

“You cannot fly without wings”

- a post-development perspective on the failure of the Kosovo
cadastre reconstruction


Abstract

This thesis analyses the failure of the post-war cadastre reconstruction that has been taking place in Kosovo since 1999, from the perspective of post-development theory. The “failure” is to be understood not as that the project process failed, but that the project failed in the sense that the finished product (the cadastre register) is not being used to the extent it was intended and is therefore unable to deliver the intended benefits. The study is a single-case study and the main form of empirical material collection was made through semi-structured informant interviews while on a field trip to Kosovo during the spring of 2013. The analysis is made by comparing what post-development theory argues to be common reasons for the failure of development projects, with the reasons for the failure of the cadastre reconstruction. The conclusions are that while there are many ways in which the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction project can be understood, post-development theory can be used to form an explanation to the outcome.

Key words: Kosovo, development, cadastre, land administration, post-development theory

Word count: 19 992

Map of Kosovo



Pop: 1 800 000 (2012 est.)

Albanians: 88%

Serbs: 7%

Bosniaks: 2%

Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians¹ (RAE-group): 3%
(Ask 2013, CIA 2013)

¹Balkan Egyptians is an ethnic minority of Kosovo and Albania and should not be confused with African Egyptians.

List of abbreviations

EULEX: The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

KCA: Kosovo Cadastral Agency

KCSP: Kosovo Cadastral Support Programme

MCO: Municipal Cadastre Office

UN-Habitat: The United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNMIK: The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

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1 Introduction

Imagine a country without any basic administration of land. Imagine that tenure to land and property cannot be secured and that mortgage loans cannot be established as a basis for property improvement and business development. Imagine that the use and development of land is not controlled through overall planning policies and regulations. (Williamson et al 2010:ix)

Ever since man started to harvest, land and security of tenure have been crucial for survival. For this reason, systems in which information about land is organised and stored has been argued to play a critical role in economies; the way in which a country administers its land can have a profound effect on social equity, economic growth and environmental protection. (Williamson et al 2010:ix, Schmidt 2012:3) One of the most central concepts in land administration is the cadastre; namely the tool used to manage the small units of land, called parcels, that people use in everyday life. The use of cadastre registers in land administration is an old tradition, and ancient-Egypt registers have been found from as far back as 1000 B.C (Williamson et. al. 2010:46). The importance of security of tenure is regulated and discussed in a vast number of international declarations; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 17) states that 1) “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others”, and 2) “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property” (UN 1948). Land is the source of all wealth according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (2008:12). By that reasoning, “cadastre systems are vital for the welfare of the state and the benefit of the citizens” (UNECE 2008:25).

When Serb troops left Kosovo in 1999, the Balkan wars had come to an end. Kosovo was left in distress; years of conflict had left the region in pieces and a long strive towards reconstruction and – ultimately – independence lay before it. Towards the end of the war, most of Kosovo's cadastral documentation and land administration technology was destroyed or taken to Belgrade by the Serbs. In combination with years of discriminatory legislation impeding the rights for Kosovoalbanians to transfer and own property, the relocation and destruction of the archives led, according to numerous international agencies, to juridical, regulatory, fiscal and informational implications for the government and people of Kosovo, as there was no longer any way of knowing or proving what piece of land belonged to who, or the exact size and location of this land. (Meha et al 2004:2f, Un-Habitat 2004:10, Un-Habitat 2012b, Schmidt 2012:3)

There was a popular opinion in the international community that a reconstruction of the cadastre registers would be a crucial element in the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo and a valuable tool in contributing to sustainable development (Schmidt 2012:3), as a “functioning land administration system is the basis on which many other societal functions rest” (Williamson et. al. 2010:15). For this reason, and others which will be further discussed below, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) initiated the Kosovo Cadastral Support Programme (KCSP), consisting of the governments of Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, to reconstruct the cadastre register and to form and aid the Kosovo Cadastral Agency (KCA), a government agency intended to manage the cadastre management after the departure of the international community. The KCSP officially dissolved in 2003, but the international community, mainly UN-Habitat and the governments of Germany, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, have since then continued their support for the reconstruction and development of an accurate and effective Kosovar² cadastre register. (Meha et al 2004:2f) As of spring 2013, substantial parts of the reconstruction has been completed, new legislation for its management is in place and an agreement has been reached with Serbia regarding the relocation of the registers and technology that were taken in 1999 (Xhemajli 2012:15ff)

In spite of this, numerous sources suggest that few of the intended benefits of the project have been reached. Field research carried out in Kosovo in the spring of 2013 showed that after nearly 15 years of cadastre reconstruction, few people know about the existence or purpose of the register and yet fewer people are using it. (Interviews 4, 8, 16, 17)

1.1 Purpose and research question

Based on land administration theory, most recently summarised by Williamson et. al (2010) and the benefits of land administration, listed in the documents that have served as the guide for the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo, the starting-point for this thesis is the assumption that an accurate, publicly accessible, and widely used cadastre register has positive implications for the development of a nation, and that the lack of such has negative effects (Williamson et. al. 2010:15). Considering the fact that so much time and money has been invested in the reconstruction of the Kosovar cadastre register, vis-à-vis the fact that it seems as if it has failed to become an integral part of Kosovar society, the purpose of this thesis is to, from the perspective of post-development theory, suggest explanations to this outcome. Thus, this thesis aims to answer the following question:

²Kosovo is both the term used for things from Kosovo, and a demonym for people from Kosovo

RQ: How can post-development theory explain the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction?

Important to note is that the word "failure" in this thesis should not be understood as that the cadastre reconstruction failed because it has not reached its intended benefits (as this would imply a causal relationship between the reconstruction and the outcome which is difficult to establish, see 1.7.3). Rather, the word should be understood in the way it is used above; that the cadastre reconstruction failed in the sense that the finished product (the cadastre register) has *failed to be of use* in the Kosovar society.

1.2 Relevance of study

Up until recently, cadastre registers and their use in land administration have often been taken for granted and little attention has been paid to their importance. The recent economic crisis in the West has however led to an increased global focus on mortgage policies and land administration information, and what happens if such information is lost. (Williamson et al 2010:ix)

Written material on land administration suggests a rather uniform opinion that cadastre registers are crucial for the administration and economic advancement of a nation, and there is little to suggest the opposite. (USAID 2004:2, Williamson et al 2010, Un-Habitat 2012a, Österberg 2006, Meha et al 2004, Un-Habitat 2012b, Schmidt 2012:3). Creating or recreating cadastre registers is a central component in many development cooperation strategies and Sweden, a nation with a long tradition of cadastral registration, has worked with cadastre projects not only in Kosovo, but in many African countries (Österberg 2006:3).

However, there is comparatively little analytical material on the subject of the relation between cadastre reconstruction projects and development (UNECE 2008:21). In addition, UNECE argue that current approaches to cadastre reconstruction analysis are holistic and that reports regarding its relation to development are few (2008:24). While country-specific reports on cadastre reconstruction projects are possible to find, these seldom take into account the effects they had, or failed to have, on the society where they were implemented (2008:25). And most importantly for the purposes of this thesis; they do not attempt to explain cases of success or failure.

In addition, development (and post-development) academia is seldom associated with the countries in eastern Europe. Rather, one could argue there is a surplus of studies on the under-developed and developing countries on the southern hemisphere, and a deficit of studies of developing countries in Europe –

notwithstanding that Kosovo, together with Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova and Montenegro are still considered to be developing countries by the World Bank (2013). This academic literature deficit is also apparent in regards to cadastre projects. Most of the few country-specific cadastre (re)construction project reports that have been written in recent years concern mainly Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania (Österberg 2006:3, Williamson et al 2010:263, Un-Habitat 2012c). Based on the above, this research will be relevant for the fields of political science and development studies as it;

- 1) is one of few studies that analyses and theorises cadastre (re)construction as a development strategy,
- 2) discusses the development in the Balkans at a time when the development discourse tends to focus on other countries and regions,
- 3) applies post-development theory to a context in which it has been little applied before,
- 4) combines the above and contributes to the field of both development and land administration theory by presenting explanations on how failures of not only cadastre reconstruction projects, but development projects in general, can be understood.

For the Swedish reader interested in the development of the Balkans, this thesis will provide useful insights as the Swedish reform cooperation with Kosovo has had cadastre reconstruction as one of its priorities (Utrikesdepartementet 2009:6). For the reader interested in development policies and practices in general, the thesis is relevant as it discusses the gap between project planning and project results. For the reader with limited knowledge of political science or development theories, this thesis is of interest as the land administration discipline engages not only political scientists but urban planners, sociologists, human geographers, anthropologists, lawyers, land and resource economists and many others (Williamson et al 2010:5). It is hoped that the results of this study will spark interest for further studies on cadastre reconstruction failures and successes, and lead to improvements of practices for the future.

1.3 Making this researchable

Although the aim of this thesis is to suggest how post-development theory can explain the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction, this cannot be done unless the reasons for its failure are first discovered. The operationalization is thus twofold. To operationalize the research question, common reasons as to why development projects fail, as argued by post-development theory scholars have been analysed and summarised to form an analysis apparatus. Semi-structured

interviews – to some extent guided by the theoretical definitions given by post-development theory in order with Esaiasson et. al, who claim interview questions to be operational indicators of theoretical concepts (2012:242) – were then carried out while on an 8-week field visit in Kosovo in the spring of 2013, with the intention to conclude what the reasons the failure of the cadastre reconstruction were argued to be. These reasons were then compared to the analysis apparatus formed by post-development theory to see how the two sets of explanations corresponded.

1.4 Academic material

A wide selection of works has been used in order to develop the section on methodology; among others *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process* by Tim May, *The conduct of inquiry in international relations* by Peter T Jackson, *Att fråga och att svara* by Jan Teorell and Torsten Svensson, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Metodpraktikan* by Peter Esaiasson et. al. and *Case Study Research* by Robert Yin. For the section on interview method, not only a selection of the above-mentioned have been useful, but also *Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun* by Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, *Intervjumetodik* by Annika Lantz, and *The Great Interview*, by Joseph C. Hermanowicz³. To gain a deeper understanding of land administration theory and concepts, the extensive anthology *Land Management for Sustainable Development* by Ian Williamson et. al. has been of use. As a foundation for the understanding of post-development theory, *The Post-Development Reader* edited by Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree has been useful, as has *Geographies of Development*, edited by Robert B. Potter et. al, *The History of Development* by Gilbert Rist, *Doctrines of Development* edited by Michael P. Cowen and Robert W. Shenton, and others. Most of the empirical material was collected through interviews while on a 8-week field study in Kosovo in the spring of 2013. Secondary material in the form of reports from ministries and government agencies, both Kosovar and foreign, have been used to complement the interviews.

³Hermanowicz is a sociologist and the suggestions he poses are in many respects more inclined for sociological research than political science research. However, with some modification, it fits well also for the political scientist, especially when conducting semi-structured informant interviews.

1.4.1 Comments on academic material

A research using interviews as the main source for empirical material will naturally be facing problems with inter- and intra-coder reliability (Esaiasson et al 2012:64, 207). It would be near impossible for a future researcher to reach the exact same answers by consulting the same informants as i) a choice has been made not to disclose the identity of my informants and ii) even if the identity of the informants had been disclosed, chances are they would not respond identically, should they be asked the same questions once more. Information is perishable, and as time pass, peoples' perceptions of certain events will change – certain points will be forgotten, others will be remembered (Lantz 2007:59). For this reason, interviews were recorded, and what I regarded to be central information gathered from them was transcribed. A more substantial discussion of the possible pitfalls of interviews as a strategy for material collection can be found in section 3.3.

1.5 Delimitations

1.5.1 The problem of establishing causality

There are of course numerous explanations to the situation in Kosovo today. The conclusion that few of the benefits that the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction was intended to lead to are present in Kosovo today is not necessarily proof that the outcome would have been any different had the project been handled differently. Establishing a causal relationship between the cadastre reconstruction and the current level of development in Kosovo is in other words difficult. However, this thesis holds no such aspiration. The aim is rather to explore how post development theory can explain why the cadastre – a development strategy introduced with the intention that it would be not only beneficial to a series of immediate goals in itself, but a solid base on which other development projects could rest – is not being used. For this reason, analytical attention will not be given to the other challenges that are standing in the way for development in Kosovo, and no assumption should be made that the failure of the Kosovo cadastre is the sole reason as to why the country is struggling.

1.5.2 The theoretical framework

There are naturally many ways in which the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction can be understood. The explaining factors that could be drawn from the material could for example be analysed by help of theories on social capital or institutionalism. This thesis is limited to investigating how post-development theory can explain the case at hand. This choice has been made for two main reasons: out of interest for post-development theory, and as post-development theory has been little applied in research on development projects targeting European countries in the past (as mentioned in section 1.2)

1.5.3 The many explanations of post-development theory

Post-development theory presents a large number of reasons as to why development projects fail. This thesis presents and makes use of only a selection of these reasons. This choice was made for reasons of comprehensibility – collecting all what post-development theory gives as reasons to the failure of development projects would be a too big task which would not fit into the scope of this thesis. A strategic selection of reasons, based on what is considered to be the most wide-spread reasons given, has thus been made.

1.6 Definitions

For the sake of clarity, some initial definitions need to be made.

