

Development at Home

A case study of development cooperation between the
Swedish government and the Somali diaspora in Sweden

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Abstract

This paper departs from an interest which has grown exponentially since the beginning of the 2000s' for cooperation between donor governments and diasporas in development initiatives directed at the diasporas' country of origin. It notices a discrepancy between identified potential and observed practical results. In an attempt to understand this discrepancy, the thesis seeks to explore the seldom explicitly studied dynamics of interests between donor governments and conflict-generated diasporas in development cooperation. Thereby the study seeks to contribute to an understanding of the conditions underpinning diaspora engagement in development work.

To achieve this end, a case study on the development cooperation between Swedish development agencies and the Somali diaspora in Sweden is conducted. Interviews are carried out with members of the Somali diaspora and Swedish development agencies, all of whom have experience of joint development initiatives.

It is argued that the dynamics of interest are influenced by the diasporas special relationship with both the home and host country, and that the dynamics are present in the political, economic, cultural and social sphere. Finally, a set of theoretical concepts that are central to understanding the dynamics of interests in this form of development cooperation are developed.

Key words: diaspora, development, dynamics of interests, Somalia, Sweden

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1 Introduction

In 2002, a USAID-report was published with the title “Foreign Aid in the National Interest”. The report contained an element of surprise, perhaps best captured in a table on the 27th page. The topic of the table was “Estimated U.S. international assistance to developing countries, 2000” (USAID 2002 p. 27). What was arguably most unexpected was not the volumes but rather the title of a row, namely “Individual remittances” (ibid. p. 27). The content of the table might seem technical but the content of the matter was that for the first time had an OECD-donor incorporated migrant remittances in its international assistance statistics (Brinkerhoff 2010 p. 38). Prior to this publication and even more exponentially since¹, the interest in both remittances and wider diaspora contributions to development has gained considerable attention. Several donor governments have sought ways to engage the diaspora in their national development policies (see De Haas 2006, section 2.3 in this paper).

The rapid development of both the interest in diasporas and the link between diasporas and development merits attention. Departing from recent interest and research, both in academia and the policy sphere, this paper will seek an understanding of the conditions for cooperation between donor governments and diasporas in development assistance directed at the diasporas’ country of origin. Both in academia and policy, potential benefits of including and engaging the diaspora in development assistance have been stipulated quite frequently. This potential have also left marks in several government policies, such as development strategies. However, the potential have not been matched by practical results.² This gap between potential and practice intuitively highlights the need for research about the conditions for such cooperation to take place.

One frequently underlying factor in research about this form of cooperation is the interaction of interests between diasporas and donor governments. Yet, this factor is seldom explicitly addressed. Moreover, the relationship between *conflict-generated* diasporas and governments are particularly interesting considering both the presumed development needs of countries that generate diasporas, and because these relationships could be especially problematic and contain a complex set of interests given the background of the diaspora. Indeed, the potential complexity of interests begs attention. Since the prospects of donor and diaspora cooperation are appealing, rushed policies can easily come at the expense of

¹ No causal suggestion is intended by this statement.

² A background to the stipulated potential as well as the lack of practical results can be found in the chapter on previous research (see section 2.2 and 2.3).

ignoring the perhaps problematic complexity of interests. This would however lead to a flawed conception of this form of cooperation.

1.1 Research question

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interactions of interests between donor governments and conflict-generated diasporas in development cooperation in an attempt to seek understanding of the conditions underpinning diaspora engagement in development work. Against this background the research question for this paper can be formulated:

- *How can the dynamics of interests in development cooperation among Swedish governmental agencies and the Somali diaspora in Sweden be understood?*

In order to answer the research question above, the similar question how the phrase “the dynamics of interest” can be understood begs an answer. Dynamics of interest refers to the interests of the diaspora and the government agencies and how these relate to each other. In other words, what common as well as contentious interests there are. The paper will pay particular attention to the contentious interests since these constitute the most problematic area and are likely to highlight the complexity involved. It phrase also refers to the influence that interests can have on one another, and how interests are influenced by the particular context of development cooperation between diaspora and government. Therefore, in order to answer the research question above, this paper will, apart from identifying common and contentious interests and the factors that influence these, develop a set of concepts that are central to understanding how interests are constituted and influenced in development cooperation.

The main purpose of this paper is theory-development since no theoretical model for the dynamics of interest in this form of development cooperation has been developed. As mentioned above, the issue have been touched upon by various studies (see 2.3) but no paper has explicitly developed a model of the kind proposed here. Developing the proposed set of theoretical concepts should yield relevant insights into the interests in development cooperation. Thus previously unobserved, or at least untheorized, but important factors can be observed. Therefore, the paper seeks to fill a gap in previous research and the cumulative knowledge on the topic. The paper departs from and can contribute to the research fields of diaspora politics and studies on migration and development. Indeed, this paper will depart from diaspora politics in order to gain insight as to how the development cooperation is influenced by the special perspective and properties of diasporas.

The paper can furthermore be of importance to policy-makers since the form of cooperation discussed here is frequently part of national and international development strategies (cf De Haas 2006, Utrikesdepartementet 2013 p. 4). The

topic is furthermore filling an empirical gap since few studies have examined diaspora engagement in a Scandinavian or Swedish context.

1.1.1 Definitions and delimitations

The concept "diaspora" will be the subject of a lengthier discussion in later chapters (see 2.1, 3.1) and will therefore not be elaborated here. Some definition and disclaimers are needed however. "Development cooperation" will refer to any form of development policy, strategy, program, project or other development work directed at the home country, Somalia in this case, where both diaspora, the Somali diaspora in Sweden in this case, and government agencies, Swedish government agencies in this case, are involved. *Note that development cooperation therefore exclusively will refer to cooperation between donor government agencies and the diaspora and not cooperation between other civil society actors and governments or inter-governmental cooperation, unless it is explicitly stated.*

Moreover, the phrase "contentious interests" mentioned above in relation to the research question needs some clarification. The phrase does not solely refer to interests where the interests of the government and the diaspora are directly conflicting. Rather, it refers to all interests that have generated dissatisfaction or disappointment. To just study common and conflicting interests would limit the study to interests that have a counterpart among other actors. In other words, interests that one actor possesses but other actors are indifferent to would not be captured. Therefore, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics of interest, even interests that are not reciprocal are included in the phrase contentious interests.

It should also be noted that this paper does not employ semantic rigidity regarding the "home" and "host" country. To denote the country to which the diaspora has migrated, the terms "receiving state" and "host country" will be used interchangeably. To denote the country from which the diaspora has migrated the terms "home country" or "sending state" will be used interchangeably. The term "homeland" will be used to denote the home country as well but will refer to the diasporas' subjective imagery or understanding of the home country.

Some limitations are furthermore suitable to state at this point. This paper will treat development cooperation involving conflict-generated diasporas (see 3.1). The ambition is to gain theoretical insights relevant for theory on this particular set of cases, and there is no ambition to generalize the findings beyond this sub set.³ Furthermore, despite the fact that this paper studies the conditions for development cooperation, causality will not be studied. Therefore, conclusions about when, how or even if development cooperation can contribute to the development of the home country is beyond the scope of this paper. Likewise, conclusions regarding how the dynamics of interest affects the development

³ See 4.1.1 for a discussion about the possibilities of generalisation.

cooperation in contrast to other factors, such as structural constraints, are not possible. Conclusions can solely be drawn about the dynamics of interest and not the causal effect on or of development cooperation. This does not however make the study irrelevant since the aforementioned purpose of investigating the often visible but seldom studied dynamics of interest in order to understand conditions for cooperation is a highly relevant exercise in itself.

2 Previous research

This chapter will briefly review the previous research regarding the topic in this paper. The purpose of this chapter is first and foremost to situate this thesis within the context of previous academic work and to explicate the gap this paper seeks to fill. The concept of diaspora will be reviewed first. Subsequently, a longer discussion about the migration-development nexus will be presented that will successively narrow down to the field that is most interesting for the topic at hand, namely development cooperation.

2.1 Diaspora group concept

Before proceeding to a review of literature on diasporas and development some discussion of the concept diaspora is advantageous. Two broad dimensions within the previous research will be made visible. First, the basic but complex discussion about what the concept diaspora refers to will be treated. Second, the philosophical positivist-constructivist underpinnings of various definitions and conceptions of “diaspora” will be discussed.

“Diaspora” as a concept has, along with exponentially growing research interest during the last decades, accumulated several interpretations, meanings and uses (Dufoix 2008 pp. 31-33; Brubaker 2005). This dispersion of the word, or as Brubaker put it “the ‘diaspora’ diaspora” (Brubaker 2005) of course highlights the risk of conceptual stretching where the extension of a concept becomes so big that the intension suffers. Brubaker (2005 pp. 5-7) still identifies some commonalities in descriptive definitions. Diasporas are commonly conceptually constituted by dispersion in space, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance.

Dufoix (2008 pp. 21-25) presents a helpful three-way meta-categorisation of definitions: open, categorical and oxymoronic. Open definitions do not discriminate and no limitation to the number of observations are provided beforehand. A recent could be what Esman (2009 p. 14) terms “the modern usage of the term that covers ‘any transnational migrant community that maintains limitations and opportunities in its country of settlement’ [...]”. Another recognised definition is one by Sheffer which refers to ethno-national diasporas. Categorical definitions refer to those that do limit the number of observed cases according to a criteria and consequently distinguish between “true” and “false” diasporas. It has for instance been argued that a “true diaspora” should contain a large enough number of migrants relative to the population residing in the sending state (Dufoix 2008 p. 22). Another well-known example is the criteria-based definition offered by Cohen (2001 p. 26) where a set of nine “common features of

a diasporations” is presented, and the more characteristics that are fulfilled, the more true or ideal-typical the diaspora is. Oxymoronic definitions refer to postmodern approaches that seek to capture the hybrid identity of diasporas. Therefore, essential features are not only unhelpful but in ways contrary to diasporic identity since difference, as opposed to similarities, is at the core of the concept diaspora (Dufoix p. 24)

Brubaker (2005 p. 12) responds to the dispersion by suggesting that “diaspora” should stop being treated like a substantial, descriptive category but rather as “idiom, stance and claim”, thus being a “category of practice” with normative functions. Dufoix (2008 p. 62-66, 107) meanwhile presents an ideal-typical framework for “structuring the experience abroad”, rather than answering the question “what is a diaspora?”.

As is apparent from the preceding discussion, several epistemological positions are visible when approaching the concept diaspora. The categorical definitions in many ways adopt a positivist perspective in the strive to define diasporas according to, often quantitative, factual criteria. Meanwhile, there is a constructivist tradition, mainly among the oxymoronic definitions. Here, the formation and constitution of identity are central themes.

Furthermore, the adherence to both positivist and constructivist perspectives can be observed within single definitions. One example is Sheffer who both emphasises the physical and virtual boundaries that diasporas relate to (Sheffer 2003 p.11-12). The last perspective could largely be observed in a critical realist perspective where both the “real” and the constructed are acknowledged.

2.2 Migration-development nexus

Having briefly introduced the concept of diaspora, it is relevant to turn to the link between migration and development. The academic and policy-oriented interest in this nexus has experienced an increase during the last twenty years and most exponentially since the turn of the century (Brinkerhoff 2010 p. 38; De Haas 2006 p. 1; Faist & Fauser 2011 pp. 2-3). The potential links between migration and development are plenty, both looking at how local development affects migration, how migration affects local development, what the development implications are of different kinds of migration, what is the development implications of return migration and what inclines migrants to contribute to development in the country of origin (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002 pp. 18-24).

The field will be narrowed down but a brief general history of the link is suitable. Using broad strokes, Faist & Fauser (2011 pp. 4-8) categorises the history of this nexus into three phases. During the 1950s’ and 60s’ migration intended to fill labour gaps in the North were believed to contribute to development through financial remittances and return migration. This would involve a natural knowledge transfer from the North to the South. The optimism turned pessimism during the 70s’ and 80s’ when the perceived causal relationship reversed and migration came to be seen as the product and not a solution of

underdevelopment. The linkage was placed within the context of the dependency structures where reversed transfer of knowledge, or brain drain, accentuated rather than alleviated underdevelopment. The last turn began in the 1990s' bringing about the regained optimism regarding the connection between migration and development that is now visible among global and national development actors, such as the World Bank and OECD-donors (Faist 2008 p. 26).

What distinguishes the new phase from previous ones is the agency ascribed to migrants (Faist 2008 p 26; Faist & Fauser 2011 p. 7-8). Previous research has been more inclined to top-down structural conceptions of migration and development. Exchanges were conceived to be constituted solely by resources and the main unit of analysis was the nation-state, sending and receiving. Only during the 1990s' was the process of migration nuanced to account for migrants as agents (Faist & Fauser 2011 p. 15). According to Faist & Fauser (2011 pp. 8-12) the new conception of the research topic is simultaneously underpinned by and in need of a transnational perspective, that provides space for the "new" transnational and "diasporic actors". This is necessary in order to arrive at a more thorough understanding of transnational transfers and networks. Glick Schiller (2011 p. 32) similarly argues that "methodological nationalism" should be replaced by a "global power perspective" in migration studies that would observe transnationalism and introduce new units of analysis.

