"Essence of indecision"

- Explaining Veto Player structures and Agenda Setting processes in Swiss Foreign Policy

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Abstract

The Swiss foreign policy offers a deviant case. Most countries that were neutral during the Cold War have during the last decades become more cooperative, while Switzerland on the other hand still contains a rather stable foreign policy. Because traditional theories in International Politics offer no concrete explanation to this puzzle, I have been oriented towards decision-making theories in domestic politics. The research questions were explored through two case studies. The first case study analysing the veto player structures in the Swiss security reports 1973-2010 with help of Tsebelis Veto Player Theory (1995). Finding that not all institutional veto players favoured the proposed changes in the security reports. The consent of all three veto players is however necessary in order to change a policy, leading therefore to no change. The second case study examines the agenda-setting process in the UN membership proposal in 1986 with help of Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework (1995). Finding that the prominent actors in the governmental agenda and the decision agenda differed, explaining therefore why the UN membership was rejected. In both case studies the people through the referendum's where identified as the most sufficient factor influencing the decision-making process in the Swiss foreign policy.

List of Abbreviations

AUNS	Action for a neutral and independent Switzerland (Aktion für eine unabhängige und neutrale Schweiz)
BBI	Federal Gazette (Bundesblatt)
BfS	Federal Statistics (Bundesamt für Statistik)
BRD	Federal Republic of Germany (west germany)
BV	Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung)
DDR	German Democratic Republic (east germany)
CVP	Christian Peoples Party (Christliche Volks Partei)
ECHR	European Convention on Human Right
EEC	European Economic Cooperation
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States
FDP	Free Democratic Party Switzerland (Freisinnig Demokratische Partei)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SPS	Social Democractic Party Switzerland (Sozialdemokratische Partei Schweiz)
SVP	Swiss Peoples Party (Schweizerische Volks Partei)
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNHCR	Office oft he United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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List of Foreign Concepts

Bundesversammlung
The Swiss Federal Assembly or the Swiss parliament

Doppelmehr
double-more, in an obligatory referendum the people as well as the cantons need to adopt the referendum

Fakultatives Referendum
Optional referendum, the people can contest any regulation in the parliament

Fraktionen
Fractions, politicians are divided into fractions in the parliament that include members of the same party or from like-minded parties

Kantone
Cantons, are the 26 member states of the federal state of Switzerland

Nationalrat
The National Council, the lower house in the parliament

Obligatorisches Referendum
Obligatory referendum, in order to join an international organization the people's consent is a constitutional requirement

Schweizer Bundesrat
The Swiss Federal Council, the executive

Ständerat
The State of Council, the upper house in the parliament

Volksinitiative
Citizen's initiative, a referendum raised by the people

Zauberformel
Magic Formula, describes the constellation in the Federal Council, seven members share the power in the executive, are elected in proportion to the four biggest parties

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1 Introduction

The end of the cold war, and thereby the end of bipolarity, has had a great impact on foreign policy. The external security environment and international order has changed and with that new possibilities in foreign policy have emerged. Especially the European Security environment has undergone major changes during the past two decades. One important factor that has contributed to these changes is the European Union. During the last decades the EU has increased its amount of member states progressively, which has made the EU increasingly an important actor in foreign policy.

Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden were all neutral during the Cold War, during the last decades they have become more cooperative by joining the EU and in line revised their Security Policy towards EU: s priorities. As a consequence neutrality has in these countries successively over gone to non-alignment (Agius-Devine, 2011, Goetschel, 1999). Switzerland, on the other hand has since the end of the Cold War not abandoned its longstanding foreign policy. Switzerland is neither member in the European Union nor in the NATO, and became only recently member in the United Nations.

The Swiss foreign policy offers a puzzle in foreign policy, in order to understand *why* we first need to take a look at the source, which is found in the context: decreasing territorial problems, greater interdependence between European States and increasing involvement of the EU and the NATO in foreign policy. The following events have contributed to examine the *purpose* of neutrality in the aftermath of the Cold War. Different theoretical assumptions are stated in the academic debate regarding neutrality. For instant Rickli argues in his article that small European states have two security policy alternatives, either to be cooperative by joining a security institution as for example the EU or NATO, or to join ad-hoc coalitions (2008:308). This argument highlights that neutrality today is an unnecessary strategy because of the changes in the international environment. Switzerland's foreign policy offers therefore a problem in the topic of foreign policy. Traditional theories in International Politics contribute with no useful explanations to the question: why Switzerland since the end of the cold war still holds on to neutrality and is rather isolated in World Politics.

The changes in the international relations in foreign policy in the 1990s called the attention of scholars to explain this changing process (Rosati, 1994, Holsti, 1982, Gustavsson, 1998, Hermann, 1990, Goldmann, 1988). As a result a variety of different models were developed that aimed to explain foreign policy change. This thesis has made use of these contributions when searching for explanatory factors. Arguing that the variables influencing foreign policy change also contribute with explanations about why these variables had no impact on

the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process. However, the models contain no theoretical elements therefore this thesis consumes theories outside the field of foreign policy. This thesis uses Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory (1995) and Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework (1984), both established and prominent theories in political science, however rather rarely tested in the topic of foreign policy. I argue that both theories make use of the explanatory factors suggested by the scholars in the field of foreign policy change, however focusing on different perspective.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand and explain indecisions in the Swiss foreign policy. It is impossible to explain all types of foreign policy; the ambition of this thesis is therefore too explain two particular decision-making processes in the Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss foreign policy offers two deviant events in the decision-making process.

First, in most political systems the government has a great influence on the decision-making process, meanwhile in Switzerland the government serves rather as a mediator. Switzerland is therefore often viewed as something extraordinary due because of its institutional settings as direct democracy, the government coalition and the extensive vertical and horizontal power sharing, which has been studied in various research before (Kriesi, 1998, Linder, 1994, Neidhart, 1970). In international comparison, Lijphart argues that Switzerland is the prime example of a "consensus democracy" (Lijphart, 1999:249). As mentioned before Swiss foreign policy has historically rather been a consensus topic, the majority of politicians favour neutrality because of its success during the World War I and World War II (Hagmann, 2010). Because the Swiss Political Institutions are often described as special (Wenger, 2008, Linder, 2005), I argue it is therefore theoretically relevant to examine the Swiss political institutions closer. Analysing the decision-making process in the Swiss setting as well as the actors within. However, rather drawing on Lijphart´s "consensus democracy" I am going to use Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory. The theory contributes with plausible explanations about veto player structures in the Swiss political institution and how actors hold veto power influencing the policy outcome. Therefore I argue that the Swiss foreign policy indicates an important case within foreign policy, namely that security strategies are not always formed because of events in the international level but rather because of domestic politics.

Second, Switzerland adopted permanent neutrality at the Vienna Congress in the year 1815 (admin.ch). Neutrality was first reinforced in order to secure Switzerland´s sovereignty from the surrounding neighbours and later served as a diplomatic innovation. Neutrality has been a positive experience for Switzerland during the Franco-German war, the World War I and World War II. Historically the Swiss foreign policy is rather a restrained topic in domestic politics, contains no bigger disagreement (Hirschi, et al. 2005). However in the early 1970s foreign policy became a heated debate, mainly because actors from the left-wing advocated to join the United Nations in order to become more cooperative in the international arena. This debate dominated the Swiss political agenda for decades and as Hagman underlines: "by the turn of the millennium,

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disagreements had risen to such levels that scholars diagnosed an unprecedented and alarming erosion of the national security policy consensus" (2010:249).

In the debate two main disagreements were found. First, politicians debated about the meaning of Security Policy in the aftermath of World War II. The conservative traditional politicians arguing for a traditional military strategy, meanwhile the government together with the majority of politicians favouring a policy that could meet the new security threats in the international environment. The second disagreement was about how to approach the Swiss security policy, the traditional conservatives emphasising the maintenance of neutrality, meanwhile the government favoured cooperation with international organizations as for example the European Union and United Nations. As underlined before the conservative parties favoured neutrality and emphasised a military centred security policy. The Swiss People`s party was the smallest party in the Swiss Federal Council, during the 1970s and was primarily popular in rural cantons. However in the 1990s under the influence of Christoph Blocher the party underwent structural and ideological changes and got highly engaged in the UN debate and made later foreign policy their main interest. Being the smallest party in the federal council in the beginning of the 1990s in the year 1999 at the national elections, SVP increased its popularity and became the strongest party in Switzerland. With help of Kingdon´s multiple stream model (1984), I will analyse not only how the UN membership became an important issue in the political agenda but also how individual actors influenced the decision-making process and the development of this.

1.1   The Aim and Research Questions

This study has the empirical aim, to test two plausible explanations offered in the decision-making literature. Therefore this thesis is separated into two case studies, both of which use one of the frames of reference when searching for explanations to the research question. This research highlights central issues in the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process, which deepens the understanding of Switzerland´s foreign policy and contributes with theoretical explanation in new topics. Meanwhile the theoretical aim is to make a contribution to the study of decision-making in foreign policy.

The general research question is outlined as followed:
- *How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be explained?*

    In order to answer this overall research question I have formulated two separate sub-questions, which give the outline for each case study.

    Case study 1 aims to answer the following sub-question:
- *What plausible explanations can Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory contribute with in the Swiss Federal Assembly debate regarding the Swiss Security Report, 1973, 1990, 2000, 2010?*

Case study 2 aims to answer the following sub-question:

- *What plausible explanations can Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework contribute with in the 1986 UN debate?*

2 Theoretical Framework

"We should not ask what goals account for a nation´s choice of action, but rather what factors determine an outcome (...)"

<div align="right">Allison, 1971:253</div>

The theoretical framework is established with help of theoretical discussions of decision-making processes in foreign policy as well as theoretical explanations outside the field. This chapter begins with an overview of previous studies in the field of foreign policy. Following a discussion about the contributions of the topic foreign policy change to this thesis. In the final part of this chapter *Tsebelis´Veto Player Theory* and *Kingdon´s Mutliple Stream Framework* are presented, each of which serve separately as a theoretical explanation to the phenomena Swiss foreign policy stability.

2.1 Foreign Policy as a field of research

This research has the intention to make a contribution to the topic of *foreign policy*. Foreign policy is a classical topic within the studies of political science; offering a selection of different perspectives. Most studies in foreign policy try to explain *action* taken by states or individual units (Gustavsson, 1998:16). Within the studies of foreign policy one main disagreement is found, namely whether action is dependent on external sources or internal sources. To put it in another way, whether action is influenced by international affairs or because of domestic politics.

The traditional theories in foreign policy engage in security issues rather on the *international level*. The so-called *rational actor assumption* has been the main focus in studies about foreign policy strategies; especially the realistic perspective has dominated this topic. The main argument here is that states adapt and change their political structure due to world politics (Dunne in Baylis, 2008:96). One of the most influential scholars within *realism* is Kenneth Waltz (1979), who argues that foreign policy strategies are formed because of the structure of the international system. Waltz only takes into account international factors and argues even further that domestic explanations play no role or only a minor role in states foreign policy strategy. I criticise Waltz´s theory because his arguments are far to general, the realist approach cannot explain why

Switzerland in the aftermath of the Cold War still is rather restricted in World Politics. The prominent realist Mearsheimer also argues that *all* states try to maximize their power at the costs of other states (2001:20). For this Mearsheimer has been criticised by scholars (Keohane, 1986, Ostrom-Job, 1986). Keohane emphasises: "*States concerned with self preservation do not seek to maximize their power when they are not in danger*" (1986:174). I agree with the critics, arguing that not all states try to maximize their power by adapting to the changes in the world order, as the Swiss case implies *status quo* states are present. The Rational Actor perspective offers though explanations about the process from *non-alignment* to *cooperation,* with reference to the systemic structure. For instance Rickli explains this process with help of the international level, arguing that small European states have in the aftermath of the Cold War two security policy alternatives: either to be cooperative by joining a security institution as for example the EU or NATO, or to join ad-hoc coalitions (2008:308). Other rationalist scholars argue that "post-neutrality" is a logical step in the aftermath of bipolarity and a result of new security demands (Huldt, 1995, Cox - MacGinty, 1996, Dahl, 1997, Missiroli, 2003).

Switzerland, on the other hand, has since the end of the Cold War not abandoned it´s longstanding policy of non-alignment and not fully taken part in the European Integration process, which makes the rationalist assumption in the Swiss case superfluous. The realistic assumption assumes further that the state is a *unitary actor*, this statement ignores however that individual actors within the state create foreign policy and that the state rather consists of a variety of different actors. Hermann defines a foreign policy as: *a problem-oriented or a goal oriented program established by policymakers with the aim to meet problems that exist outside the policymaking environment* (1990:5). The traditional theories, as discussed, offer no explanation to why the Swiss foreign policy is stable in the aftermath of the Cold War. Therefore concentrating on forces *within* the state, in the domestic politics. As Hermann emphasises: "foreign policy is established by policymaker" (1990:5), foreign policy is therefore seen as a process of decision-making and explains the actions taken by policymakers.

Explaining foreign policy with help of decision-making process is a prominent explanation style within the study of foreign policy and often referred to as the "Foreign Policy Decision Making" (FDPM). As Lagon underlines:

> The State is not in fact a unitary rational actor responding mechanically to
> an international equilibrium or to some clearly definable objective interests.
> Real, live human leaders must answer these questions. The national interest
> is the product of the subjective beliefs of elites, not of objective theory
>
> (Lagon, 1992:65)

Similar conclusions where drawn in the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, they argued that foreign policy was the outcome of the decision-makers subjective interpretation of the situation rather than the influence of international forces (1962:14-185). Arguing further that: "*the key to the explanation of why the state*

behaves as it does lies in the way its decision-makers as actors define their situations" (Snyder, et.al. 1962:65). Another influential approach in foreign policy decision-making is the concept of *bounded rationality*, first introduced by Herbert Simon (1983). Simon argues that the structure in which solutions are considered affect the outcome of the decision. He focuses on the individual level, claiming that action in foreign policy depend on the decisions made by human beings (1983:12). Simon (1983) and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) contribute with essential insights when explaining state actions, action is taken because decision-makers *inside* the government chose to take action. Foreign policy can therefore not be seen an objective force driven by a *common* goal/interest, but rather the outcome of decision-makers subjective interpretation of a situation leading to a foreign policy action or no action.

