>4</sup> See for example Keohane & Martin. 1994, Keohane. 2002 or Snidal. 1996.

other, to collaborate more effectively.

Even though the theory of rational choice institutionalism has developed a more precise conception of the relationship between institutions and actors' behaviour, the foundations rests on a simplistic image of human behaviour. This might result in the analysis built on the theory missing out on important dimensions affecting partnerships performance. However, at present it provides an important perspective in the field of global governance and represented a major advance on traditional approaches that wants to explain the origins and survival of institutions due to its focus on strategic interaction (Hall & Taylor. 1996. P. 950-951).

### 4.3 The linkage between institutionalisation and effectiveness

As presented in the section above, actors are driven by their rationality according to rational choice institutionalism. Therefore, cooperation is difficult as it forces partners to act strategically and consider at all times what other participants' intentions are. This in combination with the impossibility to know what other actors' intents are is what causes problems regarding the performance and effectiveness of collaborations. Even though common interests exist and cooperation could lead to a more effective process and a better result, it is not certain that it is possible as it demands of the members to take actions that potentially would not be beneficial for them if the other actors would not do the same. The institution, or in the case of this study, the partnership, does provide means that enables cooperation and solves this problem. These means are what structure the strategic behaviour of the members of the partnership. By providing information and clear communication, the partners can perform certain actions due to the institutionalisation of the partnership which clearly states what is demanded by all partners involved. One example of this mechanism is the stated objectives of the partnership. Becoming involved in the partnership is a voluntary action; members that do not strive towards the same intentions or do not want to perform actions needed in order to reach the objectives would probably not become a partner. This decreases the uncertainty within the partnership when it comes to what could be expected by other actors and hence allows more effective cooperation.

# 5 Analysis

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## 5.1 Level of Institutionalisation

### 5.1.1 The level of institutionalisation within the UNEP-SBCI

The institutionalisation level within the UNEP-SBCI is very low. The UNEP-SBCI partnership has no legal obligations for the membership. Further, it does not have any other conditions regarding the behaviour of members involved either. The only condition for becoming a partner of the UNEP-SBCI is to donate an annual fee (UNEP-SBCI. 2012. P. 10). Depending on the donated sum, the participation level will defer from being only a donor to becoming an actual partner. The opportunity to host events for the UNEP-SBCI and to participate more vigorously within the partnership is offered if a grander sum is donated, although it is not a requirement (Ibid). The level of precision is classified as low/medium. The partnership does not have clear and measurable targets that make it possible to follow up and evaluate whether the partnership works in line with its mission statement. However, until 2011, a work plan was prepared for each year by the advisory board and presented at the annual general meeting. The work plan included both deadlines and a budget for each targeted objective. Further, there are no written regulations or specific guidelines for the work of the UNEP-SBCI. Instead the secretariat, a source provided by the UNEP, and the advisory board is foremost executing the activities performed by the partnership (UNEP-SBCI.1). Potential conflicts or other issues that may arise will therefore be handled without any guidelines for the involved partners. The delegation level is also low. The secretariat and the advisory board, consisting of volunteering members, perform the evaluation and monitoring of the work of the UNEP-SBCI partnership internally. The evaluation is presented each year in the annual report but the evaluation is foremost a description of the UNEP-SBCI activities the previous year and does not indicate whether they have reached certain targets (UNEP-SBCI).

### 5.1.2 The level of institutionalisation within the PCFV

In a document containing the governance rules for the partnership no obligations can be found for partners. Everyone can become a partner and no fee is further required (PCFV 2). Membership applications are nonetheless subject to the advisory boards review. If the advisory board has objections regarding the membership of a new actor, this is forwarded to

