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The Arab Spring and its different outcomes

Explaining the variation in the state of democratisation

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Abstract

The theme of this study is the Arab Spring and democratisation. The Arab Spring affected every country in the region very differently. This study aims to explain the variation of the state of democratisation in the different countries, as well as identify the factor(s) behind this variation. Six countries are selected for the analysis; half of them experienced major changes, the other half just minor political changes. These are tested against the modernisation theory, while controlling for Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation. The chosen method is a comparative politics method, together with quantitative analysis. The result shows that, contrary to the modernisation theory and the hypothesis, economic and socioeconomic development does not explain the variation in the state of democratisation. Countries with minor political changes are, to some extent, also more developed. The result further suggests that other factors such as economic failure and monarchy's resilience could possibly explain the variation in the state of democratisation.

Key words: Arab Spring, Democratisation, Modernisation theory, Huntington, Quantitative

Words: 18 747

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List of abbreviations

AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IAF	Islamic Action Front (*Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
QOG	Quality of Government (*University of Gothenburg*)
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (*Software*)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WDI	World Development Indicators

1 Introduction

On 17 December 2010, the street vendor Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia. This was done in an act of desperation and as a protest against the local police and municipal officials that had confiscated his wares and mistreated him.

This became the catalyst - and marked the beginning - of the Arab Spring. It began with protests in Tunisia, but it soon spread across the whole Arab world[1], leaving virtually no country in the region unaffected. It caused a major turmoil and change, but to a very different degree depending on the country. In some countries there were major protests and unrest, sometimes leading to the government being overthrown, for instance as in Tunisia and Egypt, while the protests escalated to civil war in other countries like Libya and Syria. There were, however, several countries where the political unrest did not lead to any major changes, where the Arab Spring left the authoritarian regimes moderately unaffected. This illustrates a puzzling and interesting variation among countries in the region – countries that are in many ways similar - but where the Arab Spring had a very different degree of effect. How could this be explained, and which factors caused this variation of the state of democratisation? The Arab Spring is a contemporary phenomenon and there is still much uncertainty concerning which way the Arab countries will go and if the recent development will lead to a full democratisation. However, this study will take a closer look at the initial phase of the Arab Spring, and try to explain the variation in the state of democratisation.

[1] When referring to the region where the Arab Spring occurred it is easy to get caught up in a debate over geographical definitions. Some would refer to the region as the *Middle East*, which is a very broad term, including countries from Morocco to Afghanistan, and even Turkey and Cyprus (CEE 2013a). Others would name the region *MENA*, for *Middle East and North Africa*, which is almost as broad. This study has instead chosen to use the term *Arab world*, or *Arab states*, which is used by both the World Bank and UNESCO. See http://data.worldbank.org/region/ARB http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/worldwide/arab-states/

2 The research problem

The Arab Spring is a remarkable case of how civil protests and demands for political reforms could spread from one country to a whole region of countries in a matter of weeks. The Arab Spring as a phenomenon is highly relevant and topical as a case of democratisation within the field of Political Science. It offers a wide range of different cases or countries where to study this democratic transition. Considering that virtually all countries in the region were classified as authoritarian prior to the Arab Spring, there is a clear focus on the change or transition towards democracy. There is, however, another side to it, this is not a past phenomenon. The Arab Spring is quite present and ongoing. The political changes and reforms are continuously being implemented and it is too early to see where this will lead. This does make it more complex to analyse as it is a moving and changing study-object. On the other hand it offers an opportunity to study a recent phenomenon, where there is still much research do be done.

The Arab Spring is here studied as a case of democratisation or democratic transition. More precisely this study will focus on the political state of democratisation in the countries in the region. While most countries in the region were affected by the Arab Spring, the state of their democratisation varies a lot. This will be analysed with the help of modernisation theory, while controlling for Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation. The preliminary hypothesis is that modernisation, in terms of economic and socioeconomic development, helps to explain the variation in the state of democratisation.

The research-question would be formulated as follows:

- *How can the recent political state of democratisation, in the wake of the Arab Spring, be explained?*

Sub-question:

- *Which factor(s) could help to explain the variation of democratisation in the region?*

While some countries have experienced a major political change after the Arab Spring, other countries only have a low degree of change, thus the state of democratisation varies a lot between the countries in the region. The aim of this study is to explain this variation. The dependent variable is therefore measuring the state of democratisation, after the initial part of the Arab Spring, separating between major and minor political change. In relation to the sub-question, this study aims to identify the factor(s) behind the variation of democratisation during the Arab Spring.

2.1 Delimitation: Democratisation and democracy

The main theme of this study is democratisation and thus, by extension, democracy. This section will discuss and define these two concepts, which will guide the delimitation of the study. However, this will only offer a brief introduction, and by no means a complete overview of the different democratisation and democracy theories.

The definition of democratisation is described as how one form of exercise of power is replaced by another. The previous form is regarded as non-democratic and is replaced by a more democratic one, and democratisation as a concept catches and refers to this transition. Democratisation could be described both as a change with a direction, or as a process structured into phases (Denk & Silander 2007:10-12). Democratisation as a direction refers both to a complete, as well as to an incomplete, transition from a non-democratic state to a democracy (Denk & Silander 2007:17f). In the case of the Arab Spring the outcome of the democratisation is still unknown and volatile. Hence this study will focus on the change or movement towards democracy, rather than only focus on a complete transition. Democratisation could also be described as a process consisting of four phases, offering a broader analysis than merely the direction or change from non-democratic towards democracy. Dankwart Rustow was the first one to introduce this idea, he named the four phases: background condition, preparatory phase, decision phase, and habituation phase (Rustow 1970; 1999:25-35; Sørensen 1998:40-46). However several other scholars have since followed and formulated their own models of these phases. A summary of these models could be found in Denk and Silander's book (2007:26-34) (my translations, Rustow's model in brackets):

- *Entity phase* (Background condition) – The society is established and stabilised as a political entity.
- *Dissolution phase* (Preparatory phase) – The non-democratic way to govern the society is dissolved.
- *Transition phase* (Decision phase) – Efforts to establish a democratic way to govern the society commence.
- *Consolidation phase* (Habituation phase) – The democratic way to govern the society stabilises.

Considering this model, and applying it to the case of the Arab Spring, there is a strong variation among the different affected countries. Which phase are the Arab countries in? Some states have experienced just a minor step towards democratisation, putting them somewhere between the *entity* (background condition) and *dissolution* (preparatory) phase. Other countries with major changes are more in the *transition* (decision) phase. The two folded answer to this question is precisely what constitutes the puzzle, or the research problem, for this study. It is also important to note that the full transition towards consolidated democracy may take a long time, sometimes several decades (Sørensen 1998:41).

There is a myriad of definitions of democracy. Ranging from the most basic Greek origin, with *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule), "*rule by the people*" (Sørensen 1998:3), to one of the most prominent and well-cited definitions made by Robert A. Dahl (Denk & Silander 2007:18f). According to Dahl, the democratic system is made up of these eight institutions (Dahl 1989:220-222):

1. Elected officials.
2. Free and fair elections.
3. Inclusive suffrage.
4. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
5. Right to run for office.
6. Freedom of expression.
7. Alternative information.
8. Associational autonomy.

In a non-democratic society these institutions are not present according to this theory. Furthermore Dahl concluded that there is no state in the world where these eight conditions are fully satisfied (Sørensen 1998:12). Yet, this merely offers an illustrative description of democracy. This study will, however, rather than stipulate a theoretical framework of democracy on its own, rely on already established operationalized definitions. For instance Freedom House's comparative index of democracy in the world, offers a definition of democracy in line with Dahl's own. It is also one of the few democracy indexes that are annually updated, which offers a more updated comparison of level of democracy (Denk & Silander 2007:89-105; Sørensen 1998:16-20; Freedom House). This index will enable a comparison of the different countries in the Arab world.

3 Theory

The overall theme for the selected theories in this study is "democratisation". Democratisation, as well as democracy theory, are perhaps the most central areas within political science, with a wide range of theories to choose from. Hence a theoretical delimitation is needed in order to tighten the theoretical discussion and focus. As previously mentioned, democratisation is a process that occurs in different phases (see previous section 2.1). This study does not intend to cover the complete transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. Instead, focus lies on the initial phases of the democratisation. In other words, the start or the triggering factor in an authoritarian state that eventually, and assumedly, lead to democratisation. More precisely, the scope of this study is delimited to the *Dissolution phase* (Preparatory phase) and the *Transition phase* (Decision phase). However, in this phases it is impossible to predict exactly in what way the political situation will develop. History has shown that a revolution or political liberalisation does not necessarily point toward a road to democratisation. This study recognises this issue, but instead makes the theoretical assumption that the recent democratisation in wake of the Arab Spring is to be regarded as the *Dissolution phase* (Preparatory phase) of a democratisation. Whether these countries become full-fledged democracies in the end, the process stagnates, or even reverses, is not of decisive importance for the study, rather, it is the initial aim and stated purpose of the revolution that defines it as a case of democratisation.

3.1 Selecting theories

Within the toolbox of democratisation theories two main types of theories have been selected in order to explain the recent state of democratisation. The first one is *modernisation theory*, which takes into account the states' internal features and characteristics (i.e. economic growth and socioeconomic development). Following the recent events during the Arab Spring, it has been suggested that modernisation had a strong effect (Kuhn 2012; Campante & Chor 2012). There are also previous case studies from the region that point in the same direction. In the case of Jordan, Mohamed Abdullah Abu Rumman finds that the economic situation in the country had a strong impact on the democratisation from 1989 and the preceding years (Rumman 2012). More support for the relationship between economic factors and democratisation is found in Brynen (1992) or in Rumman (2010) which links a socioeconomic factor as education with democratisation. This forms good support for the choice of theory. There is, however, a lack of more recent studies of the

region, and it will be interesting to see how these theories apply to the latest development during the Arab Spring.

The second theory discusses the external factors that are presumed to trigger a democratisation of a state. This theory assumes that a state's democratisation could be explained by more external and global factors, rather than just its internal characteristics. Samuel P. Huntington's idea about *waves of democratisation* is here the most prominent theory. It gives a more global perspective of democratisation and how events in one state is neither separated nor unaffected from the rest of the world. The Arab Spring serves as an example of how events in one country triggered reactions in other countries within the region. This is the reason why this theory was selected for the study, with the hope to explain how external factors contributed to current development in the region. Furthermore, in a recent case-study of Syria and Egypt after the Arab Spring (Sarihan 2012), Ali Sarihan concludes that at least the latter seems to have experienced all the phases of Huntington's third wave of democracy (Sarihan 2012:80-82).

The separation between internal and external theories is a common division in the literature, but often formulated in different ways. Lauri Karvonen makes the distinction between "modernisation" and "international factors" (Karvonen 1997), and the terms "national factors" and "international factors" is found in Denk and Silander's book (2007). Other authors chose to deem both theories as "preconditions" for democratisation, albeit with a distinction between socioeconomic development and modernisation on one side, and "international factors" and "waves of democracy" on the other (cf. Hadenius 2006; Ekman et al. 2006). For the sake of simplicity, this study will henceforth discuss these two theories as *internal* and *external* factors, with the latter including Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation.

It is not claimed that neither of these two theories are independent from each other nor mutually exclusive. They should rather be seen as complements to each other, by explaining both the internal and external factors of democratisation. It would be imprudent to think that a state is only affected by internal factors thus being autonomous from external influence. On the other hand, external factors would have a very small effect if the internal prerequisites for democratisation did not exist. These two theories are therefore in many aspects intertwined (cf. Karvonen 1997:108f; Ekman et al. 2006:199-202).

This study will apply the modernisation theory on the case of the Arab Spring, and test its explanatory power. The external theory, with Huntington's waves of democratisation, will be used as an explanatory theoretical complement, and will be controlled for. Important here is to again accentuate that the study tests the modernisation theory, while controlling for the external factors. Assuming that internal and external factors are in many ways intertwined, putting these two theories against each other would be both unnecessarily time-consuming and also somewhat counter-productive. Therefore it would not be fruitful to take on a research approach wherein both theories are tested against each other.

This study recognises the existence of several other theories that could explain the variation in the state of democratisation. Huntington lists several plausible factors that are said to contribute to democratisation (Huntington 1991:37; see also Welzel 2009). Among these are for instance theories looking at agrarian regimes and industrialisation in a study by Barrington Jr. Moore (Moore 1967), or various studies on how religion seems to have an impact on the level of democracy (e.g. Stepan 2000; cf. Welzel 2009:80). Furthermore, a classic study by Alexis de Tocqueville, named *Democracy in America*, written in two volumes 1835 and 1840, discusses how a vibrant civil society is beneficial for a democracy (see Tocqueville 1840). There is also a somewhat similar but later study by Robert Putnam (Putnam 1993). Some theories bring in social classes and their connection to democratisation (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Even geopolitical factors are said to play a role in democratisation, some of which include the size of the state or how island states tend to be more democratic (cf. Anckar 2002a; 2002b; 2004; 2010).

However, after carefully examining the wide range of other democratisation theories and previous research on the subject (see chapter 4), this study has come to the conclusion that the two selected theories are the most fitting to be applied to the case of the Arab Spring, as well as the most prominent theories within this field. Several of these other factors are also accounted for and sometimes included in the modernisation theory and in Huntington's theory. This makes them broader and more applicable to the case of the Arab Spring.