- A *cadastre register* – the term *cadastre* will be used synonymously – is a register of property showing the extent, value, and ownership of land for taxation. (Williamson et. al. 2010:47).
- The meaning of *cadastre reconstruction* will be further elaborated upon below. In short, it is the process in which land parcels are remapped, and cadastre register information is recreated (meaning, re-registered to owners)
- *Land administration* refers to the process in which information about land (cadastre registers) is managed (Williamson et. al. 2010:5).
- In land administration theory, *land* is defined as “resources, buildings, and the marine environment – essentially, the land itself and all things on it, attached to it, or under the surface.” (Williamson et. al. 2010:5)
- The meaning of the term *property* can of course be debated from both a juridical, political and philosophical standpoint. This thesis uses the juridical definition,

and equals property to an: “article, item, or thing owned with the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment, and which the owner can bestow, collateralize, encumber, mortgage sell or transfer, and can exclude everyone else from it”. (Businessdictionary)

- *Development* and *underdevelopment* and developing vs. developed countries, are terms that are not uncomplicated to define, especially in a thesis using post-development theory as the basis for analysis (Rist 2006:8ff) and some would argue that these terms should not even be used (Rist 2006:8ff). Regardless, the terms developed, underdeveloped and developing are the ones that will be used in this thesis. There is no standardized definition of development, but Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, suggested that a developed country is “one that allows all its citizens to enjoy a free and healthy life in a safe environment” (Annan 2000). That Kosovo is classified as a developing country by the World Bank (World Bank 2013) has served as the basis for discussion in this thesis. In this terminology, development means the process of moving from underdeveloped to developed.
- *Sustainable development*, defined in the Brundtland report as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (UN 1987) is a mode of development that highlights resource responsibility. The concept of sustainable development is typically viewed in three interdependent dimensions: economic, sociopolitical and environmental. (Williamson et. al. 2010:8)

1.7 Disposition

This introduction will be followed by a chapter on the theoretical framework of this study. It will briefly touch upon the subject of importance of theory for methodological choices, and the epistemological considerations guiding this research, before turning to the theoretical foundation for this thesis, namely post-development theory. The chapter will discuss the emergence of this school of thought and its main points; focusing on reasons to why development projects fail. These reasons will form an analysis apparatus which will guide the analysis at a later stage. Chapter 3 will present the methodological considerations and choices that have been made in this thesis. Focus will be turned towards the case study method; prerequisites of case studies, case study research design and common critiques. The remainder of the chapter will present the method of interviews, why semi-structured such were considered to produce the most fruitful results for this thesis, how informants were chosen and how their answers were interpreted and coded. Chapter 4 provides the reader with background information of the justifications made, the intended benefits of, and the process of the cadastre

reconstruction and will thus form a necessary base for chapter 5, in which my material is presented. Chapter 6 will contain the analytical stage of this research by combining the material from chapter 5 with the analysis apparatus formed in chapter 2. My conclusions will be presented in chapter 7.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 The importance of theory

Theory, a “theoretical description of why actions, occurrences, structures and thoughts occur” (Yin 2007:48, my translation), plays an important role throughout the research process, and is highly influential in research design (Yin 2007:48, Merriam 1994:70). It is necessary to lay out a theoretical framework about what is to be studied before the data collection begins as the theory will decide what data is of value. (Yin 2007:47f) Theory formation is however not only crucial to the process of data collection, but for the generalisations the study will be able to generate, as case study research generates analytical (or theoretical) generalisations (Yin 2007:28), rather than statistical generalisations, meaning that case study findings will be generalisable across theoretical hypothesis, rather than populations. (Yin 2007:28).

Broadly speaking, theory can be used in research in three ways. Theory developing research, just like the name implies, aims to expand or refine already existing theories, or to create new such. Theory testing research is in a sense also theory developing as its aim is to test if a theory that holds in a certain number of cases also holds in a new one. Theory consuming research uses already established theories to explain a certain outcome (Esaiasson et. al 2012:35ff). Post-development theory is not only a theory, but a mindset that takes a stand against popular discourse (Escobar 1997:80ff). As a pre-requisite for the theory is that the very concept of development is reprehensible, using it for aims of theory testing might yield few results; the post-developmentalists will often get results that proves his or her point. A theory developing aim is best put to use in comparative research, and therefore not applicable to this study. The aim for this research is to see how post-development theory can explain the outcome of the cadastre reconstruction project in Kosovo, making it an example of theory consuming research.

2.2 Epistemological considerations

How you view the world, yourself as part of that world, and how it is possible to make sense of the world affects the way in which you obtain knowledge and what you can make of it (Jackson 2011:34). For this reason, a discussion on the theory and philosophy of science must be had. In considering the relationship between the researcher and the world, Jackson (2011) presents two ontological wagers that create four main ways of acquiring and understanding knowledge – the first wager being that between mind-world dualism (meaning that the mind and the world can be separated) and mind-world monism (meaning that the two are inseparable). Mind-world dualism claims that it is indeed possible to study the independent world as it exists independently of us. In this line of thought, knowledge means to have knowledge about the world (to "record" the world), as there are general laws making un-contingent knowledge possible (Jackson 2011:35f). Mind-world monism holds that the world cannot be studied as in independent unit, as mind and world are interdependent. In this reasoning, knowledge is a concept that is difficult to grasp as truth is dependent on the researcher and therefore ever-changing (contingent knowledge) (Jackson 2011:35).

The second wager concerns what is to be considered as basis of knowledge. Here, just as above, two distinctions can be made; phenomenalism and transfactualism. According to the former, knowledge is based on what is observable. According to the latter, knowledge can be based on observable and unobservable features of reality. The two can be used in combination; the researcher uses phenomenalism to gather material and create knowledge of that material. Through transfactualism, conclusions can then be made that can be generalised to a greater population. (Jackson 2011:37). The two wagers create a matrix with four basic approaches to the world and to knowledge; neopositivism, analyticism, critical realism and reflexivity.

Table 1, Philosophy of science

	PHENOMENALISM	TRANSFACTUALISM
DUALISM	Neopositivism	Critical Realism
MONOISM	Analyticism	Reflexivity

Like mind-world monism, I do not believe that mind and world can be separated but that truth is ever-changing and knowledge therefore contingent. Like transfactualism, I believe that it is possible to form knowledge also about what cannot be observed. For this reason, this study places itself in the bottom right

corner of the above matrix. This means that my results will be affected by the methodological choices I make. (Jackson 2011: 159, Yin 2007:138) This highlights the question of intersubjectivity and reliability which will be further discussed in chapter 3.

2.3 Post-development theory

Post-development theory is a collection of theories that hold that the concept and practice of development, "a historically bigoted civilizing mission" (Keene 2007:1), is a Western-Northern ideological colonisation of the "underdeveloped" world that enables the rich to live off the poor, the spread of Western culture and values and the simultaneous destruction of local such (Mohanty 1984:61, Rist 2006:10, Escobar 1997:85).

2.3.1 Background

To understand the reasoning behind post-development thought, some attention must be paid to development theory. The start of modern development theory has been argued to be 1949, when former president Truman gave rise to "the era of development" in his inaugural address (Potter et. al. 2008:6, Cowen and Shenton 1996:6). The address highlighted the need for the industrialized countries to make "the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas"(Truman 1949) and marked the starting point of development as we know it today; not because development cooperation strategies and politics were entirely new, but because the term "underdeveloped" was coined and placed into daily political speech (Rist 2006:21ff, Cowen and Shenton 1996:6). This, according to post-development thought, created a hierarchy in which "underdeveloped" was unwanted, and that in the years to come, the development process came to mean a move from traditional societies to (market) economy, bringing with it not only economic, but political, social and cultural trend changes. (Rist 2006:21ff).

2.3.2 Main points

Post-development theory emerged during the 1980's as a reaction against development theory, claiming it to be a socially constructed ideology based on and directed by western political and economic norms and perceptions of reality, dominating the way we view other cultures and the meaning of being developed.

(Rist 2006:21ff, Nandy 1997:169). It was also a reaction against current development approaches which were claimed to be so ingrained in (western) minds, there was little critical debate about their supposed benefits (Escobar 1997:80ff); Arturo Escobar and Ivan Illich were some of the first writers in the field and have been followed by academics such as Gustavo Esteva, James Ferguson, Serge Latouche, Majid Rahnema, George Rist and Wolfgang Sachs.

The post-development theorist claims that development theory depicts the "underdeveloped world" as primitive, while the contrasting developed West is progressive (Loomba 2005:36, 113, Potter et al 2008:52, Nandy 1997:168). The terms developed and underdeveloped create a conflict of values where the underdeveloped is inferior and dependent on the developed to change; to become developed, which when looking at the terminology of the two words is the undisputed goal (Escobar 1997:87ff). Such depictions wrongly justifies the developed countries interventions in the underdeveloped, which brings with it an ideological colonisation of local political practices, culture and traditions. This change is not only an effect of development projects, but a goal; a prerequisite for the success of development projects is that the political and economical system of the recipient country must change. (Escobar 1997:91)

Post-developmentalists thus criticize the very reasons for development, which they claim to be a way in which the West, through a self-imposed superiority of knowledge and world-views, defend their right to intervene in other cultures and economic systems (Kapoor 2002:648, Mohanty 2008:24), recreating the Western hegemony that had supposedly ended with the end of the colonial era (Rist 2006:21ff). The development process itself therefore becomes a socially constructed process in which Western authority maintains and recreates itself by determining not only the direction and implementation, but the outcome of development projects (Mohanty 1984:61, Rist 2006:21ff, Escobar 1997:85) But, as Keene puts it, "perhaps constantly intervening, planning, representing, mobilizing is not 'empowering' at all. Perhaps the most effective aid is quite specific and only given when requested."(Keene, 2007:21)

The post-development field can be broadly divided into two groups. The first-wave post-development theorists draw heavily on the Foucauldian and post-structuralist school of thought (Ahorro 2008:2) in that they problematize the aspects of politics and power, and often reject the concept of development altogether, calling for alternatives *to* development. The second-wave post-development theorists are less extreme and attempt to understand how and why development projects fail (Ahorro 2008:3), in order to better development practices for the future, as "the goal of improving people's lives must not be abandoned" (Ahorro 2008:3) While agreeing with the first-wave scholars that the "post-World War II development endeavor may be obsolete and bankrupt" (Ahorro 2008:3), second-wave post-development scholars call for *alternative* development, or a "new way of changing, of developing, of improving, to be

constructed in the place of the ruin of the post-World War II development project” (Matthews, 2004:367ff), a possible response to Sachs claim that development practice is “a ruin in the intellectual landscape.” (1992:1) This alternative development should come from within; meaning from the local populations of the countries in question.

Based on the above discussion, this study places itself in the second wave of post-development theory, in that it seeks to explain the outcome in Kosovo, and not to dismiss the project altogether.

2.4 Why do development projects fail?

Post-development theory claim several reasons (the word “explanations” could be used synonymously) to the failure of development projects, most of which can be traced to the claim unequal power relations between the developed and under-developed, creating a situation that is inherently unjust (see for example Rist 2006, Keene 2007, Kapoor 2002, Mohanty 2008, Escobar 1997, Tandon 2000, Loomba 2005). To facilitate analysis, a selection among the most common reasons has been made. Three of the most widely acclaimed reasons to the failure of development projects are that development project plans,

- give little or no regard to the complex context in which they are introduced,
- are too problem orientated and seldom well-fitted for the problem at hand, but tend to be either over generalised and superficial,
- are formed on basis of a development culture (Keene, 2007:2)

Let us explore these three reasons a bit closer as they, together with a few sub-reasons (in bold, below), will be used to form the analysis apparatus in a later stage.

2.4.1 Development projects disregard complex contexts

A common claim in post-development theory is that project planners take little or no regard of the historical, political, social, economic and environmental contexts in the society in which the development project is introduced (Kapoor 2002:648, Mohanty 2008:24, Escobar 1997:91). One reason for this is rather straightforward, but nonetheless problematic: Project planners at international organisations, while experts in their respective fields, are continuously moved to different missions or

placements, meaning that they will often have an inadequate understanding of the socio-economic context of the country in which they are currently stationed. (Keene, 2007:3). In order to be able to work in societal contexts which are both unfamiliar and complex, simplifications of the situation at hand are made, creating parallel realities. This creates a number of problems: When these parallel realities, or **simplifications of reality**, are used as justification for the implementation of a certain development project, there is a chance projects will fail to reach their intended benefits as they are developed for much simpler situations than the factual (Escobar 1997:91). Planners that fail to consider the reasons as to why a (perceived) problem exists create a situation in which **problems are targeted for the wrong reasons**, meaning that the applied remedy will not be successful (de Senarcales 1997:193). On a side note, development project planners that fail to take note of the local history in the implementation of a development project risk re-wakening or worsening (ethnic) violence or problems such as corruption and nepotism by deconstructing local systems or awarding power to the wrong groups. (Keene, 2007:4) But over-simplifications of contexts can lead to not only problems regarding justifications and implementation of development projects, but to more structural issues, threatening the success of implementation: **Without a thorough examination and consideration of the adopting capabilities** of the target community, such as infrastructure, competence and public opinion, chances are that the initiative will have little effect (Keene, 2007:7f). In Keenes words,

Although technology and cheap hardware are necessary /.../, they must be accompanied by the necessary 'software' to make the project sustainable and include the benefiting community. The term software includes more social science-related practices like capacity building, qualitative assessments, health and education programs, and the creation of management/maintenance schemes according to social structures, dynamics and demands. (Keene, 2007:24)

Lastly, an initiative that has introduced by international aid workers and subsequently handed over to local authorities might, if the authorities for one reason or another cannot sustain it, create public distrust in not only local authorities, but the international agent that introduced it.

