

LUND UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

- HOW DOES IT AFFECT XENOPHOBIC ATTITUDES?

Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

Globalization is a complex and constantly changing phenomenon shaping our contemporary world and societies. It is argued to generate economic growth and greater possibilities to most people in the world, but has an impact on an individual level as well, on our personal values and social attitudes. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the research done within the field of globalization and how it affects people's attitudes towards foreign people and culture. This research area is today filled with diverse arguments, conclusions and theories about this complicated relation. Our quantitative study on globalization and xenophobic attitudes in European countries during the last decades examines whether different dimensions of the globalization, i.e. social and economic, affect xenophobic attitudes in different ways.

Approached from a theoretical framework of four hypotheses suggesting how globalization affect people's reaction on increased flows of foreign people and culture, our study states that both social and economic globalization have a relation to the level of xenophobia in a state. Furthermore, the results suggest that social globalization foster tolerance towards what is foreign while negative changes in economic globalization may increase xenophobic attitudes.

Key words: Economic globalization, social globalization, xenophobia, social attitudes

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1. Introduction

Globalization is one of the main concepts used to explain the contemporary situation of our world. International political cooperation, free trade agreements and integration of different cultures are all processes often prioritized on states' political agenda. This phenomenon is dominant on a global as well as on a national and individual level. It shapes most individual's lives on an everyday basis and is often seen as mainly positive, something that generates possibilities and economic wealth. Nevertheless, there are also negative aspects of this process discussed on the political and societal arena, such as inequality and changes in social attitudes. Another topic that has been highly debated on the European political agenda the last decade is the rise of xenophobic and racist parties and movements. The simultaneous emergence of both phenomena makes us wonder whether the increase of xenophobic attitudes might be one of these negative aspects of globalization.

Previous research has treated the field of the globalization's consequences, and more specifically the topic on how it affects people's attitudes towards the growing flow of foreign people, culture and structures. Still, the conclusions are many and the only consensus reached so far is that the globalization is a very complex phenomenon. If one divides the general concept of globalization into three more concrete dimensions, political-, economic-, and social globalization, more aspects of the relationship between xenophobia and globalization can be studied. They all come hand in hand, but do they affect our mindset and attitudes in different ways? Can the development of xenophobic attitudes be a rational action of a risk averse individual whose personal or national identity feel threatened by the growing flow of foreign people and culture, or rather rational action due to a situation of economic recession?

The increase of xenophobia in Europe the last couple of years can be considered distant or non-influential to some people, but if it continues to grow and takes place in policy-making on a national level it will probably affect many people's lives. To prevent a development like this, more research in the area is needed to create a deeper understanding of these phenomena shaping our contemporary world and individual lives.

1.1.1 Study objective

The aim of this study is to contribute to the research done within the field of globalization and social attitudes. Globalization and the increasing xenophobia, as well as other far-right ideologies, and the relationships between them have been frequently studied the last years. The majority of these studies are qualitative studies of xenophobia in specific countries, or studies based on the *level* of globalization. We are interested in examining the *difference* in globalization over periods, both aggregated and divided in the sub-categories economic- and social globalization, and if there is any correlation between any of these differences and the rise of xenophobia in European countries during the last decades.

It is not our intention to study what the main cause of xenophobia is, but the analysis and result of our own study do touch this topic. Our results and discussion do treat and support different perspectives and theories on the primary cause to xenophobia attitudes, but it is, however, rather our intention to study whether different dimensions of the globalization is a mechanism in this process and affect the possible causes of xenophobic attitudes.

1.1.2 Research question

With a breeding ground in the field presented above, and our objective to this study, we have formulated the following questions to answer: Does the difference in the globalization level have an impact on people's attitudes towards foreigners and their culture? More specifically, can differences in social and economic globalization tell us something about the increase of xenophobia in Europe the last decade?

1.2 How do we answer the question?

To approach this problem and our research question, we bring forward and compare both empirical situations and theory concerning xenophobia with previous research on the growing globalization and its consequences. Based on this theoretical discussion we formulate four hypotheses used as guidelines throughout the analysis. Our contribution to this research area is our own study with focus on the difference in globalization and how this might have a relation to the increasing xenophobic attitudes in Europe. We make quantitative regressions on 30 countries in Europe in the period of 1990 to 2010. Since we examine the

globalization's impact on xenophobia, the level of xenophobia is our dependent variable, and it is analyzed with the independent variable difference in globalization and a number of control variables. The results are analyzed based on a theoretical framework about xenophobic attitudes and the different dimensions of globalization.

1.3 Disposition

After this short presentation of our research question and our approach to this problem, chapter 2 gives a brief background to the progress and situation of the two phenomena globalization and rise of xenophobia in Europe, as well as our definition of the concepts. Thereafter a theoretical discussion analyzes relevant theory on why xenophobia occurs, present earlier research in the field and our hypotheses. In chapter 3 we present our contribution to the field, the method and results of our study. The result is then compared to earlier studies and analyzed within a relevant context. In chapter 4 we summarize the paper and give our conclusion.

2. Empirical background and theoretical framework

In this chapter we give a brief introduction to the situation of the two phenomena in focus of our study, globalization and xenophobia. Our definition of the phenomena and how we use the terms throughout the paper is presented. After a review of the empirical situation we first discuss the theoretical framework of xenophobia briefly and thereafter theory and previous research concerning the relationship between xenophobic attitudes and globalization.

2.1 Current situation

2.1.1 Era of globalization

Our contemporary time is sometimes called “the era of globalization”. Globalization is often referred to as a global merger of economic and political systems and structures. Research about the phenomenon can be divided into macro-level development, such as economic and political changes, and a lower micro-level of individual- and cultural attitudes and changes. (De Burgh-Woodman 2014, p. 289ff)

The increasing globalization has one instant effect. Different cultures and people interact more frequently than earlier, political and economic systems change and what once was foreign and far away is now your neighbor or a vital part of the social structure where you live. The Eurobarometer, the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission, shows that the experienced benefit of globalization is not only positive (Eurobarometer 2013, p.111). In their survey just over 50% of the participants in the survey 2013 agreed on the statement that globalization is an opportunity to economic growth. This indicates on skepticism towards globalization on an individual level, which creates a further motive to our study.

As stated above, globalization is a very broad and complex phenomenon and therefore often divided into the subcategories social-, political, and economic globalization. These categories

include different parts of the society, but come hand in hand. This is a division we use in this paper to explain more easily what part of the globalization is intended. When all categories are used as one general concept it is phrased as aggregated globalization.

2.1.2 Rise of xenophobia

Racism, xenophobia and right wing movements are growing in Europe. Cultural differences, multiculturalism and immigration are political topics which have become more popular in many European countries (Evens Foundation 2002, editorial preface). In 2010 approximately half of the European Union countries had a xenophobic and/or racist party in their parliament, and in the last years these kinds of parties have been represented in the European parliament (Bjurwald 2010, p.3).