3.2 Internal factors – Modernisation theory

The most central scholar within modernisation theory ought to be Seymour Martin Lipset, who formulated his theory in an article from 1959 (Karvonen 1997:28f). In the chapter titled "Economic development and Democracy" he states:

> *"Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. (Lipset 1959:75; Lipset 1960:48-50)"*

This laid the foundation for what came to be known as the *modernisation theory*, linking economic development and democratisation together. Numerous scholars have since then revisited Lipset's ideas and made their own contribution to this theory. Nevertheless the core essence of the modernisation theory remains today. The concept of the theory is that economic development eventually leads to a democratisation of the country. Adam Przeworski argues that democracy always survives in a country which is sufficiently developed, while democracy rarely survives in poor countries (2005:265f). This does in addition add a more democracy consolidating effect to economic growth.

Economic growth in a country is usually correlated with a higher level of *Education*. With a stronger economy the government has more money to invest in education, which is always a necessary feature in a developed economy. Education is said to broaden the citizens' outlook, help them understand the norms of tolerance, restrain them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and help them make more rational choices. This summarises many of the features needed for a democratic political culture (Lipset 1959:79; Karvonen 1997:29; Hadenius 1992:78).

When the people's economic situation improves, there is a change in *the time perspective* that they put in politics and society. With more wealth and education people are less likely to adhere to quick extremist ideas. In other words, there is a shift from lower class values and needs, to a more middle class set of values, with a better understanding of political processes and their implementation. A broader middle class provides a safer economic situation and inspires a more sensible approach to politics, hence leading to a weakening of political extremism in the country (Lipset 1959:83; Karvonen 1997:29f). An essential and recurrent part in this theory is how the society shifts from a large lower class to a stronger *middle class*. The theory is, in its simplicity, formulated like this, "*economic growth produces an educated and entrepreneurial middle class that, sooner or later, begins to demand control over its own fate. Eventually, even repressive governments are forced to give in*" (Downs & de Mesquita 2005:77). Furthermore, since the wealthier middle class now has more time, they engage themselves in various organisations. The civil society – as an important part of a democracy – is therefore strengthened (Karvonen 1997:30).

Larry Diamond, one of Lipset's employees, published an article in 1992 which further strengthened the support for Lipset's theory. Diamond's findings also contributed to a more detailed analysis and broadened perspective. The causal relationship between economic development and democratisation was not linear according to Diamond. Every increase in economic development did not automatically increase the likelihood of democratisation. Instead the curve was more N-shaped, meaning that in the beginning modernisation increased the chances of democratisation, but on a middle level the effects of economic growth were gone or even negative. It was first when the country was among the most developed that the causal relationship was once again positive. Diamond further concludes that it is not only economic growth that is needed for democratisation, but also *socioeconomic* progress (Diamond 1992:125-128; Karvonen 1997:33f; See also Boix 2011). Axel Hadenius (1992) is another scholar that contributed to the field of modernisation theory, albeit with a different approach than Lipset and Diamond. Hadenius instead analysed all the countries in the developing world, thus moving away from analysing only the wealthy countries in Europe which his predecessors had focused more on. In his study he broke down the concept of socioeconomic development into several factors or variables, for instance, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita, literacy rate, urbanisation, infant mortality rate, and education. A summary of Hadenius' findings is that socioeconomic development is positively correlated with democracy, but that it consists of two dimensions: economic development, plus cultural and educational resources. The

latter dimension has the strongest explanatory power on democratisation, with literacy rate being the best single explanatory factor. Beside these findings, infant mortality rate is found to have a significant negative relationship with democracy, a high infant mortality rate tends to lower the level of democracy in a country (Karvonen 1997:35-37). Hadenius' work is relevant for this study, as it is focusing on developing countries and his detailed operationalization of socioeconomic development offers a good base for additional analysis which will be further elaborated in the method-chapter.

3.2.1 Critics, exceptions and empirical tests

If we test this theory empirically it becomes evident that there are several exceptions from this "rule". Economic growth does not necessarily lead to democratisation in every country, as we can see today. The most noteworthy exceptions today ought to be Russia, China, and the oil-rich gulf-states, with Brunei belonging to that group as well (Karvonen 1997:42f; Downs & de Mesquita 2005:78). The latter group has become a research topic in itself, since oil- or mineral-rich countries often score low in democracy. There has been studies testing the casual relationship between these, for instance Michael L. Ross analyses this link in his article "*Does oil hinder democracy?*" (Ross 2001). His conclusion is that oil does indeed hinder democracy in many cases, also deeming this issue as a "resource curse effect" (Ross 2001:356f). Further research found less support for Ross' resource curse hypothesis when the theory was tested under a longer time period (Oskarsson & Ottosen 2010:1079f). Nonetheless, other results found that oil, gas and to some extent hard minerals seemed to generate "bad wealth" for a country, hence inhibiting the democratisation process (Nilsson 2008:30). The income the oil generates is also what preserves and protects these authoritarian regimes, implicitly making their rule dependent on the world's oil demand and the global oil price (Hadenius 2006:225). One explanation could be that these resources mostly benefit the wealthy elite and hence do not contribute to expanding the middle class. Without a shift towards a stronger middle class there will not be a significant social change in the country, and the democratisation will not occur. According to Huntington, the oil revenue accrues to the state, thus increasing the power of the state and reducing the need for the government to collect taxes. With a low level of taxation the public has hence less reason to demand representation (Huntington 1991:65). Following the recent events in the Arab world, Ross draws the attention to the fact that the Arab Spring has only seriously threatened one oil-funded rule so far, (i.e. Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya), further confirming that oil wealth is still one of the most stubborn obstacles to democratic reform (Ross 2011). This does of course depend on how you define "seriously threatened", as there are other oil-rich countries that have experienced major protests during the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, al-Qaddafi is the only one who have been overthrown.

As demonstrated above, Lipset's modernisation theory has a limited explanatory power today and one should take caution when applying it globally (Downs & de Mesquita 2007:77-80; Hadenius 2005:36-40; Robinson 2006). Consequently, Lipset's theory has been criticised by numerous scholars. Criticism has for instance been that Lipset only used cross section data, while still trying to find a historical relationship. He was also criticised for putting too much focus on Christian western countries, thus excluding many developing countries in his analysis (Karvonen 1997:32). Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker mean that modernisation theorists are partly right. The shift towards an industrialised society does indeed lead to cultural changes in a country, where the norms change from traditional values and absolute norms to increasingly rational, tolerant and trusting values. Yet, modernisation does not follow a linear path, different cultural zones tend to choose different ways, and some value systems persist in these cultures even after industrialisation (Inglehart & Baker 2000:49). Some also argue that while development theorists, such as Lipset, are right in assuming that increases in per capita income lead to increases in the populations' demand for political change, they have clearly underestimated the ability of authoritarian regimes to thwart those demands (Downs & de Mesquita 2005:78). Robinson further weakens the theory by claiming that income per capita is only correlated with democracy because they are both influenced by the same underlying factors. This does not, however, imply that there is a causal relationship between income and democracy (Robinson 2006:517). He further concludes that, "*More likely, these two variables are correlated because the same factors that tend to make a society prosperous also tend to make it democratic*" (Robinson 2006:525). Another study suggests that democracy is often associated with, for instance, higher human capital accumulation, lower inflation and higher economic freedom. In this study, they study the suggested reversed causal relationship that democracy would lead to economic growth. While they do not find any evidence that democracy would be detrimental to growth, they do however find that democracy has a strong indirect effect on economic growth (Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu 2008:1-5 & 35f). This further shows that economic growth and democracy are in many ways intertwined and often occur together. Some scholars might question the detrimental causal relationship between economic growth and democratisation laid out by Lipset, nonetheless it is still clear that these factors are related. It is furthermore still one of the most prominent and influential theories within democratisation today. An interesting read here is the text written by Larry Diamond (1992), in which he revisited Lipset's theory, decades after it was first formulated. Diamond reassessed the theory and found that it still had strong support in most cases.

In regards to this study, the modernisation theory has some constraints when it comes to the troublesome interpretation of the oil and gas producing countries. Many of the countries in the Arab world belong to this group, making it hard to include them in the analysis. As a result, it will be important to take this into account when selecting cases to analyse.

3.3 External factors – Waves of democratisation

In his book "*The third wave – Democratisation in the late twentieth century*", Samuel P. Huntington (1991) formulated his theory about how democratisation has occurred in, so far, three successive waves in the world (Karvonen 1997:108f). The first "long" wave of democracy started with the American and French revolutions and occurred during 1828-1926, followed by a shorter second wave in the end of World War II, from 1943 to 1962. Similar to the characteristics of a wave, there were also *reverse waves* in the gaps between the waves of democratisation. The democratisation process tapered off, and many states that had previously adopted a democratic form experienced a reversal back to more authoritarian rule (Huntington 1991a:16-21). Huntington described the democratisation contra reverse waves as a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern. This meant that the reverse waves eliminated some of the transitions towards democracy, but not all. More and more states have become democratic over the decades, albeit with some reversing (Huntington 1991a:25). The third wave started, according to Huntington, in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1974. The 25 April coup d'etat in Portugal, that ended the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano, marked the beginning of the third wave (Huntington 1991b:3-21). It remains unclear if we are still experiencing Huntington's third wave of democratisation today. Some would suggest the recent events during the Arab Spring are so unprecedented that it could be a sign of even a fourth wave of democratisation. However, following the logical pattern of Huntington's theory we ought to have first experienced a third reverse wave, before a fourth wave could occur. This study has not found any research or evidence suggesting that such a reverse wave has occurred in the world - in a larger scale – since 1974 (cf. Diamond 1996; 2005; 2011:305). This study works with the assumption that the third wave of democratisation is still ongoing[2]. Ali Sarihan makes the same assumption when he applies Huntington's theory on the cases of Egypt and Syria in his recent study of the Arab Spring (Sarihan 2012). Furthermore, there is another reason for making this assumption. There is already a well-established definition and theoretical definition of the third wave that is suitable to apply in the case of the Arab Spring. Discussing whether the Arab Spring is a fourth wave of democratisation or not would require a more theory-developing project and falls far from the purpose of this study.

According to Huntington, five major factors have contributed to the third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991b:13):

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[2] There are some scholars that argue that we have already passed the third wave and what we see now is the fourth wave of democratisation (cf. Kuzio 2008; McFaul 2002; Olimat 2011; Popescu 2012; Way 2005). However these articles are fairly inconclusive and use the term "fourth wave" more in a descriptive way, and often lack a theoretical definition of this new wave. This study relies on Huntington's original theory, and has so far not found any clear evidence suggesting the need to discuss contemporary events in terms of a fourth wave of democratisation.

1. A deepening *legitimacy problem* for authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values are becoming widely accepted, and these regimes' inability to maintain successful performance or "performance legitimacy" due to economic or military failure.
2. The unprecedented *global economic growth* of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and expanded the urban middle class in many countries. (This is strongly related to the modernisation theory, pointing to an external global economic growth that affects internal factors.)
3. The *shift in the doctrine* and activities of the Catholic Church and the transformation of national Catholic churches from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism.
4. Changes in the policies of *external actors*, most notably the European community, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
5. "*Snowballing*", meaning the demonstration effect or transitions earlier in the third wave which stimulated and provided models for subsequent efforts at democratisation.

These five factors constitute the theoretical base of Huntington's third wave of democratisation, and will later be tested for in the analysis. However, parts of the factors are a bit outdated, for instance the significance of the Soviet Union as an important external actor, and the third factor might not apply to the case of the Arab Spring. Some alteration of the factors might be needed in order to optimise the theory.

3.3.1 Critics, exceptions and empirical tests

Seth G. Jones (2013) goes against the notion that the Arab Spring should be seen as a delayed third wave, or even a fourth wave, of democratisation. He argues that this is merely a mirage, and that there are low prospects for further democratisation in the wake of the Arab Spring. He does for instance show that the countries in the region still have low scores in Freedom House's ratings (Jones 2013). However, one could also argue that it is still too early to make this claim, and that the democratisation-process takes longer than the two years Jones analysed. Historically we can see that revolutions did not have an immediate success in creating a democracy, but did instead forever erode the legitimacy of the dictatorial regime that they challenged (Stepan & Linz 2013:28f).

In an article by Mark Thompson (1993) he argues that Huntington's idea about a "snowballing effect" is empirically supported in many parts of the world. However, there seems to be an exception when it comes to some Southeast Asian countries. Compared to other regions in the world, the democratisation in

ASEAN[3] has been limited. Thompson analyses how the authoritarian polity in ASEAN countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia[4] have remained immune to democratisation. While authoritarian regimes in many other countries have faced declining legitimacy problems, these countries have still enjoyed a high degree of popular public support (Thompson 1993:469f). Legitimacy problem is, as previously stated, something that Huntington takes into account and one of the major factors that have contributed to the third wave of democratisation. Thompson argues that these three countries have legitimised their non-democratic rule by for instance an outstanding economic growth, while at the same time succeeded in limiting income inequality. Furthermore they have claimed that their political systems are based on a different kind of 'democracy', thus not comparable to a western model (Thompson 1993:471). Acemoglu & Robinson conclude that the reason why Singapore has not democratised is because it is a very equal society, with no traditional wealthy elite, therefore, most people appear to be relatively happy with their situation (2006:353f). As such, the Singaporean government is not facing a legitimacy problem and its people have little to gain relatively from a democratisation, compared to what they already have. Though the Arab world is indeed very different from Southeast Asia, it is possible that they share some similarities. There is a rather paradoxical relationship between economic growth and democratisation, where many authoritarian regimes are dependent on this to legitimise their existence. Economic growth could over short term increase an authoritarian regime's prospects of survival. However, it eventually leads to democratisation in the long term as it creates the resources needed for the change towards democracy and thus threatens the survival of a repressive government (Karvonen 1997:33; Downs & de Mesquita 2007:79). This is a vivid example of how economic growth, in line with Lipset's theory, works together with Huntington's factor of "global economic growth". Although, this should be seen in relation to the authoritarian regime's ability to legitimise its rule, as failure would eventually lead to a democratisation in that country. It does, as well, show how some countries have been able to withstand Huntington's snowball effect.

