What Motivates Cooperation in the Aid Industry?

Exploring Reasons for Donor Cooperation: The Case of Vietnam

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Abstract

It has been argued that harmonization leads to a more effective delivery of aid to recipient countries, and ultimately to the target population and thus cooperation in general would be an adequate means to achieve this goal. However, the implementation of the Paris Agenda has so far progressed slowly. Vietnam is often reported as a case where cooperation between donors is working fine. By making use of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, the question was answered what incentives cooperation among donor organizations in the case of Vietnam motivate? In order to explore relevant incentives for cooperation, qualitative interviews and a survey were conducted. It is the first study conducted in Vietnam about incentives for cooperation and the first study among development organizations that also includes intrinsic incentives, such as the personality of decision makers. Results encourage further research on four incentive clusters: trust and personality, an open and equal communication process to define expatiations before starting cooperation relationships, creating opportunities for knowledge exchange and guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation.

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My family, partner and friends know how important they are for me in my life.

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List of Acronyms

AFD Agence Française de Développement	
ADB Asian Development Bank	
AEF Aid Effectivness Forum Vietnam	
AFD Agence Française de Développement	
BOD Biochemical Oxygen Demand	
CENTEC Swedish CENTEC Vietnam	
CG Consultative Group (in Vietnam)	
EU European Union	
GDP Gross Domestic Product	
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammer	narbeit
IAD Institutional Analysis and Development	
IGO International Governmental Organization	
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency	
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Developm	ent Bank)
LMDG Like Minded Donor Group	
NGO/INGO International Non Governmental Organization	
NRC VUFO-NGO Resource Center	
ODA Official Development Assistance	
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel	lopment
UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the I	Empowerment
of Women	
UN United Nations	
US United States of America	
WB World Bank	

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Research Question

Since the adoption of the Paris Agenda for Aid Effectiveness in 2005 cooperation among donor organizations has been widely discussed under the umbrella of the concept of harmonization, one of five key concepts included in the Agenda. It has been argued that harmonization leads to a more effective delivery of aid to recipient countries, and ultimately to the target population and thus cooperation in general would be an adequate means to achieve this goal.

However, the implementation of the Paris Agenda has so far progressed slowly. Several reasons have been brought forward. On the macro level some have argued that harmonizing aid would not be in the interest of donors as this would harm their position in relation to other donors. On the meso level, some have argued that implementation in donor organization is a tough task as established procedures are hard to change. And on the level of the individual it has been argued that the correct incentives are not yet in place to trigger cooperation. Thus, regardless of whether cooperation leads to more efficient aid delivery, cooperation still remains a challenge for donors.

Internationally differing degrees of cooperation between donors can be observed, varying from sector to sector as well as from country to country. Vietnam has experienced an astonishing development over the last decades, particularly with regard to its economy and thus the associated reduction of poverty. Donors have only been active in Vietnam since the beginning of the 1990s, but since that time, both the number of donors and the quantity of aid to Vietnam have gradually increased.

Despite the fact that the international framework for cooperation is valid in every country, Vietnam is often reported as a case where cooperation between donors is working fine. It could therefore be argued that Vietnam is experiencing a special situation. However, no study has yet been conducted that investigates the reasons for cooperation in Vietnam. It is therefore of interest to ask: What motivates cooperation among donor organizations in Vietnam?

This thesis will thus explore the motivational factors for cooperation among donors. It will attempt to close a gap in the literature, where so far no studies for the case of Vietnam have been conducted that put the individual in the centre of interest. The reality in aid organization has shown that decision makers in organizations have been able to make decisions about significant cooperation activities. It is assumed in the reminder of this thesis that they are the ones who can make a difference if only the incentives for them are right.

To explore reasons for cooperation the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework will be used. This framework, developed among others by Elinor Ostrom, seems to be perfect to explore the case of Vietnam as it considers contextual factors as well as it allows for a analysis of incentives that structure the interaction between actors.

The reminder of this text is structured as follows. First of all the IAD will be introduced and applied to donor cooperation. Secondly, the methodology that was used to explore the incentives will be summarized. Thirdly, the elements of the IAD will be applied to cooperation in Vietnam. Fourthly, the results will be discussed and hypothesis for further research will be developed.

1.2 Contribution

Whether harmonization of aid has a positive impact on the target group has been assessed in different contexts. Some have criticized the idea (e.g. Crespin 2006; Easterly 2002; Eyben 2007) whereas others consider harmonization as beneficial for aid effectiveness (e.g. Dodd et al. 2009; Emmanuel 2010; Riddell 2007; Torsvik 2005; Sundewall et al. 2010).

Much research has been conducted on the macro level of cooperation where different countries and their policies play a role. Fuchs et al. (2013) for example tested whether the competition for export markets and political support deters countries from coordinating when delivering aid. They use several indicators such as voting patterns in the UN and sector export structures to check their hypothesis. Countries tend to coordinate less when competing for exporting markets and political opinion may also be a factor, though to a lesser degree. In the case of the decentralization sector in

Indonesia, Winters (2012) concluded that the lack of coordination could be attributed to the strategic interests of the donors.

Others focus on factors for within country coordination, thus focusing on the organizational level. In a quantitative study on coordination in Cambodia, Öhler (2013) finds a modest decree of coordination within the country. Especially bilateral seem not to coordinate among each other, whilst INGOs do cooperate to some extent. He concludes that "This suggests that aid continues to be regarded as a political or commercial tool in the competition among donor countries." (Öhler 2013: 17).

Others looked into explanations for different structures of donor networks. For instance, Atouba & Shumate (2010) found in a study of network patterns among INGOs and IGOs that collaboration of INGOs was most likely with other INGOs and that in general, organizations tended to collaborate more frequently with partners of partners than for them unknown organizations.

Coyle & Lawson (2006) identify, among other reasons, a lack of training and high staff turnover in the World Bank as reasons for the lack of harmonization. The same conclusion in a different context can be found in Renzio et al. (2005). In summary, there have been almost no studies on cooperation among donor organizations which attempt to put the individual in the centre of interest. To date, studies which consider factors that are directly associated with the individual in donor organizations, such as personality or interpersonal trust, are missing in the literature. No studies have been conducted that explore incentives for cooperation in the case of Vietnam.

Thus, the contributions of this research to the literature are twofold. It aims not only to contribute to the discussion on reasons for cooperation among donor organizations with putting the individual in the centre of interest, but also to contribute to the literature by exploring incentives for cooperation in Vietnam. Additionally it makes use of cooperation literature outside of development aid and thus makes a contribution to both fields of research by making a first attempt to cross the line for the case of Vietnam.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Framework for Analysis

So far, approaches have been based on structure-agency theory, asking whether the individual is responsible for his own behavior or whether the structure determines the behavior of the individual. However, an integration of both elements seems to be fruitful and thus this research is inspired by the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework, developed by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1999: 46). Initially developed for research on collective-action situations, it has been widely used to answer questions about resource management and management of common pool resources. However, it has also been applied to other contexts (e.g. Klaas 2008; Christensen 2003).

The IAD Framework in this context shall guide the research during the complex process of analysis by laying the ground work for theories on cooperation that are integrated into the basic structure of the framework. It will thus be adapted according to the research questions, whereby the framework will be reduced to its most important aspects. In a first step the framework will be summarized, then theoretical approaches to studying cooperation introduced after which a model specific to the case of Vietnam will be developed that explains cooperation using this framework and added theory.

Figure 1 summarizes the set up of the framework. The context (external variables) structures the action arena, which result in outcomes that in turn feed back into the external variables.




Figure 1: The IAD Framework (Source: Ostrom 1999)

Starting from the end point, outcomes are the result of interactions between actors. These interactions take place in an action arena. Action arenas are a construct and serve to identify the boundaries in which actions of actors take place. In order to be able to identify the structure in which actors operate, an analysis of action arenas includes the analysis of two aspects: The Actor and the action situation itself.

The analysis of an individual who executes actions (actors) includes "[...] what and how actors value; what resources, information, and beliefs they have; their information-processing capabilities; and the internal mechanisms they use to decide upon actions [...]" (Gibson 2005: 2.3.1). Ostrom (1999) emphasizes that an actor is usually perceived as 'homo economicus', because assumptions in this regard are best developed and therefore could be easily employed. However, other assumptions are valid and would depend on the action situation.

Secondly the analysis of an action situation is of importance. Within action situations actors make decisions that lead to outcomes. An analysis of the situations includes a description about the following aspects (Ostrom 1999):

- 1. a set of actors;
- 2. the specific positions that can be filled by actors;
- 3. allowable actions and how they are linked to outcomes;
- 4. potential outcomes and how they are linked to sequences of actions;
- 5. the extent of control actors have over choices;
- 6. the information actors possess concerning the structure of the action situation;
- 7. the costs and benefits that are assigned to actions and outcomes.

Action situations and the actors that interact within these situations themselves are influenced in their actions by three contextual elements. Firstly, rules-in-use refer to the rules which govern the behavior of individuals, it explains what actions are required, prohibited or permitted (Ostrom 1999). The emphasize lies on 'in-use', because they can be both formalized and very informal. As people act, they can bring rules to live and these rules can get institutionalized. Also the opposite is possible: rules can also be 'unspoken rules' that are known to everyone.

