

Securitizing Libya

The securitizing aspects of UN:s and NATO:s justification of
Operation Unified Protector



Abstract

One of the toughest challenges for the international community is to justify military interventions in sovereign states. Echoing in terms of post-colonialism, underlying interest and power domination, military interventions must be argued for and legitimized in order to gain support from both public and institutional opinion. This is even more essential in our modern era with its rapid and unimpeded flow of communication and information regarding the state and affairs of the world. This study presents how the international community achieves such justifications from a securitizing perspective. By reflecting the military intervention against the Qadhafi regime in Libya 2011 and using a descriptive idea analysis, I uncover the implicit messages of the UNSC Resolution 1973 which authorized the intervention, and in statements by NATO who executed it, and connect these expressions to the securitization theory. This I argue shows how the international community raises security issues, conditioned with crisis and emergency, in order to justify interventions.

Keywords: *Securitization; Referent Object; Securitizing Actor; Securitizing Speech Act; Military Intervention, Libya; UNSC; NATO*

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Abbreviations

FOI - Swedish Defense Research Agency (eng. translation)

ICC - International Criminal Court

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFZ - No-fly zone

OUP - Operation Unified Protector

R2P - Responsibility to Protect

Sec. Gen. - Secretary General

UNCS - United Nations Security Council

Res. 1973 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

1 Introduction

On 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized military action in response to the escalating situation in Libya by adopting resolution 1973 (Res. 1973). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it called upon the Libyan authorities to establish an immediate cease fire and end its abuses against the people of Libya,¹ who had joined in with the Arab spring in February the same year. Inspired by the events in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt the Libyan population was in full revolt against the authorities, led by Muammar Qadhafi, when Res. 1973 was adopted. The authorities had responded by ordering security forces to open fire upon demonstrators and even ordering airstrikes when the protest grew stronger.² Human rights abuses such as enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture and summary executions were also amongst these responses.³

Two days after the UNSC: adoption of Res. 1973 NATO initialized the military operations, established a no-fly zone (NFZ) and started executing aerial attacks against the Libyan regime.⁴ NATO would eventually take over the whole command and administration of this campaign, named Operation Unified Protector (OUP),⁵ which took out the regimes air power and gave the rebels the upper hand. By October 2011 the regime had been defeated, Qadhafi executed and the OUP was disclosed, hailed as a great victory for international peace and security.⁶

The international community's actions in regard to Libya were swift and dynamic. In less than two months these reactions had transformed from condemnations, to increased diplomatic pressure and sanctions, to the UNSC authorization of OUP and finally its implementation by the NATO-led intervention.⁷ On the first appearance one might consider these events as an ideal scenario, giving the impression of a decisive and effective international community reacting quickly and with authority in ending an oppressive regime, humanitarian crisis and escalating conflict.

¹ United Nations Security Council: *Resolution 1973*. UN Doc. S/RES/1973, 17 May 2011 [henceforth referred to as *UN Doc. S/RES/1973*], § 1, § 4.

² Lindström, Madelene & Zetterlund, Kristina (2012): *Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO*. Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency: FOI-R--3498--SE, p. 13.

³ UN Doc. S/RES/1973, preamble.

⁴ Kuperman, Alan J. (2013): A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign. *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 105.

⁵ Lindström & Zetterlund (2011); *FOI-R--3498--SE*, p. 13.

⁶ Kuperman, Alan (2013); p. 105.

⁷ Bendetta, Berti (2014): Forcible Intervention in Libya: Revamping the 'Politics of Human Protection?'. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 25.

However, the issues of military interventions in sovereign states are of great complex from many perspectives within international relations. Legitimacy, western dominion in the third world and underlying goals and interest are all factors that problematize such campaigns. These obstacles put the international community under a legitimizing pressure when intervening militarily; one cannot simply march into a country shaken by political instability and rouge states without justifying it, and remarkably so, first.⁸

While peace- and conflict studies provide many perspectives of highlighting and approaching these aspects of international interventions, the theories of securitization has become one of the most popular approaches, challenging many of the more traditional IR theories.⁹ The theory has a direct interest to how and why security problems emerge and why certain issues become security issues while others do not.¹⁰ In sum, for scholars interested in how security problems are constructed in contemporary international relations, that is how security and threats are brought into being in political contexts, the securitization theory provides a useful analytical framework.¹¹

This study analyzes how securitization theory can be used in understanding justifications of military interventions. By using a descriptive idea analysis and the theoretical frameworks presented by Barry Buzan et. al. and Thierry Balzacq, I study the securitization aspects of the justification of the OUP in Libya 2011. I argue that such justifications can be understood in this scope of securitization where issues of civil conflicts and rouge states are highlighted in crisis and emergency, making extreme countermeasures legitimate.

1.1 Purpose and question of research

The purpose of this study is to analyze how multilateral organizations behave and argue when justifying and legitimizing military interventions. I intend to accomplish this by analyzing the justification process of OUP, implemented in response of the Libyan civil war 2011, and how the international community argued, formulated and phrased this operation from a securitizing perspective. I find this issue of relevance to understand the international community's

⁸ Watson, Scott (2011): The Human as Referent Object?: Humanitarianism as Securitization. *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 4-5.

⁹ Williams, Michael C. (2003): Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, p. 511.

¹⁰ Balzacq, Thierry (2011): *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. New York: Routledge, preface.

¹¹ Williams, Michael C. (2003); p. 511.

attitudes, perceptions and behaviors when justifying militarily interventions in other sovereign states, thereby setting and affecting the political structures and agendas of international peace and security.

The approach from a securitizing perspective is also relevant since current research traditionally views justifications of military interventions from perspectives such as the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) or in the view of long-established international relations theories. Realism, neo-liberalism- and critical security studies are a few examples of such perspectives that traditionally emphasize existing research. By approaching the issue from a securitizing perspective instead, I wish to highlight the broader aspects of the problematic distinctions between proportional and emergency counter-measures to threats, certain actors privileged positions in nuancing insecurity and why some issues are constructed as security issues whilst others are not.¹²

The question formulation for research in this study is: *How can the UN:s and NATO:s justifications of Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011 be understood from a securitizing perspective?*

1.2 Material

The primary material for the analysis consists of the UNSC Res. 1973. The resolution presents the terms and the contextual background of the OUP and functions as the operations authorizing mandate. It consists of a preamble, 29 paragraphs and a list of proposed designations in regard of Libyan government officials.¹³ The resolution was adopted on 17 March 2011 with ten votes in favor and five abstentions in the UNSC.¹⁴

An additional source of primary material is a selection of official NATO statements regarding OUP and the situation in Libya. These statements have been collected from either NATOS official website or from the organizations official YouTube channel, directly linked to its official website. Both websites have provided transcriptions to some of these statements, whilst I have freely transcribed one statement myself where transcriptions have not yet been provided (see *References*).