As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter there are some parts of this theory that would be regarded as a bit outdated, such as the importance of the Catholic Church or discussing external actors like the Soviet Union. Keeping this in mind, some parts of the theory could be disregarded when studying the recent case of the Arab Spring. While it is believed that other parts of the theory can contribute greatly to explain the case of democratisation in the wake of the Arab Spring.

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[3] ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

[4] Bearing in mind that Thompson's article was written in 1993, there have been some changes since then. Indonesia can to some extent be said to have gone through a democratisation process today, if you consider their democracy score from Freedom House, where they are ranked 'Free' (2012).
- http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia

3.4 Hypothesis

Based on the two previously described theories, modernisation theory and Huntington's waves of democracy, this section will try to formulate a short hypothesis for this study. This hypothesis will be tested against the empirical material in the analysis.

Hypothesis:

Economic development, including socioeconomic development, is believed to explain the state of democratisation in that country. Hence, a country with a relatively strong development within these two areas is believed to have a higher degree of democratisation, compared to those countries with a low level of development. This also suggests that a country that has reached a certain degree of economic maturation will experience democratisation. This describes the internal factors in that country, but these are dependent on that the external prerequisites apply. For democratisation to take place there is a need for the major factors defining Huntington's third wave of democratisation, to be in place.

4 Literature-review

The literature-review should be seen in relation to the selected theories for this study. It is believed that it will also help guide the selection of cases and the operationalization, as well as contribute to broaden the analysis for this study. This chapter consists of several articles about the Arab Spring that are collected and examined. While it would be nearly impossible to cover everything that has been written about the topic, the purpose of this chapter is to offer an overview of previous research within this field. Much of the previous research has dealt with explaining the cause of the Arab Spring as opposed to the reason for why there is variation between the countries. However, many of the articles touch upon the research-question for this study, and are often intertwined. There are four main themes identified in the literature-review, namely, 1) monarchy's resilience, 2) the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia, 3) economic factors and modernisation, and 4) social media.

Monarchy's resilience

Many scholars have focused on the Arab monarchies and how these have proven to be very resilient in the face of political challenges. In an article by Lisa Anderson (1991), she notes that the major ruling monarchies in the world reside in the Arab world, where they rule more than a third of the countries of the Arab league (Anderson 1991:1). This still remains true today. The Arab monarchies of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain (although major clashes occurred here) have all remained reasonably unaffected in the wake of the Arab Spring (Kühnhardt 2012:58; Tétreault 2011:629; Jones 2013). There are many different explanations to the resilience of the Arab monarchies. Anderson put forward arguments as regional exceptionalism and cultural determinism, monarchy is a traditional and by that a congenial type of regime in the Islamic world. Historically the Arab monarchies were an instrument of European imperial policy, and especially British. Important to note here is that almost all the states in the region, monarchies as well as republics, are a product of the twentieth century. Hereditary monarchy in the Arab world is not a traditional regime type with deeper historical roots (Anderson 1991:2, 11). Nevertheless, Elliot Abrams (2012) claims the opposite, that it is actually the historical connection of the Arab monarchies that give them their strength and legitimacy. He explains how the monarchy is often sustained by religious belief, and this gives them more legitimacy than any self-appointed strongmen (Abrams 2012:27). According to Anderson many republican regimes in the region mimic the monarchies in the sense that they are so called "presidential monarchies", regimes in which a strongman dominates a state with relatively few stable political institutions (Anderson 1991:11). This might be exemplified by a famous

quote from the former Tunisian president Bourguiba. When asked by a journalist in the 1960s about Tunisia's political system, he exclaimed, in a perhaps Louis XIV inspired quote[5], "*The system? What system? I am the system!*" (Moore 1965:51). It is possible that a similar position expressed by Bourguiba might as well been seen among many Arab leaders, at least before the Arab Spring.

The role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia

Other scholars focus on the resilience of the gulf monarchies. While one could argue that their resilience is due to oil and wealth, Tétreault means that another common denominator for these countries are the *Gulf Cooperation Council* (GCC). Countries like, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are all members of this organisation. Tétreault argues that the aegis of the GCC have helped these countries against the political challenges during the Arab Spring. One example here is how Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent troops to Bahrain to help their security forces quell the protests in 2011 (Tétreault 2011:629-632; Kühnhardt 2012:58; Jones 2013). Ludger Kühnhardt follows the same line of thoughts, but focuses more on the role of Saudi Arabia as the protector of monarchies. He argues that Saudi Arabia, as the main power in GCC, is particularly interested in supporting the Arab monarchies. This would also explain the motive behind inviting Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC, which were understood as a means to curb and curtail reforms that could challenge the existing structure of power in these countries (Kühnhardt 2012:58, 66; Helfont 2012:84; Salih 2013:202). Some would claim that Jordan has, in the wake of the Arab Spring, become a battleground between those who would like to see a more democratic country and those who would like to maintain economic stability. Saudi Arabia together with the rest of the GCC are in the forefront of the actors who wish to preserve the economic stability in the region, and thwart any democratic reforms that might threaten this stability (Helfont & Helfont 2012). In the article, "*Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring*", Toby Craig Jones (2011) examines how the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been able to evade public unrest and revolutions during the Arab Spring by seeking the support of the religious establishment (Jones 2011; Salih 2013:199), as well as offer a package of economic reforms by, for instance, allocating money to aid the unemployed (Salih 2013:198f; Ben-Meir 2012:110). The article also corroborates previous articles that claim that Saudi Arabia with its regional hegemony and fear for regional democratisation, has tried to counter the revolutions in neighbouring countries (Jones 2011). The Saudi Arabian dynasty of Al Saud fear that democratic change will threaten their power, but also the privilege and excess that comes with it (Jones 2011:44f). In line with this, Lisa Anderson describes another aspect of the monarchy, "[…] *no king wants himself or his successor to be the end of the dynasty. This is no doubt a very powerful motive for the monarch himself*,"

[5] Referring to the famous, presumably apocryphal quote, made by the French king Louis XIV, while addressing the Parliament of Paris (13 April, 1655). "*L'Etat, c'est moi*." - "I am the State." or "The state, that is me" (Dulaure 1834:298).

(1991:15). Some scholars argue that while the coup-proofing strategies that Saudi Arabia has adopted have proven to be successful for now, this strategy cannot respond to political challenges in the long-term, and therefore reforms will be needed (Mabon 2012:550; Ben-Meir 2012:111).

Economic factors and modernisation

The economic factors behind the Arab Spring have been one of the main explanations used by media, but also by many scholars. One noteworthy example of how these factors could explain the Arab Spring is The Economist's "Shoe-thrower's index", which measures the Arab countries' vulnerability to revolution. This index is made up by putting together and weighing a number of indicators that they believe feed unrest in the Arab world, such as youth population, years of government in power, corruption, GDP per capita, and several other indicators. The result shows that the potential for unrest in the Arab world 2010 were highest in Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Syria, while countries like Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Lebanon had the lowest scores (the Economist 2011:26). The index lacks theoretical backing, but is to some extent empirically supported. However, other scholars support some of these indicators. The economic impoverishment of the majority of the people, staggering food prices, high rates of unemployment, and especially among the large youth population - are all regarded as plausible roots and causes for the Arab Spring (Salih 2013:187). Especially the deteriorating food security and living standards in the region is said to have led to the uprisings (Breisinger et al. 2011). Another article focuses on the youth population and discusses the Arab Spring in terms of a "youth revolution". The high unemployment among the young people in this region is seen as a major problem, with youth unemployment as high as 80 % in some areas. The overall conclusion is that frustration with the lack of jobs makes the youth population more prone to protest (Hoffman & Jamal 2012:169f, 184f). Emmanuel Martin claims that one of the more forgotten causes for the Arab Spring was the lack of economic freedom in these countries. The government policies required tremendous administrative steps to set up a formal business, which Martin sees as a part of the political oppression and authoritarianism in these countries (Martin 2012:94f).

In line with the chosen theory for this study, there is also literature that brings up the modernisation theory as a possible explanation for the Arab Spring. Randall Kuhn (2012) uses the modernisation theory when analysing the Arab Spring. He claims that no other developing region has seen such improvements in the human development, with for instance declining child mortality, increased schooling and longevity. This human development fosters a set of higher expectations among the citizens on the government, including the right to self-determination. In his conclusion he suggests that this might eventually lead to a democratic change (Kuhn 2012:674-677). Filipe R. Campante and David Chor (2012) break down the modernisation theory and decide to focus on education as an underlying mechanism. They discuss the interaction between schooling background and economic circumstances, and especially the scarcity of job opportunities for university graduates. They further describe how the pace of growth, i.e. modernisation, does not keep up with the education profile of its

population (Campante & Chor 2012). They do not make a clear conclusion of their result, but the result displays how factors as youth population, unemployment, economic growth, and education, are all intertwined. In the case of Morocco, Badimon makes a similar connection between the high unemployment among university graduates and the social unrest during the Arab Spring. However, many of the university graduates were reluctant in joining any political alliance against the government, as there was a risk that this would jeopardise their chances of getting hired in the public administration (Badimon 2013).

Social media

In recent research about the Arab Spring it has been much in fashion to discuss the role of social media, making it almost mandatory to address this topic in some way[6]. In some articles this is termed as a "Twitter -" or "Facebook revolution" (Khan 2012:56), but also "cyberactivism" (Khondker 2011:678), and "social media revolution" (Comunello & Anzera 2012:453). However, social media could both be seen as an effective tool for the rebels, but also for the repressive machine (Comunello & Anzera 2012:465; Khan 2012:56). Many scholars agree that social media played a significant role, but was nonetheless not the main cause of the Arab Spring or the determinant factor (Comunello & Anzera 2012:453; Wolfsfeld et al. 2013; Joffé 2011:525). Social media was an "accelerator" of the Arab Spring (Khan 2012:62), or a vital tool, but the most important underlying factor was the presence of revolutionary conditions (Khondker 2011:678).

Other articles

Some authors analyse the role of the armies in the Arab uprisings, and thus how the armed forces acted differently in the Arab countries. For instance it is suggested that some of the variation between the outcomes of the different countries during the Arab Spring, could be explained by the role of the armies. This is for instance exemplified by the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, where the army in one way facilitated the overthrowing of the governments, while there was stronger military resistance against the protesters in countries like Libya and Syria (Frisch 2013; Salih 2013). Ellen Lust (2011) does instead look at the relationship between Islam and democratisation. She means that it is not the religion itself that stalled the "third wave of democratisation" during the Arab Spring, but it was instead the fear of political Islam. This fear was used by the regime to drive a wedge between Islamic and secularist opposition groups, in order to weaken their efforts to struggle against the regime (Lust 2011:186-188).

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[6] Social media is mentioned and discussed in several articles (cf. Ben-Meir 2012:106f; Comunello & Anzera 2012; Joffé 2011:525; Khan 2012; Khondker 2011; Kuhn 2012:650; Mabon 2012:531f, 542-544; Tétreault 2011:630f; Price 2008:306-310; Wolfsfeld 2013; Worrall 2012:99)

5 Method

In regards to the stipulated theories and the multi-facetted case of the Arab Spring, there is a wide range of aspects to analyse. The Arab Spring is analysed on a macro-level and the study objects, or cases, are consequently set to different countries. These countries will be compared to each other in order to explain the state of democratisation, and to identify the factor(s) that could help explain their variation. When choosing the method for a comparison, it often comes down to the choice between an intensive case analysis with a small amount of cases (small N), or a statistical analysis (large N). Arend Lijphart does for instance discuss both comparative and statistical methods in his article. He argues that the comparative method resembles the statistical in all respects, except concerning the number of cases analysed. The small number of cases does not permit systematic control of partial correlations between the variables, i.e. a statistical method (Lijphart 1971:684f). The Arab Spring offers a limited amount of comparable cases, therefore, it would not be appropriate to choose a purely statistical method for this study. Instead, because of the limited amount of cases, the chosen method for the study is a *comparative method*. However, it does not necessarily have to be a choice between comparative and statistical methods. Many scholars argue for the advantages of mixed methods, by combining qualitative and quantitative methods (cf. Coppedge 1999; Lieberman 2005; Lijphart 1971). Another reason is that the different factors defined in the stipulated theories could be measured and operationalized both as quantitative variables, and as qualitative factors. This is one of the reasons for conducting the study with a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. For this study a mix of both methods has been chosen. It is done with the aim that these methods will complement each other, as some parts might be more suitable to measure quantitatively, while other parts would benefit from a more qualitative approach.

