

Somaliland: The Morality of Secession

In what ways can the de facto secession of Somaliland be considered morally just?



LUND
UNIVERSITY

BY
Max Höglom

This thesis is dedicated to the loving support and patience of my family.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to understand if the de facto secession of Somaliland from Somalia in 1991 can be considered morally just according to just secession theory. This theory follows the approach of Allen Buchanan and Wayne Norman and their formulation of just cause theory of secession. The theory is based on the Just War tradition, which provides the moral foundation for its arguments. This study takes a qualitative normative approach by applying the moral theory upon the case of Somaliland. Six established criteria of just secession are used to analyze the moral justifications of Somaliland's secession. The result of the study suggest that Somaliland has strong moral grounds for its secession, and that its lack of recognition is mainly based on geopolitical factors rather than moral or legal factors.

Keywords: Just Secession, Just War, Secession, Ethics, Morality, Somaliland, Somalia, SNM

Word Count: 9,864

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS	2
1 INTRODUCTION	3
1.1 Research Question	4
1.2 Purpose	4
1.3 Literature Review	4
1.4 Disposition	5
2 METHOD	6
2.1 Scope and Materials	7
2.2 Delimitations	8
3 BACKGROUND	9
4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	13
4.1 The Just War Tradition	13
4.2 Just Secession	15
4.3 Principles of Just Secession	17
4.3.1 Just Cause	17
4.3.2 Last Resort	18
4.3.3 Proportionality	19
4.3.4 Probability of Success	20
4.3.5 Legitimate Authority	20
4.3.6 Rightful Intention	21
5 ANALYSIS	22
5.1 Just Cause	22
5.2 Last Resort	23
5.3 Proportionality	24
5.4 Probability of Success	25
5.5 Legitimate Authority	27
5.6 Rightful Intention	29
6 CONCLUSION	30
BIBLIOGRAPHY	32

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AL	Arab League
AU	African Union
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SNM	Somali National Movement
UN	United Nations
USC	United Somali Congress

1 INTRODUCTION

Astonishingly, the number of sovereign states in the world system has quadrupled since the beginning of the twentieth century (Coppieters, 2003(b): 1). Will new states continue to join this community in the coming decades and on what grounds should potential states be allowed to enter into the international society? These questions necessitate discussions about the moral justifications, rights and legitimacy of secession. This thesis will augment this debate by examining the remarkable case of Somaliland.

Somaliland is remarkable because it exists in oblivion. Although the Horn of Africa is no newcomer to the peering eyes of the international community, the spotlight shines upon the seemingly unending spirals of violence, piracy and poverty of Somalia, but rarely upon the goings on in Somaliland – an unrecognized state in the northern regions of Somalia. In stark contrast to the warlords, and corrupt governments in the region, Somaliland “undoubtedly has the most democratic political system in the entire Horn of Africa,” (Kaplan, 2008: 143). Whereas the international community pumps billions of dollars into the Somali failed state, Somaliland cannot access international investments and aid due to its unrecognized status.

Will Somaliland be the next independent state? The case for recognition as a sovereign state is strong, from a legal standpoint. In fact, “in terms of international law Somaliland holds some very strong cards – stronger than, for example, Bosnia some years ago – qualifying it as an independent state,” (Doornbos, 2002: 96). These cards include its previous status as a sovereign state in 1960, and the fulfillment of the 1933 Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood (Kaplan, 2008: 153). The legal perspective is one that has been studied previously, yet the moral aspect provides an additional intriguing perspective with which to further understand the Somaliland case.

1.1 Research Question

In what ways can the de facto secession of Somaliland be considered morally¹ just?

1.2 Purpose

This thesis aims to apply the theory of just secession to the case of Somaliland in an effort to better understand the possibilities of and the grounds for Somaliland to potentially enter into the international community of nations. The normative foundations of the Just War tradition, which form the basis of the just secession theory used in this thesis, is also a building block of international law. Therefore, if these same foundations can lead to a moral justification of Somaliland as an independent state, this will provide a strong argument for the recognition of Somaliland.

In addition, combining the logic of the Just War tradition with secession is a relatively new theoretical enterprise, which has not reached the mainstream in the realm of secession studies (Coppieters, 2003(b), 2). Even though secession and war are frequently inter-related, these two topics are often treated as separate fields of research (*ibid.*). This thesis will expand this developing corpus by studying a case that has not previously been studied through the perspective of morality.

1.3 Literature Review

Academic literature on Somaliland mainly covers topics such as democratic institution-building and the successes of Somaliland's elections and peace-building efforts. Extensive research focusing on piracy, failed statehood, failure of international aid, etc. has been conducted in the wider context of Somalia. However, these issues often obscure Somaliland, its achievements and politics. Prominent academics of Somaliland include I.M. Lewis, who has written volumes of anthropological studies, including historical accounts of the region and extensively used in this thesis; Mark Bradbury, author of *Becoming Somaliland* – analyzing nation-building efforts and suggesting Somaliland's viability as a state (van de Walle, 2009); and Michael Walls and Steve Kibble, who have written articles about Somaliland state-

¹ This study does not aim to debate morality per se, but rather builds upon a theory that is based on a given set

building, such as “The Emergence of the Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland,” by Michael Walls (2009) and “Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland,” by Walls and Kibble (2010). However, these studies do not touch upon the moral grounds of Somaliland’s secession.

Coppieters and Sakwa’s anthology *Contextualizing Secession* (2003) lies at the forefront of the Just War and just secession nexus, and provides the main theoretical backbone of this thesis. This anthology covers several cases of secession, however does not discuss the Somaliland case. Notable academics in the field of just secession include Allen Buchanan and Wayne Norman, who have played an instrumental role in the formation of the theory (Coppieters, 2003(a): 257).

1.4 Disposition

The study will follow the following sequence: Firstly, the method describing the practical steps and considerations of the research is presented. Following this, the background provides the historical context to the secession of Somaliland from Somalia. Thereafter, the just secession framework is structured in line with its core principles. This forms the norms necessary for the analysis, which follows. In the analysis, the historical background fuses with the theory in an identical structure following the core principles of the theory. Here, the actual history of the case is controlled against the norms to see how it stacks up to the theoretical criteria.

2 METHOD

This is a literature-based desk study, which involves research followed by theory-application in order to answer the research question through analysis. It is theory-consuming in the sense that theoretical norms are applied to a real case to see how the case, rather than the theory, performs. The study takes the form of a qualitative normative case study, which builds upon an analysis of scholarly and historical secondary materials within the confines of a normatively structured theoretical framework. The normative element of the study is embodied in the ethical norms propagated by the theory used in the study. The Just War theory, applied to secession, is rooted in religious and moral philosophizing (Reichberg, 2008: 12). Thus, due to the subjective nature of morality, the concept brings with it a debate with a large spectrum of agreements and disagreements. Therefore, this study does not claim to validate one moral view over another, but rather uses the moral norms employed by the theory as a foundation upon which the analysis hinges. Thus, it is a normative analysis based on a *given*, or normative starting point, used as a springboard to problematize the subject of the study (Badersten, 2006: 44). In this study, given a certain moral view of secession, how does the secession of Somaliland measure up?