¹² Watson, Scott (2011); p. 4-5.

¹³ UN Doc. S/RES/1973.

¹⁴ Lindström & Zetterlund (2011); *FOI-R--3498--SE*, p. 13.

For the theoretical grounds in the study I have mainly used the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) and Thierry Balzacq (2011). Buzan et. al. are credited for conceptualizing the securitization theory, commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School, and how it can be used in a broader understanding of the term security.¹⁵ Balzacq takes the theory one step further by reconceptualizing it so that it includes more sociological aspects of how security issues emerge, evolve and are perceived.¹⁶ I have chosen to use these reconceptualizations in consideration of the criticism the theory has received, represented in this study by Michael C. Williams (2003) and Matt McDonald (2008). To further describe the theoretical outlines of securitization I have also used Columbia Peoples and Nick Vaughn-Williams (2011) work.

For my methodological considerations I have chosen the work of Jan Teorell & Torsten Svensson (2010). I have further used Teorell & Svensson to describe the strategic choices of cases and analytical units. To describe my chosen method for my analysis, a descriptive idea analysis, I have mainly used Ludvig Beckmans (2005) work, complemented by the work of Björn Badersten & Jakob Gustavsson (2010) and Göran Bergström & Kristina Boréus (2012).

Secondary literature consisting of a report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) regarding the situation in Libya has been used as more descriptive background material. This FOI, investigated by Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund (2012), covers the decision making period leading to the OUP in Libya. The works of Scott Watson (2011), Alan Kuperman (2013) and Berti Bendetta (2013) have also provided secondary material when describing the background and events of the Libyan civil war.

1.3 Demarcations

The study focuses exclusively on the UNSC and the NATO because these actors can be stated as the most relevant for the OUP. This is because UNSC Res. 1973 authorized the OUP,¹⁷ and that the NATO administrated, executed and commanded the military campaign.¹⁸ The UNSC Res. 1973 is further limited to its preamble primarily because of its sheer size and with account to the given space given for the study, and secondly because the similar linguistic

¹⁵ Balzacq, Thierry (2011); preface.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Kuperman, Alan (2013); p. 105.

¹⁸ Lindström & Zetterlund (2011); *FOI-R--3498--SE*, p. 13.

structures between its articles and preamble.¹⁹ Noting that a full analysis of Res. 1973 is of relevance, I have however chosen to include NATO statements instead. This is to take broader account to all central actors of relevance in the regard of OUP, thereby leaving the articles of Res.1973 for future research. Both UNSC Res. 1973 and the NATO statements are however presumed as the collective and unified voices of the individual member states of the organizations, and thus viewed as representing several state actors.

I have also chosen to limit the number of NATO statements to five analytical units, again with account to the given space for the study. Since the statements have all been collected from the internet I have further chosen to only include statements directly made by NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen in order to ensure the authenticity of the statements. The dates of these statements also set the time limit in the study from 11 March 2011 to 28 March 2011, with the adoption of Res. 1973 on 17 March 2011 within this time span.

The fields of research regarding the OUP also concern the R2P doctrine to a high degree.²⁰ In this study however I view any connections to R2P as part of the overall securitization of Libya and not as an individual factor or perspective in this study. I thereby also chose leave deeper studies of R2P:s connection to Libya to further research.

Within securitization theory there are three units of relevance for the construction theory; securitizing actor, referent object and functional actor. Here I have chosen to exclude the functional actor (see *table 1: Classification scheme*), since I deem the occurrence of this unit as quite irrelevant. This is another reason for the inclusion of Balzacq, which thereby also function as a theoretical compensation for this exclusion. The functional actor will however be mentioned in the theoretical chapter mainly for the record.

¹⁹ See UN Doc. S/RES/1973.

²⁰ Kuperman, Alan (2013); p. 105.

2 Theory

I have chosen the securitization theory first brought into the field of International Relations by Ole Weaver in 1989,²¹ with some theoretical additions according to Balzacq's approach. The reason for these additions is to take into account the criticism the theory has received and thereby make it more stable and fruitful for the study. First though I will describe the theory as it is presented by Buzan et. al. since the basic elements still inform this study, before presenting the adaptations made in accordance to Balzacq.

2.1 The construction and occurrence of security

According to Buzan et. al. security must be seen as a socially constructed and intersubjective phenomena. Ultimately it is the same for security as for all politics; it rests upon its audiences' collective and subjective norms, attitudes and opinions in order for it to have effect. Buzan et. al. argue that the studies of security in an objective manner rather than in a subjective one would presume that we lived in a fully deterministic world. This is because security arguments always are hypothetical and predictive in the sense that they contain two future alternatives; the consequences that will occur if a security measure is executed and the consequence that will occur if this measure is not executed.²²

Security then is according to Buzan et. al. a certain act of politicization but in more extreme fashions where issues of politics are taken beyond customary political frames. Issues that are viewed as security issues hold a special status and priority which justifies the use of extraordinary measures within them. Out of this perspective then Buzan et. al. describe that security is not about the objective nature of threats, but rather about how the term is used and perceived.²³

Buzan et al. describe that all and any public or political issue can occur within a three leveled political spectrum. They can be (1); non-politicized and thereby not an issue of public or political debates, concerns or decision making processes, or (2); politicized, meaning the issue is part of public policy and thereby a subject to political choices, decisions and

²¹ Balzacq, Thierry (2011); preface, p. 1-2.

²² Buzan, Barry, Weaver, Ole & de Wilde, Jaap (1998): *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 30-32.

²³ Ibid. p. 23-24.

resources, but in a regular and standardized fashion and without coercive elements of policy.²⁴ Finally the issue can be (3); securitized, meaning that it is presented above regular politics as existentially threatening. It thereby requires emergency measures which in turn justifies extraordinary actions and countermeasures that would normally overlap regular political custom and procedures. At this stage there are no elements of freedom or choice thereby separating it from, and raising it above, regular politicized issues.²⁵

In other words, by saying 'security' one also implicitly claim a context of crisis and emergency in which more or less all means necessary to counter a threat are legitimate. Issues that are securitized as existential threats will vary from state to state as well as between cultures. Some might securitize religious issues, other culture and identity, and some even environmental issues. In these regards Buzan et. al. further addresses that despite its connection to politicization securitization is not a phenomena that occurs only through states, governments or multilateral organizations, but other social entities within society might raise issues as existential threats in the same manners.²⁶