Xenophobia and racism are often seen as synonyms, but there are theoretical differences between the expressions. According to the Oxford Dictionaries xenophobia is “*Intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries*”, while racism is “*The belief that all members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that race, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races*”. The racial focus, which racism is built on, is not a part of xenophobia. Instead it is focused on cultural differences, such as religion and language, and the fear that another culture may undermine one’s own (Migrationsinfo 2012). According to Stephen Castles, professor in Sociology at the University of Sydney, racism is a changing phenomenon that today is more focused on cultural and social identity (Castles 2000, p.164, 179). This definition by Castles makes the difference between xenophobia and racism even more vague and harder to define.

Similarly, nationalism is closely related to the two ideologies as it is also focused on one’s own nation and its superiority of others (Oxford Dictionaries 2014). The close relationship between the three ideologies makes it sometimes difficult to define the difference. From this point we only use the term xenophobia, but it often include racism, Nazism and nationalism where xenophobic attitudes are expressed. In section 3.2.2 a more specific description of our criteria for a xenophobic party and how we measure it is presented.

2.2 Theoretical perspectives

People are well aware of the increasing stream of people, increasing trade flows and worldwide integration of culture due to the social globalization and how it affect our everyday life. But does the social and/or economic globalization affect attitudes towards these new foreign citizens and their appearance as well? Three main questions structure the theoretical discussion. Firstly, why do xenophobic attitudes occur? Secondly, which are the possible reactions on the growing stream of foreign people and culture, and thirdly, do different dimensions of globalization affect these reactions? The discussion concerning the second and third question emerges into our four hypotheses on possible outcomes. Last in this section previous research are discussed.

2.2.1 Why do some people fear the foreign?

As the previous section 2.1.2 stated, we define xenophobia as a broad concept including both racism, Nazism and in some cases nationalism. A brief presentation on two main theories explaining the causes of xenophobia is given, which thereafter proceeds to a discussion connected to globalization. The two perspectives are the economic materialistic “scapegoat theory” and the social and more idealistic “social identity theory”. This division of perspectives explaining xenophobia is used in other research from different fields on xenophobia and immigrant attitudes (see Hopkins & Hainmueller 2013 and Sides & Citrin 2007¹).

The scapegoat theory simply suggest a relation between negative events occurring in a society, such as economic recession and social ill, and citizens’ negative attitudes towards foreigners (all categories put together: asylum seekers, immigrants, workers etc.) (Alarape 2008, p. 77ff). The basic logic behind this theory is that people simply blame foreigners for causing social ill, stealing their jobs and making economic crisis even worse. Foreigners are simply turned into a scapegoat which people can blame their misfortune (ibid). This process is also called “externalization of internal conflicts” (Rärthzel 2002, p. 18f), and it is argued that this externalization of internal conflicts is an unconscious mechanism of individuals, furthermore a political process used to gain control and power. Migration rules as example is covering problem areas in the society that policy making can control, not like the free market

¹ Both these studies are commented in a later stage.

and the economic liberalization where the states in Europe have less impact on national politics due to the European Union (ibid).

The theory focusing on social identity approaches this problematic topic differently. It suggests that xenophobia is a result of individual values and social norms where people tend to divide citizens into groups. The first group includes oneself, family and friends. Since people think good about oneself, this group is given all positive qualities while the “other group” is given bad qualities. The other group is often foreigners who suffer from being (often arbitrary) categorized with negative features as a result of the other citizens attempt to increase their self-esteem and qualities. (Alarape 2008, p. 79ff)

The social identity theory is originally based on an individual level, but can also be applied on a national level (Ariely 2012, p.462f). The threats from outside are then believed to destroy the nation and its traditions.

2.2.2 Possible reactions on the increasing level of immigrants and foreign culture

To put the two basic views on causes to xenophobic attitudes in a context of the growing globalization discussed above, we now examine if and how the difference in the dimensions of globalization affects xenophobia. Social globalization, which includes flows of people as well as cultural factors, has in general grown over the last time in Europe (Dreher a 2006) as well as the net migration share (World Bank a). Irrespective of the actual causes of xenophobia, but grounded in the differences in the dimensions of globalization, how does people’s attitudes towards foreign people and culture change?

In a situation of a continuously growing global movement of people, culture and ideas, we can directly consider two alternative outcomes of attitudes towards the foreign flow. The first perspective implies that individuals do not see a risk that an increasing interaction, integration or coexistence with foreign people would lead something bad. Instead it proposes that the results are deeper understanding of other cultures and more tolerance towards the “others”. People get to know the foreign, understand unknown traditions and simply learn to coexist and accept differences between each other. The second perspective proposes the opposite reaction and assumes that individuals are risk averse. It suggests that more interaction and

mixture of cultures increase fear of the foreign and therefore xenophobic attitudes. With other words the two perspectives state the immigration and global streams of social and cultural exchange to result in more or less xenophobia. Other researcher discusses this reasoning as well, *“Different theories predict that greater day-to-day contact with immigrants may either increase or decrease the perceived threat posed by immigrants”* (Card, Dustmann & Preston 2005, p.21). What interests us is whether globalization affects this process in any direction, and if the different dimensions of globalization are mechanisms in this process affecting differently.

Dividing the general concept of globalization into the more specific dimensions gives an opportunity to examine the two outcomes of how citizens react on immigration closer in a context of globalization. As noted, globalization has brought increasing trade and growing GDP for most countries in the world. Since the dimension of economic globalization is built on economic indicators and is therefore affected by the state’s economic situation, we find it closely related to people’s materialistic preferences and the scapegoat theory. In a similar way we consider the social globalization connected to the social identity theory. As example, the social globalization is affected by the number of immigrants in a state, which in turn may affect people’s attitudes towards immigrants. When we put the two possible outcomes of reactions to the increasing foreign flow discussed above in the context of social and economic globalization, four hypotheses can be derived from this theoretical approach.

The first hypothesis states that both social and economic globalization is correlated with xenophobia. This result supports a relationship between globalization and xenophobia, but since we use the difference in globalization, support for the different theories depends on whether the relationship is positive or negative.

The second hypothesis states that none of the dimensions correlate with the level of xenophobia. This simply indicates that globalization in itself is not a mechanism affecting xenophobia, and it would not support or reject any of the theories of what causes xenophobia.

The third hypothesis applies that if there is a strong and positive relationship between xenophobia and social globalization but not between xenophobia and economic globalization. This would indicate that actual face-to-face interaction with the foreign creates more fear towards the “others” than it creates understanding and a development towards a well-

functioning multicultural society at the same time as attitudes due to economic globalization is unchanged. The theory of social identity as a cause to xenophobic attitudes would then be supported.

The fourth hypothesis applies if there is a negative relation between economic globalization and xenophobia, but no relationship between social globalization and xenophobia. This would support the scapegoat theory, that negative changes in the global economy make people blame the foreign.

Before we present the results of our own study and analyze it within the theoretical framework and the four possible hypotheses, we discuss what previous research has examined and concluded.

