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Developing Country Responsibility for Mitigation

*Conceptualizations within Climate Governance Theories and
their correspondence to Developing Country Perspectives*

An Ideal-Type Analysis

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Abstract

In the contemporary or so-called “post-2012” period of climate governance, the question of what a new future climate agreement might entail has arisen in conjunction with the initiation of negotiations on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action in the climate regime. In parallel to this, larger states, industrial countries as well as developing countries are now dominating the UNFCCC process, seeking other ways of realizing their national climate policy, and pursuing negotiations on other governance arrangements. A key issue in this changing situation is how the responsibility for mitigation among developing countries is perceived. Do developing country conceptualizations of responsibility correspond to how this important issue is conceptualized within contemporary theories of climate governance? By performing an ideal type analysis, the conception of this responsibility within a select group of climate governance theories was elucidated and compared with how the question of responsibility was expressed in a number of important policy documents formulated by major developing countries in connection to the negotiations within the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The investigation concluded that a) there is a subtle correspondence between Neoliberal-Institutionalists and Developing Countries in regards to the role of the state as the basis of responsibility, b) there is a subtle correspondence between Green Critical International Political Economy perspectives and Neoliberal-Institutionalists in regard to the importance of restructuring the UNFCCC, and lastly c) that the question of developing country responsibility in the climate regime reveals that climate governance is inseparable from climate politics:

Key words: Developing Country, Climate Governance, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities, Durban Platform, Minilateralism, Ideal type analysis

Words: 15596

Abbreviations

ADP	The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AWG-ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
BASIC countries	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
CBDR	The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
COP	Conference Of the Parties
DCs	Developing Countries
G77	Coalition of developing nations (77 founding members but now 132)
ICs	Industrialized Countries
IR	International Relations
UNCED	UN Conference on Environment and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background and Problem Description

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) constitutes the most important entity in the climate regime and exemplifies the most concerted effort by states to attempt to cooperate in finding solutions to Climate Change. From its adoption in 1992 the UNFCCC has however met with considerable obstacles along its 21-year trajectory and the relation between Industrialized Countries (ICs) and Developing Countries (DCs) has been of critical importance in this regard. During the Conference of the Parties COP 18 in Doha in 2012 the only encompassing legal document that negotiations in the UNFCCC have produced, the Kyoto Protocol, entered into its second commitment period, also known as the post-2012 period. Currently, however it is widely acknowledged that the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that have renewed their commitments will only cover approximately 15% of global emissions.

What is becoming evidently clear is that there is no way that the UNFCCC will achieve its ultimate objective of a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”(UNFCCC.Art.2) if large Developing Countries (DCs) do not agree to mitigate their emissions. It is concluded by notable authors within political science that: “No climate regime can succeed without finding ways to persuade the major non-Annex 1 countries (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Indonesia) to accept the need to cap and then to reduce emissions sharply over time.” (Young, 2011:630). As well as within natural science disciplines: “The implication is indisputable: no climate regime can be effective if it does not bring about considerable mitigation activity in the South.” (Kantha, 2011:512).

During the Durban COP in 2011, Parties to the convention decided to “to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all

Parties.”(FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1). However the precise meaning of this formulation is still not clear. What is clear is that the potential impacts of climate change on developing countries are truly severe as is evidenced in the Human Development Report from 2013. With respect to Development Studies; the question of Climate Change is highly relevant.

With respect to how this is addressed in political science, the field of climate governance theory describes a fragmentation within the governance architecture of the climate regimes (Zelli, 2011). A brief further inquiry into the field reveals that “...there is hardly any coherent, systematic, structured system of global environmental governance.” (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012).

Hence, the question of DC responsibility for mitigation emerges in connection to that of the current status of climate governance. How is the question of DC responsibility for mitigation treated in the theoretical literature? What can be understood about the connections between DC responsibility and climate governance in political science theory? In addition to these questions, it would appear that the question of how DCs themselves regard their responsibility for mitigation is relevant bearing in mind that most indications state that Climate Change carries with it such potentially disastrous consequences. Are there any similarities or differences between these two conceptualizations? And if so how can they be characterized?

1.2 Research Question

In regard to the previous introduction my overarching Research question is the following: How do theories of climate governance conceptualize Developing Country Responsibility?

I have chosen to break this main research question into two sub questions:

- a) How do climate governance theories conceptualize developing country responsibility?
- b) How do developing countries conceptualize their responsibility?

I will restate the research question and its affiliate sub-questions in the end of chapter 2 section 4.

1.3 Aims and Structure

Bearing in mind the descriptive character of the above stated research questions, the aim of this thesis is to attempt to clarify multiple theoretical attempts to conceptualize DC responsibility within the realm of climate governance and to create an ideational model through which to clarify the various positions as well as clarify what the underlying basis for differences may consist of.

The structure of the thesis is as follows; it begins in chapter 2 with a literature review that broadly examines the concept of responsibility with specific regard to developing countries in the UNFCCC. At the end of this chapter the research question is restated in light of the findings of the literature review and two key thematic aspects that have been extrapolated from the literature.

Following the restated research question, chapter 3 addresses the theoretical positioning of this thesis in more detail.

In Chapter 4 the choice of method and its connection to the stated research aims are described in more detail, including the delimitations of materials and documents that will be used.

In Chapter 5 the first restated sub-question is answered through an extensive theoretical exposition of firstly, climate governance theories relationship to international relations theory as well as the role of the state. Secondly in chapter 5, the concept of responsibility in climate governance is explicated following the two key aspects that emerged in chapter 2. Thirdly in chapter 5 climate governance theory and developing country responsibility are discussed in relation and the ideal types of climate governance are exemplified with reference to a current debate within climate governance concerning the concept of unilateralism.

Lastly in chapter 5 an ideal-type model of how two broad types of climate governance theories differentiate in relation to how the key aspects of developing country responsibility are conceptualized and in relation to how the two types differentiate in relation to the concept of unilateralism.

In Chapter 6 an analysis is performed on two key policy documents that have emerged within the UNFCCC negotiations on a possible new climate agreement. In the first section the documents are explained in accordance to how they have come about through the use of a paper trail. In the second section the content of

the documents are reported and then analyzed in regard to how the content articulates a conceptualization of developing country responsibility.

Lastly the content of the policy documents is presented in an ideal type model that is identical in structure to the model from chapter 5. In the conclusions in chapter 7 the two models are presented and analyzed in conjunction and the correspondences are commented. Lastly the findings of the model are discussed and reflected upon.

1.4 Theoretical Positioning

The purpose is not to describe in any detail the actual climate policies in the proposals or methodologies employed when climate policy is formed. The objects of this thesis are the content of the governance theories as well as the content of documents that articulate developing country views, both in regard to how they conceptualize responsibility.

Due to the fact that what I am inquiring into are ideas my theoretical positioning with respect to this thesis is Constructivism, which I will describe, in greater detail in chapter 3. I will also be addressing my aims in greater detail in Chapter 3 and 4.

1.5 Methods

My choice of methods in this thesis is that of a content oriented ideational analysis. In terms of my materials I will also employ elements of qualitative text analysis. In terms of how the content of texts are analyzed I will make use of an ideal-type analytical tool that is commonly used in order to systematically organize content and is thus commensurate with my stated aims.

2 Literature Review

This chapter provides a review of research that examines the concept of responsibility in the UNFCCC in specific regard to developing country parties. I will first describe the aims of my review, the type of literature I have selected, and the methodologies these sources employ. Secondly, I will describe various thematic tendencies that I have been able to extrapolate from the literature and thirdly, I will present the findings I have derived from these themes. Lastly I will specify my research question in light of these findings.

2.1 Review Aims, Types of Literature and Methods in Literature

Research fields that address the problem of climate change, are numerous and varied. I have selected literature from International Environmental Law, Global Environmental Politics/Governance as well as affiliated International Relations disciplines such as International Political Economy. The research reviewed employs various methods and theoretical explanations. Most of the material I have selected is of political science orientation and include both documentary analysis and interviews with key informants that are most often delegates or representatives engaged in UNFCCC negotiations.

The scope and scale of analysis of the literature is a possible limitation due to the fact that I have selected literature from multiple research fields. I consider this limitation acceptable, however, given the broad ideational concept that I am seeking to examine. The review aims to synthesize scholarly accounts and seeks to extrapolate meta themes that transcend the academic disciplines of these scholarly accounts.