2.4.2 Development projects are un-holistic and un-strategic

Development projects should be both holistic and strategic. Holistic, in that they on basis of a multidisciplinary definition of development such as that put forward in the Brundtland report seek to achieve positive changes across a multitude of societal realms. Strategic, in that each intervention is limited to only those area(s)

where change is needed, that the interventions are carefully planned to only target the specific area(s) it is intended for, and that the outcome should be the most positive possible (Keene, 2007:12). Unfortunately, many development projects fall short of this ideal, creating a multitude of reasons as to why development projects fail. According to many post-development theorists, **development plans focus too much on economic development** and too little on other aspects of society (Rist 2008:25ff, Potter et. al 2008:4, Ramonet 1997:180, de Senarclens 1997:191f), which will have detrimental to the success of development projects as

...the focus on economic development rather than a holistic approach to development /.../ ends up negatively impacting other important realms of development. (Keene, 2007:12)

In addition, post-developmentalists claim that development discourse views developing countries not as separate countries but as, at best, a few rather homogenous groups. This, in combination with the assumption that development plans are devised under pressure of time and money, while wanting to do too much too fast, leads to plans being large-scale and therefore ill-equipped for local contexts, or **too complicated to be practically applied in the given context**. (de Senarclens 1997:193)

2.4.3 Development projects are the product of development culture

The culture of development planners – as created in the multinational, western-dominated, and rather closed environment of international organisations – is an important factor in the outcome of development initiatives (Escobar 1997:91. Shiva 1997:161) and defined as a ”cultural paradigm that perpetuates unsustainable development based on narrow-mindedness, /.../, exclusion, rigidity and a lack of feedback and accountability” (Keene 2007:2)

In *the White Mans Burden*, economist William Easterly differentiates between two types of actors; ”planners” and ”searchers” (Easterly 2006:5)

The Planner is characterized as a good-hearted, but isolated bureaucrat who /.../ resigns himself to reformulating problems so that they seem to fit the solutions he has devised. On the other hand, the Searcher is /.../ in tune with reality, its whims, resources, demands and many competing interests. (Keene 2007:17)

Planners, he argues, are those that are dominating and directing current development discourse, planning and practice, which has led to it being bureaucratic and inapplicable to real-life situations (see above). As Keene notes:

”Sometimes the solution needed might be something academic, political or religious. Too often development planners shut their eyes to these other possibilities.” (Keene 2007:19). This is worsened, argues post-development theory, by the assumption that the development community consists of mainly western staff, generating **projects implemented on basis of western values** (Escobar 1997:91), which will be unsuccessful as what a development worker “considers a viable livelihood and way of living cannot be simply planted /.../ into a new environment and be expected to take root.” (Keene 2007:20).

Development workers functioning in homogenous professional surroundings in combination with them having the power to control the general direction of development programmes leads to the practice of top-down planning, and repeated exclusions of local populations (Rist 2008:4ff) as projects are implemented without first consulting with local populations;

Planners still have a hard time figuring out how to help without dominating and who to include, when and how they should be included (Keene 2007:20).

As an effect, **projects are often not based on the demands or the needs of the community**. But even in cases where local communities are consulted, these **consultations tend to reach the more privileged groups of society** as those groups are easier to reach and have more incentives and possibilities to make their voices heard. This leads to a reinforcement of pre-existing power dynamics and uneven development across the country. (George 1997:213, Sachs 1997:296) Lastly, **ownership of specific projects is often unclear and there are few means or efforts made to carry out long-term evaluations**. It is therefore not always clear who should be held accountable when a project is facing difficulties and how such difficulties should be explained (Brett 2003:13). Not only is this a problem in itself, but it creates structural problems for future development initiatives and the sustainable development of a nation: “planners with no feedback and accountability cannot impose a system of feedback and accountability.” (Easterly 2006:116)

2.4.4 Analysis apparatus

Based on the above, the following table has been devised, illustrating post-development theory explanations to the failure of development projects (in the left-hand column). The table will at a later stage form the basis for analysis together with the empirical material collected from the interviews (which will be sorted into the right-hand column). It thus serves as the analysis apparatus of this thesis and will be referred to as such. The cells in the table should not be seen as mutually excluding – many of them will incorporate the others. Structuring the

theory into comprehensible categories was however necessary to facilitate the analysis.

Table 2, Why do development projects fail?

Development projects disregard complex contexts	
Post-development theory	Reason for failure
Projects are developed for simplifications of reality	
Problems are targeted for the wrong reasons	
Project planners make little consideration of adopting capabilities	
Development projects are un-holistic and un-strategic	
Post-development theory	Reason for failure
Project plans focus too much on economic development	
Project plans are too complicated to be practically applied in the given context	
Development projects are the product of development culture	
Post-development theory	Reason for failure
Projects are implemented on basis of western values	
Projects are not based on the demands or the needs of the community	
Consultations reach only the more privileged groups of society	
Ownership is unclear, meaning few means or efforts for long-term evaluation	

3 Method

3.1 Research strategy

A research strategy is a way of studying an empirical theme by following a set of previously specified procedures. (Yin 2007:34) From an epistemological perspective, most research strategies are the same. Methodologically, however, research strategies differ from each other in terms of procedures for case selection, operationalization and uses of different kinds of logic (George and Bennett 2005:5, Yin 2007:6). For this reason, different research strategies have different comparative advantages and disadvantages; certain types of strategies, or methods, are better equipped to answer certain types of research questions, and different kinds of methods can reach very different kinds of answers to the same research question (George and Bennett 2005:5, Merriam 1994:20, Yin 2007:27). In other words, the type of method chosen will influence the analysis and the results. When deciding on what method to use for a research project, the researcher must therefore not only give thought to the research question, but also to how the material required to answer the question is intended to be collected, and of what kind the material will be; namely what research strategy to use (Yin 2007:18, George and Bennett 2005:8).

3.1.1 Choosing an appropriate research strategy

Yin argues that the researcher on basis of a few factors can determine which type of research strategy is suitable for a certain research proposal (Yin 2007:25). In this reasoning, the case study method should be the more suitable for my research as the question is of the type how-/why, there are limited or no opportunities for controlling events⁴, and the focus lies on current occurrences, observed by help of direct observation and interviews. (Yin 2007:2, 17, George and Bennett 2005:6, Merriam 1994:21f).

⁴One must however keep in mind that a researcher carrying out interviews might involuntarily manipulate informants unless sufficient care is taken when preparing the interview guide (George and Bennett, 2005:99, Yin, 2007:25). This will be discussed in the interview section below.

3.2 Case study

The case study is a challenging method to use in a research purpose within the social sciences, yet one that is of use in situations where the aim is to contribute to the accumulated knowledge about individual, group-related, organisational, social and political occurrences (George and Bennett 2005:9, Merriam 1994:20, Yin 2007:17). According to Yin, the need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena as "the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events." (Yin 2007:2, my translation) George and Bennett define the case study as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events." (George and Bennett 2005:5) and the aim of it to be to "analyse phenomena /.../ in ways that would draw the explanations of each case of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory." (George and Bennett 2005:67) The case study can be divided into three different types depending on its aim, which can be i) exploratory, ii) descriptive or iii) explaining. While the three are not mutually excluding (Yin 2007:21, Merriam 1994:40), this thesis holds mainly explanatory aspirations.

3.2.1 The importance of validity and reliability

Validity and reliability are central to scientific research (George and Bennett 2005:19, 107, Merriam 1994:174). Validity concerns the question if the researcher is researching what he or she – on the theoretical level – has set out to do, while reliability concerns the accuracy in which the operational indicators are put to work (Merriam 1994:174). The following section will discuss these prerequisites and what measures I have taken to assure high validity and reliability in this research.

On the subject of validity an initial distinction can be made, namely that of external and internal such. *External validity* concerns the generalisability to cases outside that which has been researched, and is the instance where the case study most often meets challenges for reasons discussed below. While it is hoped that the results of this research will be generalisable outside Kosovo, theory consuming research tends to put more focus on the case itself and the value of internal validity, and less on external such (Esaiasson et al 2012:88). An attempt to increase the external validity has however been made by having a clear theoretical connection, in order with Yin (2006:57) and Esaiasson et al (2012:90). The remainder of this section will discuss the different aspects of *internal validity*, namely the extent to which viable conclusions about the case at hand can be

drawn (George and Bennett 2005:21f, Esaiasson et al 2012:90, Merriam 1994:177).

Conceptual validity, or the absence of systematic errors, regards the connection between the theory, the operationalization and the material (Esaiasson et al 2012:57). If the operational indicators do not correspond well with the theoretical definitions the researcher will constantly collect inaccurate information and draw inaccurate conclusions, producing results that are neither valid nor reliable (Teorell and Svensson 2007:237, George and Bennett 2005:19, Esaiasson et al 2012:57, Merriam 1994:174ff). As (post-development) theoretical definitions have guided the material collection for this research my theoretical definition and operational indicators are very closely linked. This should increase the conceptual validity, as conceptual stretching is less of a problem when the distance between the theoretical definition and the operational indicator is short (Esaiasson et al 2012:59).

However, conceptual validity does not ensure viable results. The operational indicators must be used correctly to ensure reliability in research. *Reliability* – the absence of unsystematic or random mistakes, can thus be understood as a measure of the diligence with which the research is carried out. One of the reasons to recording all my interviews, and adding a rather extensive appendix to this thesis stems from the argument that the researcher wanting to increase reliability must carefully document each significant step of the research process (Merriam 1994:180). This should be especially important when the main form data collection is made through interviews (see section 1.5) as intra- and inter-coder reliability (Esaiasson et al 2012:64, 207) would be de facto inexistant without it. To further contribute to high reliability, information has been triangulated, by letting more than one empirical source (informant) answer the same question (Merriam 1994:133).

Based on the above discussion, the *result validity* of this research should be high as it is dependant on both conceptual validity and reliability. (Esaiasson et al 2012:63)

3.2.2 Case study prerequisites and design

Case study research needs to be structured, in that the questions asked of the case (or cases) must be carefully prepared so that they fit the research objective and theoretical focus of the study (George and Bennett 2005:73f) so that “an orderly, cumulative development of knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question” can be made (George and Bennett 2005:70). It needs to be theory oriented, to avoid accounts that are too descriptive or that fail to make generalisable conclusions. It needs to be focused (George and Bennett 2005:73), in that the researcher must sure that the class of events of which the case is part is

clearly defined, so that the chosen case is an instance of only one phenomenon. It should also limit the scope to only focus on a certain aspects of the examined case (George and Bennett 2005:68) The research objective should be clearly defined, as should the chosen method(s) for reaching that objective. The selection and analysis of cases should thereafter be guided by the objective and method(s) at hand. Lastly, the case study researcher needs to take measures to ensure validity in the collection and analysis of data and reliability in the conclusions made. (George and Bennett 2005:69) A comprehensible research design will contribute towards these criteria.

Research design, as defined by Nachmias and Nachmias:

...guides the researcher in the processes that concern collection, analysis and interpretation of data. It is a logical model for evidence or proof making it possible for the researcher to draw conclusions about casual relations between the studied variables (in Yin 2007:39, my translation)

Research design is the logic connecting the research question with the collection and analysis of data and the conclusions that will eventually be drawn (Yin 2007:37ff). It guides the researcher through the tasks of preparing for the study, collecting the material and analysing it to form conclusions. (George and Bennett 2005:73ff, Merriam 1994:24) A research design is also helpful as it will assist the intersubjectivity of the research, by keeping readers informed about the steps taken from the initial question to the final conclusions (George and Bennett 2005:86).

George and Bennett offer comprehensible suggestions for research design, consisting of five interdependent stages: i) specification of the problem and research objective, ii) development of a research strategy, iii) case selection, iv) describing the variance in variables, and v) formulation of data requirements and general questions (George and Bennett 2005:72, Yin 2007:40) The first step has already been carried out and explained above while the second step is dealt with in this chapter; the objective of this thesis is to explore how post-development theory can explain the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction by help of a single case study using semi-structured interviews as the main strategy for collecting material. A theory consuming single case study is the research strategy of choice and by using the reasons for the failure of development projects as a starting point for formulating the units of analysis (see table 2, section 2.4.4), interview questions were formed. After these initial stages however, my design differs slightly from that suggested by George and Bennett, in that the case of Kosovo was chosen at an early stage in the research process. The reason for this is that I find George and Bennetts suggestion of leaving the case selection process to step three out of five rather impractical and inapplicable other than in theory. In

addition, choosing a case after the specification of the research question and hypothesis might increase the risk of case bias, namely that the researcher knowingly chooses a case that will strengthen the hypothesis (Yin 2007:27). A discussion on the case selection process can however be found below. The fourth stage of George and Bennetts design suggestion is to consider how to describe the variance in the variables; in other words how to operationalize; how to measure (or code) the variables of interest (George and Bennett 2005:72). This will facilitate the analysis of the material as it organises, and in many cases simplifies, the data into more comprehensible groups. It is also of crucial importance to ensuring intersubjectivity and inter-codar reliability. (George and Bennett 2005:86) Discussions on operationalization and coding can be found in sections 1.3 and 3.3.3 respectively. The fifth and last step concerns that the research design should contain an idea on how the researcher intends to analyse the material, and is important for reasons of conceptual validity and reliability (George and Bennett 2005:86). It is problematic that there is not much written on the subject of case study analysis that can guide this researcher through this important step (Yin 2007:138). As mentioned above, the analysis will be made by seeing how the reasons for the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction fit in to an apparatus of analysis formed by post-development theory explanations to the failure of development projects. The material will be approached with a form of pattern matching. In short, this means that information units (the reasons given in my interviews) will be related to theoretical hypothesis (the reasons listed in post-development theory) (Yin 2007:45f, 145ff)

3.2.3 Case selection – the case of Kosovo

The single case of Kosovo has been selected on basis of the outcome of the cadastre reconstruction (a case of a failed development project) rather than on basis of the theoretical approach, in line with Esaiasson et. al. (2012:89) who argue that theory consuming research tends to put the case first and the theory second. The case was chosen as it is surprising that the cadastre reconstruction failed in Kosovo. To make a slight exaggeration to clarify this point; the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction, if one looks to land administration theory, *should have worked* but it failed to do so. Kosovo, as an European nation, shares many institutional qualities with western-European countries who have adopted and are making use of cadastre registers very similar to that which was implemented as part of the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo (Interview 1, 7, 16, 17). In spite of this, the project failed, and this fact makes the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo fruitful to study, as

...many lessons can be learned when you research a country close to your home. Kosovo is in Europe's backyard, on the boundary between developed and developing, western and eastern, northern and southern (Interview 9, also in interviews 2, 3)

By researching why a certain project failed (which will be done during the material collection phase of this research) in a country that is not so different from the countries by which it was devised, generalisations might be made that can later be applied when similar projects are applied to other countries (George and Bennett 2012:162f) – the challenges that stood in the way for the success of the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo are likely to be found, perhaps to an even greater extent, in countries less similar to the West. The above points make the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo an interesting case to research (George and Bennett 2005:83f, Merriam 1994:58), making it both a crucial case – in the sense that the reconstruction process should have worked but did not, and representative – in the sense that conclusions drawn from Kosovo can serve a basis for future studies of other cadastre reconstruction processes. (George and Bennett 2012:162f)

3.2.4 Case study critique

George and Bennett claim one of the main reasons for the case studies previously bad reputation to be that up until a few decades ago, most case studies were badly carried out, leading to results that were incomparable and ungeneralisable. (George and Bennett 2005:68, Yin 2007:27, also in Merriam 1994:45ff, Kvale 2012:283) They add that the case study strategy has gained new recognition over the last few decades, mainly because of better practices. (George and Bennett 2005:5). However, the case study method, just like any other method, faces critique that needs to be addressed.