The case study format is suitable for this study for several reasons. The theoretical framework necessitates a detailed analysis, which cannot be accomplished without the in-depth focus of a case study. In addition, normative case studies help to give context to the study in an effort to thoroughly understand and explain the ethical values associated with the topic (Thacher, 2006: 1632). Since secession is relatively rare and each case is lodged in unique webs of circumstance and history, the case study makes sense in trying to understand the unique features of a specific attempt at secession, within the limited scope of this paper. This study will however use a single case study instead of multiple cases for several reasons. Firstly, compared to a study involving multiple cases, the single case study format allows for a more profound and focused analysis of the subject (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 140). Since Somaliland has not been the topic of a just secession study previously, the merits of such

detail and depth become apparent. Furthermore, the emphasis on a single case will make the step-by-step analysis of the just secession criteria much more focused and detailed. Thus, the study will allow for a more insightful analysis of the one case, rather than a simpler understanding of several cases.

The drawback of using a single case study format is that it limits the possibilities of generalization (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 140). Thus, even if arguments work in other contexts than Somaliland, making general statements about secession as a phenomenon will be difficult, unless using the study to compare with other similar studies. Secondly, by not using a comparative case study limits the possibilities of enriching the analysis with different perspectives. However, this is a tradeoff due to the limited scope of the study, which entails either having a more in-depth understanding or a comparison. A limitation to the theoretical framework is that it cannot produce any truths, or final conclusions about justice or morality since these concepts are subjective in their nature.

Case studies are “histories with a point. They are ‘cases’ of something – and the thing under study is interesting, relevant, or ‘in focus’ because of a larger theoretical concern or a specific research design,” (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 132). Somaliland was chosen for this thesis because of its fascinating place in the modern world – an anomaly of politics. Whereas violent conflict has plagued Somalia for more than two decades, Somaliland goes about its business under the radar of the international community – with a functioning democratic government and peaceful stability, yet no recognition (Kaplan, 2008: 144).

2.1 Scope and Materials

The scope of the study is to apply the principles of the just secession theory to the case of Somaliland in order to reach some conclusions about the morality of this secession. Within this topic there are many further discussions which would be rewarding to undertake, but which cannot be touched upon due to the limited scope of this thesis. Furthermore, empirical observations stemming from a field research would provide a clearer picture and undoubtedly add more nuances to the study. However, the study instead takes the form of a desk research, relying heavily upon secondary materials – academic literature about

Somaliland and just secession theory, accounts of Somali history, and historical records from the UN. In an effort to make the study intersubjective, the method, theory and other materials used have been carefully and critically selected, and used in a transparent manner for the possibility of replicating the study.


2.2 Delimitations

Delimitations to this research can be attributed to the choices of method, theory and materials. The limits to the case study approach have been discussed above, but the delimitations include the opportunity cost of not choosing another method, which might have yielded other, or better results. Likewise, the specific wording of the research question has effectively removed other possible problems associated with the topic, such as the deeper meaning of morality and ethics – its connection to the theory and its validity. Choosing the just secession theory and certain materials over others creates a bias to the study since my experiences, values and interests shape the choices made. Furthermore, since the material base for both Somaliland and also just secession theory is small, this may lead to an undiversified choice of materials for the study.

3 BACKGROUND

On the 18th of May 1991, Somaliland declared itself a separate entity from Somalia. Somaliland is the northern-most region of Somalia, a territory on the boundaries of the previous British Protectorate of Somaliland. The secession is in more precise terms a dissolution of the unification agreement between independent Somaliland and independent Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland). Prior to independence in 1960, the greater Somali population was divided between different territories (see map) – present-day Djibouti was controlled by the French, Somaliland by the British, the southern region of Somalia by the Italians, the western Ogaden region by the Ethiopians, and the southern-most region (the Northern Frontier District), by British Kenya (Davidson, 2005: 332).

Somali society is built around clan-lineage, which forms not only an effective way of identification, but also an intricate web of social insurance and protection (Lewis, 2002: 11). There are six main clans, which in turn are divided into several degrees of sub-clans, until the family unit (Chopra, 1995: 21). Although the clans may be bitter enemies among each other, they consider themselves as one family in the presence of outsiders (Cockburn, 2002). Therefore, as independence was granted from the colonizers for British and Italian Somaliland, an



agreement of the question of the unification of the greater Somali population became the highest priority for the government of Somalia (Laitin & Samatar, 1987: 129). This foreign policy goal ostracized Somalia from its neighbors who felt threatened of their sovereign territory, and culminated in the Ogaden War of 1977-78 against Ethiopia, where president Siad Barre lost the fight to retake the Ogaden region (*ibid.*). Siad Barre ascended to presidency in a military *coup d'état* in 1969, toppling the hugely corrupt government of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke (Lewis, 2002: 205-7). Although popular at first, he gained disapproval as the population felt the results of international isolation. With the economy in stagnation and morale low following the defeat in Ogaden, Somalia experienced a political and economic recession, and therefore the now less popular and increasingly paranoid Barre consolidated power to his loyal clansmen, expelling non-clansmen from key government positions. This led to animosity between clans, and the institutionalized oppression of clans by the government in a game of power-politics (*ibid.*: 254-5). Since the unification treaty of 1960, animosity between the northern and southern regions – based on different colonial legacies, clan divisions, and the North's growing political isolation in Mogadishu – led to deep discontent, especially when the government arrested civil servants peacefully demonstrating for the improvement of government services (*ibid.*: 172-5, 252-3). The climax came in 1988, when the Barre government bombarded the northern city of Hargeisa (capital of Somaliland), brutally killing an estimated 50,000 civilians of the *Isaaq* clan, causing a mass-migration of an estimated 1,000,000 to Ethiopia (Kaplan, 2008: 148). Methods of brutality included bayonetting women, placing mines in doorways and poisoning water wells (Lewis, 2002: 282; Clarke & Gosende, 2003: 137). The mass execution of civilians and the power struggle between the clans and insurgencies after the collapse of the government in 1991 was the decisive moment for the decision to secede from Somalia (Lewis, 2002: 266).