Previous critique of the development-potential of migration, informed by dependency-theory and brain drain has not vanished however. The view often associated with the latest phase is that knowledge networks, such as expatriates, can create a brain gain in the sending country through knowledge transfer (cf Meyer 2001). However, brain drain is still a commonly identified issue in the health sector in Sub-saharan Africa (cf. Connell et al. 2007). However, even in this field, receiving countries are encouraged to work together with the diaspora to mitigate the crisis (ibid. p. 1888).

Criticism has however also been aimed at the possibility of an overly actor-centric perspective and that the shift to more optimism about the migration-development nexus is likely a result of a paradigmatic shift to neo-liberal perspectives on development. Therefore, while not reducing the issue to structures and the macro-level, this level must also be recognised, along with the recognition that there is no universal link between migration and development, independent of context (cf De Haas 2010).

2.2.1 Remittances and beyond

It should be noted that remittances has been a factor of particular importance in the rediscovery of the migration-development linkage. It has been stated that "[v]irtually all published work on migration and development has touched upon remittances [...]" (Skeldon 2008 p. 7). Brinkerhoff (2011 p. 38) points out that remittances gained attention quite precipitously and therefore caught the eye of many policymakers.

It should be noted that many studies on remittances still arguably adhere to structural analysis, often using “methodological nationalism”. Examples include quantitative analysis of the impact of remittances on growth in different developing countries (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009), the effects of remittances on poverty-mitigation in Sub-saharan Africa (Gupta et al. 2009) and how remittances compare to other financial flows, such as Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries (Gammeltoft 2002; Bodomo 2013).

Along with the structural level, the new transnational perspective is argued to highlight the “meso-level phenomena of transnational actors and associated transfers beyond the limited but dominating focus on financial remittances” (Faist et al. 2011 p. 2). Nyberg-Sørensen et al (2002 p. 15) furthermore state that research about the nexus traditionally have been focused around the economics of migration, thereby reducing migration to an economic act and migrants to labourers, while ignoring the political, social and cultural dimensions. In correspondence with the abovementioned research development there is an interest, not least among policy makers in diaspora activity “beyond remittances” (De Haas 2006 p. 3, 60-64).

“Beyond remittances” could carry two different meanings. On the one hand, remittances could be defined conservatively as private monetary transfers to the country of origin. Activities beyond remittances may then involve several economic, political and social transfers, such as technology transfer, investment, tourism and political contributions as well as other transfers of knowledge, attitudes and culture that could be very intangible and where data is scarce (cf. Newland & Patrick 2004). On the other hand, remittances could refer to all resources, monetary or social. Then, “beyond remittances” refers to studies where remittances are viewed within the social processes that provide them with meaning. Such studies contextualise resources and seek to achieve a less resource-reductionist conception of diasporas and development (cf. Iskander 2008).

2.3 Diaspora cooperation with host governments in development

Following the variety of factors identified above; the agency ascribed to transnational diasporic actors, a widened and deepened conception of diasporas involvement in sending state development and interest among both academics and policy-makers; much interest has been aimed at involving diasporas in the development work of donors.

Since the middle of the 2000s’ several articles have been published on diaspora engagement in development projects by national development agencies as well as international institutions. The field is however fairly new. It should be noted that several relevant and sometimes well-cited papers have been policy reports produced by or for different organisations and institutes. Notable examples include De Haas (2006) for Oxfam Novib, Ionescu (2006) for IOM (International

Organisation for Migration) and Kleist & Vammen (2012) for DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies). These reports will therefore not provide the core of this section or the construction of the theoretical framework in the subsequent chapter.

Some academic studies have acknowledged the potential of engaging diasporas in development assistance, but display a degree of scepticism about the practical prospects. Orozco (2008) provides a review of cooperative projects between governments and diasporas. It is stressed that diasporas are important to involve in development cooperation (Orozco 2008 p. 210). However, some challenges are identified, such as limited knowledge of diasporas among development actors, limited development expertise among diasporas, policy problems created by the link to migration policy and limited communication from donors to diasporas (ibid. p. 228).

Brinkerhoff (2011) provides an enlightening although somewhat sceptical assessment of the narrative and prospects of diaspora instrumentalisation for development purposes. The scepticism is not inherently aimed at diaspora partnerships which holds potential, but rather directed at the overly enthusiastic narrative about their potential, based on several procedural and substantial problems that should be present in the partnership. Demands of bureaucratic adaptation could be resisted by diaspora organisations and even if they adapt, the instrumentalisation is likely to diminish their comparative advantage that motivated the partnership (Brinkerhoff 2011 p. 43). In conclusion, strong organisational identity among the diaspora organisations as well as mutuality in the cooperation to ensure that diasporas do not become an extension of the donor agency is suggested as prerequisites for successful development initiatives (ibid. pp. 45-46). Consequently development assistance with *some* degree of instrumentalisation of diaspora organisations is optimal, but beyond a point, further instrumentalisation will result in diminishing returns (ibid. p. 45).

Vammen & Brønden (2012) provides an overall sceptical assessment of the implications of what is coined “migration-development buzz” and entailing a simplistic optimism regarding the link between the two. In a study of two countries, it is found that government contact with diaspora groups led to disappointments and both countries are scaling down diaspora engagement activities (Vammen & Brønden 2012 pp. 32-34, 37). The identified problems where defining who the diaspora is in the face of multiple actors and associations, that the diaspora may oppose the home country government or support regional or local development rather than national development and, lastly, uncertain capacity in project execution (ibid. p. 33).

Other studies have argued that attempts to engage the diaspora in development assistance approach to issue erroneously to begin with. Horst (2013) highlights the politics of diasporas from the Horn of Africa. The main obstacles to engaging diasporas in development work are a perceived lack of values that are expected by donor governments, namely neutrality or non-discriminatory approaches, impartiality or apolitical engagement, and finally unity or lack of fragmentation within the diaspora (Horst 2013 pp. 232-235). Here it is argued that refugee diasporas have a political nature which is denied when Western development

apply their ideals to the diaspora (ibid. p. 235). It is argued that diaspora engagement should be reconceptualised as civic participation rather than aid-work (ibid. pp. 239-242).

The preceding review of existing literature prescribes an assessment of at least three issues before the theoretical framework can be formalised. First, the thesis' position in relation to recent literature on the migration-development nexus and studies regarding diaspora engagement in development should be considered. Second, a definition of diaspora needs to be presented along with, lastly, a brief discussion about the epistemological underpinnings and consequences of the adapted definition. Once these issues have been addressed, and the interest of diaspora groups have been elaborated, it will be argued that this paper fills a gap in the existing literature reviewed above on diaspora cooperation with host governments.

3 Theory

The preceding review of previous research provides a foundation to theorise possible contentions of interests between diaspora groups and development agencies. First, it should be stated that this study on the one hand can be considered a part of the third wave of migration-development academia in several ways. First, rather than investigating structural conditions, mechanisms or effects, this study places agency at the core of analysis by highlighting the motives, interests and actions of actors involved in the process. Second, it particularly emphasises the role played by diasporic actors. Third, in association with the articulation of agency, it seeks to capture transfers and actions at all levels, such as transfers “beyond remittances”.

On the other hand, the research question in this paper works partly according to the “methodological nationalist” perspective in the sense that “Swedish governmental agencies” and “the Somali diaspora in Sweden” are defined according to nationalist criteria. This is not so much a flaw however, but merely an ascertainment. The paper still highlights a topic that is current and relevant both within and outside academia. Furthermore, governmental development assistance is still mainly nationally defined and the national perspective is therefore a logical approach. It is reasoned that the national perspective is not irreplaceable considering the variety of alternative approaches to the subject, but neither is it insignificant.

3.1 Definition

This study will employ a definition of diaspora by Sheffer (2003 pp. 9-10). It is a lengthy definition but the important points are that “ethno-national diasporas” are formations that permanently reside in a country as a result of migration from a homeland. They organise to keep a common identity in relation to the homeland and a nation. They are active in the cultural, social, economic and political spheres (Sheffer 2003 pp. 9-10).⁴

⁴ The complete original definition is “an ethno-national diaspora is a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries. Based on aggregate decision to settle permanently in host countries, but to maintain a common identity, diasporans identify as such, showing solidarity with their group and their entire nation, and they organize and are active in the cultural, social,

The reasons for using the preface “ethno-national” are two-fold. First, it serves to distinguish diasporas with a territorially localisable nation from other trans-state groups lacking such a territorial homeland (ibid. pp. 10-11). Second, it stresses that the intended groups “regard themselves as being participants in nations that have common ethnic and national traits, identities and affinities” (ibid. p. 11).

The definition is suitable for a number of reasons. First, despite the wide variety of usages of the term diaspora, the definition indeed refers to what familiarly is called a diaspora in both academic and lay language. This is illustrated by the fact that the definition corresponds to the three commonalities in diaspora-definitions identified by Brubaker presented in the previous chapter. Second, despite a variety of attributes, the definition is still coherent and lacks internal contradictions. Third, it also differentiates diasporas from other groups that share certain characteristics. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it is theoretically useful since it incorporates descriptive features, actions and processes in a variety of areas. Therefore, the definition itself points out several interesting arenas and processes relevant for study. The aforementioned conceptual attributes familiarity, coherence, differentiation and theoretical utility have all been argued to be important criteria in concept-formation (Gerring 1999 pp. 368-370, 373-379, 381-382).

The definition is furthermore labelled an open definition by Dufoix (2009 p. 21) according to the categorisation presented in the previous chapter. The definition could be considered categorical since it excludes transnational communities that lack a physical homeland. These communities would be included when using a postmodern or oxymoronic definition (Dufoix 2008 p. 25). However, when studying diasporas and development, excluding the physical homeland from the definition would be nonsensical since development projects presupposes a physical territory. This is not to argue that a transnational perspective is unwarranted, the opposite point has been made; It is not however a suitable definition for the phenomena in this paper.

The last point is also related to the study on conflict-generated diasporas in this paper. There has to have been a territorial conflict that generated the diaspora. Not necessarily a conflict predominantly about territory, but one that is localisable in a territory. The definition above will furthermore be amended by adding that the *diaspora migrated from a homeland engaged in or affected by conflict*.

A more categorical definition would be problematic. For instance, the criterion that a certain ratio between population in the diaspora and the entire nation must be present, is unwanted. The criterion is reductionist regarding diaspora relations since it solely concerns their ties to the homeland. The definition by Sheffer incorporates permanent residence and organisation in the receiving state as key concerns, which is more suitable to this paper. Another advantage is the focus on

economic, and political spheres. Among their various activities, members of such diasporas establish trans-state networks that reflect complex relationships among the diasporas, their host countries, their homelands, and international actors.”

agency rather than structural features that is provided by the adapted definition. In this regard, the incorporation of activity and the spheres of these activities are particularly advantageous.

The thesis will work according to a critical realist epistemological standpoint. The underpinnings of this perspective were briefly mentioned in the previous chapter and the methodological implications of this perspective will be discussed more in-depth in the next chapter (see 4.2.1). In essence, critical realism can be summarised as providing “an alternative to both hopes of law-finding science of society modelled on natural science methodology and the anti-naturalist of interpretivist reductions of social science to the interpretation of meaning” (Sayer 2000 pp. 2-3). One key feature of critical realism is the study of “real but unobservable objects” (Jackson 2010 pp. 77). These objects can be studied by positing the “existence of some process, entity, or property that accounts for the observational data” (ibid. p. 83).

Indeed, this standpoint aligns well with the definition. The definition posits that there are real descriptive features of diasporas, such as migration, residence, contacts as well as real essential features of diasporas. Meanwhile, this is not accomplished at the expense of reducing the diaspora to a matter of true or false. The definition instead incorporates constructivist elements, such as nation, identity, solidarity and activity.

3.2 Spheres of interest

Departing from the definition above, some notes and elaborations about diaspora group interests will be presented. Sheffer (2003 p. 79) asserts that a common identity is necessary but not sufficient for diaspora establishment. These identities must furthermore, as a result of rational and emotional factors, result in organisation and the establishment of diaspora organisations. Sheffer (2003 p. 26) suggests two reasons for organising; (1) To gain a better position in the receiving state as well as (2) supporting developments in the homeland. The relationship between the diaspora and the receiving state is very important for the formation of diaspora organisation since they are a result of several decisions by the migrant on how to respond to the new circumstances. An assessment of these conditions is a precondition for the establishment of a diaspora (Sheffer 2003 p. 130).