Case studies are often criticized for being a form of soft research lacking precision, objectivity and stringency (George and Bennett 2005:22, Yin 2007:15, Merriam 1994:45) and claims that the case study is best used during an exploratory phase of a research project are not uncommon (Yin 2007:19). By this reasoning, the case study is reduced to a preliminary or preparatory research strategy which cannot be used to explain or develop existing theories (Yin 2007:21) Yin however, argues that not only is the exploring phase of research projects crucial to the development of any theory and therefore undeserving of its low status, but as mentioned above (section 3.2), that case studies are indeed of use for purposes that are descriptive or explaining (Yin 2007:21).

The perhaps most striking disadvantage when conducting case studies is that the results can be criticized in terms of generalisability or external validity. This is

a problem as “one of the chief goals of political science /.../ is to provide policymakers with generic knowledge that will help them form effective strategies.” (George and Bennett 2005:7). It is a common claim that conclusions reached in an individual case study are not generalisable to a larger population and that the case study is therefore unable to contribute to scientific development (George and Bennett 2005:22ff, Yin 2007:21, Merriam 1994:45ff). While this critique is not at all uncalled for, there are ways to meet this critique. While the findings of one isolated case study might be difficult to generalise, the same critique can be met by many other research strategies; a scientific experiment, for example, needs to be carried out many times before it can be argued to be generalisable to a greater population (Yin 2007:20ff). In cumulative research, the case study will therefore be a bridge between previous and future research and in time possibly become part of a generalisable theory. For this specific case study, the critique can also be met by the argument that external validity is secondary in theory consuming research (George and Bennet 2005:90).

3.3 Data collection: Semi-structured informant interviews

Interviewing is one of the most common methods in social science research, but also one of the most difficult to carry out for the unpractised researcher (Hermanowicz 2002:479, Merriam 1994:89). There are three main types of social science research interviews; structured, semi-structured and unstructured. What type of interview to choose depends on the aim of the research; to make a broad distinction, the structured interview typically generates data fit for quantitative conclusions, while the unstructured techniques (ranging from semi-structured to group) are more apt for research projects aiming for qualitative data. (May 2011:132). The aim of this research is qualitative, why the structured interview is inapplicable. On the other end of the scale, the unstructured interview is, as the name implies, open-ended, and the interviewee is allowed to speak very freely about the issue at hand. As I wanted to be able to maintain some direction of the interviews, the unstructured design was deemed inapplicable.

The data collection for this research has thus mainly been conducted through semi-structured interviews (May 2011:136, Merriam 1994:87, Lantz 2007:31). This type of interview has been chosen as by allowing open answers, a possibility to discover perspectives not already known is provided (Esaiasson et al 2003:278), while the researcher still maintains direction of the interview to a larger extent than in the unstructured design. (May 2011:132) The semi-structured design allows the researcher to ask follow-up questions, and ask if there is anything the interviewee wants to add (May 2011:134); crucial for this research as

the aim of each interview was to uncover previously unknown reasons for the failure of the cadastre reconstruction. The interviewees have filled the function of informants rather than respondents for the same reason (Esaiasson et al 2003:281, Lantz 2007:31).

3.3.1 Semi-structured interview design

Just like any other method, the researcher conducting semi-structured informant interviews will interpret the material used in his or her own way and thus end up with results that might be different from those that another researcher would reach (Merriam 1994:86). But the researcher carrying out this type of interviews will also affect the material given, meaning that he or she will influence the informant in one way or the other. The answers provided by the informant will depend not only on the questions asked, but how the questions are phrased and presented (Merriam 1994:89). When constructing the interview questions, the researcher must therefore take into account not only what information is desired, but what is the best way to extract that information (Kvale 2012:205ff, Merriam 1994:89, Lantz 2007:50, Esaiasson et. al 2012:264). The following section will discuss the process of preparing the interviews, a process that can be divided into three steps; creating a checklist, wording the questions and organising the questions.

The first step concerns the formulation of a check-list, namely that the researcher gives thought to what information is to be extracted from the interviews and lists this information in comprehensible categories. The check-list is not only vital as a basis for the formulation of interview questions, but by bringing both the questions and the check-list to the interview, the researcher will be able to make sure that he or she remembers to ask about all the desired information. The check-list can be found in the appendix, section 8.3.

For the second step – wording the questions – measures were taken to word each question clearly and concisely to avoid confusion (Esaiasson et. al 2012:264, Merriam 1994:93) as many writers on the subject argue that even if the informant is an expert in the field that is being researched, overly complex terms or expressions are unnecessary and that in contrast, there is a chance that the informant will open up and talk more freely about the subject if the researcher pretends to know a little less (Hermanowicz 2002:489, Lantz 2007:51). Measures were also taken to assure that no question was too long, but that complicated questions instead were given a set of sub-questions (Esaiasson et. al 2012:264)

Regarding the third step – organising the questions – interview method literature suggests that questions can be organised into groups according to their theme in order to allow the interview to flow freely and progress naturally. (Kvale 2012:120, Merriam 1994:93, Lantz 2007:51) My interviews were grouped into three main categories, each consisting of a small group of questions. The

categories were i) the situation in Kosovo immediately after the war, ii) the process of cadastre reconstruction, and iii) the situation today. This grouping meant that my informants were asked questions regarding the situation in Kosovo immediately after the war – what the most pressing issues at the time were, and how the international community together with the Kosovar society attempted to solve these. Focus was then turned to the cadastre reconstruction – how it was planned, implemented and followed-up, as well as its immediate results. After these initial steps, focus was turned to the reasons as to why the cadastre reconstruction has had such limited success. I aimed for a measure of chronology when grouping the questions in this way, assuming that if each question and set of questions anticipates the next, the informant will be able to develop his or her answers over time, in accordance with Merriam (1994:95). Another reason for this grouping was that it entailed that easier questions were put first, to be followed by more challenging questions at a later stage. This is in order with Esaiasson et. al (2012:265), as well as both Kvale (2012:146, 150) and Lantz (2007:59), who advice that by starting the interview with questions that are too challenging might threaten the informant, especially if he or she has been apprehensive to agree to an interview in the first place. If the interview starts out with a few introductory questions, the informant will gradually get used to the situation which will allow for more challenging questions as the interview progresses (ibid). Each interview was closed by asking if there was anything else the informant wanted to add. The main reason for this was that it created an opportunity for me to find out additional information, but, considering that it is a rather un-challenging question, it was also in order to close the interview on a good note. (Kvale 2012:146, 150, Lantz 2007:59). A more thorough discussion on the interview questions will be had in section 3.3.3.

3.3.2 Choosing informants

In selecting informants, consideration has to be given to the question of what actors might have knowledge about the issue at hand (Merriam 1994:91). Initially, my knowledge of who these actors were, was rather limited. For this reason, the embassies of those countries who formed the KCSP (Sweden, Norway and Switzerland), the institutions and agencies who were responsible for its implementation (UNMIK and Un-Habitat), the government agency in charge of managing the cadastre today (KCA) and the embassy of country that is most actively assisting the local agency (Germany) were the first to be contacted. After this initial contact, and as interviews proceeded, the snow-ball method was used in which the informants suggested other people that might be of interest for my continued research. (Esaiasson et al 2003:212). Throughout the process of selecting and approaching possible informants, an attempt was made to contact

people from different academic fields, in order to get a broad focus, thus enhancing the validity and reliability of the findings. This as the information that can be extracted from each interview is limited to one persons understanding, and my aim was to attain a more nuanced picture of the issue at hand. Emphasis was put on contacting both local and international actors in order to get both an inside and an outside view of the issue – the inside view being of certain importance considering my chosen theoretical framework (Potter et. al 2008:4, 114ff, Tandon 2000:320) I aimed for between 15 and 20 interviews, assuming that some interviews would provide more useful information than others (May 2011:136). Interview proposals were sent to more people than I was planning to interview, assuming that some people can be hesitant to agree to an interview, in accordance with Esaiasson et al (2003:264). Although a small minority of my informants said they did not mind if their names were published in this research, the choice was made to protect the identity of all the informants, as there is a possibility that the disclosure of the identity of one might involuntarily disclose that of another (Kvale 2012:88, Merriam 1994:92).

Twenty interviews were made before I considered theoretical saturation to be reached, namely, when I found that my informants were no longer providing new information (Esiasson et. al 2012:275) Out of these, ten informants were from Kosovo and ten from the international community. People interviewed came from a wide range of fields; diplomats, analysts, professors and political scientists, employed at embassies, governments and government agencies, NGOs, the UN, the EU, universities, policy institutes and the service sector. The common feature of my informants is that they are all working within, or have knowledge of, my field of research.

3.3.3 Carrying out the interviews

Each interview was planned to last for about an hour, which according to Kvale should be enough to retrieve the desired information, but not too long to tire the informant or to lose focus. (Kvale 2012:146ff). I considered it important to start each interview by introducing the study a bit closer than what had been done at initial contact. (Lantz, 2007:57). As the reconstruction of the cadastre registers in Kosovo proved to be a much more complicated subject than first expected, a presentation was prepared and given to the informant, both orally and written in English and Albanian, before each interview, as advised by Hermanowicz (2002:495) (see appendix, section 8.2). Even though the main objective of the interviews were to identify reasons to the project's failure, this was not clearly evident in the presentation. This was a deliberate choice, as I did not want to influence my informants opinion of the reconstruction process by stating that my research was based on the argument that the reconstruction has failed, in

accordance with Merriam (1994:94). Rather, I wanted them to think and speak freely about the reconstruction at first, before turning to questions more closely related to my research objective. During semi-structured interviews, the researcher does not rigidly stick to a set of questions but allows the informant to speak rather freely. (Lantz 2007:53) Questions and answers are often open-ended, and it is not uncommon that the informant mentions something that the researcher has not thought to ask about, making follow-up questions necessary (Merriam 1994:88, Lantz 2007:33). For this reason, interview questions were modified, omitted or added depending on the situation (Lantz 2007:53), and no informants were asked the exact same set of questions. This naturally led to a large number of questions which due to the scope of this essay will not be presented in more detail. A selection of questions can be found in the appendix section 8.4.2.

As note-taking during the interview was kept to a minimum and I relied on my recorder (Kvale 2012:196f, Merriam 1994:96), the reason being that such an approach does not only ensure that the researcher can focus more on the interview and less on note-taking, but that the subsequent analysis of the material will be more accurate, as the information can be played back several times. Recording is also of crucial importance for inter-coder reliability. However, a few notes of crucial points were taken both during and immediately after the interview to assist the subsequent processing of material (Merriam 1994:96).

Due to the scope and time-frames of this thesis, there was no time for pilot interviews, such as advocated by among others Lantz (2007:60) In an attempt to get around this problem, interviews were planned so that those anticipated to be more challenging were put last and vice versa.

3.3.4 Coding the material

As the purpose of case studies is to provide analytical generalisations and not statistical, the practice of coding answers is not as crucial as if the study would have had a different design (Esaiasson et al 2012:269). This is however not to say that a discussion of the coding process is not needed. Coding the material is a difficult task as it means that the researcher needs to find and sort out the parts of the material that is of value for formation of conclusions (Lantz 2007:120), and categorize the material on basis of this selection (Lantz 2007:109f; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009:217ff). This creates a situation in which it becomes possible for the subjective views of the researcher to influence the coding process and the subsequent analysis and conclusions (Lantz 2007:110). It is however of utmost importance to make this selection of “relevant parts” as a word-by-word retelling of the entire material would make little ground for social scientific research.

This study generated more than 20 hours of recorded interview material. Making theoretical sense of such a daunting scope of information is a difficult and

time consuming task, yet necessary in order to be able to move from text segments to analysis and relate empirical findings to theory. The coding process is facilitated if broken down into a few comprehensible stages. As this study aims to interpret on a manifest, rather than a latent level (Kvale 1997:172) the practice of categorisation (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:271) seemed most applicable. This meant the material needed to be sorted into groups, or categories depending on what kind of information they hold. (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009:215ff; Lantz 2007:100ff) What these categories should be depends not only on the research question, but what theoretical aim the research has, and the researchers pre-understanding of the issue at hand (May 2011:152f, Lantz 2007:100ff). In order to obtain material for my analysis, I collected reasons on why the cadastre reconstruction had failed. When it came to coding, I was left with two choices, the first being to sort my material under the three overarching reasons and their respective sub-reasons in my apparatus of analysis (section 2.4). A deliberate choice was made not to do so, for two main reasons. The first reason is that such a deductive approach would mean risking that the material became forced into categories where it might not belong – in other words, that I would make the material fit my theory, rather than the other way around (and a theory cannot be used to explain itself). The second reason was that it seemed simpler to categorize the material into several smaller groups at first, and then into the analysis apparatus. Attempting to sort 20 hours of recorded material directly into the categories of my apparatus of analysis seemed difficult to carry out – especially considering my limited pre-knowledge of the subject.