Secondly, attribute of the community emphasizes the role of the community in which the interaction takes place. This includes socio-economic aspects as well as the constitutional structure of the environment in which actions are taking place. Finally, the biophysical conditions refer to how "the world being acted upon effects the outcome" (Ostrom 1999). Each of the three contextual elements gains in importance, depending on the research questions asked.

The behavior of actors in action arenas is structured by incentives. Incentives are defined as "the rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to be related to their actions and those of others." (Ostrom 2002: xiv) and is defined as concept that only refers to external stimuli. The contextual elements that were mentioned above plus the assumptions about the actors themselves and characteristics of the action situation form the incentives and constraints within which actors behave. To sum up, incentives are basically every factor that can potentially motivate an action. They stem from the structure around the actor. Identifying them is a key for an institutional analysis that aims at predicting outcome or changing a given situation.

Additionally, IAD can be applied on multiple levels. At each level the concept of action situations can be applied. The different levels are connected by the rules, where rules on a higher level directly influence action on the next level which directly result in rules. The lowest is the operational level where rules directly influence operational activities of individuals. One level above is the level of collective choice that directly affects the operational level. The constitutional level is the highest of all levels and influences the collective choice level (Ostrom 1999). The concept of multiple levels highlights that action situation cannot be imagined without an externally developed set of rules that incites actions.

Those relations become obvious when applied to the case of cooperation in Vietnam, where the researchers aims to explore the motivators for cooperation among donor organizations (the outcome according to the IAD). Within the framework, incentives suitable to predict cooperation will be developed theoretically and employed in the empirical part of the research.

The framework is a complex approach to the study of institutions and has been refined several times since its development. The researcher got the impression that it is still not yet finalized, even though a lot of literature exists. In the literature the framework is used more or less 'loosely' and important aspects are left out. However, this problem seems to find its roots in the definition of the IAD. For instance, statements are partly (seldom) not quite accurate, especially when it comes to the definition and interaction of institutions, incentives and rules. Definitions are neither clear nor definable. For instance, if one compares the definition of *rules-in-use* (actions that are required and prohibited) and incentives (rewards and punishments related to action), incentives appear only to be *rules in use*. Eventhough incentives play a dominant role in the work of IAD scholars, it has only been defined in later publications (e.g. Gibson (2005) and before in one sentence in Ostrom (2002)). However, they are a perfect concept to analyze the given situation.

2.2 Literature Review of Literature about Cooperation

In order to determine what motivates cooperation, this chapter reviews the existing literature on cooperation in general and development cooperation in particular in order to condense incentives that have been mentioned in the literature. The incentives that are listed here are perceived as theories about reality. If incentive A is in place, a certain action is the outcome in the framework of the IAD. It is therefore necessary that in a next step, findings from the literature review will be merged with the IAD framework in order to make use of its broader approach.

The factors listed here are a 'value as such' and have been condensed by the respective authors. They are build on experience, empirical research or theoretical reasoning. Only measurable concepts were used in the reminder of this thesis. Some more complex concepts, such as good leadership (Casey 2007), which would require more detailed investigations and measurement, are not listed here. They are better investigated elsewhere. However, the complex reasoning they are based on will be employed in the analytical part of the thesis.

The incentives that are found in the literature are grouped in two categories. Firstly, incentives that can be found within the actor itself (intrinsic incentives). Secondly, incentives that are part of the external structure of a person, extrinsic incentives. Literature referring to concepts such as cooperation, partnership, co-optation, interorganizational relationships and cluster of organizations was analysed. These concepts are assumed to be synonyms, especially in view of the fact that no accepted definitions of each term exist and the definition of cooperation varies from person to person¹.

Author (Year)	Intrinsic Incentives	Extrinsic Incentives		
		*Exchange ties of ressources		
Atouba & Shumate (2010)		*Reputation of organization		
Casey (2007)	Trust	equality of partnership		
Chen et al. (1998)	culture			
		*Support of superior for cooperation		
		*cross-donor common guidelines		
Coyle & Lawson (2006)		*correct disbursement policies		
Fink & Kessler (2009)	Trust			
		*Enough time		
		*cooperation not part of performance		
Lawson (2010)		review		
		*Peer recognition		
Renzio et al. (2005)		*guidelines for cooperation		
Sundewall et al. (2010)	good personal relationship			
Volk et al. (2011)	Personality ('big five')			

Table 1: Reviewed Literature about incentives for cooperation

Atouba & Shumate (2010) found that development organizations seek exchange ties so taht dependence on other development organizations is minimized. They wish to exchange their resources for the resources of the partnering organization and hope thereby to gain independence. Also, "organizations take on less risk when establishing direct ties with a partner's partners" (Atouba & Shumate 2010: 297) because the organization is not totally unknown.

For Casey (2007) trust is an important factor in why people choose to enter into closer cooperation relationships with their counterparts in other organizations. For him trust is defined as a trusting relationship. He also states that "trust is so important that a reliance on trust could eliminate the need for formal contracts." (Casey 2007: 76). Therefore if trust exists it motivates a closer relationship. He also adds the equality of a partnership as a success factor, if equality means power equity. This again incents a closer cooperation.

The concept of culture as an important aspect of cooperation patterns is emphasized by Chen et al. (1998), who theoretically develop six different cooperation patterns,

¹ Please refer to Annex 1 for an analysis of a definition of cooperation among the participants in the questionnaire used in the framework of this study.

depending on the cultural background of individuals. The patterns differ according to their intensity, the use of telecommunication methods or reward structures.

A comprehensive analysis of incentives for cooperation in the Worldbank by Coyle & Lawson (2006) finds that a good level of cooperation is fostered by the support of a superior in this area. Moreover, if common guidelines for all donors existed, everybody involved would act according to the same rules and cooperation would be easier. The same holds true for correct disbursement policies. The pressure to disburse money instead of considering cooperation as an integral part of the work, would undermine any efforts made with regard to cooperation.

Fink & Kessler (2009) highlight the importance of trust for cooperation. However, their conceptualization differs from that of Casey. They define it as a maxim that determines actions of individuals, and call it maxim-based-trust. This could be perceived as an interpersonal trust intrinsic to every individual, compelling them to act in a certain way.

Lawson (2010) points out that that those making decisions with regard to cooperation often have very little time available, rendering them less likely to cooperate. In addition, incorporating cooperation in the performance review has proven to be successful in motivating individuals to cooperate. However, failing to include it results in a lack of career incentive for individuals to cooperate, compounding the problem.

Other studies on incentives for cooperation in aid agencies by Renzio et al. (2005) point to factors such as acknowledgement among peers that cooperation is important. This goes hand in hand with support from the senior manager. Sundewall (2010) raises good personal relationships with counterparts as an important motivator for cooperation. Having a good relationship eases the process of cooperation. And Volk et al. (2011) highlight the personality of a person as an intrinsic factor that incites cooperation. Using the 'Big-Five' measurement scale, he concludes that agreeableness and prosocial behavior usually lead to more cooperation.

The literature review demonstrates that researchers have identified incentives that can have a positive effect on cooperation. Whether these incentives can contribute to the discussion in the case of Vietnam will be investigated in the empirical part of this research.

2.3 A proposed Model for Donor Cooperation

Collective Action Situations are becoming collective problems if the actions chosen by actors don't lead to the correct outcomes (Gibson 2005). If these outcomes are not correct the incentives in place are not doing what they are supposed to do. In the last chapter literature was reviewed in order to identify some of these incentives that can motivate cooperation. They will now be integrated in the IAD framework and the framework applied to donor coordination.

A first analysis concerns the actors in action arenas, their characteristics have to be analyzed. As already mentioned above, IAD scholars usually employ the assumption that individuals are *homo economicus*, thus act rationally with full information and clear strategies. "For many problems, it is useful to accept the view that an actor's choice of strategy in any particular situation depends on how he or she perceives and weighs the benefits and costs of various strategies [...]" (Gibson 2005: 2.3.1). The researcher does agree with this view only partially. This view implies a material theory about reality: Only if something pays out he or she will act to receive the payment. Extrinsic incentives are thus of great importance as they constitute a reward (or punishment) for a certain action.

However, the researcher does not assume that individuals act only upon extrinsic motivators or incentives. Rather, the classic separation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is assumed, where intrinsic motivation is defined as "[...] doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable [...]" (Ryan & Deci 2000: 55). Thus, the personality of a person is such a strong incentive that individuals are satisfied with an action if they act according to their personality structure and receive an intrinsic reward (or punishment). In this research the individual is therefore assumed to act opportunistically, not only according to his intrinsic motivation but also to his extrinsic motivation. If a certain decision must be made, the actor weights which option is the best for him. Not always in full possession of all information, actors usually can oversee the situation and act according to the payments (internal or external) one receives.

In the case of Vietnam, actors that are of interest are decisions makers in bi- and multilateral donor organizations as well as International NGOs. It is assumed that it is them who make the decisions on whether to cooperate or not and whose actions can be altered according to the incentives they are exposed to. They have good education, are experts in their field and of good physical health. All these factors give them the hypothetical chance to make rational decisions if only the incentives for them to act are correct. Additionally, the field of development aid is a competitive business area. The pressure to achieve certain objectives defined by their organization is high and jobs are rare. This situation forces the actors in question to defer to the rules of the game. This will be analyzed in the empirical part of the thesis.