2.2.3 What can previous research teach us?

Globalization and its consequences have been frequently studied the last decades. The approaches are many, as are the results. Here only a small amount of available studies and reports relevant for our approach are discussed. In focus is the authors' argumentation on how globalization and its different dimensions have affected xenophobic attitudes and we give our own interpretation on how this can be related to the main perspectives of what causes xenophobia in the first place.

In 1990 the global migration grew and became larger than ever before. This migration flow started and is proceeding hand in hand with the globalization shaping our modern time, and has been increasing since. According to scholar Charles Westin this process has brought complications to the well-functioning democracies in Europe. States have many tasks to manage, such as national and social welfare, education and secure jobs, and the globalization with its increasing migration and new cultures, ideas etc. threatens this work. The result is two types of political policies working against each other, support for multiculturalism and immigration control policies. (Westin 2001, p.6ff)

Further Westin concludes, "*These developments have triggered new forms of social conflict and exclusion. The new right in Europe is seen as a reaction to globalization and multiculturalism*" (Westin 2001, p. 9). The conclusion that globalization do affect people's

attitudes and their social behavior is shared by most scholars, and another study examining the relation between globalization and xenophobia states that it is possible that globalization affect us in different ways. It can make us more positive or negative to immigrants (Ariely 2011, p.542ff). This statement is built on a discussion of previous studies stating divided results on how globalization affects people. The main conclusion of this study is that a state with high level of globalization has a higher level of xenophobic attitudes (Ariely 2011, p. 550).

Stephen Castles, mentioned in section 2.1.2, agree and states that there is a relationship between globalization and the rise of racism and xenophobia. He argues that globalization may lead to societal changes that affect the national economy, politics and social relations. These changes express themselves through different kind of crises that can cause xenophobia. One of the crises is about culture and social identity. Globalization has led to that big parts of today's culture, such as music and films, are produced in global cultural cities as Los Angeles. This creates a feeling of loss for the national culture, such as languages, and may be a cause to the rise of nationalistic and xenophobic views focusing on the cultural aspects. Fear that other cultures may undermine one's own is another suggested cause to xenophobia that Castles brings up. This fear creates an opposition towards immigrants who bring their own cultures and languages with them. Another crisis Castles brings up is formed when companies move the production to low-wage countries and then create unemployment, especially in industrial sectors. This increase in unemployment, especially during the 1970th may, according to Castles, have for example resulted in former workers blaming foreigners for stealing their jobs. (Castles 2000, p.180ff)

Our interpretation of Castles' discussion on the crisis is that they are pointing in two different directions. The first crisis mentioned, about the loss of cultural heritage, can be related to the social identity theory and that foreign cultures are considered a threat. The second crisis is more related to the scapegoat theory. Castles argues that unemployment, primarily among industrial workers, is a cause to xenophobia and this is consistent with the scapegoat theory. On the other side, some scholars argue that the theories suggesting economic ill and labor market competition have no empirical support (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013, p.17f).

In a research paper called "Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration?" (Mayda 2006), it is argued that people's attitudes in general are more pro-trade than pro-migration.

The two variables trade and migration correlate positively with each other, but an increasing trade is generally preferred to an increasing migration. Concluded from the study's regressions, it is further stated that people working in non-trade related sectors are generally more positive to trade than immigration than people working in trade-related sectors. It is suggested that this is because people not working in the trade sector is not familiar with this sector and its dependence of cooperation and exchange with foreigners, and that they therefore feel threatened by immigrants to take their jobs. (Mayda 2006, p.3ff)

That people in general are more positive to trade than migration could indicate on what has been said before, that economic globalization, where trade is a vital part, is generally considered to bring economic growth and wealth while immigration is sometimes considered to bring negative aspects such as a threat on the labor market or a threat to a nation's culture as well. This argumentation supports the scapegoat theory in the way that foreigners are blamed to steal jobs. Another reason to the results could be that the people working in the trade sectors learn to understand foreigners and different cultures and thereby create tolerance leading to a more positive attitude towards immigration.

Another recent study investigating the relation between globalization and tolerance (Berggren & Nilsson 2014) supports the theoretical perspective stating that more globalization leads to more positive attitudes towards the foreign due to an increasing tolerance. The study finds that social and economic, but not political, globalization has a positive relationship with people's willingness to teach their children to be tolerant (p.28f). They conclude that some parts of the globalization do shape our values and attitudes in positive ways. Our interpretation of this result is that interaction with other cultures does not create fear but tolerance, which in turn reject the social identity theory.

Another interesting approach to how globalization affects xenophobia in Europe is to divide it into east and west, as Greskovits does in "Economic globalization and racism in Eastern and Western Europe" (2002). This due to that globalization has developed differently in these two parts of Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s, the countries of Eastern Europe had a period of rapid economic liberalization and economic globalization. At the same time this led to social disruptions, such as worse living standards and increasing unemployment. Theoretically this would be an environment to foster nationalistic xenophobia. At the same time Western Europe was shaped by political and

economic integration due to the growing European Union. Based on this discussion about the different preconditions in east and west compared to the empirical outcome, it is argued that economic globalization is a breeding ground to the rise of xenophobia in Europe since the 1990s, thus not in the east as predicted, but especially in the west due to the rapid integration. In Eastern Europe it did not foster xenophobia as expected due to the rapid liberalization and economic growth and globalization, but did also not help avoid it. (Greskovits 2002, 143ff)

The big impact of different political and economic conditions is something many scholars bring up in the discussion about growing xenophobia. In the case of east and west Europe mentioned here, the author implies that it was expected to see a growing xenophobia in east due to the economic changes that occurred. We interpret this as if the indicators of the scapegoat theory were expected to bring these negative attitudes in the east, but instead the rapid integration in the west led to these negative attitudes. Further, the author argues that it was because of economic globalization, but it can just as well have been because of social globalization and a feeling among people that their individual and national identity was threatened due to integration.

Some previous research is pointing in different directions concerning the globalization's effects on attitudes towards immigration. According to Card, Dustman and Preston there are two explanations to different attitudes towards immigration policy. The first one is economic. The study argue that the better economic condition in a state, xenophobia will not spread due to concerns about unemployment etc. The second explanation is the number of immigrants living in the state. The study does not state whether more immigrants increase or decrease xenophobia, it only points out that theories supporting both directions exist. (Card, Dustman & Preston 2005, p.21f)

Opposed to this argumentation, some scholars argue that economic factors as well as the immigrant ratio does not affect xenophobic attitudes. Instead social and psychological factors are more relevant and even more important that people often overestimate the number of immigrants living in the country (Sides & Citrin 2007, p.500f). Here the two different views on how economic factors and the number of immigrants affect attitudes would support different theories, but moreover indicates on the importance of contextual factors. As the power politicians and the media have on people's opinion.

2.2.4 Short summary of the theoretical framework

In sum, much research has been done in the field of globalization and attitudes towards what is foreign. What can be concluded is that no consensus on what causes xenophobia has been reached, and no clear correlation between globalization and the negative attitudes can be found in the studies. With other words, none of the hypotheses dependent on the cause of xenophobia presented as outcomes when people are exposed to increasing flows of foreign people and culture are given support by this discussion of previous research. The same can be said about the two main theories on what causes xenophobic attitudes in the first place.