The traditional theories in the field of foreign policy have contributed with rather few theoretical explanations about the changes in the world order; this led to the emergence of the constructivist approach in the field of foreign policy. The *Copenhagen School*, with Barry Buzan as the main contributor to the field, is the most prominent approach building on constructivism. Buzan argues that the concept security has become much more multifaceted and needs to be refined (Buzan, 1991:8). Buzan underlines that a "broader framework of security" will include the important aspects like environmental, economical, military, political and societal security (1991:20). The scholars have primarily explored "societal security" and it´s relation to *societal identity* when explaining foreign policy. Such as the work of Christine Agius (2011), she explains the politics of "post-neutral" states with help of a constructivist approach. Agius argues that the move from neutrality to post-neutrality shifted not only because of the emergence of new security threats, as underlined by rationalist scholars, but rather because of the involvement of ideas of the self and subjectivity (2011:384). Agius and Devine emphasise that it is questionable whether neutrality or military non-alignment has any strategic or security value (2011:266). That is why most scholars use European integration theory when explaining foreign policy change, examining the dynamics of interaction and norm exchange between the member states (Gstöhl, 2002, Goetschel, 1999, Rieker 2004).

Widmer argues that dualism, the separation of economics and politics in Switzerland, has shaped the identity formation process of Switzerland as highly heterogeneous in terms of politics, culture and religion (2008:214). Viewing the Swiss foreign policy as a social construction could explain why Switzerland since the end of the cold war still emphasises the same policy even though it's from a security perspective unnecessary. The Swiss foreign policy has been explained with help of the constructivist perspective in various academically contributions, therefore I argue that a saturation has been reached arguing that other explanatory variables need to be explored more in depth. The constructivist approach has further been criticised for viewing society as a *single* value or interest so assumes that the common values of the state is the only object of threat (McSweeney, 1996:90-91). As previous indicated, viewing the

state as a single actor misses one important factor, namely that the state holds different interests and values.

As the theory discussion specifies no *grand theory* dominates the research field foreign policy. As a result researchers tend to focus on various explanatory factors when analysing foreign policies. A prominent example is Allison´s (1971) study: "*The Essence of Decision*" explaining the outcome of the Cuban Missile crisis with help of three theoretical "lenses": the organizational behaviour, the governmental politics and the rational actor. The result of Allison´s research indicates, "*the conceptual angles present a number of significant differences in emphasis and interpretation*" (1971:379). This research has been inspired by the work of Allison in the way that many factors influence foreign policy and thereby provide broad explanations about the policy. In this research I will make use of various explanatory factors provided in the domestic level. Although, I am aware that is impossible to make use of a theoretical framework that explains all types of foreign policy. The ambition of this research is so to analyse two distinct decision-making processes in the Swiss foreign policy, both of which uses *one* of the frame of reference when searching for explanations.

In the next chapter I will discuss which *alternative* explanations are offered in the field of foreign policy when studying Swiss foreign policy stability.

2.2 The Study of Foreign Policy stability

The changes in the international relations in foreign policy in the 1990s called the attention of scholars to explain this changing process. As a result a variety of different models were developed that aimed to explain *foreign policy change* see for example, Rosati (1994), Holsti (1982), Hermann (1990), Goldmann (1988) and Gustavsson (1998). However, because Switzerland has not adapted to these changes I will use these models as premises in order to discover the dependent variables. Arguing here that the variables leading to change also explain if they were present in the Swiss foreign policy and why they had only little or no impact on the decision-making process. In this study I analyse foreign policy stability defined by Tsebelis' as: "*the impossibility of significantly changing the status quo*" (1995:2), rather than the direction of change. Most of the models include the international level in their analyses, in this study I will only focus on variables offered in the domestic level, as discussed earlier. As Goldmann states: "*domestic factors are generally taken to include the beliefs on which foreign policies are based as well as the governmental apparatus by which they are implemented, monitored and revised*" (1988:39).

Goldmann discusses how so-called *stabilizers* protect foreign policy from change (1988:43). The stabilizers are *institutionalization* explaining the commitment of the government towards a policy, *support* indicates the degree on which advocates mobilize support for the changing policy and *salience* signifies the degree of domestic power struggle (Goldmann, 1988:44). Hermann

developed a model explaining foreign policy change with help of graduated levels. Hermann emphasises that two changes need to occur in order for a foreign policy to change, change in the international system, and further that the systematic change *triggers* change in the domestic politics (Hermann, 1990:11). The independent variables influencing the decision-making process are: *leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external shocks* (Hermann, 1990:11-13). In this research I will overlook the variable *external shock* presented by Hermann (1990:12), as the ambition is to explain Swiss foreign policy stability with help of domestic variables rather than international variables. Another factor that offers no explanation in this research is the variable *leader driven* (Hermann, 1990:11). Switzerland contains no authoritative policymaker as the political power is shared by seven members in the council described as a multi-party government (admin.ch). In Hermann's model the other two remaining elements have drawn my attention: *domestic restructuring* and *bureaucratic advocacy* (1990:11-12). Domestic restructuring referring here to society whose support is required in order to govern (Hermann, 1990:11-12). Bureaucratic advocacy on the other side referring to groups within the government that advocate a redirection in the foreign policy (Hermann, 1990:11-12), similar to Goldmann's stabilizer support and therefore suggesting the same explanation. Analysing the factors explaining foreign policy change will not only provide knowledge about the determinants leading to change but also provide explanations about why these variables have no impact on the Swiss foreign policy. Further offering plausible explanations about stability in the Swiss foreign policy.

Both models offer a broad perspective about foreign policy, including the international as well as the domestic level, when explaining the decision-making process in foreign policy. Critic has been directed towards the vagueness in Hermann's model, the model contains no hypothesis about which factor is more important than others, serving therefore as a model rather than a theory (Gustavsson, 1998:19). Goldmann on the other side points out that the stabilizers might vary between different types of political systems and should therefore be threated on ad-hoc basis (Gustavsson, 1998:20). Both Goldmann and Hermann's model serve in this study as directives, contributing with knowledge about the factors determining the decision-making process in foreign policy. However because the models are rather vague I use these models as a starting point in order to find a suitable theoretical framework.

As previous implied, I view foreign policy as a process of decision-making so analysing the factors that influence the decision-making process in domestic politics. The international level offers no plausible explanation to why the Swiss foreign policy is stable. Goldmann and Hermann contribute with various factors explaining foreign policy change. In order to analyse these elements more in depth I have chosen Tsebelis' Veto Player theory (1995) and Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework (1984). Both theories can provide an understanding about the decision-making process at the national level and its impact on policy outcome. As earlier discussed it is impossible to make use of a theoretical framework that is capable of explaining all types of foreign policy, which explains why there is

no grand theory in foreign policy. The ambition of this research is therefore rather two explain two particular decision-making processes in the Swiss foreign policy, the first event with help of Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory and the second event with help of Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework. As earlier stated, this research will therefore analyse two events in the Swiss foreign policy decision-making separately, using in each case a different theoretical framework.

First, the institutional setting in Switzerland is often described as special it is therefore interesting to analyse the causal dynamic between veto player structures and foreign policy. As Hermann underlines, actors within the government can advocate a redirection in foreign policy and thereby influence the decision-making process. Analysing the veto player structures in the Swiss political system can provide explanations about whether the actors advocating change or actors favouring the status quo are favoured in the decision-making process. Hermann's second element, the role of the society in the decision-making is considered in the theory as well, especially when identifying the veto players. Goldmann's variables are studied as well, analysing the veto player structures in the Swiss political system will expose the veto players commitment to the foreign policy and the degree of support for the advocates favouring change. Salience is explained in the Veto Player theory when analysing internal cohesion and ideological difference among veto players.

Second, the Swiss UN debate in 1986 is often described as the commencement of a heated debate in the Swiss foreign policy, as described in the introductory. Politicians within the Swiss government advocated a change in the Swiss foreign policy by joining the United Nations. Hermann's bureaucratic advocacy can thereby be analysed with help of Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework. Analysing the agenda-setting process will provide with plausible explanations about how advocates make use of events and themes in order to push their ideas to the front and so influencing the decision-making process. Hermann's domestic restructuring can be analysed with help of Kingdon's theory when analysing the decision-agenda. In the light of Switzerland's direct-democracy the advocates require the support of the people, analysing the decision-agenda will provide with essential information's. Goldmann's variables institutionalization and support are realized when analysing the policyentrepreneurs and their influence on the agenda-setting process. If the advocates manage to put their issue on the agenda it indicates that there is a great support for the policy. Institutionalization on the other hand, is contemplated when analysing the decision-agenda and especially focusing on legislative enactment. The last stabilizer salience is in Kingdon´s model examined when analysing the agenda setting process within as well as outside.

Both theoretical frameworks are prominent theories in political science, however rather rarely tested in the field of foreign policy. I argue that this is a strength contributing with new explanations to the field. The usages of both theoretical frameworks contribute with a broader understanding of the Swiss foreign policy stability. Provides further an in-depth understanding of the veto player structures in the Swiss security report (1973, 1990, 2000, 2010) and the agenda-setting process in the 1986 UN membership debate. The research field

foreign policy contains no prominent theory explaining foreign policy stability, in line with that the traditional theories offer no plausible explanation this thesis will therefore make us of established theories outside the field. The discussion about the research field "foreign policy change" contributed with knowledge about where to search for independent variables in the Swiss domestic politics. The next chapter presents and discusses Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory and Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework more in detail.

*Table 1, The causal dynamics of foreign policy change*

The Causal Dynamics of Foreign Policy change

Domestic Factors → Veto Player Structures / Agenda-setting process → Decision-makers → Decision-making process → Foreign Policy

Feedback

figure inspired by Gustavsson (1998), Hermann (1990)

2.3 Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory

The veto player theory was first introduced by George Tsebelis in 1995, and has in contemporary research become an established approach explaining policy outcomes (Ganghof − Bräuniger, 2006, Keefer − Stasavage, 2003, Busemeyer, 2005). Tsebelis' theory explains policy outcomes by exploring the veto player structures in political systems.

In most political systems the government is the highest executive authority, however in the Swiss political system the Federal Council (government) has only reduced influence over the decision making process. The executive serves more as a *mediator* for the legislative arena (Linder, 2005:222). In light of federalism the political power is rather found in the legislative, as the supreme power in Switzerland (admin.ch). The constitutional rule differs thereby in Switzerland from other countries, the decision-making process cannot be examined with the help of classical institutional theories as those found in the works of Rhodes (1995), North, (1990), Knight (1992) or March - Olsen (1984). Tsebelis' has contributed with a great empirical foundation; the veto player framework can be applied on *any* political system. As Tsebelis underlines: "*The veto player theory enables the reader to study and analyze the political systems regardless of the level of their institutional complexity*" (1995:2). Contributing to

consistency, namely that the same arguments are applied on any country and any level of analysis (Tsebelis, 1995:2).

The main argument made by Tsebelis and at the same time serving as the definition of veto players is: "*in order to change policies, or (…) to change the (legislative) status quo, a certain number of individual or collective actors have to agree to the proposed change*" (1995:2). The veto players are therefore specified in the constitution or in the political system (Tsebelis, 1995:13). Emphasising further, that political actors ability to influence policies is dependent on the institutional setting, the political system generates hurdles for the actors and so influencing the decision making process (1995:23). The differences between political systems are created because of the veto player structures; it is in this theoretical assumption that Tsebelis' theory differs from other contributions in the literature on political institutions.

The veto players are the independent variables; meanwhile the capacity for policy stability is the dependent variable (Tsebelis, 1995:289). The dependent variable can be anything from a distinct policy change, as for example the UN membership policy, to a potential change in direction in a policy area as for example the process from non-alignment to cooperation. Tsebelis differs between two different veto players, the *institutional veto players*, the actors whose agreement is a requirement in order change a policy, and the *partisan veto players* identified as the political parties (1995:24). Institutional veto players play a sufficient role in the decision making process, a policy outcome is therefore dependent on the veto players. The partisan veto players are the governmental parties (Tsebelis, 1995:392). As Tsebelis further underlines their consent is "(…) *neither necessary nor sufficient*" (1995:302).

Tsebelis introduces further the *absorption rule* (Tsebelis, 1995:310), if the partisan majorities are identical in the upper and lower chamber than the institutional veto players are counted as *one* rather than two. Tsebelis' main focus is towards the institutional veto players and the partisan veto players, underlining though that political system contains also other important veto players. These veto players vary from policy area to policy area and are sometimes difficult to identify. As Tsebelis underlines "*in case studies one must identify all the relevant veto players*" (1995:308), this is important in this thesis, as the aim is to study veto player structures in a case study. Other veto players emphasised in Tsebelis´ framework are for example *interest groups* and the *referendum*. In this thesis the role of the referendum is important, however the usage of it differs from other countries. In the light of the Swiss direct democracy the referendum is continuously embedded in the Swiss political system and therefore in this thesis not considered as an other veto player. The referendum reflects the opinion of the people in the decision-making process, and introduces therefore an important veto player (Hug-Tsebelis, 2002:446). The referendum on its own says little, rather who controls it, examining who *initiates the referendum*, if the same actor asks the questions as well as initiates the referendum, then the referendum eliminates all other veto players (Hug –

Tsebelis, 2002:447). Actors can mobilize the support of the people in the referendum with help of campaigns. *Interest groups* refer to actors outside the government that become influential in the decision-making process. In Switzerland the interest groups are often involved in the electoral level, in the referendums as for example mobilizing campaigns (Linder, 2005:12).

Tsebelis names three important *constraints* that influence the dependent variable, moving the policy towards the status quo or towards the direction of change. The *numbers* of veto players, or the amount of institutional veto players has a significant impact on policy outcomes (see table 2). The higher the number of veto player's the smaller the so-called *winset* for policy change (Tsebelis, 1995:14). The winset explores the probability of beating the status quo, the greater the winset the greater the possibility of changing a policy, stability is therefore defined by the size of the winset (Tsebelis, 1995:8).

Table 2, Identification of institutional veto players

The second point of interest is the *ideological distance* between the veto players (Tsebelis, 1995:8). The greater the ideological distance among the veto players, the smaller the winset against the status quo. The third point of interest is *internal cohesion,* essential when analysing the institutional veto players in particular if they are collective actors, as for example the upper and lower chamber in the USA. The higher the internal cohesion between collective veto players, the higher the probability of blocking policy changes.

In most empirical analysis the two later constraints are left aside, however I argue that the interaction between these constraints are essential when analysing veto player structures. The amount of veto player tells us little about policy outcomes; meanwhile ideological distance and internal cohesion contribute with explanations about the complexity in the decision-making process between the veto players.

Even though Tsebelis´ theory is prominent in political science a variety of scholars have criticised some of the assumptions stated in the theory. Tsebelis´s assumes that political actors are primarily policy-seeking, however

Jochem (2003), Busemeyer (2005) and Ganghof (2003) argue that by specifying this preference other important preferences are left aside, as for example office- or vote seeking. Ganghof underlines that *"policies are means rather than ends"* (2003:10), claiming that policies are used by politicians in order to get votes or getting elected in the government. I argue that this criticism has only little impact on my case. The executive is in Switzerland constituted by collective heads rather than a unitary actor. The four biggest parties form the seven-member executive; it is the legislative that elects the members in the Federal Council. The preferences vote- and office seeking are therefore not a matter of great importance in this thesis.

2.3.1 Analytical Framework

The theoretical discussions presented in this chapter will contribute with an understanding on how to make use of Tsebelis veto player theory. In order to explore plausible explanations provided by Tsebelis, the following framework has been designed.

Table 3, Analytical framework veto player structures

Analytical Framework

Number of Veto Players	**Ideological distances**	**Internal Cohesion**
How many Veto Players?	What is the ideological distance among Veto Players?	What are the differences in policy position within Veto Players?

If increasing than

Favour of the Status Quo leading to Policy stability

2.4 Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework

Kingdon presented in 1984 the multiple stream framework, which was considered to be a refreshing contribution to the field of policy-making. In Kingdon's framework multiple sources affect the agenda-setting and the

decision-making process, analysing actors within as well as outside the government. Zahariadis explains multiple streams as:

> " a lens, perspective, or framework (…) that explains how policies are made by
> national governments under conditions of ambiguity"

<div align="right">(in Sabatier, 2007:65)</div>

Kingdon developed in "Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies" a theory that explains how an issue becomes an issue and thereby is put on the agenda. Kingdon explains the entire process starting with floating ideas and ending with the implementation of a policy (Kingdon, 2011:3). Even though Kingdon describes the entire process, he places special emphasis on the two first processes: how subjects become prominent on the policy agenda and why some alternatives are preferred over others (Kingdon, 2011:3). Kingdon's multiple stream framework is influenced by the *garbage can model*, developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). The model divides problems, solutions and decision-makers from each other; this was a major breakthrough in traditional decision-theory. However, Kingdon revised the garbage can model, focusing on understanding agenda-setting in the federal government. Kingdon provides a theoretical framework that not only captures the decision making process in one area, as for example in the parliament, but rather in the entire policy community. In order to conceptualize the dynamic process of agenda-setting, Kingdon developed the *multiple stream framework*, the process is viewed in three parallel streams: politics, policy and problem (illustrated in figure 4).

The first policy stream, *politics* reflects for instance: national mood, election results, parliamentary party division, governmental forming (Kingdon, 2011:145). The developments in the political stream have major implications on the political agenda. However, alone these political events have only little presence, it is in combination with the problem stream that these events become prominent issues and are so put on the agenda.

In the second stream, *problem* we can find so called *exceptional events* that draw the attention of governmental decision-makers and that demand political action (Kingdon, 2011:90). Those problems are often interpreted differently by actors and so leading to different outcomes, especially evident in the national opinion. How a problem is portrayed is further also dependable on the possibility of solving the problem with different solutions (Knaggård, 2009:97). Identifying a problem is therefore a significant component in agenda-setting process.

The third stream, *policy* presents the different solutions and ideas formulated by the policy-makers in order to solve real or potential problems (Kingdon, 2011:116). Kingdon describes the policy stream as: "*ideas that search for problems*" (Kingdon, 2006:117), similar to the idea presented in the garbage can model. This model illustrates the process with help of solutions that *float around in the universe* until they land in the garbage can (Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972:13). Kingdon on the other side argues that solutions not only happen to land in the garbage can by coincidence, but rather as a result of the competition between prominent actors in the agenda-setting process (Kingdon, 2011:172).

The three streams are considered to interconnect; at the same time they flow around independently (Kingdon, 2011:145). Not all issues that find themselves on the agenda have coupled the streams. However, in order to mobilize and keep an issue prioritized on the political agenda, all three streams need to be coupled in the window of opportunity (see figure 4).

The *window of opportunity* is only open for a short time and a necessity to launch an idea in order to put it on the political agenda. A window opens because of changes in the political stream, for instance change in governmental administration. This event influences the partisan distribution in the parliament and/or national mood (Kingdon, 2011:166). A window can also open if a new problem attracts the politicians, or other governmental officials, attention (Kingdon, 2011:166). If a particular event opens the window of opportunity than it is also likely that other similar issues are put on the political agenda, so called *spill-overs* (Kingdon, 2011:190). Politicians often see this as an opportunity, proposing similar solutions to problems, as the efforts are beginning to bear fruits.

The prominent actors in Kingdon´s multiple stream model are the *policyentrepreneurs*, actors that are aware of the possibility of actively coupling problems with their own solution (Kingdon, 2011:179). Entrepreneurs are willing to invest resources as for example: time, energy, reputation, and money. They invest these resources in order to promote their policy position; in addition they hope that their efforts get paid off in form of material or solidary benefits (Kingdon, 2011:179). Successful policyentrepreneurs are authoritative and stubborn, have access to a great network and possess unique negotiation skills (Kingdon, 2011:180.181).

Kingdon´s multiple stream framework (1995) is an established theory in the field of policy studies, notwithstanding the logics and conclusions drawn in the multiple stream model are criticised by other scholars. Because Kingdon´s model is based on the garbage can model, a lot of the criticism directed towards Cohen, March and Olsen are directed against Kingdon as well. Many scholars criticise the garbage-can model, as it is built on assumptions rather than on empirical recommendations. Bendor, Moe and Shot (2001) stress the aspect that Kingdon's empirical reasoning in the multiple stream framework seems strong as it builds on a theoretical foundation, I share their view. Another criticism directed towards Kingdon is whether the streams can be seen independently. Kingdon highlights that the streams are not completely independent, but at the other hand the stream acts by itself until the policyentrepreneur attaches a solution to a problem in the window of opportunity. Mucciaroni (1992) and Bendor, Moe and Shott (2001) disagree with that, challenging the independence of the streams. Mucciaroni argues that viewing the streams interdependently brings benefits and combined the streams stimulates change amongst each other, I share this view. For instance if an issue receives a good deal of attention in the media it can influence people's perception as reflected in the national mood and so influencing the politic stream. If this is the case than it is also most likely that the other two streams, policy and problem stream are affected as well.

2.4.1 Analytical Framework

The overview of previous research as well as the passage of Kingdon´s multiple streams framework will contribute to the understanding of how policies are put on the agenda, but also how this affects the decision making process. My research question addresses to explain foreign policy stability in which Kingdon´s Multiple stream model will be consumed in order explore plausible explanations to the topic. The discussions in this thesis have lead to the creation of the following analytical framework:

Table 4, Analytical Framework Kingdon Multiple Stream Model adapted by Zacharias (2003).

Analytical Framework: Kingdons Policy Stream Model

Problems
(agenda setting)

Government proposal to join the UN

The Political Stream
(agenda setting)
analysis of newspapers in order to illustrate national mood

Policy
(alternatives)

Parliament debates and floating solutions

Window of opportunity

opens because of changes in the political- problem stream

Swiss Security Policy stabile

Policy Entrepreneurs
Christoph Blocher?
The Swiss Peoples Party?
others?

Source: adapted by Zahariadis (2003)

19

3   Methodology

The in-depth understanding of the Swiss Veto Player structures and the Swiss UN Agenda-Setting process in 1986 can be reached with *two case studies*. The phenomenon will be explained with help of two different theoretical and analytical explanations. Both case studies analyse textual materials in order to get an understanding of the historical context. Finally, the methodological choices are discussed and their impacts on the research result

3.1.1   The case of the Swiss Foreign Policy

A case is framed as "an occurrence of a variety of different events". A researcher influences the studies outcome, when selecting and placing the cases as well as when outlining the theoretical framework (George – Bennett, 2005:17-18). George and Bennett define a case as followed: *We define a case as an instance of a class of events. The term "class of events" here refers to phenomenon of scientific interest* (2009:17). Before explaining the methodological choices this chapter aims to discuss: why Switzerland´s foreign policy is of scientific interest and why the explanations are found *within* rather than *outside* Switzerland.

Foreign policy is a classical topic in the studies of political science; provides broad researches that analyse multiple levels: as the international-, the domestic- and the individual level. The Swiss foreign policy is often framed as a case of *small states*, where it is compared with other small and neutral European states, as for example Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland in order to find deviant explanations (Goetschel, 1998). Traditional theories in foreign policy find it difficult to explain the Swiss foreign policy, mainly because the end of the cold war has made small neutral states more cooperative by joining the European Union. Switzerland is unique as the only European country that still holds on to neutrality and is rather isolated in world politics. As underlined in the theoretical framework, this research will search for explanatory variables in the domestic level. In the last decade various studies have emerged that try to explain the Swiss foreign policy in the aftermath of the cold war. Scholars have for instance framed the Swiss foreign policy as a case of "cultural identity" arguing broadly from a constructivist perspective about the norms of neutrality and its importance to identity (Goetschel, 1998, Agius-Devine, 2011, Gstöhl, 2002). Other scholars have framed the Swiss foreign policy as a case of "economical success", arguing that the conservative policies rely on the success of the Swiss economy (Danthine – Lambelet, 1987:149, Widmer, 2008).

This research investigates the explanatory factors *the veto player structures* in the Swiss institutional setting as well as the *agenda-setting process* in the Swiss UN membership debate. The Swiss system is often described as special because of the combination of direct-democracy and federalism, therefore defining Swiss foreign policy stability as *a case of veto player structures*. This study is however designed as two case studies; therefore defining Swiss foreign policy as *a case of agenda setting*. The 1986 UN debate brought Swiss foreign policy on the political agenda and was the beginning of a heated debate that would last for decades. Swiss foreign policy is seen as an extension of these developments. Neither agenda-setting nor veto player structures are *new* ideas; they are prominent in the study of political science although rather rarely tested in the topic of foreign policy and thereby leading to a greater awareness.

In the next chapter the research design, *case study method*, and the methodological strategy is presented and discussed.

3.2 The Case Study Method

"Methodological choices must take into account the characteristics of the phenomena we seek to understand" (Bennett – Elman, 2006:250)

So, on which basis have I decided that the *case-study method* is a fitting method for understanding Swiss foreign policy stability? This research strategy provides a high degree of freedom when selecting the theoretical framework as well as the data collection methods; it helps to focus on the case and provides the possibility to explore variables at late stages in the research process (Stenelo, 1984:24). Yin defines a case study as: *an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident* (2003:13). The overall aim of this research is to *explain: How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be explained?* This study investigates why since the end of the cold war Switzerland has not revised it´s foreign policy and thereby not adapted to the changes in the world. Other former European neutral states have become more cooperative since the end of the cold war, and still these processes are absent in Switzerland. Offering a puzzle in the topic of foreign policy. This thesis explores therefore a *deviant case,* the Swiss foreign policy stability does not confirm the predictions made in the traditional theories as realism (George – Bennett, 2005:240).

So the contemporary phenomenon to explain is *stability in the Swiss Foreign Policy*. How can this be explained? What if "if " never happened would the Swiss foreign policy look different today, that of counterfactual reasoning (Esaisson et.al. 2007:101). The "if" represents here the explanation to the phenomena, or the *context* that influences the phenomena. In which context does the Swiss foreign policy take place? The theoretical as well as the analytical explanations contributes with answers. In this research the theoretical

explanation is a combination of *"theoretical cumulation with sensitivity to historical context"* featured by George (in Bennett, 2008:493). Theory is used as guidance for the case study; it directs the research question and structures the empirical data (Esaiasson et al. 2007:99, Yin, 1994:30). This study consumes theory in order to filter data; without a theoretical framework this research would only *reinvent the wheel* (see table 5). In the previous chapter I have discussed and presented, *the Veto Player Theory* (Tsebelis, 1995) and *the Multiple Stream Framework* (Kingdon, 1995). Because the Swiss foreign policy stability is a *deviant case* in the literature of foreign policy, this research aims to explore whether theories outside the field and therefore rather new to the topic can provide with additional values to the phenomenon (Bennett – Elman, 2008:175).

Two different theoretical frameworks are selected and outlined, in order to reach an in-depth understanding of the Swiss foreign policy stability; this study is designed as *two case studies* (see table 5). The purpose of this outline is that Switzerland's foreign policy is a deviant case, the more cases explored the broader the understanding of it. But there is also the reason that the more theories consumed the more plausible explanations are provided. This research strategy is of great value when trying to explain a case, why an outcome happened, how it happened and why it happened in a particular time period (Andersen, 1997:137-138). It is important to note that this is not a classical multiple case study research. The classic approach would be to treat the cases as analytically equivalent phenomena and explain it with different theories (George – Bennett, 2005:19). The typical format is for example the "within-case comparison" (George – Bennett, 2005:V). The within case study compares the same unit, but differs in time and change. I could have compared the United Nations debate in 1986 with the UN debate in 2002 within Switzerland in order to explore changes over time. Allison´s "Essence of Decision" (1971) is a classical example of a *multiple case study*, analysing the phenomenon Cuban missile crisis from three different theoretical perspectives, or as Allison calls it from different "lenses" providing a general understanding of the case. This method would however be *theory focused* rather than *case focused.*

The structure of this thesis, is as followed, conducting two case studies each of which explains one particular event in the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process and uses further different frames of reference. Because Switzerland's foreign policy is a *deviant case,* I argue that a different outline, rather than the once suggested by Allison's or George – Bennett, combined with theories outside the field will uncover additional insights that would otherwise not have been visible in this thesis.

This case study has further a *heuristic* and *disciplined-configurative* purpose (Eckstein, 1975:12). The aim is to consume rather rarely tested theories in the field of foreign policy, however not contributing to theory but to explain the phenomena (Eckstein, 1975:14). The ambition of this research is to analyse the broad picture, therefore making use of a broad scope in order to analyse different processes in Swiss foreign policy. The two cases use different theories, the Veto Player theory and the Multiple Stream Framework, and have different

scopes; in the first case study the veto player structures in the Swiss system is analysed meanwhile in the second case study the UN membership agenda setting process. The aspect shared by both case studies is the main aim, namely to offer plausible explanations to the phenomena, Swiss foreign policy stability, by using different analytical and theoretical explanations.

The single case study can never hit the "bull´s eye" of generalizations because of the n-problem, with only one case the results cannot be generalized (George – Bennett, 2005:32). I have eliminated these risks by conducting two case studies, studying two different events in the Swiss foreign policy and two different explanations, veto player structures and agenda-setting process. This research has no ambition to produce generalized research results, because the Swiss foreign policy is unique in relation to other European states; the aim is therefore to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon.

The analytical explanation is provided described as *holistic inquiry* (Eckstein, 1975:12). The ambition is to provide an in-depth understanding of the Swiss foreign policy stability; so a detailed data collection with multiple sources will offer an analytical explanation understanding the dynamics. This research will proceed with what is called qualitative research, as underlined by Stake: *this research provides the ability to illuminate the particulars of human experience* (1995:12). This research facilitates to get *inside* a case and gives therefore justice to the Swiss uniqueness (Teorell – Svensson, 2007:11). New insights about why the Swiss foreign policy is stabile can be provided when analysing the empirical data qualitatively rather than quantitatively. The quantitative method is no alternative here as the Swiss foreign policy is deviant, but also because this thesis has no ambition to generalize. This research wants to reach an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon provided by the qualitative research method.

The analytical explanations are collected in textual material: official documents by the Swiss government, websites, newspapers and other relevant texts that contribute to the analytical explanation. The analytical method gathering the empirical data is the qualitative content analysis used in both case studies, further discussed in the next section.

In the end of this study I will conclude the lessons learned by each case study and how they both combined provide an-in depth explanation on why Swiss foreign policy is stable (see table 5). I will also try to draw some comparison between the cases, I am aware that the cases differ in both theory and analytical data which makes the generalizations very limited. I want to investigate if the case comparison finds a common ground between all the various factors.

Table 5, The Methodological Strategy

3.3 Qualitative Content analysis

The empirical material is analysed by means of qualitative content analysis. This analytical tool fits the research well, as the ambition is to highlight the essence of the content, so careful reading the text as a *whole* is therefore an essential element in order to explore the context in which the text is incorporated (Esaiasson, et.al. 2007:237). So it is the overall picture that I see as valuable to this research, analysing the text in-depth rather than the contrary, which would suggest the reading of some categorized parts as provided in the quantitative content analysis. However, the valuable findings are sometimes *hidden* in the text and are probable not very clear at first, so the texts are *closely* read. Carefully reading the empirical material will also identify the most important points in the texts, the parts that are of great importance to this case.

How is the overall research question answered empirically? The theoretical framework contributes with the explanatory variables answering the research question; the theory represents the step of direction in the empirical data. The overall research question is the problem it seeks to explain; Tsebelis veto player theory and Kingdon´s multiple stream framework offer different plausible explanatory factors to the phenomenon foreign policy stability. It is therefore important to underline that this research is theory-based; the theoretical framework directs the empirical material rather than the other way round. Both case studies present an analytical framework, see table 3 and 4, they highlight the important arguments in Tsebelis' veto player theory (see table 3) and Kingdon´s agenda-setting theory (see table 4). The *analytical framework* being put forward as a good starting point for the analysis and therefore not confused with the matter *redefined approach* (Esaiasson, et.al, 2007:245). This research follows an *open approach*, which is conducted in both case studies, with the main ambition to expose the broad picture of the phenomenon. But there is also something else, namely to minimize the risk of missing valuable factors, favouring therefore the open approach. This requires focus on the research question and problem; otherwise this will lead to the possibility of trivializing

(Esaiasson, et.al. 2007:245). It is also of major importance that the material provides answers to the research question; in an open approach the conclusions are material dependent. In this research I´ve minimized this risk by conducting a pre-study in advance, in order to explore whether the accessible material is sufficient.

As the discussions signal, the research choices have an impact on the outline of the thesis and thereby indirectly on the results. In this research I could have made use of the *combined methodological strategy* rather than the content analysis. This method combines content analysis, survey and interviews. Interviews would have provided an in-depth knowledge and contributed with a broader understanding of the phenomena that is not supported in the content analysis (Esaiasson et. al. 2007:283). However both case studies analyse a broad time period, many of the politicians that where active in the 1970s are most likely dead today and so the interviews would mostly have contributed with insights about the last decades, providing therefore an uneven picture.

3.4   Material

The study uses a broad empirical material that needs to be discussed further in this chapter (Yin, 1984:78-98). As earlier emphasised this research conducts two case studies, *Veto Player structures in the Swiss Political Institutions* and *Agenda Setting in the Swiss 1986 UN debate*. The selection of these cases depends on theoretical and analytical choices made in this research. First I will discuss how the first case study is empirically conducted and then how the second cases study is carried out.

3.4.1   Veto Player Structures in the Swiss Political Institution

In the first case study the theoretical frameworks are provided by Tsebelis´ veto player theory, the analytical explanations are offered in the debate regarding the Swiss Security Report. Because of Tsebelis veto player theory I define foreign policy stability as case of *Veto Player structures*. This research analyses the veto player structures in the Swiss political system and it's effect on the Swiss foreign policy. It is valuable to this case to analyse the political system more in depth in order to understand how the actors within the institution act in the decision-making process. So, how is this case study carried out empirically?

The decision-making process regarding *the Swiss Security Report* (Schweizerischer Sicherheitsbericht) is analysed in this case study, the report is published once a decade by the Swiss Federal Council (executive) it outlines the direction of the Swiss security strategy. The document not only discusses military defence strategies, but further also other areas within foreign policy as for example international cooperation. Four reports are examined 1973, 1990, 2000 and 2010, they further indicate the time period for this case study, where

I´ll analyse the reports before as well as after the end of the Cold War in order to examine similarities and differences between the reports. It should be expressed here that the Security Report 1973 is only briefly analysed, as the main ambition is to detect the change of direction in the Security Reports.

Tsebelis´ veto player theory explains veto player structures in three arenas: executive, legislative and electoral (se table 3). The outline of the Security Policy Report represents the executive, in Switzerland the Federal Council (government) serves as a mediator for the legislative and has only restricted power (Linder, 2005:225). The outline of the report represents therefore the standpoint of the executive, as they have formulated the Security Reports. This research will therefore disregard from analysing the decision-making process in the executive (further elaborated in chapter 4).

Main focus is on the legislative arena, as the *supreme power* in the Swiss government (Linder, 2005:197). Because of federalism the Federal Assembly consists of two chambers, the lower chamber the National Council and the upper chamber the State of Council. In this research the Swiss political system is analysed in-depth, this is a necessary condition in order to provide an understanding of the veto player structures. Analysing the outline of the Swiss Political system by asking questions such as: "Is the Swiss parliament built on majority or minority?" "What is the role of the parties in the parliament?" "How are the parties organised?" "What is the ideological distance among them?" "Is there internal cohesion?" This information is provided by the Swiss government website *admin.ch,* this is the *official* Swiss government website that contains further also the Swiss national statistics provided in the website *bfs.admin.ch*. In this case study the debate regarding the Swiss Security Report is analysed in each chamber separately, examining the ideological differences, as well as internal cohesions between veto players. The empirical material here is the "transcripts" that are provided by the Swiss government. These documents contain speeches by the actors in the National Council, as well as the State of Council on the topic "Swiss Security Policy report". The protocols are found in the national Swiss gazette, (Bundesblatt) and in the archive on the Swiss parliament website, parlament.ch. A law enters in force when both chambers approve it, therefore of great importance to analyse the decision-making process on the Swiss Security Report comprehensively in the legislative arena.

Switzerland is categorized as a so-called "direct-democracy" (Linder, 2005:502). In the federal arena the people, The Swiss Federal Assembly and the Swiss Federal Council are all involved in the decision-making process (Linder, 2005:243). The electoral arena has therefore to be included in the analysis; the people through the referendums have the power to outvote decisions in the legislative as well as executive arena (Art 3. BV). The outline of the Swiss Security Report is decided in the legislative, however goals stated in the Security Report as for example: international membership, the outline of the Swiss defence, bilateral agreements, are all goals that direct a change of direction and therefore by constitution require the consent of the people. In this case study referendums are analysed from 1973-2010, referendums that in one way or another direct the Swiss foreign policy. The electoral results of the referendums

are analysed, how the people, the parliament and the Swiss government voted in the referendum and if the decisions favoured the status quo or change. The federal office of statistics points out that since the year 1848 Switzerland has carried out 569 referendums (bfs.admin.ch), that makes Switzerland unique as no other state comes near to this amount.

3.4.2 The 1986 UN agenda-setting process

In the second case study the theoretical explanations are provided by *Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework*, the analytical explanation is, however, provided in the *debate regarding a Swiss UN membership*. With regard to Kingdon´s multiple stream frameworks defining foreign policy stability as case of *agenda setting*. Analysing the effects of the Swiss UN agenda-setting process on the Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss UN membership debate arose in the late 1970s and became later a heated debate between politicians regarding the outline of the Swiss foreign policy. I argue that it is essential to analyse this event more closely. How is this case study empirically carried out?

The process analysed in this case study is the UN debate, in this thesis referred to as the 1986 UN debate. In 1986 the Swiss population rejected the proposal to join the United Nations, the debate started however already in 1966 when Geneva became United Nation´s site, which started an intense debate. It is important to note that Switzerland joined the United Nations at the turn of the millennium, it is therefore important to separate these two debates from each other. In this case study important actors are identified that influence the United Nations membership agenda setting process and contributed that the issue is put on the governmental agenda. During this time three important decisions took place, the Swiss Federal Council adopted the Swiss UN membership proposal the Swiss Federal Assembly decided on the Federal Council´s UN membership proposal and the Swiss population in a referendum decided on the membership in the United Nations. The UN-membership debate "ended" in 1986, even if the debate started again in the late 90s with a new proposal, it was the beginning of a heated debate between politicians and parties regarding the proposed changes in the Swiss foreign policy. I will, however, analyse the politics after the UN referendum, examining whether the same actors are political active in other issues as for example the European Economic Community, European Union. Another reason for setting the time period to 1966-1992 is to explore whether the end of the Cold War has had an impact on the politics and the policyentrepreneurs.

Kingdon´s theory, "the multiple streams", structures my analytical framework and provides with explanations. This case study analyses the Streams: *Politic, Problem and Policy*, separately in three smaller sub-studies. Through different approaches the streams are explained individually as well as combined when placing them into the multiple stream framework. A further ambition is to identify *policyentrepreneurs* as well as the *window of opportunity*.

This study aims to analyse what effect the Swiss United Nations debate had on the further developments in the Swiss foreign policy. The three sub-case studies provide the ability to identify the processes that occurred before and after the United Nations proposal made it on the Swiss political agenda.

In the *first* stream the ambition is to highlight the *political stream*. The political stream is composed by the public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan and ideological distributions in the Swiss government and changes of administration (Kingdon, 2011:145). Newspapers, as the main empirical material, provide information about the politics at that time. Kingdon underlines that media has limited influence on the policy process; their main task is to *report political processes* (Kingdon, 2011:59). In this sub-study the newspapers where selected as the main empirical material as they provide an understanding of the historical context. This case study analyses the newspapers: *Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Tages Anzeiger* and *Le Matin Dimanche*, the three biggest daily newspapers in Switzerland. The Newspapers are representable in different regions and contain different political standpoints. The newspapers report on political events, if the three newspapers report similar about political events than it increases the materials objectivity. This case study searches articles in the *Swiss Media Database* (smd.ch), the database contains most Swiss newspapers and has archived articles that date back to the 19th century. In the database I search for articles that discuss *the Swiss United Nations membership*, searching further for important actors stated in the newspapers in order to identify the policyentrepreneurs. The process is "open", letting theory and contends guide the case study, which is available in the newspapers. The time period is set to 1966 until 1986 in order to examine the politics before the UN referendum took place in 1986. The newspaper serve my research question well because the UN debate dates back in time it is impossible to conduct an interview study, it is difficult to track the key persons because of the time period.

In the second stream, *the problem stream* the UN debate will be analysed in the executive level, namely in the Swiss Federal Council. In this sub-study official- and public documents, statements from press conferences, as well as media interviews are further analysed. Switzerland provides a well-documented archive, facilitating an extended data collection. Underlining, here, that the aim of this sub-study is to highlight the *problems* of the United Nations debate, as well as identifying the important actors, the so-called policyentrepreneurs. Rather than analysing the texts qualitatively, I could have conducted an interview study, or an observation study. Interviewing politicians about the problems in the UN debate. These research methods could have captured information that is absent in the content analysis, however tracking key actors, is as previously discussed problematic because of the time period.