For the first part of the analysis, the chosen method is set to a comparative politics method known as the *most similar systems design*. The design of the method is created as a comparison between very similar cases, which only differs in the dependent variable. Simplified it means that *difference is explained by difference* (Denk 2002:57f; Denk 2007:120-124). This is done with the assumption that it would make it easier to identify the independent variable which explains the outcome in the dependent variable. Ideally only one, or a few, independent variables will differ between the countries, and will consequently be regarded as the determining factor(s). This comparative strategy has its origin in John Stuart Mill's "*indirect method of difference*", described in his book "*A System of Logic*" from 1843 (Esaiasson et al. 2012:117-120; Denk 2002:56-58; George & Bennett 2005:152-160). The choice of method is inspired by Theda Skocpol's famous

study of social revolutions, in which she compared the revolutions in France, Russia and China, while using England, Germany and Japan as contrast-cases (Skocpol 1979:155-157 & 40ff; George & Bennett 2005:158f). Skocpol's study of revolutions is relevant in regard to the Arab Spring, especially through a methodological perspective. This study is also inspired by and shares many similarities with Lipset's classic study (Lipset 1959), and should therefore work well with the modernisation theory.

This method will be further complemented with a statistic method. The chosen cases are divided into two groups, conditional on the dependent variable. These two groups will be compared, in order to measure if the difference between them are statistically significant (Körner & Wahlgren 2005:136-144; Esaiasson et al. 2012:389f). This method is a good complement to the comparison, as it will further strengthen the validity of the result.

5.1 Dependent variable

The issue here is the definition of the dependent variable. In line with the research-question the aim of the study is to explain the state of democratisation, and identify which factor(s) that explain the variation between the countries. The dependent variable would then be whether a country was affected by the protests and went into a state of democratisation or not. However, virtually every state in the region was affected during the Arab Spring, and is in some state of democratisation. There have been different degrees of democratisation in the countries, varying from minor governmental concessions in order to placate the people, to stronger reactions where the government has been overthrown. This method does however require similar countries, but with a different outcome on the dependent variable. The dependent variable is hence more dichotomous, in the sense that it puts the cases, or countries, in two different groups by separating between minor and major political changes. Apart from that, the case-selection strives to include otherwise similar cases, in accordance with the chosen method. The definition of a 'major', respectively 'minor' political change, is complex, as previously discussed these countries have experienced very different degrees of political changes.

Therefore the definition of the dependent variable relies on a theoretical definition. The country's state of democratisation after the Arab Spring is described as a political change. This definition is based on democratisation theory (see chapter 2.1), and is derived from Dankward Rustows' four phases of democratisation (Rustow 1970; cf. Denk & Silander 2007:26-34). Each case is presented and described more detailed in chapter 7.

Minor political changes

These countries are still in the *Entity phase* (Background condition) according to Rustow's definition. The regime is still in power and they have not moved towards the *Dissolution phase* (Preparatory phase). Yet, while minor political and

economic reforms have been made in the country, the regime is still in possession of their core power.

Major political changes

These are the countries that have gone through the *Dissolution phase* (Preparatory phase), where the non-democratic way to govern the society has been dissolved. They have then further moved into the *Transition phase* (Decision phase) where efforts to establish a democratic way to govern the society have commenced. In practise this means that the regime in the country has been dissolved, and replaced by another. This is regarded as a drastic change that assumedly open up for more significant changes in a country compared to minor government concessions.

5.2 Selection of cases

There are some general criteria for the case selection. Firstly, the countries are geographically located in the Arab world, the region where the Arab Spring occurred. These countries share many similarities when it comes to culture, language, and religion, thus suitable for a comparison in line with the *most similar systems design*.

Secondly, the Arab Spring is still to some extent ongoing or in a stage of aftermath. It is therefore important to define a clear time limit. The selected countries are those that have been affected by the Arab Spring since its start in December 2010 until January 2013.

Thirdly, the scope of the analysis is limited to countries that prior to the Arab Spring were not fully democratic, thus excluding those countries in the region that were already democracies. In terms of measuring degree of democracy, this study relies on Freedom House's ranking of, 'free', 'partly free', and 'not free' (Puddington 2011:22f), where a status of 'partly free'[7] and 'not free'[8] is regarded as not being fully democratic.

Fourthly, the selected countries must of course also be selected, and divided, on the basis of the previously stated definition of the dependent variable.

For theoretical reasons countries that rely heavily on oil and gas have been excluded from the comparison. These countries often represent an exception from the modernisation theory and thus it complicates comparison with the other countries. Syria has furthermore been excluded from the comparison as the civil war is still ongoing and its volatile status makes it an uncertain case for the

[7] 'Partly free' countries in the region according to Freedom House's ranking 2010: Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen. – (Puddington 2011:22f)

[8] 'Not free' countries in the region according to Freedom House's ranking 2010: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. – (Puddington 2011:22f)

moment. Based on the four criteria, one comparison model is created, containing two groups of similar countries. The following countries have been selected for this study (more detailed information in chapter 7):

Comparison model

- Countries that have only experienced *minor* political changes: Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco.
- Countries that have experienced *major* political changes: Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen.

5.3 Operationalization

In this section the terms and concepts from the theory-chapter will be operationalized into more measureable variables or indicators. Operationalization means that the theory is translated in a way that makes it possible to identify the terms in reality. Within positivism there are two basic requirements for operationalization, high validity and high reliability. Put in other words, that the operationalization actually catches what the theory intends to examine, and that it is possible to measure it with precision (Lundquist 1993:99f). For this study many of the theoretical terms need to be operationalized into quantified variables. The operationalization is hence strongly connected to the chapter regarding material, but does also seek support from the literature-review, and the theory-chapter.

Instead of making its own operationalization, this study relies on the work done by Axel Hadenius. In his book, *Democracy and development*, he analyses the countries in the developing world through modernisation theory (Hadenius 1992). The characteristic of Hadenius' work is his strong focus on socioeconomic development. Further support for the use of many of these operationalizations is also found in Lipset's original work (Lipset 1960). These variables are often categorised into different groups, whereas both Hadenius and Lipset have a different way of sorting these indicators. Sorting the variables into different groups does not have a particular methodological purpose per se, yet it is here used to make it easier for the reader to follow the lines of thoughts behind these operationalizations. Lipset has four categories of indicators in his comparison, namely: a) indices of wealth, b) indices of industrialization, c) indices of education, and d) indices of urbanisation (Lipset 1960:48ff; Lipset 1959:76-78). Hadenius used similar variables but categorised them slightly different. He measured *economic development* in terms of: Gross National Product (GNP), energy consumption per capita, employees in different sectors (agriculture, industry and service), and the countries' industrial production in relation to GNP. Actual *standard of living* is measured as: consumption of calories and infant mortality in the population. *Media exposure and mass communications* is measured as: the distribution through the population of daily newspapers, telephones, radio and TV sets. Moreover he uses indicators as: Urbanisation,

literacy, school attendance at the different stages of the school system (primary, secondary and higher) (Hadenius 1992:83; 87; 101f). Larry Diamond used similar indicators as both Lipset and Hadenius (cf. Diamond et al. 1990:11-14; 1992).

For this study, these variables have been merged together into three groups of indicators. This operationalization intends to cover the theoretical concept of the modernisation theory, including terms such as, economic growth, education, the shift towards a stronger middle class, and the changing time perspective. There are also some additional variables added in order to complement, as well as modernise the operationalizations, for instance a variable measuring the amount of internet and cell phone users, quite relevant today, but none-existent when Lipset and Hadenius made their study. Furthermore, UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) is used as a complement for measuring socioeconomic development (QOG Codebook 2011:219; HDI 2010), and a Gini-index as a measurement of income inequality is used in order to measure the class structure. As mentioned before, the operationalization is interconnected with the data-collection, and as such it is dependent as well as constrained by the availability of data. This study has strived to select the most relevant variables, nonetheless, in those cases when data or relevant variables are missing, these have been excluded or replaced with the next best alternative.

A short summary of the variables (more elaborated description could be found in appendix A):

Economic development

These variables are used to measure how economically developed a country is. It is believed that a higher electric power consumption and urbanisation reflects a more developed country. Urbanisation has always been linked with industrialisation, and thus regarded as an indicator for a country's level of modernisation. Although it has less strength today, as it had during the twentieth century (Hall 2006:7-10; Knox & Marston 2007:403f). Agriculture, industry and service's value added, are supposed to measure the economic transition from an agricultural-based economy to an economy based on the service sector. The growth of the service sector is connected to the rising per capita incomes in a country, with a larger increase in demand for services. This is associated with the changing *time perspective* as well, consumers start valuing their time and try to minimise the time inputs needed to accomplish many ordinary tasks (Bryson et al. 2004:11f).

- Gross National Income (GNI) per capita
- Electric power consumption (kWh) per capita
- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
- Industry, value added (% of GDP)
- Service, value added (% of GDP)
- Distribution of family income – Gini index
- Urban population (% of total)

Socioeconomic development
The HDI index is here one of the most important indicators, as it covers many of the other variables in this group. It is a composite measure of life expectancy, schooling, and gross national income per capita.

- UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) value
- Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)
- Life expectancy at birth (Years)
- Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)
- School enrollment, primary (% gross)
- School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
- School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
- Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)

Media exposure and mass communications
This group of variables is derived from previous research done by Diamond, Hadenius, and Lipset. The literature-review of more contemporary research done on the Arab Spring does in several cases emphasise the role of media and communication during the Arab Spring. It has often been seen as an accelerator or triggering factor, but not as the main cause, of the Arab Spring. Much of the focus has lied on social media, unfortunately this study has not been able to find any reliable data on the use of, for instance, Facebook, Twitter or Youtube. Instead, these four variables are believed to reflect how developed the media were in each country, as well as access to means of communications.

- Telephone lines (per 100 people)
- Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
- Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People)
- Internet users (per 100 people)

6 Material

The material used for the analysis consists mostly of statistical data, i.e. quantified variables. This chapter is strongly connected to the chapter about operationalizations. Yet, while the operationalizations strive for a strong validity, this chapter focuses on this study's reliability. It is here important to avoid measurement and unsystematic errors (Esaiasson et al. 2012:63; Lundquist 1993:99f).

One of the main criteria for the selection of data is that the data should come from a reliable and well-known source. The main source used for this analysis is the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank), it has been complemented - when needed - with data from the *CIA World Factbook*, as well as the *Quality of Government* (QOG) database. The QOG database is administered by the University of Gothenburg, and they have collected several different variables from other databases into one (Teorell et al. 2011). The selected variables are chosen based on their year of measurement. It is here important that the variables are measured prior to the Arab Spring, i.e. the year 2010, in order to measure their effect on the state of democratisation. In those cases when data is missing for the year 2010, most recent available data for the previous years (i.e. before 2010) have been used. Because of the variation in the different countries' population, this has been taken into consideration by using percentage, or variables measured in *per capita*. For a thorough and detailed description of the material, including the variables used for the analysis, see appendix A.

When measuring the level of democracy this study relies on the *Freedom House index*, as described in section 2.1. It can be problematic to base the measurement of such an important key factor on one source alone. However, this index is one of the most well-known ways to compare and measure democracy in different countries. It is also the index used in almost all previous literature on this topic. For these reasons, together with the importance of being consistent throughout this study, the Freedom House index is chosen for this study.

7 The Arab Spring: An introduction

This chapter offers a brief introduction and overview of the Arab Spring, and the six selected countries for this study. It starts off with an introduction of the Arab Spring, with a general regional introduction, and then continues with each individual country. This introduction only covers the period of time from the beginning of the Arab Spring in December 2010, through the subsequent year of 2011.

The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring, or the Arab uprisings, represents a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that swept through the Arab world. It started off with protests in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, following Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of ill-treatment and police corruption (Salih 2013:184). This triggered protests in Tunisia, and in January 2011 the Tunisian president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown (Mabon 2012:531). The waves of protests did not stop there, soon the protests spread into the neighbouring Algeria, and broke out in Egypt and Jordan in January 2011. By February 11 violent clashes forced Hosni Mubarak to step down and end his 30-years of power in Egypt (Helfont & Helfont 2011:83). Waves of protests continued to develop throughout the Arab world. Protests emerged in Bahrain, Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, as well as Kuwait, Palestine, Iran and Iraq. The Arab Spring left hardly any country unaffected. Civil war broke out in Libya and Syria, where Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi was removed from power, whereas in the case of Syria the civil war is still ongoing (Jones 2013:1; Dupont & Passy 2011:447; Blight et al. 2012). Many of the demonstrations during the Arab Spring were also met with a violent response from the authorities, as well as from pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators (Salih 2013:184).

Minor political changes

Almost at the same time as in Egypt, protests broke out in **Jordan** on January 21, 2011 (UCDP 2011). The protesters were demanding cuts in food and fuel prices, electoral reforms, and more power granted to the parliament. There were, as well, complaints about rampant poverty, high unemployment, and corruption in the country. King Abdullah II, in response, replaced his prime minister, and formed two commissions to study possible electoral reforms and constitutional amendments. He did as well offer a $125 million package of subsidies for fuel, sugar, and other products. There have been occasional violent demonstrations in Jordan, but so far the government's concessions have managed to keep off most instability, leaving king Abdullah II still in power (BBC 2012; Jones 2013; Helfont & Helfont 2011; Miller 2011:34).