Due to the isolation and neglect beginning early after unification, the SNM formed in an effort to unite the people against the repressive Mogadishu government. The SNM was established by a group of majority *Isaaq* political exiles in London in 1981 due to the “*Isaaq* grievances ranging from inadequate political representation, neglect in development, and the frustration of local businessmen and exporters chafing at economic controls,” (*ibid.*: 252). The aim of the SNM was to protect the population from the atrocities being committed by the Barre regime. In 1982, the SNM moved its base to Ethiopia, where it sought military and

political assistance from the Ethiopian regime in combating and waging attacks against Somali government bases in the northern region. In its effort to combat and fight the Barre regime, the SNM was militarily weak so made use of guerrilla tactics, captured military equipment from the government, and disguised itself among the civilians. Public support for the movement soared after the “spectacular release of detainees from Mandera prison,” in 1983 (*ibid.*: 253). The SNM allied itself with other groups opposing the government, such as the USC lead by the Hawiye clan, but could not come to a power-sharing agreement in the aftermath of the government’s collapse (*ibid.*: 264). As Aideed chased the ousted Barre from Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi seized the moment and set up an impromptu government without consulting any of the other groups. This polarized the capital and led to increased animosity and bloodshed, instigating the SNM to set up its own government away from the chaos in the south (*ibid.*). The SNM’s secession effort relied on the “support of the traditional clan leaders. Leadership effectively reverted to the latter who, utilizing traditional diplomacy and tactics, established a sustained series of country-wide peace conferences,” leading to the establishment of Somaliland (*ibid.*: 266). Meanwhile, warlords were vying for power in Mogadishu, and the ensuing civil war has led to the deaths of an estimated 350,000-1,000,000² people since 1991.

After the SNM declared Somaliland independent in 1991, Somaliland commenced state-building through a strategy of reconciliation and unification. A series of peace conferences aimed at resolving clan differences and negotiating the structure of government – creating a hybrid form between traditional clan elder leadership (*guurti*) and parliamentary politics (*ibid.*: 283). With this structure, the SNM was phased out of government in place of a civilian leadership, where Mohammed Hajji Ibrahim Igal was elected by the *guurti* in 1993 (*ibid.*). The presidents of Somaliland since independence have been of various clan-lineages which has helped to boost the democratic governance of the territory. Since then Somaliland has accomplished several successful democratic elections and a referendum held in 2001, where 97% of the population answered that they did not want to reunite with Somalia, effectively eliminating the possibility of the government to negotiate reunification with Somalia

² Although difficult to estimate due to the various other factors connected with the war, which have lead to civilian death such as drought, malnutrition, perilous refugee traveling, etc. The number is taken from the Global Security web page, as of 2012.

(Kaplan, 2008: 152-3). The governing structure in Somaliland has a distinct hybridity between the colonial structure of government and the traditional structure of clans and elders holding political and judicial power. This hybrid structure seems to have formed a stable foundation for government (Walls & Kibble, 2010: 33), and has acquired wide public support. With the deeply engrained legitimacy, authority and practical problem-solving abilities held by the elders in the community, the government sponsored by them is likely to garner the support of the people.

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section aims to build a theoretical framework with which the analysis can later be developed in an organized manner. This framework is based upon the just secession³ theory, which has its roots in the Just War tradition. In order to better understand the logic of the just secession theory, a short introduction to the Just War tradition will be presented, after which the just secession theory will be elaborated. The just secession theory belongs to the school of remedial right only theories of secession, which is relevant to this study since it applies the Just War logic of secession.

The Just War tradition is a leading theory of war and ethics and is a keystone of international law and the study of peace and conflict (May & Crookston, 2008: 1-2). Analyzing secession based upon the Just War tradition is suitable for this study because it provides a framework for understanding the secession of Somaliland in 1991 from a moral standpoint. In the study of secession, theories based on the Just War tradition have become an alternative to other prominent theories such as the Self-Determination and Choice theories of secession (Norman, 1998: 41). Although secession and war are often strongly intertwined in real life and in theoretical arguments based on the Just War tradition – in the realm of academia, the ethics of war and secession are often seen as completely different fields, which has strongly “impeded the fruitful interchange of ideas between the two ethical traditions,” (Coppieters, 2003(b): 2). However, this thesis aims, under the terminology *just secession*, to incorporate the Just War and secession traditions and their similar arguments into a joint theoretical framework to better understand the Somaliland case from a moral standpoint.

4.1 The Just War Tradition

Just War is a theory of international politics that is anchored in moral values rather than politics, and therefore sees international politics differently than other theories of

³ This thesis employs the term *just secession theory* to refer to what has elsewhere been labeled *just cause theory of secession*, or other terms indicating the use of Just War logic in a context of secession, such as the more general *remedial right only theory*.

international relations, such as Realism or Liberalism. Whereas Realism sees war as a necessary evil for the good of the state and its survival, Just War sees war as an evil, which must be regulated by law and morally justified (Walzer, 2006: 3). Thus, Just War is a normative theory, based on values derived from monotheistic beliefs and formulated by philosophers like Aquinas and Grotius from about the twelfth century onwards (Reichberg, 2008: 12). Although the academic study of Just War as portrayed in scholarly material is based on Christian values and Christian thinkers, such as St Augustine, similar thoughts are found in other religions, such as Islam (Shapcott, 2008: 201-2). The Somali context is an Islamic one, so the Just War tradition will largely reverberate with these Islamic philosophies about the justice of war. Since this thesis focuses on secession rather than war, the differences and similarities of these traditions will not be dwelled upon further.

The justice, or moral righteousness, of war – its causes, methods, and its aftermath – are the subject of the theory, which is philosophically a nexus of debate between Pacifism, Realism, and the notion of *guerre réglée* – or bilateral rights in war (Reichberg, 2008: 12). The Just War tradition can be seen as a rationalization of warfare (or ‘brutal strife’), into a more advanced form of rule-bound war (Coker, 2010: 23-5). The theory has undergone paradigmatic changes over the course of these centuries, which has effectively meant that different values have been seen as just at different times (Lee, 2012: 66, 121). During the most recent centuries, the theory has played a great role in the formation and codification of international norms, humanitarian law and organizations such as the UN and its subsidiary international court system. It has greatly affected the formation and basis of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, and thus the post-1945 world system. Just War theory can be said to encompass three main frames of morality: *jus ad bellum* – justice of entering into war; *jus in bello* – justice of waging war; and *jus post bellum* – justice after war. With regards to modern international law, *Jus in bello* has a more planted history, such as the customary law forbidding use of poisonous weapons (May & Crookston, 2008: 2), whereas *jus ad bellum* has only in the past century or so been codified and rooted in international treaties such as the Charter of the UN (Reichberg, 2008: 11). Although the Just War tradition has conventionally been applied to inter-state, and even civil conflicts, recent academic and philosophical debates has seen it enter into the realm of secession as well.

4.2 Just Secession

Just secession theory provides a moral framework for understanding secession using the logic and principles of the Just War tradition. The theory has developed from the relatively recent debate surrounding the ethical aspects of secession, launched by Allen Buchanan amidst the crumbling states of the post-Cold War world (Norman, 1998: 34). With the fall of the USSR, secession became a hot topic with the claiming of independence by many Soviet satellite states, and their subsequent balkanization (e.g. Yugoslavia). The majority of these conflicts, along with several others in other parts of the world, such as the Biafra, and Eritrea conflicts, were ethnocentric in their nature.

The debate on the ethical aspect of secession has resulted in the crystallization of two main theoretical currents - *primary right* theories and *remedial right only* theories – which will briefly be discussed below (Buchanan, 1998: 230; Norman, 1998: 35). Primary right theories propose that groups have a general right to secede even when no injustice has been committed, whereas remedial right only theories posit that a group only has a right to secede as a last-resort remedy to a severe injustice committed against the group by the state from which it is seceding (Buchanan, 1998: 230).

The leading theory falling under the primary right group is the choice theory of secession, which, as its name suggests, bases the legitimacy of secession on the majority decision of a population. According to Norman, choice theories:

- a) “Require that the majority in a region express a desire to secede for a secession to be legitimate;
- b) Do not require that the seceding group be culturally distinct or the victim of injustice [...];
- c) Do not require that the seceding group establish some special claim to the territory they intend to take with them as they withdraw from the state,” (Norman, 1998: 37)

Choice theories do not provide for a particularly restrictive right to secession, and therefore they have been heavily criticized for being idealist and unlinked from the institutional reality of world politics (Buchanan, 1998: 233-4; Norman, 1998: 37-41). There are several perverse repercussions generated by the notion of primary rights to secession. For example, argument (a) seems reasonable and corresponds to Just War criteria, however, the two next arguments can cause chaos for the survival of states, and the very concept of the state itself, as developed from the Westphalia treaty.

The remedial right only theories provide for a more realistic alternative to the primary right theories and proposes a much more restrictive set of criteria to the justification of secession – secession is only just as a remedy to gross injustice. Legitimate injustices may include political marginalization, ethnic or cultural genocide, persecution, etc. The primary theory within the remedial right only school is the *just cause theory of secession*, based on the Just War tradition (henceforth termed *just secession*). An analogy may be made between the two theories – as Just War theory “considers the preservation of peace to the general rule and the use of force an exceptional right, [...] the just cause approach in the ethics of secession regards the preservation of existing states – including the preservation of their sovereignty and right to territorial integrity – as the general rule, and unilateral secession an exceptional right,” (Coppieters, 2003(a): 257). The restrictive nature of the theory provides a realistic approach to secession and justifies only those claims that exhibit at least one of the following criteria in addition to being a territorially confined group in favor of secession:

- 1) “That it has been the victim of systematic discrimination or exploitation, and that this situation will not end as long as the group remains in the state;
- 2) That the group and its territory were illegally incorporated into the state within recent-enough memory;
- 3) That the group has a valid claim to the territory it wants to withdraw from the state;
- 4) That the group’s culture is imperiled unless it gains access to all the powers of a sovereign state;
- 5) That the group finds its constitutional rights grossly or systematically ignored by the central government of the supreme court,” (Norman, 1998: 41)

These criteria have foundations in existing international law, and thus provide an institutionally pragmatic solution to modern claims of secession. They are in accordance with one of the main pillars of our international society – the importance of the territorial integrity of states – in the sense that breaking this integrity is only an option after gross violations of generally accepted rights (Buchanan, 1998: 241). The just secession theory is a parallel of Just War theory, which retains the same foundations and logic. However, the framework is termed in the terminology of secession rather than war, and considerations of secession and sovereignty are of prime interest.

4.3 Principles of Just Secession

Within the Just War tradition, there are six formalized criteria of *jus ad bellum*, which have been crystallized regarding the morality of starting war. These principles are carried over and linked to the morality of secession, in accordance with just secession. The criteria used in this thesis are listed below, organized following the logic of the arguments in relation to each other (Shapcott, 2008: 201):

- I. Just cause
- II. Last resort
- III. Proportionality
- IV. Probability of success
- V. Legitimate authority
- VI. Rightful Intention

The remaining sections of this chapter will be divided in line with these principles. For the sake of clarity, these same sections will then be carried over into the analysis where the theory will be applied to the Somali case.

4.3.1 *Just Cause*

The quintessential element to any discussion of Just War is the notion of just cause. Just cause is the ‘heaviest’ criterion and the one most often dwelled upon by scholars (May, 2008: 49), due to the fact that the other criteria “cannot be satisfied even in principle, unless just cause is satisfied,” (Jeff McMahan as quoted in May, 2008: 60). The core of the just cause is the wrong received from the opposing party – i.e. the moral wrong which justifies an act of war or secession – and according to the “approach of Allen Buchanan and Wayne Norman, ‘the right to secede is only legitimate [i.e. just] if it is necessary to remedy an injustice,’” (Coppieters, 2003(a): 257). This leads to the question of wrongs, and what is to be considered a legitimate wrong, and how wrong must it be for it to legitimize secession as a response? Examples of wrongs warranting secession as a response include “colonialism, the illegal occupation of a territory, national oppression, ethnic cleansing and the threat of genocide,” (*ibid.*: 258).

Regarding the just cause of war in the present era, the only causes considered just are self-defense and increasingly, in defense of human rights – although punishment and preventive

wars have been considered just in previous eras (May, 2008: 49; Grotius, 2007: 82). Self-defense is enshrined in the Charter of the UN (Art. 51), which gives the right to collective and individual self-defense against aggression. Such aggression can come from external or internal sources, and in the case of the latter, may provide a just cause to secede. For instance, the Barre regime carried out aggression against the northern population during the 1988 bombardment and massacre of thousands of civilians.

Although only one party to a conflict can be morally just, this does not stop both sides from believing they are morally justified. “This gives rise to the situation in which the wrongful party (sincerely yet erroneously) believes itself to be innocent, arising from an interplay of factors beyond its voluntary control,” (Reichberg, 2008: 19). If *bona fide*, such error excludes the party from blame but not responsibility (*ibid.*). This can be illustrated when both the central government and the insurgency claimed to be wronged – the government by terrorist and clan-based tribal groups attacking the territorial integrity of the state, and the insurgency by the government and its perennial neglect (Lewis, 2002: 253).

4.3.2 *Last Resort*

Secession has both positive and negative impacts in a society and region. Negative effects may include retaliatory violations of minorities in the newly established state and war between the central government and the breakaway region over the territorial claim. Therefore, secession must be considered only as a last exit when other possibilities of rectifying the injustice have been attempted. In terms of the ethics of secession, the last resort criterion must be considered first on an internal level within the state. Thus, “a unilateral declaration of secession may only be justified where remedying or preventing severe injustices *by any other means* seems impossible,” (Coppeters, 2003(a): 273, my italics). Such other means may include agreements on partial autonomy, minority rights, federalism, international guarantees, etc. (*ibid.*). However, alternatives to secession are only relevant if they produce the same benefit in terms of rectifying the injustices faced by the population, “not policies that produce benefits of some totally different type,” (Hurka, 2008: 134). According to Lee, the last resort criterion is “an application of the general moral rule, called the *least harm principle*,” (Lee, 2011: 93), so that which is least harmful is morally better. Thus

secession is only just according to this principle when other options cause more harm than secession itself.

However, this criterion is often criticized on the count that there may always be another peaceful possibility to avert secession, and therefore the criterion may never be fulfilled (*ibid.*: 95). A further criticism lies in the temporal dynamics of secession, such that pursuing diplomatic means if they are not fruitful, and thus delaying secession, can jeopardize its success and lead to the continuation of wrongs and oppression. The last resort criterion can better be understood in connection to the reasonable chance of success criterion, because in response to the criticism mounted above, it is argued that in the last resort, a party must make use of *reasonable* means with a likelihood of success. If no such alternatives exist or are possible, then secession or war may be justified (*ibid.*). The overthrow of the government and exacerbated tribal rivalries in Somalia provides a difficult platform for diplomatic initiatives prior to the secession of Somaliland. This chaos has meant that one of the international community's main objections to recognizing Somaliland – that Somalia should be first to accept recognition – has been difficult to achieve.

4.3.3 Proportionality

The criterion of proportionality aims at setting restraints for the gravity of harms which follow a declaration of independence, since “war and secession have high moral costs, which have to be weighed against the benefits of remedying or preventing injustices,” (Coppeters, 2003(a): 271). In terms of war, the criterion “requires that a war be such that the significance of the created evil does not exceed the significance of the resisted evil,” (Lee, 2012: 256). This logic can also be applied to secession, where the negative impacts of secession must not outweigh its benefits. However, applying the criterion to secession requires a different approach to measure consequences, because “wars are waged for a limited period [whereas] sovereignty, on the other hand, is not limited in duration,” (Coppeters, 2003(a): 272). Thereby, a just secession must produce a better situation in terms of suffering, than the status quo, and must also take account of the “resulting damage and benefits to the international community, including the enemy nation and/or the nation one wishes to secede from,” (*ibid.*: 271, 273). Somaliland's secession seems to have achieved a better situation than the status quo, seeing as the rest of Somalia is still ravaged by chaos.

4.3.4 *Probability of Success*

The probable success of secession affects its morality because according to the principle of least harm, it is morally better to avoid such things as international isolation, poor economic possibilities, or needless bloodshed. Therefore, in terms of war, it “must be such that the odds of success are not minimal, unless the war is for the very survival of the members of the state or group making the fight,” (Lee, 2011: 97). If the war is one of utmost survival, then even an improbable fight may be just. In terms of secession, “the likelihood of success principle means [...] that a unilateral declaration of independence can be made only if it has a reasonable chance of being recognized by the international community,” (Coppieters, 2003(a): 270). This is a principle of prudence, which aims at avoiding a situation where a population falls from the proverbial pot straight into the fire. An analogue to the fight for utmost survival can be drawn to secession if a party is seceding for its very survival. This corresponds to the events leading up to Somaliland’s secession, such as the oppression, torture and eventually massacring of Isaaq Somalis in and around Hargeisa, and the chaos in southern Somalia (Lewis, 2002: 282).

4.3.5 *Legitimate Authority*

The basis of legitimate authority lies in the principles of sovereignty and the social contract, emanating from the Westphalia Peace Treaty. Which party has the right to represent the population in cases of secession? The default legitimate authority in a state is the government, but can the government legitimately represent a population, which it is currently violating – as this represents a break of the social contract. The social contract is an assumed agreement, philosophically of Lockean origin, entered between the people and the state, where the people give up part of their rights in exchange for protection and stability (Brown, 2008: 511). In this sense, the criterion of legitimate authority poses an obstacle, especially in situations such as state terrorism, civil wars, or failed states (Coppieters, 2003(a): 263). This is because many groups arise with the claim of legitimately representing portions of the population, and it may be difficult to distinguish which group is legitimate. In a situation of gross rights violations, the legitimate authority of a violated people can be said to be any group that has widespread support and viability as an alternative to the government. Thus, “states exercise legitimate authority over a territory as long as they treat citizens and

groups within that territory justly,” (Norman, 1998: 42). In Somaliland, the oppression of Isaaq clan in the north led to the rise of the SNM – a unified opposition movement, which represented this group. Therefore, there were only two parties contesting authority in the region – the oppressive government, and the SNM.

4.3.6 Rightful Intention

The criterion of rightful intention focuses mainly on the motives and intentions behind a move towards independence. To what extent does the seceding party genuinely follow their stated claims to redress the suffering of the status quo – i.e. the just cause? In other words, the claim of secession needs to be a clear and transparent agenda that does not contradict the cause for the secession. The criterion seeks to reduce the chances of ulterior motives of a group in taking advantage of a population such as the aggrandizement of elites (Rengger, 2008: 32).

This principle is notoriously difficult to analyze because in most cases, the necessary information is in the heads of individuals and in covert documents. However, in some cases inference can be used to understand probable intention when ulterior motives seem very obvious or information is leaked. The reconciliatory attitude adopted by the SNM after the collapse of the government suggests its intentions of securing peace and stability in Somaliland were genuine. Instead of retaliating against clans that had previously supported the government, the SNM decided to engage in a peace process with them instead (Lewis, 2002: 266).

5 ANALYSIS

This section of the study, will link and analyze the morality of Somaliland’s secession using the previously elaborated principles of just secession in the same order as presented in the theoretical framework, in an effort to make the connection between the theory and analysis clear. The analysis focuses mainly on the years immediately before and after the secession of Somaliland, in order to establish the validity of the secession at the time when it was proclaimed.

5.1 Just Cause

What can be considered a morally just cause for secession? As previously defined, secession is just when it is a response to a grave wrong perpetrated against the seceding party. According to the principles of just secession, Somaliland can claim several valid reasons for seceding – points (1), (3), and (5) (see above, page 16). For a period of more than two decades the central government systematically oppressed and discriminated the northern region both politically and economically, making this region the most underdeveloped in the entire country. The brunt of this oppression coupled with military repression took place under the Barre regime, and culminated in massacre in 1988 (Lewis, 2002: 253, 282).

According to just cause theory, the northern population can claim the right to self-defense due to the gross violation of their constitutional rights by the government, which by way of the social contract, is supposed to protect its citizens. The contract is breached when the state is not willing or able to protect its people, thereby leaving this responsibility to the people or a group representing the people – such as the SNM. Thus, the SNM becomes a just insurgency due to the fact that “harm has been inflicted,” which is “the sole and only just cause for waging war,” (May, 2008: 17). The bombardment and killing of the population in the northern region by Barre’s military in 1988, clearly gives the population reason enough for self-defense against a regime that showed little mercy, and caused the deaths of an estimated 50,000 people. The government’s attacks against the so called “terrorists”

(Ambassador Isse at ECOSOC, 1989(a): 8), did not only lead to a copious loss of life, but also to more than 300,000⁴ thousand people fleeing their homes to seek refuge in Ethiopian camps, (UN General Assembly, 1989: 3).

However, even in the case of self-defense, the morality of secession is contentious – “some wrongs are not sufficiently grave to count as just causes that warrant [secession] as a response,” (May, 2008: 57). What then warrants secession as a response – is it when your home is taken away from you and your family and neighbors slaughtered? Surely the severe oppression of the region can be said to warrant a strong defense. The SNM insurgency was a step towards the establishment of Somaliland which brought peace, security and stability to the region, even though it did not defeat the Barre government which self-imploded. With different factions fighting for control of the government and establishing clan-based government without consulting the SNM or northern elders, the hope for continued unification disintegrated (Lewis, 2002: 264). This situation further fueled the secessionist sentiments in the northern region, and soon, the SNM declared Somaliland once again independent from Somalia. In line with the third criteria of just cause, Somaliland seceded with the same territory as the original state of Somaliland, which existed in 1960. The extended conflict and animosity and the secession has forged a polarized political identity in Somaliland where one is either Somali, or Somalilander – a “difference [which] becomes binary, not simply in law but in political life,” (Höhne, 2006: 398).

5.2 Last Resort

Was secession the only way out? Secession is just when other means to solving the conflict have been exhausted – such as diplomacy, power sharing solutions, federalism or minority rights. The period leading up to Somaliland’s secession was largely chaotic, especially in southern Somalia. Barre’s last years in power were authoritarian in nature, and cracked down upon any form of opposition and discontent (Lewis, 2002: 248-51). With the ouster of Barre by clan militias, a power vacuum exposed deeper divisions between the two main actors – Hawiye leaders General Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The SNM, allied to Aideed during the fight against Barre, joined negotiations, but the groups could not come to an agreement on

⁴ Other sources, such as Kaplan (2008: 148), suggest a larger figure approximating 1,000,000 refugees.

power sharing (*ibid.*: 264). This shows how the SNM utilized diplomatic measures prior to seceding. Ali Mahdi seized power and established a government without the approval from the other groups, which split the capital “into two armed camps [...] polarized among clan lines,” (*ibid.*). This action intensified the fighting and insecurity in the south, possibilities for diplomatic negotiations were off the table, and the hopes of establishing a new central government died with it. Somalia became a failed state when its government lost control of large portions of its territory to warlords, and could not provide basic public goods and functions (Rotberg, 2002: 85). Thereby, the SNM did not have a counterparty to engage in diplomacy with. What would have been the outcome had Somaliland not taken the initiative to improve its situation by uniting to consolidate power and security in the region? The likely outcome might entail chaotic fighting similar to that taking place in the south, division leading to other groups coming in to fight for resources, piracy, and breeding grounds for terrorism. What other alternative could have produced the same benefits as secession in terms of rectifying the injustices faced by the population?

5.3 Proportionality

What degree of human rights abuses is significant enough to warrant a response of secession? The proportionality criterion necessitates that secession is just if it is less harmful than other alternatives – to the seceding state, the mother state, the region and the international community. Barre’s loyal Red Beret elite squad tortured and arbitrarily executed civilians, especially from the *Isaaq* clan of the north in an effort to silence them. The Special Rapporteur to the UN, Mr. Amos Wako, stated in a report that;

“On 13 January 1989, a cable was sent to the Government of Somalia concerning alleged indiscriminate bombing raids, possibly including the use of chemical weapons, carried out by the government forces on the three northern towns of Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao, reportedly causing some 20,000 deaths. According to the information, the internal armed conflict in the northern part of the country had intensified and a large number of civilians belonging to the *Isaaq* clan had allegedly been killed by government forces in a summary or arbitrary manner,” (ECOSOC, 1989(b): 44).

The government justified its actions as combatting a “terrorist group,” (Lewis, 2002: 253) yet it seems that the government was not only fighting a ‘terrorist group’, but was in fact conducting an act of genocide against the *Isaaq* clan over a long period of time. The bombardment of the northern region referred to above caused a mass influx of more than

300,000 refugees into Ethiopia (UN General Assembly, 1989: 3). The people of the north had suffered tremendously at the hand of the Mogadishu government, so secession created a beneficial situation in terms of self-determination and decrease in oppression. The rise of the SNM must therefore be seen as a just and necessary entity in fighting the ethnic cleansing when there was no outside help coming to the defense of the people. However, what is the damage to Somalia due to Somaliland's secession? The harm caused to Somalia as a result of Somaliland seceding is difficult to measure due to the chaos that still engulfs that country. A rough estimation shows that Somalia lost the port at Berbera, the airport at Hargeisa and large grazing grounds for livestock, as well as the geopolitically strategic territory it occupies in the Gulf of Aden. Although due to perennial neglect, the governments of Somalia never developed these resources, until Somaliland investment increased their value after secession (Lewis, 2002: 252). As for the larger region and the international community, the secession of Somaliland has increased the security of the region, due to its political stability, and represents a role model of democratic governance – thus being more beneficial than harmful. Especially seeing that the civilians killed during the civil war in 1988 pale in comparison to the staggering 350,000-1,000,000 who have died in the decades of the Somali Civil War since 1991. The failed state to the south has suffered the collapse of institutions, mass migration, and is described by Robert Rotberg as “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested by warring factions and hospitable to harboring non-state actors – warlords and terrorists,” (Walls, 2009: 371). Thus it is possible if not likely that many deaths have been prevented by the secession of Somaliland from Somalia.

5.4 Probability of Success

Did Somaliland stand a likely chance of being recognized as an independent state when it decided to secede? The criterion demands that for the seceding party to be just it must only secede when there is a likelihood of it resulting in a better status quo. For example, it must take into account the possibility of recognition versus isolation, although utmost survival overrides other arguments.

Somaliland's claim for secession is threefold:

- 1) Somaliland existed as an independent state prior to unifying with former Italian Somaliland in 1960;

- 2) The territory and its population suffered immense violations of human and political rights under the Barre regime; and
- 3) Even after the overthrow of Barre, the southern region of Somalia became divided and engulfed in inter-clan conflict, which did not affect Somaliland's clans (Lewis, 2002: 282).

However, legitimate claims do not guarantee international recognition, and secessionist ambitions have proven to bring grave risks, especially in Africa, such as the thirty-year war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (McNamee, 2012: 20). In fact, “the laws and norms governing who receives international recognition and who doesn't are, in reality, fairly arbitrary and inconsistent,” (*ibid.*), and this means that recognition and legitimacy are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. This criterion seeks for the seceding party to foreshadow the probability of its recognition, even though there are no defined rules on how the international community grants recognition to prospective states, and there is no “judicial forum in which such claims can be evaluated and determined,” (Pavkovic, 2011: 327). Amidst the violence and suffering of the Somaliland population, it is difficult to understand how it would be possible for them to act any differently, as they were driven by the desire to survive.

The probability of success must be analyzed from a political standpoint, and politics are about interests. Is an independent Somaliland in any other state's interest? If not, then Somaliland might not stand a realistic chance of gaining the acceptance of other states. Similar cases, such as the Eritrean struggle for independence, suggest that Somalia is the primary provider of recognition, although it is not in a position to negotiate with or recognize Somaliland due to its internal conflict. If Somalia were to recognize Somaliland, other countries would likely follow suite. Other countries in the region are skeptical to Somaliland's independence. For example, it is not in the interests of Djibouti because the port in Berbera would compete with the port at Djibouti, which serves landlocked Ethiopia, who fears that an independent Somaliland could inspire its Somali-populated Ogaden region to attempt secession (Kaplan, 2008: 154).