When attempting to examine the concept of DC responsibility within the confines of the UNFCCC, the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) stands out as key. The UNFCCC in its entirety is even

defined by some authors as being “attempts to operationalize the principle of CBDR” (Bushey & Jinna, 2010:1). The first time that CBDR is clearly enunciated as a principle with respect to climate change is in connection with the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) known as the Rio Summit in 1992. CBDR was included as principle 7 of the Rio Declaration as well as in the preamble and Article 3.1 and 4 in the UNFCCC, which was adopted in conjunction with the Rio Summit (Rajamani, 2000).

2.2 Themes

The thematic tendencies that I have found when reviewing the literature and which are significant for the purposes and aims of this essay are the following; a) ambiguity regarding the nature of responsibilities in the climate regime; b) changes in composition of southern coalitions within the negotiations of the UNFCCC and lastly; c) a change in orientation regarding DC responsibilities in the recent period of negotiations, especially following COP 17 in Durban in 2011 and leading up to the present day.

2.2.1 Ambiguity regarding the nature of responsibilities

Regarding what responsibilities that the CBDR principle refers to, the literature contains numerous references to conflicting emphasis by parties to the UNFCCC when they attempt to interpret CBDR. Despite the fact that the UNFCCC contains other principles that pertain to questions of “equity” or “burden-sharing”, CBDR stands out in the literature as the most politically relevant, it is even claimed that the CBDR is “the ethical anchor of the Climate Regime” (Rajamani, 2000:130).

CBDR unavoidably includes an acknowledgement of historical responsibilities, which in the case of the UNFCCC means historical emissions or contributions to environmental degradation and this is also expressed in both the Berlin Mandate from 1995 and the Bali Action Plan from 2007 and represents a central point of contention in the entire lifecycle of the UNFCCC. This contention is embedded in the CBDR insofar that there is a shifting degree of emphasis between historical

responsibility as a form of *Culpability* and responsibility for implementation of the convention that is derived from *Capability*.

Capability in the case of UNFCCC is understood to mean economic and technological capacity (Okerere, 2008 and Rajamani, 2000). An examination of the genealogy of equity norms that underlie the CBDR principle reveals that the tension between *Culpability* and *Capability* as denoting the nature of responsibilities in CBDR runs parallel to how ICs and DCs have interpreted them in the contexts in which CBDR has figured, especially in the UNFCCC (Okerere, 2008). A number of factors determine differences among parties in their interpretation of the concept. These factors include the extent to which it is possible to establish causality in regard to emissions, and most importantly to what extent the norms fit with the neoliberal economic order. It would appear that one kind of interpretation of CBDR stands in a polemic relationship to the manner in which neoliberal perspectives on climate change conceive of DC responsibility. This leads one to query how a Neoliberal international relations theory of climate governance would conceptualize DC responsibility. Indeed it raises the questions: how does any political theory of climate governance conceptualizes DC responsibility and are there differences between theories in this regard?

In addition, a major underlying conflict in the UNFCCC in regard to what “responsibilities” mean in the context of CBDR stems from differing understanding of the actual object of responsibilities. Some researchers claim that the Climate Regime has become subsumed within a broader development discourse, which prioritizes responsibility for economic growth and poverty eradication rather than for environmental concerns (Vlassopoulos, 2012). That DC participation in the UNFCCC is motivated by development concerns is unequivocal and this is incorporated in Article 4.7 of the Convention itself. In regards to how DCs have viewed responsibility, it is equally clear that the inclusion of CBDR in the UNFCCC was seen a necessary counterbalance to an inequitable world order (Gupta, 1997) (Najam, 2004) (Miguez, 2002). For DCs, CBDR is to be understood as a critical principle subsumed within the concept of sustainable development. This framing under the broader rubric of sustainable development means that the South views the negotiations within the UNFCCC *potentially* as a positive sum game. Simultaneously however, from the perspective of the South, the CBDR principle has been steadily eroding thus hindering the

progress of the UNFCCC (Najam, 2004). This theme confirms that the way in which the relationship between development and climate is considered within the concept of SD also has relevance for how DC parties view their responsibilities in light of interpretations of the CBDR principle. The concept of responsibility for DCs is thus intimately interwoven with how the relationship between development and climate is to be understood.

2.2.2 Southern coalitions old and new

The significance of DC coalitions and their effect on the Climate Regime is evident from the literature. The two main coalitions that stand out are the G77 + China and the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), which was formed during the COP 15 in Copenhagen of 2009. These two coalitions are representative of both the old and the new, of a coalition that predates the UNFCCC and one that emerged within the Climate Regime. The G77 coalition played a considerable part in advancing DCs concerns in both the formation and adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. The significance of the G77 continued in advancing the development focus of the regime itself by way of inclusion of the CBDR principle and the deriving framework of non-requirement of mitigation to non-annex parties as was formulated in the UNFCCC and in case of the Kyoto Protocol (Kasa et al, 2008; Vihma et al, 2011; and Rajamani, 2008).

The formation of the BASIC coalition is equally important in the most recent period of climate negotiations post Copenhagen 2009 and many conclude that this emblematic of a new multipolar world that is reflected within the sphere of the UNFCCC (Hochstetler, 2012; Roberts, 2011; Saran, 2011; and Qi, 2009). Especially China and India are described as employing a consistent strategy of minimizing their obligations. However these countries also face critical challenges associated with climate change and have therefore engaged in negotiations on numerous bilateral and regional governance arrangements as well as national plans to address these challenges (Walsh et al, 2011; Wu, 2012; Bortscheller, 2010; Delman, 2011; Huffbauer & Kim, 2011; and Christoff, 2010).

Despite the fact that DC states operate in accordance with their interests and employ strategies derived from these, there is also indication of genuine

substantive concern with the ethical aspects of how the UNFCCC is constituted. Thus it is not the case that the way in which CBDR has been invoked by DC parties is exclusively motivated by instrumental concerns (Stalley, 2013). This raises the question of how DCs, especially China and India, currently view their responsibilities with respect to climate change. How do these countries conceptualize their responsibilities, especially bearing in mind the ambiguous nature of the concept and with respect to how they conceive of the relationship between development and climate?

2.2.3 Changes in orientation regarding DC responsibilities

While the Kyoto Protocol constituted a peak instance of an earlier CBDR interpretation in which the distribution of responsibilities appeared more cleanly defined along the IC-DC or North-South line, the COP 15 in Copenhagen of 2009 is considered as the peak instance of an attempted change in the differentiation of DC parties to the UNFCCC resulting in a blockage to the multilateral process (Bushey & Jinnah, 2010 and Christoff, 2010). What is apparent is that the COP 15 outcome represents a change from the earlier UNFCCC trajectory to one that is characterized by an increasing balance of power as well as an increasing parallelism. The larger states, both ICs and DCs, are now dominating the UNFCCC process, seeking other ways of realizing their national climate policy, and pursuing negotiations on other governance arrangements (Christoff, 2010 and Wagner, Hajjar & Appleton, 2013).

The post 2012 period refers to the ending of the first commitment phase for parties to the Kyoto Protocol and with respect to CBDR, this period is claimed to be characterized by a dilution of the concept of differentiation as it was earlier conceived of in regard to CBDR (Deluil, 2012). The earlier differentiation regime that favored DCs is claimed to be slowly replaced by a flexibility regime exemplified by the Durban platform of 2011 that contains a stated goal of achieving a legally binding climate agreement that is applicable to all by 2015 (Ibid). This marks a major change in the understanding of CBDR since Kyoto, namely that all parties to the UNFCCC are ascribed some responsibility for mitigation (Maguire, 2012). However, if the role of CBDR is changing, one can

ask what will characterize the kind of differential treatment in the UNFCCC, and if CBDR will continue to play the same role as before?

2.3 Findings

According to the literature reviewed, the specific interpretation of CBDR that prioritizes its initial formulation as expressed in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. that DCs should not be ascribed responsibilities for mitigation, is claimed to be slowly being diluted. A shift is claimed to have occurred in favor of an interpretation that reflects the growing importance and relevance of large DC states, particularly the BASIC group. This interpretation of CBDR is emblematic of an interpretation which prioritizes capability over culpability in so far that it derives from a view of large developing parties such as China and India as becoming capable of more stringent mitigation.

The literature also indicates, however, that for the DCs the concept of responsibility and its manifestation in the CBDR principle has been a way of establishing a Climate Regime that conforms to specific norms that emphasize culpability. Furthermore, from the perspective of DCs, the initial shared understanding that the CBDR is subsumed under sustainable development remains consistent. Thus, for DCs the question of responsibility is related to the relation between development and climate. In addition, a contemporary negotiation on a legally binding agreement that is potentially applicable to all raises the question of how DC responsibilities will be characterized in such an agreement.