In the *third* sub study *the policy stream* is studied in depth, analysing the Swiss parliamentary debates. As explained earlier the Swiss parliament consists of two chambers, so the debate is examined in both chambers: the National Council and the Council of States. Analysing the parliamentary debate enables to identify different policy solutions as well as policyentrepreneurs. Using content analysis the *protocols* are examined, this material is provided in the

national gazette Bundesblatt, as well as on the parliamentary website (parlament.ch). In this pre-study I analyse the *formal* debate, however, an interview study could have outlined *informal* aspects and the discussions between parliamentarians that often take´s place outside the official meetings.

The important assumptions in Kingdon´s model is taken into account in the three stub-studies, providing combined a widespread empirical material. Making use of the sub-studies separately as well as combined, I argue though that it is not before in the coupling of the three streams that the most sufficient factor is exposed.

4 Veto Player structures in the Swiss Political Institution

This study examines the veto player structures in the Swiss political institution, explaining which impact the veto players have on the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process. I explore this by analysing the debate regarding the Swiss Security Report 1973, 1990, 2000 and 2010 in the legislative arena. However because of direct-democracy this thesis analyses the foreign policy referendums as well.

In order to understand the Swiss veto player structures a brief presentation of Switzerland´s political system is presented. Followed by the results of the analyses in three areas: the identification of the Swiss veto players, the ideological and internal cohesion between the veto players and the role of the referendums in the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process.

4.1 Veto Player Structures in the Swiss Political Institutions

The Federal Council initiates every decade a new proposal suggesting the direction of the Swiss security strategy in the next following years. Ranges of institutional factors influence the decision-making process and thereby the outline of the Swiss Security Report. The Federal Assembly needs to approve the Security Report proposed by the Federal Council, that is a constitutional requirement. Because of federalism the Federal Assembly consists of two chambers, the National Council and the State of Council (Art 3, BV), the approval of *both* chambers are therefore required.

The Federal Assembly is the *supreme power* in the Swiss federal stated in the constitution (Art. 148. 1 BV), the legislative is therefore responsible of a variety of important assignments, there are only a few parliaments holding that differing duties (Schmid, 1971:191ff). The legislative controls the Federal Council, the Federal Court and the bureaucratic administration, provides internal order and has the greatest foreign policy expertise (Art. 163-173 BV). The Federal Assembly is thereby involved in the shaping of the Swiss foreign policy (Art. 166.1 BV), which is rather something unusual compared to other states. The National Council representative's are elected proportionally containing 200 members; meanwhile the State of Council´s representatives are elected by the cantons containing 46 members (Linder, 2005:143). Similar to the American

"check and balances" the two chambers in the Swiss Federal Assembly are equal (Linder, 2005:199).

Federalism builds on the democratic principal: "One person one vote", which is applied to "One canton one vote", all cantons are therefore equal. In the State of Council all cantons are equally represented this *representation relationship* favours therefore rather the small rural cantons. This creates a balance between the chambers; in the National Council are rather the big cantons favoured because of the proportional seat distribution. The State of Council serves its own interests, rather than the goals of the Federal Council or the Cantons, as for example in the German political system. An empirical study conducted by Wiesli and Linder (2000) showed that both chambers in the Federal Assembly articulate an equal quantity of federalist concerns. The Federal Assembly is divided into fractions and not parties (Linder, 2005:197). The fractions include members from the same party or from like-minded parties; a fraction is therefore not always the same as a party (Linder, 2005:117). The fractions are formed informally in the state of council.

The Federal Assembly and the Federal Councils relationship are strongly characterized by cooperation (Linder, 2005:184). The legislative and the executive are elected separately, the former by the executives and the later by the people. Switzerland has a multi-party system, this is based on the *Zauberformel* (magic formula) (admin.ch). The seven members in the Federal Council are solid for a four-year period and there is therefore no further separation of power between opposition and government. The *Zauberformel* describes the constellation in the Federal Council, the seven members in the Council are elected in proportion to the four biggest parties. The four biggest parties have therefore a legislative power. The constellation of the Swiss Federal Council is the main reason for describing Switzerland as a *consensus democracy* (Lijphart, 1984). Since 1959 the four biggest parties form the coalition government: the Social democratic Party (SP) with two seats, the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) with two seats, the Liberal Party (FDP) with two seats and the Swiss People´s Party (SVP) with one seat (admin.ch). The mandate period is four years, the latest federal election was held in 2011 (admin.ch). It should though be noted that this constellation has changed in the last decade as a result of the electoral increase of the Swiss people´s party, providing the party two seats to the extend of the Christian Democratic Party (admin.ch). The left-right axes can be described as followed: SP is placed as centre left, CVP as centrism, FDP as centre-right and SVP as right wing populism or nationalism conservatism. This categorization is not written in stone, provides however with helpful information about the parties in order to understand the standpoints of the parties in the Federal Assembly.

Because of Switzerland's direct-democracy all legislations are subject to direct electoral by the people through the *referendum* (Art. 140 BV). Three different types of referendums exist in the Swiss political system. Every constitutional amendment and every accession to supranational organizations

needs to be approved in an *obligatory* referendum (Art. 140:BV). Special in this referendum is the so-called "Doppelmehr" (double more), the people as well as the cantons need to adopt the referendum before implementing the policy. The most common referendum is the *optional* referendum. The people in a referendum can dispute any regulation adopted in the parliament, if 50´000 unique signatures are collected within 90 days (Art. 140 BV). A general stimulus in the Swiss society can raise a referendum, a so-called *citizen's initiative*, if 100´000 unique signatures are collected within 18 months (Art. 140 BV). Especially the people´s initiative has increased enormously in the last decades, 38 people's initiatives where risen from 1951- 1980, while in the last decades 1980-2013 the people have raised 108 citizen's initiatives (bfs.admin.ch).

4.2 Identifying the Veto Players in the Swiss Security Reports

The Security Report 1973 is based on military rationales and self-representation, focusing on strategically goals that secure Switzerland's autonomy (Sicherheitsbericht 1973). On the 1. October 1990 the Federal Council presented the Swiss Security Report 1990 with the title *Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel*[1] for the Federal Assembly (Sicherheitsbericht, 1990). The report indicated a change of direction, viewing security as multi-faceted rather than simply referring to military security conception as in the Security Report 1973. The Security Policy featured internal as well as external cooperation (ibid). The Security Report 90' addressed new kinds of security challenges and suggested strategies that hadn´t been mentioned in the Security Report 73. The Report 90' emphasised a move in direction as a respond to the changes in the international environment. The Report 90' underlined a number of times the word *interest*, indicating that Switzerland had an interest in the world politics and therefore moving away from self-representation, as in the previous Security Report 73. The main argument to these increasing security interests was the youngest upheavals in Europe as the report expressed, making it necessary to evaluate and re-define the Swiss security strategy. The report discusses further also the difficulty of predicting future developments as a result of the changes in the international environment (Sicherheitsbericht, 1990). Suggesting that the unclear future should not encourage fearfulness or defensiveness rather animate fundamental objectives that contribute to a stable and safe Europe. A further motive presented in the report, is the goal to increase international participation, although highlighting its limitations because of neutrality.

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[1] Security policy in change

The same tendencies where recognized in the Security Report 2000 and 2010. The Security Report 2000 titled as *Sicherheit durch Kooperation*[2] addressed two main goals, an increased cooperation between civilian and military resources and an increased cooperation with international security organisations as well as neighbouring states (Sicherheitsbericht, 2000). This report emphasised similar arguments as the Report 90', however pressuring more for international cooperation. The Security Report 2010 outlined the importance of a comprehensive security policy, signalling not only for strategically degrees in the form of defence and coping, however, also highlighting the importance of preventing individual forces (Sicherheitsbericht, 2010). The report emphasises further the weight of involving all federal levels, addressing cooperation among all three levels: federal, cantonal and municipal level. This was something new; security had before primarily been a main federal issue.

All Security Reports (1973,1990, 2000 and 2010) where discussed and decided in the chambers separately (Art, 148:BV). The National Council discussed the Security Report 90' in a two-day session during the 4-5 June in 1991. The emerging threats in Europe since the end of the cold war and the specification of the Army 95' where focal points in the debate. Overall the National Council agreed that the report analysed the increasing problems in the international environment well. The Social Democratic Party argued though that the conclusions drawn in the Report 90' were insufficient. The Christian Conservative Party claimed that the Report 90' contained far to generalized arguments, therefore the report seems therefore powerless to serve as a directive for future security strategies. The conservative parties, SVP and FDP, in general favoured the report, underlining though that Swiss defence is the most important instrument in war prevention (Legislaturrückblick, 1987-1991:66f). The National Council adopted the Report 90' with 121:30 votes.

Three months later, on the 24 September 1991, the State of Council discussed the Security Report 90'. In the State of Council politicians complimented the broad threat discussuion in the report. Most representatives expressed that the military national defence should be viewed as the most important instrument in the Security Policy. A minority in the State of Council argued that the Swiss Security Policy needed extensions in order to meet new threats, at the same time highlighting that the Security Report missed to point out solutions to these problems. As already indicated in the National Council, the State of Council argued that the changes in Europe have led to an increasing vulnerability towards new power structures. Some of the threats discussed in the chamber where islamic fundamentalism, nuclear prospective in the Soviet Union, and the civil war in East Europe. Thomas Onken (SP), was the only actor

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[2] Security through cooperation

emphasising a different direction, arguing that future threats as armed conflicts in Europe are a possibility but having no direct impact on Switzerland. The State of Council adopted the Security Report 90´with 24:5 votes.

In the National Council and the State of Council the discussions about the Report 2000 and 2010 contained similar arguments as emphasised in the Report 90. SP politicians emphasising international cooperation and arguing that the reports should address concrete examples about how to increase international cooperation. Meanwhile SVP and FDP politicians emphasised the national defence as the centrepiece and argued that the reports should underline this more in-depth. CVP politicians highlighted both international cooperation as well as national defence, argued that the key of a successfully security strategy is the combination of both. The Security Report 2000 and 2010 where adopted by both chambers, the National Council as well as the State of Council.

Table 5, describes the seat distributions in the Federal Assembly from 1971-2007, the years represent the mandate elections and so highlighting the seat distribution between the four biggest parties in the National Council and the State of Council. The absorption rule has no relevancy in this case because the party majority differs between the National Council and the State of Council, see table 5. Identifying the National Council and the State of Council as *two institutional Veto Players*, as they both have to agree to the proposed change. The seat distributions have been stabile in the State of Council over time; CVP and FDP having the seat majority (see table 5). Meanwhile interesting are the changes in the National Council (see table 5). In 1971 the parties SP, FDP, CVP together shared the majority, meanwhile SVP was the smallest party holding the least seats. Noteworthy is how SVP occupies in 1971 23 seats, meanwhile in 1999 nearly doubling it to 44 in 1999 and in 2007 becoming the biggest party inhabiting 62 seats in the National Council. Meanwhile, CVP and FDP lose seats in the National Council over time (left table) and so becoming the smallest parties in the chamber.

Table 6, Federal Assembly seat distribution at the time of the Security Report decisions in the legislative

	1971	1991	1999	2007
SP	46	41	51	43
CVP	49	44	43	31
FDP	44	35	35	31
SVP	23	25	44	62

National Council seat distribution, 1971-2007
(parlament.ch)

	1971	1991	1999	2007
SP	4	3	6	9
CVP	17	16	15	15
FDP	15	18	18	12
SVP	5	4	7	7

State of Council, seat distribution, 1971-2007
(parlament.ch)

The Security Report 90 addressed the importance of collaborating with the European Union in order to contribute to a safe and stabile Europe. Although the Report 90 was adopted by the Federal Assembly, a European Union membership can not only be implemented by the Federal Council without a obligatory referendum, required by constitution the consent by the people and the cantons (Art. BV:140). Therefore I identify the *people as the third institutional Veto Player*, they have to agree to the proposed change. This means that the National Council, the State of Council and the people through the referendum all are institutional Veto Players; they are all collective actors and have to agree to a change as proposed by Tsebelis'.

Tsebelis underlines that the majority party in most political systems founding the government can possess veto power the so-called *partisan Veto Player*. However because four parties, a multi-party government found the Federal Council and therefore share majority. The parties on their own have no power to implement change; this means that their vote is not a requirement in order to adopt a policy the parties are however embedded in the National Council and the State of Council.

In the next chapter the complex relationship between the three institutional Veto Players will be discussed.

4.3 Internal Cohesion and Ideological distance between the Veto Players in the Swiss Security Report

The ideological distance among the veto players have a sufficient influence on the policy outcome, the greater the distance among the veto players the more difficult to reach consent and thereby favouring the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002:30). In this research I have identified the ideological distance among the veto players as great.

In the State of Council CVP possesses the most seats at the same being a typically centre party they balance power between the parties and have therefore an advantage in the decision-making process. In the debate about the Security Report 1990, 2000 and 2010 it becomes clear that CVP encourages a modern defence as well as a participation in a European Security alliance although without risking neutrality (Bundesblatt, VIII:7666). Suggesting that the defence adapts to the new security threats. Meanwhile, FDP being the second biggest party in the State of Council focuses mainly on the defence (ibid). As highlighted by CVP a defence that can meet the increasing challenges in Europe

at the same time the party supports international cooperation, however not being the most active actor in the debate. SVP on the other side is the actor waving for an independent and neutral Switzerland (Bundesblatt, III:8). They are against an international cooperation arguing that it risks neutrality at the same time as FDP laying a lot weight on the defence, especially on air force arguing that it is the core of national defence and emphasising self-representation. Even though FDP, CVP and SVP don't share the same political standpoints in the debate about the Security Report 1990, 2000 and 2010 they still are closest ideologically. SP on the other side differs ideologically the most from SVP. The party is in general against the defence, arguing that the defence is far too costly and serves no clear strategy (Bundesblatt, III:10). The outline of the defence today is an inefficient tradition in Switzerland and cannot meet the increasing challenges in Europe. SP is further the party that the strongest emphasises international cooperation, suggesting a closer involvement with the OSCE, the UN and the EU.

The views differ between the parties, however as table 5 indicates, SP and SVP have rather little to say in the State of Council. CVP and FDP on the other side have historically seized most power in the decision-making process, especially in the State of Council. The State of Council favours in general the middle way, and thereby balancing between international cooperation and the role of the defence. In the National Council, because of the changes in seat distribution in the last decades the powers between the parties have varied. SVP had only little power in the decision-making process because it possessed the least seats. During the last decades this has however changed because it's success in the electoral in the last decades.

The two biggest parties Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and Liberal Party (FDP) are both located rather in the middle of the left-right axes, favouring therefore consensus. *Internal cohesion* was therefore rather small in the Federal Assembly regarding the Swiss security report.

4.4 The Referendum as the ultimate Veto Player

As Table 7 indicates, Switzerland has during the time period 1986-2010 had 18 Referendums that in one way or another raised a decision that is linked to the Swiss Security Policy Report, 1990, 2000 and 2010. As pointed out in the previous chapter all three reports where adopted by the institutional Veto Players the National Council and the State of council.

Table 7, Swiss Foreign Policy referendums from 1986-2010

Referendum	Amount	Status Quo
UN	2	1
EEC/EU	3	3
Bilateral	4	0
Defence	9	9

The referendum, because of direct-democracy, moved the decision–making process from the executive and the legislative to the electoral. When analysing the referendums in-depth it became evident that the Swiss People voted in favour of the status quo in 13 referendums of total 18 referendums. Once debated and adopted in the legislative the proposal once again is put out there through a referendum. The final decision is therefore in the hands of the institutional veto player the people; this veto player is far more unpredictable than the other two, National Council and the State of Council. As table 8 indicates, a referendum is either raised by the Federal Council, in an obligatory referendum, or by interest groups, people´s initiative. The interest groups possess the ability to raise a referendum because of two reasons, because of a broad network they can collect signatures and because of organizational resources they can launch campaigns. Even though the Federal Council and the interest groups have the ability to raise a referendum, as table 8 indicates, it doesn´t mean that they also take control over the referendum. Policy decisions moving to the electoral level can favour small parties, that in the legislative are in minority have an ability to mobilize voters and become therefore influential in the electoral.

Table 8, a slection of Foreign Policy Referendums from 1986-2010

Date	What for a Referendum?	Result?	People Yes Vote%	Topic	Who triggered the Referendum?	Federal Assembly
16.03. 1986	Federal Decision: UN Membership	Rejected	24.3% Yes Votes Participation 50.7%	UN	Federal Council	NR: 102:58 Yes SR -
3.3.2002	Federal Decision: UN Membership	Adopted	54.6% Yes Votes Participation 58.4%	UN	Federal Council	NR: 147:39 Yes SR 37:3 Yes
6.12.1992	Federal Decision: EEC membership	Rejected	49.7% Yes Votes Participation 78.7%	EEC	Federal Council	NR: 127:61 Yes SR: 39:4 Yes
8.6.1997	People´s Initiative: EU membership negotiations before the People	Rejected	25.9% Yes Votes Participation 35.4%	EU	Swiss Democrats	NR: 174:10 No SR: 37 No
4.3.2001	People´s Initiative: Yes to Europe	Rejected	23.2% Yes Votes Participation 55.8%	EU	New European Movement	NR: 94:69 No SR: 33:6 No
21.5.2000	Federal Decision: Bilateral Agreement	Adopted	67.2% Yes Votes Participation 48.3%	Bilateral	Federal Council	NR: 183:11 Yes SR: 45 Yes
5.6.2005	Federal Decision: Schengen Treaty	Adopted	56.8% Yes Votes Participation 54.6%	Bilateral	Federal Council	NR: 129:60 Yes SR 36:3 Yes
26.11.1989	People´s Initiative: Switzerland without an army	Rejected	35.6% Yes Votes Participation 69.2%	Defence	Group: Switzerland without an army	NR: 134:12 No SR 36 No
10.6.2001	Federal Decision: The Army as an armed military resistence	Adopted	51% Yes Votes Participation 42.5%	Defence	Federal Council	NR: 109:59 Yes SR: 38:2 Yes
2.12.2001	People´s Initiave: Credible Swiss Security Policy and Switzerland without an army	Rejected	21.9% Yes Votes Participation 37.9%	Defence	Group: Switzerland without an army	NR: 137:44 No SR: 41 No

A selection of Security Policy Referendums between the time period 1986-2010
Source: swissvotes.ch

This became visible when analysing referendum's regarding organizational membership as for example UN membership, EEC membership or EU

membership. In all these referendums the Federal Council launched the obligatory referendum, however it was the Swiss People´s party that mobilised extensive campaigns against the referendum's and exerting thereby political influence. Mobilizing campaigns gave the SVP the ability to influence the decision-making process in the electoral. The actor triggering the referendum was in all these cases not the same as the one taking control over it. The analysis indicated that referendums directing a change failed in most cases in the electoral. SVP mobilised successful campaigns against the referendums however being in the opposition in the Federal Assembly. This indicates that the parties favouring status quo also profit in national electoral. During 1986-2010 six referendums where raised regarding an international membership: two referendums regarding an European Union membership, one referendum regarding an European Economic Cooperation membership and two referendums regarding a United Nations membership. SVP is against all these international memberships and lead five successful campaigns against the referendums, lost however the last one regarding the Swiss UN entry in 2002, which was adopted by the people in the referendum. The referendums were launched during the time period 1986-2010 (see table 8), during this time SVP increased it´s votes immensely especially in the federal election in 2007 the party recorded historically the highest votes of a single party in Switzerland with 28.9% of the votes (bfs.admin.ch). In the federal elections in 1987 they had only reeceived 11% of the votes and where back than still the smallest party (bfs.admin.ch), however progressively increasing votes over time. It should be noted that historically never before had so many referendums regarding a membership in international organizations been launched as in the time period 1986-2002. This might indicate that there is a causal relationship between international organization referendums and the increasing votes of SVP. However in order to test this empirically a quantitative study is more fitted.

Another interesting indication is that half of the referendums on the topic foreign policy addressed in one way or another military matters. When analysing the Security Report 1990, 2000 and 2010 it became clear that CVP, FDP and SVP shared similar ideological standpoints, namely that the national defence is the most important actor in the Swiss Security Policy. Five referendums where launched by the Federal Council, with the aim of strengthening the national defence, all referendums where adopted by the people (see table 7). The other four referendums addressing the national defence where launched by interest groups, some of the referendums announced extreme measurements as for example eliminating the Swiss national defence completely, as in the people´s initiative "Switzerland without an army" in 1989. The only party favouring these referendums was SP, however all referendums where rejected in the electoral. Once again the people trough the referendum favoured the status quo.

4.5 Conclusion

Analytical Framework

Number of Veto Players	Ideological distances	Internal Cohesion
How many Veto Players?	What is the ideological distance among Veto Players?	What are the differences in policy position within Veto Players?

If increasing than

Favour of the Status Quo leading to Policy stability

This case study aimed to answer the following research question: *What plausible explanations can Tsebelis Veto Player Theory contribute with in the Swiss Federal Assembly debate regarding the Swiss Security Report, 1973, 1990, 2000, 2010?*

A proposed change in Switzerland´s foreign policy can be adopted if three institutional veto players give their consent, namely the two chambers in the Federal Assembly and the people through the referendum. As the Swiss veto player structures indicate, one could assume that problems would already arise in the legislative arena namely in the Federal Assembly. That the Swiss veto player structures offer hurdles in the legislative arena, as both chambers are identified as collective veto players. The chambers consist of multiple fractions, differing ideologically and thereby increasing the probability of internal cohesion, making it therefore difficult to reach consensus within as well as between the chambers. This was however never the case in this study, the National Council as well as the State of Council decided in favour of change in all Security Reports.

This indicates that the *commitment* of the government towards a policy change in the Swiss policy report was high. At the same time the advocates for a change of direction in the Security report had managed to mobilize *support* in the legislative, as all reports successfully were adopted. The domestic factors support and commitment contributed to consensus in the Swiss government. However, the most important factor influencing the outcome in the Swiss security report is *the people*. In order to implement the proposed changes in the Security report the consent of the people through referendums is required. One could assume here that because the people elect the politicians in the National Council the people would therefore also vote in line with the suggestions highlighted by the government. This did however not occur; the people favoured the status quo as the analyses of the referendums reveal and because the final decision is at the electoral level, the majority of the new proposed directions emphasised in the three latest Security reports (1990, 2000 and 2010) were not realized.

This indicates that because of the Swiss veto structures it is of great importance to mobilize support within the government as well as outside. The

counterfactual reasoning can be summarized as followed: Switzerland contains of three veto players, because the people through the referendum the advocates had successfully mobilized support in the government had however not managed to mobilize the Swiss society in the referendums, therefore causing no change of direction in the Swiss foreign policy as suggested in the Swiss security report (1990, 2000 and 2010). The mobilization of the people was though successfully lead by the opposition, the Swiss people's party. Being the smallest party in the Federal Council in the late 1980s, however over time increasing it´s votes progressively (see table 6) and so becoming the biggest party in Switzerland at the federal election in 2007. Whether the success primary is linked to the successful campaigning in referendums cannot alone be answered in this case study.

5 The UN Agenda-Setting Process

In this chapter I analyse how individual decision-makers try to push their ideas through the decision-making process. As stated in the case study veto player structures in the Swiss political system, the actors, rules and practices will vary with regard to the outline of the political system. With help of Kingdon´s multiple stream framework the problems, the politics and the policies are first analysed separately and later viewed together when viewing them combined identifying the "window of opportunity" as well the "policyentrepreneurs".

5.1 The Problem Stream

The problems in the Swiss foreign policy, especially the risk of increasing isolation and exclusion in the international arena, occurred in the late 1960s when the first advocates for a United Nations membership emerged after nearly 50 years of silence. Policymakers drew their main attention on the United Nations and emphasising the political importance of joining this international institution.

Switzerland has historically favoured rather peace friendly security strategies, which became evident in the year 1815 when Switzerland at the Vienna Congress adopted neutrality permanently. The Vienna Congress served at that time as an international organisation. Neutrality did not only secure Switzerland´s autonomy, it was at that time an attempt to contribute to peace in a time when Europe struggled with a variety of conflicts. The Swiss politicians agree that neutrality served Switzerland well during the World War I and World War II and must therefore be viewed as a successful security strategy (Bundesblatt, 1981:497). However, since the end of World War II a variety of international organisations have emerged and as table 9 indicates Switzerland joined seven international organizations before the UN debate heated off.

Table 9, selection of Landmarks in the Swiss Foreign Policy

Landmarks in the Swiss Foreign Policy
(1815-1986)

Source: Bundesamt fur Statistik bfs.admin.ch

In the late 1960s until the early 1970s, actors inside as well as outside the Swiss government became alarmed that Switzerland would become more and more excluded in the international arena, *two main events* contributed two this apprehension. First, in 1966 the *UN* established some of its *organizations in Geneva* as for example FAO, UNHCR and UNAIDS, actors underlined that if Switzerland could act as a host for UN organisations than there where no political incitements of not becoming a member (BBI, 1984:I:176) . Arguing further also that Switzerland as a non-member still contributes with a large sum in form of economical funds up to hundred million francs. Second, in 1973 the *Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic became members in the UN*, after decades being an active observer in the UN together with Switzerland. Swiss politicians where concerned that the role of the observer would diminish leaving Switzerland only one choice either to join or to be left on the outside (BBI, 1984:I:177). The actors underlining this problem were mostly people from the Swiss Social Democratic Party (SP). Attention was centred on Switzerland responsibility to contribute to *solidarity* and *universality* towards other states in the world community (Motion Tanner-Zurich, 1973:640). Even though the UN under decades had been criticised for being a lose forum without any actual power the defenders argued that the UN today is the *only* international organisation that expresses the ultimate goal to secure world peace and international security (Motion Tanner-Zurich, 1973:640). Most observers felt that, with international cooperation the future threats could be met and even suggesting rethinking or even revising neutrality. Because new "peace" institutions had emerged Switzerland´s neutrality would lead to exclusion rather than contributing to peace in the world community (ibid).

The Federal Council´s proposal from 1981 regarding the Swiss UN membership highlights that the ultimate goal in the Swiss foreign policy is the existence of Switzerland as an autonomous state and as an equal member in the world community (Bundesblatt, 1981:498). The Swiss permanent neutrality together with solidarity towards the international community is argued by the Federal Council to be the most important means in order to achieve these perceptions (ibid). The Federal Council stresses further that the attempt to join the UN is an important step towards normality, alliance as well as an extensive of the Swiss relations with the United Nations (ibid). The Federal Council underlined that the UN today differs remarkable from 1945 when it first was established, back than founded by the great powers in order to *force* world peace (ibid). However, during the Cold War the UN has made clear that military measurements are not used in order to obtain world peace and has during the last decades proven to be an essential world forum for international cooperation.

In order to summarize the political stream the events UN site in Geneva and the UN memberships of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, gave rise to discussions about a UN membership in the late 1970s.

5.2 The Political Stream

The second stream and as Kingdon underlines the most prominent stream is the political stream. On the 14 December in 1984 the Federal Assembly approved the Federal Council´s proposal to join the UN. However, the Swiss membership in the UN requires by constitution a referendum, the people and the cantons need to approve the membership with a so called double-more (Doppelmehr). The cantons and the people rejected the UN referendum on the 16 March 1986 (see table 10).

Table 10, UN referendum election result.

UN Referendum 1986, Electoral results

	Yes	No	Participation	Result
People	24.3%	75.7%	50.7%	Neglected
Canton´s	-	20 6/2*	All 27 cantons	Neglected

* Six cantons have only a half vote therefore the majority is 23 however there are 27 cantons in Switzerland

Source: swissvotes.ch

Scientists argue that it was hard to predict the outcome of the UN referendum until the day of election, the policy process had taken nearly 20 years and during the process a variety of hurdles had been accomplished (Linder, 2005 et al). The UN membership-issue made it on the governmental agenda in 1966 however the decision agenda was not concluded until 1986 when the people and the cantons rejected an UN membership (Bundesblatt, I 1966:1449).