Lebanon faced a different sort of demonstrations amid the Arab Spring. While the key slogan in Egypt and Tunisia had been "*The people wants to topple the regime*", the protest movement in Lebanon adopted a slightly different slogan, "*The people wants to topple the sectarian regime*". On 27 February 2011, the anti-sectarian movement, as it was referred to, held its first demonstration. The protests were not as much directed against the president, the prime minister or the government, but it was believed that the symbols of powers were located outside the official state institutions (Hermez 2011). However, the movement failed to attract a significant numbers of participants, and in spite of repeated calls, few people showed up for the demonstrations (Khashan 2011).

Morocco saw its first protest on February 20, 2011, and demonstrations soon spread and sprung up in over 50 cities (Badimon 2013:207; Miller 2011:36). On March 9, 2011, King Mohammed VI held an extraordinary televised speech to the Moroccan people, in which he promised "*a new charter between the throne and the people*" and outlined a so called "*package of comprehensive constitutional amendments*". The new constitution was to guarantee rule of law and an enhanced role for the prime minister, in practise it would reduce the king's power and increase that of the elected government. On June 17, 2011, the new constitution was released and in a referendum two weeks later it was passed (Traub 2012:43; Maddy-Weitzman 2012). Whether the concessions done by the Mohammed VI were sincere and will ultimately lead to a political system in line with a constitutional monarchy, is yet to be seen. It is still safe to say that Morocco did not face the same turmoil and uprisings as other countries during the Arab Spring.

Major political changes

In January 2011, protests broke out in **Egypt**. After eighteen days of protests in Cairo and in other cities, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down on February 11, 2011. This ended Mubarak's 30 years of power in Egypt. According to the Egyptian government fact-finding panel, 846 people were killed and more than 6,400 were injured during the uprisings. (BBC 2012; Salih 2013:193).

As mentioned in the introduction, the protests in **Tunisia** began on December 18, 2010. This was sparked by the self-immolation of the vegetable seller Mohamed Bouazizi in the city of Sidi Bouzid. This was done as a political protest. Pro-democratic and anti-regime protests rose up across Tunisia, in what came to be known as the "Jasmine Revolution". In the violent clashes around 300 people died during the unrest. President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was toppled, after 23 years in power, on the January 14 2011 (BBC 2012; Schraeder & Redissi 2011).

In **Yemen** demonstrations started on January 27, 2011, calling for the end of president Ali Abdullah Saleh's 33-year rule. The president announced at a very early stage that he would not seek re-election and that he would not pass over power to his son. However this did not stop the protests, which became more frequent and widespread. It was also met with a deadly crackdown by the security forces and supporters of the president. In April 2011, Saleh refused to sign a

GCC[9]-brokered deal to hand over power in return for immunity from prosecution. This prompted the head of the Hashid tribal federation, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, to declare his support for the opposition. Heavy clashes between security forces and armed tribesmen occurred in the capital Sanaa, leaving dozens of people dead. In June, president Saleh was seriously injured by a bomb explosion and was forced to leave the country to seek medical treatment. He returned to Yemen in September amid a new wave of violence. In October 2011, the UN Security Council urged the president to agree to the GCC-brokered deal. President Saleh signed the deal November 23, and formally ceded power two days later (BBC 2012; Salih 2013:193-195).

[9] GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council

8 Analysis

This chapter consists of three parts. It begins with the analysis of the internal factors, in which the modernisation theory is tested on the Arab Spring. The second part is the external factors, here represented by Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation. Important to note is that this theory will only be controlled for, and not tested. The third and last part of this analysis offers some alternative explanations, while taking into account the result from the previous two parts. That part will take a closer look at the three countries that only experienced minor political changes, i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco.

8.1 The internal factors

In line with the research question for this study, the modernisation theory will hereby be applied to, and tested on, the Arab Spring. The result from the compiled database is here presented in three different tables, reflecting the three different groups of variables used in the analysis: i) Economic development, ii) Socioeconomic development, and iii) Media exposure and mass communications. The selected countries are, as mentioned before, divided into two groups, those with minor political changes and those with major changes. These two groups will be compared. According to the chosen method, *most similar systems design*, the objective is to identify differences that one group share in one or several of the variables, which is not apparent in the other group. A table for comparing the variable's mean values for each group is also included. For further information about the analysis of mean values see Appendix B.

This analysis is done in two parts. The first part analyse all six countries and compare the mean values between the two groups. It is an overall analysis, trying to find a pattern among the independent variables. The second part of the analysis takes a closer look at four of the countries, in order to further distinguish a pattern. Each variable is also compared to the world median value with the purpose of putting them more in a global context.

8.1.1 First part

This part is divided into three different sections, one for each group of variables analysed, together with one table that shows the comparison of mean values.

Economic development

Economic development							
Country	Gross National Income Per Capita (PPP 2008 $)	Electric Power Consumption (kWh) Per Capita	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	Distribution of Family Income, Gini Index	Urban population (% of total)
Jordan	5 956,00	2 225,57	3,00	31,00	66,00	39,70	82,00
Lebanon	13 475,00	5 903,35	6,00	23,00	71,00	-	87,00
Morocco	4 628,00	472,22	15,00	30,00	55,00	40,90	57,00
Egypt	5 889,00	1 607,93	14,00	38,00	48,00	34,40	43,00
Tunisia	7 979,00	1 349,97	8,00	31,00	61,00	40,00	66,00
Yemen	2 387,00	248,62	8,00	29,00	63,00	37,70	32,00

This comparison does not show any clear difference between the two groups of countries, i.e. those with major and minor change. The result from the statistical analysis, does not show any statistical significant difference, when the mean value of each group is compared. It seems as both groups are somehow similar, and no clear patterns are found here. Yemen is in almost every aspect the least developed country, with a low GNI per Capita and electric power consumption, as well as low degree of urbanisation. Lebanon, on the other hand, has a relatively strong GNI per Capita, combined with the highest electric power consumption, the largest share of service sector, as well as the largest urbanisation.

Economic development - Comparing mean values							
State of Democratisation	Gross National Income Per Capita (PPP 2008 $)	Electric Power Consumption (kWh) Per Capita	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	Distribution of Family Income, Gini Index	Urban population (% of total)
Minor Change	8 019,67	2 867,05	8	28	64	40,3	75,33
Major Change	5 418,33	1 068,84	10	32,67	57,33	37,37	47

Although not statistical significant, this table shows a comparison of the mean values for the different variables for each group. The result shows that, contrary to the stipulated hypothesis the group with the minor change are more economic developed than the group that experienced a major change. GNI per capita, electric power consumption, service sector, Gini-index, and urbanisation is larger in this group.

Socioeconomic development

Socioeconomic development								
Country	UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Life expectancy at birth (Years)	Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	School enrolment, primary (% gross)	School enrolment, secondary (% gross)	School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)	Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)
Jordan	,6810	18,00	73,10	93,00	92,00	87,00	38,00	4,90
Lebanon	-	9,00	72,40	87,40	105,00	81,00	54,00	1,70
Morocco	,5670	29,00	71,80	56,00	111,00	64,00	13,00	5,40
Egypt	,6200	19,00	70,50	72,00	106,00	72,00	32,00	3,80
Tunisia	,6830	15,00	74,30	78,00	110,00	90,00	36,00	6,20
Yemen	,4390	58,00	63,90	64,00	87,00	44,00	10,00	5,20

Similar to the comparison of economic development, it is not possible to find a clear pattern when it comes to socioeconomic development neither. The statistical analysis is not able to find a statistical significant difference between the two groups neither. Once again Yemen is here shown to be the least developed country. Yemen has the highest infant mortality rate, lowest life expectancy, the lowest school enrolment, as well as a low value on UNDP's Human Development Index.

Socioeconomic development - Comparing mean values								
State of Democratisation	UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Life expectancy at birth (Years)	Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	School enrolment, primary (% gross)	School enrolment, secondary (% gross)	School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)	Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)
Minor Change	,624	18,667	72,433	78,800	102,667	77,333	35,000	4,000
Major Change	,581	30,667	69,567	71,333	101,000	68,667	26,000	5,067

The difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. However, by examining the mean values for each variable, it is suggested that the group with minor change is more socioeconomic developed than the other group. This result is apparent for each indicator except for the public spending on education.

Media exposure and mass communications

Media exposure and mass communications				
Country	Telephone lines (per 100 people)	Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People)	Internet users (per 100 people)
Jordan	8,00	107,00	74,23	27,20
Lebanon	21,00	68,00	55,57	43,70
Morocco	12,00	100,00	11,74	49,00
Egypt	12,00	87,00	31,28	30,20
Tunisia	12,00	106,00	22,69	36,80
Yemen	4,00	46,00	3,73	12,40

The result from this comparison does not display any clear difference between the two groups, except for possibly in the amount of daily newspapers. However, the statistical analysis does not show any significant difference between the two groups. As exhibited in previous comparisons, Yemen is here the least developed country when it comes to media exposure and mass communications.

Media exposure and mass communications - Comparing mean values				
State of Democratisation	Telephone lines (per 100 people)	Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People)	Internet users (per 100 people)
Minor Change	13,667	91,667	47,180	39,967
Major Change	9,333	79,667	19,233	26,467

The comparison of mean values between the two groups shows the same contradictory pattern as previous comparisons. It is indicated, although not statistically significant, that the group with minor change is made up of the most developed countries.

8.1.2 Reflections – First part

This analysis shows no support for the stipulated hypothesis that economic development, including socioeconomic development, is believed to explain the state of democratisation in the country. According to the hypothesis, countries with a strong economic and socioeconomic development are supposed to have reached a higher degree of democratisation than those with a weaker development. The result from this analysis displays no support for such claims. The result does instead suggest that there is an opposite relationship. Those countries with minor political changes are more developed than the group of countries with major changes, however, this connection is not statistically

significant. Nevertheless, when comparing a limited amount of cases it is sometimes difficult to achieve a statistically significant difference. Only six countries are compared here, and it is possible that the method requires more cases in order to distinguish a statistically proven pattern. For this reason, one should not see the statistical significance as an absolute requirement to prove that there is a difference between the two groups of countries.

The analysis further shows that there are two countries which are significantly different from the others, and would be regarded as outliers in this comparison. When comparing with the other countries it is shown that Lebanon is the most developed country, while Yemen is the least. This is generally true for Yemen, while Lebanon is not ranked as the most developed country for every indicator.

8.1.3 Second part

In the next part of the analysis Lebanon and Yemen have been excluded, i.e. one country from each group. Both countries are significantly different from the other selected countries in terms of development. Lebanon does as well have missing values on two of the variables, which hampers the comparison. For these reasons, a second analysis is done in order to try to distinguish a clearer pattern between the two groups. To put this in a more global context and to make it more illustrative for the reader each value on the variables has been compared to the world median and mean value. These have then been sorted, and colour-coded, into three categories, 'Low', 'Medium', and 'High'. Statistically, this represents the 33th percentile, 67th percentile and the 100th percentile of the world's countries.

Economic development							
Country	Gross National Income Per Capita (PPP 2008 $)	Electric Power Consumption (kWh) Per Capita	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	Distribution of Family Income, Gini Index	Urban population (% of total)
Jordan	5 956,00 (Medium)	2 225,57 (Medium)	3,00 (Low)	31,00 (High)	66,00 (Medium)	39,70 (Medium)	82,00 (High)
Morocco	4 628,00 (Medium)	472,22 (Low)	15,00 (High)	30,00 (High)	55,00 (Medium)	40,90 (Medium)	57,00 (Medium)
Egypt	5 889,00 (Medium)	1 607,93 (Medium)	14,00 (High)	38,00 (High)	48,00 (Low)	34,40 (Medium)	43,00 (Medium)
Tunisia	7 979,00 (Medium)	1 349,97 (Medium)	8,00 (Medium)	31,00 (High)	61,00 (Medium)	40,00 (Medium)	66,00 (Medium)

Socioeconomic development								
Country	UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Life expectancy at birth (Years)	Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	School enrolment, primary (% gross)	School enrolment, secondary (% gross)	School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)	Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)
Jordan	,6810 (Medium)	18,00 (Medium)	73,10 (Medium)	93,00 (Medium)	92,00 (Low)	87,00 (Medium)	38,00 (Medium)	4,90 (Medium)
Morocco	,5670 (Low)	29,00 (Medium)	71,80 (Medium)	56,00 (Low)	111,00 (High)	64,00 (Low)	13,00 (Low)	5,40 (Medium)
Egypt	,6200 (Medium)	19,00 (Medium)	70,50 (Medium)	72,00 (Low)	106,00 (Medium)	72,00 (Low)	32,00 (Medium)	3,80 (Medium)
Tunisia	,6830 (Medium)	15,00 (Medium)	74,30 (Medium)	78,00 (Low)	110,00 (High)	90,00 (Medium)	36,00 (Medium)	6,20 (High)

Media exposure and mass communications				
Country	Telephone lines (per 100 people)	Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People)	Internet users (per 100 people)
Jordan	8,00 (Medium)	107,00 (Medium)	74,23 (Medium)	27,20 (Medium)
Morocco	12,00 (Medium)	100,00 (Medium)	11,74 (Low)	49,00 (High)
Egypt	12,00 (Medium)	87,00 (Medium)	31,28 (Medium)	30,20 (Medium)
Tunisia	12,00 (Medium)	106,00 (Medium)	22,69 (Medium)	36,80 (Medium)

By examining the three tables above, it shows that the pattern is still inconclusive when the countries are compared between the groups. The result shows that Morocco is the least developed among the four countries, while Tunisia seems to be the most developed, closely followed by Jordan. Nevertheless the difference between the two groups is less distinctive as in the previous comparison where Lebanon and Yemen were included. In general, it is safe to say that the two groups of countries are in many aspects similar. This does of course cause a problem when the most similar systems design is used as a method. The difference in the dependent variable cannot be explained by differences in the independent variables.