The decisional aspect is an important part of the focus on agency as opposed to just structures (ibid. p. 112). There are several strategies that can be adopted by migrants and diasporas once they decide to, at least to a degree, permanently settle in the receiving state. Communalist or corporatist strategies “aims to achieve a reasonable degree of “absorption” of diasporas into the host society, but not full integration, which might lead to assimilation – all the while maintaining continuous and unwavering relations with the homeland” (ibid. p. 164). Diaspora organisations preserve identity while providing a platform for cohesive promotion of interests. It is the most common strategy among state-linked (as opposed to state-less) diasporas, and the main motivation could be summarised as attempting

to be “home abroad” (ibid. p. 164). Sheffer also states that the majority of stateless diasporas also pursue a communalist strategy (ibid. p. 157). However, stateless diasporas that support separatist movement can cause problems for sending and receiving state, sometimes through violent means (ibid. p. 157-160).

The interests of the diasporas opting not for radical aggressive and violent tactics will then be formulated through activities in the political, economic, cultural and social sphere (ibid. pp. 172-179). Diasporas could work as interest-groups in the political sphere, fund-raisers and investors in the economic sphere, promoters of culture and social ideas in the cultural and societal sphere (ibid. pp. 172-175). These interests can furthermore be present in their relationship with the sending state as well as the receiving state and other diaspora communities. Therefore, it is important to not reduce diaspora interests to interests in the sending state when one of their main functions is to allow identity continuity *in the receiving state*. Activities in these spheres are necessary to achieve both a secure existence and integrity in the receiving state while maintaining and continuing the relationship and exchange with their homeland (ibid. p. 172).

What is visibly lacking from previous research is the recognition of the complexity of diaspora interest and activity in different spheres. The studies that attempted to investigate donor-diaspora cooperation have on the one hand focused on single issues such as the problem of neglecting or approaching political issues in the cooperation or problems associated with instrumentalisation. On the other hand, some studies have identified several problems but the problems have not been systematically analysed and incorporated within a coherent theoretical framework. The recognition that the interests that underpin these issues are a part of a wider and more complex web of interests is to a large degree absent. Similarly, the dynamics of interests among governmental and diaspora actors are not explicitly addressed despite being an potentially underlying issue in several of the identified problems.

In order to capture this complexity, the subsequent theoretical discussion will be structured according to the spheres identified by Sheffer. First, when departing from the different spheres, interests can be separated in different spheres instead of being treated as simply general or overarching. Second, it also allows for comprehensive analysis since a single sphere or dimension is not predetermined to be of singular importance. Hence, a more complex set of interests can emerge.

The following sections will deliberate the dynamics of interests within each sphere, the political, economic, societal and cultural sphere, by considering both theoretical insights in diaspora studies as discussed above, as well as previous research regarding diaspora engagement in development. Within each sphere an argument will be formulated which collectively will constitute the spine of the analysis. The starting point for each section is the main function the diaspora organisation has in each sphere. Departing from this function, the implications for development cooperation will be discussed.

3.2.1 Political sphere

Sheffer (2003 p. 172) points out that diasporas can basically function similarly to other interest-groups in the political sphere, by usage of lobbying and promotional and advocacy activity. In the context of diaspora engagement, the political activity can both be aimed at the homeland state as well the receiving state.

Diasporas can have political interests in the homeland, which should be especially true for conflict-generated diasporas. This is the point raised by Horst (2013) when discussing cooperation between donors and conflict-generated diasporas. The diaspora organisation may seek to advance political interests whereas development agencies seek impartiality in development projects. The principle of impartiality becomes highly problematic since diasporas from post-conflict societies are often politically engaged. Since the sending country per definition is contested through conflict, questions about who are a part of the diaspora and what their purpose is are inherently political (ibid. pp. 236-237, 239).

This conclusion could indeed be supported by documented political aspirations of conflict-generated diasporas to influence the receiving states' foreign policy. Studies have found diasporas to seek political influence on foreign policy, such as the Albanian diaspora in the UK and the US (Koinova 2013) and the Cuban and Iraqi diaspora in the US (Vanderbush 2009). Hence, since the homeland is contested, any action towards it involves a political consideration. Therefore, conflict-generated diasporas are expected to seek political influence.

Moreover, as Sheffer (2003 p. 175) points out, political lobbying is a defence function to secure political rights in the host country. Partnerships with the host government in general should secure the diaspora members rights. Therefore, a political interest in inclusion can inform the diaspora and potentially influence the development cooperation. This point is echoed in a study by Ross (2013 pp. 298-299) where diaspora group interests in foreign policy are influence by the minority status of the group. Influence in foreign policy could be perceived as an instrument to achieve societal inclusion and internal mobilisation. However, the advancement of interests in the homeland might hinder their interest in integration if the interests stand in opposition to the host government. Therefore, the interests in the homeland could also be toned down (ibid. pp. 301-302).

In other word, a trade-off between interests in the home and host country might be present. Therefore, the political sphere should be important in development cooperation but it is difficult to determine if the interests are contentions or not. Based on the previous discussion, a tentative argument will be put forward below.

Argument 1: Contending interests could arise in the political sphere between diasporas and government agencies as diasporas seek political influence.

3.2.2 Economic sphere

Considering the attention directed at the development potential of remittances, the economic sphere should be one of considerable mutual interest between the diaspora and donor governments. As Sheffer (2003 p. 172-173) points out, one function of diasporas is to organise fund-raising and investment organisations. From a theoretical standpoint, such endeavours are correspondent to the neo-liberal paradigm in development studies. Sheffer (2003 p. 173) proceeds to stress that diasporas often seek to work as facilitators of economic ties between sending and receiving state. Furthermore, Orozco (2008 pp. 219-225) identified positive examples of both the intergovernmental organisation The Inter-American Development Bank and the donor agency and USAID linking remittances to development projects. Sheffer (2003 p. 173) also highlights “securing economic aid” as an important activity of diasporas. Considering the comparative advantages (Brinkerhoff 2010 p. 42-43) donor agencies and diasporas, such cooperation could indeed yield beneficial cooperation.

However, it should be noted that the accumulation of resources is linked to the instrumentalisation highlighted by Brinkerhoff. Diasporas might want ownership of development resources and a partnership rather than being a delivery agent of development projects formulated by others (ibid. p. 44). This is a concern echoed in policy-reports where it is stressed that the relationship should be characterised by partnership (see De Haas 2006). This interest is closely related to the economic maintenance function of diasporas in the receiving state (Sheffer 2003 p. 174).

Furthermore, since diasporas have an inherently different relationship to the sending state from the receiving state, and presumably different priorities in resource transfers, divergent opinions regarding optimal uses of resources could be present. Both the relationship between diasporas and receiving states, as well as resource priorities, are symptoms of the same issue, namely the question of ownership of the development projects.

Argument 2: Contending interests will arise in the economic sphere regarding ownership of development projects and the uses of development resources.

3.2.3 Cultural sphere

The relationship between diasporas and receiving states in the cultural sphere is well documented considering the centrality of integration in migration studies. The relationship is one that may range from assimilation or intermingling to ethnic polarisation with conflict, sometimes violent, as consequence (see Esman 2009). Esman (2009 p. 117-118) notes that an important role of diaspora organisations is serving cultural as well as practical needs. Sheffer states (2006 p. 175) that many activities in the cultural sphere, such as festivals and other promotional events, serves to “increase ethnic awareness and a sense of identity among diasporans”.

Despite the importance placed on culture in diaspora studies, the role of culture in development cooperation between receiving states and diasporas has not received similar attention. Meanwhile, it has been found that cultural solidarity, along with levels of political organisation and economic resources, is an important determinant of mobilisation within the diaspora for the homeland (King & Melvin 1999 p. 132-133). Furthermore, while neither economic or knowledge transfers from the diaspora to the homeland are necessarily cultural flows, studies have argued that diasporas, may promote understanding and “cultural competencies” gained in host countries (Brinkerhoff 2008 p. 10). Therefore, cultural factors should be important in development cooperation.

As Brinkerhoff asserts, a degree of adaptation is demanded from donors when instrumentalising diasporas for development. On the one hand, diaspora organisations may resist the degree of professionalism and administrative improvement that donor agencies require. On the other hand, if they do not, then the new administrative structures might erase their comparative advantage by distancing them from the local grassroots perspective (Brinkerhoff 2011 p. 43). The diaspora organisation has among the primary aims to ensure the continuation and preservation of the common identity of the diaspora. Therefore, resistance to organisational isomorphism could be rational as well as cultural not least since many perceived comparative advantages of diasporas are a result of a special identity with dual understanding. Therefore, “[w]hile donors and COO governments may be able to access these comparative advantages by working with diasporas for development, their ability to instrumentalise diasporas [...] is limited by the drivers that inspire diasporans’ engagement in the first place” (Brinkerhoff 2011 p. 43). Furthermore, if diaspora organisations professionalise, the sending country might come to perceive them as competitors for donor money, countering their mediating and advantageous role (ibid. p. 45). This would sever the relationship to the homeland. Consequently, the expected degree of professional integration could be an area of contention.

Argument 3: Government agencies will expect diaspora organisations to adapt to bureaucratic and professional standards whereas diasporas will resist adaptation on account of cultural integrity.

3.2.4 Societal sphere

Sheffer (2003 p. 173) states that organisations are established within the societal sphere to maintain associations and cooperation as well as coexistence with other groups, both majority groups, minorities and other diasporas. Furthermore, many promotional activities are aimed at increasing the size of the organisation and ensuring visibility as well as homeland contacts (Sheffer 2003 p. 175). Therefore, the maintenance and promotion of the organisation and its’ relationship with other organisations and groups are all important aspects of the diaspora within the societal sphere. This should not least be important considering that competing

attitudes and narrative about the homeland always are present among diasporas (ibid. pp. 153-154).

Understandably, considering the broad and vague function of diasporas in the societal sphere, it is not commonly used as a starting point to discuss the rather policy-oriented field of development engagement. One issue of importance in this sphere is however touched upon in several studies regarding diasporas and development, as well as previously in this paper, namely fragmentation *within* the diaspora. Horst (2013 pp. 233-235) identifies the lack of unity within the diaspora as a problem in the cooperation on development issues with government agencies and NGOs. The lack thereof is supposedly problematic since officials are unable to identify representatives, and collaboration with the community as a whole becomes unviable. The same problem was identified by Vammen & Brønden (2012 p. 33). Horst (2013 pp. 238-239) concludes that attempts to externally foster unity among the diaspora are ill-informed considering the nature of conflict-generated diasporas. For instance, clan-based systems that can be divisive often form important networks for diasporas in conflict-situations. Similarly, an important point is that while the actor “diaspora” often figures in policy documents, the coherent, homogenous diaspora could be constructed and therefore attributed (Faist 2010 p. 19) rather than derived from experience.

The interest among organisations for cooperation will presumably vary, since cooperation and co-existence are wanted in the societal sphere, but *co*-existence presupposes longevity and integrity of the individual organisation, why full merging of organisations should be unlikely. Therefore, the emphasis placed on unity among the different actors merits attention.

Argument 4: A contention of interest could arise in the societal sphere as government agencies will seek unitary diaspora actors, while unity is not necessarily an aim among diasporas.

All four arguments depart from the expected function of diaspora organisations and the argument is deduced from the expected, and sometimes observed, implications of this function. There is a semantic difference between them, since a contention of interest *could* arise in the first and last argument while it *will* arise in the remaining two. This is simply a reflection of the ambiguous implications of the diasporas’ function in these spheres. In the other spheres the implications are more unequivocal. It should also be stressed that the purpose of these arguments is not to be opposed or upheld, but rather to function as a heuristic tool to capture the dynamics within the identified sphere of importance. These arguments will constitute the core of the data collection, which will be detailed in the next chapter.

Table 1 – Summary of the deduced arguments

- Argument 1: Contending interests could arise in the political sphere between diasporas and government agencies as diasporas seek political influence.
- Argument 2: Contending interests will arise in the economic sphere regarding ownership of development projects and the uses of development resources.
- Argument 3: Government agencies will expect diaspora organisations to adapt to bureaucratic and professional standards whereas diasporas will resist adaptation on account of cultural integrity.
- Argument 4: A contention of interest could arise in the societal sphere as government agencies will seek unitary diaspora actors, while unity is not necessarily an aim among diasporas.

4 Methodology

This chapter will address the methodological considerations involved in the achievement of the present purpose. Three main issues will be discussed in turn, namely the case study design, interview methodology and method of data analysis.

4.1 Case design

In order to answer the research question and to provide suitable means to satisfy the thesis' ambitions, a case study design will be adopted. The study will focus on a single case, namely development cooperation with the Somali diaspora in Sweden.

A case study is suitable to theory-building since it allows for new, a priori undetermined insights (George & Bennett 2005 pp. 20-21). In relation, the case-study both recognises that the investigation is carried out within a context, without having to predetermine what is context and what is phenomena (Yin 2003 p. 13). In other words, case studies can provide insights that would be missed when using statistics or comparative methods where variables are predetermined and unchangeable.