A second analysis refers to the action situation. Donors in Vietnam include bi- and multilateral donors as well as INGOs. It is assumed that the position of actors equals the position of the respective organization they are working for in the action situation. As donors are related to each other with a function of the resources they possess, the information they have about the structure and the extent of control they have over choices so are their employees that fill a responsible position and that were the ones questioned here. This position enables them, in the boundaries of the incentives from within their organization well as their intrinsic incentives, to act as a representative of their organization. This organizations however, and therefore the actors themselves, are bound by the contextual factors, the rules-in-use as well as the community.

No formal structure whatsoever exists that can describe the relational structure of donors. However, they are quiet loosely associated, and different extents of interactions exist. Programmes are implemented in parallel structure and cooperation occurs under certain circumstances, as will be analyzed in this thesis. Basically, in the boundaries of rules-in-place donors are free to act as they please regarding cooperation. These rules in place are twofold. Firstly one has to consider the rules that are set up by the government of Vietnam and define allowable actions with regard to cooperation. Secondly, rules also include cooperation agreements, both formal and informal.

In general, donors in Vietnam are organized in a market where every donor seeks to act according to its benefit and has full control over its actions. The just mentioned characteristics can be applied to the actual actors in the arena: the decision makers within the organizations. Thus, a market situation for actors in Vietnam exists where they are free to cooperate with other organizations as long as they follow the rules-inuse. Thus, it is about the intrinsic and extrinsic incentives for decision makers when and how donors in Vietnam cooperate.

A framework for an analysis on the operational level that also includes some of the reviewed incentives looks as follows:




Figure 2: IAD framework applied to donor cooperation in Vietnam

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

Many authors stress that the fundamental difference between qualitative and quantitative research strategies is that quantitative strategies focus on testing theories whilst qualitative strategies generate them (Bryman 2012; Cresswell 2007; Yin 2009). According to Yin,

"[...] case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. [...] and in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)." (2009: 33).

Thus this case study can be perceived to be a qualitative research strategy. Yin (2009) defines case studies as an in depth investigation of a phenomenon within its context, where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident. According to him, case studies are used when a large amount of data from different sources is necessary to provide evidence for a situation. In this process, theory guides the researcher through this complex situation.

In this case, cooperation between donors occurs via a special and complex nexus of factors that also influence cooperation significantly (as will be evident later).

Furthermore, it appears to be necessary to gain a deep understanding of all the factors influencing cooperation in order to appreciate the whole complexity of the situation in Vietnam. Thus, experts were interviewed. Theory was used to guide the researcher through the complexity of the phenomenon: the variety of approaches to coordination and its definition and the different opinions on the incentives for cooperation. And finally quantifiable data was gained by use of a survey.

Regarding data collection methods Gomm et al. (2000) defines a case study as opposed to the research design of the experiment and the social survey and Yin (2009) reports that surveys are not as commonly used as qualitative methods within case study designs. In this present case study, a survey was used in addition to qualitative research methods for two reasons: Firstly for triangulation reasons to enable findings to be checked against another source. And secondly so that the two methods can complement each other: the survey is based on interviews and interviews can explain findings and relationships in the survey. In this study, data not only from a survey, but also from documents, interviews and participatory observation as well as inspiration from theory will be employed.

The theoretical model developed in the last chapter can thereby be perceived as an ideal fit when using a case study. The large amount of data processed in this framework as well as the complexity of the situation and its context that will be analyzed suggests the use of a case study. Additionally, an action arena is in its essence a case that will be studied, where contextual factors influence the actions within the case.

A summary of the research design is displayed in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Research design

3.2 Data Collection Methods

3.2.1. Qualitative Interviews

Qualitative interviews give us information about "[...] causal explanations participants provide for what they have experienced and believe and [...] about the connections and relationships they see between particular events, phenomena, and beliefs." (Mack et al. 2005: 30). Thus they provide an opportunity to gain insights into phenomena that are otherwise hard to explore. In a semi-structured interview the researcher asks questions according to an interview guide. The sequence and the questions remain the same for every interview. However, he retains the flexibility to ask additional questions and to go into further detail should particularly interesting subjects arise. (Bryman 2012)

Semi-structured interviews were conducted as they provided the researcher with the chance to confront the interviewees with observations made and ideas from the theory. During the field study an interview guide was developed on the basis of the theory and observations and interviews were held using the questions in the guide. Interviews were all digitally recorded in a quiet environment, mostly in the offices of interviewees. After the interview short notes were made on the interview and the quality. An ex-post analysis of the notes revealed that all interviews were of high quality save one, where noise level and external disturbance was quite high.

During the interview the researcher made use of several questioning types (as suggested by Bryman 2012) and tried to avoid others, for instance suggestive questioning. Usually all questions from the guide could be asked and the interviews were ultimately less structured than intended. This allowed many other aspects to be revealed which were not covered in the theory and were used later in the survey. Lastly, earlier interviews tended to influence later interviews, so that e.g. concepts that were brought up earlier could be discussed with the next interviewees. This enriched this research.

3.2.2. Online Survey

Online surveys can be perceived as a form of self-completion questionnaires (Bryman 2012) and accordingly they are said to be quicker and cheaper to administer than other forms of data collection methods. More importantly, interviewer effects are absent and interviewer variability is reduced, leading to more standardization and thus a better

comparability of results. On the other hand, it is difficult to explain questions to interviewees if they have difficulties in answering questions and one cannot ask many questions as respondents cannot be directly motivated to continue. While negative aspects especially associated with online surveys include lower response rates and non-controllable responses, meaning that people can answer several times, positive aspects include faster responses and fewer unanswered questions.

To mitigate negative aspects, specific texts were used throughout the survey to describe the instruments in detail and to avoid unclear situations for the respondent (see Annex 3 for the questionnaire). Furthermore, the number of questions was reduced to a minimum to keep attention to the study constant. Also, no graphical progress indicator was used to indicate how many questions were left. Rather, verbal indicators were included to motivate participants as they are said to increase completion rates and therefore responses (Best & Krueger: 2008). In addition, special emphasis was put on the sequence and phrasing of questions: sensitive questions were put last in the survey, interesting ones at the beginning, some concepts had to be introduced first through another question before they could be used more in details (e.g. questions about the cooperation intensity), questions had to be formulated carefully so as not to provoke or suggest answers, and also items had to be grouped into thematic sections so there was a logical progression for the reader (Alreck & Settle 1985; Cargan 2007).

3.2.3. Participant Observations

One of the main advantages of participant observation is that the researcher can "see as others see". That is that the implicit features of social life are revealed to the researcher more easily if he is at the focus of his interest and the units of interest are in their natural settings (Bryman 2012: 338). However, the researcher is very restricted to certain people and places and in this case he was restricted to one organization and the interactions of people there.

Thus, this study benefits from observations during interviews, private chats and the researcher's field placement in one donor organization. During his observation the researcher was always clear about his research to his colleagues and thus experienced no rejection or critique. However, he never actively spoke about the topic and only answered when he was asked about his research topic. Notes were made in Vietnam and

later used as a basis for this thesis. This form of data collection was a great source of inspiration at every stage of the research process.

3.3 Sample Design

The population from which the sample is drawn is specified as all decision makers in international donor organizations in Vietnam: bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as International Non Governmental Organizations. Decision makers are all persons that can theoretically make a decision about whether or not to engage in cooperation. However, no data is available about the number of staff in these donor organizations, especially considering that not all staff are authorized to engage in cooperation activities with other donors.

However, concrete figures or at least contact information for these persons would be necessary to frame the sample. Therefore, a probability sampling is not possible as no sample frame exists from which units could be drawn. In a probability sampling every single individual from the population being examined has a statistically and (more importantly) determinable chance greater than zero of being involved in the survey (Bryman 2012). In view of the unclear data situation about staff of donor organizations in Vietnam this was not possible. Thus, for qualitative and survey data collection, different non-probability, non-representative sampling methods were used.

Qualitative interviews were held in Hanoi, Vietnam with representatives from eight donor organizations from September to November 2012. Different donor organizations were contacted so that a wide array of criterion could be covered, which theoretically could influence forms of cooperation and therefore had to be investigated. The organizations contacted in the so called purposive criteria sample (Bryman 2012) were chosen with the help of a neutral employee of a donor organization, who provided contact information so that all characteristics important for the study were covered. Of 17 inquiries, 9 positively answered and ultimately 8 interviews could be held (response rate of 47%). Table 2 lists the institutions represented in the sample according to the criterion. The sample size is therefore large enough to represent possible combinations. Though not representative, it was possible to capture a broad picture through the interviews.

		ADB	CENTEC	Finnish Embassy	GIZ	ЛСА	NGO Ressource Center	UN Women	World Vision
Kind of organization	NGO						Х		Х
	UN Organization							Х	
	Bilateral Donor		Х	Х	Х	Х			
	International Bank	Х							
Size	small		Х	Х			Х		
	medium						Х	Х	
	big	Х			Х	Х	Х		Х
Paradigm	religious						Х		Х
	secular	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Background	Asian					Х			
	American								Х
	European		Х	Х	Х				
	International	Х					Х	Х	

Table 2: Interviewed organizations according to characteristics

To gain as many responses as possible for the survey two strategies were used. Firstly, the persons with whom qualitative interviews were conducted were sent the survey by mail with the request to fill it in themselves and distribute it among their peers. Secondly, the survey was sent to all organizations that were known to the researcher as mentioned above, excluding the ones already covered by step one. These organizations were contacted using their central mail address. It was not possible to control to which person the mail was forwarded to within the organization, how many persons within the organization actually received and read the mail, and to whom the interviewees forwarded the mail. Thus, it is hard to determine the probability of a unit getting into the survey and a probability sample was not possible. Therefore a snowball sampling method was applied (Bryman 2012).

The questionnaire was developed using an online tool² based on the theory and the both the interviews and the observations of the researcher were held in Hanoi. Items were developed and partly borrowed from other sources. The items were compiled and the online survey was sent to the sample by mail. The survey period was from 15th of April until 8th of May. Response rate was not calculable due to the nature of a snowball sampling, but 13 persons responded out of about 160 persons and organizations that were initially contacted. Table 3 displays the sample according to some characteristics.

² The online tool is called limeservice (<u>www.limeservice.com/</u>), which is based on LimeSurvey, an open source and free survey software. Limeservice offers the customer an online solution of the software. The user can buy answers (0.09ε per answer) and the so raised money directly goes into the future development of LimeSurvey.

Organization Type	INGO	5
	Bilateral	6
	Bank	1
	UN	1
Sex	Female	5
	Male	8
Origin of Respondent	Europe	6
	North America	2
	Asia	5

Table 3: Persons in the survey according to characteristics

3.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis of interviews and the survey was conducted with software tools. A coding scheme was developed for the qualitative interviews (see Annex 2) on the basis of theory and observations. The scheme was used to code the interviews using the tool MAXQDA. The programme allows the researcher to attribute parts of text to a code. Different themes in a text can be aggregated and thus the text is made easier to analyze. The information gained in this way is used throughout the analysis in the form of text with an indication of frequency.

The data gained from the survey was exported to an SPSS compatible file, cleaned and analyzed using the software tool IBM SPSS Statistics 21. SPSS allows the researcher to tabulate variables against units, aggregate data and explore and describe the data. This includes measures of univariate and multivariate analysis. The findings are reported in the form of tables and figures in this research as well as in the text.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

Research and researcher ethics is of great importance to any research conducted. Only by these standards can research constitute its position in society and serve a higher need. In Sweden one can find comprehensive information about research ethics in the publication "Good Research Practice" by the Swedish Research Council (VR 2011), in the UK from the British Sociological Association (2002) and the Social Research Association (2003). Generally they all have in common that protecting personal data (anonymity and confidentially) as well as obtaining informed consent are crucial for any research in the social science in order to do no harm to the participants.

3.5.1. Online Survey

However, the way these issues are treated varies for online surveys (Eynon 2008): In online surveys it is easy to collect behavioral data, such as clicks per minute and time taken to complete the survey as easy as it is to collect IP addresses without the participant's knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to either gain informed consent for this unconscious data collection or not collect it at all, as it was done in the survey for this research, in the case of the IP address also in order to guarantee anonymity. Furthermore, the participants were informed of the aim of the study, how the findings would be used and it was clear to the participants that they could interrupt and clear the questionnaire at any time by pressing a button. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that the participants all have university degrees, working in a business that often works with questionnaires and therefore in all probability have a good awareness of the risks and advantages involved in participating in a survey.

The protection of personal data raises the issues of privacy and the way in which data is stored. Regarding the collection of the data it was the aim of the researcher to respect the people's privacy and to write them only one mail, asking them to complete the survey. This was followed by one reminder 5 days after the first contact, regardless of whether they completed the survey or not, as this could not be checked. With regard to data storage of personal data, the privacy policy of the hosting company of the survey was checked against eight criteria suggested by Charlesworth (2008)³ and derived from the UK data policies in order to guarantee confidentiality. The policy of the hosting company and data will not be stored after deletion of the survey. After completion of the survey the data was stored on the personal laptop of the researcher in a password protected file.

3.5.2. Qualitative Interviews

Regarding anonymity the researcher assured the deletion of names in the interviewing documents. Also, all information was deleted from any documents that could be related

³ The criteria require ,,[...] that data must be: fairly and lawfully processed, processed for limited purposes, adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and up to date, not kept longer than necessary, processed in accordance with the individual's rights, kept securely, not transferred to countries outside the European Economic Area unless the country in question has adequate protection for individual privacy." (Charlesworth 2008: 4)

to the interviewee. In this thesis the organization is referred to rather than the interviewee. For confidentially reasons documents are stored in a safe place on the private laptop of the researcher.

As was also the case for the survey, the interviewee was informed about the aim of the study and that he could withdraw from the situation at any given moment during the interview. Also the interviewee was asked whether it was acceptable for the researcher to record the interview. All participants agreed. Furthermore the researcher introduced himself and explained how this research would be used and that it was part of an academic assignment. The researcher felt that he owed the interviewees the promise that the research would at least be distributed among the participants as a thank you for the time they spent talking about this topic.

3.6 Quality Considerations

Three types of validity can be differentiated (Yin 2003) and will be evaluated here with regard to the study. In general, validity is about the integrity of the conclusions that are derived from research. Firstly, construct validity refers to whether one really measures the concept one was intending to measure. Triangulation is an important strategy to avoid this trap and was used mainly in this study. Secondly, internal validity relates to whether the assumption that A leads to B holds true. In this research we have tried to gain internal validity through the strategy of explanation building that is the verbal development and description of the causalities based on propositions of theory. Thirdly external validity asks whether the research is generalizable beyond the specific research. As Yin (2003) mentioned it is the nature of a case study to be specific to a case and thus results are naturally generalizable only to theory and not to other cases. However, the contribution made to theory through a case study "[...] will help to identify the other cases to which the results are generalizable." (Yin 2003: 60). Thus, if the theory is tested in circumstances where the research is replicable according to its hypothesis and holds true, also the findings of the first case are generalizable to this case.

Lastly, reliability is about how the results of a case study can be repeated by other researchers and therefore concerns transparency and documentation of processes and results. The researcher of this study tries to make all steps of this research as transparent as possible and provides all necessary information to replicate this case. To do this, all

the data gained was collected and conceptualized and as much information as possible about the process is provided in this study (e.g. a coding scheme). This builds on a comprehensive documentation of all information gained.

4. Context for Cooperation in Vietnam

In this chapter the contextual factors for cooperation in Vietnam are analyzed. The researcher particularly emphasizes two of the context variables. Firstly the 'rules-in-use', which in this case mainly concerns the framework for cooperation internationally as well as in Vietnam. And the attributes of the community, or more specifically the socio-economical and cultural background to Vietnam.

4.1 The community: Political, Social and Economical Development in Vietnam In the centuries before its independence from France in 1945, Vietnam had strong ties to Japan as well as to China, sometimes violent and sometimes peaceful. After 1945, Ho Chi Minh gained power and Vietnam was declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The First Indochina War between France and Vietnam begun and lasted until 1954 with heavy involvement of different interest groups within Vietnam. Left a divided country after the Geneva Conference, Vietnam was not far away the clash between the communist North and the US supported South in the Second Indochina War from 1955 until 1975. This war led to about 1,000,000 deaths on the Vietnamese side in the years 1965 to 1975 and many others were left altered by the use of Agent Orange and other chemical weapons (Hirschman et al. 1995). There followed a long era of socialist governance with strong ties to the Soviet Union and a difficult relationship with China. This time was also interrupted by two wars, one with China in 1979 and one with Cambodia in the late 1970s. After several wars in the 20th century, Vietnam started liberalizing its economy away from planned economy, a process known as Doi Moi, in the late 1980s. It also opened up its economy to other countries, including the US.

However, there has been little progress made with regard to political liberalization and freedom. In its political rights index, Freedom House (2013) rates countries on a scale from 1 for "free" up to 7 for "not free". For 2012, Vietnam was awarded a 7 for

political rights and a 5 for Civil Liberties. In the World Bank (2013) "CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating", an index on transparency, accountability and vested interests in the public administration, Vietnam is ranked with a 3, where 1 is low and a 6 would mean high corruption. This of course has implications for working within the country, with the Civil Society and with state actors, as will be analyzed further down.

Acuna-Alfaro (2011) for instance reports that in a study among civil servants in Vietnam (n=14,108) 70% report that their salary is not sufficient to live on and that thus 31% use their positions to receive extra money and 35% would do work not related to their position to earn extra money. Additionally, training of civil servants is reported as being "largely ineffective". The same report also states that the promotion system is regulated through bribery, meaning that jobs have to be bought in order to be promoted. According to them, this is also a reason why personnel in decision-making positions is often unqualified and others that are qualified are leaving public services. (Poon et al. 2009)

According to the WB (2013) population growth in Vietnam remains at around 1% over the last years and the population totalled 88 million in 2012, compared to 55 million in 1982. Of this population 70% are of working age, of which only 2% are officially unemployed. Secondary school enrollment rates are at 77%, compared to 57% in 1998. In the same period tertiary enrollment rates grew from 10% to 25%. Regarding the economic development, GDP has grown around 5% on average over the last 20 years, increasing from around 150 Dollars in 1990 to over 1,400 in 2011 (compare Figure 4 further down in the text). This significant increase has had a significant impact on the environment. For instance, BOD pollution, an indicator for organic pollution of water surfaces, doubled between 1998 and 2008. CO_2 emissions in metric tons per capita tripled in the same period.

4.2 Rules-in-use: International and National Framework for Cooperation

One of the main international treaties that concerns coordination of donors is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In order to make aid more effective it outlines five core principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability. Accompanied by measurable indicators and periodically audited, the Agenda aimed to be one of the most sophisticated norms for action in the development sector so far. With regard to the principle of harmonization, donors agreed upon: more common arrangements at country level for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting; more joint missions to avoid duplication; more division of labor between donors, simultaneously more leadership in core areas; better organizational internal procedures and incentives for staff in order to harmonize (OECD: 2013b).

The Hanoi Core Statement (CG 2005), a four page document, was developed by donors and the Vietnamese government in order to "[...] localise the conclusions of the High Level Forum on Aid effectiveness held in Paris in March 2005 ("The Paris Declaration") to reflect circumstances in Vietnam.". It develops in all five dimensions of the Paris Declaration measurable indicators that are specific to Vietnam. So far, progress in the area of harmonization has been made, however the goals have not been achieved. For instance, in 2010 62% of all aid was programme based, 54% country analytical work was joint and only 17% of all donor missions were coordinated (OECD 2013b). Even though this represents significant progress, it still falls short of the aims that were agreed on in the Hanoi Core Statement.

Two broader approaches to harmonization of activities have been established. In order to accompany the implementation of the Hanoi Core Statement the Aid Effectiveness Forum (AEF) was established in 2010. In this forum the government and donors mutually discuss the implementation of activities to make aid more effective (AEF 2010). A second is the Consultative Group (CG) meetings and the corresponding thematic Development Partnership Groups. The CG meetings used to be held twice a year but are now being held annually. They are attended by high-ranking representatives of almost all bi- and multilateral donors, representatives of INGOs and representatives from the Vietnamese government at a ministry level. The sub groups vary regarding their formality and the persons involved. They can be highly formal with representatives from all parties, including the government as well as highly informal with only donors present (Bartholomew & Lister 2005). CG meetings have an impact of the work of donors, that is that they help to facilitate information sharing (Interviewee 8).

As Interviewee 5 mentions, "Vietnam has been very effective in promoting Aid Effectiveness all the years, including last year's High Level conference in Busan, which was thoroughly discussed and followed up by the Aid Effectiveness Forum in Vietnam". In contrast, other interviewees point out that the rules of Aid Effectiveness are not mandatory and as a result, organizations would not follow these rules (Interviewee 3, Interviewee 4, and Interviewee 1). This would also have very specific reasons, such as the fact that organizing joint missions "and to come to a common agreement is an enormous headache" (Interviewee 1) and in the end it would all rely on the individuals and their willingness to cooperate (Interviewee 4).

It is not the aim of this study to evaluate the Paris Agenda. But the before mentioned numbers show that cooperation, which is necessary to achieve any of the abovementioned aspects, has still not progressed as far as it should be according to the targeted objectives of donors. Although strong rules and platforms are in place (CG meetings, AE Forum, Hanoi Core Statement) and significant efforts are being made in order to harmonize, these efforts apparently rely on the initiative of individuals. So what stimulates cooperation at the individual level?

4.2.1. Rules-in-use for Non Governmental Organizations

NGOs really started to be active in Vietnam only in the late 1980s because of the US embargo which was followed by all donors except Sweden (NRC 2010). No official figures exist about the total number of NGOs in Vietnam today. The VUFO-NGO Resource Center (2013), an association of the largest NGOs in Vietnam, publishes the INGO Directory online which currently lists 132 NGOs as members. However, this list is probably biased as not all NGOs can pay membership fees or are willing to become a member of the center. In a publication from 2010 the Resource Center speaks of around 900 NGOs that currently have relations with Vietnam, around 600 of them are active. In total, around 273 million US Dollar were being disbursed by INGOs in Vietnam in 2009 (UN Women 2012).

The VUFO-NGO Resource Center (NRC) is a joint institution of INGOs and the government of Vietnam that was established in 1993. The name VUFO stands for Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations, which is a focal point established by the government to register and administer all NGOs. Though related very closely to the

government, the NRC perceives itself as the main bridge between INGOs and the rest of the development actors in Vietnam. Additionally they facilitate 18 intra-organizational thematic working groups and moderate different mailing lists for easy communication with on average 900 participants in the mailing lists. It has also been reported by one interviewee that the working groups are well respected expert groups and that their voice is heard at the government level. The Center also represents its members at several high level meetings, including the meetings of the CG and the Poverty Reduction Support Credit and in meetings with the government. These meetings are prepared in direct coordination among the members by the Center. Twice a year a meeting is being held that

"encourages information sharing between INGOs, coordination of their activities, lobbying for mutual issues, discussions on policy changes and preparation of joint statements on behalf of the INGO community for high-level forums and discussions with the government and donors." (NRC 2010).

Thus the Center is a main framework for coordination among INGOs in Vietnam and it can be summarized by stating that a substantial level of coordination already exists due to the work that has been done by the Center. That is a network that connects INGOs with each other to facilitate strategic discussions also with other actors and the government. This platform gives INGO the opportunity to "coordinate at the operational level through the working groups. Within these, they coordinate policy issues, changes in laws and decisions that concern their target groups. There is overall coordination on the main tasks on INGOs in Vietnam which has been over the last decades poverty reduction. Further, they coordinate on all sorts of very specific issues." (Interviewee 5)

4.2.2. Rules-in-use for Bi- and Multilateral Organizations

Regarding the bi- and multilateral donors, figures exist from the OECD (2013a). In total, 32 bilateral and 18 multilateral donors delivered aid to Vietnam in 2011. In total about 3.5 billion US Dollar of ODA was channeled to Vietnam in this year, of which about 1.4 billion came from bilateral sources and 1.1 billion from multilateral sources (WB 2013). 9 years earlier, in 2002, only 2 billion US Dollar of ODA found its way to Vietnam. This rising number is also reflected in ODA per capita. Even though population growth in Vietnam is steady, ODA per capita increased from 16.01 US Dollar in 2002 up to 40 US Dollar in 2011. Figure 4 displays this trend since 1960 in

relation to GDP per capita. These figures highlight the fact that ODA per capita is almost 14 times higher now than it used to be in the 1980s.




Figure 4: GDP and ODA per capita from 1960 until 2011 (in current US Dollars)

Source: WB (2013)

This is an important fact if one considers that all this money has to distributed through or in cooperation with Vietnamese institutions, be it ministries or local administrations. As mentioned previously, it is, however, not a secret that corruption, unqualified personnel and inefficiencies in the public sector are a wide spread evil. Combined with increasing ODA and a high number of actors in the sector it has significant effects on the context that governs cooperation among bi- and multilateral agencies in Vietnam. Additionally, the majority of interviewees pointed out that the government is "hardly fully aware of what the donors are doing with them or for them" which would be also due to "pressure on just a few people in Government that speak English" from many donors (Interviewee 1) as well as the many activities they would have to coordinate (Interviewee 6). This is also underlined by the afore mentioned lack of progress in the area of joint missions, which is putting a heavy burden on the government (OECD 2013b). However, donors wish that the "government should take a much stronger role to coordinate" (Interviewee 2, and clearly Interviewee 4, Interviewee 6). Even though the wish is strong in the development community, it is far from being reality for the mentioned reasons.

Aside from the abovementioned overall initiatives two more fragmented coordination mechanisms have been developed specifically for bi- and multilateral donors. One is

the Like Minded Donor Group (LMDG), which consists of 14 bilateral donors⁴ that are active in Vietnam. The group aims at more coordination through communication and a better implementation of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (Embassy of Finland 2013). However, their mutual activities are only geared towards developing a first understanding of common action areas (WB 2013). Another is a cooperation between the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, JICA (Japan), Korea Eximbank, AFD (France) and KfW (Germany), in the so called 6-Bank Group. Their intention is to harmonize their policies in order to have greater impact.

At least for bi- and multilateral donors possibilities for exchange and coordination in several institutionalized platforms exist.

5. Incentives for Cooperation

In the survey conducted in Vietnam among decision makers in Vietnam about cooperation, the question was asked how intense the participants would rate their cooperation with their last partner they were cooperating with. The participants could report on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was low intensity and 5 was high intensity. The answer were then grouped into three groups, 1 and 2 into a group 'Low intensity', 3 into a group 'medium intensity' and 4 and 5 into 'high intensity'. The distribution is listed in Table 4.

	Absolute	Relative
low	1	7.7
medium	4	30.8
high	8	61.5

Table 4: Intensity of cooperation among respondents

The results show that cooperation of the surveyed persons with another organization was on average high. This is an interesting result and indicates strong relationships with other organizations among the surveyed. This finding is also well in line with the opinion of Interviewee 5 who states the cooperation in Vietnam is very intense, better than ever before in his entire career. So what are the reasons for that?

⁴ Member countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom (list from 2010).

This chapter analysis incentives on different levels as defined in the theoretical framework - intrinsic incentives as well as extrinsic incentives. Where adequate, the incentives will be cross tabulated with the intensity of cooperation, which is an indicator for how well an incentive for cooperation is working as it is assumed that a strong incentive leads to more cooperation.

5.1 Intrinsic Incentives

Intrinsic incentives are incentives that create rewards and punishments from within the actor. These incentives can create positive or negative situations for cooperation in that they push a person towards a certain action because it gives him or her good or bad feelings to act a certain way. The ones under investigation here and taken from the literature: culture, trust, and the 'big-five' of the personality. They will be discussed using the data gained through a survey and interviews and enriched by observations of the researcher.

As mentioned previously, interpersonal trust as a maxim is an important intrinsic incentive to cooperate. Trust gives an actor the ability to handle interpersonal uncertainty that goes along with cooperation (Fink & Kessler 2009). If decision makers in donor organization have higher trust, intense cooperation will therefore be easier to achieve. To measure trust in the survey, a short scale with three items was used that was developed and tested by Beierlein et al (2012) at the GESIS institute. The result is an index that runs from 1 to 5. In test surveys a value of 3.37 (Standard deviation of 0.77) has proven to be the average of society. Among the surveyed employees of donors in Vietnam the value was 3.89 on average with a standard deviation of 0.71. However, no significant relationship with the cooperation intensity was found that could suggest that trusting persons cooperate more intensely.

However, Interviewee 6 highlighted the role of trust: "Of course, actually in Vietnam you must create the trust when you are working together. From the beginning it can be difficult. But if you know each other very well I think it is easy". This might indicate that it is not the intrinsic trusting attitude of a person as such but rather a reciprocal relationship that motivates cooperation. The actors are rewarded for their trusting behavior with trust from their counterpart, which then leads to a reinforcing situation.

For other personality factors, the so called 'Big-Five' measurement scale with 10 items was used, that was developed and tested by Rammstedt et al. 2012 also at the GESIS institute. The big five describe five abstract characteristics of the personality and is widely used in psychology. The five include: extraversion, neuroticism, openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. Volk et al. (2011) found that agreeableness would lead to more coordination as it is a prosocial and communal behavior. There is no relationship with any of the mentioned character traits and the cooperation intensity. The individual means are listed in table 5 and compared to the test survey.

	Survey ir	n Vietnam	Test Survey		
	Mean	S tandard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
extraversion	3.46	1.07	3.47	0.95	
neuroticism	2.19	0.93	2.43	0.88	
openness	3.38	0.92	3.41	0.93	
conscientiousness	4.12	0.77	4.15	0.79	
agreeableness	4.12	0.87	3.45	0.80	

Table 5: Means and standard deviation of 'Big-Five' character traits

It is interesting that the value for agreeableness among the surveyed persons is the only one that is significantly higher than the one in the test survey. Considering the high cooperation intensity among the surveyed decision makers, this in an interesting relationship.

When asked in the survey whether personality would be a problem for communication, 9 people responded 'almost never' and 4 agreed. This indicates that it does not seem to be a problem for communication but it plays a role in general. This is underlined by the fact that most of the interviewees pointed out that the personality of their counterpart is a factor that would influence the cooperation relationship. For interviewee 6 it is a "contributing factor" where, if the other person would have an open and sharing attitude, it would be easier to communicate with each other and to scale up the cooperation. It can thus be perceived as only a little part of the puzzle that reinforces the relationship. Interviewee 3 agrees with that position but also adds the cultural factor, which would lead to problems in interacting.

Culture as an intrinsic incentive is hard to define. Culture as such does not lead one to a certain behavior. But there are certain aspects that are associated with culture that come

with the socialization process as Chen et al. (1998) highlights in a study about how individualism and collectivism as prevailing concepts in different cultures effect cooperation. Thus, culture in this thesis is used as a general term that has to be, if investigated in detail, carefully broken down in its elements. This being said, it is in the context of this exploratory approach a first step. In the survey respondents were asked in which country they grew up mainly. These countries were then grouped into an Asian and a European category, representing the different cultural backgrounds of a person. Within the Asian group 80% of respondents replied that their cooperation was intense, within the European group only 50% replied that their cooperation was intense.

As indicated further above it might not be only the intrinsic incentive but also a reinforcing situation that lead to better communication. The respondents were asked in the survey whether they had problems with communicating with their counterpart because of cultural differences. The results were coded with 'almost never' and 'more than random'. 11 people answered that they almost never had problems with cultural differences⁵. However, in the remaining two cases who reported that they had problems, cooperation intensity was low. These results indicate that culture usually doesn't play a role as whatsoever incentive. This is underlined that no interviewee but one said that it is of importance for good cooperation.

It can be summarized that culture itself is not a strong incentive as such. Rather personality and trust can be perceived as a contributing factor to better coordination, indicated by their high value compared to test surveys. Furthermore, there are no indications for purely intrinsic incentives for cooperation that come from trust or personality. Rather the relationship seems to be reinforcing: personality and trust do lead to better coordination if personality and trust reinforce the relationship positively.

5.2 Extrinsic Incentives for Cooperation

Extrinsic incentives are rewards and punishments external to the actor. Thus, a certain action is motivated due to external stimuli. The cooperation literature suggests a number of incentives that could be helpful to motivate cooperation.

⁵ Out of the four items asked about communication problems due to different factors, this is the item with which respondents agreed the least!

5.2.1. Incentives from the Interaction with Other Donors

Casey (2007) highlights that equal cooperation relationship are by far more successful than unequal ones. He defines equality as equity. The reason would be, among others, that unequal partnerships would produce mistrust which would lead to less cooperation. In the survey respondents were asked whether their partnership is equal. 10 responded with yes and 3 with no. Furthermore, a cross tabulation indicated that people who responded with yes also reported higher cooperation intensities. Interviewee 7 also highlighted that equality for her/him means that communication is an open process and that everything is theoretically possible. That would first of all mean that "Before entering the relationship we need to discuss very deeply our expectations and their expectations and this is an open process."

Another incentive suggested by Atouba & Shumate (2010: 296) is exchange ties of resources. They argue that donors "may minimize dependence asymmetries" by seeking resource exchange ties because reciprocal dependency would lead to higher trust and more cooperation. The researcher in this case argues that with more exchange ties, trust is enhanced, and the actor has the natural incentive to cooperate more closely as he or she has more to gain than to lose. In the survey in Vietnam the questions was as asked what kind of resources the actors would gain access to when cooperating with another donor. The results were: Money (3), knowledge (10), workforce (2), or Experience (9). An index was computed that indicated how many options were chosen by one respondent. One option was chosen four times, two options were chosen seven times and three options were chosen twice. This is assumed to reflect the total number of exchange ties by one person. This was cross tabulated with the cooperation intensity and showed no results. Therefore a high number of exchange ties do not necessarily have to be a incentives for the surveyed persons to cooperate more closely.

However, the high mentioning of knowledge and experience is noteworthy. Interviewee 3 states that knowledge is so important in this business that everyone needs it. To engage in an exchange with others would be mainly for this information. Interviewee 1 underlines that and emphasize that the big question would be "How free are you with sharing that information"? This suggests a situation where actors, for strategically reasons sometimes don't share information, especially among bi- and multilateral organizations. However, the interviewee points out that information sharing can be a first step towards more cooperation. Are there any incentives from within an organization that can stimulate information sharing?

5.2.2. Incentives from within the Organization

In this regard guidelines for cooperation can be an incentive for decision makers in organizations to cooperate more intensely. 10 persons report to have such a guideline. Interviewee 7 pointed out that it would be of importance to have such a guideline as it would standardize and ease procedures. If these procedures would additionally be mutual, organizations would be able to cooperate according to shared rules and no organization could withdraw from set up rules. Interviewee 8 has the opinion that rules are necessary to define expectations. If everyone would act according to known rules, defection would not as easily be possible. Thus, this would be a positive incentive for cooperation. Also, in the survey the people were asked if they ever had problems in communicating with their counterpart due to different internal procedures. 7 decision makers answered yes and 6 no. Out of the four items asked to communication problems this one was agreed upon the most. Guidelines are thus not only helpful, but common guidelines would ease communication and thus cooperation.

However, this would need a strong support for cooperation within the organization as this is where guidelines are developed. In the survey participants were asked whether they ever had to report about their cooperation activities to someone else. In donor organizations reporting is a tool to monitor a certain process from the headquarters or somewhere remotely. Only 8 answered yes, indicating that cooperation as mechanism is not yet as important as other issues decision makers have to report about and that it is not yet build within standard operation procedures within the organization. The reality is that in most procurement documents donors have to describe the context of their project, including activities of others and how the own project can contribute as well as where are likely areas for cooperation. As long as reporting mechanism regarding cooperation opportunities, linked to proposed activities, are not strongly demanded from decision makers, cooperation is not taken seriously. Interviewee 1 reports that donors "have been copying each other's description of the context" instead of developing own opportunities for cooperation. The support of a superior is also perceived to be an incentive to cooperate. If an actor has pressure, or at least the support, of his senior manager he or she will weigh the advantage of cooperation higher than the costs. 10 people answered that their superior gives them full support. However, as Interviewee 4 points out, different approaches to integrating the success of cooperation into performance reviews of employees exist. Thus, support might exist; strong financial rewards however are not always in place.

5.2.3. Incentives with regard to Resources

Highlighted by all interviewed persons were the timely and financial restrictions one would face with regards to making successful cooperation possible. Coyle and Lawson (2006) point out that the pressure to disburse money would lead to a devaluation of the role of cooperation. Interviewee 1 explains the link as follows: "if you would follow donor coordination to the root then as a donor agency, at one point, you could say, well, I have made my survey of what my fellow organizations are doing, and I have got to take the conclusion that there is no place for me.". Even if this comment is not interpreted in its full extent, donor coordination as such also means sometimes not to engage in certain activities as they wouldn't bring an advantage to the country one is working in. According to Interviewee 4 this is due to will to survive in this competing system with scarce resources. As no one would willingly risk their jobs with refusing a job or not proposing yet another project, there is no incentive for actual coordination.

When asked in the survey whether the amount of work required of them is a lot, 9 people strongly agreed, one person was neutral and 3 persons didn't agree. No relationship was found with cooperation intensity. However, Interviewee 7 mentions that "we also feel that sometime it is quite a challenge. For instance a big proposal is coming and then the timeline is very sharp. And we try to contact some NGOs whether they can be in the cooperation but there is just not enough time." But also the mentioned initiatives like the LMDG meetings and CG meetings take time. In this regard, Interviewee 4 mentions that "people are overwhelmed by their own individual tasks. So they may not want to make extra effort to attend in the donor cooperation, because it takes time.". It is thus obvious that actors have only limited time available and that no incentives exist to spend time with coordination. This finding is closely linked with other findings from above and will be discusses in the next chapter.

6. Discussion

Indications were found that personality and trust are intrinsic incentives for cooperation, based on the statements in interviewees and the on average high value of agreeableness and trust among respondents compared to test surveys. It might be that people working in development aid are in general more trustful and agreeable because of what their job demands from them. Thus, those factors would not be the sole incentives for cooperation as everyone would have these characteristics. However, it also could be that respondents in this survey had on average high values, meaning that the high value of cooperation intensity could indeed be incent by trust and personality. In this case it is trust that helps actors to handle interpersonal uncertainty that goes along with cooperation, and agreeableness that is an incentive because of the prosocial and communal behavior it motivates. It might be worthwhile to check that finding against further research.

As was pointed out, equal partnerships lead to less mistrust. There was an indication that this holds true in the case of Vietnam. Equality then means that communication between partners first of all gives both partners the same opportunity to mention their expectations regarding the cooperation and therefore reduce mistrust.

Exchange ties seemed not to play a role as an incentive. However, it was also indicated that the opportunity for information sharing seems to be an incentive that can lead to more cooperation. NGOs that were interviewed were quite convinced that information sharing is working in Vietnam and the researcher points in this case to the positively perceived role of the NGO Resource Center, whose role is to facilitate information exchange and which is unique in the world. From activities of the Center more sophisticated cooperation relationships have evolved (Interviewee 5). However, there seems to be room for improvement with regard to information sharing among bi- and multilateral organizations, even though the rules-in-use (Paris Agenda and local groups) encourage it. These rules are quiet strong in Vietnam. In this context it was pointed out that organizations are sometimes, for strategic reasons, not so free to exchange information and this could only be altered by altering incentives from within organizations. However, information exchange can have a initial role for cooperation.

Such an incentive under investigation were guidelines. The analysis suggest that guidelines are of importance as they would ease communication between cooperation partners and thus would be an incentive for actors to cooperate. In most cases they are in place. Common guidelines that elaborate the Paris Agenda or even specify local cooperation mechanisms could help to structure the action situation in a new and positive way regarding the cooperation intensity. However, guidelines are developed within organizations and strong support for cooperation in general is naturally a prerequisite for developing such guidelines. As long as this support is not given cooperation is only progressing slowly. Missing support was indicated by the missing reporting structures within organizations. It can be argued that, as long as strong reporting structures are not in place, cooperation is not taken seriously as the wrong signals are sent by the organization system. It might help a little that support from superiors is given, as was indicated by respondents in the survey. But support does not necessarily have to be an incentive. It can just as easily be ignored by a rational actor. Thus, guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation, are incentives that have to be further investigated, as supported by statements of interviewees.

Time restrictions were emphasized by most interviewees and the survey as a constraint to cooperation. This argument goes hand in hand with missing guidelines and reporting mechanisms for cooperation. As long as these mechanisms are not in place, no time spots will be allocated by a rational actor. It is thus no surprise that opportunities for information sharing are used frequently and that institutions like the NGO Resource Center are positively evaluated because information sharing as such is not a time consuming activity. Another aspect is the pressure to disburse money, also related to other incentives that were under investigation. Wherever disbursement considerations override coordination decisions, it is a structural incentive within the organization that leads to this. The structures can be found, as pointed out by interviewees, in the will of the organization to survive. Less projects mean less funds in the next year, less impact and finally less jobs, which could also affect the ones who make the decisions whether to cooperate or not, the decision makers an actors in question here. However, as it is the case with lack of time, guidelines and reporting mechanisms can help to solve this situation as well.

Thus, it might be time to refer the discussion to the next level, where collective choices are made that directly influence the level that was analyzed. This would have the advantage to discuss about the structure and incentives within the action arena that defines the discussed incentives. Here such issues like the drafting of guidelines could be discussed and incentives within the organizations play a role. One could even go one step further on the constitutional level where the rules of the game are made. Why is there so much pressure to disburse money? Is it because development organizations are just another tool for foreign policy and thus never will be really cooperating?

To remain on this level of analysis the following hypothesis should be considered in further research:

H1: Trust and personality do play a role in motivating cooperation among donors. Thus, intrinsic incentives are important factors for cooperation.

H2: An open process before the beginning of a cooperation relationship to which both partners can equally contribute in order to define expectation is a positive incentive for cooperation.

H3: Opportunities for knowledge exchange can be a positive incentive for further cooperation.

H4: Guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation motivate actors to cooperate more.

7. Limitations

Limitations arise due to the (very) unexpected low response rate in the survey for which reasons are unknown, although poor accessibility may have been a contributing factor. Though, low n does not pose a problem to this research as a qualitative framework is used. However, the low n of all participants combined (survey and interviews) is a serious challenge when interpreting the data as structurally more similar respondents and a better distribution of answers would have allowed for better condensing patterns in the data. In general it can be said that deducing patterns from the given data is hard. However, considering that the exploratory attempt in this study it is a first and sufficient step.

Furthermore, due to the professionalism and position of the interviewees it was hard to get thorough and clear answer to the questions that were asked. Interviewees, that was the impression of the researcher, didn't clearly state their problems with cooperation. In most cases it seemed to be hard to question already given structures and thus get good insights into cooperation structures and their underlying reasons. Due to the very tight budget and time restrictions of the researcher it was not possible to investigate the topic more in detail, meaning to get more interviews and triangulate data even more. However, the topic is of importance to donors and it is the strong opinion of the researcher that a first investigation into cooperation in Vietnam was necessary and that the gained data is relevant.

Another limitation arises formally through the fact that cooperation as such is not defined and was defined by respondents in different ways. Every research that makes use of an indicator such as the intensity of cooperation will face this problem, if not standardized measures are developed. However, this is a problem of ontology in general. Or in other more broadly: whether the concept under investigation really exists and is also perceived the same way as the researcher did.

8. Conclusion

Using the IAD framework by Elinor Ostrom a case study in Vietnam was conducted to explore incentives for cooperation among donors. As a result four hypotheses were developed from the findings that need further investigation: trust and personality, an open and equal communication process to define expatiations before starting cooperation relationships, creating opportunities for knowledge exchange and guidelines and reporting mechanisms that support cooperation. Theory was applied that so far was only used in cooperation literature outside of development cooperation. Further, incentives within the actor (intrinsic incentives) could be identified, which is a new approach to cooperation in development aid. Furthermore, the special situation of Vietnam was analyzed. The thesis concludes with an encouraging message to those who want to investigate the developed hypothesis more in detail.

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Appendix

Annex 1: Definition of cooperation

In the survey two item batteries were used to develop an understanding of a definition of cooperation. One battery asked the respondents to rank five statements about cooperation according to their intensity. The findings are listed in this table:

	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	Rank 5
informal and sporadic communication	7	0	0	3	3
Signing a cooperation agreement	3	4	3	1	2
Observing the work of other donors and adjusting own project	0	3	1	4	5
Having regular meetings and exchaning experience	2	4	4	3	0
Jointly collecting data	1	2	5	2	3

The second question related to 20 statements about cooperation. The respondents were asked to tick the statements that applied. Thus, several of these statements could be included in a definition. They are listed in the following table:

shared goals	8
common purpose	
mutual respect	11
willingness to negotiate	7
informed participation	9
information giving	8
shared descision making	6
sharing power	1
long term	5
close	1
voluntary	5
pooled ressources	5
access to knowledge	10
reduce uncertainty	2
division of labor	4
more communication	7
encouraging each other	4
key for survival	1
cost minimization	6
legally binding	3

One option is to now include the five items that were mentioned the most in a definition. Therefore, cooperation could be defined as: having a common purpose and shared goals, that is build on mutual respect and works with informed participation, information giving and provides access to knowledge.

Cooperation seems to be rather informal than formal and knowledge exchange is important. However, the most important finding from this experiment is that a mutual definition of cooperation does not exist.

Annex 2: Coding Scheme

- Forms of Cooperation: organizations and intensity
 - o Formal
 - Informal
 - o Organizations and intensity of cooperation with them
 - Preferred form of cooperation
- Could you describe how cooperation depends on the environment it is set in? Does cooperation looks similar in every country?
 - Projects
 - Vietnamese context
 - Other donors?
- Framework and attitude in the Organization regarding cooperation
 - Do they exist?
 - Are they clear?
 - Ideas for improvement What would you say is a good framework
 - Is there a higher ideal which supports cooperation
 - \circ $\;$ Is there a method to assess the need for cooperation
 - Who supports cooperation, who is opposed to it?
- Resources in the Organization regarding cooperation
 - Are enough resources allocated for cooperation (time, money, knowledge)
 - \circ Not enough information available about actors, programs
- Self conception
 - Independence and room to maneuver
 - Organizations lose their competitive advantages if they cooperate
 - Instinct of self preservation of organization
 - Personality and characteristics of the decision maker
 - Is it important?
 - Age, cultural background, ego, introverted/extroverted
 - Fear to lose own competitive advantage on the personal level
- Importance of the project/programme/organization for cooperation
 - Complexity sectors the project is related to
 - Differences between NGOs and International Organizations
 - Reasons for differences
 - Characteristics and evaluation of the relationship
 - \circ Communication and problems associated with communication
- How could cooperation be improved?

Annex 3: Print Version of the questionnaire (online version slightly different)

[]Cooperation can vary along various dimensions. One is the intensity of cooperation. Please rank the following five items, starting with the most intense cooperation. *				
Please number each box in order of preference from 1 to 5				
Informal and sporadic communication with other organizations (by mail, phone)				
Signing a cooperation agreement with another organization				
Observing the work of other donors and adjusting own projects according to it				
Having regular meetings and exchanging experiences				
Jointly collecting data about a certain topic				

Cooperation Description

[]

The following questions are about the how and why of your cooperation activity with an other international donor organization. Please describe a cooperation in which you personally took part and that was/is specific, meaning restricted thematically and timely (e.g. to a programme that run for 5 years).

Please choose your LAST cooperation with an international donor, even if it is still ongoing. If you have several cooperation activities at the moment, choose the partner organization with which you started the cooperation first. Please use your own definition of cooperation to choose the organization.

Now, what is your experience with cooperation?

[]Please enter the name of the organization

Please write your answer here:

This answer is not mandatory

[]Cooperation can vary according to its intensity. On a scale ranging from 1 to 5 where 1 is low intensity and 5 is high intensity, how intense is/was the cooperation? *

Please choose **only one** of the following:

 O_1

Ο2

Оз

Ο4

Ο5

1 is low intensity and 5 is high intensity

[]Does the donor organization you are cooperating with receive its funds from the same donor (e.g. the same government or the same international support structure)? *

Please choose only one of the following:

O Yes

O No

Please describe the quality of the cooperation with a scale ranging from 1 to 5 here 1 is low quality and 5 is high quality *
ase choose only one of the following:
1
2
3
4
5
In what sector is the cooperation mainly taking place? *
Health
Environment
Infrastructure
Gender
Education
Economic development
Governance
Social Development
Other:
Interactions are not always equal. In this cooperation, which organisation has ore influence on the interaction? *
ase choose only one of the following:

- O My organization
- O The partner
- O We are ansolutely equal partners

[]How much do you agree with the follwing statements? *

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	Disagree strongly	Disagree a little	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree a little	Agree strongly	
Both partners gain equally in this cooperation relationship	0	0	0	0	0	
With the cooperation relationship, I aim to realize noticeable success as fast as possible	0	0	0	0	0	
Trust is very important in this cooperation relationship	0	0	0	0	0	
Before entering into a cooperation relationship with this organisation, I knew already about their reputation when it comes to cooperation	0	0	0	0	0	
It is of great importance that our relationship is based on legally binding contracts	0	0	0	0	0	

[]On average, how many times do you communicate with the organization you cooperate with? *

Please choose only one of the following:

- O Every day
- O Every second day
- Once a week
- Once a month
- O Less than once a month

[]How many times did you have problems with the following aspects during an interaction with your partner organization? * Please choose the appropriate response for each item: More then once or Once or twice but not Never twice regularly Regularly Always Communication problems due to Ο Ο Ο \bigcirc Ο cultural differences Communication problems due to \cap \cap \cap \cap language skills Communication problems due to \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 Ο Ο personal attributes Problems due to different internal \bigcirc \bigcirc 0 \bigcirc Ο procedures and routines

[]Compared to your organization, how can you describe the objectives (of their projects) of the organization you are cooperating with? *

Please choose only one of the following:

- O Rather identical objectives
- O Rather different objectives
- O no answer

[]How would you describe your personal relationship with your counterpart at the other organization? *

Please choose **only one** of the following:

- O Close friendship
- Sometimes we meet after work but I wouldn't call it friendship
- Our interaction is limited to work but he/she is very likeable
- Our interaction is strictly limited to work

If there is more than one person chose the person you are working with the most.

[]Cooperation can give you access to resources. What kind of resources did your organization gain through that cooperation? *
Please choose all that apply:
Money
Thematic knowledge
Workforce
□ None
Other:

Organization

[]The following o	questions are about the organization you are working for. st
[]What kind of o	rganization are you currently working for? *
Please choose only one	of the following:
O International Non	Governmental Organization (NGO)
O UN Organization	
O International Bank	(WB, ADB)
O Bilateral Organiza	tion
[]How many emp	ployees does your organization have? *
Please write your answe	here:
Please roughly estimate	the number of employees in your organization.
Please choose all that ap	is your organization active? *
Health	
 Environment Infrastructure 	
Gender	
Education	
Economic develop	oment
Governance	
Social developme	nt
Other:	
[]From which co	untry is your organization originally from? *
Please write your answe	here:
L	

	h other organizations? *
Please choose only on	e of the following:
O yes	
O no	
○ I can't remember	
[]Did you ever i other donors? *	receive training in your professional life on how to cooperate with
Please choose only on	e of the following:
O Yes	
O No	
	d include workshops, discussions or lessons about the importance of cooperation, harmonisation Agenda or policies that guide cooperation in your organization.
[]How would yo organization? *	ou assess the support for cooperation from co-workers in your
Please choose only on	e of the following:
O High support	
 High support Support 	
-	
O Support	

Please choose only one of the following:

O Yes

O No

[]Do you think you have enough room to maneuver decide when, where and how you can engage in co				eedom	to
Please choose only one of the following:					
O Yes					
O No					
[]Have you ever been asked to report your experien coordination/harmonisation of aid to someone with			anizati	ion? *	
Please choose only one of the following:					
Please choose only one of the following: Ves					
O Yes					
O Yes O No	-	-	a scal	le rang	ing
 Yes No [] Please indicate in how far you agree with this state 	-	-	a scal	le rang	ing
 Yes No [] Please indicate in how far you agree with this state from 1 to 5 where 1 is don't agree at all and 5 is full *	-	-	a scal	le rang	ing
 Yes No [] Please indicate in how far you agree with this state from 1 to 5 where 1 is don't agree at all and 5 is fully state from 1 to 5 where 1 is don't agree at all and 5 is fully state for the state of the sta	-	-		_	ing 5

Personal

[]Before we finish, please answer these questions about you. Let me remind you that this survey is completely anonymous. Thank you for your help!

[]For how many years have you been working in the field of development cooperation? $\ensuremath{^*}$

Please write your answer here:

[]The next questions are about your attitude towards other people. Please indicate to what extent you agree with each statement. *

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

	don't agree at all	agree a bit	agree somewhat	agree mostly	agree completely	no answer	
l am convinced that most people have good intentions.	0	0	0	0	0	0	
You can't rely on anyone these day	0	0	0	0	0	0	
In general, people can be trusted	0	0	0	0	0	0	

[]In which country were you born and raised (mainly)? *

Please write your answer here:

[]In which year were you born? *

Please write your answer here:

[]How well do the following statements describe your personality? *

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

			Neither agree			
	Disagree strongly	Disagree a little	nor disagree	Agree a little	Agree strongly	no answer
is reserved	0	0	0	0	0	0
is generally trusting	0	0	0	0	0	0
tends to be lazy	0	0	0	0	0	0
is relaxed, handles stress well	0	0	0	0	0	0
has few artistic interests	0	0	0	0	0	0
is outgoing, sociable	0	0	0	0	0	0
tends to find fault with others	0	0	0	0	0	0
does a thorough job	0	0	0	0	0	0
gets nervous easily	0	0	0	0	0	0
has an active imagination	0	0	0	0	0	0

[]

Which of the following best describes you? *

Please choose only one of the following:

- O Female
- O Male

[]What is the name of your organization?

Please write your answer here:

This question is not mandatory

[]People have differing opinions about how to define cooperation. Please choose the options you would like to include in a definition of cooperation *
Please choose all that apply:
shared goals
Common purpose
mutual respect
willingness to negotiate
informed participation
information giving
shared decision making
sharing power
long-term
voluntary
pooled ressources
access to knowledge
reduce uncertainty
division of labor
more communication
encouraging each other
key for survival of own organization
cost minimization
legally binding
Other:

Drawing and Results

[]Please let me know your mail address for the drawing as well as if you would like to receive the results. The following information will be stored separately to the rest of the answers in this survey. The addresses will be destroyed right after the drawing and right after the results have been send out.

[]Would you like to receive the results of the study?

Please write your answer here:

Field for your mail address

[]Would you like to participate in the drawing for one of ten vouchers for Joma Bakery?

Please write your answer here:

Field for your mail address