the partnership. The same procedure is followed when it is necessary to suspend memberships (Ibid). It should be noted however that this process has never occurred so far. Further, the PCFV does not require partners to attend any meetings or other activities. Conditionality only concerns its advisory board that includes volunteers from different member organisations (Ibid). All members in the partnership must however obey to Chatham House rules. The participants are free to use the information or opinions disclosed to them during Partnership meetings and in working group meetings subject to two conditions; a) Neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant at that meeting may be revealed. b) It may not be divulged that the information was received at that meeting (UNEP. 2010. P. 34) Due to these varying factors, the level of obligation can be said to be medium. The fact that there are spelled out procedures if members do not act correctly has shown to have a great impact on behaviour within institutions even though the procedures have not been used (Ibid). Secondly, the precision is classified as high. Each year, a data sampling has been made in order to investigate if the targets have been reached and the targets have further been measurable and precise (PCFV. 2010. P. 3). The delegation within PCFV is done through a process involving both self-reports and external monitoring. One evaluation method within the partnership has been the status for nations as leaded or unleaded. When a partner government wants to claim the status as unleaded, they write a formal letter to the Clearing House stating they have reached their goal. When the Clearing House receives the letter, they seek independent sources of information as additional confirmation that the country is actually lead-free. Further, the partnership has an extensive database available for the public that provides information on the status regarding different aspects related to the performance of countries and regions all around the world (PCFV 1). Overall, the partnership is classified as having a high level of institutionalisation.

## 5.2 Level of Effectiveness

### 5.2.1 UNEP-SBCI: Still waiting for the impact

The level of effectiveness regarding the UNEP-SBCI partnership is instead classified as low. Regarding the UNEP-SBCI output, many agree that the partnership has been successful in providing the activities, strategies and tools necessary to achieve the partnerships stated goals. The output is classified as medium since the partnership failed to achieve all stated goals but still were able to produce substantial contributions to the partnerships mission. Since its foundation, the partnership has worked towards their four different targeted objectives that concretise their mission (UNEP-SBCI). Until 2011, a work plan was set up for the upcoming year and presented in the annual report with deliverables for each objective that also had specific deadlines. The work plans and the following annual reports display that the partnership has been able to perform effectively when it comes to the stated output of the partnership. For example, the work plan for 2009/2010 included 34 different deliverables for the period. Activities could range from creating a PowerPoint presentation about the UNEP-SBCI to increase public awareness, to the finalising of the publication “Global baseline study

of energy and greenhouse performance standards for buildings - the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) Module on Building Sector Add CO<sub>2</sub>e and Cost implication” in the attempt to support policy development (UNEP-SBCI. 2010. P. 25). The annual report from 2010/2011 also showed that the partnership had reached the majority of the 34 stated targets for the period (UNEP-SBCI. 2011). Unfortunately, the latest annual report from 2011/2012 did not include a work plan for the coming period (UNEP-SBCI. 2012). This will make it more difficult to evaluate the output of the partnership in the future and also to identify possible outcomes and impact.

An aspect that favours the level of output is the initiated process to streamline and improve the impacts of its internal and external communications. This was done in direct response to results from surveys of the partnership conducted in 2010 and 2011 (UNEP-SBCI. 2011. P.9). It also goes in line with the mission of UNEP-SBCI to present a common voice for stakeholders within the building sector. The result from the survey indicated that the partners wanted the status of UNEP-SBCI to be raised and that they wanted more frequent communication as well as opportunities for contribution and participation to be more clearly highlighted. *“The membership survey revealed our members' satisfaction with the work of UNEP-SBCI, and identified a desire for more active roles. Our Committee structure attempts to provide for that opportunity, and we hope to create more forums for members to engage in UNEP-SBCI activities.”* (Maria Atkinson, Chair UNEP-SBCI Board, in the annual report of 2010-2011. P. 4). The streamlining process enabled a new partner communication tool, a monthly E-alert that in average reaches 150 partners and collaboration representatives worldwide. The external communication was improved as well through an updated website and two updated, revised and rewritten brochures introducing the partnership (UNEP-SBCI. 2012. P. 12).

The outcome of the partnership is classified as low. It is not possible to trace any present change in behaviour of targets and the specific implementation of knowledge, standards and services has so far been low. The future for UNEP-SBCI is nevertheless very interesting. The partnership has currently several on-going projects that hopefully will contribute to their objectives. One example of a successful project is the pilot Common Carbon Metric (CCM) project that was initiated in 2010 (UNEP-SBCI. 2012. P. 20). When initiated, there were no globally recognised tool for measuring the energy use and reporting the greenhouse gas emissions of building operations. The UNEP-SBCI therefore partnered with the World Resources Institute (WRI) to fill this gap. The project has until present gone through two pilot testing's. The CCM tool was also adopted by the International Standards Organisation in 2011 (Ibid). The recognition makes it possible to treat the CCM as actual outcome. This is one of UNEP-SBCI's most successful projects so far and will hopefully contribute substantially to the reduction of carbon in the building sector. Overall, the output of the PCFV shows a positive trend even if the results are mixed and difficult to interpret due to vagueness. Still, the evaluation of outcome shows that it can be regarded as low since the partnership currently almost not has been able to present any actual outcome. Further, the impact is not stated and will therefore be classified as low.