There have been several classifications of case studies (cf Lijphart 1971 pp. 691-693, Yin 2003 pp. 40-42, Lieberman 2005 pp. 444-446). These are usually related to their theoretical or empirical properties in relation to previous findings. However, considering the lack of previous findings on this topic, such an approach is not suitable.

This paper instead works similarly to what George and Bennett (2005 p. 75) calls a "plausibility probe". In these studies, a study is conducted in a previously unfamiliar context to explore if the area warrants attention. It is an exploratory study that bears similarities to what Yin (2003 p. 41) calls a "revelatory case study". Yin notes that case studies are warranted when researchers get access to previously inaccessible material. However, the aforementioned criteria seems to assume that only previously inaccessible material has not been investigated. The (in)accessibility of the material should not sensibly be important to the research relevance from a theoretical perspective. Relevance should rather depart from the previous research independent of accessibility. As mentioned previously, the scarce theoretical work on the topic of dynamics of interest in one of the key aspects of this paper.

4.1.1 Generalizability

Generalisation is a contested concept in case study designs (Yin 2003 p. 10-11, Gomm et al. 2000 p. 5). Indeed, this study does not seek survey-like or experimental generalisation to a population. Rather, it will strive for what have been termed "analytic generalisation" (Yin 2003 p. 10). The distinction between statistical and analytical generalisation is key. The statistical generalisation seeks generalisation from "sample" to "population" but neither concept is applicable in the case study. Instead, generalisations are made from case to theory (ibid. p. 38).

Furthermore, it can be argued that a misconception about generalisation is that it has to be based on a representative sample. However, even in statistical generalisation, all generalising activity is not based on the representativeness of the sample. Statistical generalisations are always accompanied by theoretical explanations and the representativeness of the sample is irrelevant for this logical inference (Mitchell 2000 p. 175). The aim of this case study is the latter generalisation, the logical inference from case to theory. The case study can furthermore analytically suppress the particular and contextual features of the case and aim for the essential and conceptual (ibid. p. 181) which indeed is the attempt here.

Moreover, the theory this paper seeks generalisations to is a middle-range theory, that is theory regarding a sub-set of a more extensive phenomenon (George & Bennett 2005 p. 144). The sub-set in this paper is development cooperation with *conflict-generated* diasporas.

4.1.2 Case selection – Development cooperation with the Somali diaspora in Sweden

Before commenting on the relevance of the case selection a rather brief empirical background about Somalia, the diaspora and Swedish development cooperation will be presented.

Somalia suffered a regime and state collapse in 1991 following two decades of dictatorial rule by Mohamed Siad Barre. Since then, the state has been at near perpetual crisis of violent conflict, famine and natural disaster (Zeid & Cochran 2014 p. 4). An illustration of the situation is that Somalia has been ranked as the world's most fragile state in the annual "Failed state index" since the index's inception in 2005 (Fund for Peace 2014).

A discussion about the causes and drivers of conflict in Somalia is beyond the scope of this paper but a short review, although admittedly simplified, is helpful to the analysis. Somalia is rather homogenous in terms of ethnicity, religion and language. Divisions are instead usually identified within clan or kinship systems (Kimenyi et al. 2010 p. 1348, Lewis 2004 p. 492, Webersik 2004 p. 516). Clanship has been linked to uneven distribution of resources (Webersik 2004). During the period of state collapse, the northern regions Somaliland and Puntland furthermore unilaterally declared themselves independent and autonomous respectively making the relations between South-Central Somalia, Puntland and

Somaliland difficult (International Crisis Group 2009 pp. 10, 12-13, International Crisis Group 2012 pp. 9-10). It has been argued that political identities with tendencies to exacerbate conflict have been constructed in the northern regions (Höhne 2006).

In the face of absent state institutions, the diaspora is considered to have been of great importance. For instance, it has been argued that “[r]emittances have been far more important for the survival of people than development and humanitarian aid put together” (Gundel 2002 p. 277).

Moreover, some cautious optimism have been voiced over recent developments in Somalia and the prospects for development. Perhaps most importantly a post-transitional government is now in place made of a leadership with relatively little involvement in the flawed previous political process and the rebel group Al-Shabaab have suffered setbacks (Hammond 2013 pp. 185-188).

Sweden was in 2012 the fifth largest individual donor to Somalia and the second largest within Europe (AidFlows 2014). Somalia was furthermore the eight largest beneficiary of Swedish bilateral aid in 2013 (Sida 2014). The development cooperation between the countries is therefore considerable. Moreover, in the Swedish development strategy for Somalia it was asserted that it is important to “make use of the competence present in the Somali diaspora outside of Somalia” (Utrikesdepartementet 2013 p. 4). Some initiatives corresponding to this ambition has been actualised, such as “Somaliaprogrammet” (Forum Syd)

What is deemed important when selecting the revelatory case for this thesis is the potential for theoretical insights that could contribute to theory at a more general level. Therefore, the case is selected according to the presence of factors that should frame interests and therefore be conducive to theoretical insight. The diaspora adhere from a country just emerging from conflict, thereby constituting a conflict generated diaspora. The diaspora has played an active role supporting the homeland given the 20-year absence of a functioning central government. The diaspora have furthermore been active in setting up diaspora organisations. The Swedish government has explicitly stated its ambition to make use of the competencies of the diaspora. There could be fragmentation within the diaspora from Somalia since they adhere from and could identify with different regions and clans. Consequently, many of the factors that are likely to frame the interests of the actors, are present in this case and the case should therefore generate important findings.

4.2 Interview methodology

To achieve the aims articulated in this thesis, semi-structured interviews will be conducted. Semi-structured interviews form a middle ground between standardised and focused interviews. This format allows for the respondents to formulate answers more on their own terms than the structured interview, while at the same time allowing for some comparability between answers that would be

difficult in an unstructured format (May 2011 pp. 134-136). The former aspect is important to advance the papers purpose of not just judging the four arguments, but also enabling a fuller understanding of the interests involved. The latter aspect is important since comparability of answers is central to understanding how the interests of various actors relate.

4.2.1 Epistemological approach

This section will clarify how the collected data is understood. Qualitative interviews could be described as “guided conversation” where the researcher is seeking meaning and interpretations using a constructivist lens (Warren 2002). Silverman (1993 pp. 90-91) makes a distinction between positivist and interactionist, where the former is interested in “facts” collected through interviews, while the latter is concerned with accessing experiences of respondents. Therefore, it is a method permissive to several epistemological standpoints.

This thesis departs from a critical realist epistemology. Therefore, the material will not be treated within a strictly social constructivist perspective. Interests could be argued to be less subjective than experiences or perceptions. Interests mainly relate to attitudes, motives and thoughts about what should be done. Silverman (1993 p. 92) suggests all of these are approachable from a positivist perspective. Still, it is not argued that interests are easily observable. It is however argued that interests are not solely a product of our subjective understanding of them.

Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the constructivist perspective and the critical point that the interviewer frames the questions and could interpret the answer in certain, often predetermined, ways. Using open, rather than restricted, questions should denounce the impact of the researcher in predetermining the answers. In other words, the variables sought will be predetermined but the classification of the answers will be open (Teorell & Svensson 2007 p. 90).

In conclusion and in accordance with the critical realist theoretical underpinnings, interests and the influences on them will be understood as being independent of our understanding of them. However, they will in contradiction to positivism, be treated as unobservable in the sense that they cannot, for instance, be accessed by a grading a scale of “how interested” one is. Rather, in this case, they must be sought by hearing the respondent refer to facts, attitudes and motives, as well as more subjective aspects, such as values, and then deduced.

4.2.2 Respondents

The respondents are selected on the basis of their experience with development cooperation between the diaspora and governmental agencies. The cooperation is therefore non-hypothetical and the respondents can both provide information about their experience of the cooperation as well as information about the

cooperation itself. Therefore, the respondents will be treated as “experts” or “elites”. The term elite interviewing has no definite meaning. It has been applied to interviews with respondents who hold a “privileged position in society” (Richards 1996 p. 199). A more open conception will be adopted here and an elite interview will refer to interviews where “it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about a topic at hand” (Leech 2002a p. 663).

Respondents were selected using snowball sampling were members of the elite were contacted and asked to provide names to others involved in development cooperation (May 2011 p. 145). It should be noted that that this is a non-probability sample method and the total amount of interviews could be considered relatively low. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample is problematic. However, this is not central to this paper for two reasons. First, interviewing respondents with experience from development cooperation reduces the potential respondents. It would furthermore always be difficult to generalize the findings from respondents with this experience to the diaspora or government without it. Second, the importance is not the commonality of certain statements but rather the theoretical meaning of statements. Therefore, it is mainly important to reach a degree of satiation, where new input becomes scarce (Ryen 2004 pp. 85-87).

In total, 10 respondents were interviewed.⁵ 5 of the respondents are members of the Somali diaspora, 4 of the respondents are civil servants from government agencies. 1 respondent is working for Forum Syd, a development organisation that on a mandate from Sida⁶ is a major dispenser of Swedish development assistance. It is important to notice that during the analysis the last respondent will be gathered in the group “governmental respondents”. This is technically wrong despite the agency given mandate of the organisation. Whenever deemed relevant, the special position of the respondent will be pointed out however.

To increase the likelihood that as many theoretically interesting points as possible could be put forward, some heterogeneity among the respondents was ensured. Half of the respondents were men and half were women.⁷ Among the diaspora, the respondents had background from all three regions. The governmental respondents all came from different positions and agencies covering both the local and the national level. Repetitions became quite common during the last interviews in both groups and it was concluded that additional interviews would add little in terms of theoretical relevance.

4.2.3 Interview technique

Regarding the interview guide, Leech argues that the best type of questions are “grand tour questions” where “questions ask for a tour based on some parameter

⁵ See Appendix 8.2 for a complete list of respondents.

⁶ The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

⁷ 3 of the respondents in the diaspora were women and 2 of the respondents from government agencies.

decided by the interviewer - a day a topic an event [...]” (Leech 2002b p. 667). These questions are beneficial since the respondent should respond at length regarding the subject matter posited by the interviewer (ibid. p. 667). These questions were employed in the interview guide. The key questions were mainly treated as sub-questions to grand tour questions. The grand tour questions furthermore gave the respondent the possibility to put forward other important points and to approach the issue from their perspective. Limited previous research, increased response validity and resistance among elites to being forced into answers are further benefits of using open question (Aberbach & Rockman 2002 p. 674) that are all applicable in this paper.

Some general means to gain rapport were employed such as displaying attentiveness, allowing the respondent to talk uninterrupted and, importantly, briefly presenting the research topic (Leech 2002b p. 666). Practically, a non-threatening question where the respondent was asked to provide a summary of development cooperation work that the respondent had experience of, was selected as the opening question. Apart from starting of the conversation, it also allowed for a display of interest and attentiveness. Another employed technique was to refer to previous interviews once a set of interviews had been carried out (Richards 1996 p. 203). This also allowed for interesting discussions with the subsequent respondent. The interview guide can be found in the appendix.

4.2.4 Interview notes

The interviews lasted for between about 30 and 70 minutes. All interviews were not recorded, partly at the request of a respondent and partly because some of the interview settings did not practically allow for audio recording. The lack thereof does not constitute a problem in the thesis since the exact wording and interaction are not central to the analysis. Attentiveness and careful note-taking are sufficient for capturing the main attitude, topic and reason given. 8 of the respondents were interviewed in person while 2 were interviewed by telephone.

4.3 Method of analysis

In order to answer the research question the interviews must be analysed systematically and the analysis must capture the interests involved in the answers. Since interests are present across the entire interview guide and since the interviews were semi-structured and the interview guide was not exactly replicated in all interviews, the need for systematic review of the collected interview data is further underlined.

In order to systematically code the material for interests, a coding method called “evaluation coding” was employed (Saldaña 2013 pp. 119-123). The method can be defined as “the application of (primarily) non-quantitative codes to qualitative data that assign judgment about the merit, worth, or significance of

programs or policy” (ibid. p. 119). Indeed, this paper is interested in precisely such judgments and the interests associated with these judgments. It should be noted that this paper is not solely or mainly interested in evaluating a policy or program, even though it is a natural component of the topic. Still, the usefulness of this method is apparent.

In essence, evaluation coding combines an eclectic set of codes that are appropriate for the study and the policy or program under evaluation (ibid. p. 120). First, comments and statements will be coded to be either positive, negative, neutral or mixed (see ibid. p. 74). These *attitudes* do not cover a fifth category, prescriptive statements. Since prescriptive statements in the interview data are frequent, partly as a result of the topic at hand and partly as a result of the interview guide, such comments will be accompanied by a code indicating prescription. Second, comments will be coded descriptively according to the *topic* they refer to, such as re-integration, development funds, a particular agency etc. These codes are not determined a priori but constructed as the analysis moves on. Third, comments are coded with regard to the particular *reason* given for the statement.

The coding procedure defined up until this point can be called “first cycle coding” which is the process by which the material is organised into individual, separate segments (ibid. p. 51). After this point the codes will be coded according to concepts at a higher level of abstraction. This can be called “second cycle coding” where “a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual and/or theoretical organization from [the] first array of First Cycle codes” is developed (ibid. p. 207). Therefore, the fourth step is to code the segments as being situated in the political, economic, cultural or societal sphere.

By applying this coding scheme (see Table 2), comments that confirms, contradicts or problematizes the arguments and the reasons for these positions should be made clear. It should then work as a suitable basis for theoretical analysis of, and discussion about, the interests involved.

Table 2 – Coding scheme

Attitude	Topic	Reason	Sphere
POS(itive)	i.e.	i.e.	POL(itical)
NEG(ative)	SIDA	“lacks	ECO(nomical)
NEU(tral)	Remittances	understanding”	CUL(tural)
MIX(ed)	Conference	“raise awareness”	SOC(ietal)
+ PRE(scriptive)		“insecure financing”	

5 Analysis

This chapter will be an integrated review of the empirical findings from the interviews and analysis thereof. Indeed, it can be stated that coding interviews in fact is analysis (Saldaña 2013 p. 8). A perfect distinction between empirical results and analysis would be somewhat artificial and needlessly complicated both in terms of substantive content as well as presentation. However, the empirical and theoretical dimension will be weighted differently in the subsequent sections. The empirics will take precedent in the first part while theory is emphasised in the second

Before proceeding to the actual analysis, a few notes on the coding procedure will be made. The interview material was coded according to the model presented in the previous chapter. The attitude, topic and reason were coded and consequently spheres were coded. The *topics* were in general formulated on a quite general level reflecting the general focus of the interviews. Discussions were for instance often about the general topic “government agencies” rather than specific agencies. Therefore, when the topic “government agencies” is mentioned in the analysis, this is a reflection of the interviews and not a part of the analytic process. All respondents recorded positive and negative *attitudes* and furthermore gave prescriptions. Mixed attitudes were not as common but this is partly a result of longer statements being coded in part as negative and in part as positive for clarity. Neutral attitudes were uncommon. Partly, this could be because of the sensitive or multifaceted character of the topics, and partly it is a reflection of the experience and expert knowledge of the respondents on the issues.

As mentioned the analysis departed from attitudes. Therefore, the codes do not cover descriptive passages. For instance, the first question in the interview guide about the respondents’ experience with cooperation between government and diaspora were not coded. Certain descriptive statements were coded as neutral statements when put forward in connection with attitudinal statements but not as a reason for the attitude. Furthermore, the codes were not used as a completely exhaustive summary of the material, and the interview notes or recordings were consulted were the analysis suggested it was relevant. For certain attitudes about certain topics several different codes were recorded if the reasons were theoretically distinct.

The amount of codes differed widely between the different interview, depending on how many reasons were given for different attitudes, how much time that focused on descriptive statements, how in-depth the reasons given were and simply based on the specific structure and length of the interview.

5.1 Analysis of the arguments

The following analysis will be divided into discussions about each of the arguments. Each section will deliberate a sphere and the accompanying argument. In general, the responses from the diaspora are discussed first, followed by the governmental respondents. Lastly, a section entitled “Other themes” consisting of themes not covered when departing from the arguments will be presented.

5.1.1 Political sphere

As mentioned previously, this is a question employing the word “could” to indicate uncertainty based on the possibility of internally contradictory implications of the diasporas function in the political sphere. Indeed, the interviews suggests there is ambiguity surrounding this question. None of the respondents claimed political influence to be an issue of contention or importance in the interviews. No statements about the topics political influence, Somali geopolitics, political parties etc. were recorded. However, several points with a political dimension were put forward, mainly among the diaspora.

While political topics such as the ones proposed above were absent, several reasons for attitudes about certain topics dealt with the geopolitics of Somalia. Mostly, the attitudes in these statements were negative. One respondent pointed out that a comprehensive approach to Somali development is missing among development agencies, and that projects tend to be aimed at Somaliland and Puntland, while South-Central Somalia is more disregarded.

“[I]t is a bit complicated because of the situation in Somalia. You have to work with different regions and get people from different regions for it to work. It becomes a bit like you either direct efforts at Somaliland or Puntland and not on the southern part because the security situation is like it is” (Respondent 1, 2014).

The respondent did not argue that the misdistribution was politically motivated, but simply that the relatively more secure climate in those regions made them more accessible. Meanwhile, another respondent argued that it was important for agencies to look beyond Mogadishu and pay attention to the regions, for instance through visits (Respondent 5, 2014). A third respondent argued that the Swedish government should not, when seeking partners among the diaspora in Sweden, base this evaluation on affiliation to different regions in Somalia because that approach creates friction and divisions within the diaspora (Respondent 2, 2014).

The statements above are not entirely conflicting, nor are they referring to the exact same phenomena. However, all statements contain negative attitudes or prescriptions about the topic “government agencies” in their approach to the regional landscape of Somalia. Furthermore, they all indicate that the geo-politics of Somalia is present in development cooperation. Meanwhile, political topics and reasons were visible absent and the overriding theme among the reasons in the

answers above is a fear of friction or misdistribution in Somalia and the diaspora, rather than the advancement of a particular agenda or the political aspirations of certain regions. In other words, the statements are defensive rather than offensive.

Meanwhile, no respondent argued that government agencies should not be involved. The prescriptive statements about government agencies did not call for less government efforts but rather different or even more activity. The respondent who claimed Swedish authorities got too involved in Somali internal affairs stated that they could do more to create a cooperative atmosphere among the diaspora and formulate suggestions (Respondent 2, 2014). One of the respondent even felt Swedish agencies was too careful in approaching diaspora organizations with suggestions about cooperation between diaspora organizations, especially regarding political issues (Respondent 1, 2014).

Among the respondents from governmental actors, no respondent named politics as a major challenge when asked to freely discuss the topic. When negative attitudes were given about the topics “diaspora partners” or “diaspora organisations”, the reasons given never referred explicitly to political aspirations or political incentives.

The respondent from Forum Syd elaborated quite extensively on the issue of politics and politically sensitive questions however. The respondent stated that Forum Syd had an experience of working with the diaspora that predated the policy-formulation of “diaspora” in Sweden. The purpose of cooperation from the beginning did not depart from the phrase “diaspora” but rather from the capacity of the actors, diasporas or not (Respondent 10, 2014). However, the current policy-wording of “diaspora” may entail difficulties;

“For agencies, when they want to involve the diaspora in some processes they will ask ‘who is the diaspora?’ [...] in a country like Somalia with different levels of conflict [...] it becomes obvious that one doesn’t feel included because who are you, who is the diaspora?” (Respondent 10, 2014)

In fact, Forum Syd themselves encountered the problem of representation among the diaspora in the formation of an advisory board. They later opted for replacing this board by another one made up of partners they had long standing relationships with (Respondent 10, 2014). However, the respondent stressed that governmental representatives should not be afraid of the political incentives of diasporas since politics is an important motivation among diasporas (Respondent 10, 2014).

The issue of representation was not raised either as a topic or as a reason by the other respondents even if many points aligned with the statement above. One respondent mentioned that the government usually preferred to work with one partner which posed a challenge when tasked with working with the diaspora (Respondent 8, 2014). The respondent did not mention representative issues however. In fact, the respondent expressed exclusively positive attitudes about the diaspora partners of whom the respondent had experience working with. The respondent stated that one particularly rewarding aspect was how practical and pragmatic the diaspora actors in question had been. The respondent moreover

stated that partners were something that evolved in this process (Respondent 8, 2014) which corresponds with the statement by Respondent 5 that long-term partners were easier to work with.

One respondent furthermore pointed out that it could be a trap to just “back the diaspora” unconditionally and thus losing goal-orientation (Respondent 9, 2014). The same respondent also stated that among the international community engagements certain actors could be described as a “traveling Tivoli” that often attend conflict- and post conflict areas, meeting and events but that mainly represent their own interests rather than those of local development actors or diaspora (Respondent 9, 2014). The respondent did not however claim that these interests are political.

Lastly, several respondents, both from the diaspora and the government held positive attitudes about development policy areas or projects that could be categorized in the political sphere. These included good governance (Respondent 9, 2014), wages for people in political functions (Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 2, 2014), gender, equality and sustainable development (Respondent 10, 2014). One governmental respondent was slightly less optimistic about getting people from the diaspora into political positions. The respondent did not reject such strategies but merely explained the challenge in funding people in political functions. Such positions are very expensive on account of the security situation on the ground in Somalia (Respondent 6, 2014). This is an economic rather than political consideration.

Consequently, contending interests about politics in development does not seem to be a comprehensive, if even manifestable, issue. The political dimension however underpins several conflicting attitudes in the cooperation. The issue of representation seems to be a sensitive issue, particularly for the diaspora. Indeed, the preference of the government to work with one partner could easily come into conflict here. However, the positive experience of the respondent who brought it up suggests it is not an insurmountable issue.

5.1.2 Economic sphere

In this sphere the predicted area of contention is ownership. When negative attitudes were expressed about the topics “Government agencies”, “Diaspora partners” or “Division of Responsibility” no reasons given indicated that the other party sought too much control or overreached in exercising control. Despite no firm divide, there were several points made pointing to some conflicting interests, even within both the diaspora and the governmental actors.

Among the diaspora, there seemed to be overall recognition that the general division of responsibility was clear and relatively well-functioning when discussing the general procedure for seeking projects (Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014). All respondents recorded positive attitudes regarding this point. However, several respondents expressed negative attitudes on topics associated with this process. Two respondents recorded a negative attitude regarding Government agencies because

of the limited inclusion of diaspora actors. Two respondents argued that while the procedure for seeking project-funding was rather unproblematic, the formulation of issue-areas wherein projects could be financed was flawed. The respondents argued that the diaspora should be included, particularly by Sida, at an earlier stage in the formulation of issue-areas. This way their input could be more reflected in the final development projects (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014). One respondent did not share this experience but stated that the attitude is not uncommon; “I usually meet a lot of other associations that think that ‘Somali-Swedes, why can’t we be involved in the process from the moment it starts?’. But, me and the women’s organisation have good cooperation” (Respondent 2, 2014).

Furthermore, several negative attitudes were expressed when the topic “Swedish aid” was brought up and notably no positive attitudes were expressed. Especially problematic was the channelling of funds through multilateral channels such as the UN and IOM. Respondents argued that these were ineffective and inappropriate to their purpose (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014), that results did not show on the ground (Respondent 2, 2014), and that they were perceived as a lack of trust in and by the diaspora and Somali society (Respondent 1, 2014).

Among the governmental actors there were some disagreements on the topics discussed and on the semantics involved. The respondent from Forum Syd stated that their relationship with the diaspora should be described as “partnership” rather than “coordination”; “We see more than the funding, rather what we ourselves can accomplish in terms of gender perspective, equality, rights and sustainable development. To achieve this I see it as a partnership” (Respondent 10, 2014). Similarly, one respondent said that it took time to convince members of the diaspora that one was interested in a genuine “partnership” (Respondent 7, 2014). Meanwhile, another respondent argued that it was important that the relationship was described as “coordination” rather than “cooperation”. The reason being that cooperation could be seen as a privileged position that could be used by diaspora actors against other diaspora actors and governmental actors (Respondent 9, 2014). Another respondent argued that more inclusion and more use of working group formats were important in the road ahead (Respondent 6, 2014). The last statement at least indicates that the division of responsibility or ownership had not become an overwhelming, or even a substantial, problem. Therefore, there was no apparent agreement on how the cooperative measures are, or should be, described.

Problems about Swedish aid were also voiced by governmental actors, although not to the same extent. Still, some negative attitudes on the topic were recorded. One respondent argued the current development funds were not accustomed to transnational work or actors and that a change in this regard is necessary (Respondent 8, 2014). Another respondent also claimed one often turn to other donors, such as USAID, to finance projects that provide conditions for re-migration, such as constructions of building. Swedish funds are too narrowly aimed at the migration-aspect of return migration and not the conditions that are necessary for this to be possible (Respondent 7, 2014). Both respondents argued that to associate “migration” with “integration” was too narrow an approach and

that a broader picture of migration was needed in governmental agencies and in general (Respondent 7, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014).

It is noticeable that the governmental and diaspora respondents in many cases referred to different aspects of Swedish aid. One type of project where directly conflicting interests was visible was internships. One governmental respondent put forward internships in Somalia, in combination with guidance or education as being beneficial models to involve the diaspora in the development of Somalia (Respondent 9, 2014). Two respondents were however highly critical of internships because of the limited if existent compensation. They argued that it was contradictory that skilled workers should return but little or no compensation was available (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014).