2.4 Specification of Research Question

In light of these findings, a relevant question is whether DC conceptualizations of responsibility correspond to how theories of climate governance conceptualize DC responsibility.

Is there a difference between the way climate governance theories and the way DCs such as China and India, conceptualize responsibility with respect to:

a) The nature of responsibilities

And

b) The relationship between development and climate?

Since mitigation has previously been the main issue of contention I will focus only on responsibility as it relates to mitigation within the climate regime.

This restated research question indicates two things: that what is to be inquired into are ideas and concepts and that the source material for these will require texts to be able to be answered. I will address these two matters in the next chapters that concern theoretical positioning and methods respectively.

3 Theoretical Positioning

This thesis is theoretically situated within the metatheory of constructivism, which is related and yet also distinct from a constructivist theory of international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010). Constructivism is thus both a theory of international relations and an approach to social theory (Fierke, 2010). This theoretical position is in line with my research question in that the latter seeks to examine how responsibility as an ideational category is articulated within on the one hand theoretical accounts of Climate Governance and by actual DC actors on the other.

Constructivism assumes that ideational dimensions can and do affect causal change in so far as norms can affect behavior but also in so far as norms contribute to the constitution of the identity of actors (Fierke, 2010). Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, constructivism identifies the reflexive quality of interpretation that is involved in how actors actually behave (Paterson, 2006). It can even be said that actors must engage in interpretation in order to act at all (Hay, 2002). Constructivism views ideas as performing a mediating role between structures and agents and are thus understood to contribute to political change (Ibid). An important element of constructivism that serves my research question well concerns a critique of rationalist explanations of behavior within the realm of international relations and the question of social cognition (Paterson, 2006 and Fierke, 2010). I am interested in providing a descriptive account of the possible difference between *how* various theories of climate governance conceptualize DC responsibility and *how* DCs conceptualize their responsibility. Constructivism is therefore suitable as a theoretical perspective in so far that it acknowledges the process of interpretation that is active with respect to how responsibility is conceptualized.

This account will be borrowing a constructivism theoretical lens, the elements of which are described and elaborated on in Pettenger, 2007. This approach assumes an interdependence between material and ideational forces and enables an examination of “...how material realities gain meaning through social

interaction” (Pettenger, 2007:6). Following this constructivism framework, my theoretical inquiry takes the shape of a norm-centered type of inquiry in which “...these studies seek to explain how and why actors define and instantiate particular norms” (Pettenger, 2007:10). My inquiry will mainly consist of a descriptive account that provides an answer to the question of *how* responsibility is conceptualized. Since what I am interested in examining in this thesis is the conceptualization of responsibility, the main focus of my inquiry will concern the content of this ideational category. This means in turn that it will be a fundamentally qualitative inquiry.

It is not a self-evident that a choice of a theoretical approach automatically associates with a choice of methodology or an epistemological perspective (Hochstetler & Lautari, 2006). However, as I will describe in greater detail in my methods chapter, there are some associative links between constructivism and particular methodological approaches of which I will make use of in this thesis. These concern the fact that my choice of methods is that of an ideational analysis which bears some similarities with constructivism’s focus on the role of ideas and norms.

4 Methods

The following chapter is divided into three segments. First, I will describe and justify my choice of method. Thereafter I will describe and elaborate the benefits and limitations of my choice of analytical tool. Lastly, I will indicate the materials and delimitations that I will employ and provide the justification for this decision.

4.1 Methods

Given that my inquiry will be an examination of broad and abstract theoretical categories, my choice of method will be that of an ideational analysis, a collective term denoting a combination of aims, research questions and methodological tools. What is most characteristic of this methodological approach concerns not only *how* it can be used, but also primarily *what* it can be used to examine (Beckman, 2007). Since the objects of my inquiry are conceptualizations of responsibility, which are ideational categories, an ideational analysis is suitable for this inquiry.

My aim will be to describe ideational content and will thus be centered on the content of the idea itself rather than their performative function (Beckman, 2007 and Bergström & Boreus, 2005). Specifically my aims are to clarify and provide a more systematic account of whether or not there is a correspondence between theoretical conceptualizations of DC responsibility and conceptualizations that are articulated by DCs themselves. Following this, the aim is to organize and classify the content of these conceptualizations (Esaiasson et al, 2012). As a descriptive analysis however, it is not sufficient to only reference this content but also necessary to relate the two conceptualizations along a point of comparison. This process requires an operationalization of the conceptualizations and in case of this thesis the operationalization takes the shape of two aspects of responsibility that I have extrapolated from my review, namely the nature of responsibilities and the relationship between development and climate.

4.2 Analytical Tool: Ideal type

When performing an ideational analysis it is required to choose an analytical tool with which to analyze. For the purposes of this thesis I have selected the tool ideal-type which can be defined as follows: "...it is a deliberate oversimplification of a complex empirical actuality for the purpose of highlighting certain themes or aspects that are never as clear in the actual world as they are in the ideal-type depiction of it." (Weber, 1999a; 191 in Thaddeus-Jackson, 2011:37).

The benefit of an ideal-type is that it can bring a certain order to a certain material and that it potentially may enable comparisons (Bergström&Boreus, 2005). While an ideal-type does not correspond to an actuality there are still some methodological criteria that should be met. Following the aims described in the former section, the ideal-type is used to organize content. In regard to operationalization of concepts it is required that types contain elements that are *comparable* to actualities and, furthermore that components in an ideal-type model are substantially different and mutually exclusive to the degree that it is possible to at least identify some form of difference. With regard to my restated research question in the previous chapter what I am comparing in terms of difference is the way which DC responsibility for mitigation is conceptualized in climate governance theories and by DCs themselves.

While the main criteria on which to judge an ideal-type analysis is its usefulness the question of validity is still relevant in so far as the model that is produced must not define the material that is to be analyzed (Bergström&Boreus, 2005). This also relates to the points in the previous section regarding that a description is not sufficient in itself to count as an actual inference. The entire point of selecting an analytical tool is to enable inference. Given that my source of materials will be texts the question of validity is relatable to the ideal-type tool in that the questions that one poses to the texts should be relevant empirical indicators of the phenomenon that one is interested in examining (Esaiasson et al, 2012).

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4.3 Delimitations and Materials

When studying the content of ideational categories, one is often compelled to study texts. This thesis employs a qualitative text analysis of the contents of these texts with the purpose of systematically ordering them in accordance with the ideal type analytical tool. When delimiting what choices of texts I will utilize I am thus considering their content as the main criteria for selection and I am both selecting according to their domain and what actor they are associated with (Halperin & Heath, 2012).

With regard to texts it is clear that they must be identified and selected in terms of their relevance to the actual research aims and question. For the purpose of this thesis, texts will be of two kinds; peer reviewed academic articles, edited volumes and books within the research field of Climate Governance and formal policy documents that are produced within the domain of the UNFCCC negotiations. There is support for the fact that, with respect to the use of qualitative methods to study processes of politics, documents are useful sources of data (Hochstetler & Laituri, 2006).

With respect to the first kind of text I have selected my material through searching for keywords that include “Climate Governance” “Developing Country” and “Responsibility” using databases and other channels available through being a student at Lunds University. The authors and researchers that I have selected literature by and which I cite are all established and notable in their respective fields. The Journals that I have selected this material from include amongst others: *Global Environmental Politics*, *Perspectives on Politics* and *Sustainable Development Law & Policy*.

As regards the second kind of texts, namely policy documents from the UNFCCC, the selection is made in regard to both which actors that have authored them, the domain in which they figure and most especially the formalized process that has generated them. What is especially true for policy documents of this kind is that they refer to other domains within the negotiations and other documents. I intend to present and clarify these relations when necessary in a “Paper Trail” (Atkinson&Coffey, 2004). This is done in chapter 6 section 1. The policy documents I have selected are two formal submissions from China and India to

the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action or AWG-ADP. The AWG-ADP is a subsidiary body to the UNFCCC that is tasked with negotiating on a new agreement within the climate regime that is stated to be “applicable to all parties” and is thus relevant with respect to the research questions restated in the end of chapter 2. Both policy documents that I have analyzed including are included in their entirety within the Appendix section as well as some related documents such as an excerpt from the main report document COP 17 meeting in Durban in 2011.