I therefore decided on an alternative and inductive process for categorisation – letting categories develop over time as interviews proceeded, based on the factors and issues put forward by my informants during interviews (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:276). This enabled me to obtain a perspicuous picture of the material that had not yet been tainted by the theory I was intending to make use of, and is in line with the reasoning behind theory consuming research, where the case usually gains precedence over the theory (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:89). Also, considering that this study draws on second-wave post-development theory thought, I assumed an inductive approach should be better suited for the explanatory aspirations.

During and soon after each interview, bullet points were made on what I believed to be the most salient information the interview had given in regards to reasons for the failure of the reconstruction. The recording of the interview was thereafter listened to at least twice, while making additional notes on what I considered to be central points (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:269). These were then sent to the informants for confirmation, as I did not want to risk a situation in which I had misinterpreted the informant (Merriam 1994:93). After this, what I believed were central points of the interview were transcribed and sorted by asking each quotation the question “what factor is talked about?” (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:269), in order to make categorisations (of quotations) possible. Quotations were

thereafter cross-referenced between interviews. To facilitate the coding process, an interview summary chart was used, in order with Esaiasson et. al. (2012:271) The chart can be found in the appendix, section 8.5.1.

How to decide what goes into the material and what does not? The coding procedure used shares some qualities with quantitative research (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:271) For quantitative research, Esaiasson et al suggests that the coding process should consider the frequency of certain answers, meaning that the researcher can chose to omit seldomly given replies from the material to facilitate analysis (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:204). I let this guide me, as I did not want to be left with a material too large to handle, and let a rule of thumb be that answers mentioned in more than 25% of cases, meaning 5 interviews, were to enter the material for analysis. But, and this is an important but: as this is a qualitative research (turning back to Yins point that the goal of the qualitative researcher is not to enumerate frequencies), I also allowed some reasons mentioned less than 5 times to enter the material. This as I assessed them to be heavily emphasised by the informant(s), as I during the coding process also asked each quotation “what emphasis is it given in relation to other factors?” in line with Esaiasson et. al. (2012:269) A few given reasons were omitted from the material due to the fact that they were only mentioned a few times. These can be found in the appendix, section 8.5.3.

After some time, eight categories were beginning to form – the eight given reasons for the failure listed below in section 5.1. The eight reasons are of course not mutually excluding – reality is too complicated to be able to make such a categorisation. The categories could however be seen as eight ideal types (Esaiasson et. al. 2012:273) (or ideal reasons) to the failure. An example of how the raw-material was coded into the eight categories can be found in the appendix, section 8.5.2.

3.3.5 Knowing what is true

The reasons for failure my informants have given me, which have formed the basis for analysis in this research face one major critique; how can I know what they say to me is true? This critique can be met in two ways. i) The aim for this research is not to provide answers to why the cadastre reconstruction failed. My aim is rather to give an example of how post-development theory can explain the reasons *given* for its failure. These given reasons – extracted from the interviews – are thus simply the material on which the analysis is made, and the conclusions made on basis of that analysis should therefore not suffer in theoretical significance. ii) The truth-value of the statements made by my informants are subjective indeed – and some statements might even be inconsistent with for example statistical data, but that does not necessarily mean their statements are

any less worthy as a basis for knowledge, especially not when considering my position in table 1 (section 2.2). To give one example – many of my informants claimed the KCA to be an agency with incompetent and in some instances even corrupt employees, and that this was one of the reasons why there was little incentive for the population to make use of their services. Consider that these statements could be disproved by making an independent evaluation of working-processes of the KCA. This finding would however make little difference as the above-mentioned fact remains; people believe the KCA has a certain level of incompetent and corrupt staff – and this belief influences their use of the agencies services⁵.

⁵This is consistent with the reasoning behind Transparency Internationals index Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

4 The Kosovo cadastre reconstruction

As post-development thought draws heavily on the notion that the West creates false justifications for their interventions in developing countries, it is of value to discuss why the Kosovo reconstruction came about, what the intentions were and how the process unfolded.

4.1 The justifications

What were the reasons for the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction? On what grounds did the international community decide that such a project should be one of the main priorities of post-war reconstruction in Kosovo? Some of the answers to this question can be found in land administration theory.

4.1.1 Land administration theory

The basic goal of cadastres is to facilitate land administration. Williamson, Enemark, Wallace and Rajabifard have written the perhaps most extensive work on land administration and its relation to sustainable development in recent years. The authors deem cadastres to be crucial to any society as

whether manual or digital, cadastres reflect the unique arrangements communities create with land and record the arrangements on cadastral maps using scales large enough to contain detail relevant to a multitude of purposes. (Williamson et al 2010:6)

The authors develop this argument by stating that all kinds of businesses and organisations need specific, accurate, timely and reliable cadastre information in order to effectively organise their activities (Williamson et al 2010:67). The basic reason that societies manage land, according to this line of thought, is to satisfy human needs as “having a secure home, or even a secure place to sleep or work, satisfies fundamental necessities of life” (Williamson et al 2010:15)

Land administration is not a new discipline, but has developed over thousands of years (Williamson et al 2010:x). In the early stages of human settlement, wealth

and power was primarily based on territorial sovereignty, and maps, as a means of showing the boundaries of territorial spaces came into existence. As societies evolved, the reasons for recording of land arrangements evolved from solely protecting land ownership to being basis for land holding taxation.

Among the array of land administration trends that developed across the globe in the late 17th century, it was the European- or Western style design that became the predominant model in modern land administration history. What set this design apart from others was that it used the cadastre; namely the instrument used to manage the small units of land – called land parcels – that are used by people in everyday life, as the basis for its organisation (Williamson et al 2010:47). It was this design that was intended in Kosovo as part of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction (Interviews 7, 8).

4.2 The Kosovo Cadastral Support Programme

When Serbian administration and troops withdrew in 1999, the United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took over administration in Kosovo, in order to begin "building peace, democracy, stability and self government in the shattered province" (Labjani & Zylfiulabjani 2006:1, also in Un-Habitat 2004:10, Un-Habitat 2012a, Valstad et. al. 2002:2, Schmidt 2012:3), as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. UNMIKs formal task was to assist the post-war reconstruction of Kosovo and to

provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (*UN 1999*),

with a special focus on providing "for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes /.../ in safety" (Ibid) The question of the cadastre, which was assumed to have been severely damaged during the war, was among the first issues to be given priority, for reasons discussed in this chapter (Un-Habitat 2004:32, Un-Habitat 2012b:76f, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:2). At the time, Kosovar institutions were severely weakened by war and lacked both the capacity and the funds to prioritise this issue in wake of more pressing problems (Valstad et. al. 2002:2, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:8, Utrikesdepartementet 2009:13), so in 1999, the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat), were tasked by UNMIK to "provide support in restoring the cadastre in Kosovo, and assist the institutional development of a centralised registry of land and property records" (Un-Habitat 2012b:76f, Schmidt 2012:5). At the request of

UNMIK, UN-Habitat carried out a rapid assessment of the situation regarding housing and property rights and property registration in Kosovo in 1999, highlighting the following issues:

- Kosovar property certificates, boundary markers and registers (treating an estimated 2.2 million parcels covering a land area of 10 900 km²), had been either destroyed or taken to Belgrade.
- a large number of land administration survey equipment had been dislocated or destroyed.
- years of discriminatory laws against Kosovoalbanians, in combination with people who had fled during the war and were now returning, had led to unclear ownership statuses of a large number of properties.
- many municipal cadastral offices were lacking qualified staff, as discriminatory laws had prevented Kosovoalbanians from holding public sector positions (Valstad et. al. 2002:2f)

In collaboration with the governments of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, the Kosovo Cadastral Support Programme (KCSP) was devised in the year 2000, funded jointly by the three countries and UNMIK (Un-Habitat 2004:32, Valstad et. al. 2002:4, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:6) with the aim to solve the above problems. The KCSP project plan claimed the immediate arguments and aims of the project to be that a “functioning cadastre system is among the crucial preconditions for economic development of a region.” (SDC 2013) Un-Habitat 2004:30ff, USAID 2004:1, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:4, interview 8), much in line with the reasons of formalising land information formulated by land administration theory. (Valstad et. al. 2002:3). Let us explore these reasons a bit further.

4.2.1 The reasons

While the reasons for formalising land information are both complex and many, the overarching goals, both in general and in the case of Kosovo, are twofold; the first being to deliver **sustainable development**, as land administration is believed to ensure ”social equity, economic growth, and environmental protection”. (Williamson et al 2010:ix, also in Valstad 2002:3, interviews 7, 8, 13). The second overarching reason is to **build economies**: as ”countries with institutions able to provide reliable records regulated by proper legislation that are securing land tenure will enhance productivity. The agricultural sector will typically grow and business investments in land increases.” (Williamson et al 2010:10, 17, also in USAID 2004:1, interview 8) The benefits can be sorted into three categories;

benefits for private persons (focusing on the alleviation of poverty), benefits for the government (focusing on government capabilities and public trust), and benefits for the environment. The below table has been aggregated by combining benefits listed by Williamson et. al with reasons listed in documents concerning the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction. Due to the focus and scope of this thesis, the listed benefits will not be commented on in more detail. The reader wanting a more in-depth discussion of the points in the below table can turn to Williamsson et. al. (2010:17ff.)

Table 3, the reasons for the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo

Benefits		
Public	Government	Environment
Delivery of security of tenure and credit (Un-Habitat 2007, Interview 8)	Improvement of land planning (Un-Habitat 2007, Un-Habitat 2002)	Ability to manage resources (Un-Habitat 2002)
Better management of land disputes(Un-Habitat 2007)	Development of infrastructure (Un-Habitat 2007, Un-Habitat 2002)	Ability to manage the environment (Un-Habitat 2007, Interview 8)
Achieving social goals; focusing on those of employment and gender equity (Un-Habitat 2002, Interview 7)	Lawful construction of houses (Interview 8)	Ability to protect state lands(Un-Habitat 2002)
Over-arching goals		
Alleviation of poverty (Un-Habitat 2007, Un-Habitat 2002)	Support for governance and rule of law support for land and property taxation (Utrikesdepartementet 2005:6), Un-Habitat 2007)	Ensuring environmental sustainability (Un-Habitat 2007)
Delivering sustainable development and building economies		

4.2.2 The Kosovo Cadastre Agency

An overarching aim for the KSCP was to develop and assist the Kosovo Cadastre Agency (KCA), an executive agency of the Ministry of Public Services intended

to take over the reconstruction and land administration processes after the end of the KCSP mandate in 2003 (Meha 2004:4f). The work of the KCA was to be managed through the establishment of 25 Municipal Cadastre Offices (MCOs) responsible for the cadastre reconstruction and services in the then 25 (today 38) municipalities (Meha 2004:4f). Since 2003, the KCA has been mandated by UNMIK to "oversee the rebuilding of the region's property registration system" (Un-Habitat 2012b:76f.)

4.2.3 The reconstruction process

In short, the reconstruction process unfolded in two steps; the recreation of cadastral maps and the re-registering of property owners (Meha 2004:4f, Xhemajli 2012:15ff). The first step proved to be the least complicated. Cadastral maps (showing boundaries but not ownership) were partially recreated at an early stage in the reconstruction process by help aerial photogrammetry from the 1960s, a cadastral textual database from 1985 and aerial photography carried out in 1999 identifying cadastre sizes by buildings and fences. While this information did not cover all of Kosovo, it provided enough information for the KCSP to begin to "fill in the blanks" between known parcels, thus recreating cadastral maps covering large parts of the country (Meha 2004:4f).

The immediate effects of this first step was that it made it possible for KCSP to begin to number and file land parcels, to create ground for the second step of the reconstruction process, re-registering of parcel owners. This step proved to be more complicated, and still ongoing today. Kosovo's 30 municipalities are divided into 1298 cadastre zones and over 2 million land parcels. (Valstad 2002:5, Interview 11). The agent in charge (KCSP in the past, the KCA today) travels to a cadastre zone and sets up a make-shift office together with a representative from the local MCO. Cadastre unit residents are asked to come to the office and show which land parcels that belong to them on cadastre maps that have been printed for the purpose. This process will take about two weeks, after which lists of all parcels and their owners are printed. The residents of the cadastral zone are then asked to come back and confirm the information on these lists. They have another two weeks do so, or to make adjustments, changes or complaints, before the register is considered final and entered into the database (Interview 16). As soon as this procedure has been carried out, the cadastre reconstruction process in that cadastral zone is considered to be final. This is where the reconstruction has encountered the problems that this thesis treats like the failure of the reconstruction project. While the technical, first step, of the reconstruction – the mapping, numbering and filing – is near its completement, very few people are registering their properties, meaning that the second step – re-registering ownership

– is a very slow process. At its current pace, it is estimated that it will be another 55 years before all Kosovars properties are registered (Xhemajli 2012:9).

5 The failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction

In accordance with academia on the subject of land administration theory, and in the international documents that were guiding the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction, the purpose of the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo was – in short – to contribute to sustainable development. A quick analysis of the situation in Kosovo today will however show that little has changed in the areas the reconstruction was supposed to target (Interviews 4, 19). While not claiming that this is proof that the cadastre reconstruction failed (see section 1.6.1 on the difficulties of establishing casual relationships), it is an interesting fact. So why is Kosovo still doing relatively badly in all the areas the reconstruction was intended to benefit, after more than 15 years on international interventions in the land administration sector? What has stood in the way of the benefits that the cadastre reconstruction was supposed to lead to?