When examining the comparison with the rest of the world, these countries are in general somewhere in the middle, judging by the 'Medium'-ranking in many of the variables. Morocco stands out here and is placed above or below the world median in several variables. The four countries all have a strong industrial sector, but at the same time a low literacy rate (except for Jordan).

8.1.4 Reflections – Second part

Looking back at the modernisation theory, both Lipset and Hadenius claimed that socioeconomic development was of significant importance for democratisation. Tunisia is, compared to the other countries, the most socioeconomic developed country, which in line with the theory could explain the state of democratisation there. However this does not explain why Jordan, the next most developed country, did not experience any major political changes. While at the same time why Egypt, which is less socioeconomic developed than Jordan, experienced major political changes. Hadenius (1992) concluded that literacy rate and infant mortality rate had the best explanatory power for democratisation. This is, however, not supported in this analysis. All four countries have similar infant mortality rates, and a low literacy rate, with the exception of Jordan which has a significantly higher literacy than the others. By further complicating the pattern, a cluster analysis on these four countries was conducted. The analysis takes into account all the variables, and tries to 'cluster' the most similar countries together into groups (Hair et al. 2010:509-534; Körner & Wahlgren 2005:175-181). The result showed that Jordan and Tunisia were the most similar countries, while Egypt and Morocco were more similar to each other than the other two countries (see Appendix B). This as well indicates that the modernisation theory is not able to explain the variation in the state of democratisation between the countries.

How could this variation then be explained? One difference between the two groups of countries, which is not accounted for here, is their different political systems. Jordan and Morocco are both monarchies, while Tunisia and Egypt are republics. The literature examined for this study, puts much weight behind this factor, and shows how the Arab monarchies have been strongly resilient during the Arab Spring (see chapter 4). This does fall outside the scope of this analysis, but could nonetheless be one of the explanations behind this variation in the state of democratisation (alternative explanations, including this factor, are discussed in section 8.3).

8.2 The external factors

This section addresses Huntington's theory regarding the third wave of democratisation. Huntington listed five major factors that contributed significantly to the occurrence of the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991a:45f). This study will focus on the three - for this study - most relevant factors, the deepening legitimacy problems, the unprecedented global economic growth, and the snowballing-effect. While the previous section tested the modernisation theory on the Arab Spring, Huntington's theory will only be controlled for. The overall questions to guide this analysis are: 1) Did the Arab Spring lack any of the external conditions or prerequisites needed for the third wave of democratisation? 2) How does this relate to the modernisation theory and the Arab Spring? And 3) Could this help to explain the variation of the political state of democratisation in the selected countries?

8.2.1 Deepening legitimacy problems

The first major factor that Huntington lists is the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful performance, and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to economic (and sometimes military) failure (Huntington 1991b:13). If we examine it closer, this factor could be divided into two parts.

The first part is the widely accepted democratic values which threatens the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. In a world where democracy has become the norm, it becomes more and more difficult for an authoritarian regime to motivate and legitimise its ruling for the people. The world has for many years, since the beginning of the third wave in 1974, seen an increase of democratic states (Diamond 2011). According to Freedom House's ranking from 2010, just before the Arab Spring, 87 countries in the world were ranked as 'Free', representing 45 percent of the world's states. Furthermore, 60 countries were ranked as 'Partly Free', or 31 percent of the world's countries. A total of 47 countries were deemed as 'Not Free' (Puddington 2011:21). As the data shows, a strong majority of the world's countries are either ranked as 'Free' or 'Partly Free'. This would support the idea that democratic values have become more widely accepted in the world. It would therefore be regarded as a threat to legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, and one factor behind the Arab Spring.

The second part is the regime's inability to maintain "performance legitimacy", which follows the first part. When democratic values become widely accepted in the world, it becomes crucial for the regime to legitimise its existence and its authoritarian system's *raison d'être* for the people. The risk is otherwise that people starts questioning the regime and raises demands for democracy. It is

therefore important for the regime to maintain its "performance legitimacy" which, according to Huntington, could fail due to an economic or sometimes military failure (Huntington 1991a:45-58). An economic failure could come in the form of rising food prices, increasing poverty and unemployment, as well as increasing inflation. In the Arab world many of these indicators of an economic failure were present during the time of the Arab Spring (The Economist 2011:26; Salih 2013:187; Hoffman & Jamal 2012; Joffé 2011). The economic failures in many of the Arab countries were unsurprisingly a problem for the regimes, which undermined their performance legitimacy. Globally this economic failure might have been sparked by the global financial crisis of 2008, which certainly affected the Arab countries (Ben-Meir 2012). Consequently, there was a global spike in food and energy costs in the second half of 2010, which had a direct impact on populations already living close to the poverty line in the Arab world (Joffé 2011:509). This is similar to the oil price hike of 1973-74, that triggered a global economic recession which significantly undermined Third World authoritarian regimes' efforts to use economic performance to bolster their legitimacy (Huntington 1991a:41-51). Whether the regimes were fully or partially responsible for the country's economic failure were of less importance as it threatened their legitimacy as an authoritarian regime.

When it comes to military failure, it is more difficult to discern a particular failure that might have threatened the performance legitimacy of the regime. Historically one of the most prominent examples of a "military failure", in relation to democratisation, ought to be Argentina. They were defeated by Great Britain in the Falkland war in 1982, which undermined the Argentinian military government, and led to an election of a civilian president and government the year after (Huntington 1991a:22f; 104f). However, it is difficult to distinguish a similar case of military failure in the Arab world prior to the Arab Spring. In the six countries selected for this study, only Yemen was in an armed conflict in 2010, according to UCDP's data[10]. The government in Yemen has, since 2005, an ongoing armed conflict with the *al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula* (AQAP) (UCDP 2010). It remains unclear, and needs further analysis, whether this armed conflict contained military failures that affected Yemen's performance legitimacy. However, it probably has a negative impact and contributed to the situation in Yemen.

The two parts of this factor - the widely accepted democratic values in the world and the economic or military failure are intertwined and depend on each other. Hypothetically, if democratic values were *not* widely accepted in the world, it is possible that authoritarian regimes would have maintained their performance legitimacy even when faced with economic or military failures. On the other hand it is possible that widely accepted democratic values would not have sufficed as a catalyst for democratisation on its own *if* the people in the Arab countries were

[10] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which collects information on a large number of aspects of armed violence since 1946. UCDP is a part of the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. - www.ucdp.uu.se/database

satisfied with their economic situation. Nevertheless this remains a hypothetical argument, as these two parts were clearly present in the Arab countries prior to the Arab Spring.

Could this factor then help to explain the variation of the state of democratisation in the six selected countries for this study? It is possible that in the three countries with a major political change, i.e. Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, the economic situations were worse than in Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco. Hence these authoritarian regimes were regarded by the people as responsible for the economic failure, and in Yemen even a plausible military failure. In the other group of countries, with minor political changes, the economic situations were better, and they were able to maintain their performance legitimacy. The data analysed in the previous section (see section 8.1) shows some support for the idea, the countries with minor changes were more developed than the other group. However, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant, and the data used is for economic development, and not a perfect indicator for "economic failure". Nonetheless it is an interesting idea, but would require a new set of data in order to analyse, to determine if there is support for this argument.

8.2.2 The unprecedented global economic growth

Huntington's second factor is the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and expanded the urban middle class in many countries (Huntington 1991b:13). This is certainly interesting as it strongly relates to the modernisation theory, but also somewhat conversely to the first factor.

The earlier part of the third wave was partly ignited by the strong global economic growth of the 1960s. However, contemporary events during the Arab Spring might also be traced back to a global economic growth. Globally we have seen an economic growth in recent years, albeit not unprecedented, but still significant. This shows how external factors, as a global economic growth, could affect internal factors in the Arab countries, which have naturally also experienced a strong economic development, especially in human development (Kuhn 2012). This was further analysed in the previous section, where the modernisation theory was used as an internal factor. However, it remains uncertain if recent global economic growth, could match the one in the 1960s. The recent years have more been defined by the financial crisis of 2008, than the global economic growth.

Relating to Huntington's first factor, at a first glimpse, it would appear as the third wave was both affected by economic failure, and by economic growth, a rather contradictory relationship. Yet, the indicators for economic growth in a country and for economic failure, or rather economic inequality, are not the same. As discussed in the previous part, it is possible that economic failure or economic inequality could have had some effect on the variation of the state of democratisation in the Arab Spring. While there has been an economic growth globally and in the country itself, this wealth and growth is not always equally distributed to the people. In relation to this, Thompson's article (1993), previously

discussed in the theory-section, could here be an interesting contribution to the discussion. He argues that Singapore and Malaysia were able to successfully legitimise their non-democratic rule by an outstanding economic performance, while at the same time limiting the income inequality in the country (Thompson 1993:471; cf. Acemoglu & Robinson 2006:353f). Seen in relation to the Arab Spring, it is possible that the economic failure in the Arab world is due to failure in limiting the income inequality. This does also relate to the first part regarding performance legitimacy.

8.2.3 The Snowballing-effect

The Snowballing-effect refers to the demonstration effect or transitions earlier in the third wave which stimulated and provided models for subsequent efforts at democratisation (Huntington 1991a:46). So where did the snowballing or the demonstration effect for the Arab Spring begin? With a strict interpretation of Huntington, it is likely that the models for the democratisation could be derived from those countries that experienced this wave earlier in the third wave. For instance Portugal and Greece in 1974, or Spain in 1975-1979, this would also represent the countries geographically closest to the Arab world (Huntington 1991a:21-24). One could here argue that the Arab countries sought inspiration from the democratisations in Europe between 1974 and 1979, and that this provided a model for them. However, the Arab Spring could also be regarded as a "delayed" third wave of democratisation. Whereas the events in Portugal and Greece represent the initial and founding inspiration or model for democratisation. It is likely that there was another democratisation closer in time that could be tied to the snowballing. Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, it is natural to assume that this was the strongest source of inspiration and also where the snowballing-effect started in this case. This is more probable than claiming that the Arab Spring was the immediate effect of what started in Portugal 1974.

How could this then explain the variation between the Arab countries in terms of their state of democratisation? The protests in Tunisia spread to neighbouring countries and further out in the region in a matter of weeks. The distribution of this news and the beginning of democratisation in Tunisia were fuelled and facilitated by far better means of communication than in the earlier stages of the Arab Spring. From the literature-review there is strong support for the idea that with the help of TV, phones, Internet, and social media, the people throughout the region were made aware of the news, and thus the snowballing had begun. The geographical proximity to Tunisia made no difference in this case. Protests sprung up in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen in January (see chapter 7), even in the remote corner of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman experienced its first protests as early as in January 17 2011 (Worrall 2012:98). Morocco and Lebanon joined the scene a bit later, in the end of February. Nevertheless, this does not indicate any significant discrepancy in the snowballing. The delayed outbreak in Morocco and Lebanon might not be that important as the Arab Spring eventually arrived there only a

month later. In the earlier stages of the third wave the snowballing took years, compared to a couple of weeks or months during the Arab Spring. It is practically impossible to prove that one single country was more or less affected by the snowballing. In a globalised world, it is natural to assume that the whole Arab world was affected collectively, rather than trying to measure the effect on each individual country.

8.3 Alternative explanations

After analysing the internal factors it seems there is rather weak support for the stipulated hypothesis that modernisation leads to democratisation, even when controlled for external factors. Those countries that have experienced major changes during the Arab Spring are in many ways similar in terms of modernisation as those with minor political changes. The result does indeed call for alternative explanations to why there is a variation between the countries and how their current state of democratisation could be explained. This chapter will therefore offer some suggestions for alternative explanations, by looking at the countries with minor political changes, i.e. Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco.