The focus in previous research has mainly been on the relationship between globalization and the concepts of nationalism or migration and not so often on xenophobia as a broader concept. This is one of the reasons to our paper, and why we take a broader approach towards the concept xenophobia. Moreover, in the previous research it is, as stated before, the level of globalization that is used to examine the relationship. This is another reason to our study and why we examine the difference in economic and social globalization to see if and how it affects the xenophobia in Europe.

3. Our study

To examine the relation between the difference in globalization and the growing level of xenophobia we run cross-sectional data regressions on our dependent variable xenophobia, that in our case is measured as xenophobic parties' vote share in the election to the national parliament, and the main variable we want to study, that is difference in globalization over the time period of 1990 to 2010. This section starts with a critical discussion about problems occurring when doing research in this field. Thereafter it presents the data we have chosen to measure globalization and xenophobia with, together with an argumentation on why they are chosen and how these variables are created. A first step of our analysis is to see if we find any relation between xenophobia and the dimensions of globalization. In a second step we present and add control variables in our regressions to see if we can learn something more about the relations. The control variables are chosen based on the perspectives from the theory section and are as follows, difference in unemployment, difference in migration stock, growth in GDP/capita and level of education. In a last step we analyze the results of the regressions and discuss these within the framework of theoretical perspectives and the empirical situation presented in the previous chapter.

3.1 Critical review

The two concepts in focus of our study, globalization and xenophobia, are both very complex phenomena. They are not only highly dependent of a state's political, social and economic context, both historical and present, and furthermore in an ongoing process of development and change. This observation comes with complications. The variables are hard to define and measure because of their dependences on situation and context. How and why xenophobia grows in a state have specific case-depended reasons, but since we study the global variable globalization's impact on xenophobia we stick to a quantitative analysis of the states and do not go deeper in any case with special preconditions. More specific problems with our variables are discussed in the following section.

3.2 How do we measure the two concepts?

3.2.1 Globalization

To measure globalization we use the KOF index on Globalization (Dreher a 2006). It is an index that register a country's level of globalization, and can be used divided in the dimensions political- , economic-, and social globalization or put together as an aggregated globalization index. The economic dimension include one part of actual economic flows such as trade, FDIs and portfolio investments, and one part of restrictions such as trade tariffs and hidden import barriers. The social dimension consists of three categories. The first is personal contact in forms of direct interaction between people in different states in all possible ways. The second is information flows that measure the circulation of ideas, and the third is cultural proximity. In the political dimension international cooperation, number of embassies and international treaties are counted. (Dreher b 2006)

We use the KOF index as a measure on globalization since it is the most extensive data on states over a long period available. Moreover, it covers the broad concept of globalization with many indicators included. In our study we primarily use the dimensions of economic- and social globalization since we consider them most relevant in the framework of our research question and theory concerning xenophobia. The political dimension is excluded throughout the study, since we find the political indicators irrelevant as explaining xenophobia from the perspectives explained in our theory discussion. The index on political globalization is as stated number of cooperation, treaties and embassies, and we do not find that close related to either the economic situation of a state or individual, and furthermore not affecting people's identity. Despite this the dimension of political globalization is still included in the cases we use the aggregated globalization data.

One disadvantage with the KOF index is that it does not include everything connected to globalization and is therefore not optimal. As mentioned before, globalization is a complex and broad phenomenon, and to measure it is hard. Indicators of all dimensions can have different meaning in different countries and its context. Since we have decided to not investigate in country specific contexts and do therefore believe that the KOF index is a good measurement for our quantitative study.

3.2.2 Xenophobia

To measure the level of xenophobia in the European states we use the results in parliament elections. This data has been collected from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (Döring & Manow, 2012) and in some cases from the European Election Database². The measurement of the level of xenophobia in a state is therefore the percentage that xenophobic parties gain in the election to the national parliament. This measurement is chosen because of the availability over time and its development can therefore be studied and compared with other factors.

As explained in section 2.1.2 we have categorized the different ideologies with close relationships, such as racism, under the concept of xenophobia. Due to the fact that intolerance today to a large extent focuses on culture and identity, we have chosen to use three criteria for which parties to include in the study. Parties included do:

- *believe that multiculturalism is something bad.*
- *believe that other cultures may undermine one's own.*
- *believe that immigrants have to adjust and adapt the country's culture to be able to stay.*

In harmony with our definition of xenophobia, these criteria include many different parties where some are more extreme than others. Still, they all have the fear of other cultures and do not believe that different cultures can co-exist in common. To determine if a party meets these criteria we have studied academic research and arguments about level of xenophobia in different parties, the party's own position on their official website concerning views on immigrants, immigration policy and multiculturalism, and other worldwide media. A list of countries, their xenophobic parties and the level of xenophobia in each country is found in the Appendix A and B.

One problem with measuring xenophobia as share in parliament elections is that it does not catch the growth of non-party xenophobic movements, such as the English Defense League (Expo, 2014) and similar movements. It does not cover general accepted norms and attitudes,

² The data applied in the analysis in this publication that are based on material from the "European Election Database" are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here.

towards immigrant as example, which can be more or less negative in different countries. It does however give a good guidance about the political power of xenophobic parties. A second problem is that it is hard to decide whether a party is xenophobic or not since opinions are subjective. A third factor influencing our choice to measure xenophobia with party share in national parliament elections is the actual political system in the specific country. The UK as an example has a two party system that makes it hard for smaller parties to establish, but this does not mean that there are no xenophobic representatives (Expo, 2014).

Despite the weaknesses with this measurement of xenophobia, we consider it useful for our quantitative study of such a complex phenomenon. Moreover it gives the possibility to analyze changes over time.

3.2.3 The combination of our chosen variables

We analyze the difference in globalization in the time period 1990-2010³, as well as divided in 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. The level of xenophobic parties share in national election is chosen as close to the last year of the period as possible, maximum three years before or after the last year of the period⁴. The period between 1990 and 2010 is based on the argumentation that the era of globalization started around 1990 and that the rise of xenophobia in Europe has developed in the beginning of the 21th century. This approach is chosen because of our intention that an eventual relation between globalization and xenophobia would come from a process where globalization affect people's minds and opinions, but first after some time would it result in pronounced xenophobic attitudes.



3.3 Can we find a relationship?


The first step in our study is to see if there is any relationship between the difference in globalization after 1990 and the level of xenophobia around 2010. Making simple scatterplots on the data, no clear trend can be spotted in the relationship between the difference in aggregated globalization between 1990 and 2010 and the level of xenophobia around 2010

³ Globalization data on Czech Republic and Slovakia starts in 1993, Estonia and Slovenia starts in 1991. They are though included from the year they start.