5 Climate Governance and Developing Country Responsibility

In this chapter I will begin in the first segment by pursuing a theoretical inquiry into the field of Climate Governance and elaborate how it may be related to International Relations theory. I will then focus in on the question of the role of the state and its connection to the question of responsibility. In the second section I will elaborate further on two aspects of DC responsibility in light of the previous section, and will describe how these aspects are problematized and elaborated in the literature. Following this I will describe a contemporary debate on the composition of the UNFCCC that holds fundamental relevance in regard to the most current climate negotiations and the question of DC responsibility. Following this I will, in the third section, construct an ideal type model of two broad categories of Climate Governance theories that first differentiate in regard to how the state can be figured as well as the status of the Climate Regime. I will then describe how these two categories differentiate in regard to the question of responsibility. That is, how they conceptually relate to the two aspects of responsibility previously noted. This will be presented as a table in order for the reader to be able to see a clear representation.

5.1 Theories of Climate Governance and International Relations

Climate Governance is a comparatively difficult field to actually systematically approach with respect to classifying distinct theoretical perspectives. The reasons for this partly derive from how Climate Governance is situated within the broader field of Environmental Governance and International Environmental Politics and secondly the theoretical challenge of theorizing any form of Governance that addresses phenomenon that occur on a global scale. In order to make reasonable

sense of what characterizes Climate Governance theories one must first elucidate how theories approach Governance on the one hand and the specific phenomenon of Climate Change on the other.

Governance can be viewed as distinct from Government in so far as Governance denotes the use of institutional power to shape processes and outcomes that does not exclusively involve states as actors but can rather include institutional and organizational entities that both transcend and are submerged beneath a state level. With respect to Environmental Governance in the broader sense a constructive definition is formulated as follows:

“Environmental Governance is synonymous with interventions aiming at changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision-making, behaviors and identities.” (Lemos & Agarwal, 2009:71).

However, Climate Change is a fundamentally global and trans-boundary problem and all theories that seek to address it are inevitably forced to theorize its globality as a constitutive element. Whilst theoretical approaches to Global Environmental Governance have originated in prior debates surrounding international environmental regimes and multilateral environmental agreements between states, it has since become a much more hybrid and complex phenomenon that invites several potential points of theoretical entry. For sake of parsimony the category of Global Governance (of which Global Environmental Governance is one) can however be theorized and defined in two distinct ways; one phenomenological and one normative (Biermann, 2006:239). A phenomenological approach to Global Governance simply describes the emerging phenomenon of governance forms and arrangements while normative approaches can either identify Global Governance as a kind of active substantive political orientation of policies that attempts to handle problems of modernity or can be used to criticize such orientations and seek to bring attention to their shortcomings (Ibid).

Regardless of which point of departure is adopted there are clear indications that Global Environmental Governance has grown more and more complex and is fragmented into multiple political scales and domains, Climate Governance is here one of the most notable examples. This change can be attributable to globalization

as such but holds importance for the specific case of Climate Governance, since in many ways, it is the quintessential global problem par excellence (Lemos & Agarwal, 2009:90). Climate Governance is an emblematic case of how the study of Global Environmental Governance has turned from studies of intergovernmental regimes and single institutions to including an expanding terminology of “governance architectures” and “regime complexes” (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012)(Keohane&Victor, 2011). These theories tend to affirm the point of view that Global Governance is most properly exercised through the market, my interpretation of this claim being that it is the only institution that can assume a truly global scale. The degree to which Regime theory and the affiliated IR theoretical position of Neoliberal/institutional still enjoy theoretical primacy cannot be understated. Whilst the importance of institutions cannot be denied, a counterargument concerns the degree of independence that can be ascribed to institutions:

“Understanding environmental problems and politics from the point at which they enter the remit of global institutions is to neglect the prior political and material relations that account for the production environmental harm.” (Newell, 2012:34)

What is critical for the purposes of this thesis is the question of whether the new and hybrid governance forms that have emerged in relation to climate change indicate a move away from traditional questions of power in international politics as it is typically described in mainstream IR theory. If Global Governance as such can be understood to describe the political change of institutional decision making in response to the phenomenon of globalization, in which increasing interdependence causes a shift in the locus of political authority to domains that transcend the parameters of a nation state and that therefore change the way that global politics actually takes place, it is pertinent to ask what then is the role of the state? On the one hand Global Environmental Governance and therefore by extension Climate Governance can be understood as inherently post-Westphalian in that it denotes institutions, regimes and agreements that transcend the international state system (Biermann, 2006:243). However, what is also important to note is that this does not mean that Global Environmental Governance can be

understood outside of the contexts of global politics. There is little basis for assuming any a-priori autonomy of either states, markets or societies (Newell, 2012). With respect to Climate Change it is evidently not clear to what extent the new hybrid governance forms produced can actually address the phenomenon of Climate Change in separation from political economic constraints. Climate Governance is clearly not possible to differentiate completely from Climate Politics;

“Climate governance cannot be understood as separate from the ideology, institutions and material interests that predominate within the wider global economy in which climate politics exist and with which it seeks to engage.” (Bulkeley & Newell, 2010:33).

As a regulatory multilateral regime that is composed of sovereign state parties the UNFCCC, despite its scope and scale is still embedded in an international state system and global political economy, however it is ironically also the case that Climate Governance is a “meta-feature” of that system since there is no aspect of political or economic reality that does not affect, or is can be said to be affected by, the Climate (Bulkeley&Newell, 2010). The identification of this overlapping complexity constitutes a common understanding which by and large forms the basis for an International Political Economy theoretical approach to Climate Governance of which there are various types (including critical and neo-gramscian) but can still be viewed as a somewhat coherent category.

There may however be need for a parsimonious approach to the term Climate Governance due to the fact that global interdependence is equally present as a key factor in other aspects of international politics. The argument being that there should be a distinction between global governance and simply the study of international politics as within the field of International Relations theory (Biermann, 2006). I will now briefly refer to an account of the important challenges that Climate Change poses to IR theory and what theoretical consequences that it carries with it. Climate Change as a phenomenon presents a theoretical challenge for both neo-realism and neoliberal-institutionalist approaches to International Relations. This is especially true for the neorealist perspective's ontological grounding in global anarchy and treatment of states as

unitary actors, whose actions are determined to be the pursuit of relative gains (Paterson, 1996). Such a perspective is unable to account for the fact that a Climate Regime and entity such as the UNFCCC actually was formed at all. By contrast a neoliberal-institutional approach, that emphasizes the pursuit of absolute gains as derived from an affirmation of the possibility of cooperative behavior among states and the capacity of institutional forms such as a climate regime to create stable expectations and the conditions of possibility for such cooperation, is better suited to explain the creation of the UNFCCC (Ibid). A typical neoliberal-institutionalist account is however not capable of explaining the differentiation and variability of state's rationalities when faced with the question of how to cooperate and the variability of how states respond (Eckersley, 2010). More specifically, a constructivist critique of assumed state rationality in face of global anarchy is also a necessary theoretical element to incorporate in regard to the UNFCCC where states have acted both as role players as well as strict utility maximizers (Paterson, 1996). With respect to any regime it is impossible to approach it as a neutral and isolated entity that can be viewed as separate from the normative context in which it is immersed (Zelli et al, 2012). In regard to climate governance the context is heavily influenced by liberal governance norms that have greatly affected what governance architectures have emerged. This is especially clear in the rejection of trade restrictive policies and embracing of market mechanisms within the regime (Ibid).

However, interestingly for the purposes of this thesis, it would appear that it is exactly the question of responsibility in the multilateral manifestations of Climate Governance as exemplified by the UNFCCC that has nonetheless changed the trajectory of international cooperation (Newell & Bulkeley, 2010:39). DCs insistence on the primacy of the CBDR principle is emblematic of a norm that has to a certain extent remained intact despite the dominant position of liberal governance. It has also indirectly spurred an increase in both bilateral and regional attempts at creating climate governance as a reaction to the obstacles within the UNFCCC and thus bringing into question the status of the multilateral process as well as raising the question of whether alternative governance forms such as minilateralism are more suitable to address the problem. I will return to address this later on in section 5.3.

In light of the challenges that have emerged during the UNFCCC's complicated path to the current negotiations and especially in light of the challenge in regard to how to elicit the engagement of the major emitting countries, it is obvious that the Climate Regime calls for further examination with regard to important norms such as responsibility and the category of equity in which it figures. While the UNFCCC as a framework convention obviously does not counteract the fact that the international system of states is an anarchic one, neither does this anarchy necessarily create a given outcome.