	<b>Output</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Impact</b>
<b>Low</b>		X	X
<b>Medium</b>	X		
<b>High</b>			

*Fig. 3 Level of effectiveness*

### 5.2.2 PCFV: A success story

The PCFV partnership was classified as a high effective partnership after the conducted study. The partnership has promoted the reduction of air pollution through three campaigns; (1) the Lead Campaign, aimed at eliminating lead in fuel; (2) the Sulphur Campaign, aimed at reducing levels of sulphur in diesel and gasoline; and (3) the Clean Vehicles Campaign, aimed at promoting the adoption of cleaner vehicle technologies (USEPA. 2010. P. 3). This case study is focusing especially on the Lead Campaign since the partnership foremost has focused on this campaign since its initiation. Since the origination, nearly all of the 100+ countries using leaded fuel has stopped doing so and the six countries that still were using lead fuel when the campaign ended was expected to be lead free in a few years (Ibid).

The output in regards to the mission statement can be found on several levels ranging from local to regional level. The output is classified as high. In total, 77 countries had been supported in activities related to the Lead Campaign during the period of 2002-2009. Countries had individual action plans that took into consideration the local settings. The action plan included timelines and roadmaps with activities to reach the targets, which proved beneficial (USEPA. 2010. P. 7). The output foremost regarded the awareness of the partnership and the environmental issue. A lot of work was done in order to spread information and develop awareness of the health and environmental impacts associated with lead emissions. This work has been executed both on an internal and external level as one aim also was to develop a communication platform for involved actors (Ibid). The objective has been fulfilled through numerous regional and local workshops with key stakeholders from different countries and several publications regarding the environmental issue as well as the partnership (Ibid). The development of a new intranet for partners to be able to communicate more effective and share knowledge was also an important output as it enabled more information sharing between the partners. Other output from the partnership has been a regular newsletter and the provision of technical assistance to governments and organisations involved in the campaigns (Ibid).

Outcome and impact of the partnership can be identified as well. The first objective for the partnership was to phase out lead in Sub-Saharan African countries. When it became clear that the target would be reached by January, 2006, the partnership instead chose a strategy of targeting 2008 for a global phase out to spur a rapid process, knowing that this target date may be unrealistic for countries facing substantial barriers to change (IPIECA. 2006). The partnership did not fulfil the target of a global phase out since there was six countries left with

lead fuel in 2009 but the Lead Campaign can still be said to be a successful project. Since the foundation, the Lead Campaign has led to the phase out of lead fuel in over 100 countries and has thus affected the behaviour of governments, organisations and individuals worldwide (UNEP. 2010. P. 7). Whether the result can be fully contributed to the PCFV is of course debatable. However, in 2009, the UNEP’s evaluation office commissioned an independent evaluation to assess the impacts of the Lead Campaign in Sub-Saharan Africa and in general, in the attempt to learn lessons from the partnership model. The evaluation found that it would have taken ten years rather than five years to achieve the elimination of lead fuel in Sub-Saharan Africa. It further found that the PCFV partnership contributed in several ways to the global phase out (Ibid).

Overall, the PCFV partnership has been highly effective in its attempt to promote the reduction of air pollution. The output has been very high measured as activities to raise public awareness of the partnerships cause. This has also led to an impressive outcome and impact that affects the life and behaviour of people worldwide.