One prominent feature in the political stream was the election of Social Democratic politicians as foreign ministers during the period 1966-1987. In 1966 Willy Spühler became foreign minister, it was the first time a representative of the Social Democratic Party held this position (admin.ch). The Swiss Democratic Party had always favoured international cooperation and made it prominent during their election campaigns. With Spühler as foreign minister they now had a passionate representative in the Federal Council. Spühler was the starting point of nearly two decades of Social Democratic Foreign ministers, with successor as Pierre Graber from 1970-1978 and Pierre Aubert from 1978-1987 (admin.ch). The combination of the problem stream and the political stream where enough to put UN membership on the governmental

agenda. If Spühler made an important contribution, namely that UN became an issue, Aubert on the other side made it a high-prioritized issue in the legislature period 1979-1983 (Bundesblatt, 1977:813). In 1981 the Federal Council agreed to join the UN, however waited nearly three years before forwarding it to the decision agenda, where the Federal Assembly decided on the proposal in 1984 where the proposal was adopted by both chambers. Aubert had thereby successfully contributed to the adoption of the UN proposal in both the executive and legislative level, however the last hurdle remained, the people and the cantons had to agree therefore the final decision remained (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 821230, 820323). Aubert being one of the main advocates led the pro-side in the UN campaign, however as already pointed out this referendum failed enormously (see table 10).

The other prominent feature in the political stream was the formation of the action committee against an UN membership (AUNS), this committee started as a lose coalition between Otto Fischer and Christoph Blocher in the early 1980s. Otto Fischer was member of the Liberal Party (FDP), representative in the National Council during the late 1970s until the early 1980s, and director of the Swiss Trade Association (Tages Anzeiger, 830113). Christoph Blocher represented the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) in the National Council from the 1980s until present, was member in the Federal Council from 2004-2007 and is a successful industrialist owning a chemical corporation (Tages Anzeiger, 830113). Fischer and Blocher started in the early 1980s to spread their ideas however they had only little success in the governmental arena. In 1983 Blocher claimed that the Swiss People´s Party would present a new party program, emphasising that SVP will highlight problems that no other party addresses (Tages Anzeiger, 830113). Neutrality became the most prominent feature in their campaign emphasising that Swiss neutrality would vanish when joining the UN. The majority of Swiss governmental parties saw no conflict between neutrality and UN membership, further elaborated in the policy stream. In 1982 Fischer and Blocher criticised the Federal Council for using tax money in the UN campaign, they argued that the government thereby favoured only one side in the UN debate. However Fischer-Blocher got only little attention for these assumptions (Glur, 1999:74-85). The Federal Council responded quickly against this accusation, as a result the Department for Foreign Affairs used only half of its budget in the UN campaign (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 870505). Interesting to note is therefore here, that the Blocher-Fischer coalition already in the beginning of the 1980s mobilised the contra-side of the UN membership, meanwhile the pro-side didn´t start to organise their campaign until 1985. Blocher and Fischer were important actors in the decision agenda, having no political power in the governmental agenda, as the policy stream indicates, however leading a successful campaign in the UN referendum. Their success must consort together with campaign advertisements (Tages Anzeiger, 831209). The campaign for "a neutral and autonomous Switzerland" (AUNS) used advertisements in the Newspapers to distribute their ideas to the voters, alone in the Neue Zurcher Zeitung from 1982-1986 180 advertisements where found. As an article in the

Tages Anzeiger further emphasises the Swiss People´s party spend over one million Swiss francs in party advertisements (Tages Anzeiger, 831209). Maybe it was strategically of Fischer and Blocher to blame the Federal Council of using tax money in their campaign. As earlier underlined the Federal Council responded by using only half of its resources, more would have been necessary in order to become a serious contender against the Blocher-Fischer coalition. But also to inform the people about to which extent an UN entry affects neutrality. When analysing the newspapers only few articles addressed the relationship between neutrality and the UN. Even though the majority of the articles favoured the UN membership most of them emphasised the importance of solidarity towards other international organizations and that it is Switzerland´s responsibility to contribute to world peace (Tages Anzeiger, 840316, Neue Zurcher Zeitung 820323)

The majority of the articles in the newspapers favoured an UN membership. The Neue Zurcher Zeitung published the most articles on the topic meanwhile the Tages Anzeiger only presented a few articles, therefore the picture is not equivalent between the newspapers. It was difficult to locate any mood swings, from the period 1980-1986 the arguments for an UN membership where the same as well as the contra arguments. Because the articles overall had a positive attitude towards the UN, the national mood is identified as favouring the UN. An "antigovernmental mood" was identified in the newspapers even though it was rather a small amount of articles. As for example the article "Neutrality and UN entry" underlines:

> Es ist unmöglich, sich vorzustellen, dass die Schweiz als UNO Mitglied immer
> noch an der Neutralität festhalten könnte (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 810514)[3]

Or as the article "Self-assertion without an UN membership" highlights:

> Die Schweiz hat auch ohne eine UNO Mitgliedschaft ihre Politischen als auch
> Ökonomischen Interessen verfolgen können. Die schweizerische politische,
> ökonomische und soziale Stabilität ist sehr geschätzt bei anderen Staaten[4]. (Neue
> Zurcher Zeitung, 860306).

Similar to Blocher and Fischer the articles against an UN entry used neutrality as the main contra-argument. The result of the election was not consistent with the result of the newspaper analyses, indicating therefore that there are other reasons for the outcome. As the political stream indicates two processes contributed to this outcome, the advertisements mobilized by the Blocher-Fischer campaign

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[3] It is impossible to imagine that Switzerland as an UN member still could hold on to neutrality
[4] Switzerland has also without an UN membership maintained it´s world political interests as well as economical interests. Switzerland's political, economical and social stability is extremely appreciated by other countries

together with the lack of information about neutrality and an UN membership had an impact on the voters favouring the status quo.

To summarize the political stream, the change of minister in the Department of Foreign Affairs had a great impact on the governmental agenda. Pierre Aubert as a member of the Social democratic party (SP) favoured an active foreign policy. He contributed to the success in the legislative and the executive level, failed however immensely in the electoral level. The Blocher-Fischer coalition on the other side had little to say in the legislative, executive level could however use the contra arguments in the electoral level by mobilising campaigns in the early 1980s. This gave them a remarkable advantage in the election. Further I can draw the assumption that the successful actors in the governmental agenda and the decision agenda differ.

5.3   The Policy Stream

Kingdon underlines the importance of softening the policy system, reaching consensus, before the window of opportunity opens (Kingdon, 2005:236). Without any loose agreements the advocates will not be able to take any advantage when the window opens leading to the outcome "no change" when the window closes (ibid).

A similar outcome happened in the UN membership initiative in 1986. Shortly after Aubert had become Swiss Foreign minister the UN membership had become a high-prioritized issue in the Federal Council making it on the governmental agenda. However the goal was to pass it further to the decision agenda in the early 1980s, in reality the UN membership was not decided before 1984 in the legislative.

Table 11, Summary of pro- and contra arguments in the UN debate

Summary of Pro/Contra Arguments for an UN membership in the Federal Assembly

PRO Arguments	Contra Arguments
- contribute to world peace	- limits sovereignty
- participate in Human Rights	- UN holds only little success
-global solidarity	- UN proven to be a passive actor in international conflicts
- Interdependence	- Small states no power because of the Veto Power of the Great States
- economical contributions without membership	- Neutrality will vanish over time
- no political risks because of the close relationship UN-Switzerland already has established	- Solidarity towards the World Community not towards an International Organization
-observer loses its position in the UN --> time to act	- permanent contract --> future unpredictable
-Within not without the UN neutrality can be proven	
-Military sanctions no option therefore neutrality not harmed	

It should though be underlined here that advocates presented different reasons for joining the UN in the Federal Assembly. Some advocates underlined the obligation to contribute to world peace, other named economical reasons, others solidarity and universality towards the World Community (se table 10). Despite the different reasons for joining the UN, Pierre Aubert, Foreign minister and the actor in charge in the UN debate had managed to build consensus among politicians. The majority of the Swiss parliamentarians favoured an UN membership. Because of federalism both chambers in the Federal Assembly had to decide on the issue. On the 15 March in 1984 the Federal Council's proposal to join the UN was decided in the National Council. Bernard Dupont (FDP) argues that the UN has changed since 1945 and that all major issues today go trough this international institution that makes the UN an important institution. As underlined:

> L'ONU de 1984 n'est pas celle de 1945. Elle est devenue universelle, par sa composition et par les tâches qui lui sont confiées. Qu'elles soient économiques, sociales, juridiques, culturelles, humanitaires, toutes les grandes questions de notre temps passent par l'ONU. Dans toute la coopération internationale, le rôle de l'ONU est de plus en plus important (BBI, 1984 : I :217)[5].

Nearly all advocates in the National Council underlined the importance of solidarity towards the world community and the increasing interdependence between world states naturally leading to an UN membership (BBI, 1984:I:214). Other advocates argued that Switzerland already contributed economically to the UN, however as a non-member they had no impact on how to make use of the money arguing it is therefore rationally to join the organization (ibid). As the problem stream underlines many advocates argued that it was time to act as the membership of the DDR and BRD had made the role of the observer irrelevant (BBI:1984:I:227). Neutrality, however, was the main argument against an UN entry and Aubert together with other advocates tried to emphasise that neutrality was not harmed with an UN entry. Walter Renschler (SP) argues that Switzerland has to prove its neutral position within the UN rather than outside the UN (BBI:I:213). As Aubert (SPS) further underlines in the National Council discussion:

> Neutralité ne signifie ni absence de politique extérieure ni obligation de se taire (BBI, 1984:I :219)[6]

However the contra side was a small minority, with Christoph Blocher (SVP) as the main opponent against an UN membership argued that the Swiss government sacrifices its neutrality with an entry (BBI: 1984:I:218). As underlined:

> Neutralität ist nicht eine rechtliche Konstruktion ausgeformt bei Bürokraten

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[5] The UN has changed since 1945, all major issues today go trough this international institution, that makes the UN a very, very important institution
[6] Neutrality means not the absence of a foreign policy or the obligation to remain silent

sondern eine notwendige Sicherheitsstrategie die bis heute der Schweiz erfolgreich dient [7](BBI: 1984:I:218).

Blocher argues further that an UN membership does not only risk neutrality it risks a strategy that historically has been successfully, a binding UN contract will lead to an unclear future (ibid). The contra arguments made by Blocher and other opponents had however no penetrative power, they did lose the election in the National Council, the UN proposal was adopted with 102:58 votes (BBI:1984:I:229)

The State of Council decided on the Federal Council´s proposal to join the UN on the 12 December in 1984. It should be highlighted here that the same arguments where emphasised by advocates as in the National Council. For instant Franz Muheim (CVP) representing the pro-side in the UN debate in the State of Council underlines:

> Die schweizerische Mitgliedschaft in der UNO ist ein natürlicher Weg unserer Sicherheitspolitik, deshalb ein Akt unserer Politik. Die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik beinhaltet die gleichen Visionen wie unser Staat, einen größeren Zweck außerhalb unserer Existenz, statt alleine zu handeln (BBI:1984:V:718).[8]

Further arguing that Switzerland needs to realize that Switzerland is a small state in the World Community, to act on its own is in long run no option (ibid). In the State of Council the opinion of the Swiss people was discussed, however Muheim underlined that the politicians have been elected because they know best about the states interest and that a decision has to be taken by politicians without the influence of public opinion (ibid). Max Affolter (FDP) on the other side represented the small contra-side in the State of Council. Affolter did not share the argument made by Muheim, emphasising the importance of involving the people in the process, making the arguments presentable for them so that the people can understand which impact an UN membership has on Neutrality (BBI:V:722). The value of understanding that the Swiss foreign policy has a traditional value for the people and therefore cannot just be decided without elaborating it in-depth (ibid). Affolter never directly said he was against an UN entry, however argued that the Swiss politicians made this topic far to easy. Further arguing that the Swiss people see the Swiss foreign policy from a different perspective and in order to persuade them the arguments for an UN entry have to be clearer (ibid). As in the National Council the State of Council adopted the Federal Council´s proposal to join the UN with 24:17 Votes (BBI:1984:V:739).

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[7] Neutrality is not a legal construction made by some bureaucrats but rather an essential security strategy that until today serves Switzerland well
[8] Switzerland´s entry into the UN is a natural move of our foreign policy, and as such an act of our governmental policy. The foreign policy holds the same drive as the state namely to have a greater purpose outside its existence rather than act on its own

How could Pierre Aubert build the consensus in the Federal Assembly? It took nearly four years before the issue, UN membership, was transferred from the Governmental Agenda to the Decision Agenda. This enabled Aubert to hold several meetings and publications in order to create loose agreements and giving him time in order to find the right moment to launch the issue to the decision agenda. Another contributor to the consensus building was that in 1948, when Switzerland the last time had discussed an UN membership, the UN had no understanding for Switzerland´s neutrality. However, during the last decades UN had proven to be an important forum where states could discuss world problems and thereby the UN was no longer a peace-forcer, which fitted with the idea of Swiss Neutrality. As an SP politician, the party historically favouring international organization, managed to get the majority of CVP and FDP by convincing the two biggest parties at the time. The two parties encouraged an active foreign policy as long Switzerland could hold on to neutrality.

Pierre Aubert and his predecessors had managed to build consensus, the majority of the parliamentarian's favoured UN membership however time was an important factor contributing to the success. Forwarding the UN membership from the government agenda to the decision agenda. In most other political systems the UN policy would have been implemented, however because of direct-democracy and because the UN membership was an issue of international membership an obligatory referendum was required by constitution. As the political stream indicates the UN membership was rejected by the people as well as the cantons in a so-called double-more (see table 9).

5.4 The UN "window" and the policyentrepreneurs

As underlined earlier there are two types of political agendas, the governmental agenda and the decision agenda (Kingdon, 2005:242). In this case study the differences of the two agendas was highlighted in the political stream. Events in the problem stream and political stream assured that the UN membership became a prominent issue on the governmental agenda, however because the influential actors differed in the two agendas it must be assumed that the window had closed before the referendum was held in 1986.