A commonly emphasized phrase when providing reasons for topics regarding the governmental approach to diaspora partners was “suggest(ion)” (Interview with Respondent 1, 2014, Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 7, 2014) as opposed to more forceful appeals. This phrase that was often used in prescriptive statements was put forward by several of the diaspora respondents as well as one government respondent. This approach also underlines a will to have ownership over projects, although not at the expense of the governmental agencies.

Consequently, there seem to be some validity to the argument that ownership can be a contentious issue, although not as saliently as expected. It does not seem as if any party believes the ownership of projects is problematic. The contending issue instead seems to be the perceived late inclusion of the diaspora. Some respondents felt the Swedish development work was misdirected and felt unable to change this, validating the expected lack of ownership of priorities. In this sense there seems to be scepticism of being treated as delivery agents. Meanwhile, the governmental actors were quite split regarding topics related to diaspora ownership, but most persons involved expressed no comments about overreach, or unrealistic aspirations in the diaspora.

It should also be underscored that the expected mutual interests in the sphere given the neo-liberal paradigm were confirmed to some extent. Several positive attitudes about the topic “business” were expressed. Two respondents from the diaspora and from governmental agencies stated business as being an important element of the continued development in Somalia (Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014, Respondent 6, 2014, Respondent 9, 2014). The topic was not brought up in the other interviews so no disagreements in this point were observable.

5.1.3 Cultural sphere

The issue of lacking administrative and bureaucratic functions was brought up quite frequently, mainly among the diaspora. All respondents from the diaspora touched upon topics and reasons related to administration and paperwork. One respondent said that the administration involved in projects were heavy relative to the capacity of diaspora organization; “[Diaspora associations] have had problems that the accounting is inadequate, both in terms of knowledge and in development

questions, Forum Syd and others have complained that [...] they do not receive sufficient data and information in joint projects” (Respondent 1, 2014). Two respondents admitted that the administrative demands were high but that it was manageable and neither said it had had detrimental effects in their experience (Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014) and one even put forward some positive aspect of it;

“There is always criteria one has to fulfil. In one way you’re forced because you can’t come up with just anything [...] One the other hand it is right that you need rules, criteria and indicators to do what you’re supposed to [...] It was positive with demands that we get to where we were supposed to, as we wrote in the application” (Respondent 5, 2014).

Two were critical of the administrative burden placed on diaspora organization seeking project funding because it was perceived as an unreasonable amount of administration in relation to the received support. The respondents highlighted that often project plans had to cover longer periods than financing could be secured for (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014). The respondents contrasted this procedure with other aid organizations, such as Diakonia⁸, who they experienced, got preferential funding and access (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014).

Still, it is important to emphasize that the negative attitudes were in general on the topic “Diaspora organization” or “Projects” and not “Governmental agencies”. Therefore, it was the lacking capacity of diaspora organisations, rather than the administrative demands by governmental agencies, that was negatively perceived. The statements by the last two respondents above serve as the main exception to this rule since they expressed negative attitudes towards the administrative demands.

One governmental respondent echoed the concerns above and stated that administrative knowledge and capacity were the biggest challenges for diaspora organizations, along with keeping focus on the action plan during the execution of the project (Respondent 9, 2014). No other respondent placed particular emphasis on the lacking administrative capacity of diaspora organizations. In contrast, the positive statement by one respondent that the diaspora organizations were surprisingly practical, pragmatic, competent and goal-oriented can be reiterated. The respondent also stated that very little time was spent focusing on cultural aspects or problems of communication (Respondent 8, 2014).

Still, the adaptation of governmental bureaucratic standards seems to pose a challenge in the cooperation. However, little suggests this is a mainly cultural problem. The administrative burden is simply put into contrast with the administrative capacity or the value of the administrative burden. If capacity is the main issue then the reasoning is solely economic and not about contentious interests, but rather about constraints. If the merits of administration is questioned

⁸ Swedish christian aid organisation with operations in 30 countries. Among those Somalia (www.diakonia.se)

it is mainly an economic reason but could be interpreted as cultural if there are different cultural notions of how much administration is justified. However, even when the merits of administration were questioned, the workload was contrasted to that of other organizations. Therefore, little suggests that there is a cultural contention of interest regarding the administrative or bureaucratic adaptation that is justified, at least at this stage.

A more contending issue seems to be the issue-areas covered by development. As mentioned in the previous section, negative attitudes about Swedish aid were frequent, and a perception, especially among the diaspora, that Swedish aid was sub-optimally appropriated. Some respondents went on to stress that development agencies in Sweden in general⁹ had overestimated their own competence and knowledge regarding Somalia which led to flawed decisions (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014). While not linking it to flawed competence, another respondent furthermore claimed that Swedish aid did not take into account the realities on the ground in Somalia, for instance the importance of agriculture (Respondent 2, 2014). One respondent did not comment on Swedish aid and instead emphasised that business was important to the development of Somalia. The respondent however claimed that the perception of Somalia in Sweden posed a challenge in business promotion (Respondent 5, 2014).

Therefore, it is possible that the adaptation to Swedish standards is not so much a contending issue in the cultural sphere so much in terms of administrative adaptation as it is in terms of adaptation to Swedish priorities. There seem to, quite naturally, be different understandings of Somalia, the priorities in development and the execution thereof. It is visible that the diaspora experience a contradiction between their special knowledge they possess and the effect this knowledge is allowed to have on development policy.

The issue is not overly contentious at this point however since several governmental respondents made points that align with some points made above. Indeed, positive attitudes regarding the diaspora were visible across of interview with governmental respondents. All governmental respondents stated that the diaspora had knowledge that is important to Somali development (Respondent 6, 2014, Respondent 7, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014, Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 10, 2014). One referred to the diasporas' advantage as "attitude", alluding to a form of contextual knowledge and capacity (Respondent 7, 2014). No respondent argued that the diaspora had been too included and some explicitly stated that work to continue to involve the diaspora was needed (Respondent 6, 2014, Respondent 7, 2014).

Still, the contradiction between the diasporas' knowledge and their input could indeed pose a challenge to development cooperation. This interest seems more offensive or proactive than the ones identified previously, since it involves the *promotion* of the home country according to the diasporas' cultural understanding.

⁹ Forum Syd was the only explicitly stated exception to this rule.

5.1.4 Societal sphere

The issue of unity among diaspora actors was brought up frequently but not in ways corresponding perfectly to the argument.

Several respondents among the diaspora raised concerns about the internal lack of coordination between diaspora actors. Most negative attitudes toward “diaspora organisations” or “projects” among the diaspora respondents were related to lack of coordination between different diaspora actors. The result of missing coordination is projects that are too small in size and no long-term perspective is viable. All the respondents believed that coordinated efforts, where resources could be divided between organisations as a result of joint planning, rather than competition, would be very beneficial (Respondent 1, 2014, Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014). One respondent had been involved in an attempt to gather organisations under an umbrella organisation to achieve this aim but with limited success (Respondent 1, 2014). No, respondent argued that organisational integrity or absorption of organisations into one another was a problem.

Furthermore, no respondent explicitly stated that government request for unity was contentious issue. Rather, the respondent provided statements that reflected a contrary view. One respondent stated, as mentioned previously, that the government was too lenient in asking organisations to coordinate their efforts; “The agencies are nervous to call associations and say ‘but you have all applied for the same thing [...] can’t you cooperate?’” (Respondent 1, 2014). Another respondent claimed that Forum Syd could be perceived as preferring small projects, while stressing it should not be interpreted as direct criticism (Respondent 2, 2014).

It is also important to return to the remarks about friction within the diaspora. As mentioned previously, Swedish attempts to identify partners based on regional affiliation were deemed problematic by some respondents from the diaspora. One respondent who expressed this negative attitude stated that the issue of division within the diaspora was particularly problematic against the backdrop of civil-war and conflict in Somalia and that it had created conflict within the Somali diaspora in Sweden (Respondent 2, 2014). “It is a step forward that creates conflict; I don’t understand how the government spends money” (Respondent 2, 2014). The respondents however welcomed government agencies to do more to foster a good cooperative atmosphere (Respondent 2, 2014). The creation of friction within the diaspora by the government when identifying representatives, were also stated by one respondent who labelled this “double morale” on the part of the government (Respondent 4, 2014). Consequently, many of the attitudes towards government agencies when discussing cooperative measures negative but several prescriptive statements contained proposals for more government activity.

The governmental attempts to achieve representativeness could easily be based on an attempt to achieve unity, or at least some kind of unitary body that could be designated “diaspora”. This possibility is partly supported by the statement made by Respondent 5 about the problems of identifying partners by asking “who is he diaspora?”. Therefore, despite no respondent explicitly stating

that demands of unity by the government have posed a problem, some statements indeed supports the argument that unity could be a contentious issue. Still, unity in the sense “coordination” seems wanted among the diaspora. The respondent from Forum Syd stated that the only realistic way the diaspora to be represented was if the diaspora themselves could find a form of representative function or body. The respondent however noted that the diaspora had encountered difficulties in doing so (Respondent 10, 2014). The respondent also stated that coordination was predominantly important between diaspora organisations (Respondent 10, 2014). The other respondents did not comment on the internal coordination within the diaspora although the great amount of diaspora organisations were frequently put forward (Respondent 8, 2014, Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 10, 2014). One respondent stated in a neutral statement that at a mapping effort in the beginning of the 2000s’ there were 400 associations in Sweden (Respondent 9, 2014) and a second claimed there were 800 associations today (Respondent 10, 2014). Therefore, the amount of organisations is clearly a part of the considerations among the governmental actors.

Moreover, the issue of how to handle the challenge of multiple organisations were brought up in the section about the political sphere. To reiterate, a respondent stated that it posed a challenge but no statement suggested it was not insurmountable problem. The respondent moreover had a very positive experience of the diaspora partners (Respondent 8, 2014).

While discussing the identification of diaspora partners, several respondents stated capacity to achieve development goals and goal-orientation as being important in finding diaspora partners. Some statements were prescriptive in the sense that it was argued that capacity should be the determining factor in identifying partners. Other statements displayed a positive attitude about how diaspora partners had been successfully identified in the past based on capacity.

One respondent discussed an initiative where applications were sent in for funds related to business and development. A surprising amount of applications came from the Somali diaspora. The respondent stated with a positive attitude that the applications that were granted funds covered all three regions when capacity had been the only determining factor (Respondent 9, 2014). The respondent therefore seemed to conceive representativeness only as a positive by-product to the important determining factor, capacity. The same respondent stressed goal-orientation as being central to all diaspora coordination (Respondent 9, 2014). One respondent, who said diaspora partnerships were a vital part of any work related to Somalia and the Somali context also stated capacity was the determining factor in finding partners (Respondent 7, 2014). The respondent from Forum Syd said their partnerships were just like partnerships with any other organisation. The partnerships were result-oriented regardless of properties or names of organisations; “In a simple word it is ‘partnership’ with these Somali associations that are a part of the associational activity in Sweden and in this way we see these organisations [...] that in later years have come to be called diaspora-associations” (Respondent 10, 2014). Many respondents therefore shared a belief that the identification of diaspora partners should be based on capacity which should precede other considerations. The last respondent furthermore linked their

capacity-based partnerships to Forum Syds' long experience in working with the diaspora and that beneficial partners therefore became clear after a process.

The last statement echoes the discussion about the evolving character of partnerships under the section about the political sphere. However, the evolution of partnerships could be put into contrast with the perceived lack of long-term processes and concerns about longevity that was voiced by respondents from the diaspora.

Consequently, no contention of interest as clear as the one put forward in the argument is visible in the societal sphere even though several interesting aspects were put forward. Perhaps surprisingly, concerns about the unity among the diaspora were most commonly put forward by members of the diaspora. While the large number of organisations was clearly a consideration among the governmental respondents, no statement suggests this is an unsurmountable issue. Therefore, some kind of unity seems to be an aim among the diaspora, even though coordination and cooperation and not fusion of organisations seem to be the preferred working model.

Meanwhile, there indeed seem to be contention present when governmental agencies attempt to find representativeness and seek out groups based on their regional affiliation. On the other hand, many governmental respondents shared a positive attitude that capacity should be the main determinant of diaspora partners, as opposed to their name, status or other properties. Hence, it does not seem to be so much a sphere in which there are a general contending interest but rather as one were sensitive issues and interests are common and were clashes of interest could arise easily, possibly as a by-product.

5.1.5 Other themes

Before proceeding to a theoretical discussion about the dynamics of interest, three more themes that were not covered in the discussion related to the arguments above will be highlighted. These themes were inductively constructed without prior theoretical concepts. No themes that divided the governmental agencies and the diaspora were found but some themes were common among both sides.

First, it is important to note that most respondents expressed positive attitudes towards cooperative measures between Government agencies and the diaspora in development assistance. The reasons given were mostly linked to the complementing resources of the two parties. Among the governmental respondents all respondents recorded some positive attitudes about cooperative measures (Respondent 6, 2014, Respondent 7, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014, Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 10, 2014). One respondent stated that coordination is beneficial since different actors are allowed take on different tasks for which they are well-suited (Respondent 9, 2014). One respondent stated that the diaspora could contribute with special expertise and contextual knowledge and that the partnership provides a platform for exchanging experiences and increase transparency (Respondent 10, 2014). One respondent went so far as to argue that

it was impossible to work with a different country without working with the diaspora (Respondent 7, 2014).