It seems as if even though the technical aspects of the reconstruction of the cadastre register are near complete – nearly all land has been re-mapped and re-numbered – the intended benefits of the reconstruction are halted as people are not registering their properties. My informants gave numerous reasons for the failure, and the most commonly reoccurring will be presented below. As mentioned in the section on coding (3.3.3) the categories are not mutually excluding; some contains elements of others, some co-variate and some are the combined result of various reasons.

5.1 Given reasons

5.1.1 Lack of trust in the state

Kosovo has a long history of foreign occupation and oppressive rulers, which has contributed to complicated people-state relations (Interviews 11, 13, 15, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:4). Having been ruled by alternately the Ottomans and the Serbs for the greater part of history, then occupied by nazi Germany during the

final years of World War II, after being incorporated into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Interview 15) there is a wide-spread perception of the state as the enemy (interviews 4, 6, 9). A contributing – or alternative – explanation offered to this lack of trust offered is that there is very little sense of citizenry in Kosovo. People do not trust the concept of public money or the value of engaging politically (Interviews 4, 18). As forcefully stated by one of my informants; “In your country, your politicians fear you. Here, we fear our politicians.” (Interview 18)

Due to this lack of trust in the state, it has been argued that there is little incentive for the public to register who they are, what they do and where they live. Not only property, but everything from car ownership to marriages and child births often go unregistered, and very few people pay their taxes (Interviews 2, 11, 13, 14). This distrust is further aggravated by the fact that there has been many accusations of misappropriates put against the KCA (see section 5.1.3), making it one of the lesser trusted government agencies. (Interviews 1, 10, 18, FRIDOM:21, USAID 2004:18).

5.1.2 Land registration is not common practice

Although there is a history of land registration in Kosovo, its significance decreased during the latter half of the 1900's for two main reasons. During the communist regime, private property was more or less inexistent, as everything belonged to the state (Meha 2004). During the 90's, discriminatory laws imposed on the Kosovoalbanian population made it de facto impossible for Kosovoalbanians to transfer or register property⁶ (Interviews 4, 15). With this in mind, and adding that the records have since then been under reconstruction, many Kosovars have become used to managing without them (Interviews 11, 14, 16, 19). In a typical Kosovar society – perhaps excluding the larger cities such as Pristina and Prizren – most people will know which house or piece of land belongs to who, and many feel there is no need for formalising this information (Interviews 10, 15, 17, 19). Turning back to the above-mentioned lack of trust in the state; many people seem to feel it is enough that they know who lives where, and that there is little point engaging the government in their affairs (Interviews 11, 14, 16). As property registration is still an expensive (relative to the PPP) and complicated task, many will not immediately think to register a newly purchased property, and it is not uncommon to see that the lawful owner of a house is actually somebody else than the person living there – either the relative who built the house several generations ago, or an individual who has been the owner of the

⁶There was no law preventing Kosovoalbanians from property transfer or registration. There was however a law saying that all papers on transfers and registrations of property had to be sent to the government in Belgrade for validation, where most papers that had Kosovoalbanians as parties were turned down (interview 2)

house at some point in the past – or that it is not registered to anyone at all (Interviews 2, 5, 6, 16, Utrikesdepartementet 2010).

In addition, it is not only the public that fail to see the immediate benefits of turning to the cadastre to resolve land issues. Many government officials are not convinced that the cadastre will have any major benefits on the Kosovoar society, and are reluctant to allocate it more funding than absolutely needed (Interviews 10, 19, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:2). Kosovo is struggling in a wide range of areas, and awarding equal attention to all of these is impossible. Kosovar politicians seem to be keen on increasing public support by working with areas that are directly important to the local population. Considering that the public do not seem interested in the cadastre register, the politicians will focus on other areas. This seems to be especially evident in times of government elections (Kosovo has had five elections since the year 2000) when so much attention is paid to campaigning that little else is done (Interviews 6, 15).

In a country like this one, the government have to choose what to put their effort into. With elections coming up, they are bound to focus more on being reelected and less on bettering a system that nobody is using (interview 15)

5.1.3 The negative spiral

The above-mentioned factors in combination create a major factor to the failure of the cadastre reconstruction. As part of the cadastre reconstruction project, efforts were made to develop a tax system. But as the public has no trust in the government and fail to see the point of the project, there is still little support for land and property taxation. Taxes are low, few people pay them and the state has little capacity to enforce tax laws, even though such laws exist (Utrikesdepartementet 2009:6). This fact becomes part of a negative spiral. As the public fail to see the point of registering their properties and paying their taxes, agencies are unable to improve and modernize their systems in a way that would perhaps motivate the public to register, and in the long perspective increase public support for the government. As the cadastre agencies have such limited funds, there is little incentive for employees to do more than what is expected of them, feeding corrupt systems (Interviews 9, 15, 20, USAID 2004:17, Utrikesdepartementet 2009:9). The KCA has been accused both of nepotism and corruption (Interviews 9, 15, 20).

...cadastre officers will go to a village, and the people there will have never heard about registering their properties. Why would they do that?

Not wanting any problem, they will pay one of the officers some money, and the problem will be gone. (interview 20)

Limited funds and bad reputation also seems to be leading to the cadastre offices being unattractive workplaces (FRIDOM:21) and qualified staff look for jobs elsewhere (Interview 17).

5.1.4 Lack of competence

As part of discriminatory laws targeting albanians during the 90's, the Milosevic regime made it difficult for Kosovoalbanians to take part in state education or hold certain (government) jobs (interviews 5, 9, 15, Meha 2004:8) An immediate effect of this is that there is a severe lack of qualified labour in Kosovo today (Utrikesdepartementet 2009:13), especially in areas that are not traditionally part of the Kosovar areas of employment, such as the one at hand (Interview 9). Those who have relevant education (often from studying abroad) seek employment in other countries or in relevant international organisations, as local wages are low (see above, section 5.1.3) (Utrikesdepartementet 2009:11). For this reason, the local cadastre agencies are assumed to be characterized by incompetence, calling for ineffective procedures and practices (Interviews 5, 9, 15, FRIDOM:21). It has been argued that they are unsustainable without international assistance (Xhemajli 2012:11) To resolve this issue, UN-Habitat once attempted to initiate a bachelor programme in land administration and cadastre, in collaboration with the American University in Kosovo. The project was eventually cancelled as UN-Habitat were not able to provide financial support, and the Kosovar ministry for education did not have the funds to finance it (Interview 9).

The situation is especially substandard in the MCOs around the country. A rapid assessment of MCO staff showed that many of the MCOs employees were lacking basic computer knowledge (Valstad et. al 2002:6) and that nearly all MCOs were having difficulties carrying out their daily tasks.

It is not only technical skills that is lacking. Training in management, planning, budgeting and organisation will be a challenge for our future support to the municipalities. (Valstad et. al 2002:11)

The assessment also showed that most MCOs were severely under-staffed and that few of the staff had relevant education. In addition, the coordination inbetween MCOs, as well as cooperation with the head office in Pristina was deemed inefficient (Ibid)

5.1.5 Unjust focus

The work of the KCSP focused mainly on urban areas, as these were believed to be the economic hubs of the country and therefore most in need of the benefits the cadastre reconstruction would bring (Valstad 2002:8). However, as the vast majority of Kosovo's population live in rural areas, where over 15% are estimated to live in extreme poverty (Utrikesdepartementet 2009:11, UNDP n.d.b), a common argument amongst my sources was that the reconstruction process targeted those who were already doing quite well, while those who were most in need of help were left behind (Interviews 3, 11, 12, 15, 18), thus claiming an unjust focus.

Some informants pointed out that this unjust focus can be seen at other levels as well. The process used to carry out the re-registration of land parcels described in section 4.2.3 seems to often fail to target the entire population of the village. Villagers have claimed to have been unaware that the registration period had taken place, that they had no time to go to the make-shift office during the weeks that the cadastral workers were there, or that they did not see the point of going (for reasons listed above) (Interviews 13, 20). The result is that many never go to the office to register when given the opportunity, while those who do gain an advantage over those who do not. An attempt was once made to change the system so that villagers could register their properties online – this attempt had little effect, as many of those who chose not to come to the registration are illiterate, or have no internet connection (Interviews 3, 11, 13, 15).

5.1.6 The international community let-down 1: Superimposed governance

The international community in Kosovo has contributed to many improvements in the Kosovar community, but it has not been as well-received as one might think. As mentioned above, there is a tradition of lack of trust in the state brought on by centuries of foreign occupation and authoritarian rulers. According to sources, many Kosovars feel that the international community is yet another form of superimposed governance benefitting on their behalf (Interviews 3, 5, 13, 18, 19). The attitude towards The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and UNMIK is especially critical and the agencies are accused of implementing numerous unnecessary projects in order to justify their presence in the country. This critique is not only based on feelings of superimposed governance on behalf of the local population, but that the wages that employees at international organisations are so much higher than those of the locals, creating feelings of unfairness.

Foreign donations come from the West, only so employees of their international organisations can get their wages. And they will write their reports, and tell you about how bad Kosovo is doing, only so they get the funding to spend another three years in Film City⁷ (Interview 19)

Protests against the organisations are not uncommon, especially when new projects that the public fails to see the point of are introduced. The cadastre reconstruction has become one of these unpopular projects, one that many Kosovars would claim has been forced on them for reasons they do not agree with.

5.1.7 The international community let-down 2: A complicated system

The above opinion is however not shared by all. A reoccurring opinion is that the cadastre reconstruction had good intentions and would very well have benefitted Kosovo, if only if the international community had taken greater care in making sure that Kosovo would be able to adopt the system the cadastre reconstruction entailed (Interviews 7, 12, 14, 17). This regards both the challenges discussed in the above sections, but also the implementation process. Since the end of the war, many countries have been involved in the cadastre reconstruction. With each actor contributing their differing views on how a cadastre should be designed, the end-result has become complex and difficult to manage for the local agencies (USAID 2004:17, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:7f).

I will give you one example. A few years back, a large number of re-registered parcels needed to be re-registered once more because it had become apparent that European and American aid-workers had used different date formats when logging information into computers⁸. People say the system is a quilt, a patchwork, an experiment. (Interview 4)

That the system is complicated to use is made worse by what has been discussed in above sections, but also by the fact that Kosovo lacks the institutional capacity or even the infrastructure to absorb it (Interviews 4, 7, 12, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:6, Utrikesdepartementet 2009:9, 13, Utrikesdepartementet 2010). With constant changes in the political arena, with unqualified staff, and with substandard roads and power grids the system is difficult to maintain at an acceptable quality. It has been argued that the international community through

⁷Film City is the colloquial name for an area in Pristina where the majority of expats live

⁸The European system uses the date format year-month-day, while the American system uses month-day-year.

the KCSP created a tool that Kosovo is just not ready to handle (interviews 12, 14).

Fuelling the above problems is the question of unclear project ownership. That the KCSP started the reconstruction process but only stayed for a relatively short time, and because the reconstruction process and management of registers has since then been the responsibility of the KCA, it is not always clear who should be held accountable when things go wrong (Xhemajli 2012:11, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:8). International evaluations of the project resulting in any change in approach have been scarce, and it is difficult to trace specific mistakes to specific actors.

5.1.8 Wanting too much too fast

When looking at table 3 (section 4.2.1), one must agree that project plans that formed the basis for the reconstruction were very ambitious. By reconstructing the cadastre, the international community hoped to see results in a large number of societal aspects; social, economic, governmental and environmental. It was also hoped that a solid cadastre register would form a firm basis for other development projects. As mentioned above, cadastre construction and reconstruction projects have been implemented in post-conflict and developing countries in the past. However, Kosovo is unique in the sense that it is not only moving from a post-conflict to a stable nation but that the country is undergoing several transitions simultaneously; post-conflict to stable, developing to developed, occupied to independent and not least from socialist to capitalist. (USAID 2004:18, Utrikesdepartementet 2005:2) Adding that Kosovo was fresh out of war, after decades of political oppression, in the years when the KCSP was active, many informants agreed that the project planners had been too optimistic in the preparation and implementation of the cadastre reconstruction programme:

The problem was that it was too much for Kosovo to handle, but the international community did not seem to consider this. But if you aim that high, without knowing what you're doing, there is no way it will work. You cannot fly without wings (Interview 15).

Informants made the claim that the project planners should have let the reconstruction remain what it was; a cadastre reconstruction project, rather than attempt to focus on such a broad scope (Interviews 9, 13, 15, 16).

6 Analysis

The analysis is in essence the process of merging theory and empirics, to see how the two fit together. In this chapter, the eight categories that developed during the coding of the material will be analysed in line with the reasons for failure of development projects put forward by post-development theory. The discussion will be summarised in table 4, below, from which the conclusion will be made.

6.1 Merging theory and empirics

The following section will look at the reasons given for the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction in relation to the reasons for failure of development projects offered by post-development theory, focusing on the three over-arching reasons discussed in chapter 2. For each over-arching reason, the findings made in the case of Kosovo will be discussed, and a reference will be made to its section in chapter 5, to facilitate the readers understanding of how the table in section 6.2 has been created. Each section will be accompanied with a reflection on what the findings might mean for Kosovo, in order to motivate their importance.