2.2 Units and conditions for securitization

According to Buzan et. al, there are three units that are central in the construction of security; (1) *the referent object* which is the object viewed as existentially threatened and has a legitimate claim to survive, (2); the *securitizing actor* which is the actor that defines the referent object as existentially threatened and thereby also defines the existential threat in question, and finally (3); the *functional actor* who can affect securitization without being neither the referent object or securitizing actor. The functional actor is often in a third party relation to the other two units that might benefit or be affected from specific issues being securitized.²⁷

What securitizing actors explicitly believe a specific security issue mean or not is not relevant, but rather how they use these issues in some ways and not in others through securitizing moves. The necessary criteria in this regard is that the securitizing actor must present the issue as existentially threatening the referent object in a way so that it overflows

²⁴ Buzan et. al. (1998); p. 23-24.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 23-24, 29.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 21-26.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 35-36.

normal political logic, making all other subsequent issues of policy irrelevant.²⁸ This happens through the *securitizing speech act*. Peoples and Vaughn-Williams describe speech acts as specific words and phrases being equivalent to actions. By saying something in certain ways also implies a social action where verbal utterances thus cause various social effects²⁹

Important in the regard of the securitizing speech act is to separate them from securitization itself. Speech acts does not create securitization per se, but are only what Buzan et. al. call a *securitizing move*. A securitizing actor might thus execute a securitizing move, issuing something as existentially threatening through several speech acts, but only if the audience accepts this issue as such is the securitizing move successful and the issue securitized.³⁰

For this to occur a few conditions need to be fulfilled. Buzan et. al. divide these conditions into two categories, the internal and external. The internal condition means that the linguistic and grammatical pronouncements of the speech acts must be in accordance and in sync with the social actions they imply, which are definitions of existential threats, emphasis on points of no return and offerings of potential solutions to this threat. The external condition implies two social factors. The first is that the securitizing actor must be in a social position from which it is regarded as relevant and appropriate to its claims in the speech acts. In other words a securitizing actor must be in an authoritarian position, and not necessarily excluded only to official authority, but rather authority within the security field and context in question. The second factor is that the issue that is presented as an existential threat must be an object or issue that generally can be referred to and attributed as threatening, be it military forces, alien identities or environmental issues. According to Buzan et al. then, these conditions facilitate securitization moves and increases the likelihood of their success and the acceptance of the audience.³¹

2.3 Re-presenting audience in securitization theory

What might be argued as the most common criticism to the securitization theory is the narrowness of its exclusive focus on the moment of the speech acts. Security might also be constructed over time, influenced and affected by other social contexts in addition to pure

²⁸ Buzan et. al. (1998); 23-24.

²⁹ Peoples, Columba & Vaughan-Williams, Nick (2010): *Critical security studies: an introduction*. London: Routledge, p. 77.

³⁰ Buzan et. al. (1998); p. 25

³¹ Ibid. p. 29, 32-33.

linguistic ones, and even through other forms of communication besides speeches such as through global media and televisual communication.³² Because of this criticism I have chosen to complement the theoretical outlets with one of Balzacq's theoretical assumptions. Balzacq argues for the possibilities to expand the understandings of the existing theoretical premises by seeing securitization from more sociological perspectives, making the theory less limited in the regards of the criticism. This assumption is also added to clarify the definitions of the roles and functions intersubjective audiences might have in the context of the speech acts and securitizing moves.³³

Balzacq argues in accordance to conventional securitization theory that for securitization to have effect an empowering audience must agree to the terms of the securitizing move. However, he tightens the theoretical outlines by stating that the attitudes, interest and perceptions of this audience must have a direct causal link to the issue of securitization; if the securitizing move is in line and synced with these social attributes of the audience, then securitization will occur. This means that the securitizing actor must identify and tune in with the audience in regard to these social perceptions to gain their moral support, thereby enabling the securitizing actor to counter the threat.

The empowering audience may vary depending on the what issues is being securitized making it problematic for empirical identification, but Balzacq emphasize both public and institutional bodies within the political context in question as major empowering audiences for securitizing actors.³⁴ By this assumption Balzacq attempts to release the conventional securitization theory from its limitations to the philosophy of language mainly expressed in the central and exclusive function of speech acts. Securitization can be thus viewed in broader social circumstances and contexts regarding psycho-cultural characters of the audience and the identifying behavior of the securitizing actor.³⁵

³² See Williams, Michael C. (2003), and McDonald, Matt (2008): Securitization and the Construction of Security. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 563-587.

³³ Balzacq, Thierry (2011); preface, p. 1-3.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 8-9.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 1-2.

2.4 Theoretical connection

Security is (1); constructed when a securitizing actor initializes various speech acts in which an issue is presented and formulated as existentially threatening a referent object. The referent object is claimed to have legitimate reason to be protected, preserved and survive in relation to this existential threat. This is called a securitizing move,³⁶ where the securitizing actor tunes in with the interests of an empowering audience.³⁷ (2) Thus a social and intersubjective condition of crisis and emergency is created for the audience which coercively separates and raises the issue above regular political conditions; it is of that nature that it *must* be handled, all other political considerations are secondary.³⁸ Finally (3); if the empowering audience accepts and embraces the securitizing move and its premises this enables the securitization actor to counter the securitized issue and thus securitization has occurred.³⁹

Table 1: Classification scheme

Analytical instrument	Indicators
Referent object	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • existentially threatened • formulated with legitimate reason to survival/protection/preservation
Securitizing actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Securitizing speech acts; • defining existential threats • legitimizing countermeasures by conditioning issues in terms of crisis and emergency • Identifying with empowering audiences (the public and institutional bodies) for moral support

³⁶ Buzan et. al. (1998); p. 21-25, 36.

³⁷ Balzacq, Thierry (2011); p. 8-9

³⁸ Buzan et. al. (1998); p. 23-25, 29.

³⁹ Balzacq, Thierry (2011); p. 8-9.

3 Methodological considerations

According to Teorell & Svensson the variables of all studies must be given and described a specific variable value in order to make them measurable and fruitful for analysis. This means that I must pinpoint and define what properties I look for in the empirical data when executing the analysis. This is called an operational definition which is a theoretical precision of how the variables operate within the empirical analytical units.⁴⁰

This is important for the study's validity since vague or diffuse definitions of the variables might steer the study off track. To not define them properly would mean I could analyze just anything by which I can certainly expect errors in the analysis. This also establishes fail safes from unpredictable errors that might occur, thereby allowing me to execute the analysis in a reliable way that generates credible results.⁴¹ Securitization is however not measurable per se and cannot be observed directly due to its abstract nature and social mechanisms, but it nonetheless still possible to analyze since it instead operates through manifested expressions within the empirical analytical units, also defined as indicators.

Again, this is why the properties for what is to count as securitization must be defined theoretically and operationalized in order to be able to determine how their indicators in the analytical units, that are Res. 1973 and the NATO statements, are expressed.⁴² I dedicated the entire previous chapter to this task where I principally structured the theoretical properties of securitization as the *referent object* and *securitizing actor* and connected them to their indicators summarized in the classification scheme in the end the chapter (see *table 1*).

I have selected Res. 1973 and the five NATO statements strategically. This means I have selected these analytical units since they are expected to show expressions of securitization.⁴³ This is to be able to generalize the theoretical expressions and properties I find in the chosen empirical data and consider them in relation to a greater population regarding securitization.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Teorell, Jan & Svensson, Torsten (2007): *Att Fråga och att Svara: Samhällsvetenskaplig Metod*. Stockholm: Liber, p. 24-25, 55.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 55-59, 63.

⁴² Ibid. p. 39-40.

⁴³ Ibid. p. 84.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 68-71.

3.1 Method: descriptive idea analysis

I have chosen to conduct the analysis by using a descriptive idea analysis. Idea analyses are similar to text- and argument analyses but with the difference that it is more solid when trying to identify implicit messages.⁴⁵ Descriptive idea analyses processes the empirical data in a way that makes its invisible messages visible, and since my aim is not to objectively describe its explicit discursive meanings, it is therefore a suitable method of choice.⁴⁶ In a sense this method involves the core of political science since it focuses on political ideas expressed as goals and ideals for society.⁴⁷

According to Bergström & Boréus there are different variants of idea analyses. I have chosen the *content idea analysis* which is concerned with analyzing the logics in ideological argumentations. It thereby takes the conduct of analysis one step further than argumentation analysis by reflecting the political arguments implicit messages and relating them to ideologies they might express. This is another reason why I have chosen idea analysis since it allows understanding of how the UN and NATO express and argue their ideologies.⁴⁸

Within idea analyses there are also possibilities to consider what contexts ideas and ideologies occur within. Beckman describe that this so called *actors centered approach* looks more to the social circumstances where the aim is more to understand the speaker and their personal motives and interests for expressing their ideals in specific context.⁴⁹ I have chosen to use this approach since it allows me to focus on who is expressing political messages and their implicit goals and motives, thereby including the context of the ideologies. Connecting the arguments to their relevant political context allows deeper analyses and thereby avoids mere transcriptions of the empirical data.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Beckman, Ludvig (2005): *Grundbok i Idéanalys: Det Kritiska Studiet av Politiska Texter och Idéer*. Stockholm: Santérus förlag, p. 48-49, 56.

⁴⁶ Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina (2012): *Textens Mening och Makt: Metodbok i Samhällsvetenskaplig Text- och Diskursanalys*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, p. 161-162, 166.

⁴⁷ Badersten, Björn & Gustavsson, Jakob (2010): *Vad är vetenskap? Om Undran Inför Politiken?*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, p. 115-117.

⁴⁸ Bergström & Boréus (2012); p. 145-146.

⁴⁹ Beckman, Ludvig (2005); p. 15-17.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 49.

3.1.1 Analytical instrument

In idea analyses an analytical instrument needs to be constructed by the researcher in which the variables one looks for are defined and searched for in the empirical texts of choice. This is a vital criteria in order to draw conclusions from the text and to exclude the possibility of the researchers own presuppositions to inflict the analysis and the results.⁵¹ I have chosen the *referent object* and *securitizing actor*, operationalized and structured throughout the theoretical chapter and the classification scheme (*table 1*), as analytical instrument. I will in other words look for implicit indicators of these two analytical instruments in Res. 1973 and the NATO speeches in order to draw conclusions from them.⁵² Again, this is of importance to the discussion of validity, reliability and reproductivity of the study.⁵³

To analyze ideological and political texts and speeches always involves interpretations from the researcher, and in one sense this is important since objective facts are hard to pinpoint in ideologies and policies. However, in order to not let this affect the results the empirical interpretations must constantly be argued in accordance with the theoretical analytical instruments throughout the analysis. Repeatedly as this may sound, it is necessary in order to connect theory and analytical units and thus to achieve validity and reliability.⁵⁴ This also limits the possibilities of letting my own presuppositions to interfere with the analysis and politically or ideologically judge the material, making the analysis transparent.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Beckman, Ludwig (2005); p. 19-21.

⁵² Ibid. p. 15-17.

⁵³ Bergström & Boréus (2013); p. 40-42.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 49-51.

⁵⁵ Badersten & Gustavsson (2010); p. 116.

4 Analysis & discussion - UNSC Res. 1973: preamble

Already at the beginning of Res. 1973 a referent object can be argued as indicated through the formulation:

*"Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties [...]"*⁵⁶

The emphasis on the heavy civilian casualties in this formulation can be argued as a quite strong indication of it being existentially threatened, and likewise is the expression of grave concern to the situation a formulation of the populations legitimate reason to survival. Further formulations of the situation in Libya as deteriorating and escalating can also be interpreted as an indication of a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures since the formulation conditions the issue with crisis and emergency.

Res. 1973 then takes a more straightforward approach in elevating the Libyan issue by stating that it is:

*"Condemning the gross and systematic violations of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, [...] acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities [...] and urging these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law [...]"*⁵⁷

These condemnations of the of the situation in Libya, all formulated into arguments against the Libyan authorities violations, can all be argued as indicators in which the Libyan authorities are defined as an existential threat. The formulation of the situation in Libya, described in terms of gross and systematic violations of human rights, torture and executions, also indicates a securitizing actor conditioning the issue into terms of crisis and emergency to gain legitimization of countermeasures. By arguing in favor of humanitarian aspects such as human rights Res. 1973 can also be said expose an indicator of a securitizing actor trying to identify with empowering audiences interests to gain moral support for its cause by expressing such altruistic purposes of protecting and insuring these aspects.

⁵⁶ UN Doc. S/RES/1973; preamble.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

In the next section Res. 1973 expresses its will and potentials to take action by stating:

*"[...] its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and [...] its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas [...]"*⁵⁸

Here Res. 1973 can again be argued to formulate Libyan civilian population as the referent object with its formulation of its legitimate reason to protection. By here emphasize the absence of humanitarian elements again the issue of Libya is also conditioned with emergency and crisis and thus indicates a securitizing actor trying to legitimize counter measures in these regards. Res. 1973 formulations of taking appropriate measures as necessary, here claimed in regard of humanitarianism and protection of civilians in proportional and altruistic manners, can also be viewed as an indication of a securitizing actor trying to identify with an empowering audience for moral support.

The next section might be argued as an attempt to enhance this identification with empowering audiences by rallying up other multilateral organizations and refer to their unison expressions of disapprovals:

*"Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and [...] the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed [...]"*⁵⁹

It is interesting to note that by referring to mainly to multilateral organizations of Arab and African origins Res. 1973 can be argued to try to identify with more local empowering audiences to achieve local moral support to its cause. This emphasis on already given local support might further be argued as attempt to encourage other bodies of audiences to join in. By again conditioning the situation in Libya with crisis and emergency through references to violations of human rights and humanitarian law, further addressing them as serious, Res. 1973 exposes another indication of a securitizing actor trying to legitimize its counteractions by conditioning the issue of Libya with crisis and emergency.

⁵⁸ UN Doc. S/RES/1973; preamble.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

These emphasizes of serious violations to human rights and humanitarian law that are committed also expresses a legitimate reason to preservation and protection of these humanitarian aspects, thereby indicating as existentially threatened referent objects. This could further be interpreted as to implicitly include the objects of such humanitarian aspects, upon which the formulation also can be argued as concerning the civilian people as a referent object as well.

Res. 1973 then refers to previous countermeasures regarding the Libyan issue. The resolution states in this approach that it is:

*"Taking note also of the decision [...] of the League of Arab States [...] to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas [...] that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals [...] Taking note further to the Secretary-General's call [...] for an immediate cease fire,"*⁶⁰

Here it is interesting to note that rather than trying to legitimize contemporary countermeasures, Res. 1973 instead formulates specific countermeasures of the past as in favor of protecting the Libyan people. However, by referring to the necessity of previous military action Res. 1973 implicitly also emphasizes the necessity of the continuation of such countermeasures, thereby conditioning the current Libyan context with crisis and emergency. Thus an indicator of a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures, specifically NFZ:s and protected safe areas for civilians, can be argued. The same can also be said of the formulations of requesting cease fire immediately.

Again Res. 1973 also constructs the Libyan people as an existentially threatened referent object with the claim of its exposure to violence from Libyan military aviation, and through formulations of its legitimate need and right of protection in the form of safe areas. This time Res. 1973 also includes foreign civilians in the process, here formulated as foreign nationals. Res. 1973 can also be argued to express an additional indication of a securitizing actor defining an existential threat, implicitly as the Libyan authorities by this emphasis on its air forces. Further, the altruistic formulations of acting to protect civilians and the emphasis on the Arab Leagues calls can be defined as an attempt by a securitizing actor trying to identify with empowering audiences for moral support.

⁶⁰ UN Doc. S/RES/1973; preamble.

Next Res. 1973 connects the Libyan context to formulations of international criminal law by:

*"Recalling its decision to refer the situation [...] to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible for [...] attacks targeting the civilian population [...] must be held to account,"*⁶¹

By referring to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in this manner, Res. 1973 can be argued to define the civilian population of Libya as a referent object by implicitly claiming its legitimate need of juridical protection regarding and in accordance with international criminal law. The civilian population is thereby also formulated as existentially threatened by the arbitrators of these international juridical principles. The latter indicates as a securitizing actors definition of an existential threat, that is the arbitrators or those responsible for the attacks as Res. 1973 formulates it. Interesting to note is that by referring to the ICC Res. 1973 can be argued to indicate an attempt by a securitizing actor trying to identify with empowering audiences, here by referring to more juridical countermeasures rather to the use of force to gain moral support.

Res. 1973 then returns to expressing UNSC:s concern, but this time to the situation regarding refugees:

*"Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence [...] welcoming the response of neighboring states [...] to address the needs of these of those refugees [...] and calling on the international community to support those efforts,"*⁶²

Thus another indication of referent objects emerges, this time as Libyan refugees and foreign workers, affected and existentially threatened by violence. By embracing and thus emphasizing the neighboring countries actions in addressing the need and exposure of these refugees and foreign workers, and calling upon the international community to do the same, this referent objects legitimate reason to protection is also indicated. Also, Res. 1973 can be argued to condition the Libyan issue with crisis and emergency in effort of legitimizing countermeasures through the rather substantial request of the whole international community's support, thereby indicating a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures.

⁶¹ UN Doc. S/RES/1973; preamble.

⁶² Ibid.

Also, it indicates an identification with empowering audiences for moral support as well, identifying to both local neighboring countries when celebrating their acts as well as the international institutional communities when calling upon its support. The same can be argued to be expressed through the formulations of the refugees needs, meaning that Res. 1973 is again implicitly making altruistic references of protection.

In the next section Res. 1973 deplors the Libyan authorities use of mercenaries.

"Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities," ⁶³

This sentence, short as it may be, still indicates a securitizing actor defining existential threats; the authorities and the mercenaries. By further connecting the mercenaries to the Libyan authorities, the latter is thereby defined as the major existential threat.

Next, Res. 1973 is again referring to NFZ:s and humanitarianism:

"Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace [...] constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians [...] for humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities [...]" ⁶⁴

By again emphasizing NFZ:s previous importance to protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance and as a decisive step for containing hostilities, this implicitly emphasize the necessity of continuation of such measures and thereby conditions the current context with crisis and emergency. Indications of a securitizing actor trying to critically conditions the issue to legitimize counter measures can thus be argued. The emphasis on the importance of protection for civilians, humanitarianism and an end to hostilities also express indications of referent objects legitimate need of protection and of its existentially threatened position. The existential threat is defined as all flights, implicitly referred to Libyan authorities air forces. Indications of identifying with empowering audiences are also present, again with the altruistic formulations of purposes of protecting civilians, ending hostilities as well as ensuring humanitarian aspects.

Res. 1973 then returns to addressing its concern for foreign nationals in Libya:

"Expressing grave concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights [...]" ⁶⁵

⁶³ UN Doc. S/RES/1973; preamble.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

As with previous and similar formulations the formulations of grave concern conditions the issue with crisis and emergency, from which a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasure can be argued. This means that foreign nationals also indicate as referent objects formulated with legitimacy to protection regarding their safety and rights. It also indicates identification with empowering audience for moral support, again through implicit altruistic formulations of protecting the safety and rights of the foreign nationals in Libya.

The next section addresses the diplomatic measures taken to find a peaceful solution in Libya:

*"Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya [...] and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis [...]"*⁶⁶

By referring to previous diplomatic efforts and supporting these initiatives, formulated as attempts of reaching for sustainable peace, an indication of a securitizing actors identification with empowering audience to rally for moral support can be argued. This is done by Res. 1973:s formulations of embracing and advocating peaceful and non-violent solutions over the use of force. However, by further formulate the situation in Libya as a crisis nonetheless conditions the issue with emergency, indicating a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures.

It is interesting that the emphasis on diplomacy rather than use of force is presented right before the more critical and decisive end of the preamble of Res. 1973, since this part contains several implicit references to the use of force as a last resort.

*"Reaffirming the strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity [...] Determining that the situation [...] continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations"*⁶⁷

In other words the disposition of the formulations is as such that they first welcome previous diplomacy and peaceful solutions before readdressing that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat. This disposition means that diplomacy and peaceful solutions

⁶⁵ UN Doc. S/RES/1973; preamble.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

implicitly are formulated as insufficient in contrast to the use of force, and further highlights force as the last and single option. The issue is thereby conditioned with crisis and emergency to legitimize the use of force as countermeasure, formulated as acting under chapter VII, and thus indicating a securitizing actor trying to legitimize its actions. By these formulations the critical condition can also be argued to be quite substantial due to the magnitude of international peace and security, which implicitly emphasize the necessity of use of force even further.

There are also indications of attempts to identify with empowering audiences that can be argued for through formulations of accounts of state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, Chapter VII and mostly of claims of purposes to ensure international peace and security. This implicitly implies that the actions are proportionate and initialized as an utmost last resort, showing an attempt to make them more morally appealing. Also, a strong indicator of defining existential threats and referent objects also emerges through these emphases of the situation in Libya as constituting a threat to international peace and security.

4.1 NATO: Statement on Libya

Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen addressed the public on NATO:s position to the situation in Libya at a press conference in connection to a NATO defense minister meeting 11 March 2011. In this statement he formulated the situation as follows:

*"[...] Libya has become the scene of violent clashes and a growing humanitarian crisis. [...] it is unclear which future direction the country will take. [...]"*⁶⁸

When analyzing this part of the statement out of the analytical instruments, the first indicator that can be argued to be expressed is the conditioning of the situation in Libya as a crisis. An indication of a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures to the issue is thus present due to the formulations of Libya as a scene of violence, a growing humanitarian crisis and with an unclear future. By then continue to emphasize the unified condemnations made by the whole international system of the of the situation, rallying the community up in one unison voice, this can be argued as an indicator of identification with empowering audiences and to simultaneously encourage a broader range of audiences to achieve moral support for the cause:

*"[...] What is clear is that the international community is united in condemning the outrageous and systematic violence against the Libyan people and that our first concern must be the plight of the civilian population.[...]"*⁶⁹

The referent object is quite strongly indicated as the Libyan people through Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussens formulation of them as of first concern. He thereby also formulates its existentially threatened position and its legitimate reason to protection. The formulation of the violence on civilians as systematic can be argued to implicitly define Libyan authorities as an existential threat, being the actor how is methodologically conducting it. Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen also uses formulation of protecting civilians in an altruistic manner which can be argued to be done to identify with empowering audiences and summon moral support for the cause. This is also expressed in the next section:

⁶⁸ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *Secretary General press conference on Libya at Defense Ministerial Meeting*. NATO HQ: Brussels, 11 March 2011.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

*"[...] This crisis requires close international coordination. That is why we have been in regular contact with other international organizations, in particular the UN, the EU, the African Union and the Arab League. [...] Time is of the essence."*⁷⁰

The emphasize on the coordination with other multilateral organizations, both international and local, can be argued as another attempt to identify with empowering audiences, and to reach out and encourage a broader range of empowering audiences to give their support. The implicit aim by these emphases is to make the countermeasures more morally appealing. Further, the statement can be argued to end in the same manner as it started, by indicating a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures by conditioning the issue in terms of crisis and emergency. This is formulated implicitly through the emphasis on a significant and acute lack of time, imposing requirements of swift and immediate counteractions.

4.2 NATO: Statement following the UNSC Res. 1973

One day after the adoption of Res. 1973, the NATO made an official statement were it hailed UNSC:s authorization to military intervention. Sec. Gen Fogh Rasmussen said in these regards that:

*"This Resolution sends a strong and clear message from the entire international community to the Qadhafi regime: stop your brutal and systematic violence against the people of Libya immediately [...]"*⁷¹

The conducts of violence are interestingly connected directly to Qadhafi himself. And the formulation of the violence as brutal and systematic, and of the authorities as a regime, frames Qadhafi in even darker terms. Here then, an indicator of a securitizing actor defining an existential threat can be argued as quite compelling. By the additional definition of the regime however, the existential threat also implicitly includes the Libyan authorities. The violence is phrased as occurring to the Libyan people, upon which this indicates a referent object,

⁷⁰ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *Secretary General press conference on Libya at Defense Ministerial Meeting*. NATO HQ: Brussels, 11 March 2011.

⁷¹ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *Statement by NATO Secretary General following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973*. NATO HQ: Brussels, 18 March 2011.

existentially threatened by the Qadhafi regime. By continuing his statement the referent objects legitimate claim for protection, formulated as legitimate aspirations, is also indicated:

*[...] There is an urgent need, firm support from the region and a clear UN mandate for necessary international action. Allies stand behind the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy and human rights."*⁷²

By formulating the need for intervention as urgent this indicates a legitimization of countermeasures by conditioning the issue with crisis and emergency, which is also indicated in the previous mentioned formulations of the violence as brutal and systematic. Identifications of local empowering audiences are also indicated through the formulations of firm support in the region, and with institutional audiences through the formulations of the possession of a clear UN mandate. Combined, both of these identifications can also be argued as encouraging other empowering audiences to do the same.

4.3 NATO: Statement on arms embargo against Libya

Four days after the adoption of Res. 1973, NATO launched an operation by air and sea to enforce the arms embargo on Libya, to which Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen announced that:

*"[...] All allies are committed to meet their responsibilities under the United Nations resolution to stop the intolerable violence against Libyan civilians. [...] They will conduct operations to monitor, report and if needed, interdict vessels suspected of carrying illegal arms or mercenaries [...]"*⁷³

Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussens formulation of allies having a responsibly, and the emphasis that they are committed to this responsibility, to stop the violence against Libyan civilians can be argued to indicate a securitizing actor conditioning the situation with emergency and crisis to legitimize the countermeasures. Further, by the formulation of the violence as intolerant this critical conditioning can be argued further, as can an indication of an attempt to identify with an empowering audience for moral support for the cause. Also, by referring to

⁷² NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO HQ statement: *Statement by NATO Secretary General following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973*. Brussels, 18 March 2011.

⁷³ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO HQ: Brussels statement: *NATO Secretary General statement on arms embargo against Libya*. 22 March 2011 (freely transcribed).

proportionality by the claim of interdiction of vessels only when needed, this can also be argued as an identification with empowering audiences by phrasing the actions as more morally appealing.

The Libyan civilians can be argued as an existentially threatened referent object, indicated by the formulation of the violence caused against them. Likewise, the formulations of mercenaries and arms can be argued as indicating a securitizing actor defining existential threats, implicitly connected to the Libyan authorities by contrasting arms and mercenaries to the safety of civilians. The civilian populations legitimate claim to survival and protection can also be argued to be expressed in the emphasis of the allies commitment and responsibilities to these efforts. The statement then continues with Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen declaring that:

*"[...] This will be done in close coordination with commercial shipping and regional organizations. And we will welcome contributions from NATO partners to our common endeavor. [...]"*⁷⁴

It can be argued that Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen here returns to try to identify with an empowering audience by the insurance that the countermeasures will be done in corporation with commercial and regional entities, thereby making them more morally appealing, and due to the implicit request to NATO:s partners to contribute. By framing these actions as a common cause among NATO and its partners, this identification is even more enhanced. Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen then connects these formulations with plans of potential fortifications for the NFZ:

*"[...] At the same time, NATO has completed plans to help enforce the no-fly zone to bring our contribution if needed [...] to the broad international effort to protect the people of Libya from the violence of the Qadhafi regime."*⁷⁵

By formulating the enforcement plans as NATO:s own contribution to a broad international effort with the purpose of protecting civilians, and as to be enforced proportionally when needed, an additional indication of a securitizing actor identifying with empowering audiences attempting to achieve moral support for such reinforcements can be argued. The issue is also conditioned with emergency and crisis through the formulations of the people of

⁷⁴ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *NATO Secretary General statement on arms embargo against Libya*. NATO HQ: Brussels, 22 March 2011 (freely transcribed).

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Libya in need of protection on international scale from the violence and thus indicates a securitizing actor trying to legitimize these countermeasures. This formulation also highlights the people of Libya as a referent object, and the Libyan authorities as well as Qadhafi as an existential threat.

4.4 NATO: Statement on NFZ over Libya

On 24 March 2011, NATO declared to the public that the organization would assume the responsibility of enforcing the NFZ over Libya. The statements contain similarities with the statement on enforcement on the arms embargo since Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen declared the NFZ as:

*"[...] part of the broad international effort to protect civilians against the attacks by the Qadhafi regime. We will cooperate closely with our partners in the region and welcome their contributions. [...]"*⁷⁶

Formulated as with a purpose of protecting civilians, the statement can be interpreted as an indication of a securitizing actor trying to gain moral support from an empowering audience. By also emphasizing the cooperation with NATO's partners in the region this can be argued to make the actions more morally appealing in attempt to also encourage a broader extent of empowering audiences to support. By again addressing the civilian population in need of protection on an international scale, conditions of crisis and emergency can be argued which indicates a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures.

Definitions of an existential threat are also indicated, again as the Libyan authorities and Qadhafi, through the formulation of attacks conducted by the Qadhafi regime. Libyan civilians are likewise again formulated as a referent object by the formulations of its need of protection. In the continuation of the statement, Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen is again declaring the organizations dedication:

⁷⁶ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *NATO Secretary General's statement on Libya no-fly zone*. NATO HQ: Brussels, 24 March 2011.

*"[...] All NATO allies are committed to fulfill their obligations under the UN Security Council resolution, and that is why we have decided to assume responsibility for the no-fly zone."*⁷⁷

By again emphasizing the countermeasures as obligations, this time by referring to Res. 1973, and also emphasize NATO:s commitment to these obligations, this further conditions the issue with crisis and emergency and thereby indicates a securitizing actor trying to legitimize the countermeasures. By also formulating NATO:s obligations as legitimate under Res. 1973, and thereby also as being supported by the UN, an identification with a empowering audience can be argued. By again rallying up and emphasizing other international institutional bodies that have already approved, this might be argued as an attempt to persuade a broader range of empowering audiences to give its moral support as well.

4.5 NATO: Statement to take over all military operations in Libya

On 28 March 2011 NATO declared that it would take over the whole military operation in Libya under Res. 1973. Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen announced the decision with the organizations goal to:

*"[...] protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack from the Qadhafi regime. [...]"*⁷⁸

Again, formulations of the Libyan civilian population being under threat of attacks can be argued as indicating an existentially threatened referent object. The existentially threat can be argued to be defined as the Libyan authorities, as well as Qadhafi himself, by the formulation of the Qadhafi regime and the emphases on his/its attacks on civilians. An attempt by a securitizing actor trying to rally up moral support by the public empowering audience might also be argued as indicated through the continuation of the statement. This time by

⁷⁷ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *NATO Secretary General's statement on Libya no-fly zone*. NATO HQ: Brussels, 24 March 2011.

⁷⁸ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *NATO Secretary General statement - NATO takes over whole military operation in Libya*, NATO HQ: Brussels, 27 March 2011.

emphasizing principles of proportionality and in acting in accordance to Res. 1973 to highlight the actions as more morally appealing:

*"[...] NATO will implement all aspects of the UN Resolution. Nothing more, nothing less. This is a very significant step, which proves NATO's capability to take decisive action [...]"*⁷⁹

Also, by underlining the decision as very significant and further connect it as proof of NATO acting decisively, this might be argued as an indicator of a securitizing actor trying to legitimize its actions by critically conditioning the subject. This is also present in the next section of Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussens statement:

*"In the past week, we have put together a complete package of operations in support of the United Nations Resolution by sea and by air. We are already enforcing the arms embargo and the No Fly Zone, and with today's decision we are going beyond [...]"*⁸⁰

By summing up and referring to previous countermeasures Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen is in other words contrasting the past efforts to the current context, expressed in the formulations of the current enforcements of the arms embargo and the NFZ. The premise here can be interpreted as if these countermeasures by sea and air where necessary and legitimate in the past context, they are also so in the present one. Thus, this formulation also indicates a securitizing actor trying to legitimize countermeasures by conditioning the issue in terms of crisis and emergency. Finally the quote ends Sec. Gen. Fogh Rasmussen insuring that:

*"[...] We will be acting in close coordination with our international and regional partners to protect the people of Libya."*⁸¹

This can be argued as an attempt to rally up moral support both from public and institutional bodies for the cause by referring to both regional and international partners as already involved in the decision and the will to protect the civilian population, encouraging other empowering audiences to support as well. The statement can be argued to end by expressing the Libyan civilian populations legitimate need to protection, indicating it as a referent object.

⁷⁹ NATO Sec. Gen. Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement: *NATO Secretary General statement - NATO takes over whole military operation in Libya*, NATO HQ: Brussels, 27 March 2011.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

5 Results

Analyzing policies and ideologies always involves interpretations of the empiric material by the researcher.⁸² The aim of this study is however not to judge the ideologies or policies of the UN or NATO, but rather to analyze the empiric material and show how the implicit messages in the material can be interpreted as expressing indicators of securitization.

5.1 Referent object

What reoccurs in both Res. 1973 and the NATO speeches is the continuous emphasis on the Libyan civilian population and its vulnerability and exposure to violence and humanitarian absence and arbitrations. The analysis also shows repeated claims of the Libyan population legitimate positions and entitlements to protection and preservation. This means that both Res. 1973 and the NATO speeches frames the Libyan civilian population as the existentially threatened referent object, formulated with a legitimate reasons to survival, protection and preservation. Res. 1973 however also contains additional expressions in which foreign nationals are formulated as referent objects.

The analysis also show that certain ideologies and policies, mostly aspects of humanitarianism such as human rights or international humanitarian law and international peace and security, are also defined as additional existentially threatened referent objects. This can be seen as expressed through the repeated formulations of these ideologies as being exposed to violations, arbitrations or of being in danger of complete elimination. However, the expressions of foreign national, international peace and security or aspects of humanitarianism as existentially threatened are not as extensive compared to with emphasis on the Libyan civilian population.

This is interesting to note since international peace and security logically could be perceived as the most urgent ideology due to its substantial magnitude. Since the analysis does not go deeper in addressing various patterns the referent objects might appear in, it is insufficient in answering such questions. Noting the relevance of the reasons for this priority it is in place to address that the classification scheme is not constructed to highlight patterns of referent objects, but only to identify referent objects as such.

⁸² Beckman, Ludvig (2005); p 49-51.

5.2 Securitizing actor

There are several indicators of securitizing actors throughout Res. 1973 and the NATO. The results of the analysis show many speech acts defining and constructing existential threats. In this aspect the Libyan authorities and Qadhafi stand out as a major actors being defined as the existential threat. This is also quite often expressed implicitly by formulations of acts of violence and humanitarian arbitrations as systematic, brutal or intolerable, and in some occasions through the emphasis on the use on mercenaries and flow of arms.

Expressions of implicitly conditioning the issue of Libya in terms of crisis and emergency in order to legitimize countermeasures are substantial in the analytical units. These are also expressed in definitions on the situation in Libya in terms of gross, brutal and systematic violence and arbitrations, urgent and immediate requests to end or stop these actions, emphases on the needs of the referent objects and by the immediate requests to take action through NFZ:, arms embargos, safe areas and immediate cease fires. They were also expressed by definitions and emphases of the necessity of previous countermeasures which implicitly conditioned the contemporary context as in need of the continuation of such countermeasures. Likewise there are expressions of previous diplomatic and non-violent countermeasures as insufficient or failing and thereby conditions the issue with crisis to legitimize last resort of the use of force, further formulated as an utmost last resort.

Indications of identifying with empowering audiences for moral support are also extensive within Res. 1973 and the NATO statements. There are several altruistic formulations and emphasizes of interventions and plans for interventions as being in favor for and in protection of humanitarianism, its related rights and laws, and the civilian population. These altruistic expressions can be argued as identification with the public bodies of empowering audiences, rallying up moral support for the cause of protecting and to ensure humanitarianism and the Libyan civilian population. This indicator was also expressed by insurances of proportionality of countermeasures, interpreted as attempt to present them as more morally appealing.

Emphases on regional actors already giving their support might be viewed as an attempt to identify with the more local public audiences to rally up their moral support. The same emphases are made regarding international actors which thus can be viewed as an attempt to identify with more institutional audiences. What is important to note though is that by identifying to one of these audiences, public, local or institutional, both the UNSC and NATO

might in fact try to address all of these audiences simultaneously. Unfortunately is hard to answer which audience is being identified with and addressed.

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter Balzacq describes that the empowering audience may vary depending on what issues is being securitized. The descriptions of the public and institutional audience within the political contexts gives some definitions and specifications to start from, but such audiences remain difficult to identify due to the many variations of identities and political contexts. It is therefore also difficult to determine whether or not the empowering audience has given its support.⁸³

Nonetheless the outlines of Balzacq regarding empowering audiences have still been important in the analysis. This is because emphasizing empowering audiences nonetheless highlights important social circumstances of how the speech acts and securitizing moves might be interpreted and perceived by the majority, be it public or institutional, as well as of the behaviors and attitudes of the securitizing actor.⁸⁴

⁸³ Balzacq, Thierry (2011); p. 8-9.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

6 Conclusions

In this study I have tried to answer the question of how the justification of OUP by the UNSC and NATO can be understood from a securitizing perspective. By analyzing Res. 1973 which authorized the OUP, and five statements concerning the issue made by NATO who executed it, through an idea analysis I identified the implicit messages in these analytical units. These expressions were then interpreted in accordance to the analytical instrument.

The justification of OUP can be described as securitizing moves comprised of UNSC:s Res. 1973 and by NATO:s related statements. The UNSC and NATO thereby correspond as the securitizing actors in regard to OUP:s justification. The securitizing moves in turn consist of securitizing speech acts expressed by these securitizing actors. Through these speech acts the issue of Libya is manipulated in directions promoting the justification of OUP.

First, the Libyan civilian population is defined as existentially threatened referent object. So too are foreign nationals, humanitarian aspects such as human rights and international humanitarian law and international peace and security. This is done by emphases on brutal and systematic violence and arbitrations, to which these referent objects are formulated as directly exposed to, and by additionally claiming a legitimacy of the referent objects survival, protection and preservation. Secondly the securitizing actors speech acts are constantly connecting the acts of violence and arbitrations to the Libyan authorities by formulating the authorities as the conductor of these acts, upon which the Libyan authorities are defined as an existential threat to the referent objects. The same can also be said of Muhammad Qadhafi who is formulated and defined as an existential threat in the same manner.

These definitions of the existential threat to the referent objects raises the issue of Libya above regular policy as a security issue, and as such it is thereby conditioned with crisis and emergency. From these conditions the issue of Libya holds a critical status and priority from which the securitizing actors justifies use of extra ordinary measures in response. By continuously identifying with empowering audiences the securitizing actors also try to gain moral support for these justifications. This is done through emphases of the countermeasures altruistic purposes of protecting the civilian population in Libya, ensuring human rights and international humanitarian law in Libya and securing international peace and security. They also attempt to achieve this support by emphasizing both local and international organizations and entities that have already given their support, encouraging other audiences to do so as well, and by insuring proportionality to make the justifications morally appealing.

The above mentioned interpretation sum up how I argue that the UNSC and NATO justified the OUP from a securitizing perspective. From this perspective the UNSC and NATO can be seen as the securitizing actors where Res. 1973 and NATO:s statements concerning the issue of Libya comprise the respective organizations securitizing moves. The speech acts in these securitizing moves show how UNSC and NATO might behave and argue when justifying military interventions in sovereign states, and thus gives an insight to the processes and nature of how multilateral organizations might affect and set the structures for international peace and security.

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