Similar points were made by many respondents from the diaspora. One respondent stated that cooperative measures in general, not just in development assistance, are important to trust-building both among the diaspora and between the government and the diaspora. Trust is especially important considering the civil war in Somalia (Respondent 1, 2014). Another respondent stated governmental actors and diaspora actors brought complementary resources and that governmental financing makes more projects possible (Respondent 2, 2014). Another respondent furthermore stated that aside from financing, the cooperative measures were important since it allowed for consultations and different perspectives which is rewarding (Respondent 5, 2014).

Second, another theme that came up during discussions was the importance of acknowledging gender and women empowerment in the development of Somalia. Several governmental respondents recorded positive attitudes about the inclusion of gender in the continued development (Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 10, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014). One respondent argued that female entrepreneurs are particularly important for the economy of Somali households and economy and should therefore be visible in development efforts (Respondent 9, 2014). Diaspora respondents also asserted the importance of gender (Respondent 1, 2014, Respondent 2, 2014). One of the respondents argued that this was particularly important since the upcoming national elections in 2016 is the first time Somali women will have an opportunity to vote (Respondent 2, 2014).

Third, another theme was the constraining capacity in Somalia which was mostly put forward by the governmental respondents. The governmental respondents often referred to capacity in Somalia as a condition for diaspora engagement in development. One respondent stated that an important aspect to observe was how the local agencies in Somalia can make use of economic or other resources that the diaspora contribute with (Respondent 10, 2014). Another respondent said the capacity of local agencies must strengthen in order to receive the diaspora in ways that benefit Somali development (Respondent 9, 2014). One respondent also stated that the kinds of initiatives that are possible in the future are dependent on the development in Somalia (Respondent 6, 2014). What is important to note about this theme is the remainder that the situation in the developing country conditions the type of development assistance and therefore the form of cooperation that is possible with the diaspora.

5.2 Theoretical implications

In the preceding analysis several contentious issues are visible in a variety of spheres. Second, the interests and issues often overlap and affect issues in other spheres. In this section the findings above will be theoretically discussed and analysed with the aim of ending with a more parsimonious theoretical understanding of the dynamics of interest in development cooperation. First, the

face validity of the arguments will be reviewed and the implication on theory of these findings will be discussed briefly. Second, the apparent common interests will be briefly summarised. Third, the contentious issues and the interests involved will be theoretically discussed at more length since the dynamics of interests are more complex in cases of disagreements than cases of agreements. Fourth, the interplay between the spheres will be briefly elaborated. Finally, a summary of theoretical concepts that are central to understanding the dynamics of interest in development cooperation between donor governments and post-conflict diasporas will be presented.

Considering the arguments, the findings from the previous section can be summarised. Two of the arguments can be said to be partly supported, namely those in the economic sphere and in the cultural sphere. They were partly supported since the main concept of ownership in the economic sphere and adaptation in the cultural sphere were found to be relevant. Therefore, while the arguments were imperfect in predicting the implication of these issues, the theoretically underpinnings of these arguments were supported.

Furthermore, two of the arguments did not gain support, namely the remaining two in the political and societal sphere. In the political sphere, no basis for the assumption that diasporas would seek political influence were found. However, it is important to note that there was several defensive remarks about politics. The importance of addressing all regions in Somalia was often put forward. Therefore, while there seems to be little support that the diaspora would advance the interest of a particular geopolitical region and seek an advantage, there were clearly opposition to being disadvantaged. Therefore, the argument is not refuted either.

The fourth argument did not gain support as unity, at least in the form of increased coordination within the diaspora, was apparently a more acute interest among the diaspora than among governmental representatives which is contrary to the argument. This is not to suggest that governmental agencies are disinterested in unitary diaspora actors, the opposite point gained support. Neither is it argued that the lack of unitary diaspora actors will not pose a problem. It is solely ascertained that there was no contending interest of the character proposed in the argument.

Before continuing it is worth noting that the arguments as an analytical tool gained some validity from the fact that the arguments displaying certain expectations (in the certain use of “will”) gained more support than those which demonstrated ambivalence (in the uncertain use of “could”).

Considering the common interests, it is important to note that despite the complex and contentious issues involved, and despite the fact that the interview guide were constructed in order to uncover precisely contentious issues, there were several commonalities in attitudes and perspectives that were put forward. There was a consensus that cooperative measures indeed were beneficial since the governmental agencies and the diaspora had complementary resources. Furthermore, the governmental respondents stressed that the diaspora had knowledge and skills that would benefit Somali development and the development assistance to Somalia. Furthermore, interest in working with different areas was raised by several respondents from both the government and the diaspora. The

main issue areas were business and gender, both of which were frequently mentioned. Finally, there seemed indeed to be mutual interest in continued inclusion even if the envisioned direction of this inclusion were not necessarily shared.

It can be noted that the common interests are mainly visible in the economic sphere. Complementary resources or comparative advantages are mainly an economic consideration. The importance placed on business furthermore highlights the mutual interests in this sphere. The themes continued inclusion and knowledge and expertise in the diaspora could partly be considered economic but also partly cultural since inclusion is connected to organisational culture and knowledge is connected to cultural skills and experience. The issue of gender is furthermore related to all spheres. Taken together, it is observable that many common interests are situated in the economic sphere.

5.2.1 Considering the contentious issues

There are two noticeable overlaps between the different spheres in the first part of this chapter. First, the problematic issues of representation, dealing with friction and the problem of identifying the “diaspora”, were brought up both in the political and the societal sphere. Second, there were several contentious issues that were found both in the economic and cultural sphere, namely issues of inclusion and priorities. In the cultural sphere these issues were furthermore linked to the issue of knowledge or expertise. The consequent analysis will be structured according to these two themes or clusters of themes.

First, there are the themes of *representativeness* and *distribution* that was present particularly among the diaspora in both the political and societal sphere. The emphasis placed by the diaspora on having a comprehensive approach to Somalia that does not disservice certain regions accentuates an interest in the development of all regions in Somalia. As mentioned previously, the interest did not seem to be to acquire advantage for certain regions but rather to avoid disadvantage for certain or all regions. Meanwhile, some respondents argued that the government should not create friction within the diaspora by identifying partners that represent regions since this approach exacerbated division within the diaspora. Collectively, the interest is therefore to have development initiatives that are (1) distributed across all regions and (2) not based on regional representation, at least not in the sense government-identified representatives. This is naturally a difficult balancing act. The first point is related to the interest in the political sphere to avoid disadvantages of geopolitical regions. This interest is theoretically linked to the aim of the diaspora to maintain their relations with the homeland while to some degree integrating in the receiving state. The second point is related to the interest in the societal sphere to avoid friction within the diaspora and the Somali community. This is theoretically linked with the aim to foster a common identity and close relationships within the diaspora.

Furthermore, the two-folded criteria should not be seen as a trade-of, since inattention to one of the interests while satisfying the other should impact the

satisfied interest negatively. If comprehensive distribution is pursued by identifying representatives then the political interest of avoiding disadvantaged regions is satisfied at the expense of the societal interest of avoiding division. However, increased division should increase the perceived need to advocate the needs of particular regions since the regions form the representative basis for development initiatives, thus exacerbating the fear of misdistribution across all regions.

None of the governmental respondents indicated an interest contrary to either of the statements above. However, one respondent said that the government usually preferred one partner but other methods were demanded when cooperating with the diaspora, indicating that a single representative diaspora actor would have some attraction. Furthermore, one respondent stated that government agencies can start by asking the a problematic question, namely “who is the diaspora?”. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the government could be interested in constructing a partner of some kind that represents the diaspora. As mentioned previously (3.2.4) governments to some degree do construct unitary diasporas in policy documents. However, government led forms of representation will lead to a contention of interest because of the interest among the diaspora of avoiding division and particularly externally enforced division.

Therefore, there could indeed be a common interest of increased unity or forms of representation in the diaspora since the diaspora also found the lacking coordination within the diaspora to be problematic. The representative forms cannot however be externally imposed but should be internally constructed. But as both governmental and diaspora respondents argued it has been difficult for the Somali diaspora to find forms of representation themselves this option seem unpractical.

Meanwhile, many governmental respondents shared an interest in working with partners based solely on capacity and goal-orientation. This approach seem unproblematic in terms of interest as long as comprehensive distribution is achieved without the identification of representative actors. If a model is found where distribution across all regions is achieved by identifying partners only based on capacity then no contentious interests should be present in the identification of partners. It allows for the diaspora both to maintain relations with the homeland and avoiding external intervention in the common identity and unity of the diaspora.

However, as was posited during the interviews, cooperation based on capacity and goal-orientation is in itself dependent on experience and evaluation. Therefore, it could be expected that long-term processes and continued work with inclusion, aside from being a common interest in itself, would help to satisfy other common interests, in increasing the potential for capacity based cooperation with comprehensive distribution.

Second, there are the themes of *inclusion*, *priorities* and *expertise* which will be discussed continuously. The first theme, priorities of Swedish development assistance were the topic for much concern among the diaspora. This partly related to the general priorities as well as to the priorities in diaspora engagement initiatives, such as the scepticism towards current internship programs. The

interests here are partly located in the economic sphere in the emphasis on efficient resource distribution¹⁰ as well as in the cultural sphere in the resistance of the diaspora to adopting Swedish development priorities.

A contention of interests could therefore present itself because of divergent interest in different areas of development. First, there are areas where there is some visible common interest, such as gender and business-promotion. Second, there are areas where there is visible interest or disinterest among either government or diaspora and no visible interest or disinterest among the other part, such as increased funds to agriculture¹¹ and resistance to the extensive reliance on multilateral channels, both of which were points raised by the diaspora. Third, there are areas where there are contending interests, such as the use of internships where a governmental respondent was positive but some diaspora respondents were critical of the lacking compensation.

However, the priorities themselves were not the only contentious issue, but also the procedure by which they came into effect. Here, concerns about the second theme of inclusion of the diaspora were raised by respondents from the diaspora. Several respondents argued that the diaspora should be included earlier in the process. Such earlier inclusion would allow the diaspora to not just formulate the project, but also to formulate the criteria by which projects would be judged. It was also argued that consultation was not sufficient but practical results were needed. Several governmental respondents shared the view that continued inclusion of the diaspora was desired. The difference is therefore not so much the interest in inclusion, which is a common denominator, but rather *how* to include the diaspora. There is a likely discrepancy in perspective between government and diaspora regarding this question. For instance, even though no governmental respondent argued regarding the topic of multilateral channels, it is unlikely that the government would include the diaspora in its allocation of multilateral aid, at least to an extent that would be satisfactory to the diaspora.

The last point highlights the third theme, namely that of knowledge, expertise and the perceived lack thereof. Respondents from the diaspora were unimpressed by the knowledge of Somalia in the government. Several remarks furthermore stressed that knowledge of the context in Somalia is important and missing. Indeed, respondents argued that the lack of knowledge in the government led to wrong priorities and accentuated the need for increase inclusion of the diaspora. Still, the benefits on drawing on the knowledge of the diaspora was indeed voiced by the governmental respondents and sometimes connected to the need for continued inclusion. However, there is likely to persist a perceived contradiction among the diaspora between the knowledge they possess and the limits of their influence.

¹⁰ Distribution across different sectors, policy areas, different actors etc. as opposed to regional distribution which was discussed regarding the political sphere.

¹¹ Agriculture was also brought up by one of the governmental respondents but as a business sector that could be of interest to Swedish companies (Respondent 9, 2014) rather than a prioritised area in aid allocation.

Consequently there are many overlaps between the cultural and economic sphere. As mentioned the contenting interests regarding priorities are both situated in the economic and cultural sphere. The contending interests regarding inclusion are also situated in the economic sphere, since more inclusion would also allow for increased resource access, and in the cultural sphere, since it related to the issue of adaptation to priorities that depart from a different cultural understanding. The issue of cultural understanding is furthermore closely related to the interests regarding knowledge which are mainly situated in the cultural sphere in the emphasis on contextual knowledge and expertise. Finding common interest regarding different priorities would not be sufficient to completely align the interests since there is a cultural and economic interest among the diaspora in further inclusion and increased exertion of the diasporas' special knowledge.

Before proceeding, a remark about the interplay between the spheres is needed. The division that emerged in this section into interplay between, on the one hand, the political and societal sphere, and on the other, the economic and cultural sphere, is not definite. One interaction in particular is important to note and that is the interplay between the societal and economic sphere. In the societal sphere a common theme was the lack of coordination within the diaspora which led to small projects. Indeed, a more collective effort would increase the ability of the diaspora to secure more resources and lessen the completion for smaller project funds thus furthering the interest in the economic sphere. The interests in these spheres are therefore mutually reinforcing to some extent. However, it is unclear whether increased availability of funds would strengthen or lessen this reinforcement, since increased availability of funds for a single organisation or association could decrease the perceived need for coordination.

5.2.2 Central concepts

Lastly, concepts that emerged as being central to understanding the dynamics of interest will be presented. These will be formulated in general theoretic terms and will depart from the discussion in the previous section.

First, mainly departing from the political sphere, there will likely be an interest in *distribution* among the diaspora and whether or not it is *comprehensive*. Distribution in this sense entails distribution across different regions or other political cleavages in the homeland. Furthermore, the concept should be understood against the, potentially conflicting relationship, between the simultaneous need for political activism on behalf of the homeland and the need for a degree of integration in the receiving state. While diasporas may be inclined to advocate an advantageous position for a political unit in the homeland, this may prove difficult in the receiving state. Therefore, a more defensive approach of opposition to a disadvantageous position becomes the main interest. For the same reason, comprehensive, rather than universal distribution will be advocated, since some political units in post-conflict or conflict societies are likely to be off-limits, such as groups with noticeable involvement in violent conflict. In cases of more

powerful diasporas with more radical motives, it is possible that favourable distribution for certain political units could be advocated.

Second, mainly situated in the societal sphere, the *construction of the "diaspora"* will be important, and in particular, whether the diaspora is *internally or externally* constructed or defined. Attempts by external actors, such as government agencies, to find representation or to externally construct the "diaspora" using other parameters will be contentious since it infringes on the common and special identity of the diaspora and their decision to maintain and define it. Therefore, internal construction of and by the diaspora will likely have more potential in fostering common ground. Consequently, lacking a internally constructed unitary "diaspora", identification of partners need to be based on criteria that are non-interventionist in diaspora identity, such as capacity.

Third, *complementary resources* are naturally important since it indeed proved to be one of the essentials in cooperation. When there is a conception that the different actors have different knowledge, skills and resources that can complement one another, continued cooperation can be seen as beneficial despite challenges. Therefore, the conception of the other actor as a resource is fundamental to the understanding of the dynamics of interests. What resources are seen as complementary will furthermore determine what projects that will be of common interest. This aspect is mainly located in the economic sphere.

Fourth, also mainly departing from the economic sphere, is the concept *inclusion in process and outcome*, which entails both inclusion of the diaspora in the sense of ownership of the outcome or final project plan and execution, and inclusion in the process of determining the allocation of resources to different project-areas. The inclusion in the process of determining does not necessarily include actual decisions but rather the possibility to provide input in the process that is then visible in substance. To what degree there can be mutual satisfaction among government agencies and the diaspora regarding the degree of inclusion is difficult to appreciate, even in an in-depth case study such as this paper. The important point is that interests must be understood not just in relation to either preparatory consultation or final projects but rather in relation to both and the link between two. Inclusion is central for the diaspora to act as a link between the homeland and the receiving state.

Finally, departing mainly from the cultural sphere, the *narrative about the home country* is important since different narratives are likely to be found between government agencies and the diaspora. The different narratives also establish the degree to which the diaspora must adapt to different priorities. The diaspora will likely have a different understanding of Somalia, to a large degree dependent on contextual cultural understandings. Therefore, diasporas can experience the knowledge of governmental agencies to be limited since they do not share the contextual and cultural awareness of diasporas. Furthermore, the divergence in narrative is likely to affect the perceived need for inclusion thus affecting the previous point. It would however also make such inclusion more difficult. It is highly unlikely that a divergence in narrative between governments and diasporas will not always be present. Therefore, the main questions should be

how and to what degree they diverge. The narratives will also to a large extent determine what areas that are of common interest.

These five concepts constitute and influence the dynamics of interest present in development cooperation. Contentious and common interests are likely to be traceable to divergent perspectives regarding one or more of these concepts among the diaspora and government actors. All concepts may not, or are even likely to be salient at all levels in all development cooperation. Still, all concepts have the capability to frame the dynamics of interest.

6 Conclusion

To return to the research question in this thesis, how can the dynamics of interests in development cooperation among Swedish governmental agencies and the Somali diaspora in Sweden be understood?

To reiterate, it has been argued here that the dynamics of interest cannot solely be understood as a singular matter of misconceived politics, organisational resistance to adaptation or as an unstable and unpredictable product of homeland conflict. Rather, it has been posited that the dynamics of interest have to be understood in relation to the complex set of interests of the diaspora, which are active in the political, economic, cultural and societal sphere. These interests are in essence not reducible to interests in the home country but are a product of the diasporas' dual relationship with the home and host country. The attempt to be "at home abroad" then frames the interest in development cooperation through ambiguity and the special identity that emerge from this situation.

In the Swedish development cooperation, several common as well as contentious interests is present. The common interests revolved around the general theme of complementary resources and different issue areas, such as the importance of gender and business in development. Therefore, the common interests are mostly situated in the economic sphere. The contentious interests were mostly expressed among the diaspora and were situated across all four spheres. In the political and societal sphere there is an interest in both distribution across all regions in Somalia and an interest in avoiding representation based on regional affiliation, as long as representation is externally imposed. Moreover, in the economic and cultural sphere there was a perception that the diaspora should be more properly included. Thereby, their knowledge would not be unappropriated and the Swedish development priorities would not be flawed as was both perceived to be the case now. All of the aforementioned interests are influenced by the need of, and motivation for, a common, self-defined identity that maintains relationships with both home and host country and acts as a link between the two.

Still, despite the contentious interest there seems to be some commonalities as well. For instance, many governmental respondents preferred to work with partners based on capacity. Identifying partners based on capacity could indeed alleviate the contention regarding the issue of representation based on regional affiliation. However, this might influence the interest in comprehensive distribution negatively. Regarding other factors, such as dissatisfaction about the degree of inclusion among the diaspora, a common satisfaction might be unattainable.

The dynamics of interests can be conceptualised in five concepts that constitute and influence the diasporas interests and the relationship with the government agencies (see table below).

Table 3 – Conceptual framework for understanding dynamics of interest

1. *Distribution (Degree of comprehensiveness)*: Diasporas are likely to display interest in comprehensive distribution in the homeland since the main interest is to avoid disadvantage for the political unit with which they identify.
2. *Construction of the diaspora (internal or external)*: The diaspora are interested in constructing the “diaspora” themselves, that is internally and are likely to oppose any external attempts at constructing a diaspora.
3. *Complementary resources*: The degree to which the government and the diaspora perceive there to be complementary resources will affect the overall interest, in particular of the government, for development cooperation.
4. *Inclusion in process and outcome*: The diaspora will have an interest to both be involved in the process by which priorities are set and the execution of these priorities through projects and programmes. The inclusion is aimed at securing ownership and inclusion in both process and outcome is perceived as necessary.
5. *Narrative about the home country*: The degree to which the diaspora and the governmental agencies differ the in their narrative about the sending state, which they inherently will, will both affect to amount of areas in which there are common interests as well as the perceived need for inclusion.

The conceptual framework above should yield important insights and provide the basis for rewarding analysis on development cooperation. A more in-depth understanding of the dynamics of interest in development cooperation, and the potential problems and complexities that can arise from them, should be beneficial both in academia and in the policy realm. Indeed, for the governments’ ambition to engage the diaspora residing in Sweden, and for the diasporas’ interest in affecting the development in the homeland, it is important to understand their interaction in the continued work with development at home.

6.1 Further research

In order to suggest further research, it is helpful to return to the limitations identified in the introduction. It should be stated that the conceptual framework were developed as a middle-range theory for engagement of conflict-generated diasporas. Therefore, it can be applicable whenever an understanding of the dynamics of interests in development cooperation with conflict-generated diasporas is wanted. Specifically, it could be interesting and beneficial to

incorporate the framework in a causal study on, for example, how the cooperation is affected by different interests. Second, the conceptual framework could be tested or developed in relation to other actors, such as international and transnational actors and, perhaps even more importantly, the home country.

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Interviews

- Interview with Respondent 1, 2 April 2014
 Interview with Respondent 2, 7 April 2014
 Interview with Respondent 3, 2 April 2014
 Interview with Respondent 4, 2 April 2014
 Interview with Respondent 5, 10 April 2014 [Telephone]

Interview with Respondent 6, 3 April 2014
Interview with Respondent 7, 4 April 2014
Interview with Respondent 8, 4 April 2014 [Telephone]
Interview with Respondent 9, 2 April 2014
Interview with Respondent 10, 3 April 2014

8 Appendix

8.1 Interview guide

Interview guide (translated from Swedish to English)

1. As we are about to talk about cooperation/coordination between the Somali diaspora in Sweden and Swedish governmental agencies, I am initially wondering if you briefly could describe what such collaborations you have experience of?
 - How did you get involved in that collaboration?
 - [*If not mentioned during the briefing*], Have any project or work been related to aid or other efforts directed at Somalia?
2. During your time at the agency/organisation/in the diaspora network..., what have emerged as the biggest advantages with this form of cooperation?
 - Do the diaspora and the agencies have different ways of working, competences and resources that complements each other?
 - Can one expect uneven benefits in cooperation within different areas? Such as economic issues, cultural issues, political issues, social issues?
3. [*Transition based on previous answer*] Are there also problems or hindrances that can emerge in this type of collaboration?
 - [*If not mentioned at this point*], Are there any problems regarding the division of responsibility between agencies and the diaspora in these collaborations? (*clarification if needed*: That is, how decisions are made or who hands out the tasks)
4. [*Transition based on previous discussion*], What (do you believe) is important to consider when agencies evaluates one or more persons or organisations from the diaspora as partners in the (development)work?
5. If we (finally) should look ahead, what could change in order for collaborations between the diaspora and agencies to work (even) better in the future?

Intervjuguide (original in Swedish)

1. Då vi ska prata om samarbete/samverkan mellan den somaliska diasporan i Sverige och svenska myndigheter undrar jag först om du kort kan berätta vilka sådana samarbeten du har erfarenhet av?
 - Hur blev du involverad i det samarbetet?
 - [*Om inte omnämnt under genomgången*], Har något projekt eller arbete varit kopplat till bistånd eller andra insatser riktade till Somalia?
2. Under din tid på myndigheten/med organisation/i diasporanätverket..., vad har framgått/framgick som de största fördelarna med den här typen av samarbeten?
 - Har diasporan och myndigheterna olika arbetssätt, kompetenser och resurser som kan komplettera varandra?
 - Kan man förvänta sig olika fördelaktiga samarbeten inom olika områden?, så som ekonomiska frågor, kulturella frågor, politiska frågor, sociala frågor
3. [*Brygga baserat på föregående svar*] Finns det även problem eller hinder som kan träda fram vid denna typ av samarbete?
 - [*Om inte omnämnt vid detta skede*], Finns det några problem med ansvarsfördelningen mellan myndigheten och diasporan i dessa samarbeten? (*förtydligande vid behov: Alltså hur man fattar beslut eller vem som delat ut arbetsuppgifter*)
4. [*Brygga baserat på tidigare diskussion*], Vad (tycker du) är viktigt att tänka på då myndigheter och organisationer utvärderar en eller några person(er) eller organisation(er) från diasporan som partner i (utvecklings)arbetet?
5. Om vi (slutligen) ska blicka framåt, vad skulle kunna förändras för att samarbeten mellan diasporan och myndigheter ska kunna fungera (ännu) bättre i framtiden?

8.2 Respondents

- Respondent 1: Chair of a religious association and former chair of the biggest Somali national association in Sweden with experience of cooperation with agencies on both local issues and development directed at Somalia.
- Respondent 2: Individual from the Somali diaspora currently working with a civil society women's organisation with experience of development projects in Somalia financed by Swedish development funds.
- Respondent 3: Individual from the Somali diaspora engaged in the national Somaliland association and in a clan-transcendent civil society organisation with experience of development cooperation with government agencies.
- Respondent 4: Individual from the Somali diaspora engaged in the national Somali women's organisation with experience of development cooperation with government agencies.
- Respondent 5: Individual from the Somali diaspora running a company with the ambition of contributing to development with experience of cooperation with government agencies from organising a conference linking business to development in Somalia.
- Respondent 6: Civil servant at the Utrikesdepartementet (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) with experience of working group cooperation with the Somali diaspora.
- Respondent 7: Civil servant at Stockholm stad (Stockholm municipality) with experience of working with the diaspora on the issue of re-migration.
- Respondent 8: Civil servant at Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden) with working experience from the secretariat for the Swedish Chairmanship of the Global Forum for Migration and Development.
- Respondent 9: Former civil servant at Migrationsverket (The migration board, Swedish migration agency) with considerable experience of diaspora engagement in homeland development in Somalia.
- Respondent 10: Desk officer at Forum Syd, a Swedish development organisation with long experience of partnerships with the Somali diaspora.