Factors that can potentially affect outcomes of inter-state action are the norms that are present amongst actors and how they are subsequently interpreted (Paterson, 2006). Norms are however equally present in the context of Regimes themselves and critically do not only affect the institutions but also the inter-linkages of institutions (Zelli et al, 2012). As mentioned previously liberal norms have constituted the basis from which the creation of market mechanisms have gained its legitimacy. This governance form has proven to be dominant. Furthermore the process of creation of such markets that operate as governance forms through governing via price; require prior governance outside of the market itself. Especially when markets are created to serve a purpose other than their own continuation and proliferation the question becomes what rationale informs that purpose (Newell&Paterson. 2010). One account identifies that this general phenomenon of the marketization of governance:

“..has occurred principally because of a structural feature of carbon markets as responses – that they created concentrated, immediate benefits for powerful actors – and the political dynamic which has resulted from this structural feature.” (Paterson, 2011:619)

In the case of Climate Change and given the intentions of this thesis the question concerns how do liberal-market norms affect the conceptualization of responsibility in regards to DCs? Embedded in this question is a second one regarding the meaning and significance of how the new, hybrid and fragmented forms of climate governance actually relate to the role of the state in regard to climate change and to what extent the changes in governance forms actually supersede the theoretical understandings of international politics that are germane

to conventional IR theory. In order to make more sense of this I will now pursue a discussion regarding the role of the state in Climate Governance.

5.1.1 The Role of The State

With specific respect to Climate Change it is evident that there are two tendencies within attempts to approach it theoretically. On the one hand Climate Change poses unique challenges for more conventional theories of International Relations in so far as the statist orientation of these is incommensurable with the globalized nature of the problem (Paterson, 1996)(Stripple, 2005)(Paterson & Stripple, 2007). On the other hand negotiations within the main multilateral and regulatory entity of the Climate Regime that is supposed to facilitate cooperation and the seeking of absolute gains, namely the UNFCCC, has encountered multiple challenges and obstacles.

For some this would indicate that the sovereign, territorially bound state is still an important and basic unit of analysis that can explain the outcomes and trajectory of climate politics (Compagnon et al, 2012). Furthermore it stands to reason that while the Climate Regime as manifested in the UNFCCC may be regarded as an example of a form of Global Governance in that it occupies a space “above” sovereign states, it is however not a Global Government and is to a certain degree only the sum of its member-states, which are unavoidably sovereign (Wapner, 1998). While the modern westphalian western state may be viewed as being embedded in a euro-centric 19th century experience, it can also be said that Global Governance is based on the experiences of countries that are members of the OECD, and so from the perspective of DCs one may conclude that Global Governance tends to hold a different meaning than what is usually assumed (Compagnon et al, 2012).

Bearing this in mind, the identification of Climate Governance as a concept which shifts according to interpretations; that can, in one extreme denote a pragmatically informed political program seeking to remediate the problems that occur in a globalized society or on the other extreme describe a particular, geographically specific mode of policy formation that implicitly verifies a neoliberal hegemony, seems to be accurate. This would confirm that Climate

Governance as it is interpreted is a normative category and must be approached through acknowledging its essentially constructed nature.

On the other hand there is very clear indication the modern state as such is equally a constructed category and that it is primarily the territorialized grounding of sovereign states that renders the problem of climate change such a theoretical conundrum (Strippel, 2005)(Paterson&Strippel, 2007). Territoriality is thus a fundamental ontological category that provides the condition of possibility and basis for the majority of theoretical perspectives on climate change as well as underlying how the problem is addressed within global political arenas:

“Since the territorial configurations of political space are made to appear natural certain political and economic solutions to the climate issue becomes legitimized.” (Paterson&Strippel, 2007:150)

With regard to responsibility this territorialized grounding is especially pertinent. Responsibility as a conceptual element within the question of “burden-sharing” is embedded and nestled within a language that relates exclusively to states (Strippel, 2005). The question of how to interpret the CBDR principle for instance is still enclosed in a political language that affirms the primacy of sovereign states (Ibid). Bearing this discussion in mind I will now proceed and elaborate briefly on the question of responsibility in Climate Governance with particular attention two key aspects of the question of responsibility that have emerged in connection to contentions within the UNFCCC negotiations and which be shown to broadly differentiate between two theoretical perspectives on climate governance.

5.2 Responsibility in Climate Governance

It should be stated that the question of responsibility is cemented within a much broader conceptual area of equity, fairness and justice, which I have no intention of making an exhaustive account of. Suffice it to say that in order to discuss responsibility it is necessary to qualify what aspect of climate change it can refer to and to characterize its relationship to more general norms of justice. Being that

as it may, with respect to the question of responsibility in Climate Governance I will focus on two of the themes that I have previously extrapolated from my review of the academic literature on the CBDR principle. These two themes concern the ambiguity of the Nature of Responsibilities and how the relationship between Climate and Development is considered.

5.2.1 The Nature of Responsibilities

What introduces the question of Responsibility *inter alia* in the case of Climate Change is a fundamental asymmetry between cause and effect. The cause of the problem is both local-cumulative and trans-boundary in nature and as is sometimes stated the climate pays no attention whatsoever to where the carbon is emitted. The effects however are another matter entirely, and furthermore as will be seen, when concerned with normative concepts such a responsibility the question of where and in conjunction with which processes emissions occur is of critical importance. That being said, these asymmetries are addressed in different ways and with differing results regarding how responsibilities can be described. One ambiguity regarding the nature of responsibilities can be derived from differing emphasis on *capability* or *culpability* which is in turn dependent on contentions concerning more general equity norms that have been present from the outset of the UNFCCC (Okerere, 2008).

For the purposes of this thesis and very generally speaking these contentions in the negotiations revolve around approaches to distributive questions. Within the question of distribution lies the question of *allocation* that refers to either between countries or over time (Vanderheiden, 2008). I will not refer to the complex inter-linkages between these two or to the linkages between adaptation and mitigation but will focus entirely on the question of inter-generational equity and mitigation. The complex debate between international and cosmopolitan justice however, is simply too extensive to include in this thesis.


In the case of mitigation there are two basic distributive issues in play; the question of distribution of abatement costs and of emission rights (Grubb, 1995). Both of these issues pertain to the question of how to allocate *future* emissions and in absence of separate transfers that are associated with abatement the choice

of allocation approach will impact heavily on the cost, meaning that if not addressed through policy concerning financial support from ICs to DCs the cost of abatement is directly dependent on the distribution of emission constraints/rights (Ibid). The alternative to transfers is tradable permits that have proved to be the preferred method in ex. the Kyoto Protocol. The distinction between the allocation of abatement costs and of emission rights can also be described as that between “burden-sharing” meaning the allocation of abatement and “resource-sharing” meaning the allocation of emission rights. What is common to all is that the question of responsibility revolves around the assigning of responsibility to pay (Baer, 2011).

Very broadly speaking approaches can take the form of an egalitarian, utilitarian, entitlement approach or as departed from a responsibility principle that ascribes culpability associated with “the polluter pays” principles such as through the accounting of emissions based on “historical responsibility” (Parks&Timmons-Roberts,2009). The egalitarian approach associates with a per capita approach however may conceal intra-state inequity if not weighted in relation to income distribution, which is often raised by governance theories that emphasize global and intra-state inequality (Parks&Timmons-Roberts, 2006). In association to this egalitarian approaches departing from a cosmopolitanism that relates to a discussion on the difference between “luxury” and “survival” emissions explore the possibility of introducing the differentiation of responsibilities within states including large DCs (Harris, 2011)(Harris, 2012).

5.2.2 Climate and Development

From the perspective of Developing Countries, a unifying discourse that is grounded in The Right to Development is a fundamental aspect of how the question of Climate Change is approached (Najam, 2004). There are two sides to how Development and Climate relate from the perspective of the South (The South in the context of the UNFCCC is composed to 95% of G77). On the one hand Climate Change poses a real and substantial threat to development in many countries, on the other hand DCs are also apprehensive of the possibility that actions and policies that aim to address Climate Change can potentially also pose such a threat (Kantha, 2011:505).




To fully appreciate the dilemma facing DCs, the above figure supplied by Kartha 2011:505 depicts a best possible scenario in which in order to keep warming under 2 degrees Celsius global annual emissions peak before 2015 and are reduced below 85% of 1990 levels by 2050, and Kartha, 2011 emphasizes that this represents a very ambitious globally coordinated mobilization. The black line here represents global emissions. ‘

In regard to ICs or Annex 1 countries the figure shows a very ambitious trajectory, starting immediately emissions would be reduced at more than 5 % annually, falling below 40% by 2020 and by 90% in 2050. Kartha states that this trajectory actually corresponds to demands made by many DCs. IC emissions are here represented by the dashed line. Through subtracting IC emissions trajectory from global emissions trajectory the other the dotted line in the middle shows the “emissions” space that would remain for DCs.