⁴ For list on parties, election year and level of xenophobia see Appendix A and B.

more than a vague negative relation, see Chart 1. This negative trend would imply that the larger and positive change in globalization is, the lower the level of xenophobia. If we remake this procedure after dividing the globalization up in its dimensions social and economic globalization the similar results are to be observed, see Chart 2 and 3.







When giving the data from KOF index on social and economic globalization for our selected observations a closer look, one interesting trend can be observed. Most of the states have a negative change in in economic globalization the last years. The measurement of difference in economic globalization between 1990 and 2010 does therefore include first an increase and thereafter a decrease. The total outcome of this movement is a small increase and this affects the results⁵. This notification is the reason to our choice to divide our period in two parts, difference in globalization 1990-2000 with xenophobic level 2000 and difference in globalization 2000-2010 with xenophobic level 2010. It is then possible to see if this negative trend in the economic globalization during the last period has any impact and change our earlier results. Stacked regressions on our data, with a dummy variable equal to zero for the first period and equal to one the second period, support this decision. The regressions with aggregated and economic globalization have significant dummy variables, even with control variables included, while social globalization has insignificant dummy variables⁶. However, since there is significance for the dummy in the first regressions, and because of the visual difference looking directly at the data, for both economic and social globalization, the continuing parts are focusing on the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2010.



Looking at the social globalization in the period 1990-2000, see chart 4 below, we find the same vague negative relation as before dividing the period up. The same result can be seen in the next period with social globalization, see Chart 5. Concerning the economic globalization

⁵ For charts on differences in globalization between the two periods see Appendix D.

⁶ For tables on stacked regressions see Appendix C.

the negative relation to xenophobia almost disappears completely in the period 1990-2000, see Chart 6. In 2000-2010, see Chart 7, the results with economic globalization slightly change and we find two trends. Firstly, the observations have formed two clusters, still with a negative but steeper relation to xenophobia, which we can identify as west European states to the left and east European states to the right. Secondly, the Western states all have a negative difference in economic globalization this period and the Eastern have a positive. This observation can be related to Greskovisky's discussion, mentioned in section 2.2.4, that former Soviet Union states had a rapid economic development but not the rise of xenophobia that was expected. Still we can see a xenophobic growth in some of the Eastern states, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, but not as large as in the west European states. Altogether the relationship is stronger than in the whole period of 1990-2010 and do indicate that a declined economic globalization does have a relation to xenophobia.





We can see a difference between the development of social and economic globalization and this indicates that the globalization in general, particularly social, does have a positive effect on people's attitudes towards foreigners and foreign culture. This is one of the different approaches Card, Dustman and Preston discusses, see section 2.2.4, and what we can see from our results so far closer interaction and integration due to social globalization does lead to more understanding and tolerance. At the same time, looking only at the economic globalization and how that index is built up, one more relation can be observed. A decrease in economic globalization, i.e. something related to the state's economy or economic structure have declined or gone bad, is fostering xenophobic attitudes. This finding supports the fourth hypothesis and the scapegoat theory arguing that economic factors have a big impact on xenophobia.

Our results at this stage conclude that there is a weak negative relation between globalization and xenophobia. Most of the perspectives discussed in the theoretical framework support the idea that globalization, in one way or another, foster xenophobic attitudes. Even if the size of an increase in globalization generally could affect the level in a negative way, specific parts of the globalization could still affect xenophobic attitudes in a positive direction, i.e. that globalization foster fear for the foreign. Due to our results, a decrease in economic globalization during the last years may have had this effect. This would indicate on two forces working in different directions, especially during the last decade. The negative changes in economic globalization would then support the scapegoat theory and fostering xenophobia, while the positive changes in social globalization creates tolerance and prevents xenophobic attitudes. Approached from the perspective of our four hypotheses vague support for the first and the fourth is found. The next step is to see if we can identify any of these differences with help from other indicators.

3.4 Can other indicators tell us more?

3.4.1 Control variables

To examine if we get a stronger or weaker correlation between the differences in any of the types of globalization and the level of xenophobia we run more detailed cross section data regressions with control. Due to our limited number of observations we use only a few control variables to not get misleading results. The four control variables we run are closely related to economic growth and globalization, and according to us relevant in the context of xenophobic attitudes. The division of two time periods is used as in the last section. Since we want to examine how changes affect xenophobia our control variables are measured in differences or growth, except the average school years variable. Changes are used because we use the difference in our main variable, globalization, and we find it more relevant to measure changes when investigating development in people's attitudes. As an example, the level of unemployment can be high for many years, which according to some theories foster xenophobic thoughts. However, a sudden change and increased unemployment may according to us affect xenophobia even more. Below the control variables are briefly presented and their relevance as indicators of xenophobic attitudes in our study is argued.

The first control variable is difference in *unemployment of the total labor force* in a state. The World Bank data on total unemployment ratio of the labor force and the total labor force is used to calculate the control variable. (World Bank b, c 2014). According to the scapegoat theory and previous research the fear of losing a job due to immigration is sometimes big. If this is the case, the unemployment rate, or rather the change in unemployment would be an important factor affecting xenophobic attitudes. Moreover, increasing unemployment could be a result of an economic crisis or political failure. In combination with increasing social globalization and immigration, this would be a reason for people to blame the scapegoat.

As second control variable the difference in *total migration stock* of the whole population is used. More precisely it is data from the World Bank on the international migrant stock (World Bank a 2014), which include the number of people born in a state other than where they currently live as well as refugees. The number of immigrants and the migration flow into a state would in itself affect xenophobic attitudes in different ways depending on whether the underlying reason to these negative attitudes are economic recession or related to the social identity. Based on our theoretical discussion both an increased xenophobia, as well as an increased tolerance are possible outcomes.

The third control variable is growth in GDP/Capita. Data on GDP/capita (PPP) is taken from the Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston 2012). GDP is a variable frequently used in contexts related to economic growth or welfare, and is observed to correlate with globalization. According to the scapegoat theory on xenophobia, economic recession is argued to be one of the reasons for xenophobic attitudes. GDP per capita is an indicator able to measure for example an economic crisis well. An even better indicator to measure economic changes would be the growth rate in GDP/capita. Unlike GDP/capita, the growth rate of GDP/capita would directly indicate on the short-term situation without comparing with previous years. The lower level or growth rate in GDP would then according to the scapegoat theory indicate on more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

The fourth and last control variable used is the *level of education* in a state. The data used is Barro Lee's data on Average years of total schooling for everyone in the population over 15 years (Barro & Lee). According to some scholars and surveys there is a correlation between higher education and positive attitude towards immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013, p.18; Card, Dustman & Preston 2005, p.25). This argumentation would yield irrespective of

whether xenophobia is based in the scapegoat theory or social identity theory. Moreover, it can be argued that higher education decreases fear for losing a job due to immigrants. The results of the first European Social Survey implied a strong correlation between higher education and positive attitude towards immigrants (Card, Dustman & Preston 2005, p.38).

The control variables chosen are used in similar studies. As example, in the analysis of the results in the first European Social Survey (ESS) on migration and minorities the authors use GDP/capita, unemployment level, level of immigrants/foreign born and education as well as some more variables, in the regressions trying to explain attitudes towards immigrants (Card, Dustman & Preston 2005, p.22ff). Unlike our study, they use the level of immigration and the level of all control variables while we are more interested to examine changes in these variables and their affection on our dependent variable xenophobia.

3.4.2 Results

To continue the analysis started in section 3.3 and its conclusions, this part of the analysis continue to use the division of two time periods. Due to the four theoretical hypotheses on possible reactions to foreign flows depending on economic and social globalization formulated in the theoretical section, the regressions start with social globalization as our main independent variable and thereafter economic globalization. Level of xenophobia is still or dependent variable and we add the control variables one by one to see how they affect to the model.

The first equation with social globalization is as follows,

$$\text{Xenophobia2000} = c + \beta_1 \text{socialglobalization90-00} + \beta_2 \text{unemployment90-00} + \beta_3 \text{migration90-00} + \beta_4 \text{growthGDP/capita90-00} + \beta_5 \text{averageschoolyears2000} + u$$

Table 1

Dependent Variable: Xenophobia 2000
 Method: Least Squares
 Included observations: 30
 White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Social globalization 1990-2000	-0.395731 [0.264152]	-0.439349 [0.279942]	-0.598885* [0.307788]	-0.616841* [0.306888]	-0.873576** [0.315584]
Unemployment 1990-2000		0.00000335 [-0.0000052]	0.00000686* [-0.00000383]	0.00000671 [-0.00000444]	0.00000992** [-0.00000474]
Migration 1990-2000			-0.00000335** [-0.00000126]	-0.00000349** [-0.00000139]	-0.00000503*** [-0.00000144]
Growth GDP/capita 1990-2000				-0.084645 [0.071456]	-0.123790* [0.071657]
Average school years 2000					-3.263174** [1.468556]
R-squared	0.095553	0.110041	0.184734	0.227580	0.341085

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
 * significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

Chart 4, in section 3.3, presents the difference in social globalization 1990 to 2000 and level of xenophobia year 2000 and implies a vague relationship between the two variables. The first regression, displayed in Table 1, supports this by showing us that there is no significant relation between the difference in social globalization and the level of xenophobia in the first period. The relation is though constantly negative, which corresponds with earlier results and indicate that more social globalization would lead to less xenophobia. This would in turn support the theoretical discussion that globalization foster tolerance.

Further we observe that the more control variables we add to the regression, the difference in social globalization becomes more significant. The control variables that seem to affect the outcome the most are the difference in the migration stock and average school years which both are significant when added in the model. The difference in migration stock has a negative relationship to the level of xenophobia, which implies that increased migration flows would lead to lower levels of xenophobia. Again, this supports the theory that more interaction with other cultures fosters tolerance among people. The average school years variable is significant and has a negative relation to xenophobia, which supports the theory that the more knowledge people acquire the more tolerant they get. In column 5 all variables are significant. The growth in GDP/capita variable has a negative relationship with xenophobia, while the difference in unemployment has a positive relationship. Approached from a scapegoat theory perspective, our interpretation is that as long as people have a

positive growth in economic terms, or there is no increase in unemployment, there will be nothing to blame the scapegoat for.

In general the model explaining our dependent variable xenophobia can explain the relation better the more variables we add. It suggests that the difference in social globalization does have an impact on xenophobia.

To see if this result applies in the next period, we use the following equation,

$$\text{Xenophobia}_{2010} = c + \beta_1 \text{socialglobalization}_{00-10} + \beta_2 \text{unemployment}_{00-10} + \beta_3 \text{migration}_{00-10} + \beta_4 \text{growthGDP/capita}_{00-10} + \beta_5 \text{averageschoolyears}_{2010} + u$$

Table 2

Dependent Variable: Xenophobia 2010

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 30

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Social globalization 2000-2010	-0.16044 [0.235358]	-0.170481 [0.242115]	-0.196012 [0.266569]	-0.15022 [0.295676]	-0.157669 [0.310963]
Unemployment 2000-2010		-0.00000206 [0.00000225]	0.000000315 [0.00000307]	-0.000000372 [0.00000262]	-0.000000239 [0.00000301]
Migration 2000-2010			-0.00000171 [0.00000157]	-0.00000199 [0.00000153]	-0.00000206 [0.00000174]
growth GDP/capita 2000-2010				-0.074278 [0.063874]	-0.070368 [0.067094]
Average school years 2010					-0.296508 [2.146027]
R-squared	0.018044	0.032938	0.051334	0.08595	0.086954

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
* significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

In the second period we cannot see any clear relation in Chart 5, only that the trend line is negative. The same result appears in this regression, see Table 2, where there is no significant relation between social globalization and xenophobia. When we add the control variables there is no difference, social globalization as well as the control variables are insignificant throughout all of the five regressions in Table 2.

Before we analyze the results with social globalization further within the theoretical framework we look at the results concerning the economic globalization.

The equation for the period 1990 to 2000 is,

$$\text{Xenophobia}_{2000} = c + \beta_1 \text{economic globalization}_{90-00} + \beta_2 \text{unemployment}_{90-00} + \beta_3 \text{migration}_{90-00} + \beta_4 \text{growth GDP/capita}_{90-00} + \beta_5 \text{averageschoolyears}_{2000} + u$$

Tabel 3

Dependent Variable: Xenophobia 2000

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 30

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Economic globalization 1990-2000	-0.273197 [0.163939]	-0.276253 [0.164477]	-0.307233* [0.165278]	-0.446476** [0.174435]	-0.481827** [0.181469]
Unemployment 1990-2000		0.0000012 [-0.00000379]	0.00000263 [-0.00000303]	0.00000253 [-0.00000327]	0.00000307 [-0.00000366]
Migration 1990-2000			-0.00000179* [-0.000000852]	-0.00000212** [-0.000000936]	-0.00000247** [-0.00000101]
Growth GDP/capita 1990-2000				-0.129428* [0.069772]	-0.148814* [0.077676]
Average school years 2000					-1.406762 [1.404880]
R-squared	0.052971	0.054985	0.079827	0.167009	0.193140

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
* significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

When examining Chart 6 we can see that the relationship is very vague. In Table 3 economic globalization is insignificant when being the only independent variable, but adding control variables to the model the economic globalization becomes significant with a negative relationship to xenophobia. This implies that a larger positive difference in economic globalization gives a lower level of xenophobia. Again, this supports the scapegoat theory in the way that it indicates a positive economic outcome to decrease the level of xenophobia.

Both the migration stock and growth in GDP/capita are significant with a negative relation to xenophobia. As concluded in the discussion about Table 1 these relationships indicate on an increasing flow of migration fostering tolerance, as well as a high growth of GDP/capita decreases xenophobia.

The equation for the next period is as follows,

$$\text{Xenophobia}_{2010} = c + \beta_1 \text{economic globalization}_{00-10} + \beta_2 \text{unemployment}_{00-10} + \beta_3 \text{migration}_{00-10} + \beta_4 \text{growth GDP/capita}_{00-10} + \beta_5 \text{average school years}_{2010} + u$$

Table 4

Dependent Variable: xenophobia_2010

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 30

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Economic globalization 2000-2010	-0.475857*** [0.148074]	-0.558004*** [0.161223]	-0.591172*** [0.151827]	-0.671856*** [0.190565]	-0.697780*** [0.199396]
Unemployment 2000-2010		-0.0000049*** [0.00000175]	-0.00000143 [0.00000231]	-0.00000114 [0.00000231]	-0.000000725 [0.0000026]
Migration 2000-2010			-0.0000026** [0.00000115]	-0.00000249** [0.00000117]	-0.00000276* [0.00000132]
growth GDP/capita 2000-2010				0.058238 [0.068798]	0.076202 [0.076043]
Average school years 2010					-1.078072 [1.859982]
R-squared	0.254957	0.331635	0.373897	0.389559	0.402832

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
* significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

What differs Table 4 from the rest is that it is the only one where globalization, economic in this case, as only independent variable is significant (at a 1 % level). This result remains when we add the control variables. If we compare Table 3 and 4, economic globalization has a negative relation to xenophobia in both tables. We can observe that there is a higher significance in Table 4 as well as larger negative coefficients for the economic globalization. This implies that economic globalization affects xenophobia more in the second period than in the first. As discussed in section 3.3 a majority of the states have a negative or a very small difference in economic globalization in the second period compared to the first one, i.e. one or several of the indicators of the economic globalization index has decreased. This implies that during an economic regression, which may affect the economic globalization in a way that it decreases or is idle, the level of xenophobia is affected more by the economic globalization than when the economic globalization is strongly positive.

Interesting to note in this regression is that also unemployment is significant when added. This significance does though disappear when we add migration, which is significant with a negative relation independent on what we add. That the significance of unemployment

disappears may be due to that the two control variables are relative high correlated, 0.7. It is not a problem for the regressions but it may be the answer to why it happens. In our model migration explain the xenophobia better.

3.4.3 Viewed from a perspective of our hypotheses

To shortly summarize the results we have in the regressions found that economic globalization has a close relation to the level of xenophobia, and especially in the last period where it constantly was significant at a 1% level. Social globalization was significant in the first period after adding control variables, and moreover the migration variable showed significant results in all regressions except Table 2. This implies that an increased migration flow results in lower levels of xenophobia, and that globalization, especially the economic dimension, has a negative impact on xenophobia.

Approaching these results from a perspective of the four hypotheses our study find support for hypothesis number 1 and number 4. Hypothesis 1 states that if the difference in both social and economic globalization are correlated with the level of xenophobia, we can only state that they have an affection on xenophobia, but not really why or support any of the theories on what causes these negative attitudes. Since our results tell us that the difference in economic globalization is significant in both periods, as well as on a higher level of significance, than the difference in social globalization, we also find our results to support the fourth hypothesis. It indicates that the difference in economic globalization has a stronger effect on xenophobia than the social, which could imply that individuals are more risk averse in situations of economic ill. Because of the negative difference in economic globalization in the last period and its relation to xenophobia, we argue that our study have a tendency to support scapegoat theory.

With our results in the regressions we do reject the third hypothesis that a high level of social globalization would lead to more xenophobic attitudes and in turn support the social identity theory. Most importantly we got a negative relation between the two; increasing social globalization seems to lead to decreased level of xenophobia. As argued from some scholars referred to in our theoretical section of this paper, this result support the theory that social globalization fosters tolerance. Furthermore, the control variable difference in migration stock has a significant negative relation to xenophobia, both when analyzing the differences

in social and economic globalization. This would also support that a growing stream of people and culture does foster understanding and tolerance towards the foreign.

4. Conclusion

The complexity of the phenomenon of globalization stated in the beginning of this paper can once again be noted. In what scale it affects individuals' way of thinking and their attitudes is a perspective that is sometimes forgotten due to the economic growth and wealth it generates. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine if the change in globalization and its different dimensions may be related to the growth of xenophobic parties in Europe during the last decades. Based in the theoretical discussion and analyzed through the perspective of four hypotheses, our study generates results making it possible to contribute with new perspectives within this field of study.

Our first conclusion is a relationship between the change in globalization and the level of xenophobia in Europe the last decades, as the majority of researchers and theoretical perspectives argue. Whether the different dimensions of globalization affect these xenophobic attitudes in different ways is a more complicated question. To guide and structure our study we formulated four hypotheses, whereas the first has already been clarified by our first conclusion and the second thereby rejected. We further reject the third hypothesis, that if social globalization correlates positively with xenophobia but not with economic globalization it suggests that the social identity theory is the main cause to xenophobia. Instead of a positive we found a negative relationship, indicating that social globalization foster tolerance and positive attitudes towards foreign people. Moreover, our control variable difference in migration stock has a significant negative relation in the model, which supports this conclusion. This result can still not state that the social identity theory is not relevant; it can still be a part of the process and be a force working against the tolerance, a process our study cannot notice.

The fourth hypothesis, that a negative relation between economic globalization and xenophobia occurs but not with social globalization which in turn would support the scapegoat theory on what causes xenophobia, find vague support in our study. In the last period examined, the economic globalization is negatively related to xenophobia no matter which control variables we add. At the same time there is no significant relation between social globalization and xenophobia during this period. Most interesting is that more than half

of the countries had a negative change in economic globalization in our results, which indicates for an economic recession or decline in some way, and this would support the scapegoat theory even stronger. The economic ill would imply that people find it rational to blame this on the growing flow of foreigners. Furthermore, the negative relationship between difference in economic globalization and xenophobia is stronger in the second period. This implies that when there is an economic recession the economic globalization affects the level of xenophobia more than when the economy is growing. An interesting aspect to this finding is the difference between the Western and Eastern European states in this case, where the Western had the negative change in economic globalization whilst the Eastern had a positive change. The difference in these areas' political and economic situation has been discussed in our theoretical chapter, and does together with our results indicate one of our most important conclusions: that the context, political, historical or economic, has a big impact on how both xenophobia and globalization can take place and develop and this is something that affects both people's attitudes as well as the results of studies like our own.

Based on our results we hope this area of study will be elaborated further. We get significant results in three out of four time periods and do support, or refute, the previous theories about why xenophobia occurs. Nevertheless, this study area can certainly be developed even more. For further research we suggest two components that could be developed. Firstly, as mentioned earlier in the paper, we only have 30 observations in our examination because of our focus on Europe. Despite this relatively small number of observations we get significant results on globalization in three out of four periods. For future research we therefore suggest to expand the number of observations to see if the results remain, change or even improve. Secondly, we have discussed the problematic when measuring xenophobia. Greater resources in time and capacity, or different approaches to measure attitudes like xenophobia could improve the research and future studies.