	<b>Output</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Impact</b>
<b>Low</b>			
<b>Medium</b>			
<b>High</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>

*Fig. 4 Level of effectiveness*

# 6 Discussion

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The conducted study can due to its result support the hypothesis. A positive correlation between the level of institutionalisation and the level of effectiveness was identified. This further strengthens the theory of rational choice institutionalism and its applicability on partnerships. Studying the case of the UNEP-SBCI shows that the partnership has a low level of institutionalisation as well as low level of effectiveness. This due to almost no existing obligations or conditions regarding membership, no precision in regards to the objectives and no follow-up on targets. One notable finding regarding the partnership is identified in the conducted study as well as in the member survey from 2010 (UNEP-SBCI. 2011. P. 9). It shows that the partners in general are very pleased with the performance of the partnership but lacks information on possibilities to engage more actively in the partnership activities. The result of the member survey hence supports the impression received by the partnership during the study. The main tasks and the key performance activities of the partnership are performed by the secretariat consisting of UNEP staff (Ibid). The high output effectiveness can therefore be argued to be a result of a well-functioning secretariat rather than due to the inclusion of several actors in a transnational partnership. The main function of the partners does instead seem to be to finance the project and market the mission and activities performed by UNEP. Further, the outcome and impact of the partnership is still not viable. This can be related to several different factors. First of all, the partnership has no measurable and explicitly expressed target to monitor and evaluate. This makes the mission of the partnership vague. Further it makes it difficult to decide when the mission of the partnership actually is fulfilled. It should also be said that the UNEP-SBCI partnership was initiated in 2006 and it might need further time before actual outcome can be presented. At the moment several on-going projects could prove to be successful outcome in the future, much in regard to the working groups set up for certain issues related to the objectives of the partnership,

The PCFV instead proved to have a high level of institutionalisation and a high level of effectiveness. The partnership was classified as having a high level of institutionalisation partly due to its strong commitment to the Chatham House rules steering the behaviour of actors within the partnership. A review of global multi-stakeholder partnerships found that the mere existence of governance and rules provided a sense of security amongst partners even if there has not been occasion to call upon or enforce these rules in practices (EU. 2009) This in combination with precise and measurable goals, a well functioning evaluation system and external monitoring has made it possible for the PCFV to reach their objectives and have an actual impact on their domain. However, an important note regarding the PCFV is that partners were vital on a local and regional level rather than on a transnational. Their main

function has been to spread the mission of the PCFV and raise the awareness of the impact that lead fuel has on its surroundings. They have also been crucial in the attempt to tie the objectives of the partnership to key stakeholders around the world and make it an important issue on the political agenda. The somewhat disseminated partnership is however nothing unusual. It is instead also identified as a common phenomenon in world politics by Robert Keohane “Finally, international institutions do not need to be integrated into one coherent network. Cooperation is almost always fragmentary in world politics: not all the pieces of the puzzle will fit together” (Keohane. 1984. P. 246).

Several central features of the theory of rational choice institutionalism can be strengthened by the cases. In the illustration of the PCFV and the Lead Campaign, all four significant features of the theory can be identified. Further, the theory’s proposed correlation between the two studied variables can also be supported.<sup>5</sup> In the case of the PCFV Lead Campaign, air can be said to be the common good and its protection can be argued to be of everyone’s interest. Before the Lead Campaign, 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were still using lead fuel. Since the transformation to become lead free demands investments and a change of behaviour by everyone in the society, uncertainty was very high. Governments did not know how private actors would respond to a possible attempt within the country to be lead free and the private sector did not know what government planned to do or how NGO:s would act or what was in their interest. In this case, the PCFV provided the society with information concerning the issue and on what activities that had to be executed in order to become lead free. The partnership thus enabled more effective cooperation (Keohane. 1984. P. 67).

Another interesting finding of the study was that the level of institutionalisation seems to matter more or less depending on the partnership. This can also be linked to the theory of rational choice institutionalism and its close tie to game theory. The theory argues that, depending on the type of collaboration, the level of institutionalisation affect the effectiveness of institutions more or less (Keohane. 1984. P. 69). Accordingly, what the partnership is destined to achieve and the underlying interests of involved actors matter. In fundamentally cooperative games, collective action is self-enforced since it is the most beneficial alternative for both (Snidal. 1986. P. 93). In such a game, only a low level of institutionalisation is needed. However, in mixed-motive games; in which both players can benefit from collaboration but each can gain from betraying the other, a high level of institutionalisation is needed (Keohane. 1984. P. 67).