8.3.1 Jordan

Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont (2012) review different explanations as to why Jordan did not experience the same social uprisings as neighbouring countries did during the Arab Spring. One argument is that the situation in Jordan was not as severe as in other Arab countries, and the people's grievance was not nearly as acute. The protest movement did, for instance, not call for the toppling of the regime, but rather demanded political reforms. A national survey conducted by the *Center for Strategic Studies* at the University of Jordan showed that 80 percent of the national population did not support the protests, 55 percent of which claimed that these events "*led to chaos and sabotage and undermined security and stability*" (Helfont & Helfont 2012:90). The Jordanian society is also said to be divided between East Bankers and West Bankers, or Jordanians and Palestine descendants. There are as well ideological divisions in the country, where Islamists[11] are the most organised opposition here, but liberal youth activists are another driving force behind the Arab Spring in Jordan. The conservative elements, rooted in East Bank tribal politics, do also play a significant role in Jordanian politics. Although these groups do not trust each other, they do trust the king. Where "*Abdullah II is seen by most as an arbiter between various groups and a bulwark against the chaos that has engulfed neighbouring countries*". It is further suggested that the Jordanians favour economic reforms before political and democratic reforms (Helfont & Helfont 2012:84-91). The economic and political reforms that Jordan undertook during the Arab Spring were not the first in the country's history. The political re-liberalisation in 1989 is still regarded as the most important, but the king has traditionally used reforms when faced with

[11] The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest and most active faction here. The Jordanian Brotherhood's political party, The Islamic Action Front (IAF) is both tolerated and well integrated into the Jordanian political landscape (Helfont & Helfont 2012:87).

economic or political crisis in Jordan (Ryan & Schwedler 2004; Rumman 2012; Robinson 1998; Kamrava 1998). S.E. Finer (1970) described Jordan as a "façade democracy", the definition of a façade democracy was "*A system where liberal-democratic institutions, processes and safeguards are established by law but are in practice so manipulated or violated by a historic oligarchy as to stay in office*" and it "*is the palace that rules from behind the manipulated democratic forms*" (Finer 1970:441; 460f). Beverley Milton-Edwards (1993) revisited this notion years later and came to a similar conclusion, no evidence that contradicted Finer's classification of Jordan as a façade democracy was found. She further concluded that the democratisation process in Jordan was manipulated by the regime and the king to perpetuate their own rule (Milton-Edwards 1993:201). Glen E. Robinson did also study the reforms in Jordan, but gave it a different term. He called it a "*defensive democratisation*"-strategy. By undertaking sufficient reforms, but without altering the core structures of power in Jordan, the king was here able to assure his political longevity (Robinson 1998:387). Considering the Jordanian tradition of façade democracy or defensive democratisation, it might be suggested that the latest reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring is merely a way for king Abdullah II to placate the people and preserve his power, thus avoiding any major political changes.

8.3.2 Morocco

It is said that religious legitimacy could explain some part of the resilience of the monarchies in the region. Both king Abdullah II of Jordan and King Muhammed VI of Morocco claim to be descendants of Mohammed, which clearly gives them much Islamic legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens[12]. Muhammed VI had also begun modernising the state's government long before the Arab Spring, beginning from 1999 when he ascended the throne, with reforms aiming to reduce poverty and corruption, and to improve Morocco's human-rights record. The king's reforms have had positive effects in the last decades, for instance with reduced poverty, a more open political space, strengthened rights for women, and by allowing more political parties to function. The king's political and economic reforms combined with his religious legitimacy explain why he has been able to stick to power, at least for now (Miller 2011; Traub 2012; Joffé 2011:511). Morocco is said to claim that they have chosen a "third path" between democracy and tyranny in the wake of the Arab Spring, thus constituting the "Moroccan exceptionalism". However, while Morocco still has the same social, economic, and demographic problems that led to mass protests elsewhere in the Arab world,

[12] This share many similarities with the "divine right of king"-doctrine which was used to justify monarchy in early modern Europe. It claimed that kings "*received their earthly power by divine mandate and, as a result, could not be subject to any temporal or secular authority*". The king's right to rule was said to be based on the law of god and of nature, therefore active resistance to a king was a sin ensuring damnation (Reiner 2010; CEE 2013). Kings are only accountable to god alone according to this doctrine (Figgis 1914:5-8).

it is unlikely that the “third path” will be a realistic alternative to democracy in the long-run (Traub 2012).

8.3.3 Lebanon

The unifying characteristics of Jordan and Morocco are that they are both monarchies. By revisiting both the literature-review, but also empirical result, it clearly shows how monarchies have been particularly resilient in the face of political challenges like the Arab Spring. However this does not help explaining the case of Lebanon.

Lebanon has been regarded as a special case for many years, with its own transformational revolution, the Cedar Revolution, going on since 2005. Syria’s strong influence in the country has had its effect on Lebanon. For most Arabs, Lebanon has always been an anomaly (Kühnhardt 2012:59; Abrams 2012:27). Some Lebanese analysts and politicians have even claimed that the Arab Spring was inspired by the Cedar Revolution (Khashan 2011). Lebanon has a long-running system of confessional democracy, which reserves specific roles for different sectarian groups (Kuhn 2012:675f). As previously mentioned (see chapter 7; Hermez 2011), protests in Lebanon were more directed towards the sectarian political system than the regime itself. If we combine this with other factors such as the previous Cedar revolution, and that a strong human development has left them better-off than other countries in the region (Kuhn 2012:675f) – this might contribute to explain why Lebanon has not experienced any major uprisings during the Arab Spring. Revisiting the literature-review, and the Economist's "Shoe Thrower's index", Lebanon was among the countries with lowest vulnerability for revolution, and potential for unrest (the Economist 2011:26) It appears that there was a general weak support for protests in Lebanon, at least in comparison with neighbouring countries (Khashan 2011). However, there is still a lack of research on Lebanon in relation to the Arab Spring.

8.3.4 Summary

Jordan and Morocco share many similarities with Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, in terms of level of modernisation. They should therefore have - according to the modernisation theory and the stipulated hypothesis - experienced the same major political changes. However, a plausible explanation to this exception from the hypothesis could be the monarchical political system in Jordan and Morocco. The monarch’s legitimacy, and especially their religious legitimacy, offered a stronger support for them as leaders than the political leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. Another reason is the fact that both Abdullah II and Muhammed VI had already made many economic and political reforms in their countries, the people’s grievance were therefore not as acute as in other Arab countries. Both monarchs are also regarded as very skilful politicians, and have been able to abide to people’s demands without jeopardising their own political power. The terms of

façade democracy and defensive democratisation, previously mentioned, are truly vivid examples of this. In the case of Lebanon there are several factors that might explain why they did not experience any major political changes during the Arab Spring. While Lebanon had already experienced a civil war and a revolution of its own, it is plausible that the people were not as interested or keen to stage another uprising. Lebanon is also by far the most developed country in terms of economic development, compared to the other five countries in this study. Once again it might be suggested that the people's grievance were not as acute. The Lebanese sectarian political system could also have been a hindrance for an efficient uprising.

There are of course several other plausible alternative explanations explaining the state and variation of democratisation after the Arab Spring. The literature-review represents an overview of other research done in this area. For instance, the role of the GCC and Saudi Arabia, social media, and economic factors that take into account economic inequalities. However, to give these other factors a comprehensive and feasible analysis would require a study of its own. This section has instead focused on giving some alternative explanations to those countries with minor political changes, in relation to the purpose and scope of this study.

9 Conclusion

This study has focused on democratisation in the wake of the Arab Spring. Focus has lied on six selected countries. Half of them have experienced major political changes - Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen - while the other three - Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco – have had minor political changes during the Arab Spring. These two groups have been compared to each other in order to explain the recent political state of democratisation, as well as finding which factor(s) could explain the variation of democratisation between these two groups. This has been done with the help of the modernisation theory, which it has been tested for, while Huntington's theory about the third wave of democratisation has been controlled for. As a complement this study also reviews other plausible explanations for the state of democratisation and the variation between the countries.

Contrary to the modernisation theory and the stipulated hypothesis, this study has found no support for the notion that economic and socioeconomic development would explain the variation of democratisation in the six selected countries. The result does instead suggest that the countries with minor political changes were the most developed countries, however, this has not been fully supported, and is not statistically proven. It would rather be said that several of the countries show strong similarities in terms of development. This was also controlled for with Huntington's theory about the third wave of democratisation, which shows that several of the major factors that characterise the third wave of democratisation have also been present in the case of the Arab Spring. In other words, the external preconditions for a wave of democratisation were all fulfilled. The conclusion is that the variation between the countries in terms of the state of democratisation could not be explained by the modernisation theory. In the analysis of external factors there are some arguments connecting the Arab Spring with the global economic crisis together with the authoritarian regime’s economic failure. Alternative explanations that have been reviewed for this study suggest that the monarch’s strong legitimacy and willingness to make concessions, in the form of both political and economic reforms, might have saved Jordan and Morocco from any major political changes, while Lebanon seems to be regarded as a special case with a previous revolution.

The Arab Spring is in many ways an ambitious case to study. It has been particularly difficult to analyse because it is in many ways still on-going, and it is still very uncertain which direction it will take. Recent events in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen would even suggest that these countries are not developing towards a democracy. However, this study has focused on the initial phases of the democratisation in the year after the Arab Spring, and not the more recent events.

It is thereto important to note that the democratisation process takes time, and often decades. In Freedom House's latest edition (2012), Egypt and Tunisia have moved up from a rating of "Not Free" to "Partly Free", which should be seen as a good sign, while Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen remains where they were in 2010 (Puddington 2013).

9.1 Suggestions for further research

Throughout this study several interesting factors, apart from the modernisation theory, have been touched upon. Many of these other aspects and factors could certainly help further explain the variation of the state of democratisation during the Arab Spring. This section brings up three suggestions for further research on this topic.

While the modernisation theory seems to have had a weak explanatory power on the Arab Spring, both the literature-review and Huntington's theory, point out other economic factors. One interesting factor for future research would be to look at how the global economic crisis affected the Arab world as an external factor, and further look at each country to analyse how these were able to cope with it. Some countries were possibly more prepared and thus less vulnerable to the economic failure. For instance in the analysis with the modernisation theory, it was partly suggested that those countries with minor political change were more developed than the other group. It is possible that the people in these countries were hence less prone to uphold longer demonstrations and demand a regime-shift. This would however require another set of data, more than just variables focusing on economic development. It would here be important to look at different indicators for economic and social inequality, to measure the people's economic situation. Indicators such as number of people living in poverty, unemployment-rate, inflation rates, and wealth distribution, as well as food and energy costs.

The monarchy's resilience during the Arab Spring is also another important factor to take into consideration in future research. The major ruling monarchies in the world reside in the Arab world, and have so far been relatively unaffected by the Arab Spring. It would be interesting to widen the analysis and also include other absolute monarchies in the Arab world, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia. This would further test monarchy's resilience as an important factor.

In this study, six countries were selected for the analysis. Although, these countries only represent a small part of the whole Arab world. For obvious reasons it was not possible to include every country, as that would certainly have complicated the analysis. However, it still makes it difficult to draw any conclusion on the whole Arab world. For that reason, further research would

preferable include other countries in the region, and apply the same analysis on these. It is possible that this would generate a different result, or further strengthen the result from this study.

Executive Summary

On 17 December 2010, the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia. This act of protest, and desperation, became the catalyst - and marked the beginning - of the Arab Spring. It began with protests in Tunisia, but it soon spread across the whole Arab world, leaving virtually no country in the region unaffected. It caused a major turmoil and change, but to a very different degree depending on the country. In some countries there were major protests and unrest, sometimes leading to the government being overthrown, for instance as in Tunisia and Egypt, while the protests escalated to civil war in other countries like Libya and Syria. There were, however, several countries where the political unrest did not lead to any major changes, where the Arab Spring left the authoritarian regimes moderately unaffected. This illustrates a puzzling and interesting variation among countries in the region – countries that are in many ways similar - but where the Arab Spring had a very different degree of effect. How could this be explained, and which factors caused this variation of the state of democratisation? This study takes a closer look at the initial phase of the Arab Spring, and try to explain the variation in the state of democratisation.

The Arab Spring is a remarkable case of how civil protests and demands for political reforms could spread from one country to a whole region of countries in a matter of weeks. The Arab Spring as a phenomenon is highly relevant and topical as a case of democratisation within the field of Political Science. The Arab Spring is here studied as a case of democratisation or democratic transition. More precisely this study focus on the political state of democratisation in the countries in the region.

This is analysed with the help of the modernisation theory, while controlling for Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation. The preliminary hypothesis is that modernisation, in terms of economic and socioeconomic development, helps to explain the variation in the state of democratisation. While some countries have experienced a major political change after the Arab Spring, other countries only have a low degree of change, thus the state of democratisation varies a lot between the countries in the region. The aim of this study is to explain this variation. The dependent variable is therefore measuring the state of democratisation, after the initial part of the Arab Spring, separating between major and minor political change. In relation to the sub-question, this study aims to identify the factor(s) behind the variation of democratisation during the Arab Spring.

The main research-question:

- *How can the recent political state of democratisation, in the wake of the Arab Spring, be explained?*

Sub-question:

- *Which factor(s) could help to explain the variation of democratisation in the region?*

Within the toolbox of democratisation theories, two main types of theories have been selected in order to explain the recent state of democratisation. The first one is modernisation theory, which takes into account the states' internal features and characteristics (i.e. economic growth and socioeconomic development). This theory, originally formulated by Martin Seymour Lipset (1959), links economic development and democratisation together. The second theory discusses the external factors that are presumed to trigger a democratisation of a state. This theory assumes that a state's democratisation could be explained by more external and global factors, rather than just its internal characteristics. Samuel P. Huntington's (1991) idea about waves of democratisation is here the most prominent theory. According to his theory, democratisation has occurred in - so far - three successive waves in the world.

The chosen method is a comparative politics method known as the *most similar systems design*. The design of the method is created as a comparison between very similar cases, which only differs in the dependent variable. Simplified it means that *difference is explained by difference*. This is done with the assumption that it would make it easier to identify the independent variable which explains the outcome in the dependent variable. Ideally only one, or a few, independent variables will differ between the countries, and will consequently be regarded as the determining factor(s). This method is further complemented with a statistic method. The chosen cases are divided into two groups, conditional on the dependent variable. These two groups are compared, in order to measure if the difference between them are statistically significant. This method is a good complement to the comparison, as it will further strengthen the validity of the result.