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World Bank c, Unemployment, Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS> (23-05-2014)

6. Appendix

A. Countries, xenophobic level ~2000 and ~2010 and election year

Country	Xenophobic level ~2000	Election year	Xenophobic level ~2010	Election year
Austria	26,9	1999	20,5	2013
Belgium	11,4	1999	7,8	2010
Bulgaria	0		9,4	2009
Cyprus	0		1,1	2011
Czech Republic	3,9	1998	0	
Denmark	12,4	2001	12,2	2011
Estonia	0		0	
Finland	1	1999	19,1	2011
France	11,1	2002	13,6	2012
Germany	1,8	1998	1,5	2009
Greece	0		17,6	2012
Hungary	4,4	2002	16,7	2010
Iceland	0		0	
Ireland	0		0	
Italy	16	2001	8,3	2008
Latvia	5,4	2002	7,8	2010
Lithuania	1,2	2000	0	
Luxembourg	10,5	1999	8,1	2009
Malta	0		0	
The Netherlands	17	2002	15,5	2010
Norway	14,7	2001	22,9	2009
Poland	10,2	2001	1,5	2007
Portugal	0		0	
Romania	20,9	2000	3,2	2008
Slovakia	3,3	2002	5,1	2010
Slovenia	4,4	2000	1,8	2011
Spain	0		0	
Sweden	0		5,7	2010
Switzerland	26,5	1999	27,9	2011
United Kingdom	0		0	

B. Countries, parties and websites

Country	Party/parties	Website
Austria	<i>Freedom Party of Austria</i>	http://www.fpoe.at/
Belgium	<i>Vlaams Block/Belang</i>	http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/
	<i>Front/Démocratie National</i>	http://www.dnat.be/
Bulgaria	<i>Ataka</i>	http://www.ataka.bg/
Cyprus	<i>National Popular Front</i>	http://www.elamcy.com/
Czech Republic	<i>Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia</i>	http://republikani.webnode.cz/onas/
Denmark	<i>Danish People's Party</i>	http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/
Finland	<i>True Finns Party</i>	http://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/
France	<i>Front National</i>	http://www.frontnational.com/
Germany	<i>The Republicans</i>	http://www.rep.de/
	<i>National Democratic Party of Germany</i>	http://www.npd.de/
Greece	<i>Golden Dawn</i>	http://www.xryshaygh.com/
	<i>Independent Greeks</i>	http://anexartitoiellines.gr/

Hungary	<i>Hungarian Justice and Life Party</i>	*
	<i>Jobbik</i>	http://www.jobbik.com/
Italy	<i>Northen League</i>	http://www.leganord.org/
	<i>National Alliance</i>	*
Latvia	<i>Latvian National Independence Movement</i>	http://www.tb.lv/
	<i>For Fatherland and Freedom</i>	*
Lithuania	<i>Young Lithuania</i>	http://www.jaunalietuviai.lt/
Luxembourg	<i>Alternatice Democratic Reform Party</i>	http://www.adr.lu/home/
The Netherlands	<i>Pim Fortuyn List</i>	http://lijstpimfortuyn-eindhoven.nl/
	<i>Party for Freedom</i>	http://www.pvv.nl/
Norway	<i>Progress Party</i>	http://www.frp.no/
Poland	<i>Self-Defence of the Republic Poland</i>	http://www.samoobrona.pl
Romania	<i>Greater Romania Party</i>	http://prm-central.ro/

Romania	<i>Romanian National Unity Party</i>	*
Slovakia	<i>Slovak National Party</i>	http://www.sns.sk/
Slovenia	<i>Slovenian National Party</i>	http://www.sns.si/
Sweden	<i>Swedish Democrats</i>	http://sverigedemokraterna.se/
Switzerland	<i>Swiss People's Party</i>	http://www.svp.ch/
	<i>National Action against Foreign Domination/Swiss Democrats</i>	http://www.schweizerdemokraten.ch/aktuell/index.shtml
	<i>Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland</i>	http://www.edu-schweiz.ch/cms/
	<i>Freedom Party of Switzerland</i>	http://www.auto-partei.ch/

*For parties without any website. Visit <http://detslutnaeuropa.se/lander-2/> for more information.

C. Stacked regressions with dummy variable

Aggregated Globalization with Dummy Variable

Dependent Variable: Xenophobia

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 60

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Aggregated globalization	-0.486294*** [0.157117]	-0.488938*** [0.159602]	-0.552603*** [0.162397]	-0.534225*** [0.159978]	-0.548972*** [0.163393]
Dummy	-5.157147** [2.524738]	-5.136949* [2.573001]	-5.701315** [2.530294]	-5.580483** [2.493201]	-5.148113** [2.517949]
Unemployment		-0.00000135 [-0.00000235]	0.00000175 [-0.00000215]	0.00000119 [-0.00000215]	0.00000148 [-0.00000229]
Migration			-0.00000255** [-0.00000104]	-0.0000027** [-0.00000109]	-0.00000294** [-0.00000121]
Growth GDP/capita				-0.063042 [0.047292]	-0.061726 [0.048264]
Average school years					-0.869938 [1.114841]
R-squared	0.143880	0.148312	0.193872	0.218790	0.228866

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
* significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

Economic Globalization with Dummy Variable

Dependent Variable: Xenophobia

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 60

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Economic globalization	-0.397002*** [0.112479]	-0.420821*** [0.119998]	-0.459948*** [0.113691]	-0.438623*** [0.112858]	-0.441437*** [0.114012]
Dummy	-4.449092** [2.141583]	-4.664142** [2.295688]	-4.978309** [2.183273]	-4.787724** [2.164505]	-4.397523* [2.253001]
Unemployment		-0.00000257 [-0.00000209]	0.000000174 [-0.00000202]	-0.000000245 [-0.000002]	-0.000000652 [-0.00000215]
Migration			-0.00000235*** [-0.000000863]	-0.00000247*** [-0.000000908]	-0.00000262** [-0.00000102]
Growth GDP/capita				-0.053216 [0.047432]	-0.052413 [0.048434]
Average school years					-0.608163 [1.147650]
R-squared	0.146631	0.162269	0.201709	0.219212	0.224189

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
* significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

Social Globalization with Dummy Variable

Dependent Variable: Xenophobia

Method: Least Squares

Included observations: 60

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Social globalization	-0.270544 [0.178022]	-0.267525 [0.179978]	-0.344022* [0.204997]	-0.324592 [0.214390]	-0.370787 [0.237244]
Dummy	-1.716247 [2.579670]	-1.654382 [2.592868]	-2.168426 [2.659522]	-2.100636 [2.702195]	-1.722528 [2.671964]
Unemployment		-0.000000862 [-0.00000234]	0.00000215 [-0.00000229]	0.0000015 [-0.00000228]	0.00000205 [-0.00000252]
Migration			-0.0000024** [-0.00000112]	-0.00000255** [-0.00000113]	-0.000295** [-0.0000013]
Growth GDP/capita				-0.068360 [0.045210]	-0.065910 [0.046651]
Average school years					-1.138491 [1.234514]
R-squared	0.050350	0.052159	0.090887	0.120187	0.136397

Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses
* significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%

D. Differences in globalization