6.1.1 Development projects disregard complex contexts

The post-development claim that development planners disregard complex situations could, if one turns to the presentation of material, perhaps be used as an explanation for all of the above given reasons; post-development theory could suggest that the cadastre reconstruction project failed as all the above challenges were not sufficiently considered beforehand, in short, that the project was developed for a much simpler situation than the one at hand. But as Williamson et. al. put it, land administration project cannot just be applied to a country as "different countries are at different stages on the evolutionary cadastral continuum, reflecting national social, institutional, legal, and economic circumstances." (Williamson et. al 2010:56) Instead, as the design of any national cadastre reflects its local history and capacity (Williamson et.al 2010:58), the institutional arrangements of a country needs to be allowed to influence the design

of its cadastre. (Williamson et.al 2010:55) This reasoning fits well together with the top-down planning vs. grass-root perspective put forward by post-development theory, and one could argue that the international community failed in this regard, as they have been accused of having taken little consideration to the fact that land administration is not common practice (section 5.1.2) – one of the most common reasons to the failure put forward by my informants. It is of crucial importance to the success of a project that those who are supposed to benefit from it see the point of its implementation and that they trust the agencies or actors that are managing it (section 5.1.1), my material suggests neither of this was present. A project that has little support and is introduced by unpopular actors is bound to fail, especially if the country is simultaneously lacking the competence (section 5.1.4) and institutional capacity (section 5.1.4) to maintain it at a high level of function; "the build up of capacity, competence, organisation, technology, equipment, reference network and communication is a huge /.../ task, necessary to suit the cadastre to a market economy." (Valstad et. al 2002:1)

That the project had such ambitious intentions (section 5.1.8) might also fit under this category; a more qualitative evaluation of the situation on Kosovo at the time when KCSP began their work might have shown that the country would not be able to achieve all the assumed benefits, being severely weakened by years of oppression and war. And as argued above, Kosovo might still not have the capacity to administer the registers without outside support. All of these challenges in tandem could be seen as feeding into the negative spiral discussed in section 5.1.3. This negative spiral is continuously making it more difficult for the cadastre register to contribute to its intended benefits.

The above could perhaps have been avoided had the international community taken greater measures to evaluate the adopting capacities before implementing the project. Considering the above claim that development project planners who fail to take note of the local history risk re-awakening violence, a disregard of complex situations might be especially precarious in a country with such an intra-ethnic violent past.

6.1.2 Development projects are un-holistic and un-strategic

One of the reasons listed in this category is that development projects focus too much on economic development and too little on other aspects of society. I did not get this impression when looking at the cadastre reconstruction project plans or the benefits of formalising land information put forward by land administration theory. Neither did my informants suggest that the project had been too focused on economic development. A possible reason for this is that the project proposal, as well as land administration theory, claims sustainable development as the ultimate goal for formalising land information, and the essence of sustainable

development is that it looks further than the economic sector. For this reason, this cell has been left empty in the below table – the post-development theory explanation does not fit in this aspect.

Rather, one could argue that the project failed for going the opposite way; it focused on too many aspects of society, hoping to achieve benefits in a wide range of sectors and to be a base for the continued development of the country. Keene notes the perils of such an approach: "too often project planners, so caught up in their own ideas and out of touch with the real world, gravitate towards large-scale, utopian plans instead of strategic interventions" (Keene 2007:12), and develops her argument by calling the post-conflict development interventions in the Western Balkans a shock treatment that did more harm than good. This opinion was shared by many of my informants, who expressed that the fact that the project had such ambitious goals (section 5.1.8) had detrimental effects for its success. The second sub-reason offered under this category therefore fits more neatly; the project has been argued to be overly complex, which meant that it was difficult to implement, especially in a country that was already struggling on so many levels (section 5.1.7). Keenes claims that initiatives introduced by international aid workers and subsequently handed over to local authorities can create public distrust in those authorities if they are unable to sustain it, seems to be highly evident in this case. This goes directly against one of the aims of the project – that it would increase support for governance, rule of law as well as land and property taxation. Too many intervening actors and too many intended benefits made the finished product complicated and difficult to implement in the real-life context, perhaps "a reflection of planners' attempts to control everything rather than be strategic" (Keene 2007:12).

A possible contributing factor to this outcome is that land administration is such a complicated subject, drawing from a variety of disciplines and fields (Williamson et al 2010:5), thus making it very difficult to implement in any kind of simplified form, which might have been a better fit for Kosovo. Considering that one of the aims of the cadastre reconstruction was that a functioning cadastre would be a solid base for future development projects, it becomes especially regrettable that the project failed.

6.1.3 Development projects are the product of development culture

There is little to suggest that the project failed because it was planned and implemented by westerners, as Keene and other suggest is a contributing factor to the failure of development projects. None of my informants made such a claim, and I have found little secondary material to suggest such a thing. The way it was introduced however, could perhaps be understood as an expression of imposing western values in an unwanting context, if one looks at the reason given in section

5.1.6; the opinion that the project was an expression of superimposed governance from the international community on the local population. This was a common claim among my informants, who added that the public opinion of the project and the implementing actors could be undermining the project's success from below. One could perhaps also make such a claim on basis of what was used as justifications of the project (section 4.1) turning back to the post-development theory claim that development projects are a way in which the West defends their right to intervene in other cultures and economic systems through a self-imposed superiority of knowledge and world-views. (Kapoor 2002:648, Mohanty 2008:24)

The material also suggests that the project was very loosely based on the demands or needs of the Kosovars, that informants considered the project to have had both an unjust focus and that it failed to reach the entire community when efforts were made to connect with the local population (section 5.1.5). This has created an uneven success-rate of the project implementation across the country, with the municipalities that were better off when the project started having made more progress in the land administration field and vice versa. This fits well into the framework developed from post-development theory. Keene argues that development projects that make this mistake are "perpetuating pre-existing power dynamics by allowing the more privileged participants more say" (Keene 2007:21) This would be especially detrimental in Kosovo, considering the ethnic composition of the country (see map, p. ix.) and their relation to each other. The two largest ethnicities (Kosovoalbanians and Kosovoserbs) have been quarrelling for decades while the three smallest minorities (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians) are extremely marginalized (Interview 3, Utrikesdepartementet 2011:2). A system that is enforcing such dividing lines will go against all intentions for the future of Kosovo.

The project seems to have suffered greatly due to the fact that land administration is not common practice (section 5.1.2) and that its benefits are not widely recognized, leading some of my informants to the conclusion that the international community should never have invested so much time and money in a project that nobody was interested in. The explanation that the project failed because it was too complicated for Kosovo to handle, that ownership of the project has been unclear and that few efforts to evaluate it (section 5.1.7) might also fit into this category.

6.2 The analysis apparatus put to use

The below table is a summary of the above section, and an illustration of how post-development theory could explain the failure of the cadastre reconstruction. It has been created by adding the eight reasons given in chapter 5 to the analysis apparatus created in chapter 2.

Table 4, the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction

Development projects disregard complex contexts	
Post-development theory	Reason for failure
Projects are developed for simplifications of reality	Lack of trust in the state The negative spiral
Problems are targeted for the wrong reasons	Land registration is not common practice Wanting too much too fast
Project planners make little consideration of adopting capabilities	Lack of competence The international community let-down 2: A complicated system
Development projects are un-holistic and un-strategic	
Post-development theory	Reason for failure
Project plans focus too much on economic development	
Project plans are too complicated to be practically applied in the given context	The international community let-down 2: A complicated system Wanting too much too fast
Development projects are the product of development culture	
Post-development theory	Reason for failure
Projects are implemented on basis of western values	The international community let-down 1: Superimposed governance
Projects are not based on the demands or needs of the community	Land registration is not common practice
Consultations reach only the more privileged groups of society	Unjust focus
Ownership is unclear, meaning few means or efforts for long-term evaluation	The international community let-down 2: A complicated system

The table suggests that many of the reasons for failure of development projects that the theory lists have been found to be evident in the chosen case. The table should not be seen as the only way in which the theory allows the material to be interpreted, but rather as one example of interpretations, based on the above section. Neither should the different categories (on the left-hand side) be seen as mutually excluding, why the reader will notice that the same reasons given for the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction (on the right-hand side) appears more than once. The table makes no distinction between the variables regarding

how often they were mentioned or how important they were claimed to be. It is possible that one factor has more explaining power than the other, but as the aim of this thesis was to explore how post-development theory could explain the outcome, and not what the reasons to its failure were, this will not be elaborated upon in more detail.

7 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to explore how post-development theory could explain the failure of the post-war reconstruction of the Kosovo cadastre register – namely the fact that the register is simply not being used and this is preventing the cadastre reconstruction from having the intended positive effects.

The above analysis suggests that post-development theory, based on the three over-arching reasons in the analytical apparatus, could explain that the cadastre reconstruction in Kosovo failed for three main reasons: it took little consideration of the local context in that it, among other things failed to consider the complicated people-state relations and the fact that land registration is not common practice, it was unstrategic in the sense that it wanted to achieve too much too fast and implemented a too complicated system to do so, and that it was tainted by a development culture, among others in that it took little consideration to local populations.

This as it is possible to see a correspondence between reasons for failure of development projects as argued by post-development theory, and reasons for failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction in the analytical apparatus.

It was interesting to note how the factor “too much focus on economic development” specified by post-development theory did not seem to be visible in the chosen case. A possible explanation for this is that much of the material that that factor was based on is rather old, and it seems as if current development practices are focusing more on development in all sectors of society and less on solely economic factors, than what has been the case before.

In sum, one can argue that the analysis has found that the theory corresponds rather well with the empirics at hand. It should be noted that even though I during the process of coding and analysing my material attempted to hold theory and empirics apart – see the short reflection in section 3.3.4 about strategy for categorisation – it is possible that my findings and therefore conclusions have been tainted by my pre-knowledge of post-development theory and the post-development theory reasons listed in my analytical apparatus. This might have been a problem had I used a theory testing approach, but as my aim was theory consuming, it should not negatively influence my conclusions.

What to make of this conclusion? Perhaps that while an accurate cadastre register might be still be crucial to the development of a nation, it is rendered useless unless it is developed in a society that not only has the capacity, but the will to embrace such a system. Turning back to Escobars claim that a prerequisite

for the success of development projects is that the political and economical system of the recipient country must change, one could indeed connect this quote to the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction. To make a very broad summary, the project failed because Kosovo is lacking the institutional prerequisites that would have made the project successful. There are thus two ways out of the situation; either Kosovo's political and economical system changes, or the project design changes. Briefly returning to the distinction between first- and second-wave post development theorists; one could assume that theoretically speaking, the first-wave post-developmentalists would claim the project should change, while Kosovo should remain the same. There is however one major flaw with this statement. My eight weeks in Kosovo, and the hours I have spent researching the economic, social and environmental situation in the country, has taught me that Kosovo is under a great deal of hardship. In one way or another, the country must change, in order to be one that allows all its citizens to enjoy a free and healthy life in a safe environment. But this research has shown that some of the help that has been offered to Kosovo so far is flawed. When discussing capacity issues as one of the reasons to the failure of the cadastre reconstruction, one of my informants made an observation that came to be the title of this thesis; "you cannot fly without wings." Perhaps the right way to help Kosovo would be to help the country manage on its own, to fly by its own wings. This is in line with the second-wave post-development theory focus on the grass-root perspective as an alternative form of development. And after all, the name Kosovo comes from the Serbian word for blackbird, so hopes that the country will fly should be high.

7.1 Suggestions for future research

The reader will notice that the above listed reasons for failure uses not only interviews, but also secondary sources as references. As my eight categories were beginning to form, they were compared to secondary sources in order to strengthen reliability and result validity where possible. That most of the reasons given by my informants can be found in secondary sources is interesting, as it does not only suggest there was a great deal of empirical truth-value in the statements of my informants, but most importantly: that the information this research has extracted was not previously unknown. This second point deserves some extra mentioning. From what I can gather by looking at my secondary sources, none of them list all the above reasons together. I would claim that this increases the relevance of this study as it has combined already known reasons into a rather extensive framework, producing an attempt to an overview of the situation which in future research could be analysed by some other theory than the one used for this research.

The reader might also notice that when it comes to the reasons given for the failure of the cadastre reconstruction, Kosovar sources have been referenced to to a greater extent than Western sources. The reason for this is simple; my Kosovar sources seemed to have more to say on why the project failed, while my Western sources were inclined to talk more generally about the situation in Kosovo. Considering the post-development theory emphasis on the importance of on looking to the demands and needs of local populations, this could be interesting. Perhaps a quantitative study, comparing local and international views on development could bring fruitful results.

Executive summary

How can one explain that some development projects fail? This thesis takes its roots in the aftermath of the Kosovo war. In 1999, as Serbian troops and administration left, they took with them most of Kosovo's land administration information and technology. Much of this was destroyed, some was stored in Belgrade, where it still remains today. As part of the post-war reconstruction of the shattered region, the international community, led by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) initiated a programme – the Kosovo Cadastre Support Programme (KCSP) in which the cadastre registers were to be reconstructed. The reasons for the reconstruction project stemmed from a common opinion that land and security of tenure is one of the cornerstones of human advancement, having been so since the beginning of the farming community. Assuming not only that a functioning land administration system would be a firm base on which future reconstruction and development projects could rest, the project was intended to bring a vast array of benefits; economic social, political as well as environmental – with sustainable development as an overall goal.

However, fifteen years after the projects implementation, little has changed in the sectors that the cadastre reconstruction was intended to reach. Initial research showed that the reconstruction project had one major flaw; the finished product – the cadastre – is not being used. This thesis explores how this “failure” of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction can be explained from the perspective of post-development theory, its research question being

RQ: How can post-development theory explain the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction?

The post-development school of thought evolved in the 1980's as a reaction against current development approaches – popularized by former president Truman in 1949 – which post-development theorists claimed created a hierarchy between the developed and underdeveloped, which wrongly justified the developed (West) to intervene in the underdeveloped (often South). Such interventions entailed that traditional practices and values were deconstructed to make room for Western such. Two broad schools of post-development theory can be identified; one can differ between first- and second wave post-development

theorists. The former takes a firm stance against development projects altogether. The latter seeks to explain why development projects fail, in an attempt to better practices for the future. While the first-wave post development theorists talk of alternatives to development, the second-wave theorists focus on alternative development – often focusing on local participatory approaches.