Beyond these individual nations are multi-state organizations with influence, such as the AU, UN, and AL. The AU is principally against secession, based on the principle of territorial integrity favored by the OAU insisting on the preservation of colonial borders. However, Somaliland is based on previous colonial borders, and a 2005 AU fact-finding mission to Somaliland came to the conclusion that Somaliland is “unique and self-justified in African

political history,” and “should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s Box,’ ” (African Union Commission, 2005). This represents a shift in the AU’s stance, but has not resulted in any concrete steps towards recognition. The UN “supports [Somaliland’s] aspirations for peace and prosperity,” (UN News, 2013) but aims foremost at strengthening the central government in Somalia. The UN insists that Somaliland must come to an agreement with Somalia in order for it to recognize Somaliland. As for the AL and its members, Somaliland’s independence represents a threat to the territorial integrity of one of its member states, a possible instigator of chain reactions in the AL, and to the notion of a united Somalia acting as a counterweight to Christian Ethiopia (Kaplan, 2008: 154).

Since Somaliland had already existed as a sovereign state, and it fulfills the criteria of least harm, the probability of success may have seemed favorable. However, even if the probability of recognition was small, there was no other alternative for Somaliland but to secede at this point, as previously mentioned. Time has shown it to be a prudential path, when the stability of Somaliland is compared to the spiraling chaos of southern Somalia. Ironically, Somaliland’s international isolation has helped to strengthen internal peace- and nation-building efforts (*ibid.*: 152, 154-5).

5.5 Legitimate Authority

How significant is legitimate authority? Within the Eurocentric state-system, the state is the default sole authority within a defined territory. However, other agents may be considered legitimate at times when the state is grossly violating a region or a people. In the Somaliland case, the decades-long political and social marginalization of the northern Somaliland region during the union with Somalia, coupled with the massacre of around 50,000 people, can be considered to be an example of such a gross violation. This is because it is systematic (through the keeping of political power in the hands of a southern elite with the constant marginalization of northern interests for decades) and directed at a particular region (the Somaliland region) and a particular people (mainly Isaaq Somalilanders) (Lewis, 2002: 252, 282). This argument ascertains that the government might not be the legitimate authority in the Somaliland region in this case.

However, if not the government, which group can be said to hold legitimate authority? The strongest organized resistance to the government from the north was the SNM, which held widespread support amongst civilians in the region. The SNM forcefully resisted the government's violations in guerrilla-style warfare, and its support was further augmented in the eyes of the population after their successful military operation releasing political prisoners in 1983 from the Mandera prison (*ibid.*: 252-3). As an insurgency, the SNM had to "gamble on [its] ability to enlist popular support, to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population, needed for an eventual victory against the superior military forces of the state," (Lee, 2011: 256). The insurgency can be said to have moral authority when it has taken upon itself to do the right thing, to protect the people (Ladenson, 1972: 336). Thus the SNM's legitimacy became significant when it showed itself to be the protector of the people. The organization gained the support of the respected clan elders, or guurti, of the Somaliland society to build their support-base and legitimacy amongst the public.

According to the criterion, a legitimate authority also needs to be a viable alternative to the government. Secession does not end at the declaration of sovereignty, but must lead to a viable state, which provides public goods and upholds the social contract between state and citizens. To what degree can the SNM be seen as a viable alternative to the central government? The aim of the SNM was not a long-term governing of Somaliland, but rather a liberation of the territory from the oppressive regime (Kaplan, 2008: 148). At the onset of independence in 1991, the SNM appointed Abdirahman Tur as the president. However, Tur did not gain the trust of the population and was asked to step down after a conflict-ridden period as president. At this point, the guurti stepped in to avert further crisis and in the Borama Peace Process of 1993, negotiated the instatement of Mohammed Hajji Ibrahim Igal (Lewis, 2002: 283). This illustrates how the SNM was able to successfully hand over power to a civilian government, and to solve conflicts through mediation – a key to a stable government. Although resources did not allow for the early administration to deliver all public goods, it was able to deliver security, justice, and a largely democratic governance. These achievements show the significance of public support and legitimacy for the success of secession.

5.6 Rightful Intention

How can intention be measured? The word itself enters into the domain of vagueness and psychology, and deciphering intention can be difficult, especially without all the cards on the table. Does motive and action provide a sufficient tool for measuring intention? G.E.M. Anscombe insists that to find truth in intention, one needs to judge actions (1976: 8). Thus, in the case of Somaliland, the rightful intention – i.e. following in action the proclaimed just cause – may best be understood by analyzing the events following the collapse of the central government. The initial intention was not for Somaliland to secede, but rather, as previously discussed, negotiate better terms of power sharing between other large clan groups after the ouster of Barre (Lewis, 2002: 264). However, with the failure of these negotiations, and the outbreak of chaos and warlordism in Mogadishu, Somaliland seems to have been left with no choice but to secede. Past experience showed them that sharing power with the south left Somaliland impoverished and bullied, and there was no desire to attempt to salvage the abusive marriage (*ibid.*: 282). The rightful intention criterion allows inference to be employed in determining the justness of secession. Somaliland’s intention can be inferred from their desire to build a more fair and balanced political system allowing the population of the northern regions to thrive on their own, based on grievances articulated during the Barre-era (*ibid.*: 252). The peace processes in Somaliland in the early 1990’s paint a clear picture of the sincerity of these desires, because the SNM – militarily powerful – rejected revenge and instead opted to negotiate and reconcile with previously hostile clans in the region, which “had fought for Siad Barre against the Isaaq,” (Kaplan, 2008: 150). This process eventually led to peace in Somaliland and the electing of a civilian administration in 1993 (*ibid.*: 148). This indicates that the SNM, which led Somaliland to secession, did not have the agenda to stay in power indefinitely, but rather aid the ascension to peaceful and deliberative democracy.

6 CONCLUSION

In what ways can the de facto secession of Somaliland be considered morally just? Utilizing the established normative moral foundation of the just secession theory, this thesis has analyzed the secession of Somaliland following the six criteria set up by the theory. The results from this analysis will be presented in an aim at providing an answer to the research question.

- I. Just Cause: Somaliland has a morally strong case for its secession, fulfilling three out of five just-cause criteria – a long history of systematic oppression and denial of constitutional rights that allows for a claim of self-defense, as well as having a legitimate claim to its territory.
- II. Last Resort: Somaliland’s secession represents an action of last resort following failed power-sharing negotiations and the utmost desire to survive, stemming from the ethnic cleansing of the Isaaq clan.
- III. Proportionality: Although it is difficult to measure the benefits and negative effects of the secession due to the instability of Somalia, there has been notable benefits to Somaliland and its population, such as self-determination, stability, and degrees of economic, social and political development. In addition, international community has benefited from this stability and bottom-up model of state-building. These benefits support the least-harm demand of the criteria, which means that the secession has led to less harm than what would otherwise have occurred, possibly a mirror of the devastation of southern Somalia.
- IV. Probability of Success: Although recognition has not been forthcoming mainly due to political agendas, Somaliland’s isolation has ironically contributed to its stability and nation-building efforts. Lack of an institutionalized forum for judging secession, adds to the difficulty of this criterion. The drive to secession may be seen as morally just because it was an instinct of utmost survival; at the time recognition may not have played a major role.