The advocates had to take advantage of the confluence of the three streams, or their chance would be gone. The Federal Council, and especially the Swiss Social democrats with help of their foreign minister Aubert, knew that they had an opportunity to push their ideas in the late 1970s was put on the governmental agenda. However they knew that waiting with pushing the issue into the decision agenda would pay off. Waiting would give them better opportunities in the legislative arena, pushing to early and their chance would be lost for decades. The Federal Council waited therefore from 1981, proposal established, until the year 1984 before letting the National Council and the State of Council decide on the UN proposal. As the policy stream indicates both chambers in the Swiss Federal Assembly adopted the proposal. However maybe

the advocates had focused too much on the first part of the decision-making process and thereby missed the window of opportunity, because in 1986 the window was most certain closed. The UN proposal had no chance of success in the referendum as table 9 indicates. During the whole policy process the advocates had forgotten to take control over the electoral level, therefore only controlling one part of the decision agenda. Aubert could on the 14 March in 1986 not couple the three streams together and missed therefore his window of opportunity. Blocher-Fischer on the other side had taken control over the decision agenda, which gave them the opportunity to realize their ideas.

Pierre Aubert became a policyentrepreneur, as a SP politicians and Foreign minister he had the right authoritative policy position in the UN debate. Making great use of the politic and problem stream so that the issue made it on the governmental agenda. However another important policyentrepreneur was identified Christoph Blocher, a real underdog in the political arena and new in the politics however he had a great ability to speak for his interests and was persistent with his ideas. Together with Otto Fischer they had a great network outside the political arena because of their success as industrialists and had therefore the contacts and the funds to create an enormous anti-UN campaign. We see here how important it is that the policyentrepreneur is active in all three streams in order to couple the streams together and create a change, in the UN case however the entrepreneurs differed which gave Blocher-Fischer the advantage in the referendum.

People inside as well as outside the Swiss government claimed that the rejection of the UN membership in 1986 through the UN referendum was a major step backwards in the Swiss foreign policy. Others argued it was the right decision to take. Regardless what the policy-makers had decided the people had the last say.

A particular relevance to this case is that in the European Economic Cooperation referendum held in 1992 Christoph Blocher was highly engaged in the electoral level, mobilizing an extensive campaign against it, favouring once more the status quo (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 920822, Tages Anzeiger, 921106, 921118). Even this referendum was rejected even though the government had recommended it (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 930510, 930514)

5.5 Conclusion

This case study aimed to answer the following research question: *What plausible explanations can Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework contribute with in the 1986 UN debate?*

A proposed change in Switzerland´s foreign policy can occur if the policyentrepreneur manage to couple the three streams policy, politic and problem in the window of opportunity. The coupling of the three streams is not that simple. The analyses of the problem stream indicated that two main events influenced the agenda setting process, namely the establishment of the UN site in Geneva in 1966 and the UN membership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1973, both events opening the road to UN membership discussions. This requires however that advocators make use of these events by proposing solutions to these problems. In 1966 Willy Spühler, for the first time ever a social democratic politician, was elected as Swiss foreign minister. This was the starting point of nearly three decades of social democratic foreign ministers, with successor as Pierre Graber and Pierre Aubert. The social democrats had always favoured a change of direction in the Swiss foreign policy, having their party member as foreign minister gave them the prime opportunity to mobilize a change. The UN membership became a prominent issue in the governmental agenda especially with the help of Willy Spühler and Pierre Aubert, however taking nearly four years before the issue was forwarded to the decision agenda. Whether it was a strategically move from the advocators to wait so long or if the issue just didn't had any space in the decision agenda could not be identified in this case study. However, Pierre Aubert had managed to successfully mobilize support in the legislative as the UN proposal was adopted in the legislative. This indicates that the commitment of the government towards a policy change in the UN policy was high. The analyses indicate that the opposition, with the main actors Christoph Blocher and Otto Fischer, had no influence in the decision-making process in the legislative arena. However, because the UN membership proposal falls under a so-called obligatory referendum, requires therefore by constitution the consent of the people and the cantons. The referendum was held in 1986. As the result of the analyses indicate Aubert had successfully mobilized success in the government had however failed enormously at the electoral level, the cantons as well as the people rejected the referendum with clear percentages. So this indicates that the window of opportunity had already closed in 1986. The analysis indicates that it was a mixture of failure of the advocators and a success of the opposition that led to this outcome. Blocher and Fischer had already in the early 1980s started to mobilize support at the electoral level with help of campaigns against an UN membership and thereby favouring the status quo. Pierre Aubert and following had not managed to inform the people about the extent, to which neutrality is influenced by a United Nations membership. Something that the opposition utilized well, as they primarily used neutrality as the main contra argument against a UN membership.

The *counterfactual reasoning* can be summarized as followed: the policyentrepreneurs, especially the social democratic foreign ministers, had successfully made use of the problems and attached their solutions to it which made the UN membership a prominent issue on the governmental agenda. The policyentrepreneurs had further managed to mobilize the support in the government as the UN proposal was adopted in the legislative. However failed to mobilize the support of the people in the UN referendum leading therefore to no change.

6 Concluding Discussion

6.1 Common ground between the cases

I will here discuss the similarities between the cases; the discussions are of qualitative nature as the empirical explanation is provided in only two cases. How can the cases combined contribute with an in-depth understanding of Swiss foreign policy and thereby offer plausible explanations to my general research question:

- *How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be explained?*

The explanatory variables identified in this thesis point in the direction of policy stability. In both case studies the commitment of the government towards the proposed changes in the foreign policy was great. However, as both case studies discuss the Swiss federal council needs the support of the federal assembly in order for a proposed change to occur. In light of Switzerland's federalism this requires the approval of both chambers. At first, one would suspect that this is the real challenge to mobilize support in the legislative. The belief was therefore, that the cleavages in the federal assembly would be strong, both in the debate about the Swiss security report as well as in the UN membership. Especially because the Swiss foreign policy for decades had been based on military-rationales, the move towards European Cooperation must therefore be considered as a huge step forwards. Adding that neutrality had been the core of Swiss foreign policy since 1815, this study assumed therefore that the debate in the federal assembly would be more intense, discussing these proposed changes more critically. But, as the results of both analyses indicate, the decision-making process in the Swiss federal assembly occurred without any greater problems reaching thereby consensus. The Swiss government as a whole favoured in both decision-making processes change, moving beyond the status quo. So, the proposed changes were politically salient, rather than the discussions about how the proposed changes affect neutrality. Both case studies highlight further that the small opposition emphasising the status quo, had no or only little impact on the decision-making process in the legislative.

As both case studies imply the government as a whole favoured change, so where are the sufficient factors located explaining Swiss foreign policy stability? Both case studies identify the role of the people as important. In both case studies the *referendum's where identified as the most sufficient factor* influencing the outcome. The analyses expose that the people favour rather the

status quo, and followed therefore not the recommendations of the government. One could therefore argue that the domestic struggle was a confrontation between the people and the government. In sum up, the argument presented here indicates that the *support of the people* is a necessary factor in order to move the Swiss foreign policy in the direction of change. Both case studies reach this conclusion. Further the role of the opposition was therefore great at the electoral level, especially the role of the Swiss People's party. The party had no or only little impact on the decision-making process in the legislative arena became however, a prominent actor in the electoral level. One of the reasons for the success identified in the case studies is the mobilization of votes in the electoral level with help of extensive campaigns.

6.2 Where do we go from here?

Conducting a case study approach, as the one applied in this thesis has its limitations. It sacrifices breath for depth and can therefore not reach definite conclusions about other countries foreign policy. This was however never the ambition, as the aim was to explain the *deviant case* Swiss foreign policy stability. The structure of this thesis, conducting two case studies, each of which explains one particular event in the decision-making process using a different frame of reference. This outline did not only provide a broad understanding of the decision-making process in the Swiss foreign policy, the cases uncovered also additional insights about how alternative frameworks and alternative events can emphasize quite similar explanations. This thesis argues therefore about the importance of thinking outside the box, using an outline that fits the case and using theories outside the topic field that can contribute with new plausible explanations that otherwise would not have become visible.

It would have been interesting to study the Swiss people's party more in-depth, as they are mentioned in both case studies. For instance, why has the right-wing populist Swiss people's party increased its votes at the national elections since the end of the cold war? Examining the causal dynamics between the citizen's initiatives and the Swiss people's party, as both have increased during the last decades.

Another interesting study would be to examine whether Switzerland actually during the last decade has become more cooperative. In 2002 they became members in the United Nations and have further also agreed on a variety of bilateral agreements as for example the Schengen agreement.

7   Executive summary

The end of the Cold War, has had a great impact on foreign policy. Former neutral states as Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria have during the last decades become more cooperative by joining the European Union and in line revised their security policy towards EU: s priorities (Agius-Devine, 201, Goetschel, 1999). As a consequence neutrality has in these countries successively over gone to non-alignment. Switzerland on the other side has since the end of the Cold War not abandoned it´s longstanding foreign policy of non-membership. Switzerland is neither member in the European Union nor in the NATO, and became only recently member in the United States. The Swiss foreign policy offers therefore a puzzle in foreign policy, the source of this puzzlement is found in the context: decreasing territorial problems, greater interdependence between European States and increasing involvement of the EU and the NATO in foreign policy.

Given the uniqueness in the Swiss foreign policy as one of few European countries still containing a rather stable foreign policy this study aims to answer the following general research question:

- *How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be explained?*

The traditional theories in foreign policy engage in security issues rather on the international level. Especially the realistic perspective has dominated the topic, with contributions from the influential scholars Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001). The realistic assumption assumes that the state is a unitary actor, ignoring therefore that individual actors within the state create foreign policy involving rather a variety of actors. In this study I argue therefore that international factors offer no explanation to why the Swiss foreign policy is stable. This thesis assumes that individual policymakers establish foreign policy, analysing therefore the decision-making process within the state, at the domestic level.

The changes in the international relations in foreign policy called the attention of a variety of scholars. This study is inspired by the work of Hermann (1990) and Goldmann (1988), however because Switzerland has not adapted to these changes I have used these models as an inspiration in order to find the independent variables in domestic politics. The models offer broad perspectives about foreign policy, containing a variety of important explanatory factors however being rather vague. In order to analyse the independent variables suggested by Hermann and Goldmann in depth, I have chosen Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory (1995) and Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework (1984). Both theories provide an understanding about the decision-making process at the national level. The theories make use of Goldmann's and Hermann's domestic

explanatory factors, however they are established theories rather than vague models and therefore more suitable.

It is however impossible to make use of a theoretical framework that is capable of explaining all type of foreign policy, therefore the ambition of this research has been to explain two particular decision-making processes in the Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss political system is often described as something special because of the combination of direct-democracy and federalism. Therefore analysing the veto player structures and their impact in the decision-making process in the Swiss Security Report (1973, 1990, 2000 and 2010) with help of Tsebelis' Veto Player theory (1995). On the other side the 1986 UN debate brought Swiss foreign policy on the political agenda, starting a heated debate in Switzerland that lasted for decades. Therefore analysing the decisions in the UN agenda-setting process with help of Kingdon's Multiple Stream Framework (1984).

In order to answer the general research question presented above, this thesis has therefore formulated two separate sub-questions, which give the outline for each case study.

Case study 1 aims to answer the following research question:

- *What plausible explanations can Tsebelis' Veto Player Theory contribute with in the Swiss Federal Assembly debate regarding the Swiss Security Report, 1973, 1990, 2000, 2010?*

Case study 2 aims to answer the following sub-question:

- *What plausible explanations can Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework contribute with in the 1986 UN debate?*

The research questions were explored through two case studies. Each case study analysing one particular decision-making process in the Swiss foreign policy (Security Report vs. UN agenda setting) making use of a different theoretical framework (Tsebelis' vs. Kingdon). Two case studies were conducted because the aim was to analyse the broad picture of the Swiss foreign policy, both cases therefore contributing with explanations to the overall research question. In both case studies the content analysis was conducted, producing a descriptive overview of the decisions in the Swiss Security Report and the Swiss UN agenda-setting process.

The following arguments where highlighted in the analysis of the Swiss veto player structures in the Swiss security report:

- *Three* important *institutional veto players* were identified in the decisions about the Swiss security report, the two chambers in the Federal Assembly (National Council and State of Council) and the people through the referendum. All three have to agree to the proposed change.
- The *ideological distance* among the parties is great, especially between the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP). However because both parties occupy rather few seats in the Federal Assembly having therefore rather little impact on the decision-making process.
- The two biggest parties Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and Liberal Party (FDP) are both located rather in the middle of the left-right axes,

favouring therefore consensus. *Internal cohesion* was therefore rather small in the Federal Assembly regarding the Swiss security report.

- All security reports (1973, 1990, 2000, 2010) were adopted in the legislative, the government favoured thereby change in the Swiss foreign policy. The analysis of the Swiss foreign policy referendums from 1986-2010 discovered however, that the Swiss people in 13 of total 18 foreign policy referendums favoured the status quo. The people's consent is required in order to change a policy, however because the people favoured in most cases the status quo, most of the proposed changes in the Swiss security report were not realized.

The following arguments where highlighted in the analysis of the Swiss UN membership agenda-setting:

- The UN debate became an issue on the governmental agenda because of three events: in 1966 the UN established some of its organizations in Geneva, in 1973 west and east Germany became members in the UN after being an active observer with Switzerland and in 1966 for the first time a social democratic politician (SP) held the position of foreign minister (the party strongly emphasises international cooperation)

- The UN membership was however not forwarded to the decision agenda before decades later giving the foreign minister at that time Pierre Aubert (SP) the great possibility to mobilize support within the government. The UN proposal was successfully adopted in the Federal Assembly.

- The opposition with Christoph Blocher and Otto Fischer had no success in the governmental agenda, however started early to mobilize the support of the people through extensive campaigns. The people rejected the UN referendum in 1986, revealing that the advocators had failed to persuade the people and therefore no change occurred.

In both case studies the referendum's where identified as the most sufficient factor influencing the outcome. In sum up, the argument presented here indicates that the *support of the people* is a sufficient factor in order to move the Swiss foreign policy in the direction of change.

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