Post-development theory gives many explanations as to why development projects fail. This research uses three of the most frequently given explanations, and provides each explanation with a few clarifying sub-reasons that together form an analytical apparatus. The first explanation is that development projects disregard complex situations. This, according to theorists, contributes to the failure of development projects as; i) projects become developed for simplifications of reality – meaning that they will be unable to function in the real and more complicated context; ii) problems become targeted for the wrong reasons – as planners take too little regard as to why a problem exists and therefore how it should be solved; and iii) planners take too little regard of the adopting capabilities of the target community – meaning that the project might be unsustainable without outside support. The second explanation is that development projects are un-strategic and un-holistic. The sub-reasons offered under this explanation is that i) development plans focus too much on economic development and too little on other, equally important, aspects of society; and ii) that projects devised under the pressure of time and money are large-scale and therefore ill-equipped for local contexts, meaning that they are too complicated to be practically applied in the given context. The third and last explanation is that development projects are the product of a development culture; meaning devised in the homogenous (Western) work-environment of international organizations. Sub-reasons offered under this explanation is that i) project plans are implemented on basis of Western values, which means they might be an ill-fit for the local context; ii) projects are often not based on the demands or the needs of the local community, as a top-down, rather than a bottom-up, approach is used; iii) eventual consultations with local populations target only the more privileged groups of society, enforcing uneven powerstructures; and iv) ownership of specific projects is often unclear and there are few means or efforts made to carry out long-term evaluations, meaning that it is difficult to hold actors accountable when the project faces problems.

The research uses a theory consuming, qualitative, single-case study approach, where Kosovo functions both as a crucial and a representative case. The aim is explanatory, attempting to generate analytical/theoretical generalizations, and the science-philosophical position is that of reflexivism. While on an 8-week field study in and around the Kosovar capital Pristina in the spring of 2013, 20 semi-structured informant interviews were carried out with local as well as international actors who had knowledge about the issue at hand. The aim of the interviews was to retrieve explanations to why the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction failed, and the

subsequent coding process generated eight reasons to the failure. These were chosen on basis of how frequently they were mentioned and what emphasis they were given.

The reasons given were the following: i) Because of Kosovo's complicated political past, there is a wide-spread public distrust in the state, contributing to a reluctance to register property ownership with the government. ii) As a result of a socialist regime, and the subsequent dislocation of cadastre archives, the practice of land registration lost importance during the latter half of the 20th century, meaning that few people now see the point or the benefits of registering property ownership. iii) A negative spiral, in which the above two reasons play a big part, is undermining the success of the project; as few people register their properties and even fewer pay their taxes, the state has limited funds and cannot make the necessary adjustments to the cadastre registration system that could perhaps increase public support. iv) Partly as a result of discriminatory legislation against the Kosovoalbanian population that prevented them from taking part in state education or hold certain government or public service positions during the Milosevic regime, there are very few Kosovars who have the necessary competence to manage the registers, calling for ineffective practices and procedures. v) The project has had an unjust focus, in that it has focused on the larger cities, despite the fact that the vast majority of the population live in rural areas and that rural Kosovars are generally poorer than urban. The unjust focus has also been evident in the regard that consultations with the local population has failed to reach the less privileged members of the community. vi) The attitudes towards the international community; especially The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and UNMIK, is often negative, and informants suggested that many Kosovars feel that the agencies have brought with them a superimposed form of governance which the local population will not tolerate. vii) As the reconstruction process engaged many different nationalities, the end-result (the cadastre register) is complicated and difficult to manage, especially for a country with already weak institutions. viii) The project had too ambitious intentions, especially when one considers the extent of Kosovo's current problems.

In the analytical process, the analytic apparatus was put to use, comparing the explanations to the failure of development projects put forward by postdevelopment theory to the reasons for the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction that my informants had provided me with. The analysis found that the two sets of reasons correspond to a certain extent – perhaps with the one main dissimilarity in explanations that the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction was not claimed to have failed because of a too large focus on economic factors, which was one of the explanations offered by post-development theory. The thesis thus concludes that while there are many ways in which one can understand and explain the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction, post-development offers one explanation; namely that the project planners took little consideration of the

local context, among other things by failing to note that wide-spread public distrust in the state could hamper the success of the project, and that land registration was no longer common practice; that the project was unstrategic in that its ambitions were too ambitious and the finished product too complicated; and that it was devised by a development (planner's) culture, noted among other things by that the project was only loosely connected to local needs and demands and that it had an unjust focus as it targeted mostly the more privileged members of society.

This finding highlights the question of what would be the way forward for Kosovo, ending the thesis with a reflection on that the second-wave postdevelopment theory school of thought, arguing for a heightened focus on the grass-root perspectives and local participatory approaches might be a solution to the problem.

The thesis closes with two suggestions for further research: that the reasons found for the failure of the Kosovo cadastre reconstruction could be qualitatively tested in another context and analysed by help of another theoretical framework, and that one could perform a quantitative research of the similarities and dissimilarities by which local populations on the one hand, and international organizations on the other, explain the failure of development projects.

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8 Appendix

8.1 Informants

- Interview 1: Western diplomat 1
- Interview 2: Western diplomat 2
- Interview 3: Western diplomat 3
- Interview 4: Analyst in western aid agency 1
- Interview 5: Analyst in western aid agency 2
- Interview 6: Analyst in western aid agency 3
- Interview 7: Westerner working in the swedish land administration sector
- Interview 8: Westerner working in the western land administration sector
- Interview 9: Western professor teaching in Kosovo
- Interview 10: Western lawyer
- Interview 11: Kosovar working in an international organisation 1
- Interview 12: Kosovar working in an international organisation 2
- Interview 13: Kosovar diplomat 1
- Interview 14: Kosovar diplomat 2
- Interview 15: Kosovar historian
- Interview 16: Kosovar with background in land administration 1
- Interview 17: Kosovar with background in land administration 2
- Interview 18: Kosovar working in the service sector
- Interview 19: Kosovar professor in law
- Interview 20: Kosovar professor in human rights

8.2 Presentation

The following presentation was prepared and given to my informants, both orally and in printed form, before each interview.

English version:

This is a study about the post-conflict reconstruction of the Kosovar cadastre register and how well the results of this reconstruction correspond to what was intended when the reconstruction process began. The questions I would like to ask you will concern how you consider the results of the reconstruction, and what you believe are the reasons to this outcome. I value your participation in this study, but if you at any time have any concerns or wish to end the interview you are free to do so. The interview will be recorded to allow me to accurately keep track of information, but your anonymity will be protected if you wish it to be so, and recordings will not be shared with a third party.

Albanian version:

Ky është një studim në lidhje me rindërtimin e regjistrit kadastral Kosovarë të pasluftës, dhe sa mirë korrespondojnë rezultatet e këtij rindërtimi me atë që ishte menduar kur filloi procesi i rindërtimit. Pyetjet që unë do të ju parashtroj kanë të bëjnë me atë se si i konsideroni ju rezultatet e rindërtimit, dhe cilat janë arsyet për këtë rezultat. E vlerësoj pjesëmarrjen tuaj në këtë studim, por në qoftë se ju në çdo kohë keni ndonjë shqetësim apo dëshironi ta përfundoni intervistën, ju jeni të lirë për të bërë kështu. Intervista do të regjistrohet për të më lejuar mua t'i përcjelli informatat, por anonimiteti juaj do të jetë i mbrojtur në qoftë se ju dëshironi që ajo të jetë kështu, dhe regjistrimi nuk do të ndahet me një palë të tretë.

8.3 Check-list

- Perceived level of development immediately after the war
- Most pressing issues immediately after the war

- The situation with the land records; what had happened to them in the war
- The situation with the land records; What this meant for the people of Kosovo
- The situation with the land records; What it meant for the international community
- The situation with the land records; what was done, why

- The cadastre reconstruction; why it was done, what the intentions/intended benefits were
- The cadastre reconstruction; how it was done
- The cadastre reconstruction; by who it was done
- The cadastre reconstruction; the results
- The failure; why it is not being used
- Perceived level of development today
- Most pressing issues today

8.4 Interview structure

8.4.1 Introduction

- Thanking the person for agreeing to meet me for an interview
- Explaining how I am in Kosovo to collect material for my master thesis, funded by a scholarship from the Swedish development agency.
- Presentation of study (see section 8.2)
- Asking about the person; his or her field of work, time spent in Kosovo (if foreign) etc.

8.4.2 Interview questions

Below are examples of questions I asked my informants, sorted into themes (in bold) Each main questions (MQ) has one or more sub question (SQ). While I aimed to ask the same questions in every interview, different answers entailed different follow-up questions. Follow-up questions have not been included below. It was interesting to note how some of the most valuable information I was given (meaning, reasons for the failure of the reconstruction) were not given as answers to questions asking about these reasons. The situation was rather the opposite, and reasons for the failure were given throughout the interviews. This indicated that the semi-structured interview was indeed a fitting interview design for this study.

The situation in Kosovo immediately after the war

(MQ 1) Can you tell me a little bit about the situation in Kosovo immediately after the war?

(SQ 1.1) What were the most pressing issues?

(MQ 2) Can you tell me about the situation with the land records?

(SQ 2.1) What had happened to them?

(SQ 2.2) What effects did this have on society according to you?

(SQ 2.3) What effects did this have on society according to the international community?

(SQ 2.4) What did the international community do about this, and what were their reasons?

The process of cadastre reconstruction

(MQ 3) Can you tell me a bit about the process of the cadastre reconstruction?

(SQ 3.1) What values were guiding it?

(SQ 3.2) Who were the main actors?

(SQ 3.3) What were the intended benefits?

(SQ 3.4) How were these benefits intended to be reached?

(SQ 3.5) Can you tell me about the implementation process?

(SQ 3.7) How and by who has the project been evaluated?

The situation today

(MQ 4) Can you tell me a little bit about the situation in Kosovo today?

(SQ 4.1) What are the most pressing problems facing Kosovo today?

(MQ 5) Can you tell me about the results of the cadastre reconstruction?

(SQ 5.1) Has it reached its intended benefits?⁹

The reasons for the failure of the cadastre reconstruction

(MQ 6) Why would you argue the reconstruction failed to reach its intended benefits?

(SQ 6.1) Please develop your answer

(MQ 7) Which of the reasons you have mentioned do you feel is the most important?

(SQ 7.1) Why is this?

⁹To this question, all informants answered no, motivating MQ 6.

(MQ 8) What could the international community have done differently?
(SQ 8.1) What effects do you imagine this would have had?

(MQ 9) Do you think the cadastre reconstruction could have benefitted Kosovo more, had it been implemented differently?
(SQ 9.1) Why do you think so?

8.4.3 Closing

- I have asked you everything I was planning to, but I would like to ask if there is anything else you would like to add?
- Do you know anybody else who might have relevant information for my project and who might be willing to meet with me for an interview?
- Thank you again for meeting with me.

8.5 Coding procedure

8.5.1 Interview summary chart

The following chart was used to summarise the main points and reasons given in each interview.

Name, date
Main point(s)
Reason(s) for failure
My own comments

Reasons given extra emphasis were marked with a “+” -sign

8.5.2 Example of coding process

The following section will exemplify how interview quotes have been coded into the categories that formed the basis for analysis.

(MQ 2) Can you tell me about the situation with the land records?

(A) Basically, when the Serbs fled, they wanted to take as much they could. You know, to sabotage. I think they took the records for a symbolic meaning. How can we be a country if we don't even have the papers to prove it, you know? The UN says they took them for other reasons. But the thing is, we did not even use those papers very much. I know where I live and you know where you live right? (Interview 15)

Main points:

1. The informant sees few political/economic effects of the registres being dislocated, as the registres were not used very much
2. The international community thought differently

Reason(s) for failure of cadastre reconstruction:

1. Not common practice
2. Superimposed governance

(MQ 5) Can you tell me about the results of the cadastre reconstruction?

(A) "The cadastre reconstruction had many intended benefits. Perhaps too many. The project had good intentions, and maybe the results would have been better if the scope hadn't been so large. For this reason, it's difficult to say what changes in Kosovo are thanks to the reconstruction project." (Interview 9)

Main points:

1. The project had a very large scope
2. It is difficult to see what changes the reconstruction has contributed to

Reason(s) for failure of cadastre reconstruction:

1. Wanting too much too fast

(MQ 6) Why would you argue the reconstruction failed to reach its intended benefits?

(A) *“People don't trust the state too much here. One of my colleagues told me her and her husband were getting a divorce, and I asked her if it took a long time to process all the papers. Because she has kids, and in (my country), it takes a really long time to process a divorce if you have kids. And she said to me that the government had no idea she was married, or that she had kids, so why would she tell them she was getting divorced? I think that if you go that far not to involve the government, you're not gonna be too bothered to tell them where you live.”*
(Interview 2)

Main point(s):

1. People do not trust the state
2. People do not register where they live

Reason(s) for failure of cadastre reconstruction:

1. Lack of trust in the state

(MQ 7) Which of the reasons you have mentioned do you feel is the most important?

(A) *I think that if nobody trusts the system, if nobody uses it, if nobody pays their taxes, how will it ever get better? What if it gets worse? These things feed into themselves, and I think you could say that the project is undermining itself from below. It creates a negative spiral, and I don't know what the way out could be.*
(Interview 9)

Main point(s):

1. A combination of problems are feeding into a negative spiral

Reason(s) for failure:

1. Lack of trust in the state
2. Not common practice
3. Negative spiral

(MQ 8) What could the international community have done differently?

(A) *“Like I said, I think the project design was too big, too complicated. There was no way Kosovo was ready for such a complicated system. I'm not saying the project was a bad idea, just that Kosovo could have needed more help to get it on its feet. Now we were left with this huge system and we didn't really know what to do with it.”*(Interview 11)

Main points:

1. The project was too big and too complicated for Kosovo to handle

2. Kosovo needed more help

Reason(s) for failure of cadastre reconstruction

1. A complicated system
2. Lack of competence

8.5.3 Omitted reasons

Some lesser-mentioned or lesser-emphasised reasons to failure given by the informants were the following:

- The project was too focused on the economic sector (interview 18)
- The project would have been successful but was sabotaged by Serbian administration (interview 16)
- The project needs some more time to adjust (interview 8)