The Representation of the EU and EU-Hungarian Relations in
Népszabadság and *Magyar Nemzet* –
a Critical Discourse Analysis

Patricia Szolnoki

Master of Arts in European Studies

Supervisor: Anna Cabak Rédei

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Abstract

This study examines the representation of the European Union (EU) and EU-Hungarian relations in the two largest daily newspapers in Hungary, *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Nemzet.* Focusing on the topic of the Hungarian national elections and the tenth anniversary of Hungary in the EU, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) was carried out on articles appearing between 1 March and 5 May 2014 to identify discourses on the EU and EU-Hungarian relations. My analysis found that both newspapers are consistent with their representational strategies, but contrasting in their respective discourses. *Népszabadság* presents a pro-European discourse with a representation of the EU as a social and political community, thereby projecting a positive attitude towards further European integration. *Magyar Nemzet*, meanwhile, represents the EU as a powerless actor, as a mere assistant in coordinating nation states. Instead, the nation state remains the only legitimate political actor while the EU is described as an external influence. The Hungarian state, the Hungarian government and Hungarian citizens are used synonymously and represented as one group. These strategies achieve a strengthening of Hungarian national identity and allegiance and disable a possible allegiance or identification with the EU.

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1. Introduction

Hungary joined the EU on 1 May 2004, along with nine other states. This date marks the biggest enlargement of the EU to date. This event has added a new dimension in the history of the EU, as it widened the debate on the notion of Europeanness and belonging to Europe with new and unique views on the matter. This debate stems from different perspectives all over Europe, varying from member-state to member-state. Case argues that the course of European history created a divide now termed variably as West and East, Old Europe and New Europe or even Core Europe and Non-core Europe.[1] The discussion on what it means to be European for Hungary, therefore, needs to take into account specific features of Hungarian politics that reflect Hungary's position in the debate where binary oppositions of East and West, Old Europe and New Europe, national and supra-national power clash, and Europeanness is interpreted in so many diverse ways. The perplexing discourse of Hungarian politics, which many times dazzle the international public, is a useful ground to get a grasp on EU-Hungarian relations.

I set out to examine what the European Union is represented to be in Hungary with a focus on Hungarian media. Hooghe and Marks claim that the media has a crucial role in influencing mass politics, and I therefore consider the analysis of media a relevant starting point to discover how discourse is shaped in Hungary in regards to the EU. [2] My chosen method is a critical discourse analysis performed on newspaper articles, as I expect that representations of the EU will be varied and salient there, and they reflect the Hungarian perspective more authentically than international media. The online versions of the two largest quality broadsheets, *Magyar Nemzet* and *Népszabadság* will give the material for the investigation. My focus will be to identify what roles are assigned to the EU by different media outlets, what differences (if any) can be seen between these representations, and what representational tools and techniques are used in relation to the EU. As *Magyar Nemzet* is traditionally associated with a centre-right perspective, and *Népszabadság* with a centre-left perspective, I expect to find notable differences between

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[1] Case, Holly, "Being European: East and West," in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 111-115.

[2] Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (2009): 10, accessed 18 Mar. 2014, http://lovisa.lub.lu.se.

their respective portrayals of the EU. This, in turn, should give an insight into varied discourse practices on the EU in Hungary from different angles of representation.

My research question, therefore, is formed to address this issue:

How are the EU and EU-Hungarian relations represented in *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Nemzet*?

I set out to answer this question in order to understand what the debate on EU and EU-Hungarian relations look like in the Hungarian media specifically. Although I cannot possibly analyse all media outlets, I expect that my study may give indications to the state of affairs as represented by the two largest Hungarian newspapers. This also implies that I am not attempting to address the complex question of the exact influence of media representation on mass politics, as it would require a much larger study. Rather, I aim to gain an insight into the current state of affairs of the EU and Hungary as represented by Hungarian media, with a special focus on the two largest Hungarian dailies. Consequently, my study may serve as a contribution to the research on national discourse building in regards to the EU, the notion of Europeanness, and EU membership as reflected in Hungarian media.

2. European Integration and Hungary in the EU

In order to understand connections of the European Union and Hungary, I will give a short account of the history of European integration with a special focus on European identity politics and the 2004 enlargement, along with a brief account of Hungarian politics today. The connection of my research interest and European identity politics may be explained by the close relation between identity, politics and discourse. Identity, politics and discourse are mutually constitutive, and by analysing discourse, I aim to gain an insight into how identity and politics shape and are shaped by discourse. The European dimension of my inquiry requires a specific account of European identity politics. As Hungary and EU-Hungarian relations are the focus of my investigation, I consider it important to account for the relevant themes of the 2004 enlargement, as this event still has a great influence on European identity politics. This will be followed by a brief account of Hungarian politics

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today to serve as a background to understanding my analysis.

2.1. European Integration and European Identity Politics

European integration has been characterised by its technocratic nature, initially intended to solve those problems that were present in post-war Europe at the end of the 1940s.[3] Bickerton states that in the first thirty years of European integration, it was an exclusively elite-driven process, away from the daily concerns of citizens in member states. This began to gradually change in the 1970s and continued through the 1990s until today.[4] As Checkel and Katzenstein point out, while the strategy of de-politicisation of European integration, creating Europe by stealth, functioned well in the beginning, it produced a backlash that has increased over time.[5] Bickerton attributes this to the gradual erosion of trust in national elites and a rise in citizen participation in politics from the early 1990s. This accelerated debates and political mobilisation among citizens who wished to understand by whom and how political decisions in the EU are made. The question of 'who rules?' became paired with citizens worrying about national sovereignty and national identity.[6] Checkel and Katzenstein, however, identify a further disjuncture between elite-level politics and the masses. While elites were still searching for de-politicising Europe, mainly through the creation of the Eurozone and the European Central Bank, the effects of EU-policies started to filter down to the masses in more personal ways.[7] This, together with citizens' uncertainty on who is deciding over them, resulted in what Marks and Hooghe termed as

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[3] Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," in *European Identity,* ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2.

[4] Christopher J. Bickerton, *European Integration: From Nation-states to Member States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), accessed 10 Apr. 2014, http://lovisa.lub.lu.se, 4.

[5] Checkel and Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," 2.

[6] Bickerton, *European Integration: From Nation-states to Member States,* 5-10.

[7] Checkel and Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," 16.

constraining dissensus.[8] The entrance of mass interests into politics, and the intense politicisation within nation states imposed a break on European integration "not because people have changed their minds, but because, on a range of vital issues, legitimate decision making has shifted from an insulated elite to mass politics. […] Even if preferences have not changed much, the game has".[9]

One result of the intense politicisation of European politics in member states was to make *identity* part of a political debate. In Checkel and Katzenstein's definition

> [i]dentities refer to shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. They consist also of collective beliefs about the definition of the group and its membership that are shared by most group members. We understand identities to be revealed by social and geographical structures and national contexts.[10]

The concept of identities, based on this definition, is complex and multi-layered. I see fit to adopt this definition, however, because it allows me to approach those aspects of identity that are relevant to my research. Shared representations of a collective self, group membership and social structures are all concepts that my analysis will take into account. The relevance of national context is also high because I am interested in investigating the national approach to the EU and EU-Hungarian relations as manifested in national news discourse.

The explanation of the concept of identity, however, cannot be reduced to a simple definition. Complex and often conflicting interests influenced the development of identity-politics ever since the issue entered the public debate. According to Checkel and Katzenstein, this was helped along by the fact that the 1991 Maastricht Treaty to the 2007

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Hooghe and Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," 5.

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Ibid., 13.

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Checkel and Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," 4.

Lisbon Treaty where elites focused on widening the scope of European politics still left everyday concerns of the masses unaddressed. This gap between the elite-driven European integration and the masses left opportunities for nation states and national conceptions of Europeanness to enter the political debate. The outcome was that "Europe, the EU and European identity have become focal points of contestation and politicisation; they are no longer topics reserved for experts".[11] Marks and Hooghe extend this argument by suggesting that the relevance of identity is high because it is actively mobilised by domestic politics. The depth of European integration is now such that it causes national barriers to break down, and mass immigration and economic competition to intensify. Political actors mobilise the tension that rises when a rapid jurisdictional change in the EU and relatively stable (national) identities clash. However, "[w]ether an issue enters mass politics depends not on its intrinsic importance, but on whether a political party picks it up."[12] This suggests a rather complex approach as to why identity matters in both domestic and European politics.

Castiglione, on the other hand, approaches the issue from a different angle. He claims that the question has become whether and how much political power should be moved from the national to the supranational level. This resulted in clashing narratives where identification with the nation or with Europe are often represented as binary opposites by political parties that present the EU as a fearsome monster threatening national sovereignty and, by extension, national well-being. This debate has generated oppositions where European, national, and anti-European identities clash.[13] In this account, identity politics is an instrument in the hands of nation states where the goal is to maintain national allegiance in order to preserve the form and function of the nation state, or in the hands of the European level to gain the loyalties of citizens. However, Castiglione further argues that political identification with the EU is unproblematic and does not need to rest on a definite conception of what it is to be European, mainly because of the modern transformation of

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       Checkel and Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," 16.

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       Hooghe and Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," 18.

13
       Dario Castiglione, "Political Identity in a Community of Strangers," in *European Identity*, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 29-37.

conceptions of political identification and because the distinct nature of EU governance. Therefore, national, regional and European identities may coexist.[14]

Castiglione addresses political identification in particular, while Checkel and Katzenstein describe political and social mechanisms of identification. Therefore, Castiglione's account, I believe, is not contradictory to any of the above accounts, but rather serves as a complement. This dimension of political contest, where identity is a tool rather than the object of political contestation, gives a more balanced and diverse picture of identity politics in the EU. Bellucci et al. supplements this by suggesting that there seems to be a wide consensus on the fact that European integration may slow down or falter if a collective European identity is underdeveloped as it needs to survive the battering of nationalists and populist concerns voiced by member states.[15] This sums up the basic importance of addressing the issue of identity politics in the EU.

This brief account highlights the complexity of the mechanics of European identity politics. Against the backdrop of the evolution of European identity-politics, I identify three areas of interest to my research: the manifestation of identity in discourse, the level of political mobilisation detectable in this discourse and the specific dimension of EU-Hungarian relations. The following two sections will address these issues in further detail.

2.2. The 2004 EU Enlargement and Hungary

The 2004 enlargement brought a new era of European politics, not only because the EU almost doubled its members, thus extending its power and territory across ten new member-states, but also because new, localised understandings of the EU and Europe entered into the public debate. What Europe and the EU meant for those joined in 2004 (and most likely for those joining later on as well) is an issue that East and West dealt with quite differently. This debate is also connected to the issue of identity politics because self-

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    Ibid., 29-31.

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    Paolo Bellucci, et al., "Introduction: Antecedents and Consequences of European Citizenship," in *The Europeanization of National Polities?: Citizenship and Support in a Post-Enlargement Union*, ed. David Sanders, Paolo Bellucci, Gábor Tóka, and Mariano Torcal, accessed 10 Apr. 2014, http://lovisa.lub.lu.se, 3-6.

definition of groups enter into the debate where the quest is to find their common Europeanness.

According to Case, the East-Central European versions of European history, of always having belonged to, defended and represented Europe and European values, present a problematic dilemma for the West. These stories, based on localised memories of European history, cite a gentle criticism and an appeal to Western European states to accept and interact with how East-Central European states perceive their belonging to Europe. For the time being, however, overlooking or belittling the importance of these narratives is not only an error of snobbery alone, but is a political move.[16] In fact, Case further argues that the oppositions of East and West serve as a tool to enable national elites to "associate or disassociate their nation's course with/from that of their near or distant neighbours to achieve localised, generally 'national' goals".[17]

Mártonyi claims that the accession of East-Central European states to the EU is often portrayed as "a conversion to the value system of the Euro–Atlantic community of nations" but for Central-Eastern Europe, it is "rather like a homecoming: the return to the family these nations had been forcibly excluded from for too long. For generations of Central and Eastern Europeans, Europe meant a dream we had long cherished: about freedom, democracy and the rule of law."[18]

The differences of rhetoric on the newly joined member states' accession to the EU depends, according to Case, on the fact that Europe was already an entity into which new member states could assimilate. This conception of Europe was based on localised or national experiences of already existing member-states. Conceptions of Europe by the East-Central European states joining the EU, however, differed from these experiences, and most crucially, were equally valid and had their historic origins. Case refers to these

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[16]
        Case, "Being European: East and West," 111-115.

[17]
        Ibid., 111.

[18]
        János Mártonyi, "Europe, Central Europe and Hungary: 2014, a Year of Anniversaries," Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 3 (2014): 361, accessed 25 Apr. 2014.

differing conceptions as "false oppositions between 'East' and 'West'"[19] This conflict, even if Case argues is based on false oppositions, is still relevant because it contributes to the discourse on how Eastern-Central Europeans imagine Europe and how this interacts with other, sometimes conflicting, views of Europe.

Another approach to the question of the division of East and West is presented by Castiglione. He claims that enlargement produced rather paradoxical results in Eastern-Central Europe because deep divisions between Western and Eastern Europe, or "Old" and "New" Europe undermined the optimistic conviction that joining the EU meant an affirmation of national sovereignty. Instead, it became part of the rising of Euro-scepticism and created a reluctant attitude to giving up newly gained national sovereignty to a supranational power.[20] This suggests a rather different approach than that of Case. What Case calls false oppositions and sees as a tool in nation states' hands to disassociate themselves from the EU, Castiglione sees as the reason why newly joined member states developed a certain amount of resistance to associating themselves with the EU. However, whether differences of East and West are causing Euro-scepticism or are only used by national elites to achieve localised goals, they still contribute to the discourse on what it means to be European and what kind of Europe Eastern-Central members imagined to join or imagine to bring about.

Specifying what kind of Europe Hungary imagined to join is difficult, but there are some general pointers. Bozóki and Simon argue that the main political value in the beginning of the 1990s was *freedom*, both in its liberal and democratic senses. Liberal freedom, meaning the exercise of human rights and civil liberties, was paired with democratic values. Democracy was understood as a manifestation of *popular sovereignty*, because it meant no external influence in building a political community.[21] Case confirms this by stating that Hungarian sentiments in the beginning of the 1990s were to build up a national identity

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       Case, "Being European: East and West," 130-131.

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       Castiglione, "Political Identity in a Community of Strangers," 37

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       András Bozóki and Eszter Simon, "Hungary since 1989," in *Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 210.

that was free from the oppression of communist regimes and where a renewed sense of national belonging would eventually lead to a return to Europe. Viktor Orbán, the current prime minister of Hungary, already then envisioned a European integration process that would not threaten national interests[22]

Based on the above, the kind of Europe Hungary imagined joining was one where Hungarians were strengthened in their national identities and part of this is expressed by their adherence to democracy, European values and culture. This suggests that Hungarian self-identification viewed a European identity as a derivation from national identity, an inherent part of it, and not as an extension or replacement. Although this seems rather unproblematic in itself, it does create a specific discourse on Hungary's membership and conceived identity within the European community. By conceiving democracy as the forum for nation-building based on self-definition and sovereignty, Hungarian politics seems to consider external influence a threat to this newly found freedom. This is in stark contrast with a conceived historic belonging to Europe and its manifestation, the EU. The issue, therefore, is not only the perceived difference between East and West, and their representations in discourse, but also how Hungarian elites define or utilise this in their respective rhetoric and how they portray Hungarian identity and Hungary's belonging to the EU.

2.3. Hungarian Politics Today

The parties that have played a role in Hungarian politics since 1990 may be placed on a left-right ideological line. The far left is represented by the Workers' Party and the Communist Party, neither of which has seats in the parliament. The socialist parties are MSZP (The Socialist Party) who governed between 1994-1998 and 2004-2010, and MSZDP (Hungarian Social Democratic Party), the latter of which is an extra-parliamentary minor party. SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) is a liberal party which was part of three governments in alliance with MSZP.[23] LMP (Politics Can Be Different) is a relatively new

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[22]
      Case, "Being European: East and West," 126-130.

[23]   Bozóki and Simon, "Hungary since 1989," 213-16.

green-liberal party, which has been represented in the parliament since 2010.[24]

The conservative side is represented by Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), FKGP (Independent Smallholders' Party) and KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party). FKGP slowly declined and since 2002 does not have an influence in Hungarian politics. MDF is a minor party now, although it was the major winner of the first elections in 1990. The far right was first represented by MIÉP (Party of Hungarian Life and Justice), but since 2002 it has no impact on Hungarian politics, while its agenda has been largely adopted by Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) recently.[25]

The first multi-party elections after the fall of the Soviet Union were held in 1990, with more than fifty parties participating.[26] As a result of the elections, six parties won seats in the parliament, with the centre-right coalition of MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) and FKGP (Independent Smallholders' Party) as the winner.[27] Up until 2006, all successive governments lost elections, which Bozóki and Simon attribute to the general pessimistic attitude of Hungarian voters and to the fact that the performance of each government left Hungarians disappointed.[28]

Consequently, in 1994, the left-liberal coalition of MSZP (The Socialist Party) and SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) won, while in 1998 a centre-right coalition won again, this time consisting of Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), MDF and FKGP, with Viktor Orbán as prime minister. In 2002, MSZP and SZDSZ won again and also managed to win a re-election in 2006 and thus governed for eight years until 2010. In 2010, however, the centre-right coalition of Fidesz and KDNP was victorious again, this time gaining 67,88% of the seats in the parliament and Viktor Orbán was appointed prime minister for the

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    "Országgyűlési Képviselők Választása 2014. április. 6 Eredmények," last modified 28 Apr. 2014. http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html

25   Ibid, 213-216.

26   Bernard A. Cook, ed., *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia, vol. 2,* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.), 593-594.

27   Ibid., 593-594.

28   Ibid., 214.

second time.[29] The latest elections, which were held on April 6, 2014, granted a third term in office for Viktor Orbán and his government-coalition (Fidesz-KDNP) with 133 seats, roughly equalling with two-thirds, of the parliament. The centre-left alliance set up specifically for the 2014 elections was named Unity and won 38 seats, Jobbik, the Hungarian extreme-right populist party 23, while LMP (green-liberalists) received 5 seats.[30]

The currently governing party (2014-2018), Fidesz, was formed in 1988 in Budapest.[31] Bozóki and Simon describe Fidesz as the leading right wing force ever since the 1990s. In the beginning, it was a small liberal party which became a centre-right conservative party by the mid-1990s and added "Hungarian civic party" to its name. [32] [33] In the wake of the 1998 elections, Fidesz gained office for the first time, and Viktor Orbán became prime minister in a coalition with MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) and FKGP (Independent Smallholders' Party).[34] Bozóki and Simon suggest that already in that period, Fidesz "wished to reserve membership in the nation only for those who shared its ideological views and by 2002 had made some alarmingly rightist statements".[35]

In the 2014 elections, similarly to the second term of the Orbán government (2010-2014), two-thirds of the parliament seats (133) were awarded to Fidesz-KDNP and Orbán was named prime minister for the third time. According to Orbán, these results are a European

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      "2010. Évi Országgyűlési Képviselő Választás 2. fordulója - 2010. április 25 Eredmények," last modified 11 May, 2010. http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/parval2010/354/354_0_index.html

30
      "Országgyűlési Képviselők Választása 2014. április. 6 Eredmények," last modified 28 Apr. 2014. http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html

31
      "A Fidesz Története," last modified 27 Mar. 2006. http://archiv.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=60

32
      Bozóki and Simon, "Hungary since 1989," 215.

33
      "A Fidesz Története,"

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      Ibid.

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      Bozóki and Simon, "Hungary since 1989," 215

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record and they are a clear statement from the Hungarian voters that they support his policies on creating jobs, supporting families and fighting for national sovereignty. He also claimed that Hungarians reinforced that they should stay in the EU, but only if they have a strong national sovereign government.[36]

3. Methodological discussion

As my interest lies in understanding how the EU and EU-Hungarian relations are represented in media, I will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with a specific focus on newspaper discourse as a method for my investigation. By starting with a more general discussion, I will lay out the underlying themes of CDA, which will then be narrowed down to specifics of newspaper discourse analysis to fit my purpose.

3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Discourse is practical, social and cultural; language users accomplish social acts and participate in social interaction. "Such interaction is embedded in social and cultural contexts and has a purpose".[37] This interactional angle of discourse accentuates that discourses exist in a wide social context rather than isolated. Social and cultural factors influence the production and nature of discourse, as do language users who engage in the production and reception of discourse. These aspects all invite an analysis that takes into account the social contexts of discourse and not only linguistic analysis. This implies a more complex approach to text analysis and indicates an interest of what happens outside the realms of texts, how they are connected to social reality and how they produce and reproduce it.

Texts are a constitutive part of the social world and have causal effects. They bring about

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    "Viktor Orban Claims Victory in Hungarian Election," *Euronews,* 7 Apr.2014, accessed 8 Apr. 2014, http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/07/viktor-orban-claims-victory-in-hungarian-elections/

37
    Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," in *Discourse studies: a multidisciplinary introduction. Vol. 2, Discourse as Social Interaction,* ed. Teun A. van Dijk (London: SAGE, 1997), 2-3.

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changes in our knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, values, in social relations and the material world. These changes, however, are not simply based on a cause-and-effect mechanism.[38] Fairclough suggests that theories of social constructivism are overly idealistic in their approach to texts (language and discourse) as they do not differentiate between "construction" and "construal". We may construe the social world by representations or even imagination, but whether our representations are really influential in changing the structure of social constructions depend on a variety of factors. At the same time, social institutions set the limits and affects discursive constructions that may have an effect on them. Thus, prevailing social reality and the power of who is construing (representing) these social constructions has a significance as to what extent they will be affected by them.[39] Assuming that the European Union is such a social construction, this suggests that although there is a mutual constitutiveness between the EU as an institutional structure and its representations, the ultimate impact of these representations will be based on who produces these contruals and what social context these representations appear in. This leads to two vital aspects of critical discourse analysis: power and context.

Power is a central concept in critical discourse analysis, as it organises many of the relationships between discourse and society.[40] The kind of power that is relevant here is the power that decides relations between groups or institutions, and personal power as far as individuals act as part of a group. Much power that is connected to discourse is not coercive but *mental*.[41] "That is, the discourses of a powerful group may be such that others will form the intentions and accomplish the acts as if they were totally without constraints, and consistent with their own wants and interests."[42] This kind of social power is often referred to as *hegemonic* power, and the crucial question is how this is implemented in

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  Norman Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London: Routledge, 2003), 8-10.

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  Ibid., 8-9.

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  van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," 16.

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  Ibid., 17.

42

  Ibid., 19.

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society.[43] Van Dijk suggests that

> in order to exercise hegemonic power and in order to establish consensus, powerful groups control the actions of others through controlling the minds (knowledge, attitude, ideologies) of groups, and they largely do so through discourse. This, however, presupposes another fundamental aspect of the relations between power and discourse, namely *access*. […] Thus, the various power elites control (the access to) many types of public discourse, for instance in politics and the administration, the media and so on.[44]

Public discourse, thus, will also be shaped according to what the powerful wish to be included or, more importantly, not included in it. What does, or does not, reach the public has a profound effect on what their social reality is based on. In turn, this will shape public opinion to a large extent.

Another influential aspect of discourse is the notion of context. What context discourses are embedded in may give an indication of their ability to construct social reality. Similarly to discourse itself, contexts are not fixed or pre-ordained and nor are they objective. Contexts are shaped by discourses as discourses are a structural part of them. Discourse and context mutually shape each other. Similarly, discourse is not objective, and nor are contexts. Social facts are understood individually and are made relevant by and for participants.[45] Individuals try to make sense of them and thus engage in meaning-making.[46] As a result, contexts may be defined as mental constructs and are connected to meaning-making.[47] Meaning derives from three separate elements of discourse, namely the production, the text itself and the reception. In other words, the social position of the

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[43]   Ibid., 19.

[44]   Ibid., 20.

[45]   Ibid., 15-16.

[46]   Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, 10.

[47]   van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," 16.

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producer, the different components of the text and the knowledge and values of the receiver all interact in the interpretation of a text.[48] "This also explains the vital link between discourse and context: as subjective representations, mental models of contexts may thus directly monitor the production and comprehension of talk and text."[49] Therefore, not only linguistic form, but processes of meaning-making and contexts are also constituent parts of shaping social reality.

Finally, there is another aspect of discourse that needs addressing, namely ideology. In van Dijk's definition, ideologies are the cognitive counterparts of power and serve a coordinative purpose between the acts and practices of individuals as members of social groups. They have a social and a cognitive function as they tell people what their social position is and what to think of social issues.[50] Ideologies also define how groups are related to other groups and how they are positioned in complex societal structures. "It is this prevalent, overall *self-definition* or social *identity* that is acquired and shared by group members in order to protect the interests of a group as a whole."[51] Ideologies, therefore, are closely connected to identities and group representations. According to van Dijk, ideological analysis needs to focus on discourse structures that exhibit group goals or interests rather than personal views and creates *ingroups* and *outgroups* and defines their association with good and bad. Representation, thus, focuses on our good things and their bad things, while de-emphasises our bad things and their good things. Van Dijk calls this the principle of the ideological square of positive self-representation and negative other-representation.[52]

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   Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, 10-11.

49
   van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," 16.

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   Ibid., 29.

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   Ibid., 26.

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   Ibid., 32-33.

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3.2. News as Discourse

Building on the basic elements of critical discourse analysis I addressed above, I need to narrow down my focus in order to fit my aims and scope of analysis. The specific genre I set out to investigate is newspaper discourse, and thus my analysis needs to take specific features into account. I adopt Richardson's approach, who focuses specifically on discourse of newspaper articles, or as he refers to this, news discourse. As I detected a large overlapping between the concept of news and other newspaper articles in Richardson's account, I will also use the concept of news discourse analysis to refer to any discourse analysis performed on articles appearing in a newspaper. This also allows me to extend my analysis to any articles appearing in my chosen newspapers, which will give a more inclusive result during my data collection and analysis.

Richardson's approach to news discourse analysis is "founded on the assumption that journalism exists to enable citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world".[53] This function, however, does not exclude its role in reporting the events of the world and the actions of the powerful in ways that are both entertaining and consumable. Although this suggests that newspapers are businesses in which journalistic texts are products, the conclusion of news discourse analysis should reach far further than this statement. Discursive practices of news are far more complex than establishing newspapers as commodities and audiences as consumers.[54]

Analysing the discursive practices of journalistic discourse requires treating them as a "two-way street".[55] The producer and mode of production of news encode meaning into the texts. This may happen for instance with selecting stories, by foregrounding one view over another or even by choosing one word over another. The text also influences the producer, due to the conventions of the genre of news production. The interpretation – or decoding –

53
    John E. Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers: an Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7.