The case of the UNEP-SBCI can be used as an example. The partnership only requires its members to pay an annual fee. This allows the partners to benefit from several merits such as participating in the partnership activities, make use of its network, and gain publicity that possibly improves the image of the partner. In turn, the funding enables the partnership to fulfil its mission; to present a common voice for stakeholders from the building sector on sustainable buildings and climate change (UNEP-SBCI). This mission foremost regards

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<sup>5</sup> See features at p. 16-17 and a discussion on the linkage between the studied variables in section 4.3.

knowledge sharing and raising awareness, which can be argued as not requiring binding rules and formal structures. However, the partnership does also aim to construct tools and standards for the industry as well as conduct pilot project. The Common Carbon Metric project is such a project (UNEP-SBCI. 2012 P. 20). The activities require costly investments and in order to execute these assignments effectively, the partnership eventually chose to establish working committees for the separate activities. The structure of the committees are more formalised and there are guidelines for how the committees should execute their mission and an action plan with further information on budget, monitoring and time plan (UNEP-SBCI. 2009. P.2). The activities performed by the working committees can be argued to be more of a mixed-motive game. It takes more effort and investments to fulfil specified targets. From a rational perspective, it would be more beneficial to let others do it. This is why a higher level of institutionalisation was needed in order to perform the collective activities effective and showed to be an effective way of coping with the collective action problem.

As mentioned, the study identified a positive correlation between the level of institutionalisation and the level of effectiveness. The in-depth study of the relationship showed that factors related to institutionalisation such as obligations, information sharing, precise objectives and a functional evaluation system affected the effectiveness of partnerships. The applicability of the theory on partnership is therefore supported and can prove to be an important perspective in further studies on partnerships. However, the thesis also exemplified critique that previously had been aimed towards the theory of rational choice institutionalism. The critique includes arguments claiming that the foundation rests on a simplistic image of human behaviour (Hall & Taylor. 1996. P. 950-951). It is further claimed that this might result in the analysis built on the theory missing out on important dimensions affecting partnerships performance. This in combination with one of the previously presented limitations of the study, that the analysis is only built on two cases is an important notion and it is important to be aware of the fact that there were several other factors that contributed to the effectiveness of the studied partnerships as well. Other factors that were identified in this study were for example the partnerships financial strength, its network, the type of mission and their staff. The result of this qualitative study must therefore be qualified further as to verify that the identified connection is not spurious.

# 7 Conclusion

The purpose of the thesis was to explain transnational partnerships variation in effectiveness. More specifically, the thesis investigated whether the level of institutionalisation increased the effectiveness of partnerships. The hypothesis could be supported by the study. Both of the studied cases showed a positive correlation between the level of institutionalisation and the level of effectiveness.

However, it was also noted that different types of partnership depended more or less on the partnerships level of institutionalisation. In line with rational choice institutionalism, it was displayed that those partnerships resembling mixed-motive games was in further need of a high level of institutionalisation than those resembling fundamentally cooperative games. Another important notion was that the level of institutionalisation was not the only factor contributing to the effectiveness of the partnerships but rather one feature that contributed to its success.

Finally, the rational choice institutionalism can be argued to be ministrant to the study of partnerships in global governance. The theory proved to be a remunerating perspective to emanate from also when it was not focusing exclusively on states as solitary actors in world politics. Instead, the central features of rational choice institutionalism relating to strategic interaction, and collective action dilemma could be strengthened as to be fundamental to the study of global governance.

## 7.1 Further Research

In order to achieve a cumulative research process and build on the most contributable features of this study, selected proposals on further research will be presented below. One possibility is to further study partnerships from a rational choice institutionalism perspective but instead focus on how different types of actors demand different level of institutionalisation in order to prove successful. The study would focus on the anticipatory variables, the reason for why institutionalisation is desirable in the first place. This would be interesting as to identify what type of actors that creates more uncertainty in a collaboration game. Identifying what type of partnership structure that is the most beneficial for different type of objectives would be a very important empirical finding. This is also an interesting study to execute with the use of game theory.

Further studies supporting or rejecting the results of this study is also needed in order to qualify the result. The studies could be done using different methods. A quantitative method could be used in order to sample a larger amount of data that could enable a higher level of generalisation of the result. This in combination with further in-depth studies in order to capture the different dimensions of studied partnerships would possibly prove to be valuable. Finally, studies on other potential factors that affect the effectiveness of partnerships is gratifying as it was recognised in the study that additional factors possibly are relevant.

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