Six countries, or cases, are selected for this study, based on four different criteria. The main criterion is that the countries are geographically located in the Arab world, the region where the Arab Spring occurred. These countries share many similarities when it comes to culture, language, and religion, thus suitable for a comparison in line with the *most similar systems design*. For theoretical reasons countries that rely heavily on oil and gas have been excluded from the comparison. These countries often represent an exception from the modernisation theory and thus it complicates comparison with the other countries. Syria has furthermore been excluded from the comparison as the civil war is still ongoing and its volatile status makes it an uncertain case for the comparison. Based on the dependent variable, two groups of countries have been selected. Countries that have experienced minor political changes - Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco - and countries that have experienced major political changes: Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen.

Instead of making its own operationalization, this study relies on the work done by Axel Hadenius, Martin Seymour Lipset, and Larry Diamond, in which they have applied the modernisation theory. However there are also some additional variables added in order to complement, as well as modernise the operationalizations, for instance a variable measuring the amount of internet and cell phone users, UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) is used as a complement for measuring socioeconomic development, and a Gini-index as a measurement of income inequality is used in order to measure the class structure. The indicators or variables are divided into three groups: economic development, socioeconomic development, and media exposure and mass communications. The material used for the analysis consists mostly of statistical data, i.e. quantified variables. One of the main criteria for the selection of data is that the data should come from a reliable and well-known source. The main source used for this analysis is the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank), it has been complemented - when needed - with data from the *CIA World Factbook*, as well as the *Quality of Government* (QOG) database.

The analysis consists of three parts. It begins with the analysis of the internal factors, in which the modernisation theory is tested on the Arab Spring. The second part is the external factors, here represented by Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation. Important to note is that this theory will only be controlled for, and not tested. The third and last part of this analysis offers some alternative explanations, while taking into account the result from the previous two parts. That part will take a closer look at the three countries that only experienced minor political changes, i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco.

Contrary to the modernisation theory and the stipulated hypothesis, this study has found no support for the notion that economic and socioeconomic development would explain the variation of democratisation in the six selected countries. The result does instead suggest that the countries with minor political changes were the most developed countries, however, this has not been fully supported, and is not statistically proven. It would rather be said that several of the countries show strong similarities in terms of development. This was also controlled for with Huntington's theory about the third wave of democratisation, which shows that several of the major factors that characterise the third wave of democratisation have also been present in the case of the Arab Spring. The conclusion is that the variation between the countries in terms of the state of democratisation could not be explained by the modernisation theory. In the analysis of external factors there are some arguments connecting the Arab Spring with the global economic crisis together with the authoritarian regime's economic failure.

Alternative explanations that have been reviewed for this study suggest that the monarch's strong legitimacy and willingness to make concessions, in the form of both political and economic reforms, might have saved Jordan and Morocco from any major political changes, while Lebanon seems to be regarded as a special case with a previous revolution. The monarch's legitimacy, and especially their religious legitimacy, offered a stronger support for them as leaders than the

political leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. Another reason is the fact that both Abdullah II and Muhammed VI had already made many economic and political reforms in their countries, the people's grievance were therefore not as acute as in other Arab countries. Both monarchs are also regarded as very skilful politicians, and have been able to abide to people's demands without jeopardising their own political power. While Lebanon had already experienced a civil war and a revolution of its own, it is plausible that the people were not as interested or keen to stage another uprising. Lebanon is also by far the most developed country in terms of economic development, compared to the other five countries in this study. Once again it might be suggested that the people's grievance were not as acute.

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11 Appendix A

11.1 Variables used in the analysis

In this chapter all the variables used for the analysis are listed. The description of each variable is derived from each source, in most cases the World Bank. For more information about each variable, see respective listed source.

11.1.1 Economic development

Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP 2008 $) – (ed_GNIpercapita)
Year of measurement: 2010
GNI (gross national income) per capita Sum of value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad, divided by midyear population. Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. When expressed in PPP US dollar terms, it is converted to international dollars using PPP rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP that a US dollar has in the United States (HDI 2010:224).

Source: UNDP
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf

Electric power consumption (kWh) per Capita – (ed_EnergyPerCapita)
Year of measurement: 2010
Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants.

The variable was computed by dividing each countries' total electric power consumption with the population, in order to have the variable in per capita.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) – (ed_Agriculture)
Year of measurement: 2010
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS

Industry, value added (% of GDP) – (ed_Industry)
Year of measurement: 2010
Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS

Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) – (ed_Service)
Year of measurement: 2010
Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The industrial origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS

Distribution of family income - Gini index - (ed_Gini)
Year of measurement: Jordan and Morocco 2007, Lebanon [data missing], Egypt 2001, Yemen and Tunisia 2005.

This index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country. The index is calculated from the Lorenz curve, in which cumulative family income is plotted against the number of families arranged from the poorest to the richest. The index is the ratio of (a) the area between a country's Lorenz curve and the 45 degree helping line to (b) the entire triangular area under the 45 degree line. The more nearly equal a country's income distribution, the closer its Lorenz curve to the 45 degree line and the lower its Gini index, e.g., a Scandinavian country with an index of 25. The more unequal a country's income distribution, the farther its Lorenz curve from the 45 degree line and the higher its Gini index, e.g., a Sub-Saharan country with an index of 50. If income were distributed with perfect equality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the 45 degree line and the index would be zero; if income were distributed with perfect inequality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the horizontal axis and the right vertical axis and the index would be 100.

Source: The CIA World Factbook
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html#48

Urban population (% of total) – (ed_Urban)
Year of measurement: 2010
Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS

11.1.2 Socioeconomic development

Human Development Index (HDI) value – (sec_Hdi)
Year of measurement: 2010
(Lebanon is not included in the HDI due to the unavailability of certain crucial data)

A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. (HDI 2010: & 224).

Source: UNDP
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf

Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) – (sec_Infant)
Year of measurement: 2010
Level & Trends in Child Mortality. Estimates Developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA, UNPD).

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN

Life expectancy at birth (Years) – (sec_LifeExpect)
Year of measurement: 2010
Life expectancy at birth Number of years a new born infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the infant's life (HDI 2010:224). The life expectancy at birth estimates are from World Population Prospects 1950–2050: The2008 Revision (UNDESA 2009d), the official source of UN population estimates and projections. They are prepared biennially by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division using data from national vital registration systems, population censuses and surveys (HDI 2010:140)

Source: UNDP
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf

Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) – (sec_Literacy)
Year of measurement: 2010 (For Morocco 2009, Tunisia 2008. Value missing in WBI-database for Lebanon, replaced with CIA world Factbook, year of measurement 2003)

Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and CIA World Factbook
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html

School enrollment, primary (% gross) – (sec_EdPrimary)
Year of measurement: 2010

Gross enrolment ratio. Primary. Total is the total enrollment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR

School enrollment, secondary (% gross) – (sec_EdSecondary)
Year of measurement: 2010
Gross enrolment ratio. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR

School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) – (sec_EdTertiary)
Year of measurement: 2010 (For Yemen 2007)
Gross enrolment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR

Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) – (sec_EducationSpent)
Year of measurement: 2010 (For Jordan 1999, Morocco 2009, Egypt and Yemen 2008)

Public expenditure on education as % of GDP is the total public expenditure (current and capital) on education expressed as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a given year. Public expenditure on education includes government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), education administration, and transfers/subsidies for private entities (students/households and other private's entities).

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS

11.1.3 Media exposure and mass communications

Telephone lines (per 100 people) – (me_Telephone)
Year of measurement: 2010
Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched telephone network and that have a port on a telephone exchange. Integrated services digital network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are included.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.MLT.MAIN.P2

Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) – (me_Cellphone)
Year of measurement: 2010
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology, which provide access to the public switched telephone network. Post-paid and prepaid subscriptions are included.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2

Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People) – (me_Newspapers)
Year of measurement: 1997-2004
Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a week and calculated as average circulation (or copies printed) per 1,000 people. Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (QOG Codebook 2011:199).

Source: QOG

Internet users (per 100 people) – (me_Internet)
Year of measurement: 2010
Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network.

Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2

12 Appendix B

This appendix contains the output from the statistical analysis.

12.1 Comparing mean values

This section contains the output from the statistical program SPSS. The used analyse-method is "Independent Samples T-Test", which is used to compare the mean values of the two groups of countries, and to test if there are any statistically significant difference between them. It is especially the two sided significance-test (column "Sig. (2-tailed)") that is important here (Körner & Wahlgren 2005:136-144; Esaiasson et al. 2012:389f). Neither one of the tested variables show a value below 0.05, which means that the difference between the two groups are not statistical significant on a 5% significance-level. It is therefore not ruled out that the difference between the groups are random.

12.1.1 Economic Development

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
							Lower	Upper
Gross National Income Per Capita (PPP 2008 $)	Equal variances assumed	,813	4	,462	2601,33333	3201,30982	-6286,92764	11489,59431
	Equal variances not assumed	,813	3,249	,472	2601,33333	3201,30982	-7158,37771	12361,04438
Electric Power Consumption (kWh) Per Capita	Equal variances assumed	1,087	4	,338	1798,20384	1653,69667	-2793,19417	6389,60186
	Equal variances not assumed	1,087	2,270	,379	1798,20384	1653,69667	-4564,28286	8160,69054
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	Equal variances assumed	-,485	4	,653	-2,00000	4,12311	-13,44758	9,44758
	Equal variances not assumed	-,485	3,124	,660	-2,00000	4,12311	-14,83107	10,83107

Industry, value added (% of GDP)	Equal variances assumed	-1,257	4	,277	-4,66667	3,71184	-14,97239	5,63906
	Equal variances not assumed	-1,257	3,974	,277	-4,66667	3,71184	-14,99888	5,66555
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	Equal variances assumed	1,000	4	,374	6,66667	6,66667	-11,84297	25,17630
	Equal variances not assumed	1,000	4,000	,374	6,66667	6,66667	-11,84315	25,17648
Distribution of Family Income, Gini Index	Equal variances assumed	1,367	3	,265	2,93333	2,14519	-3,89363	9,76029
	Equal variances not assumed	1,693	2,490	,207	2,93333	1,73237	-3,27737	9,14404
Urban population (% of total)	Equal variances assumed	2,075	4	,107	28,33333	13,65447	-9,57754	66,24421
	Equal variances not assumed	2,075	3,977	,107	28,33333	13,65447	-9,66470	66,33137

12.1.2 Socioeconomic development

Independent Samples Test								
		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
							Lower	Upper
UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)	Equal variances assumed	,419	3	,704	,0433333	,1035303	-,2861462	,3728129
	Equal variances not assumed	,467	2,973	,672	,0433333	,0927206	-,2532439	,3399105
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Equal variances assumed	-,806	4	,465	-12,00000	14,88474	-53,32667	29,32667
	Equal variances not assumed	-,806	2,689	,485	-12,00000	14,88474	-62,62070	38,62070
Life expectancy at birth (Years)	Equal variances assumed	,936	4	,402	2,86667	3,06141	-5,63317	11,36650
	Equal variances not assumed	,936	2,061	,445	2,86667	3,06141	-9,93812	15,67145
Literacy rate, adult total (%	Equal variances assumed	,612	4	,574	7,46667	12,20728	-26,42619	41,35952

of people ages 15 and above)	Equal variances not assumed	,612	2,489	,592	7,46667	12,20728	-36,31296	51,24630
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	Equal variances assumed	,184	4	,863	1,66667	9,04311	-23,44102	26,77436
	Equal variances not assumed	,184	3,797	,863	1,66667	9,04311	-23,97823	27,31156
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	Equal variances assumed	,576	4	,596	8,66667	15,05176	-33,12373	50,45706
	Equal variances not assumed	,576	2,990	,605	8,66667	15,05176	-39,32476	56,65809
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)	Equal variances assumed	,625	4	,566	9,00000	14,41064	-31,01036	49,01036
	Equal variances not assumed	,625	3,517	,570	9,00000	14,41064	-33,27597	51,27597
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)	Equal variances assumed	-,789	4	,474	-1,06667	1,35195	-4,82029	2,68696
	Equal variances not assumed	-,789	3,277	,483	-1,06667	1,35195	-5,17090	3,03756

12.1.3 Media exposure and mass communications

Independent Samples Test								
		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
							Lower	Upper
Telephone lines (per 100 people)	Equal variances assumed	,926	4	,407	4,33333	4,67856	-8,65642	17,32309
	Equal variances not assumed	,926	3,563	,413	4,33333	4,67856	-9,30968	17,97635
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	Equal variances assumed	,561	4	,605	12,00000	21,39055	-47,38968	71,38968
	Equal variances not assumed	,561	3,518	,609	12,00000	21,39055	-50,73934	74,73934
Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People)	Equal variances assumed	1,381	4	,239	27,94667	20,22998	-28,22076	84,11409
	Equal variances not assumed	1,381	2,745	,269	27,94667	20,22998	-39,95899	95,85233

Internet users (per 100 people)	Equal variances assumed	1,377	4	,241	13,50000	9,80742	-13,72977	40,72977
	Equal variances not assumed	1,377	3,957	,241	13,50000	9,80742	-13,84648	40,84648

12.1.4 Cluster analysis

This section shows a cluster analysis of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The method takes into account the value of each variable, in order to 'cluster' the most similar countries together. The variables have been standardised (Z-scores) in order to work properly with this method (Hair et al. 2010:509-534). The cluster analysis method used here is a hierarchical cluster, and the result is shown in the *dendrogram* below: