The European Union's Attitude Towards Hezbollah:

EU's Changed Attitude Toward Hezbollah Over Time

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Abstract

The European Union is expected to respond to world events every day and terrorist acts are predominate and often conducted by terrorist organizations or non-state actors. One of the most delicate cases is the Lebanese Hezbollah frequently resorting to violence and has over the last 20 years grown evermore important in the Middle East and Lebanon, thereby increasingly elevating the need for the EU to respond. The thesis investigates whether the EU is reactive to occurring events by analysing whether the EU's attitude has changed over time and secondly, why the EU's attitude has changed under the theoretical assumptions of Social Constructivism and Neorealism. This study analyses the discursive constructions of EU's attitude towards Hezbollah and to understand why this change in attitude has occurred, I analyse three highly relevant explanations: Hezbollah's activities, the influence of France and the influence of the US. The study concludes that the EU's attitude has in fact changed over the years resulting in an explicit mentioning of Hezbollah combined with a more forceful and cautious attitude, and although France, more than the US, seemingly has influenced this change to an extent, it's clearly evident that Hezbollah's activities undoubtedly has affected the EU's changed attitude.

Key words: European Union, Hezbollah, attitudes, neorealism, social constructivism
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1 Introduction

The European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) has become increasingly aware of the need for giving a response to world events faced with each day and terrorist acts are a predominate one. Terrorist acts are more often than not executed by terrorist organisations or non-state actors, many of which are increasingly taking place closer to home, on European soil, such as the Burgas Bus bomb in July 2012[1], elevating the need for analysing EU's attitude towards non-state actors. Indications suggest that there has been a change in EU's attitude toward moderate[2] Islamist non-state actors (Kausch 2009: 129) and an interesting case to investigate is Lebanese Hezbollah. This change can be seen in EU statements from 1983 to the stronger use of language in later statements from 2012: "The Ten appeal for an immediate ceasefire leading to the cessation of violence and pressure in Lebanon and to national reconciliation. They call upon all parties to" (Appendix: Statement 1) and "The EU strongly condemns the bomb attack…which killed Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan […] this act of violence as well as other assassination attempts, must be fully investigated and the perpetrators must be brought to justice swiftly" (Appendix: Statement 30). Investigating the change in EU's attitude towards Hezbollah over time will indicate whether the EU is reactive to the occurring events or whether France and the United States' influence has changed the EU's attitude with regards to a particular event they are addressing concerning Hezbollah, which would thus indicate the EU being passive and not reactive and changing its attitude towards Hezbollah based on these state's influence.

One of the most intricate, debated and delicate cases is the Lebanese Hezbollah[3] that, like Hamas[4], still continue to employ violence and thereof fails to completely

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[1]"Hezbollah linked to Burgas bus bombing in Bulgaria" http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21342192 (BBC 2013b),
See also "Cyprus court jails Hezbollah man for plotting to attack Israelis" by Michele Kambas
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-cyprus-hezbollah-idUSBRE92R0KN20130328
(Reuters.com 2013)

[2] In this study, the term moderate will be employed according to Kristina Kausch's definition that signify Islamists as "…those parties or movements among the Islamist spectrum that have eschewed or formally renounced violence in the domestic context and aim at achieving their goals within the margins of the political process." (Kausch 2009: 129).

[3] There are several transliterated versions of Hezbollah (Party of Allah or Party of employed God), including Hizbullah, Hizballah, Hizb'ullah and Hizb'allah, however, in this study, for purposes of consistency and simplicity, the term Hezbollah will be utilized.

[4] Hamas is a known Palestinian militant Islamic group controlling the Gaza strip and is officially dedicated, as stipulated in the group's manifesto, to the obliteration of Israel and establishing a Palestinian State. Israel, the EU, Canada, the US and Japan has listed Hamas as a terrorist organisation due to its continuous use of violence. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522 (BBC.com. 2012)

be labelled as 'moderates'. However, EU's attitude toward Islamist non-state actors need to take into consideration the importance Hezbollah, like Hamas, has within the contextual spectrum in the Middle Eastern region (Ibid 134). Hezbollah has over the last 20 years seemingly gained greater popular support both from within Lebanon and other Shi'ite societies notably in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Haddad 2006; Norton 2007: 12-13).

Furthermore, Hezbollah is a unique case as it is considered to be the A-team of terrorism (Levitt 2005) and has reportedly an increasingly active and global reach beyond the Lebanese borders; in Europe, South American, Africa, Southeast Asia and Middle East (Levitt 2013: XV), which has made it that much more important to address for the EU. What make it even more unique and distinct from Hamas is its relation with its patron Iran and being a dedicated Bashar al-Assad ally, and its different conceptualizations; a terror group, social movement, political party, and as Augustus R. Norton (2007) points out, "Hezbollah is not easily understood either by simplistic stereotypes that typically inform depictions of the organization in the newspapers and on the airwaves of the Western world nor by black and white worldviews." (Ibid:8).

There has evidently been a change in EU's attitude towards Hezbollah over the years in which Hezbollah is more explicitly and forcefully referred to, however, implicit reference occurs in official EU statements and declarations with the occasional cautious tone. Despite Hezbollah not renouncing from violent tactics the EU seem to have developed a cautious tone, however, over the years, their active involvement seem to have reached new public heights indicating a change in EU attitude. Although it seems more forceful in recent years, the cautious tone that characterizes their official statements is indicated by the partial designation. Occurring in 2013, as opposed to listing the entire Hezbollah organisation as a terrorist organisation, seem to further confirm the cautious but increasingly forceful change in EU attitude towards Hezbollah. Furthermore, the Neorealist theory argue that there is increasingly a multipolar international system of both states and non-state actors that become more intricate with actors of more equal distribution of capabilities and power resulting in a threatening "us vs. them" attitude (Elman 2008: 19; Dunne & Schmidt 2014: 1014; Waltz 1990: 36), and the Social Constructivists stipulates that these power and capabilities within a multipolar world system are ascribed meaning by the actors' ideas, identity and interests (Wendt 1999). Hence, the explanations I will use are derived from these theoretical assumptions and are Hezbollah's own terrorist activities, the influence of France with its strategic interests in Lebanon, and the influence exerted by US.

The EU, formerly known as the European Community (EC), have long had a special connection to the Middle east within which Hezbollah is primarily active:

> "The Member States of the European Community have particularly important political, historical, geographical, economic, religious,

cultural and human links with the countries and peoples of the Middle East. They cannot therefore adopt a passive attention towards a region, which is so close to them nor remain indifferent to the grave problems besetting it. The repercussions of these problems affect the Twelve in many ways. At the present time, tension and conflict in the near and Middle East are continuing and worsening" (Bull. EC 2-1987, point 2.4.3)

The EU is not passive towards Hezbollah because it is expected of the EU to react or give a statement on world events constantly occurring, but they have seemingly only used implicit reference to Hezbollah, however, the EU seem to have adopted a more stern and forceful attitude over the years especially signified by the more strong use of words and explicit reference to Hezbollah, thus indicating that a change has occurred over time in their discursive constructions of Hezbollah. In this paper I argue that the EU has adopted a more forceful but still cautious, at times, attitude towards Hezbollah over time. Furthermore, I argue that it is mostly due to Hezbollah's own increased activities that the EU's attitude has changed thus resulting in the EU being rather reactive than proactive.

Therefore, in this study I will employ the method of discourse analysis to analyse how the EU statements, made with implicit or explicit reference to Hezbollah, has changed over time looking at semantics; meaning attributed to a word or sentence, pragmatics; the context within which meaning was attributed to the word or sentence and stylistics; the selection of words employed by the author complimented by the use of positive and/or negative expressions (Fairclough 2001:5; Chilton 2004:48; Dijk 1983:24; Dijk 2008:80). In answering why a change in EU's discursive constructions has occurred relevant and plausible explanations will be analysed in the second part of the analysis and they are: Hezbollah's violent activities, the influence of Lebanon's closest European friend and colonial ties; France (Aljazeera.com 2012) and the US's influential position in international relations that cannot be disregarded as derived from the theoretical frameworks. Additionally, I am well aware that there may be many other plausible explanations, however, in answering my research question: Has the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah changed over time and why, the explanations chosen above will offer relevant insight and analytical discussion and understanding into this change of attitude.

1.1 Statement of Purpose and Research Question

For years and years, the EU has traditionally always voiced their opinion when events in the world transpire and more actively so in later years. Being what the EU is today: an advocator of fundamental norms such as human rights,

democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression and more, the EU is expected to constantly express opinion on world matters faced with each day. Hezbollah's complex structure, difficult conceptualizations and increasing significance in world matters all add to the increasing expectation of EU's need to react to and speak with one voice; the EU's ability to agree on joint declarations and/or statements the heads of governments of all EU member states stand behind. The EU has opined on many issues over the years and amongst many are "the EU partially freezing aid to Rwanda due to the possible financial support by the state of rebel activities" (Smith 2012), "ex-aide to Milosevic takes power in Serbia, unnerving EU" (Robinson & Vasovic 2012), "EU approves tighter sanctions on North Korea" (Reuters 2013) and "EU to give Haiti $25.1M in humanitarian aid" (Eubusiness 2013).

It is fairly known, that the EU is traditionally not inclined to engage, in any way, with non-state actors who condone the use of and employ violence and therefore the EU distance and renounce from any type of dialogue (Kausch 2009: 129), however, some non-state actors have changed and use politics and democratic procedural means to increase popularity and transform it into "electoral success" and acquire power (Ibid 130). Consequently, they are depicted as actors with the ability to reform, which more importantly could lead to democratic reforms, an enduringly stable and peaceful community with an aptitude to similar EU democratic aspirations (Ibid). Hezbollah is an excellent case in point as they have used politics to involve themselves and induce a somewhat stable community in their own way, however, the EU's attitude seemingly has changed into a more forceful and explicit one whilst adopting cautiousness at times. This leads to the question why a change in the EU's discursive constructions; their attitude, towards Hezbollah has occurred over time. I am well aware that there may be several influential explanations within international relations, however, in this paper, the explanations I cannot exclude and find most important and relevant are the activities of Hezbollah, influence possibly exerted by the one EU member state with closest colonial ties to Lebanon where Hezbollah is predominantly active; France, and the dominant pressure exerted by the US cannot be disregarded with regards to whether EU's attitude toward Hezbollah has changed over time which thereby leads one to naturally discuss why.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the EU is reactive to world events by answering the following research questions: Has the EU's attitudes towards Hezbollah changed over time and why?

1.2 Previous Research

There has been some academic papers conducted on EU's approach to political Islamist groups, as opposed to my particular angle of this study; EU's attitudes, such as Timo Behr's *'Dealing with Political Islam: Foreign Policy-Making between the Union and the Member States'* presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics in June 2010. Behr (2010) addresses the EU's foreign policies with political Islamist parties or organizations and the shift in engagement with various Islamist groups that include Turkey's AKP (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), Morocco's PJD (Justice and Development Party), Hamas and Hezbollah.

Furthermore, Kristina Kausch (2009) touches on similar basis in her chapter on *'Europe's Engagement with Moderate Islamists'* and argues there has been an identifiable shift in EU attitudes towards moderate Islamist actors. Furthermore, Kausch suggests EU's new attitude, as opposed to the hushed European engagement with Islamist organizations, is an attempt to curb re-radicalization and the reformed view of moderate Islamists as rational actors seeking power through democratic vices is something the EU should take advantage of. Asseburg (2009) in his *'Conclusions: Dynamics in Political Islam and Challenges for European Policies'* touches slightly on the challenges the EU is facing in todays' political Islam and discusses somewhat EU's approach to Hezbollah and it differing from the classified terrorist organisation Hamas. However, it should be taken into consideration that at the time of writing the EU hadn't listed Hezbollah's military wing a terrorist organisation, which leads one to ponder if the entire organization of Hezbollah would be terrorist listed, whether the EU would in fact employ the 'no dialogue' strategy making it illegal for the EU to engage with terrorist listed actors/organizations. Furthermore, Boubekeur (2009) writes about how the EU should improve its engagement with moderate Islamist movements in her independent contribution in the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance titled *'Updating the European Union's Policies towards Islamist Parties and Radical Actors'*.

Moreover, a PhD dissertation was submitted last year in the University of Exeter that is close to what I am endeavouring to do and it is written by Adeeb M. A. Bader (2013) titled *'European Union's Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Inconsistencies and Paradoxes'*. Bader examines the inconsistencies and paradoxes in the EU discourse towards Hamas and what determines those contradictions when answering questions of "how" and "why". Additionally, Bader examines the influence of external actors on the EU's foreign policy towards Hamas, which is similar to what I aim to do, however, with Hezbollah as a case in point.

1.3 Background

In order to understand EU's relation to Hezbollah it's important to understand the how Hezbollah has developed over time. Hence, I will provide a brief account of Hezbollah's emergence and in the next subsection provide an overview of EU's relation with Hezbollah as well as a brief discussion for choosing Hezbollah in this study.

1.3.1 Hezbollah: The Organization

Hezbollah's origin dates back to 1978 when it developed as an Islamic movement, and driven by a long held social and political dissatisfaction amongst the Shiite members of the clergy in Lebanon and with its ideological teachings from the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 who became their patron, Hezbollah promoted vociferously in Lebanon the necessary fight against the Western powers and the importance of traditional Islamic principles (Alagha 2006: 13; Townsend 2010: 12 &14). 1975 was the beginning of the 15-year-old civil war that would bring bloodshed and continuous strife between factions in Lebanon; Druze, Christians, Shiite and Sunni groups, together with Syrian participation and this was the final spark after growing tension and dissatisfaction from the 1960s (Ibid). With the Israeli invasion in 1982, Hezbollah was given momentum and sufficient cause to fight Israel in the name of Lebanon and re-claim what was considered rightfully theirs; the southern parts. In the 1980s, Hezbollah has reportedly participated in multiple attacks: the attack against the Multinational Peace-Keeping forces and the U.S Marines and the hostage takings (Mannes 2004:170-172 & 177; Frontline World 2013). In addition, the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner was said to be the work of Hezbollah and the aftermath bombing of the Saudi Embassy (Levitt 2013: 42; Mannes 2004: 173). The Ta'if Accords were signed ending the civil war in 1989. Syria, Lebanon's protector, in concurrence with Hezbollah made certain that a demarcation between militia and resistance was agreed upon, thus, the Lebanese government through institutionalization considered it "a legitimate-national resistance" (Alagha 2006: 41). Thus solidifying their influence in Lebanon.

Furthermore, at the turn of 1991, as Hezbollah adopted the popularly received open policy, *infitah* (openness) (Ibid: 14), thus, began what Ayatollah Fadlallah, Hezbollah's spiritual leader, dubbed Hezbollah's "Lebanonization". This meant that Hezbollah ought to adapt its approach to the situation in Lebanon, thus, "in spreading the faith, the Muslims in Lebanon should not follow procedures that would be inappropriate to Lebanon." (Fadlallah & Soueid 1995: 67). By 1992, as Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was elected Secretary General, Hezbollah's third leader, Hezbollah embarked on a political campaign. The first parliamentary elections held after the civil war, Hezbollah successfully won twelve seats, mostly due to its increased popularity both in the suburbs of Beirut and its stronghold in the south, particularly Qana (Alagha 2006: 42-43). Moreover, Hezbollah's raison d'être (reason for existence) has always been the elimination of the illegal existence of

Israel due to Zionism: the creation of a Jewish state (Gaub 2013:7-8). Hence, several clashes with Israel and others have occurred (Katzman 1995: 11; Fisk 1996; UN Press Release 1996; Leonnig 2006; BBC.co.uk. 2001). So, in 2006, Hezbollah reportedly kidnapped two Israeli soldiers that brought on the one month long war with Israel (Geukjian 2008; Tür 2007) which yielded international response (Baker 2006; Tisdall & MacAskill 2006). After 2006, Hezbollah's raison d'être had to change. Despite its antipathy towards Israel, Hezbollah couldn't justify attacking Israel without any provocation without compromising its legitimized identity as a resistance movement against the Israelis and its role as an influential political party. Thus, as Ayatollah Fadlallah noted, Hezbollah's leading body knows that the multifaceted organization "does not function in a vacuum but within an environment that imposes certain restrictions on its freedom of action" (Ranstorp 1998: 108). So, the Palestinian cause was a logical fit with Israel as the enemy and Iran's personal interest that continuously has been reiterated as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke to the nation in 2006 stating "the most important issue in Arab society is the Palestinian cause" (BBC.com 2006).

After the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Bray-Collins 2013: 281; BBC.com 2014; Dahdah 2005; (Mehlis UNIIIC Report 2005), Lebanon split into two houses; Hezbollah and its pro-Syrian allies, 8th of March, and the anti-Syrian 14th of March group, in commemoration of Rafik Hariri, consisting of Druze, Sunni and Christian political parties, leading to numeral deadlocks in the forming of a government (Wiegand 2009: 676). A wave of politically motivated attacks followed (Knudsen 2010: 5 & 15-16; Naharnet Newsdesk 2012; Schwerma 2010: 70; Bakri 2007; Levitt 2013: 7; Chulov 2012), which has rendered the political climate in Lebanon precarious and has led to an inter-political struggle between pro-Syrian, mainly Hezbollah, and anti-Syrian factions resulting in political deadlocks; some being resolved only to create new ones (telegraph.co.uk 2008; Dailystar.com.lb 2013b; Kechichian 2014; Worth 2008; UNSC report 2008). With the Syrian crisis looming and spilling over, a disassociation policy: the Baabda Declaration, has been advocated vociferously and to fully abide by in Lebanon but Hezbollah's active involvement in the conflict has made it difficult to implement (Dailystar.com.lb 2013a).

1.3.2 EU's relation with Hezbollah

The EU's direct involvement with Islamist political movements is traditionally severely thin and non-existent, or more often than not fairly non-publicized as some critics argue that states' publicized engagement with Islamists would endow them with "undeserved attention and legitimacy" and disagree with the EU's ability to influence the endogenous characteristics and change of Islamist political movements through democratic reform away from potential re-radicalization and instability in the Middle East region (Kausch 2009: 129-130). Despite the width

of criticism, the seemingly lack of feasible options are resulting in an increasing concurrence of the necessity of engaging with Islamist political organizations. Eliminating the stigmatization of Islamist parties or actors active in political circles is developing into a very important issue for the EU, especially within the context of improving the opportunities for participating in the political scene in their respective countries (Ibid: 131). Hence, it has become gradually understood by the EU that the influence of Islamist organizations cannot be disregarded and as their rightful need for actively participating in the political system, which possibly would lead to a stabilizing community in the Middle East. This would potentially curb any potential re-radicalization. The EU's foreign policy speak has suggested over the years the will for improving relations with Islamist political organizations (Emerson and Youngs 2007: 5) and it is commonly understood, as argued by Rees and Aldrich (2005), that the EU "conceptualizes radical Islam in less absolute terms" than the US (Ibid: 905). However, despite the optimistic commitments the EU has taken a more hesitant approach to Islamists as indicated by the EU's choice to conduct low-level contact with Hezbollah:

> European states opposed the US push for a blanket proscription of Hezbollah, recognizing the latter to be the fastest growing political organization in Lebanon... A number of European embassies commenced low-level dialogue with Hezbollah, with the aim of backing the group's political arm against the militia wing. (Young 2006 quoted in Seeberg 2009: 83)

Hezbollah, despite not fulfilling the non-violence condition to completely be denoted as a moderate Islamist actor, cannot be excluded. Nonetheless, still considered one of the important cases in the regional political reality of the Middle East and therefore, cannot be omitted in EU's relation with Hezbollah, Lebanon and the region. It is commonly viewed that the influence Hezbollah exerts in Lebanese politics is of the degree that no solution will be possible without their involvement (Kausch 2009: 134). Open EU engagement with Hezbollah has been fairly accepted and viewed as essential by the EU, as opposed to any direct engagement with representatives from Hamas is deemed illegal as it was designated a terrorist organization in 2003 (Rettman 2012). However, with the EU designating Hezbollah's military wing as terrorist organization in July 2013 (BBC.com 2013a), it became illegal for the EU to engage with Hezbollah's military wing whilst leaving the door slightly ajar for EU relations with Hezbollah's political wing. Despite this, low-level contact with political representatives from Hezbollah seems to be the preferred way of communication, since EU states remain hesitant to have "official high-level contact" but still prefer to have "open lines of communication with the political wing of Hezbollah than none (Asseburg 2009: 176). Furthermore, Seeberg (2009) delves into the complexities of the EU-Hezbollah relations:

> "The Hezbollah is a strong or even dominant actor, competing with

the official government for political hegemony, thereby constructing a 'dual power' situation in Lebanon: a situation where two sources of authority are competing for power and legitimacy… The EU reluctance to strengthen relations with Islamist organizations in the Mediterranean puts pressure on the EU in Lebanon, in the sense that it has to position itself in relation to the complexities of the 'dual power' situation there."(85 & 87-88)

The EU's partial designation of Hezbollah's military wing and France's role in it (Liphshiz 2013; Black 2013) has not been without grave criticism, especially by the US, Israel, Canada and the Netherlands and none other than Hezbollah's own Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem who rejects any distinction made between Hezbollah as a political and a resistance entity by stating that:

"We don't have a military wing and a political one; we don't have Hezbollah on one hand and the resistance party on the other. Every element of Hezbollah, from commanders to members as well as our various capabilities, are in the services of the resistance and we have nothing but the resistance as a priority" (Dailystar.co.lb 2012) […] Hezbollah has a single leadership. All political, social and jihad work is tied to the decisions of this leadership. The same leadership that directs the parliamentary and government work also leads jihad actions in the struggle against Israel."(Latimes.com 2009).

Therefore, EU relations with Hezbollah have not been easy to maintain and more often than not is characterized by evident difficulties in knowing how to respond to Hezbollah and maintain open line of communication with the political wing. Hezbollah has in recent years established itself as an actor on the international scene attempting to, partaking and/or executing numeral violent terror attacks from Thailand to Europe to the US, as well as reportedly conducting money laundering, drug and illegal weapon trade in Europe and elsewhere. This has most likely added pressure on the EU and contributed to its difficulties in how to engage with Hezbollah and thereby EU's attitude towards the Islamist organization (Norell 2013).

1.3.3 Selecting Hezbollah

Many don't know that much about Hezbollah, and if they do, it's usually in simplistic terms such as terrorist organization, a conception that fail to completely comprehend the complexities of the organisation that has transformed over the years in order to remain current. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah is in several ways a phenomenon with the regional interests constantly surrounding it. Its influential power as a political and military actor in Lebanon has elevated Hezbollah's position as a resilient one. The political challenges in the Middle Eastern region

has not eased the EU's difficulty in defining its attitude; be it the growing role of Iran due to its cooperation and axis with Hezbollah and Syria (Seeberg 2009:86-87). This contributes to the complex and distinct characteristics of Hezbollah, as opposed to the Palestinian Hamas who doesn't have the same ideological alliance with Iran and does not actively participate in Syria as Hezbollah does, hence, is not faced with the same political challenges in the region. Even though there is a fairly good amount of information available on the organization and its different conceptualizations, there isn't that many studies carried out on whether the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why a change has occurred. Additionally, the discussions surrounding Hezbollah and its growing and established role as an actor on the international scene is leading to the more pressing and necessary need of discussing and understanding the organization, and more importantly how international actors such as the EU chooses to engage with and thereby their attitude towards similar non-state Islamist actors.

1.4 Choice of Data

In this study, I will employ both primary and secondary sources to give a certain width and comprehensive understanding of whether and why the EU's attitude toward Hezbollah has changed over time, as well as conduct my own analysis of the primary empirical material at my disposal. I will utilize the Bulletin of the European Communities from the 1980 to 1993, because Hezbollah first emerged in the 1980s, and continue with Bulletin of the European Union available online from 1994 to the last EU Bulletin issue covering events in July-August 2009, because they seized to be available in the same format and were replaced by the EU News Website[5]. I use the Bulletin of European Communities/European Union because they provide a detailed description of the monthly activities of the EC and the EU and more importantly relay official council statements, conclusions and/or declarations addressing events or occurrences in the world. By sifting through a large quantity of empirical material from the beginning of the 1980s and onwards, I will select specific relevant periods of time discussing EU's attitude towards Hezbollah and emphasize the change in attitude by analysing EU's discursive constructions of Hezbollah. Furthermore, why the change in EU attitudes has occurred will be analysed by discussing influential explanations identified as the following: Hezbollah's activities, France's colonial and close ties with Lebanon and the influence of the US cannot be disregarded in matters of international relations. There are many other explanations that could be relevant: Israel's influence and relation to the EU and the important role of Iran may well be relevant, however, in this study the explanations identified above are, according to me, the most important explanations to analyse when answering my research question.

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[5] See http://europa.eu/newsroom/index_en.htm

Furthermore, it would seem rather void and unnecessarily time consuming to use all material from the 1980s and onwards since Hezbollah is not constantly mentioned in official statements, conclusions or declarations. Therefore, I will, after sifting through material from 1980, analyse statements from different years that are relevant with regards to my research question and where reference; implicit such as "parties in Lebanon" or explicit by name, to Hezbollah has been made that indicate a change in the EU's discursive constructions, hence, EU's changed attitude towards Hezbollah, which in turn will provide for a richer and concentrated foundation for analysis. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Bulletin of the European Union is only available through mid-2009, which means that in order to have a comprehensive time frame I will therefore complement it with the use of Council Conclusions from 2009 to 2013.

1.5 Limitations and Source Criticism

This study includes important limitations that need to be taken into consideration and this includes the making of interpretations. This analysis will incorporate levels of interpretations, which will be my own and therefore, could, most likely, diverge from others' interpretations and will certainly, and hopefully, not be the only versions available. Yet, I hope that my interpretations will offer an awareness and comprehension of whether the EU's attitudes toward Hezbollah have changed over time and why this change has occurred. Inherent to interpretations is the concept of objectivity and due to the likelihood of numeral levels of interpretation; it renders it almost impossible to be completely objective. Thus, I will make interpretations of EU statements, declarations and/or conclusions, which can also be viewed as their interpretations of events or occurrences upon which they have based their statements on, however, it should be noted that it is difficult to distance oneself from such a natural aptness for interpretation in any communicative act.

Furthermore, the number of EU statements, declarations and conclusions will vary depending on where one as a researcher makes delimitations with regard to the length of the study and the aim of the study. The same goes for the variety of explanations available when investigating why a change in the EU's attitudes toward Hezbollah has changed over time. Thus, making delimitations is an important, if not essential, aspect when conducting any study and so is the acceptance that all possible explanations cannot be included. However, most importantly is taking into consideration the various possible explanatory factors available and thereafter make reasonable and pragmatic decisions relevant to the aim of the study and the research questions, which is how I have reasoned when considering possible explanations. Moreover, the use of council conclusions as

complement to the Bulletin of the European Communities/Union is a necessary and pragmatic choice in order to have a comprehensive and continuous timeframe. I could not see how ending mid-2009, when the Bulletin of the European Union was discontinued and transformed into an online EU newsroom, thus making it impossible to find statements made by the EU in that format, would provide a comprehensive study, therefore, I felt the need for complimenting my empirical material.

1.6. Outline of the Study

In this paper, I will in the first chapter provide an introduction to the study and the aim of the paper. Additionally, previous research on the EU's attitude towards Islamist non-state actors involved in violent activities and a background on Hezbollah will be provided in order to offer a comprehensive understanding of the following section on EU's relations with Hezbollah, which is considered a prerequisite and will contribute to the understanding of my research questions of whether the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why. Furthermore, in the second chapter there will be a discussion about the philosophical considerations taken within which the study will be situated and is followed by the theoretical frameworks of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism and Alexander Wendt's theory of Social Constructivism that will be employed in a complimentary fashion and be rather helpful in answering my research questions. The reason is that both approaches revolve around the fundamental principle that there is an inherent state of anarchy; a society without the existence of a world government, in the international system and that states are not the absolute key actors in global politics. Thereafter, in chapter 3 a discussion of the methodological section will follow and in chapter 4 a two-part analysis will follow where I answer both the question of whether the EU's attitudes towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why by analysing the three previously explanations. Lastly, in the final chapter 5, I will provide the conclusions derived from the study and discuss possibilities for further research.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1. A Philosophical Discussion

When conducting a research project it is imperative to maintain a research strategy to uphold a general orientation towards the methodological aspect of the study. There are particular assumptions of ontological and epistemological nature, which concerns the way in which a researcher endeavours to investigate and acquire knowledge about the social world we live in. The philosophy of science stance we maintain and within which we situate the study is very important to be clear upon and well defined, and thereby, avoiding possible misunderstandings about the assumptions of the nature of and the way of approaching the social world (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 1).

The ontological standpoint are mainly concerned with the nature of reality; primarily if they can be regarded as social objects independent from social actors or are merely socially constructed consisting of viewpoints and the acts of social actors (Delanty and Strydom 2003:6). The latter ontological assumptions rendered suitable and in alignment with the research questions is constructionism that emphasize occurrences in the social world and the meaning attributed to them is by the social interactions of social actors. Thus, indicating that such occurrences are continuously being reconsidered and altered (Graue & Walsh, 1998; Byrne-Armstrong et al 2001). The former ontological stance is objectivism which assumes that social actors do not influence social occurrences and its attributed significance (Bitter-Davis & Parker, 1997; Gallagher, 2008); however it doesn't suit the importance of social occurrences and the dependence on social actors. Understanding social actors and their influence on the occurrences and their meaning is key in this research study, and we cannot disregard the influence actors have on a phenomenon of change (Bryman 2012: 33).

In the epistemological viewpoint concerned with what is or ought to be considered as acceptable knowledge in the social sciences, there are primarily two epistemological views: positivism and interpretivism. On the one hand, the positivist researcher argues the use of natural science methods when analysing the social world; hence in an objective manner (Bryman 2012: 27-28). On the other hand, the interpretivist researcher contends that the study and subjective significance of social actors/actions and the inherent institutional structures are vastly contrasting which requires a different way than the natural scientific approach. A known demarcation was postulated by Von Wright (1971), between

what was designated hermeneutics; a theological notion that emphasizes the methodological and theoretical consideration of interpreting actions by social actors, and the positivist view. The latter endeavours to explain human behaviour, whilst the former seeks to understand the behaviour of social actors (Ibid). In accordance with Von Wright is the assumptions of phenomenology that identify the need for a different logic of epistemological approach: "social reality has a meaning for human beings and therefore human action is meaningful […] it has a meaning for them and they act on the basis of the meanings that they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others" (Ibid: 30). Therefore, in order to uncover and understand this, a researcher in social science need to interpret these acts and the social reality within which they occur in a subjective manner in order to acquire the most accurate understanding.

In this study, interpretivism is important because it facilitates the understanding of human actions and ascribed meanings, however, what is often forgotten and not emphasized enough is the importance of positivism since it provides causal explanations to questions of why something is the way it is. Therefore, positivists believe reality is static and a given because it's inherent to the human nature, whilst the interpretivist subjectively interprets reality to understand it. Thus, in this study I posit the question of 'has the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah changed over time and why?' which necessitates a philosophical outlook on reality that is situated somewhere in between consolidating the other[6].

The thorough understanding of ontological and epistemological positions whilst conducting a research study is of significant relevance to direct the general orientation. However, Hughes and Sharrock (1997) considers researchers to be pragmatists and advice to

> "Not worry about epistemology and ontology but about the particular problems they confront from their theories and investigations […] If all that matters is that scientists go about their business […] using methods appropriate to the problems they have to deal with, then philosophical worries about ontology and epistemology are an irrelevance"(94).

Following Hughes and Sharrock's line of argument, for a pragmatist it's difficult to disregard or down-size the importance of the philosophical approaches, since they are more concerned with finding a suitable method for approaching a research problem it would seem imperative to ensure such methodological applicability by justifying the relevance of the ontological and epistemological stance. Hence, for any researcher conducting a study it's important to be aware of the philosophical standpoints as they provide a general orient to the way in which to approach a scientific problem and add great scientific support to the

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[6] For a more interesting discussion on the consolidation of the two theoretical frameworks with contrasting epistemologies; interpretivism and positivism, see Price, R. and Reus-Smit, C. (1998).

applicability of a method, which could have a significant effect on the results of the study.

2.2 Theoretical Considerations

Furthermore, I will essentially apply a combination of Alexander Wendt's theory of Social Constructivism within International Relations and Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism, which is considered helpful in answering if the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why. The reason is that both approaches revolve around the fundamental principle that there is an inherent state of anarchy; a society without the existence of a world government, in the international system and that states are not the absolute key actors in global politics. The principle is highly relevant within the multipolar international system that we are currently living in. Social constructivism in particular, would help clarify the broader context behind the apparent change in EU's attitude toward Hezbollah over time. Therefore, in this section I will relay the core assumptions of the two theoretical conceptions and discuss their necessary applicability in this research study.

2.2.1 Neorealism

Neorealism, also termed structural realism, was first coined by Kenneth Waltz and is a nuanced departure from the classical realist assumptions that has dominated the field of International Relations for quite some time. In his book *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz advocates a systemic approach that facilitates the study of state behaviour change, and subsequently emphasizes the international structure that function as a form of constriction on state behaviour; strategies and motivations. There are six foundational concepts inherent to Neorealism, which will be discussed: structure, anarchy, capability, and distribution of power, polarity and national interest. Many of the mentioned concepts have been widely discussed in different adaptations by realist thinkers within the discipline of International Relations (Jervis 1997; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979; Snyder 2002; Buzan, Jones & Little 1993).

Furthermore, Neorealists argue that the international structure is characterized by anarchy; which refers to "the absence of a world government" and not the existence of chaos and disorder (Waltz 1979: 88), and state capabilities, which predominantly addresses the notion of polar, bipolar or even a multipolar international system. Classical realist assumptions are not discussed in a lengthy manner in his book; however, Waltz disagrees with Hans Morgenthau, one of the prominent realist thinkers, who failed to conceive the influential importance of the international political system as distinguished from its inherent units; state,

bureaucracy and individual level analysis, when emphasizing the steering elements of a foreign policy (Waltz 2008: 71). Thus, according to Waltz, the framework within which other numeral causes occur is the structural formation of the international system (Hollis & Steve 2000: 853). With that said, anarchy, according to both classical realists and neorealist, exists within the international structure within which each state is independent in its actions without a global government restricting its behaviour. The state of anarchy dictates that every state to its own, meaning that a state can only depend on its own abilities, which renders the issue of security to be a vital aspect for a state (Mingst 2004: 66). Additionally, they are of the same opinion concerning the state as a central actor in the international system and naturally revolve around inter-state relations. Consequently, non-state actors and multi-national corporations (MNCs) are less important and not as central as states are, however, Neorealists agree that non-state actors exist and do play a role within the international system and Hezbollah is an example of this (Jackson and Sorensen 2007: 60).

According to neo-realists, states acting rationally are a key notion whilst, classical realists claim this cannot be ensured (Forde 1995: 145). Thus, due to the "everyone to themselves" notion, states will feel threatened by other actors, which is where the aspect of capabilities becomes important. States' capabilities that are vital when protecting oneself in the face of a threat, are divided into multiple levels of capability within the international structure so to distinguish between states at various different points in time (Dunne & Schmidt 2014:104). Hence, the more threatened a state feels, the larger will the incentive be for acquiring more capabilities and ensure security; i.e. security dilemma, which results in an endless cycle of competitiveness. The "rank-ordering of states" or competing for maximizing security is contingent upon power being distributed differently, or capabilities if you will (Ibid: 104-105), which as Waltz (1989) contends: "power is a means to the end of security […] and because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it" (Waltz 1989: 40 cited in Dunne & Schmidt 2014:105). The concept of power is thus an inherent characteristic of the international structure and is comprised of a state's capability and its differing and changing distribution amongst states (Waltz 1990: 36).

Furthermore, the concept of polarity in the international structure is defined by the varying degree of capabilities distributed amongst states, which results in the establishment of the nature of the international system that are; unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. The first distinction entails the superiority of a singular state in the international system; secondly, bipolarity signifies the existence of two superior powers compared to other states with regards to military, economic, technological, wealth and production capabilities, and thirdly, multipolarity refers to when more than two actors have similar capabilities (Buzan 2013:156). Similarly to Neorealists, Alexander Wendt (1999) assumes that "international social structures are built around relationships of enemy, rival and friend" (Wendt cited in Buzan 2013: 157), however, the relationship of friend is

excluded by Neorealists and supposes that polarity is the focal point with regards to political and military security. Distinct changes happen when bipolarity or unipolarity occurs, and when there are more actors than two, states depend on their own capabilities and/or on the formation of alliances with other actors. Additionally, this also results in the competitiveness among actors in a multipolar system, like the current international system we are residing in, which renders it increasingly ambiguous when calculating the capabilities of the actors and evaluating strength of alliances (Waltz 2000: 6). The multipolarity of the international system is highly relevant today with various actors with distinct capabilities, such as Hezbollah challenging states such as the US and France, with alliances with Iran, Hezbollah gains additional capability that dictate state behaviour. France is a distinguished European state with regards to Hezbollah due to its colonial ties with Lebanon and its continuous support for the Lebanese government and therefore, it is assumed that France would influence the EU's attitude since it lies within their interest to concern themselves with the stability and well-being of Lebanon. According to Hezbollah, after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister in February 2005, France has become increasingly anti-Syrian, which has, in the eyes of Hezbollah, set France apart from other EU states (Atrissi 2007: 94). Hence, this contributes to the competitiveness of maximizing security for many actors such as the US and the European states, as it does with the increase of Hezbollah terror operations both in Europe and around the world, which correlates to Waltz's expectation that multipolar system will not be as stable as in a bipolar international systems, and that interdependence will most likely increase in a multipolar system (Elman 2008: 19).

The concept of national interest is somewhat obscure; however, in relation to safeguarding a state's territory, economic development and military ability, it is considered a national interest when endeavouring to develop these capabilities. The level of capability can also be considered a constriction or provide the impetus to strive for those national interest. Hence, as Telhami (2003) argues the incentive for a state to pursue its interests is determined by its own capabilities (109). Furthermore, the way states behave can be due to interstate competitiveness because it is in their calculated interest to do so, and it can additionally be the result of interstate socialization, meaning that it is considered to be within a state's interest to follow certain rules or standards (Elman 2008: 18).

2.2.2 Social Constructivism

As of late years, the Social Constructivist theory developed within International Relations with the aim of explicating the increasing new developments arising on the international arena (Knutsen 1997: 1), due to constructivists claiming that the theoretical frameworks available such as liberalism, realism etc. lack to comprehensively provide explanations for the new developments in world

politics. Similarly, as Steve Smith (2001: 225) concurringly argues, "…this has been necessary because of a changing world" with the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the largest EU enlargement to date are just a few world developments, which renders a new lens necessary in order to better understand the new global order. One of the leading scholars who have elevated the application of Social Constructivism within International Relations is Alexander Wendt and his idea that international politics is fundamentally constituted by shared knowledge and ideas. Fundamental constructivist concepts are discourses, norms, socialization and identity, all of which I will touch upon. Wendt argues that power politics is not a materialistic phenomenon as Neorealists would claim, but is constructed in a social manner, and therefore subject to change by human practices (Wendt 1992), thus providing a new and social understanding of International Relations. Wendt (1999: 1) contends, "…the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature", which naturally makes individuals dependent on the socially constructed structure.

Within the international system and relations, constructivists consider states to be very important actors, central if anything, with the aptitude to act in a defensive or an offensive mode. States' offensiveness usually has a distinct bearing on other states and its interactions that potentially could generate violent factions and terrorist groups states ultimately need to face (Wendt 1999: 9). Henceforth, Social Constructivists do place an importance on non-state actors and/or social movements as they are viewed as the consequences of states' inability to meet certain requirements (Scott 1991 cited in Foweraker 1995: 10). Thus, the activities of non-state actors can have significant impact on international politics. Ideas that constitute structures of the international system are viewed from materialist and idealist point of view. Materialism refers to the crude form of material forces such as production and arms capabilities, natural resources and the importance of a state's geography, which carry certain significance as they can be used to endow capabilities to some as well as cultivating threats. On the other hand, idealists are of the opinion that the structuring of the social consciousness; i.e. the diffusion of knowledge and ideas, usually is constituted as norms or rules. Hence, the social structures are significant since they are comprised of interests and identities. Thus, according to idealists actors attribute materialist forces with meaning and it is only then that they are considered significant (Wendt 1999: 23-24). The level of importance given is based on the shared ideas of others and oneself. Idealists posit that social constructions are what they are due to the shared ideas and conceptions of material forces and human activity (Wendt 1995: 73).

According to Social Constructivists, they concur with Neorealists that there exists a state of anarchy in the international structure; however, it is not considered a condition of the structure because it is perpetually defined by rational and social interactions of states (Wendt 1992: 397-398). The identity of actors is formed through the international structure and is in turn institutionalized because it is

within an actor's, a state or non-state actor, interest. The interests dictate actors' preferences and its perpetual alteration continuously reshape the system and the anarchic structure. Thus, anarchy is as Wendt states "An empty vessel, without intrinsic meaning. What gives anarchy its meaning are the kinds of people who live there and the structure of their relationships" (Wendt 1999: 309). Furthermore, Wendt contends that anarchy has three potential structures that govern within the international system, which are friend, rival and enemy. Anarchy can signify interstate cooperation, competitiveness and rivalry, and the perpetual fight between enemies in pursuit of superiority (Ibid: 247-249). These anarchic structures enable cooperation between states due to the internalization of specific common beliefs and ideas as either friends or rivals characterizing the international system, hence, excluding the structure of enmity (Ibid: 259). Constructivists are of the same opinion as Neorealists and Classical Realists that states endeavour to survive, though constructivists argue that the use of violence or force is not necessarily the way to acquire such survival (Weber 2009: 67). The characterization of an enmity structure in the international system, according to Realists, would dictate that no cooperation is possible due to the constant threat perception and the distrustfulness of thy neighbour, whilst, constructivists would conversely claim that as the international system can go insofar as be characterized as friendly or rival at most it would therefore enable a form of anarchic cooperation for the reason that it is states that define the meaning of anarchy at any point in time when interstate socialization occurs (Wendt 1999: 253-255).

Due to social constructions only being able to be identified in the continuity of social interactions and practices, it can therefore be applicable to a variety of historical occurrences, and consequently, could very well be used when understanding whether the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time as it can offer a clarification of the broader context behind this change and thus give indications of why such a change has occurred. Additionally, Constructivism adds useful views on how power is translated through actors, and as Wendt contends, "Ideas always matter, since power and interest do not have effects apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such" (Wendt 1995: 73-74). Moreover, Neorealist scholar Mearsheimer argues that social structures inherent to an international system allow for actions to occur by attributing actors with particular preferences and characteristics simultaneously providing material forces with distinct significance. Wendt agrees with Mearsheimer's view to a certain extent, however, the constant redefinition and duplication of the structure's characteristic and the effect they have is not dealt with. Thus, if a state or a non-state actor militarize or act violently, this will result in other states defining that state as a threat, which will thus affect the entire international structure creating new attitudes resulting in a security dilemma where, as Wendt states, "they are effects of practice" (Wendt 1995: 76-77). Furthermore, Wendt argues, "It is only through the interaction of actors that the structure of the international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes

transformed (Wendt 1999: 366), thus indicating the possibility of change. The continuous socialization that helps identify the role of power facilitates the understanding of "how ideational structures shape the very way actors define themselves- who they are, their goals and the roles they believe they should play" (Copeland 2000: 190). The relation between discourse and power is intrinsically important and cannot, or should not, be disregarded as Foucault has discussed lengthy in his acclaimed work[7]. Power is a pivotal aspect in the continuous redefining, refining and reproducing of practices of social constructions, irrespective of being recognized or not, because it is perpetually an inherent part of the communicative exchanges important for social constructivist scholars.

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[7] See Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish: the birth of a prison and Foucault, M. (1998). The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge.

3 Methodological Framework

3.1 Research Design

In a study, it is of paramount importance to carefully consider the appropriate research design and the way of approaching it, so that it is in alignment with the aims of the research project. This study will involve the investigation of a single case. George and Bennett (2005) argue that a research design consists of executing five tasks important for studies employing the method of case study. These tasks will act as guidance while conducting this study, and will now briefly be introduced. The premier task discusses the single most important aspect in a research design, the formulating and specifying the objective of the study and identifying a problem worth investigating (George & Bennett 2005:74). As King, Keohane, and Verba (1996: 15) argue, a research project ought to "pose a question that is important in the real world" and contribute to scholarly works by providing "scientific explanations of some aspect of the world".

Furthermore, George & Bennett (2005) identify numeral theory-building research objectives and the disciplined configurative form of case study will be utilized as it corresponds to the aim of this study. Disciplined configurative denotes the use of already established theoretical assumptions in order to explicate the end-result of a research puzzle (Ibid: 75). The subsequent task is the specification of variables. In order to do so, the dependent variable and the independent variables need to be identified to explain why the specific outcome has emerged (Ibid: 79-80). In this study, the dependent variable is identified as EU's changed attitude towards Hezbollah, which corroborates with the aim of the study, which is whether the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time. And the independent variables that can potentially explain this change is Hezbollah's activities, France's colonial ties and close relationship with Lebanon can act influential in a change of attitude, and the influence of the US on EU attitudes. The following task addresses the aspect of case selection, which ought to be "an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study" (Ibid: 83). George and Bennett (2005) further state the central aim with regards to case selection is its significance to the aim of the research. Thus, within this study choosing to investigate if and why EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time, which will indicate whether the EU is reactive, is of central importance as this epitomizes the overarching objective of the research. The fourth task important to the research design is the consideration of the variance in the selected variables. The vital question is how many or few categories are

chosen that entail the required carefulness, and yet maintain the depth of descriptions (Ibid: 85). When it comes to the independent variables, I will look at indicators for measurement; Hezbollah's activities will be analysed by the increase of violent activities Hezbollah executes or participates in based on their interest; France implicitly or explicitly expressing opinion in the media, where it is the easiest platform to express opinion, upon which the EU afterwards expresses similar opinion which would serve as an indicator for France's influence as it is guided by their national interest to act in a certain way; and the same goes for measuring the US's influence on EU's attitude towards Hezbollah, who then implicitly or explicitly says something as it lies within their interest to which the EU says something in similar line. Thus, these variables are derived mainly from the theoretical framework of Neorealism employed in this study.

In this paper, web searches will be conducted on the particular events the EU has issued statements about; searching relevant key words and corresponding dates, to see whether the US or France has relayed their opinion on the event in question and to see if it contrasts with EU's attitude. It will be assumed that if representatives from either the US or France haven't spoken in the media about Hezbollah on a particular event, it is the assumption that they in fact concur with the EU and thereby doesn't need to influence the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah. Hence, that is considered the most pragmatic and apt way to uncover which explanation is the most likely one. The media platform is the most available and freely expressive forum where state representatives' opinions are conveyed, because it's fairly difficult to find official documentation where France or the US candidly or willingly states its opinion on Hezbollah. The final task refers to the formulation of data requirements obtained from the empirical material collected or analysed. Consequently, this is essential whether a researcher employs a single case or numerous, in order to make it comparable to other cases in other studies the requirements need to be identical (Ibid: 86). Hence, the data acquired from the empirical material is guided by the theoretical assumptions discussed extensively in this study.

3.1.1 A Qualitative Study

A qualitative analysis will be carried out because it enables one to understand how meanings are formulated and their continuous altering characteristic and its multiple ways of application. It's imperative to keep in mind when analysing a text to "approach it through understanding the context of its production by the analysts themselves" (May 2001:193). Furthermore, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009:272) contend, "Interpretation implies that there are no self-evident, simple or unambiguous rules or procedures and those crucial ingredients are the researcher's judgment, intuition, and ability to 'see and point something out'..." An inherent attribute to qualitative analysis is the notion of reflexivity, which denotes the recognition of your own subjective stance with regards to the issue of

investigation, ergo, instituting awareness and approaching a text in a critical fashion (Ibid: 9-10). Thus in this study, the qualitative aspect will guide the analytical understanding of the process and the social context within which the communicative acts occurred.

3.1.2 The Method of Case Study

In this study, I will predominantly utilize the method of case study as it, according to Bryman's categorization (2004), involves a single case. Accordingly, this generates questions concerning what this study is a case of (Collier 1995:465). In this study, it is a case of a common approach by an international actor's attitudes towards sub-state actors. Guided by my research questions, this would specifically mean investigating the discursive constructions through linguistics employed by the EU in official statements and declarations and in analysing if and why there has been a change in the EU's discursive constructions of Hezbollah. Furthermore, it is a case of a particular faction's altering approach towards a transnational organization and what's conducive to such alteration. When employing the method of case study, it essentially seeks to study a specific social phenomenon within its contextual framework for purposes of comprehension (Yin 1994 cited in Woodside 2010:1). George and Bennett (2005:18) construe a case study to be "a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself." Thereby, this demarcation signifies a difficulty, if possible at all, to investigate all aspects associated to the specific study and research questions at hand; the EU and all associated links to Hezbollah. Therefore, the research questions posited are pertinent in the guidance and considerations of the scope of limitations this study carries.

Case study methods offer a very distinguished level of conceptual validity; the ability to recognize and measure indicators that most accurately epitomize the theoretical concepts meant to be measured (George & Bennett 2005:19). Several variables are not easy to measure, which is why researchers must conduct "contextualized comparison", that "self-consciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena- even if expressed in substantively different terms- across different contexts" (Locke & Thelen 1998:11). These exhaustive considerations are necessary when identifying intra-contextual factors, and are customary in case studies, however, exceedingly arduous in statistical investigations (George & Bennett 2005:19). Additionally, case studies provide the opportunity to, in an in-depth fashion, analyse the causal mechanisms' function under specific conditions. Lastly, in case studies the causal complexity offers, for example, the possibility of reaching conditional generalizations by a variety of potential means. Nevertheless, despite case studies demanding a more extensive process tracing of evidence to detail such intricate dealings, there is a significant value in such comprehensive studies (Ibid: 21-22).

Furthermore, this study seeks to answer two questions, a "has/what/how" question and a "why" question. Even though, the "has/what/how"-questions commonly contain a descriptive element, and are not that ostentatious they, nevertheless, shouldn't be underestimated. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 15) assert the knowledge and facts acquired when answering the "has/what/how"-question is necessarily conducive and foundational when answering the why-question. It is along that line of descriptive and explanatory case that my study is situated. Furthermore, Hollis and Smith (1990) seemingly discuss that where societal issues are concerned two sides of a story is to be told. The outsider version is an attempt to generate generalizations of the natural science nature pursuing to explain, whilst the insider aims to understand how and what something is. Hollis and Smith are supposedly implying, and convincingly enough, the consolidation of the two disciplines:

> "The actors' view is a starting point and, advocates of Understanding will say, the only starting point. We must know how actors defined the issues and the alternatives, what they believed about the situation and each other, what they aimed to achieve, and how. Only then can we ask more pointed questions about their clarity of vision, their underlying reasons, and the true meaning of the episodes." (2).

However, Hollis and Smith (1990) quite surprisingly and questionably, argue in fact the impossibility of such amalgamation due to the different comprehension of the social world and the human nature. Therefore, I am well aware of the hot debated consolidation of positing a has/what/ how-question in a combination of a why-question nevertheless, by seeing the great value in firstly understanding the nature of something in order to explain why it is that way, I choose to apply this amalgamation. Thus, easily put, I believe that you can't explain why something is a certain way, if you don't know what or how it is in the first place.

3.2 Discourse Analysis: The Linguistic Approach

In this study, I intend to investigate the discursive constructions of the EU with regards to Hezbollah during selected years where the referencing to Hezbollah is explicit and forceful, which will thus indicate if the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed and why. There are many ways of studying discourses, both in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or as Teun a. van D Dijk terms it Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and is dependent on a number of factors; aim of the research study, the empirical data, the interests and ability of the researcher as well as the limitations of the research project (Dijk 2008: 2-3). Therefore, to conduct this study, the method of CDA or CDS, if you will, will be employed in order to acquire an understanding of the language utilized by focusing on the

semantics, pragmatics and style; inherent to positive and negative expressions of the declarations and statements issued by the EU. Thereinafter, analyse whether the discursive constructions of the EU's attitudes towards Hezbollah has changed over time and why. Discourse analysis is employed because it is viewed as the most suitable method when analysing the various positive or negative wordings and sentences within context that is given specific meaning which then interpretative narratives can provide a greater understanding of whether and why EU's discursive constructions of EU's attitudes towards Hezbollah has changed over time. Combining this method with the more explanatory ambitions in this study when answering the question of why EU's attitudes has changed over time is considered most applicable because the contextual interpretations is always required when conducting an analysis in a rational way, especially since it correlates with the aim of the study and helps when answering my research question.

The meaning attributed to a word, sentence, an entire paragraph or text is commonly denoted to as the study of semantics, which ranges from views and attitudes to the definitiveness of decision making (Fairclough 2001:5). Pragmatics entails the study of the contextual milieu within which the meaning attributed to a word or situation and the influential characteristics the milieu has on those ascribed meanings (Chilton 2004:48). Moreover, an additional component of linguistics is stylistics or style that pertains to the selection of words employed by the author or publisher of the text and the use of lyrical and assonance in word formulations, the nifty use of parallels to establish a differentiation, the inter-changing of sentences on the basis of a changeable audience in order to emphasize certain expressions or statements, or simply the formal and informal aspects of style in communicative acts (Dijk 1983:24). Lastly, I will employ positive and negative expressions to demonstrate the perceived attitude of the EU towards the Lebanese Hezbollah, which will help ascertain, at least the official, European attitude towards Hezbollah. It is important to be aware that the use of specific words with ascribed significance is used to influence and situate words in either positive or negative inference (Dijk 2008:80).

3.2.1 Words and Expressions

In this paper, I will mainly look for certain words and expressions that indicate a more forceful attitude in EU statements. They are the use of adjectives such as strongly, deeply, utmost, strongest (possible) terms and often the amalgamated use of condemns, deplores, vicious, killings, assassination, tragedy, disintegration, "need", "must" and "should". The words' and expressions' frequency and increasing use in the same context as Hezbollah is mentioned will indicate change.

3.3 Discourse Analysis: The Communicative Approach

The method of discourse analysis is commonly regarded as various acts of communication, both in the form of speech or in written texts, which transpires in an interactive act of influence between the reader and the author (Mills 1997:2-4). Discursive acts occur in light of text or speech reproduction by a different person inscribing their personal use of language and opinions conducive to communicating information with specific objectives (Ibid: 5). Furthermore, Michel Foucault (1972 cited in Mills 1997:6-7) contends that the communicative act ascribed significance to it have influential characteristics on social interactions, which renders it entitled to be considered a form of discourse.

In any form of communication, certain significance is attributed and transferred between the producers of the communication, whether in the form of speech or in written texts, and the receiver and/or interpreter within the specific milieu of its deliverance and language. Chimombo and Roseberry (1998) argue that the concept of power is an integral part of that unique inter-relation from the time a text is produced and the receiver(s) who conduct their interpretations of said text (307-308). It is also important to address media discourse as a central and valuable channel in continuous modification, reviewing and revision that comprise of the audience's different social realities and is intersubjective in the sense that it continuously diffuses meanings that down the line develops into common knowledge and mutual significance (Ibid: 317 & Talbot, 2007: 3-4).

Furthermore, Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA) focuses primarily on studying the occurrence of change. The actual use of language derives from previous discursive constructions and the producers of communication, with the use of language, utilize the previously ascribed meanings, which is what Fairclough's concept of intertextuality entails. Hence,

> "It is by combining elements from different discourses that concrete language use can change the individual discourses and thereby, also, the social and cultural world. Through analysis of intertextuality, one can investigate both the reproduction of discourses whereby no new elements are introduced and discursive change through new combinations of discourse" (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 7).

It is important to have the concept of intertextuality in mind because it could help identify and deduce significant interpretations concerning the EU's linguistic use and by extension their approach towards Hezbollah and their actions. Furthermore, intertextuality is helpful when investigating why such a change in reference to Hezbollah has occurred when having identified previous discourses and identifying new ones.

In this research study, it's important to discuss the notion of political discourse, as it is an integral part when analysing political texts and understanding both how EU's discourse of Hezbollah is constructed and why those discursive constructions have changed. Firstly, it's important to define what I mean by political discourse, since it can both be a discourse, which in itself is political in nature, and a discourse, which is political but there are no direct reference to anything political, in way of substance or context wise. Therefore, political discourse is defined here as focusing principally on formal and informal contexts, political actors, among others political institutions, governments and media (Wilson 2001:398). In political discourses, as in other discourses the goal is to persuade the interpreting audience and in order to do so ethos, pathos and logos are key. Firstly, ethos concerns the individual features, authenticity and credibility as well as the use of terminology and sentences (Metcalfe 2012: 297), secondly, pathos signifies the allure and appeal to the audiences' emotions by making analogies and relating to issues of significant importance to the interpreter (Ibid: 299), and thirdly, logos is a term referred to when employing reasonable argumentations and evidence to strengthen one's claims (Ibid: 205-206).

3.3.1 The Relation between Discourse and Power

In social interactions, the concept of power is essentially defined as control that occurs when controlling others' actions and such power is exercised in the form of speeches or writing texts. Hence, the author in that position controls the discursive line of communication. The relation between discourse and power is important to discuss because in various communicative lines; i.e. discourses, occur within the EU and it is essentially where power and knowledge intersect and is deflected in the political and social life. Hence, power is inherent to various communicative acts; words and sentences, and, therefore, cannot be disregarded in the course of conducting a discursive analysis. Discourse has become a way of communication by various influential actors; political actors, the governments and the public media, thus resulting in power being enmeshed in the discourse becoming one and sometimes difficult to separate (Dijk 2008: 9). As Francis Bacon (1597) once said knowledge is power ("*scientia potestas est*"), which would prove accurate if actions are controlled which would influence the actors' personal opinions and beliefs, and then by extension being in control of the knowledge of social actors endows those authoring the communicative discourses in combination with its influential contextual milieu (Dijk 2008: 10). Chilton (2004) stipulates the importance of power in the way of its acquisition and ways of keeping it is mainly by using reason, persuasion and/or manipulation (3). In exchanges of communication; whether in speech or in writing, control and power is usually procured by enunciation and/or repetition with reasoned argumentation, and sometimes in combination with a nifty twist drawing the reader into your speech or text (Dijk 2008:37-38). Furthermore, in various forms of text; statements,

declarations or reports, the exercise of power can occur when limiting the substance of a text, which essentially means preferring particular understandings of an issue and phrasing it in a specific way. This would be construed as a hidden form of power that would correspond with the intention and aim of the author (Fairclough 2001: 43).

3.4 Textual Analysis

In its crude form, textual analysis is a qualitative method of collecting information about the perceived reality we live in and is useful for studying material of communication. Hence, as Alan McKee (2003) relays it "when we perform textual analysis on a text, we make an educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations that might be made of that text" (1). The applied method for conducting the second part of the analysis addressing the explanatory factors for the EU's changed attitude towards Hezbollah over time will be a form of interpretative research that is concerned with understanding why a particular process has unfolded over the course of time (Bhattacherjee 2012:106). The employed data collection technique is documentation, which means external and internal documents such as the public statements and articles, which are then used to make educated analytical interpretations based on the gathered and previously analysed data concerning whether EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has changed over time (107). This is a suitable way of analysing possible explanations for why EU's attitude has changed because "texts are the material traces that are left of the practice of sense-making- the only empirical evidence we have of how other people make sense of the world" (McKee 2003:15).

4 Analysis

4.1 The EU's Changed Attitude over Time

4.1.1 1983

Lebanon saw itself in the midst of war that erupted in 1975, the Ten, which was what the EU referred to itself when it comprised of Ten Member States, stated "they call upon all parties to respect the integrity of Lebanon and the authority of its government" which means to signify several involved parties in the Civil War (Appendix: Statement 1). The EU addressed eruptions of violence and death occurring in Lebanon in the midst of the civil war, which is an expected response by the EU but does not use forceful words such as "condemn" or "deplore". The EU's use of the term "all parties" signifies the implicit call to Hezbollah amongst Syrian, Palestinian and Israeli factions to behave in a responsible manner and "appeal for an immediate ceasefire leading to the cessation of violence and pressure in Lebanon" meaning that Hezbollah is perceived as one of the factions employing violence, which according to the EU, would be a "tragedy" and possibly result in the "disintegration" of Lebanon. Despite, the overall tone of the EU being rather inexpressive the selection of words such as "tragedy" and "disintegration" of Lebanon is heavy and in some ways heart wrenching, something that Hezbollah is perceivably contributing to. What is more, the statement by the Ten is intentionally cautious when refraining from explicitly mentioning Hezbollah and not using the word "deploring", as the European parliament did in the same month where they "…deplored the attacks perpetrated against soldiers of the multinational peace-keeping force…" (Appendix: Statement 2).

The non-explicit attitude expressed in the language of the statement issued in November 1983 with reference to the threat of force in the Middle East that "…all those concerned to put an immediate halt to the fighting and let reason and moderation prevail" indicate EU's moderately expressive tone as they instead of using "condemn" the phrase "deeply concerned" is preferably employed (Appendix: Statement 3). Simultaneously, it should be considered due to the civil war at the time and the numeral factions involved, interpretations of who did what in the war could be slightly troublesome to ascertain. However, indications made in previous statement by the EU show, in its contextual frame, that Hezbollah are positively one of the implied factions. The term employed by the EU, "all those

concerned" conveys a slightly cavalier tone, which seems somewhat out of place and a much more firm and determined tone would be expected with war and civilian causalities. Even so, the EU with traditionally a culture of condemning any act of violence and thus, failing to adhere to EU values such as human rights, rule of law, freedom of expression amongst others, would be expected to provide a statement of more strength and condemnation. Yet, the EU could be interpreted to be just enough concerned and supporting as to not add pressure to the violent fighting and have it deteriorate further.

4.1.2 1985

The EU expresses concern especially for the southern population in Lebanon that are "…subjected to unjustifiable acts of violence" that cannot be condoned irrespective of whomever is carrying out the violence and uses the phrase "continue to view" which is not forceful enough (Appendix: Statement 4). In alignment with the "Israeli Government's decision to withdraw its forces", the EU determinately adheres to the UN Security Council resolutions that explicitly request the withdrawal "…of other forces which are not there at the request of the Lebanese Government". Thus, this elevates the multiple interferences by foreign forces; the Syrians, the Israelis and Hezbollah, who are not there per request by the Lebanese government, as Hezbollah in 1985 wasn't yet considered a legitimate Lebanese force (Alagha 2006: 41). The EU specifically emphasizes the need for "…security arrangements be reached between the Israel and Lebanese Governments", whilst simultaneously acknowledging the difficulties surrounding such encounters considering Hezbollah's perpetual opposition as it would compromise its raison d'être and go against everything Hezbollah and its patron Iran represents (Gaub 2013:7-8). Moreover, the EU uses the traditional term "all the parties concerned" wherein Hezbollah is implicitly included, "both within Lebanon and outside", as well as both Syrian and Israeli forces (Appendix: Statement 4). The EU refers to them in a formal manner that neither provides impetus to think twice as a faction or change the violent approach groups have resorted to. The EU is using very apprehensive and implicit terms when referring to Hezbollah which could in one way be perceived as the EU, at this point in time, needing to fully understand Hezbollah's role and interests, as they only recently emerged in the beginning of the 1980s (Alagha 2006: 13), without assigning blame.

EU's cautious use of words is persistent but there is a tone of worry for the "deteriorating situation in Lebanon" and the clashes developing more seriously resulting in that "whole populations are leaving their homes" (Appendix: Statement 5). Hezbollah is still not mentioned explicitly but implicitly in the EU's "…appeal to all parties concerned…" which is issued in the context of the EU advocating the necessity of a national reconciliation by encouraging communication among the Lebanese factions.

4.1.3 1988

The EU continues to refer to Hezbollah in an implicit manner by the term "all parties" which within the context of the civil war can be considered an apt and suitable way to formulate a response (Appendix: Statement 6). The meaning attributed to that term; "all parties" can be perceived as a "just enough" use of words that keeps within the line of expected response in the midst of war. Furthermore, the EU again condemn terrorism as iterated in both statement 5 and 6 and is further highlighted in statement 7 held at the Western Economic Summit where the EU "strongly reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in all its form, including the taking of hostages" which refers to the increasing hostage-taking particularly in Lebanon and the region (Mannes 2004: 172) merely a week after the EU issued a statement on Lebanon and the hostage situation, but still does not use those forceful words like "condemn" with an explicit reference to Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 6). Additionally, the EU stating explicitly in statement 7 that "terrorists must not go unpunished" and the EU will fight it through "the application of rule of law, the policy of no concessions to terrorists and their sponsors" shows the EU's negative and disapproving attitude towards kidnappings.

4.1.4 1989

The EU addresses Hezbollah, yet again, in an implicit manner; "all parties involved" (Appendix: Statement 8). What is interesting is that the EU mentions Iran in a statement on Lebanon, stipulating that it has "expressed its hope that the Iranian leaders will prove, by concrete actions, their willingness to develop constructive relations with the Community and its Member States, on the basis of freedom, tolerance and respect for international law". Iran is perceived to have a special interest in the developments in Lebanon, which can be understood through their relation with and supporter of Hezbollah through the perceived assumption by the EU that Lebanon is in reality affected by this relationship. The EU mentioning Iran for the first time in a statement about Lebanon indicates the acknowledgement that Iranian ties are certainly influential in Lebanon and could be key when resolving the political and security situation in Lebanon (Ibid). Additionally, the fact that the EU emphasizes the need for leaders of Iran to engage in relations with the EU with values of freedom, tolerance and respect for international law implies the shared EU understanding that Iran fails to operate and uphold similar democratic aspirations, which are highly foundational in the EU (Kausch 2009:130). This distinction renders the perceived understanding of the EU being different from Iran, and thereby, Hezbollah as its ally and "student" since they share the same ideology and is an extension of the other signifying a sense of 'othering'; 'us versus them' the EU is subtly conveying. In addition, contextually the Ta'if accords were agreed upon due to Hezbollah strong-arming the negotiations and through means of pressure and Syrian support the Lebanese

government legitimized Hezbollah and as a Lebanese resistance force, thus circumventing the classification of militia and keeping their arms and weapons (Alagha 2006: 41).

4.1.5 1993

The EU states that they are "greatly concerned at the resurgence of violence on the Lebanese-Israeli border, whether they concern operations by the Israeli army in Lebanon or attacks against Israel emanating from Lebanon" rendering it a diplomatic paragraph by the EU indicating that they are concerned with not taking, at least publicly, any sides and using forceful "condemning" words with explicit mention of Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 9). Nevertheless, the wording above indicates the awareness and public acknowledgement of attacks on Israel, as attacks from the Israeli army are occurring, which implies Hezbollah being behind them. Yet, the EU continues to refrain from explicitly naming them; most likely because the EU wants to maintain relations with Lebanon that will facilitate possible communication as opposed to destroy any chance of conducting dialogues by publicly naming and shaming Hezbollah. Furthermore, the EU begins to use words such as "greatly" concerned and "firmly" condemn, which convey forcefulness and a sense of urgency for all parties to resolve their differences and ensure political stability (Ibid). Furthermore, many of these statements are issued in the context of the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and Palestine as stated "…to pursue intensively the peace process negotiations…" which indicate the shared view that resolving political difficulties in Lebanon will lead to an important step in the peace process, and this includes that Hezbollah, an actor that cannot be excluded, take steps to refrain from any attempts of hindering possible progress.

4.1.6 1996

The tone of sentences formulated by the EU is cautious but forceful as seen mid statement; "the European Union is seriously concerned" and "deeply deplores the suffering inflicted on the civilian populations of both countries, in particular the tragedy of Qana […] Equally, it deeply deplores the attacks on Israel." (Appendix: Statement 11). It's evident that the EU tries immensely to be equally 'condemning' of Israel and Hezbollah actions and not take any sides as they all the more begin to use forceful and strong words towards Hezbollah. Furthermore, the fact that Qana in southern Lebanon is a known Hezbollah stronghold (Alagha 2006: 42-43), the EU refrained from making explicit reference to Hezbollah as the one responsible for the attacks on Israel. Additionally, the European Parliament, just four days before the Council issued its statement, made explicit reference to Hezbollah with regards to the event where they "condemned the attacks by Hezbollah terrorist movement against Israeli villages. However, it also felt that the

Israeli response to these violent attacks was disproportionate, particularly in the view of the consequences for civilians in Lebanon" (Appendix: Statement 10). Additionally, the Parliament further "condemn the Iranian Government for the support it gave terrorist groups like Hezbollah and called on it to drop its political opposition to the peace process", which evidently shows the direct link between Iran and Hezbollah and the European Community's knowledge of this, but to the best of their ability the Council refrains from agitating what is obviously a sensitive situation. However, despite the Council not naming Hezbollah directly, the fact that the Parliament did, denouncing Hezbollah and referring to it as a terrorist group shows that there are discussions within the Community that indicate negative and conflicting attitude towards Hezbollah. The negative attitude is identified in the title of the parliament's resolution "Hezbollah attacks against northern Israel and Israeli retaliation" where Hezbollah is perceived as the instigator of the attacks and Israel's use of violence is purely self-defence, but this is complimented by claiming that the attacks by Israel was considered "disproportionate". The view of the parliament definitely provides a context to the Council's softened language as to not upset Hezbollah and/or relations with the Lebanese Government. However, the view of the parliament provides a more explicit understanding of Hezbollah and deductively a much more negative attitude that the Council tries to downplay. Furthermore, the bomb attack in Saudi Arabia was deemed a terrorist attack by the EU targeting the American Headquarters in Dhahran and the EU firmly stipulating that "the attack is the latest in a wave of hostile and criminal acts perpetrated against those who serve in favour of peace in the Middle East" (Appendix: Statement 12). Thus, those actors opposing the Middle East peace process has long been Hezbollah and Iran as the EU has mentioned in earlier statements (Appendix: Statement 9-12).

4.1.7 2001

The EU, for the first time, refers to Hezbollah by its name in the midst of an "Israeli attack on Syrian targets in Lebanon, the first in many years, as a retaliation for the Hizbollah attacks on the Shebaa farms, was an excessive and disproportionate reply" (Appendix: Statement 13). Here is identifiably the recognized change in the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah, thus the EU has until now only implicitly referred to Hezbollah. The use of the expression "excessive and disproportionate" is especially emphasized and follows with a sentence supporting the excessiveness by the Israelis by relaying their similar response on the Palestinian territories. The tone of the statement is one of restrain without using words, such as "Hizbollah *terrorist* attacks". The EU's view of the Israelis acting too harshly in their reply does provide the assumption that the EU somehow is slightly sympathetic towards the attacks the Lebanese people experienced than the Israelis. Moreover, the EU's use of words such as "condemns" and "deplores" signifies a stronger use of words to convey a more determinant attitude towards Hezbollah as the EU also "condemns the renewed

attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli positions in the Shebaa farms sector and the Israeli's army's launch of missiles against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon" (Appendix: Statement 14). Despite the EU at times pertaining to fairly lenient responses, the EU has increasingly employed a stronger use of words to convey a forceful and dynamic attitude.

4.1.8 2004

The exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah was tremendously welcomed by the Council, in which they were "hoping that this would clear the way for the resolution of problems between Israel and Hezbollah". It's visibly apparent that the EU views Hezbollah as a fully-fledged, capable and powerful actor who cannot be excluded in any dialogues as they carry influential weight, as seen in the exchange of prisoners. What is more, the attitude of the EU with regards to this exchange of prisoners is evidently encouraging but utterly cautious (Appendix: Statement 15).

4.1.9 2005

In the wake of the former Lebanese Prime Minister's assassination, the Council "strongly condemn the attack which cost the life of Mr Rafik Hariri" (Appendix: Statement 16). The EU's use of the word "strongly condemn" conveys their forceful attitude and their firm empathy of the attack. Using the words "cost the life" implies that Rafik Hariri stood up for something that he later paid for, which leads one to interpret that amongst the people who opposed his political policies was an enemy. It corroborates with the EU's view of suspiciousness since they felt the need to call for an international inquiry concerning the circumstances of his death. Hariri was unapologetically anti-Syrian and its interference in Lebanese matters (Wiegand 2009: 676), hence within that context the Hezbollah-Syria and the death of Hariri link has been questioned and still is with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) set up by the UN (BBC.com 2014). Furthermore, the EU shows significant appreciation for Hariri and his work using positive expressions and words such as "paid tribute" and "the strengthening of relations between Lebanon and the EU". However, the EU recognizes the sensitive situation, particularly by choosing to be watchful and wary about upcoming events as seen by using the word "vigilant". Additionally, the role of foreign interference or influence is highlighted and criticized, which can again be interpreted to mean the Syrian and Iranian influence (Ibid). What is more, the EU presses the issue of resolving the circumstances surrounding the killing of Rafik Hariri "by means of a thorough investigation", which implies that this issue is of significant importance to the EU (Appendix: Statement 17) and is issued within the context of the Syrian pledge "to withdraw all Syrian troops and intelligence services from Lebanon" (Ibid).

The Syrian interference is reiterated by the EU four months later with the outbreak of bombings which they "strongly condemn" by selecting words that have a forcefulness to them and expresses a profound concern for the regional instability, which Syria is contributing to (Appendix: Statement 18). The EU calls for "Syria to take action…and ending support for groups that oppose the Middle East Peace Process and calling on them to abstain from the use of violence", which implies Hezbollah. The style of words used by the EU such as "strongly condemns" and "deep concern" add an immense urgency to a sentence and/or word that is often required when conveying their support or in this case their disapproval. Again, Hezbollah is not directly mentioned but there is a link, as indicated by the EU, between Hezbollah and Syria; the shadow of Hezbollah follows implicitly in the mentioning of Syria or Syrian influence (Appendix: Statement 19). The continuous attacks on Lebanese personalities persists and negative wording is employed in describing the events; "assassination", "murder", "vicious", and as the EU could have utilized softer words such as "attack" or "death" as have been used before, they didn't and instead these words carry a strict forcefulness. The use of the words "vicious campaign" to describe the latest "assassinations" implies the awareness of the long meticulous planning needed to carry out these attacks. Additionally, the EU places a grave emphasis on "serious indications of the involvement of Lebanese and Syrian security services" in the attack on Mr Hariri and voices "its concern at the incomplete cooperation provided by the Syrian authorities" (Ibid). Hence, there are Syrian and Lebanese; Hezbollah, implications, consequently EU calls for the prosecution of those involved conveying their definite knowledge of Hezbollah and Syria's involvement (Ibid).

4.1.10 2006

The Council "condemned the attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. It called for their immediate and unconditional release and for the cessation of all attacks on Israeli towns and cities" (Appendix: Statement 20). Again, the EU utilizes the word "condemned" that has now become one of the forceful words employed to show their disapproval with Hezbollah. In parallel, the EU utilizes cautiousness when publicly referring to Hezbollah as not to upset the situation further, and can therefore be conceived as leniency towards Hezbollah. In addition, to make the condemnation less negative or balance it out the EU expresses its support for the Prime Minister immediately after condemning the attacks by Hezbollah. The tone towards Hezbollah is more condemning than before in the 1980s and 1990s with a newly developed cautious attitude (Ibid). The EU attributes sensitivity to Hezbollah, the circumstances and its role in the region, whilst still using forceful words to indicate their dissatisfaction. The context of these statements is the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war that increasingly spurred the explicit mention of Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 21). The structure of the sentences is formally composed, but strong dynamic words such

as "utmost" and "condemned" are employed as seen in "the Council expressed its utmost concern at the Lebanese and Israeli civilian causalities" and then continues by stating that "it condemned both the rocket attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the death of innocent civilians, mostly women and children, by Israeli air strikes such as that on the Lebanese village of Qana". Moreover, Syria is called upon to "stop supporting Hezbollah" which suggests that the EU behind closed doors in fact have a fairly negative attitude towards Hezbollah, or at least their actions, but hold back from publicly stating Hezbollah in a very negative light (Appendix: Statement 22). This could be interpreted as the EU despite not condoning their violent activities, and perhaps not being very influential, formal relations with Lebanon is necessary and any public clash with Hezbollah might affect that relationship. Moreover, more attacks on Lebanese personalities occurred to which the EU "unreservedly condemns" and such "political assassinations or other terrorist acts […] by internal or external forces" are condemned completely (Appendix: Statement 23). This is the first time the EU states that these acts are perceived within the frame of terrorist acts. The EU shows determination in using words as "assassination" and "unreservedly condemns" and when calling upon Syria to not interfere in Lebanon on all accounts using the words "must", "needs" and "should", signifying the EU putting serious pressure on Syria and on those executing the targeted attacks on politicians. Hence, it's apparent that a change in EU's attitude has occurred due to the increasingly explicit reference to Hezbollah and stronger use of forceful words (Ibid).

4.1.11 2007

The EU has more explicitly mentioned Hezbollah over the years but implicit reference does occur, as seen in some statements and the term "all parties" is utilized giving the impression of a changed but a cautious attitude employed by the EU towards Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 24). The term "all parties" is employed in the context of the political deadlock in forming a government in Lebanon, which the EU seems to link to Hezbollah. Therefore, emphasizing that solution to the political deadlock is not through means of violence but communication, thus indicating that those violent attacks made to disrupt a political solution are most likely executed by those opposing a solution disadvantageous for some. Thus, in its contextual understanding, Hezbollah, with its supportive allies in Syria and Iran, seeking to increase their influence in the political system is the actor the EU is implicitly referring to as all three actors have special interest in Lebanon and the route its taking (Fadlallah & Soueid 1995: 67). One of the violent attacks, which the EU "condemned in the strongest possible terms", is the "assassination of Mr Eido, Member of Parliament, his son and others" (Appendix: Statement 25). Describing those executing the attack as "perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these ruthless acts" conveys a sharply negative and determined attitude of the EU as expressed by the Council. The Council could have expressed itself in a less colourful and provoking manner but

didn't and consequently, it's interpreted as wanting to make a forceful statement of deploring the attacks. Similarly, this attitude is further characterized in an attack that "claimed the life of six people including Member of Parliament Antoine Ghanem" and "urges all Lebanese parties and all actors in the region" to not resort to violence (Appendix: Statement 26).

4.1.12 2008

The Council "condemned the terrorist attack perpetrated in Beirut…the bombing of a US diplomatic vehicle…and the attack on Unifil", and by characterizing it a terrorist attack the EU infers it to be meticulously planned by a well-organized faction. Although Hezbollah is an important actor and contributor in the political deadlock (Worth 2008), Hezbollah is not mentioned directly and the EU refrains from naming them despite their key role in its resolution (Appendix: Statement 27). The solving of the political deadlock is highlighted and the EU congratulated "all parties concerned", nonetheless the agreed conditions, which were all beneficial for Hezbollah are not addressed at all (Appendix: Statement 28; Worth 2008).

4.1.13 2010

The EU posits that it is "convinced" that solving the killing of Rafik Hariri will yield a stable Lebanon and therefore, "calls on all parties to fully cooperate with the Tribunal", and although Hezbollah is implicitly mentioned, the EU conveys its understanding of that interconnection wherein Hezbollah is an inherent part (Appendix: Statement 29). Furthermore, the EU calls on parties and actors in Lebanon and the region to not hinder and interfere with the work of the Tribunal. Hezbollah was supposedly instrumental in the attack on Rafik Hariri with Syrian support (Mehlis UNIIIC Report 2005), but the EU is refraining from explicitly naming or shedding any light in their role in the Tribunal especially since they imply that Hezbollah do play an instrumental role.

4.1.14 2012

The EU "condemns" and emphasizes the "repeated incursions by Syrian forces into Lebanese territory" and addresses the necessity of Lebanon avoiding any involvement in the Syrian crisis and calls on "all parties" to realize the Baabda Declaration and effectively disassociate from the Syrian conflict (Appendix: Statement 30). However, the EU understands Hezbollah's role and implicitly call on them to not get involved in the Syrian conflict, despite reports stating they're fighting alongside Bashar al-Assad supporters. Consequently, it makes Lebanese disassociation extremely difficult to abide by. On its entirety, the EU maintains a

supporting attitude whilst upholding a cautious, calculus and simultaneously a forceful and strong attitude, which can be perceived at times as a slightly indecisive attitude.

4.1.15 2013

In late July, the EU designated the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization effectively freezing all funds pertaining to Hezbollah's military wing in Europe and all lines of communication (Appendix: Statement 31). However, the EU is careful to state that this designation does not affect EU dialogue with Lebanon and its political parties, and in doing so separating between Hezbollah as a political party and its military wing where the former is a significant part of the Lebanese government. Furthermore, the EU continuously reassures that it's "fully committed to the stability of Lebanon" and their insistent reiteration that nothing has changed in the EU-Lebanon relations. The sense of both forcefulness and supporting attitude is conveyed with regards to this decision and by evaluating previous statements by the EU and its forceful attitude towards Hezbollah in recent years; there were not enough strong indications that would result in this partial designation. Yet in the context of this event, the designation seem to have been due to international pressure, but most importantly with events transpiring in Bulgaria; the bombing of a bus with Israelis and Cyprus; a Hezbollah operative plotting to attack Israelis; and Hezbollah's increasing participation in Syria culminating in necessitating the EU to take action (Black 2013). Later that year, the EU "strongly" called on all parties and made an explicit reference to Hezbollah "to act responsibly, fully abide by Lebanon's disassociation policy from the conflict in Syria" which evidently shows the EU's increasing use of forceful words to emphasize their disapproving attitude (Appendix: Statement 32). The issue of neutrality continuous to be disputed and Hezbollah is construed as inviting violent clashes and contributing to the Syrian "spill-over of violence". Furthermore, the EU balances the statement by underlining that the EU-Lebanon dialogue and relation with all political forces is imperative and encourages "all regional actors", which here most importantly signifies Iran and Syria to be "constructive", not just helpful but productive and not obstructive. Thereby, the selected time periods analysed above show that a change to the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah has unfolded over the years and become markedly forceful and explicit in reference.

4.2 Reasons for EU's Changed attitude

In this section I will attempt to explain why there has been a change during the selected time periods to the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah over the years.

Thereby, in November 1983, the EU expressed that the use of force occurs "particularly among the civilian", which positively indicate that international forces have been targeted, which translates into the attacks on the 23rd October against the United States Marine Headquarters and barracks as well as a French station in Beirut which claimed the lives of 241 US Marines and 56 French soldiers (Mannes 2004: 170). In addition, the string of Hizbullah car bombs in November and December 1983 targeted French Multinational Forces in Lebanon all of which the Islamic Jihad took responsibility for and later became known as Hizbullah's military wing (Ibid). Hence, the statement in November 1983 confirms Hezbollah's instigating mode that generated EU's statement. Hezbollah has organized itself well since its emergence resulting in surreptitious operations as seen above, which has facilitated its global web reach and interactions (Levitt 2013). Even though the statements from the EU is with a few months apart in the 1980s, it needs to be taken into consideration that the EU was not very expeditious in the issuance of statements immediately after an occurrence in the 1980s, nowadays the EU is incredibly quicker due to the technological advancements. Furthermore, the importance of Israel and Lebanon reaching security arrangements is emphasized in April 1985 (Appendix: Statement 4), which evidently is the result of a car bomb belonging to Hezbollah where 12 Israeli soldiers are killed and 20 are injured. Additionally, the EU refers to the kidnapping of foreign nationals such as the American citizen and journalist, Terry Anderson being kidnapped by Hezbollah (Mannes 2004: 172). Their web of interactions show a great width to their capabilities among actors in the region as seen in their actions founded upon their socially constructed animosity towards Israel and its allies; the US. Thus, evident by the kidnapping of Americans as also seen in May when Hezbollah kidnapped an American official at the American University in Beirut as addressed by the EU (Mannes 2004: 172; Appendix: Statement 5). Evidently, the US did react to American's being targeted in mid 1980s and withdrew their troops home, as France and Italy did, effectively disbanding the multinational peacekeeping force (Front world 2013). Even though kidnappings still occurred, the US, despite being targeted, didn't influence the attitudes of the EU markedly, which could be explained due to the more effective influence Iran could exert on Hezbollah because of its patron-student relation instead of what the former EC could do.

Hezbollah's actions seems to have coloured EU statement in June 1988 when responding to the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner, despite addressing it two months later at the Western Economic Summit, information confirmed Hezbollah operatives hijacking the flight and demanding the release of convicted Hezbollah terrorists in 7 bombings in Kuwait, amongst them American and French embassies in 1983 (Levitt 2013: 35-36 & 42). Hezbollah's participation in these operations has yielded mixed EU attitudes, at least when it comes to explicitly naming Hezbollah as the responsible actor for the attacks. Hezbollah is by the end of the 1980s, based on the EU statements, an actor the EU is evermore noticing and following. EU reiterates a lasting ceasefire in response to a Saudi diplomat

being killed and the bombing of the Saudi embassy in Beirut in the same month of June 1989 (Mannes 2004:173). These attacks were considered an act of vengeance for executing Kuwaiti Shiites behind the bombing plans in Mecca (Appendix: Statement 8). Furthermore, Hezbollah has behaved in a provoking manner towards numeral states with aforementioned targeted attacks, the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel resulting in a threat perception and an "us vs. them" attitude thus, Hezbollah embodying the role of the enemy relinquishes the possibility for cooperation. Hezbollah, opposing the Middle East Peace Process continuously tries to disrupt it by for example the violent conflict in July 1993 as expressed by the EU (Appendix: Statement 9) resulting in several Israelis' death in the hope of Israel attacking Lebanon and Syria (Katzman 1995: 11). The current state of affairs dictate indeed a multipolar world system and as Waltz envisioned, it's evident that the more capable actors establish themselves onto the international scene like Hezbollah, the less stable it will be and even more intricate. The increasing existence of the multiplicity of actors with equal capabilities will result in actors feeling threatened by others, as has happened with Hezbollah on the international scene and a sense competitiveness which certainly explains Hezbollah, with the help of its patron Iran, challenging Western powers and their long held influence in international relations and for once not adapting to western conditions but creating their own conditions. However, it seems the more active Hezbollah gets and their reported involvement in attacks, the more they're increasingly placed within the international system and constrained actors like Hezbollah are subjected to targeted sanctions, as seen later in 2013 (Black 2013).

The suffering the EU deeply deplores in April 1996 concerning the tragedy of Qana in Southern Lebanon simultaneously the attacks on Israel is depicted forcefully. The Israelis fired rockets near the UN position of which it has been stationed for 18 years, which evidently shows the Israeli awareness of this, but Hezbollah reportedly fired missile rockets first from behind the UN building in Qana (Fisk 1996). The US reportedly stated, "Those who allowed the Hezbollah militia to act with impunity should bear responsibility for their actions" (UN Press Release 1996), but they seemingly didn't influence the EU's attitude to refer explicitly to Hezbollah. Furthermore, the EU expressed in statement 12, with "horror and indignation" of the attack that occurred in the American Headquarters in Saudi Arabia in June 1996. Strong evidence show Iranian military cooperating with the Saudi Hezbollah faction with the financial aid provided by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and security implicated by the captured Hezbollah operatives (Leonnig 2006). These attacks are interpretatively a string of attempts at hindering the Middle Eastern Peace Process; resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which Iran and by extent Hezbollah is opposing and has combatted for a very long time as it is central to their raison d'être, eliminating Israel and fighting opposing allies (Gaub 2013:7-8). France recognizably hasn't expressed itself in media at this point concerning Hezbollah that differs from the EU statements, which can be interpreted as they at least concurring with the EU expressed statements with regards to Hezbollah, thus it lies within France's national interest

to continue with the EU's forceful attitude paralleled with cautiousness towards Hezbollah. Especially, with the attacks against French soldiers situated in southern Lebanon as part of the Multinational peace-keeping force (Liphshiz 2013) it's within France's interest to keep a cautious and not overtly provoke Hezbollah, thus the constructed interest is what determines how France acts. Additionally, France's close relation with Lebanon and its long colonial ties would undoubtedly be affected as it could potentially affect Lebanon's stability which is of great concern to France.

In 2001 fighting erupted around the Shebaa farms, situated on the borders of Lebanon and the Golan Heights, therefore, it has long been an area of dispute and the Lebanese government and Hezbollah have long held that the Shebaa farms belong to Lebanon (BBC.co.uk 2001. The EU issued a statement just a few days after violent attacks erupted in April where the EU in fact explicitly referred to Hezbollah as one of the fighting factions and the axis of allies is evident in the disputed issue of the Shebaa farms (Appendix: Statement 13-14). Syria and Iran; Hezbollah's axis of allies, has given more impetus for Hezbollah's ability to act in certain ways and the Shebaa farms gave Hezbollah reason and justification for fighting with the Israelis, as part of their raison d'être (Ibid). The window of opportunity was grabbed by Hezbollah to show strength and capability to Israel and the international community, and so when the EU in January welcomed the large-scale exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah ample perception of its competence to protect Lebanon and its interest spread (Appendix: Statement 15; Mannes 2004: 177). Hence, the exchange of prisoners shows the use of power as a means to acquire something of significant interest. Additionally, the EU does recognize the influential role Hezbollah plays in the region but specifically in Lebanon and to think they can be excluded in any developments or improvements in the country is reckless. Moreover, the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, which the EU addressed within days of the attack, created a distinctive divide in Lebanon that has yet to be amalgamated (Bray-Collins 2013: 281). The assassination is commonly considered to have been at the hands of Syria, Hezbollah's ally, reportedly due to Hariri growing more anti-Syrian and its continued interference in Lebanon (Ibid). Some months before his death, Hariri supposedly had been warned by Syria about breaking ties and so when Rafik Hariri's close friend former French President Jacques Chirac demanded for an international inquiry (Dahdah 2005), it has visibly yielded concurrence from the EU, France and the US amongst few, demanding immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, and despite the US blaming Syria openly, the EU never swayed from their forceful but cautious stance (UN Security Council 2005). Its apparent that the US and France concurred with EU opinion of calling for an international investigation which must have contributed to the EU's attitude of a more forceful stance on this event and Syria's role and Hezbollah's partner (Appendix: Statement 16-18; Dahdah 2005).

Furthermore, in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, politically motivated attacks claimed the loss of many political personalities, which the EU publicly condemned in statement 19 amongst them the murder of Gibran Tueni and his companions who were Syrian critics assassinated on the 12th December (Knudsen 2010: 15). The American president at the time, George W Bush deplored the attack and stated "efforts by Damascus and Tehran to foment instability in Lebanon must stop now" (BBC.co.uk 2007). The US equal condemnation apparently increased EU's determined support for the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC) as it in statement 19 notes "serious indication of Lebanese and Syrian involvement in Hariri's death. It is further confirmed by leaked Syrian documents revealing Hezbollah's cooperation and involvement in Tueni's death (Naharnet Newsdesk 2012). The enemy imagery is further strengthened by the EU to an extent, the US and France especially by requiring an international inquiry than a Lebanese national inquiry investigating the assassinations. The constructed shared understanding of Hezbollah with allies Iran and Syria has seemingly prompted the EU to adjust their attitude towards them in a fashion that still allows them to continue formal political dialogues and cooperation possibilities with the Lebanese government. The actions by Hezbollah in July 2006 attacking Israel and kidnapping two Israeli soldiers prompted condemning response just days after the attacks triggered by Hezbollah that amounted to war until August 14th (Geukjian 2008: 136). The explicit call by the EU to Syria to stop supporting Hezbollah in statement 22 fundamentally affirms the complexities of the existence of multipolarity in the international system and the difficulties in engaging with such actors and hence, their attitude towards Hezbollah, but also Iran and Syria as supporters of such behaviour. Hezbollah instigated the violent attacks by attacking an Israeli army convoy, which added to the common view of Hezbollah as a capably violent instigator changing the EU attitude towards them and the use of proxy wars by Syria and Iran (Appendix: Statement 20-22; Tür 2007: 117). While France and the EU critiqued Israeli retaliation as excessive, the US initially stated "Israel's right to defend herself" but later in the evening urged Israel to exercise restraint and think about the civilian causalities (Baker 2006). France challenged the US hands-off strategy by pushing for a UN resolution, which resulted in the increase of the UNIFIL force in the south and a ceasefire in August 14th (Tisdall & MacAskill 2006). The EU, in statement 23, emphasizing the central role of the new UNIFIL force and the new Security Council Resolution 1701, clearly shows the particular influence of France during the 2006 conflict.

Disruptions continued with the assassination of the Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel in order to stall the forming of a government; the political deadlock (Appendix: Statement 23-24; Schwerma 2010: 70). The only way of resolving the political deadlock meant Hezbollah acquiring a veto right, consequently solidifying Hezbollah's firm influential grip on the Lebanese government (Kechichian 2014). This veto right complicates things further for the EU, their attitude towards Hezbollah and knowing how to appropriately engage with them.

With the veto right, Hezbollah is an essential part of the Lebanese government meaning that any negative statement about Hezbollah could very well affect and disrupt the EU-Lebanon relation effectively isolating Lebanon from any EU dialogue which is contrary to the EU constantly reiterated commitment to Lebanon and its people as in statement 23. Naturally, the actions of Hezbollah clearly do affect the EU's attitude towards Hezbollah and their perception of the actor as evident by their forceful but cautious tone; however, due to their long proclaimed commitment of Lebanon it hinders them from being completely negative of Hezbollah. Thus, the EU attempts to exercise a balancing act; keeping good relations with Lebanon on the one hand and issuing statements of events Hezbollah participates in on the other, which is also what is expected of the EU. Additionally, an example is the assassination on the Internal Security Captain Wissam Eid in January 2008 where a Canadian report incriminated members of Hezbollah (Appendix: Statement 27; Levitt 2013: 7). The signing of the Doha Agreement effectively resolving the political deadlock in May 2008 was welcomed by the EU in a congratulated manner, something the US agreed with stating it being a "good step" (Worth 2008), however, it was still perceived as a setback for the US as it had pushed for Hizbollah to be disarmed and reduce Iran's influence in the region (telegraph.co.uk 2008). Thus, their ability to influence the EU's attitude was lacking as the EU welcomed the Doha agreement.

Moreover, the setting up of the International tribunal investigating the killing of Rafik Hariri in 2006 is the reason why minsters from the Hezbollah party resigned from the government, which lead to the political deadlock (BBC.com 2014). Hence, the contestation of the tribunal has never seized and continues until today and actors in the region, mainly Iran and Syria is encouraged to not obstruct the work of the tribunal (Appendix: Statement 29). Furthermore, the conflict in Syria in 2011 has increasingly spread into Lebanon and resulted in violent attacks around Lebanon between pro-Syrian Hezbollah allies and the Syrian opposition targeting Hezbollah since they strongly support Syria's Bashar al-Assad and his regime (Appendix: Statement 30; Kechichian 2014). The EU stated all parties including Hezbollah should abide by a disassociation policy from Syria and claim neutral ground, however, Hezbollah's continuous active involvement in the conflict fighting against the Syrian opposition seemingly elevated the necessity of discussing Hezbollah as their active role in international politics is evermore growing. Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah said, "His participation in the Syrian battles alongside regime forces is a final decision which his party would never reverse" (theDailystar 2013). Adding to the mix, there was attempted attack in Cyprus on Israeli tourists in July after a confessed Hezbollah member collected information on and planned to attack Israelis (Reuters 2013). Additionally, an attack happened in Bulgaria claiming the lives of five Israelis and has strong links to Hezbollah executing the attack (BBC.com 2013). At this point, these attacks on European soil presumably lead the way to partially designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, leading up to this the US and Israel have continuously pressured the EU for a complete terrorist designation, and whereas

EU members United Kingdom and the Netherlands has reinforced such pressure, France has especially opposed it (Liphshiz 2013). France apparently fear that designating them a terrorist organization would restrict their relations with and interests in Lebanon, destabilize the country as well as the French citizens serving in Lebanon probably becoming targets. France's colonial ties and national interests seem to have influenced the EU's attitude in amalgamation of the compelling events that seem to have necessitated such a response. France's apprehension seems to have been accommodated as a partial designation was agreed upon, the US effectively failing to influence EU's attitude towards Hezbollah in a complete designation, whilst France was quite successful in its endeavours. Hezbollah rejects EU's partial designation and state that Hezbollah has one deciding management for both the political party and the resistance (Latimes.com 2009), which by disregarding this indicate France's determined interest and successful endeavour in this partial classification. France influencing EU's attitude in this way effectively shows its capabilities and persuading power with regards to an actor like Hezbollah in a multipolar international system.

5 Conclusion

Over the years, with world events faced with every day, the EU's need to respond is expected and required especially with challenges moderate Islamist non-state actors bring and terrorist actions, on European soil nonetheless, is a dominate one that cannot be disregarded. Hezbollah is a significant Islamist actor with a web of continuous interactions internationally and with its increasingly growing influential role in political circles and their military capabilities, indications suggest that alternative approaches towards Islamist moderate actors has increasingly been explored indicating a change in attitude. There has evidently been a change in EU's attitude towards Hezbollah over time, at least over the last 18 years, where Hezbollah has more explicitly and forcefully been described and referred to in amalgamation with the increasing use of stronger and determined vocabulary such as "strongly", "deeply", "deplores", "condemns", "assassination", "killings" etc. The forceful use of words in amalgamation of Hezbollah very much confirms an evident change in EU attitude. However, over the recent years a cautious tone, occasionally seen in the implicit reference, has also developed parallel to the forcefulness, which indicates the increasing sensitiveness pertaining to the role Hezbollah currently plays in the international arena. Hezbollah being a political and a militant actor not completely renouncing from the use of violent tactics does complicate the appropriate EU attitude towards Hezbollah.

In this paper, I argue that the EU has in fact adopted a much more forceful but cautious attitude towards Hezbollah over time and I argue that it is mostly due to Hezbollah's own increased activities which has resulted in the EU being rather reactive than proactive in the international arena. The amalgamated use of both Social Constructivist and Neorealist theories has aided the understanding and explanation of the argument as the theoretical assumptions contend that the inherent state of anarchy in the international system wherein states are situated are not the absolute key actors in world politics. The assumption is highly relevant in the multipolar international system we live in. Furthermore, this study shows that it's evident France has, as opposed to the US, influenced the EU's attitude more on specific events, and that is mainly due to their strategic interests in Lebanon as well as their colonial ties. However, the main explanation for the change in EU's attitude is undoubtedly Hezbollah's increasing public activities in various events such as the Burga bus bomb in Bulgaria and the attempted attack in Cyprus, but also their active participation in Syria and fighting with the ruling president. Thus, with the axis of allies: Iran and Syria, Hezbollah's influence in many parts of the world is increasingly growing, and at times more difficult to curb. This analysis

shows that the EU is thoroughly reactive to Hezbollah's activities, which is evident by the EU's changed attitude over the years that have become more forceful and determined. Simultaneously, the cautious tone that has developed in parallel is mainly to keep good relations with Lebanon and not generate instability and by extent the region where Iran and Syria, is thoroughly involved. The EU's reactive nature in a multipolar international system where states are not the absolute actors, is imperative and one that has generated an increasingly determined attitude from the EU, but with the influence Hezbollah has in the Middle Eastern region and its international width it becomes a sensitive issue to have an attitude about and the recently developed cautious tone very much explains this. The analysis also shows that the EU is seemingly beginning to view Hezbollah as a more 'secular' actor and not so much as an Islamic fundamentalist one, which undoubtedly characterizes the EU's changed attitude towards Hezbollah over time, which could also provide possible indications for future change in EU attitude and approach towards other Islamist non-state actors. Moreover, there are numerous ways in which further research could be conducted on this topic and amongst them are covering a specific time period when a particular phenomenon occurred and investigate EU attitudes during that time or conduct a comparative analysis on the European media perceptions and the official EU attitude toward Hezbollah or any other Islamist non-state actor or even compare EU's attitude towards different non-state actors thus, the possibilities are endless.

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7 Appendix

1. "At the meeting in Athens on 12 September the Foreign Ministers of the Ten adopted the following statement on the situation in Lebanon: '*The situation in Lebanon is more critical than at any other time in the last 16 months. The number of innocent victims increases every day. The international community must do all it can to help put an end to this tragedy before it leads to the disintegration of Lebanon. The Ten appeal for an immediate ceasefire leading to the cessation of violence and pressure in Lebanon, and to national reconciliation. They call upon all parties to respect the integrity of Lebanon and the authority of its government. They stress the need for early progress towards the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, except as the Lebanese Government may request otherwise. They are ready to work for these objectives, jointly and individually. They are convinced that the abnormal situation in Lebanon, so long as it continues, is a further obstacle to the achievement of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East as a whole'*" (Bull. EC 9-1983, point 2.4.1. p.82).

2. The parliament adopted resolution on the situation in Lebanon; "*...on the resumption of hostilities in Lebanon: deploring the attacks perpetrated against soldiers of the multinational peace-keeping force, whose sole aim in going to Lebanon was to help restore peace, and condemning the shelling of the Christian areas of the Lebanese capital and the mountains, Parliament urged all the Governments of the Member States to increase their active support for the Lebanese Government in its efforts to restore national sovereignty...*" (Bull. EC 9-1983point 2.4.13. p.89)

3. On the 22 November the minsters held an initial discussion to prepare the ground for the European Council to state its view when it meets in December on the situation in Lebanon and the whole problem of the Middle East. They reviewed the present situation in Lebanon and expressed concern about the fate of the Palestinians in Tripoli. The Discussion followed the statement by the Ten *"The Ten are deeply concerned at the fighting in the north of Lebanon, which is causing intolerable suffering and large-scale loss of life, particularly among the civilian population of the region, Palestinians and Lebanese alike. The Ten, who have frequently expressed their opposition to the use or threat of force in the Middle East, appeal to all those concerned to put an immediate halt to the fighting and let reason and moderation prevail. The fresh outbreak of violence highlights more than ever the urgent need to seek a negotiated settlement of the region's problems, in accordance with*

the principles, which the Ten set out in the conclusions of the European Council on 29 June 1982 and in subsequent statements. In particular, self-determination for the Palestinian people, with all that this implies, remains a fundamental issue which must be dealt with in the context of a fair and lasting overall solution to the conflict" (Bull. EC 11-1983, point 2.4.2. p.68).

4. At their political cooperation meeting in Luxembourg on 29 April the Foreign ministers of the Ten adopted the following statement on the Middle East. *"The Ten continue to view with concern the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and in particular its consequences for the civilian population in the south, which continues to be subjected to unjustifiable acts of violence. Following the Israeli Government's decision to withdraw its forces, they look for the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of those forces from that region in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, as well as of those other forces which are not there at the request of the Lebanese Government. The Ten consider it important that appropriate security arrangements be reached between the Israeli and Lebanese Governments. The Ten appeal to all the parties concerned, both within Lebanon and outside, to act in such a way as to facilitate the process of restoring the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon, a process which has been seriously compromised by the recent worsening of the political and security situation. The Ten reaffirm their support for UNIFIL's role, avoiding all incidents, cooperating fully with the force and ensuring the safety of its personnel. They are deeply concerned at the suffering of the Lebanese people and at the kidnappings involving foreign nationals."* (Bull. EC 4-1985, point 2.4.1. p.59).

5. While the Council was meeting in Brussels on 20 May, the Foreign Ministers issued the following statement on Lebanon: *"Recalling their statement of 29 April, the 10 Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Communities express deep concern for the deteriorating situation in Lebanon, where clashes between various groups are becoming more serious, acts of violence are increasing and whole populations are leaving their homes. They appeal to all parties concerned for the resumption of the dialogue between the various Lebanese groups and the holding of a true national reconciliation conference. The Ten reiterate their conviction that only if present internal differences are overcome can Lebanon preserve its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and are ready to contribute in the search for such a solution.* (Bull. EC 5-1985, point 2.4.1. pp.81).

6. Statements on Lebanon were issued by the Foreign Ministers on 13 June in Luxembourg: *"The Twelve follow with concern the critical situation in Lebanon, which urgently requires a political solution after 13 years of war*

and suffering. The proper functioning and strengthening of Lebanon's constitutional bodies is a precondition such a solution. The Twelve therefore believe that the orderly and constitutional conduct of the forthcoming presidential election will be of decisive importance for the future of the Lebanese Republic. They call upon all parties involved to support the preparation and good conduct of the election. The Twelve are convinced that the lasting peace can only be achieved by national conciliation and a just solution of the internal problems, taking into account the legitimate interests of all of the different communities of the country. This implies that all should be prepared to make mutual concessions. To this end the Twelve appeal to all parties to work together constructively for an early political solution to the Lebanese crisis and its regional implications. The Twelve furthermore stress the need to intensify efforts aimed at restoration of the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The full independence and sovereignty of Lebanon must be respected, and it must solve its problems without foreign involvement or interference. The Twelve underline their support for UNIFIL and call upon all parties to ensure these forces are allowed to fulfil their mandate without hindrance. The Twelve once more condemn the fact that hostages are still being held in Lebanon, and call for their immediate release." (Bull. EC 6-1988, point 2.4.2. p.117-118).

7. Western Economic Summit, Toronto 20 and 21 June 1988 on terrorism: "*We strongly reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in all its form, including the taking of hostages. We renew our commitment to policies and measures agree at previous summits, in particular those against State-sponsored terrorism. We strongly condemn recent threats to air security, in particular the destruction of Korean airliner and the hijacking of Kuwaiti airliner. We recall the principle affirmed in previous declarations that terrorists must not go unpunished. We appeal to all countries who are not party to the international conventions on civil aviation security, in particular the Hague Convention, to accede to those conventions. We express support for work currently under way in the International civil aviation Organization aimed at strengthening international protection against hijacking. We welcome the most recent declaration adopted by the ICAO Council which endorses the principle that hijacked aircraft should not be allowed to take off once they have landed, except in circumstances as specified in the ICAO declarations. We welcome the adoption this year in Montreal and Rome of two international agreements on aviation and maritime security to enhance the safety of travellers. We reaffirm our determination to continue the fight against terrorism through the application of rule of law, the policy of no concessions to terrorists and their sponsors, and international cooperation.*" (Bull. EC 6-1988, point 3.5.39. p.174).

8. The Madrid European Council, 26 and 27 June: "*The European Council reiterates its determination to continue contributing to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and has approved the attached declaration (→ point 1.1.23). In this context, the European Council considers that a definitive solution to the Lebanese crisis should be urgently negotiated and implemented. It confirms the full support of the Twelve for the Committee of Three set up by the Arab League Summit in Casablanca. The European Council calls on all parties involved to cooperate fully with the committee of Three with the aim of achieving a complete and lasting ceasefire and a just political solution to the Lebanese crisis based on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The European Council considers that a political solution should be based on the election of a President, political reforms and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese troops. It renews its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages in Lebanon and elsewhere. It reaffirms its full support for UNIFIL. The European Council has expressed its hope that the Iranian leaders will prove, by concrete actions, their willingness to develop constructive relations with the Community and its Member States, on the basis of freedom, tolerance and respect for international law.*" (Bull. EC 6-1989, point 1.1.17. p. 14).

9. The following statement was published in Brussels on 27 July: "*The European Community and its Member States are greatly concerned at the resurgence of violence on the Lebanese-Israeli border, whether they concern operations by the Israeli army in Lebanon or attacks against Israel emanating from Lebanon. They firmly condemn once more all acts of violence whatever their origin. They deeply regret the civilian casualties resulting from such violence and operations, which have already caused the exodus of several thousand people. The civilian population throughout the region has a right to peace and security. They call for an immediate stop to all such actions directed against the sovereignty of Lebanon, its territorial integrity and its independence and which threaten the peace process. They also call on all parties concerned to respect and cooperate with the UN forces in the region. The European Community and its Member States recall that they have for many years called for the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425. The all-too-long years of violence and conflict have shown that the use of force and recourse to violence have brought neither a solution nor the prospect of peace for any of the parties involved. They call on all parties to show restraint and to pursue intensively the peace process negotiations, which have reached a crucial phase. Only their successful conclusion will offer any hope of an untroubled future for this region and its sorely tried people*". (Bull. EC 7/8-1993, point 1.4.13. p. 104).

10. Parliament resolution on Hezbollah attacks against northern Israel and Israeli retaliation. Adopted on 18 April. "*Parliament roundly condemned the attacks by Hezbollah terrorist movement against Israeli villages. However, it also felt that the Israeli response to these violent attacks was disproportionate, particularly in view of the consequences for civilians in Lebanon. It reiterated its behalf that the peace process was the only viable way of ensuring lasting peace and stability in the Middle East. Parliament went on to condemn the Iranian Government for the support it gave terrorist groups like Hezbollah and called on it to drop its political opposition to the peace process. It called on the EU presidency to take the diplomatic steps necessary to enable it to mediate an end to the fighting and to strengthen the Union's contribution to the peace process. In addition, the Commission was asked to provide emergency humanitarian aid for Lebanese refugees.*" (EU. Bull 4-1996, 1.4.68. p.75).

11. The following European Union statement on Lebanon was published at the Council meeting held in Luxembourg on 22 April: "*The European Union seriously concerned by the aggravation of the situation in Lebanon and northern Israel. It renews its appeal for an immediate cease-fire and, in this context, supports UN Security Council resolution 1052. It considers that only a political solution can bring an end to the current crisis and allow the peace process to resume its course. It considers that the populations of Israel and Lebanon must be able to live in peace and security. The European Union deeply deplores the suffering inflicted on the civilian populations of both countries, in particular the tragedy of Qana (Southern Lebanon), and the loss of human lives, which continues to increase. Equally, it deeply deplores the attacks on Israel. Current events also risk compromising the peace process and stability in the Middle East. The European Union insists that all the parties, whether directly or indirectly involved in the current conflict, contribute to an immediate halt to hostilities and acts of violence with the aim of allowing peace negotiations to resume. The European Union reaffirms its support for all the parties involved in peace negotiations. It confirms its willingness to contribute actively to the search in progress for an immediate halt to hostilities and a lasting peace in the region. In this regard it supports the action undertaken by the presidency, the troika and Member States, notably France, who have been in the region or made representations in recent days. It supports all the efforts, notably those of the USA, currently being undertaken with the same purpose. The aim of these efforts must be to obtain, with an immediate halt to hostilities and acts of violence, the elaboration of a lasting agreement between the parties, which would not prejudice a global agreement between Israel and Lebanon in the context of the peace process. This agreement must contribute towards guaranteeing Israel's security and preserving Lebanon's sovereignty, in accordance with the Security Council resolution 425, to which the*

European Union remains committed. The European Union expresses its support for the continuing efforts of United Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in highly adverse circumstances, which have included horrific injuries to four Fijian peacekeepers at Qana, to try and alleviate the effects of the current violence and ensure the safety of the civilian population. Lebanon, which for some years has been courageously engaged in reconstruction, must be able to find once again the peace to which, like its neighbours, it has a right. The European union will continue to provide assistance to that Lebanon can take its rightful place in peace and prosperity in the Middle East. In this regard the European Union will pursue its support for Lebanon's reconstruction and development, particularly in the field of energy. It declares itself ready to increase significantly the substantial humanitarian contribution ehich it is already making, by means of national contributions, to relieve the suffering of the civilian population and in particular the refugees in southern Lebanon. In this context it launches an appeal for free and secure circulation on the coastal road south of Beirut with the sole purpose of guaranteeing access for humanitarian assistance to the population of Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyeh. The European Union reaffirms its commitment to pursue diplomatic efforts in the region and expresses its willingness to participate in proposals aimed at promoting just, lasting and comprehensive peace " (EU. Bull 4-1996, 1.4.11. p.59-60).

12. The following presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on the bomb attack in Saudi Arabia was published in Rome on 27 June and in Brussels on 28 June. "*The European Union has learned with horror and indignation the news of the terrorist attack on the American headquarters in Dhahran, in which so many people lost their lives or were wounded, criminally carried out when Secretary of State Warren Christopher is engaged in a new and delicate peace mission in the region. The attack is the latest in a wave of hostile and criminal acts perpetrated against those who serve in favour of peace in the Middle East. In expressing its condolences to the relatives of the victims, the European Union wishes to reaffirm, as solemnly reiterated at the recent Florence European Council, its absolute condemnation of the scourge of terrorism and political violence and its continuing support in favour of stabilization and peace-building in the Middle East.*" (EU. Bull 6-1996, 1.4.8. p.122-123).

13. The following Presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on the escalation of violence in the Middle East was published in Brussels and Stockholm on 18 April. "*The European Union is extremely concerned about the dangerous escalation of violence in the Middle East. The Israeli attack on Syrian targets in Lebanon, the first in many years, as retaliation for the Hizbollah attacks on the Shebaa farms, was an excessive and disproportionate reply. Furthermore, the excessive use of the army and the*

disproportionate Israeli reply to mortar attacks from Palestinian administered territories on Israeli targets further escalate violence and aggravate the conflict. Israeli incursions into Palestinian controlled territories are illegal and must not be repeated. The spiral of violence must be reversed. The price to be paid by the peoples of the region could be high. The European Union urges all parties to act with maximum restraint, restore calm and do their utmost to prevent actions, which may claim new victims. The European Union remains convinced that there is no alternative to a negotiated solution based on international law, in particular UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of land for peace. The Union encourages both parties to engage in serious attempts to find a negotiated solution at this critical juncture and welcomes efforts that are made to this effect such as the Egyptian-Jordanian initiative." (EU. Bull 4-2001, 1.6.14).

14. The following Presidency statement on behalf of the European Union on the escalation of violence in the Middle East was published in Brussels on 3 July. *"The European Union expresses its deep concern at the upsurge in violence in the Middle East. It condemns both the latest car bomb explosions in Yahud in the suburbs of Tel Aviv and the extrajudicial execution by Israel of three Palestinian militants. With regard to the latest developments in Lebanon, the European Union refers to its statement of 18 April 2001 and also condemns the renewed attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli positions in the Shebaa farms sector and the Israeli's army's launch of missiles against a Syrian radar station in Lebanon. The European Union urges all parties to show the utmost restraint and to work resolutely to break the spiral of violence, the main victims of which are civilians. The European Union is convinced that negotiation offers the only solution to the problems that beset the region and considers that all possible steps must be taken to implement in full the recommendations made in the report of the Sharm-el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell report), starting with a strict observance of the ceasefire."* (EU. Bull 7/8-2001, 1.6.25).

15. Council conclusions on the Middle East peace process. Adopted on 26 January. *"The Council welcomed the announcement of the conclusion of an agreement on the exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah, hoping that this would clear the way for the resolution of problems between Israel and Lebanon as regards prisoners and prisoners' remains."* (EU. Bull. 1/2-2004, 1.6.118.).

16. Council conclusions on the attack carried out in Beirut. Adopted on 21 February. *"The Council strongly condemned the attack which cost the life of Mr Rafik Hariri, the former President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon. It paid tribute to the work Mr Hariri did for his country and for the strengthening of relations between Lebanon and the EU and called for an international inquiry. The Council agreed to remain vigilant so that the forthcoming legislative elections in Lebanon be held in accordance with a free and fair electoral process, without any foreign interference or influence."* (EU Bull. 1/2-2005-1.6.61).

17. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 16 March. "*The Council noted the reappointment of the outgoing prime minister to form a new government. It hoped to see the early formation of a government able to act in the interests of all Lebanese. The Council reiterated the importance it attached to the holding, on schedule, of free, fair and transparent elections, in accordance with the Lebanese constitution, without any outside interference or meddling. It also reiterated its call for the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004). The Council called on Syria to implement rapidly the pledges made by President Bashar Al Assad to withdraw all Syrian troops and intelligence services from Lebanon. It also urged the Lebanese authorities to clear up the circumstances of the killing of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr Rafik Hariri, by means of a thorough investigation.*" (EU. Bull. 3-2005, 1.6.36.).

18. Council conclusions on Lebanon and Syria. Adopted on 18 July. "*The Council strongly condemns the bombings which have taken place since October 2004 and calls upon the Lebanese government to mount a full investigation into these attacks. It underlines the importance of full implementation of UNSCR 1595 (2005) and the need for all parties to cooperate towards this. In this context, the Council reaffirms its full support for the international investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese Head of Government. While noting the withdrawal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon, it expresses deep concern at the current situation in the region and calls on Syria to take action to promote regional stability, including by: supporting the legitimate and sovereign new government of Lebanon and allowing for smooth circulation of goods between the two countries; supporting the political process in Iraq including by cooperating with the Iraqi authorities to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists; and ending support for groups that oppose the Middle East Peace Process and calling on them to abstain from the use of violence. Lastly, the Council welcomes the nomination of Mr Fouad Siniora as the President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lebanon and the successful completion of legislative elections in Lebanon, which represents a decisive step towards an independent, sovereign and democratic Lebanon.*" (EU Bull. 7/8-2005, 1.6.57).

19. Brussels European Council, 15-16 December. Annexes to the Presidency Conclusions. "*The European Council reiterates its support for Lebanon's unity, stability and independence, and reminds its neighbors of their obligations to respect Lebanon's sovereignty. The European Council strongly condemns the assassination of Gibran Tueni and the murder of companions travelling with him. This assassination is the latest in a vicious campaign against Lebanese citizens, journalists, political leaders and their right to freedom of expression. The European Council also notes with extreme concern the conclusions of the second report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) under Mr*

Detlev Mehlis. It notes the confirmation of serious indications of the involvement of Lebanese and Syrian security services in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and expresses its concern at the incomplete cooperation provided by the Syrian authorities to the Commission. It urges Syria to cooperate unconditionally with UNIIC as they continue their efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. It welcomes the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1644 of 15 December which extends the mandate of the UNIIIC; authorizes the UNIIIC to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigations into other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004; and acknowledges the Lebanese government's request that those charged with involvement in Rafiq Hariri's assassination should be tried in a tribunal of an international character. The European Council reaffirms its full support for the government of Lebanon and urges it to extend its authority throughout the country and to tackle urgently economic and political reform as agreed at the Core Group meeting held in New York last September. It welcomes the international conference to be held in early 2006. It reminds all concerned of their obligation to implement UNSCR 1559 in its entirety, including the disbanding and disarmament of all militias." (EU Bull. 12-2005, *I.27*).

20. Council conclusions on the Middle East. Adopted on 17 July. *"Developments in Lebanon and Israel: the Council condemned the attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. It called for their immediate and unconditional release and for the cessation of all attacks on Israeli towns and cities. The EU expressed its support for Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, recalled the need for the Lebanese state to restore its sovereignty over the whole of its national territory and for the full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559(2004) and 1680(2006)."* (EU. Bull. 7/8-2006, 1.33.8).

21. Council conclusions on the crisis in Lebanon. Adopted on 1 August. *"The Council expressed its utmost concern at the Lebanese and Israeli civilian casualties and human suffering, the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and the increased number of internally displaced persons following the escalation of violence and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities to be followed by a sustainable ceasefire. It condemned both the rocket attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the death of innocent civilians, mostly women and children, by Israeli air strikes such as that on the Lebanese village of Qana. It also stated that all attacks against United Nations personnel are unacceptable and deplored the tragic deaths of four UN military observers. The Council expressed its full support for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council to be rapidly convened to define a political framework for a lasting solution agreed by all parties, which is a necessary precondition for deployment of an international force. EU Member States have indicated their readiness to contribute to such an operation together with international partners. The Council underlined the EU's commitment to Lebanon, to its full*

sovereignty, and to its long-term political and economic partnership with Europe. The EU is ready to contribute to rebuilding a Lebanese state able to exercise full sovereignty on its territory and to protect its people. It reiterated its determination to work with the wider international community to bring humanitarian relief to the people of Lebanon and called on all parties to grant secure and efficient passage for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to southern Lebanon. Thus far the Community and EU Member States have committed over EUR 56 million to the relief efforts, with another EUR 52 million in pledges. Turning to the continuing violence in Gaza and the West Bank, the Council expressed its concern at the equally distressing humanitarian situation and reiterated its call for the parties to return to the peace process on the basis of the roadmap which it considers the only path to achieving a viable independent Palestinian state which can live side by side, in peace and security with Israel." (EU Bull. 7/8-2006, 1.33.6).

22. Council Conclusions on: Syria. *"European Parliament resolution containing the European Parliament's recommendation to the Council on the conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean association agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Syrian Arab Republic, of the other part. It asked the Council to strengthen its initiatives with a view to deepening the cooperation between the EU and Syria and ultimately signing that agreement, while taking account of a number of recommendations. These include: calling on Syria to respect Lebanon's security, refrain from interfering in its internal affairs, establish formal diplomatic relations with Lebanon and stop supporting Hezbollah*" (EU Bull. 10-2006, 1.33.5).

23. Annex II to presidency conclusions. Brussels European Council 14-15 Dec. Declaration on Lebanon. *"The European Council is concerned by the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, and underlines its determination to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. A solution to the current political deadlock should be sought only through dialogue and with full respect for the democratic institutions of the country. The European Council confirms its full support to the efforts of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the legitimate and democratically elected government, aimed at maintaining dialogue with all political actors in Lebanon and at tackling the important challenges it is facing, in particular fully implementing UNSC Resolution 1701 and reconstructing the country. The European Council calls on all parties in the region to comply with the resolution, notably the arms embargo. It urges Israel to stop violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli Air Force. The European Council unreservedly condemns the assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel and any attempt by internal or external forces to destabilize Lebanon through political assassinations or other terrorist acts. It expects those who committed such crimes to be identified and brought to justice. In this context, the European Council welcomes the endorsement by the Lebanese Council of Ministers of the draft status of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1664, and looks*

forward to the early completion of the remaining steps necessary for the establishment of the Tribunal. The European Council reaffirms its support for the efforts aimed at the reconstruction and the prosperity of Lebanon. It reiterates the willingness of the EU to actively contribute, in close coordination with the Lebanese government, to the full success of the International Conference in support to Lebanon due to take place in Paris on 25 January 2007. The European Council recognizes the need for urgent financial backing in order to lay a sound foundation for the future economic and social development in Lebanon. The EU and its Member States by their prominent role in the new UNIFIL have demonstrated their commitment to the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 with a view to reaching a long-term solution to the questions that led to last summer's confrontations. The European Council welcomes the recent report by the UN Secretary-General and his intention to consider the possibilities for a greater UN role on the Shebaa farms issue including the suggestion by the Lebanese Government to place the area under UN jurisdiction until permanent border delineation and sovereignty over them is settled. The European Council calls for the immediate release of the two abducted Israeli soldiers. The European Council calls upon all Lebanese and regional actors to show responsible leadership and full respect for Lebanese democratic institutions. Syria must end all interference in Lebanese internal affairs and actively engage in the stabilization of Lebanon and the region. Syria needs to do so to be in a position to develop normal relations with the international community, including with the EU. Syria should recognize, and cooperate with, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon." (EU Bull. 12-2006, I.15).

24. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 12 February. *"The Council welcomed the success of the international conference in support of Lebanon held in Paris on 25 January 2007. By pledging more than USD 7.6 billion in aid, the international community has sent a strong message of support to the people of Lebanon and its legitimate and democratically elected government. The EU and its Member States contributed more than 40 % of the total aid pledged at the Paris conference. These resources will contribute to meeting the challenges of reconstruction and macroeconomic stabilization, to the benefit of the entire Lebanese population. The adoption of the EU-Lebanon action plan in the context of the European neighborhood policy will enable further deepening of our existing cooperation within the framework of the association agreement and of the Barcelona process. The Council expressed great concern about the renewed violent clashes of the past weeks in Lebanon. It urged all parties to refrain from all forms of violence and to do everything possible to prevent an escalation of the situation. A solution to the current political deadlock should be sought only through dialogue and with full respect for the democratic institutions of the country. The Council recalled its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon and renewed its call for the full and speedy implementation of Resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1664 (2006). It reiterated its call on Syria and other countries in the region to refrain from interfering in the*

domestic affairs of Lebanon and to actively engage in the stabilization of Lebanon." (EU Bull. 1/2 -2007, 1.34.5).

25. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted at its session of 17 and 18 June. *"The Council condemned in the strongest possible terms the assassination of Mr Eido, Member of Parliament, his son and others on 13 June. It recalled that Mr Eido and other personalities targeted since 2004 had distinguished themselves by their struggle for an independent, sovereign and stable Lebanon, free of foreign interference. The Council expressed its support for the efforts by the Lebanese government and the security forces to bring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these ruthless acts to justice and to ensure security and stability throughout Lebanon. The Council reaffirmed its determination to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and its support for the legitimate and democratic government of Mr Siniora, Prime Minister. The Council went on to strongly condemn the attacks on Lebanese security forces by terrorist groups operating from the Palestinian refugee camps at Nahr el Bared and Ain el Hilweh, and the recent bomb attacks. It deplored the loss of life and human suffering caused by the terrorist violence, including the killing of two Lebanese Red Cross workers on 11 June. The Council concluded by reiterating its call on all political forces in Lebanon to search for a solution to the current political deadlock and to develop the widest possible consensus for the forthcoming election of the President of the Republic. Dialogue and full respect for the democratic institutions of the country should be the guiding principles of the political process, in the interest of all Lebanese people."* (EU. Bull. 6-2007, *1.34.4).*

26. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 15 October. *"The Council condemned in the strongest terms the car bomb attack perpetrated on 19 September in Beirut, which claimed the life of six people including Member of Parliament Antoine Ghanem. It urges all Lebanese parties and all actors in the region to refrain from any activities that would further endanger the political stability of Lebanon. The Council is following closely the electoral process and has taken note that the Parliamentary session to elect a new president of the republic has been adjourned to 23 October. It called for the holding of free and fair presidential elections, without foreign interference and in conformity with the deadline set by the constitution. The Council welcomed the end of the crisis caused by extremist militants entrenched in Nahr el Bared Palestinian refugee camp and reiterated its full support for the Lebanese Government and armed forces. Finally, the Council recalled previous statements and remains determined to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and independence, according notably to UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701 and 1757."* (EU Bull. 10-2007, 1.34.4).

27. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted on 28 January. *"The Council:*

-Condemned the terrorist attack perpetrated in Beirut on 25 January, the bombing of a US diplomatic vehicle on 15 January and the attack on UNIFIL on 8 January;
 -Remains concerned at the continued absence of a Head of State in Lebanon and regrets that the Parliamentary session has been postponed yet again until 11 February;
-Welcomed the unanimous endorsement, of a plan for the immediate election of the President by the extraordinary session of the foreign ministers of the Arab League held on 6 January in Cairo, the formation of a national unity government and the adoption of a new electoral law;
-Called upon all parties to work responsibly in order to implement the plan of the Arab League without delay;
-Reiterated its support to the legitimate and democratic government of Prime Minister Siniora and to the Lebanese armed forces and their contribution to the stability of the country;
-Looks forward to the start of the work of the special tribunal;
-Condemned the rocket attack launched against Israel on 8 January." (EU. Bull. 1/2-2008, 1.35.9).

28. Council conclusions on Lebanon. Adopted by the Council at its session of 26 and 27 May. *"The Council welcomed the agreement reached in Doha on 21 May that opens the path towards a full resumption of the functioning of all democratic institutions of the State of Lebanon. It welcomed the election of General Suleiman as President of Lebanon. The Council also congratulated the parties concerned for their constructive approach and their will to engage in dialogue and in particular commended the efforts of the Arab League. The Council reaffirmed its solidarity with the people of Lebanon and its full support to the government and other democratic institutions. It also commended the Lebanese armed forces and their contribution to the stability of the country. However, it deplored the recent acts of violence and reiterated its firm denunciation of all attempts aimed at undermining peace and stability in Lebanon."* (EU Bull. 5-2008, 1.35.4).

29. Council Conclusions on Lebanon 22 Nov 2010. 3048th Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The Council adopted the following conclusions: *"1. The Council reaffirms its full support to the Government of National Unity led by PM Hariri, established in the wake of democratic elections. Concerned by the situation in Lebanon, it calls on parties to further engage in dialogue in the spirit of consensus and to respect the rule of law. The Council supports the Lebanese institutions, the full implementation of the Doha Agreement and of the principles enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution and the Taif accord. 2. The Council also reaffirms the full support of the European Union for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) as an independent court, created by UNSCR 1757 and following the highest judicial standards, as unequivocally reaffirmed in a recent statement by the UN Secretary- General. The Council expresses its concern at intimidations and condemns attempts to hinder the work of the STL. 3. The Council is convinced that achieving international justice on*

the killing of Rafik Hariri and others, and preserving stability in Lebanon are mutually reinforcing. It calls on all parties to fully cooperate with the Tribunal in order to put an end to impunity and bring stability to the country. It recalls legal obligations stemming from UNSCR 1757. The Council further calls upon all parties and actors, both in the country and in the region, to play a constructive role, not to interfere in the Tribunal's work and not to prejudge its outcome. 4. The Council remains determined to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and stability. The Council recalls its commitment to the full implementation of all relevant UNSC Resolutions, including 1559, 1680, 1701 and 1757. 5. The Council commends the crucial role of UNIFIL, whose activities alongside the Lebanese army continue to be essential for peace in the region. The Council calls for the implementation of all provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701, for respect of the blue line in its entirety and for the full cooperation with the United Nations and UNIFIL."

30. The Council adopted the following conclusions on Lebanon. p, 12-13. Foreign Affairs Council 19 Nov 2012. *1. "The EU strongly condemns the bomb attack on 19 October 2012 in Beirut, which killed Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan, Head of Information Branch of the Interior Security Forces, and two other people, and injured many others. This act of violence, as well as other assassination attempts, must be fully investigated and the perpetrators must be brought to justice swiftly. Impunity and political violence cannot be tolerated in a democratic society. 2. The EU stresses the importance of preserving Lebanon's national unity and stability. The EU encourages all political forces to participate constructively in the dialogue efforts being led by President Michel Sleiman and to fully implement the Baabda Declaration agreed in the framework of the National Dialogue. 3. The EU condemns the repeated incursions by Syrian forces into the Lebanese territory and reaffirms its commitment to the unity, stability, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The EU underlines the importance of Lebanon's efforts to avoid the spill-over of violence from neighbouring Syria. In this regard, it calls on all parties to fully implement the provisions of the Baabda Declaration on the necessity to disassociate from regional conflicts, which can have negative repercussions for Lebanon. 4. The EU commends the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese population for the support provided to the people fleeing violence in Syria. It reaffirms its readiness to step up its assistance, as the needs further increase. 5. The EU recalls the importance of strong, independent and democratic Lebanese public institutions. Their continued work is essential for preserving stability and unity in Lebanon, as stressed by the High Representative during her recent timely visit to Lebanon. The EU welcomes the efforts of the Lebanese security forces, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, to ensure security for all people living on Lebanese territory, with due respect for the rule of law and human rights. The EU recalls its commitment to support Lebanon's institutions and security forces in fulfilling this role. 6. The EU stresses the importance of*

Lebanon's continued commitment to the full implementation of all its international obligations, including UNSC resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701, 1757. Recalling all its previous Council conclusions, the EU reaffirms its full support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and calls on all parties to fully cooperate with it. 7. The EU encourages Lebanon to pursue its reform process, including in view of the 2013 parliamentary elections. In this context, the EU stresses the importance of its partnership with Lebanon in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and looks forward to a reinforced cooperation with Lebanon as outlined in the new ENP Action Plan currently under adoption."

31. Joint Council and Commission Declaration on the specific restrictive measures to combat terrorism. Brussels, 25 July 2013. *"The Council and the Commission underline that the decision to designate the Hezbollah Military Wing under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of restrictive measures to combat terrorism does not prevent the continuation of dialogue with all political parties in Lebanon. In addition, the Council and the Commission agree that the decision does not affect legitimate financial transfers to Lebanon and the delivery of assistance, including humanitarian assistance, from the European Union and its Member States in Lebanon. The Union remains fully committed to the stability of Lebanon. As for all designations under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, this decision will be reviewed on a six-monthly basis."*

32. Council conclusions on Lebanon. FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 16 December 2013 *"1. The EU reaffirms its commitment to the unity, stability, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. 2. The EU condemns the repeated violence and security incidents, including the latest terrorist attack targeting the Iranian Embassy and the recurrent clashes in Tripoli. The EU welcomes the efforts of the Lebanese security forces, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, to protect Lebanon's borders and ensure security for all people living on Lebanese territory, with due respect for the rule of law and human rights. 3. The EU strongly calls on all parties, including Hezbollah, to act responsibly, fully abide by Lebanon's dissociation policy from the conflict in Syria and support the efforts of President Sleiman to implement the provisions of the Baabda Declaration agreed by all political forces. 4. The EU underlines the importance of continuing the national dialogue among all political forces to overcome all divisions and the current stalemate and move towards a broader agreement on the future of the country. The EU calls on all regional actors to play a constructive role in this regard. 5. The EU calls on Lebanon to urgently form a new Government capable to address the extraordinary humanitarian, economic and security challenges the country is facing. The EU looks forward to the timely holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and encourages Lebanon to carry out necessary electoral reforms. 6. The EU commends the Lebanese authorities for their open border policy and reiterates its appreciation for the support and generosity demonstrated by*

the authorities and population towards all the people fleeing the conflict in Syria. The EU expresses its concern at the unprecedented effect the crisis has on the stability of Lebanon as well as on its natural and economic resources, educational systems, health care and labor markets. 7. As the largest donor of humanitarian and development assistance in Lebanon the EU will continue to contribute to meeting the growing needs of host communities and refugees. The EU underlines the importance of supporting local host communities through social and economic measures to mitigate the impact of the refugee influx from Syria. In this regard, the EU looks forward to the coming UN Regional Response Plan and will mobilize appropriate funding. The EU also reiterates its call on international partners to increase their support to Lebanon, including at the upcoming Kuwait 2 Conference. 8. The EU recalls its commitment to support Lebanon's institutions and security forces, as well as its readiness to continue this assistance and explore possibilities for increased support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The EU welcomes all efforts by the international community, including the International Support Group for Lebanon, to support and stabilize the country at this critical juncture. The EU stresses the importance of Lebanon's ownership to steer and keep the momentum of these international efforts. 9. The EU attaches high importance to its partnership with Lebanon under the European Neighborhood Policy and encourages Lebanon to pursue its reform agenda. The EU looks forward to the reinforced cooperation agreed in the new EU-Lebanon ENP Action Plan. 10. The EU stresses the importance of Lebanon's continued commitment to the full implementation of its international obligations, including UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701, 1757. The EU reaffirms its support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and calls on the Lebanese authorities to continue fulfilling their obligations regarding the STL, including the financial contribution. The EU reiterates its support to the role of UNIFIL in supporting peace and stability in South Lebanon."