- V. Legitimate Authority: With the government oppressing the northern region and thereby breaking the social contract with this population, the SNM – unchallenged and holding the moral support of the people in the north – is here seen as a legitimate authority which can justly secede on behalf of the population.
- VI. Rightful Intention: The events following the secession – such as reconciliatory peace-building and constitutional transfers of power – lead to the deduction that the intention of the seceding party was to bring peace, stability and self-determination to the region, rather than consolidating power within different groups or any other hidden agenda.

The application of these criteria to the Somaliland case strongly suggests that Somaliland holds a moral ground for just secession. In addition to this, from a legal standpoint, Somaliland also qualifies as a state based on the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Therefore, the question is not if Somaliland should be recognized, but rather why this recognition is not forthcoming? The main reason for this seems to be geopolitical – an independent Somaliland is not in the interest of many powerful countries. Fears of balkanization and exacerbation of the Somali situation remain obstacles for international recognition. However, these reasons seem unfounded in the light of the stability to the region, which Somaliland can contribute to. Somaliland should stand as an example of successful bottom-up indigenous peace- and nation-building efforts, which can be employed elsewhere.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- African Union Commission, 2005. "Resume: AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland."
African Union. 30 April – 4 May, 2005. Addis Ababa.
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1976. *Intention*. 2nd Ed. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Badersten, Björn, 2006. *Normativ Metod: Att Studera det Önskvärda*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Brown, Chris, 2008. "Human Rights" in John Baylis et. al. *The Globalization of World Politics*.
 4th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, Allen, 1998. "The international institutional dimension of secession," in Percy B. Lehning (ed.) *Theories of Secession*. New York: Routledge.
- Chopra, Jarat, 1995. "Fighting for Hope in Somalia." *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations*. No. 6.
- Clarke, Walter S. & Gosende, Robert, 2003. "Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?" in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*.
 Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutional Press.
- Cockburn, Andrew, 2002. "Online Extra: Somalia" *National Geographic Magazine*. July 2002.
 Accessed 06/01/2014.
<http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0207/feature3/fulltext.html>
- Coker, Christopher, 2010. *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Coppieters, Bruno, 2003(a). "Conclusion: Just War Theory and the Ethics of Secession" in Bruno Coppieters & Richard Sakwa (eds.) *Conceptualizing Secession: Normative Studies in a Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Coppieters, Bruno, 2003(b). "Introduction" in Bruno Coppieters & Richard Sakwa (eds.) *Conceptualizing Secession: Normative Studies in a Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, Basil, 2005. *Africa in History*. 5th Ed. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperback.
- Doornbos, Martin, 2002. "Somalia: Alternative Scenarios for Political Restruction." *African Affairs*. Vol. 101, No. 402. pp93-107.

- Global Security, 2012. "Somalia Civil War," *Global Security*. Accessed 12/12/12.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm>
- Grotius, Hugo, 2007. "The Rights of War and Peace [excerpt]," in David Kinsella & Craig L. Carr (eds.) *The Morality of War: A Reader*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Heuser, Beatrice, 2010. *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hurka, Thomas, 2008. "Proportionality and Necessity" in Larry May (ed.) *War: Essays in Political Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Höhne, Markus V., 2006. "Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia." *Modern African Studies*. Vol. 44, No. 3. Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, Seth, 2008. "The Remarkable Story of Somaliland." *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 19, No. 3. The John Hopkins University Press. pp143-157.
- Ladenson, Robert F., 1972. "Legitimate Authority." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4. University of Illinois Press.
- Laitin D. David & Samatar S. Said, 1987. *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.
- Lee, Steven P., 2012. *Ethics and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levy, Jack S. – Thompson, William R., 2010. *Causes of War*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Lewis, I.M., 2002. *A Modern History of the Somali: Revised, Updated, & Expanded*. 4th Ed. London: James Curry, Ltd.
- May, Larry, 2008. "The Principle of Just Cause," in Larry May (ed.) *War: Essays in Political Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- May, Larry & Crookston, Emily, 2008. "Introduction," in Larry May (ed.) *War: Essays in Political Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Moses, Jonathon W., & Knutsen, Torbjorn L., 2007. *Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Norman, Wayne, 1998. "The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics," in Margaret Moore (ed.) *National Self-Determination and Secession*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pavkovic, Aleksandar, 2011. *The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

- McNamee, Terence, 2012. “The First Crack in Africa’s Map?: Secession and Self-Determination after South Sudan,” Discussion paper 2012/01. *Brenthurst Foundation*.
- Reichberg, Gregory M., 2008. “Jus ad Bellum” in Larry May (ed.) *War: Essays in Political Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rengger, Nicholas, 2008. “The Jus in Bello in Historical and Philosophical Perspective” in Larry May (ed.) *War: Essays in Political Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rotberg, Robert I., 2002. “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure.” *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 25, No. 3 (Autumn 2002). pp85-96.
- Shapcott, Richard, 2008. “International Ethics” in John Baylis et. al. *The Globalization of World Politics*. 4th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thacher, David, 2006. “The Normative Case Study.” *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 111, No. 6. University of Chicago Press. pp.1631-1676
- UN ECOSOC, 45th Session (1989(a)). Summary Record of 33rd Meeting. (E/CN.4/1989/SR.33). Official Record. New York, 22 February, 1989.
- UN ECOSOC, 45th Session (1989(b)). “Summary of Arbitrary Execution” *Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. S. Amos Wako*. (E/CN.4/1989/25). Official Record. New York. 6 February, 1989.
- UN General Assembly, 44th Session (1989). “Assistance to Refugees and Returnees in Ethiopia,” *Report of the Secretary-General*. (A/44/482). Official Record. New York, 19 September, 1989.
- UN News, 2013. “New UN envoy hails Somaliland as ‘island of relative peace and stability’ in insecure region.” *UN News Centre*. 13/06/2013. Accessed 2/12/2013.
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/h%3Cspan%20class='pullme'%3EIn%20short,%20when%20you%20empower%20a%20woman,%20you%20change%20the%20world%3C/span%3Ehttp://www.unfpa.org/www.fao.org/www.unicef.org/html/story.asp?NewsID=45173&Cr=somalia&Cr1=#.UsXoomRDuIe>
- van de Walle, Nicolas, 2009. “Becoming Somaliland; Understanding Somalia and Somaliland,” Rev. of *Becoming Somaliland* [Mark Bradbury, 2008. London: James Curry Ltd.], and *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland* [I.M. Lewis, 2008. New York: Cambridge University Press]. *Foreign Affairs*. May/June Issue 2009.
- Walls, Michael, 2009. “The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland.” *African Affairs*. Vol. 108, No. 432, pp371–389.

Walls, Michael & Kibble, Steve, 2010. "Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland," *Africa Spectrum*. Vol. 45, No. 1.

Walzer, Michael, 2006. *Just and Unjust Wars*. 4th Ed. New York: Basic Books.

Map

Laitin D. David and Samatar S. Said, 1987. *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.