This shows that for DCs the peak in emissions would occur only a few years later than ICs, and also before 2020 all the while realizing their development and poverty eradication goals (Kartha, 2011:505). In light of the fact that development in ICs has been largely made possible through the emissions of GHGs, the DC position is grounded in an apprehension that climate stabilization can potentially mean a loss of access to development and that a climate regime may create a fundamental tradeoff between development and climate.

With respect to the negotiations within the UNFCCC, Kartha, 2011 points out that the DCs staunch stances on the right to sustainable development is informed by an experience that is based in the acknowledgement of “a non-negotiable foundation of greenhouse-age geopolitical realism.” due to the fact that Sustainable Development represents the only way to reduce the cost of abatement in relation to the cost of not abating (Kartha, 2011:507). While the previously mentioned an equal per capita approach to allocation is based on an egalitarian concept of equity (Parks & Timmons-Roberts, 2009) The notion of historical responsibility regularly invoked by DCs introduces an affirmation of the culpability aspect of responsibility in contrast to capability. In order to make sense of the DC position the following figure (also supplied by Kartha, 2011) can prove constructive:



The figure represents the sharing of the total amount of carbon space if warming is to be constrained at below 2 degrees. Starting during the beginning of industrialization in 1850 and ending in 2050 the allocation of the emissions budget is as follows: the striped area represents IC emissions (720GtC02), while the black area represents ICs per capita share (430GtC02). The white area represents DC emissions (770GtC02). The per capita share of DCs would be the white plus the striped area (1490GtC02) (Kartha, 2011).

This view of historic responsibility from the perspective of DCs is also greatly compounded by considering that the first 1/3 of the carbon budget took 130 years

to spend and the 2/3 took 20 years (Kantha, 2011). This figure sufficiently sums up the rationale behind the concept of historical responsibility and carbon debt, especially considering the fact that CO₂ can remain in the atmosphere for a hundred years (Vanderheiden, 2008).

Despite this concept of “debt” the actual DC demands do not refer to compensatory payment but rather center in on a conditional demand for IC leadership and the provision of financial and technological support and transfers. These conditionalities are articulated in the UNFCCC Convention in amongst others Article 4.1b-c and Article 4.3 which also constitutes an important reason for why DCs are so adamant about retaining the integrity of the multilateral regime. I will now conclude this chapter with a section that theoretically conceives of two Climate Governance types with respect to how they differentiate in regard to the two aforementioned responsibility aspects as well as introducing a contemporary debate that exemplifies how these types can be understood to relate explicitly to key Policy Documents which I will analyze in Chapter 6.

5.3 Climate Governance, Developing Country Responsibility and Minilateralism

In this last section I will first reiterate some of the initial discussions regarding the challenge of demarcating Climate Governance theories. I will then exemplify how two IR theory approaches are represented in a contemporary climate governance theory debate concerning minilateralism. Lastly I will conclude with displaying an ideal type model in which these two approaches are differentiated according to the aspects previously analyzed in this chapter.

When attempting to excise demarcated types of Climate Governance theory from engaging with the literature it has become exceedingly clear that the field is considerably more fraught with complexity than that of more typical IR theory. To reiterate the beginnings of section 5.1 Climate Governance theory doesn't necessarily adopt clear substantive stance a when approaching the task of theorizing how the Governance of Climate Change is manifested. However there are clear differences in the approach to Climate Governance taken by Green Critical International Political Economy IR theories and some Normative

Cosmopolitan theories on the one hand and more mainstream Neoliberal Institutional IR theories on the other. These differences are most clearly indicated in regard to their differing understanding of the interaction between the global economy and environment but most fundamentally in their understanding state rationalities. Following the earlier discussion of the role of the state that was addressed briefly in section 5.1.1 and which indicates its importance in regard to the question of responsibility, it can be added that what has been revealed as underlying the clashes in negotiations on the post 2012 period is that the ethical issues including responsibility is that International Relations as well as Climate Governance are directly concerned with how human life is organized (Paterson&Stripple, 2007). This is not sufficient in itself to constitute the differentiating axis along which to align distinct types. I have therefore chosen to instead indicate the differences that I believe are relevant through selecting a contemporary theoretical debate. This debate concerns the future composition of the Climate Regime and to what extent it should retain its multilateral form, or whether the problem of what form of governance that is more conducive to Climate Change will ultimately be answered by unilateralism. As first hinted in chapter 2 the post 2012 period of climate governance has seen a questioning of the efficacy of the UN based framework approach of the UNFCCC (Bäckstrand&Lövbrand, 2007). This connects directly to the question of DC responsibility in so far as the inevitability of future DC mitigation came into play. Unilateralism has thus figured as a concept referring to the possibility of restructuring the Climate Regime.

The Neoliberal Institutional IR position is based on the conclusion that the climate regime is so fragmented that it is rather a “Regime Complex” and that due to structural diversity amongst actors as well as asymmetrical power and interests, efforts to rebuild a comprehensive regime are likely to fail (Keohane&Victor, 2011). While equity and “fairness” norms are important in so far as they inform states interests, if too disparate amongst actors they will hinder cooperation. What this position does conclude is that regime complexes in that include spheres with balanced interests can in contrast facilitate working agreements (Young, 2011). Examples of these include the Asia Pacific Partnership, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate or the G20 or G8 (Cole, 2011) (Keohane&Victor, 2011).

The Critical Green IPE position IR position by contrast, while acknowledging the problems raised by the Neoliberal-Institutionalists, attach more importance to normative and justice related aspects of the problem in the Regime. The UNFCCC in its current form in which the differential treatment for DCs is a constitutional element is identified as “Affirmative Multilateralism” (Eckersley, 2010).

Although this position identifies the problems given the current regime it regards legitimacy aspects as key and advances an argument that asymmetric principles can actually be incorporated into agreements in ways that reflect justice and legitimacy concerns (Eckersley,2012). While not ceding ground entirely to problem of regime fragmentation proposals nonetheless gravitate towards recasting the regime architecture in the form of an composition with either a form of “Inclusive Minilateralism” such as a Climate Council within the UNFCCC that is based on the principle of “Common But Differentiated Representation” (Eckersley, 2010:26) or on an emulation of the G20 in a leadership group within the UNFCCC (Huang, 2009). The key differences between these two positions concern the degree to which the UNFCCC as an entity is considered a reliable and capable regime that can actually reach an agreement.

5.3.1 Ideal Types

The model on the next page represents an ideal-typology of climate governance theories according to their differentiation in relation how they conceptualize the nature of responsibilities and the relationship between climate and development as well as how they respond to the question of the future composition of the climate regime with regard to the concept of minilateralism.

Climate Governance Theory Responsibility Aspect	Neoliberal Institutionalism	Some Cosmopolitan Normative/ Green IPE/Critical/
Nature of Responsibility	Entitlement through trade. Responsibility is about Capabilities. Regards states as units of responsibility	Egalitarian Per capita but also with respect to intra-state. Per capita accounting but adapted for ability to pay intra-state. Combined Capability and Culpability
Climate and Development	Climate and Development resolvable through mainly market governance. Equity and responsibility effectiveness issue.	Climate and Development requires major change. Not only question of regime efficiency but also about inequality in global economy and states
Minilateralism/Regime Composition?	Regime Complex effective due to symmetry of interests. Regime restructured more effective, more probable outside of UNFCCC.	Inclusive Minilateralism/ Common but Differentiated Participation. Legitimacy and Justice important and possible through restructuring regime

6 Analysis of Policy Documents

In the following chapter I will describe and analyze documents from the contemporary UNFCCC negotiations. I will then introduce the documents by way of a paper trail that will explain which subsidiary body in the negotiations that they originate in as well as which workstream that they are part of. I will then select and report their content based on its relevance in regard to the aspects of responsibility previously delineated as well as in regards to the question of regime composition. I will then present how, in light of previous chapters their content may be understood and then conclude by presenting the contents of these documents in an ideal type model.

6.1 The Paper Trail

During the COP 17 in December 2011, The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action was adopted which included the launching of a process to develop a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” (FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Dec1, Paragr 2). This process was to be developed through the establishment of a subsidiary body under the Convention called The Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (AWG-ADP) and the deadline set for an agreement by 2015 to be implemented by 2020. At its first session in Bonn 2012 the AWG-ADP adopted its agenda and initiated two workstreams, one addressing matters related to paragraphs 2–6 of decision 1/CP.17 (see Appendix two) and another addressing matters related to paragraphs 7–8 of the same decision (FCCC/ADP/2012/2). It is the first of these workstreams, which is the focus of the documents that I have selected for this thesis.

The AWG-ADP later met in an informal session in Bangkok, Thailand between 30 August and 5 September of 2012 during which parties held discussions under amongst others the rubric “Visions and aspirations for the ADP”. In preparation for this discussion the co-chairs presented the parties with a number of questions that would form the basis for the discussion, for example “How do Parties understand the term ‘applicable to all’? (see Appendix one for a complete list of questions).

These discussions were later summarized during the second part of the first session of the AWG-ADP that was held in conjunction with COP 18 in Doha. During this meeting the parties agreed to hold three further roundtable discussions based on upcoming challenges and on four issues identified by the co-chairs as holding an interest for parties to discuss, for instance “How the principles of the Convention will be applied in the new agreement” (see Appendix One for a complete list of questions).

During the second part of its first session the AWG-ADP decided to hold more in-session roundtable discussions and workshops in 2013 and also “invited Parties as well as accredited observer organizations to submit to the secretariat by 1 March 2013, information, views and proposals on matters related to the work of the ADP, including, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building, and transparency of action and support addressing a number of issues: [see Appendix One for a complete list of issues]”(FCCC/ADP/2012/3)

The documents that I am analyzing in this chapter are submissions from the parties China and India to the ADP in response to the aforementioned requests.

6.2 Report on Content

The following is a report on content in the submissions to the ADP from China and India. The following represents my selection of the most pertinent content of the documents, given the aim of this thesis. The original documents can be found in Appendix 3 and 4 respectively.

6.2.1 Submission by China to the ADP

China begins by clarifying that the Durban Platform's objective, principles and basis are inseparable from the multilateralism of the Convention. China further clarifies that both process and outcome of the Durban Platform should be in accordance with the Conventions principles, especially equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and moreover that "The dichotomy between developed and developing countries is the very foundation of the Convention regime". China continues to add that any attempts to modify the categorization of countries in regards to their Annexes will delay progress.

China goes on to state that:

"The outcome of Durban Platform process shall be 'applicable to all parties' in the same manner as the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, which shall by no means suggest or imply uniformity of responsibilities and obligations for all parties in terms of nature, content and magnitude. The outcome shall define the differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing countries, reflect the historical responsibilities of developed countries and giving full consideration to the development stages and respective capabilities of developing countries, bearing in mind that social economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities for developing countries".

China also addresses Post-2020 Enhanced Actions emphasizes they should "comprehensively implement the provisions of the Convention, covering mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building." China goes on to emphasize that the agreement on the post 2020 enhanced actions should "define the differentiated commitments and actions for developed and developing countries in full accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities."

With respect to mitigation for Developing Countries China states that it:

"..will take diversified enhanced mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development, consistent with their national circumstances and

supported and enabled by adequate finance, technology and capacity building support from developed countries.”

In connection to this China emphasizes Art.4.7 of the UNFCCC as well as stating that in regards to transfer they should mainly come from public funds. With respect to Pre-2020 ambition, China states that all actions should be “guided by the objective and principles of the Convention” regardless of whether they are taken under the Convention or outside it. Furthermore China states that Developed countries “shall commit to reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases in aggregate by at least 25%-40% below their 1990 levels by 2020.” and goes on to state that those developed countries that will undertake commitment for the 2nd term under the Kyoto Protocol “shall revisit and raise their mitigation ambition by 2014 at the latest.” In addition China states that those developed countries that are not part of a 2nd period “shall undertake comparable mitigation commitments under the Convention. Moreover China states that Developed countries should increase their mitigation ambition mainly through domestic efforts.

China concludes by stating in regard to developing countries ambition that “developing countries have already presented ambitious nationally appropriate mitigation actions and their contribution to global mitigation efforts is far greater than that by developed countries.” Furthermore China declares that for developing countries “any activities, no matter whether they are taken within or outside the framework of the Convention, are part of their efforts to implement their nationally appropriate mitigation actions that have been presented” and that “any international cooperative initiatives may facilitate the implementation by developing countries of their presented actions, but shall not introduce any new or additional commitments for developing countries.”

6.2.2 Submission by India to the ADP

India states that the including of “under the Convention” in the Durban Platform implies “consistency with, adherence to, and reflection of all the principles and provisions of the Convention, with no reinterpretation of the Convention, neither of its principles nor its Annexes.” Thus India concludes that an agreement reached in the ADP ” may not in any way, explicit or implicit” change the content of the

Convention. India states this especially in regard to equity and CBDR, which are implicitly reaffirmed by the phrase “under the Convention”.

India goes on to say that the necessity of basing any outcome on the Durban Platform on “duly incorporate requirements of common but differentiated responsibilities” concerns not only the common goal of climate stabilization but also “to ensure that the goal of social and economic development and poverty eradication in developing countries is not compromised.” Moreover India states that:

“The actions and commitments of Parties in the post 2020 period must be differentiated on the basis of equity in terms of historical responsibilities and the fundamental imperatives of social and economic development and poverty eradication.”

Furthermore, India states that the phrase “applicable to all Parties” does not mean a change in differentiation. India declares that the way responsibilities are established in the Convention should remain - “Universality of application does not translate into uniformity of application”. Lastly India emphasizes the importance of avoiding “unilateral measures” and that Parties should ensure these “are not allowed to damage the spirit of multilateralism.”

In regard to how the ADP should build on experiences from other processes under the Convention, India states that the Durban Platform is based on the understanding that “fulfilling the ultimate objective of the Convention will require strengthening the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention.” India goes on to say that at the Doha COP, parties recognized the importance of the Kyoto Protocol and its accordance with equity and CBDR and that: “ADP must therefore build on the model of Kyoto Protocol.”

India goes on to emphasize the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I parties to the Convention and that any other approach to mitigation would mean that the principles of the convention would not be maintained. In regard to the question of ways of defining and reflecting enhanced action, India states that enhanced action under the Convention should be based on CBDR and the “provision of finance, technology and capacity building to developing countries in

order to support their mitigation and adaptation actions under the Convention and take into account the imperatives of equitable access to sustainable development.”

India concludes by stating that in order to encourage broader participation “there has to an assurance on how to an assurance on how the principles of the Convention are applied, that the social and economic and developmental imperative will be respected, multilateral rules are fully respected and that threat or use of unilateral actions, particularly against developing countries are permanently removed.” (sic)

6.2.3 Ideal Type Analysis of Policy Documents

I will categorize the content of these two documents as following what emerges when examining how they relate to the two aspects of responsibility as previously stated.

Nature of Responsibilities

Both India and China make continuous reference to the unquestionable primacy of the CBDR principle and that this should by no means be changed in any future climate agreement. Both countries assume a staunch opposition to a view of “uniformity” regarding the nature of responsibilities and they both refer to the historic responsibility of ICs and that the differentiation and categorization that is derived from the CBDR principle remains the fundamental basis of the entire UNFCCC. This is not surprising and rather confirms the findings of chapter 2. This would confirm that both countries remain adhering to a fundamental acknowledgement of the Culpability inherent in the CBDR principle. China also declares that the mitigation that it already has taken is far more ambitious than that of ICs and in its statement seems to adhere to a strong sovereign interpretation regarding its right to interpret its own actions as always commensurate with the UNFCCC regardless if its commitments occur outside of the negotiations.

Climate and Development

Both countries make continual reference to the conditionality inherent in the UNFCCC and that responsibility as a concept is embedded within the question of

equitable access to Sustainable Development. Both countries also consider the acknowledgement of the right to development and poverty eradication for DCs as greatly influencing any future negotiations. Interestingly China emphasizes the need for that transfers of financial and technical support for implementation should come mainly from public funds.

Regime Composition

Both countries affirm the importance of multilateralism and the comprehensiveness of the continued negotiations on the question of a new agreement in regard to both procedural and substantive elements. Both countries state several reiterations that no new agreement should rearticulate the Convention with a strong emphasis on rule-based multilateralism. India especially declares that any unilateral action should be avoided and any such proposals should be removed.

The following figure represents a fitting of the content of the two policy documents that were selected as part of the ideal type model as previously created:

Responsibility Aspect	Large DCs (Ex China & India)
Nature of Responsibility	No uniformity. CBDR as Culpability Historical Strong emphasis distinction between Developing and Industrialized. Sovereignty
Development and Climate	Climate conditional on Development Sustainable Development only solution. Responsibility as in CBDR part of Sustainable Development
Minilateralism?	Retain affirmative multilateralism. New deal should not reformulate Convention.

7 Conclusions

In this final chapter I will begin by displaying both ideal type models as derived from previous chapters in conjunction. I will then comment on correspondences within the model. I will then reconnect to the research questions as formulated in the end of chapter 2 and on what conclusions can be drawn from this.

Climate Governance Theory / DCs Responsibility Aspect	Neoliberal Institutionalism	Some Cosmopolitan Normative/Green IPE/Critical/	Large DCs: China & India
Nature of Responsibility	Entitlement through trade Emphasizes. Responsibility is about Capabilities. Regards states as basis of responsibility	Egalitarian Per capita but also with respect to intra-state. Per capita accounting but adapted for ability to pay intra-state. Combined Capability and Culpability	No uniformity. CBDR as Culpability Historical Strong emphasis distinction between Developing and Industrialized. Strong Sovereignty
Climate and Development	Climate and Development resolvable through mainly market governance. Equity and responsibility effectiveness issue.	Climate and Development requires major change. Not only question of regime efficiency but also about inequality in global economy and states.	Climate conditional on Development Sustainable Development only solution. Responsibility as in CBDR integral part of Sustainable Development
Minilateralism/Regime Composition?	Regime Complex effective due to symmetry of interests. Regime restructured more effective, more probable outside of UNFCCC.	Inclusive Minilateralism/ Common but Differentiated Participation. Legitimacy and Justice important and possible through restructuring	Retain affirmative multilateralism. New deal should not reformulate Convention.

		regime	
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7.1 Ideal-Type model in Conjunction

7.2 Correspondences

At first glance there appear to be very few correspondences. Many of the formerly noted differences that appeared in Chapter 2 are reproduced. Although the differences between conceptualizations are clear between both theories as well as with respect to the policy documents, one may be able to identify subtle similarities.

Regarding the first row following Nature of Responsibility one may note that while Neoliberal Institutionalism from Capabilities and DCs from Culpability both consider the state to be the unit to which responsibility can be assigned. While some Cosmopolitan and Green IPE or Critical theories view an important consideration to include differentiation of responsibilities within states they depart from acknowledging both Culpability and Capability.

The second row following Climate and Development indicates a similarity between Green IPE and Critical theories with DCs in so far that they both consider that for the possible Climate Development tradeoff to be avoided requires substantial change either via addressing questions of both inter- and intra-national justice or through a fundamental change within the context of Sustainable Development.

The last row represents to some extent the most relevant since it concerns how the previous differences are addressed in terms of whether the multilateral process under the Convention is believed to be able succeed given its current composition. Here it is rather the climate governance theories that while proposing different solutions still share the view that the Convention requires restructuring in contrast

to how the DC position which considers any other attempt at any change to the principle elements concerning the IC-DC differentiations fundamentally, unacceptable.

7.3 Final Conclusions

My research question in this thesis concerned whether the way in which large Developing Countries conceptualized their responsibilities for mitigation corresponded to how theories of climate governance conceptualized DC responsibilities for mitigation. As indicated in the previous section, there were no obvious correspondences between either theories or between theories and in terms of how they conceptualized DC responsibility for mitigation.

However some subtle similarities were found concerning the role of the state as well as what was considered to be necessary in order to address the Climate – Development relationship. In addition the question of the composition of the climate regime was shown to have an indirect connection to the question of how DC responsibility is conceptualized. The two aspects of DC responsibility through which I chose to operationalize the concept were revealed to be deeply intertwined from the perspective of DCs themselves, which confirmed the thematic findings of Chapter 2. Although this was by no means a surprise, it was revealing how strongly concomitant the two aspects were as expressed in the policy documents. In terms of how norms are constitutive of worldviews, this fact in itself was a clear indication and a verification of the utility of employing a Constructivist informed approach. Climate governance theories by contrast proved to be considerably less composite both in regard to how they conceptualized the two aspects of DC responsibility but also in regard to their basic theoretical orientations and points of departure.

One observation is that the relations between climate governance theories were revealed to be less malleable in regards to strict differentiation in comparison with the more conventional IR theories from which they stem, at least from the perspective of this author. It would seem that on the one hand the profound conditions of interdependence that are engrained within a global phenomenon such as Climate Change preclude even the possibility of approaching it with a

consistent theoretical task at hand. Perhaps the intricate complexity apparent in the many theoretical orientations are an indication that global governance as a concept and phenomenon is irreversibly altered by the changes that are occurring in our planet's climate system and that this shift requires a rethinking of fundamental categories. I would conclude that some of the researchers cited in this thesis definitely provide constructive attempts to do so but that the sheer enormity of the issue means that at least for now the only theoretical language available that can attempt a full description based on any kind of notion of "verstehen" is still that of International Relations Theory. I interpret this to indicate that climate governance is a concept that is inseparable from climate politics.

In regards to my stated aims it is clear that a mere description such as this is more than likely not sufficient in itself to provide the basis for any new, distinct or comprehensive future analytical engagement with the question of Developing Countries and Climate governance. Nonetheless the two broad theoretical types that I have identified and the subtle similarities in regard to the correspondences described may perhaps be of some use. With respect to matters concerning validity that were addressed in Chapter 3, and bearing in mind that I have not attempted to infer any causal relationship regarding the correspondence that I have described but simply attempted to, as per the stated aims, produce a useful descriptive account, I can only hope that it proves to be just that.

8 Appendixes

8.1 Appendix 1 Instructions to the members of the "Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action" on three different occasions

At an informal session in Bangkok, Thailand between 30 August and 5 September of 2012. In preparation for this discussion the co-chairs presented the parties with the following questions that would form the basis for the discussion:

- “(a) What is your vision for the main contours and elements of the results of the work of the ADP?
- (b) What work is needed between now and 2015, and in particular in 2013, to achieve these results?
- (c) What do Parties mean by ‘national circumstances’? How could ‘national circumstances’ be accommodated in the results of the work of the ADP?
- (d) How do Parties understand the term ‘applicable to all’?
- (e) How can broader participation be encouraged and ensured?
- (f) How could “flexibility” be incorporated in the results of the work of the ADP?
- (g) How should the principles of the Convention be applied in the context of Parties’ vision for the ADP and the results of this workstream? “

(Summary of roundtable on workstream 1 –Note by the Co-Chairs, 26th September 2012)

Second part of the first session that was held in conjunction with COP 18 in Doha.

During this meeting the parties agreed to hold three further roundtable discussions based on upcoming challenges and on four issues identified by the co-chairs as holding an interest for parties to discuss:

- “(a) How the principles of the Convention will be applied in the new agreement;
- (b) How national circumstances and changes thereof should be taken into account;
- (c) How the new agreement will be “applicable to all” in practice, including approaches to defining differentiated commitments;

(d) Ways to incentivize full and ambitious participation and ensure effective implementation and compliance arrangements.”

(ADP.2012.6.InformalSummary)

During the continuing in-session of the second part of the first session the AWG-ADP decided to hold more in-session roundtable discussions and workshops in 2013 and also “invited Parties as well as accredited observer organizations to submit to the secretariat by 1 March 2013, information, views and proposals on matters related to the work of the ADP, including, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building, and transparency of action and support addressing such as the following:

- A) Application of the principles of the Convention;
- B) Building on the experiences and lessons learned from other processes under the Convention and from other multilateral processes, as appropriate;
- C) The scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement;
- D) Ways of defining and reflecting enhanced action.”

(FCCC/ADP/2012/3 Paragraph 29)

8.2 Appendix 2 Decision1/CP.17

FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1

Decision 1/CP.17

Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

The Conference of the Parties,

Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties, and acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions,

Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels,

Recognizing that fulfilling the ultimate objective of the Convention will require strengthening of the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention,

Noting decision 1/CMP.7,

Also noting decision 2/CP.17,

1. *Decides* to extend the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention for one year in order for it to continue its work and reach the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan) through decisions adopted by the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the Conference of the Parties, at which time the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention shall be terminated;

2. *Also decides* to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, through a subsidiary body under the Convention hereby established and to be known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action;

3. *Further decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall start its work as a matter of urgency in the first half of 2012 and shall report to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work;

4. *Decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020;

5. *Also decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall plan its work in the first half of 2012, including, inter alia, on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building, drawing upon submissions from Parties and relevant technical, social and economic information and expertise;

6. *Further decides* that the process shall raise the level of ambition and shall be informed, *inter alia*, by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the outcomes of the 2013–2015 review and the work of the subsidiary bodies;

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