54
    Ibid., 7-82.

55
    Ibid., 40.

of the texts depends excessively on the reader, however. Individuals read and interpret texts differently, based on their perspectives, backgrounds and previous knowledge. In addition, they also assess the meaning by their judgements of who produced the text, as people tend to believe the information given by people or institutions they trust. The reader also influences the production of texts as the producer always keeps in mind the target audience and their preferences.[56] This seemingly complex system of news production needs another dimension that would add a critical quality to the analysis of news texts.

As critical discourse analysis aims at discovering "how discourse (language in use) relates to and is implicated in the (re)production of social relations"[57] and the social dimension of text production needs to be taken account as well. Richardson suggests that society and news discourse effect and shape each other mutually; they are in a dialectical relationship.[58] Society is the background that creates structures and facilitates news production. There is also a dialectical relationship between the consumption of news and social practices as readers engage their social background in decoding the meaning of news discourse. These dialectical relationships suggest that news as discourse is shaped by and reflect on social realities while they also have the power to shape the social practices of individuals.

To be useful in my analysis, there is a need to translate this quite abstract discussion into practical terms. I adapt the approach suggested by van Dijk, who states that there is an increasing tendency to distinguishing the local or interactional context and a global or societal context in discourse analysis.[59] Local and global levels spell out the overarching dimensions of discourse into tangible components. Van Dijk suggests to identify three aspects of local and global levels present in discourse: meaning, form and context.[60]

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[56] Ibid., 40.

[57] Ibid., 42.

[58] Ibid., 42.

[59] van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," 15.

[60] Teun A. van Dijk, "Multidisciplinary CDA," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth

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Global meaning, or semantic macrostructures, has to do with analysing the topic and topical arrangements within the text.[61] Local meaning is discernable by studying the meaning of words, the structure of propositions, implications, allusions and vagueness in texts. Meaning is the most closely connected to influencing the opinions and attitudes of readers and thus have the most obvious social consequences. Furthermore, both the local and global meanings are expected to reveal an overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation and thus are connected to identity.[62]

Global forms of discourse are the superstructures of texts that are defined by genre categories; in this case, it means the organisation of the text in order to fit into the category of news articles. Local form involves (but is not exclusive to) the analysis of syntax, pronominal relations, active-passive voice and nominalisations. Formal attributes are not as closely connected to the text's ideological work because they are less consciously controlled by the writer.[63]

Context, the most discussed feature of discourse so far, also needs two levels of observation. The global level of my context analysis, in this case, is the social, political and cultural structures I demonstrated in the Introduction. The local level has to do with the immediate, interactional situation of the communicative event, and helps define what is relevant to the social situation for the participants.[64]

My analysis, addresses both the topical arrangement of texts, the semantic analysis of words, and the use of presuppositions and implications since this is the aspect, according to the above, that has most influence on readers. Apart from these, I also look at the structure

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Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), 98-113.

[61]
    Ibid., 101-103.

[62]
    Ibid., 98-106.

[63]
    Ibid., 106-108.

[64]
    Ibid., 108-113.

of propositions, the active-passive voice and transitivity (who does what to whom). With the combined analysis of these aspects, and by referencing my findings to social and political aspects of my inquiry, I hope to gain an understanding of how the Hungarian mainstream news media help shape the knowledge, attitudes and opinions of the Hungarian public.

3.3. Material

The material for my analysis is taken from the online versions of the two largest dailies in Hungary, the left-leaning *Népszabadság* and the right-leaning *Magyar Nemzet* available at www.nol.hu and www.mno.hu. I consider these two newspapers to be appropriate for my study because they are both printed and distributed nationally, are written in Hungarian and are addressed to a Hungarian audience (even including Hungarians living outside the national borders). Newspapers as part of the Hungarian national media are suitable for my investigation because, as Hooghe and Marks suggest, national media content is crucial in shaping public opinion.[65] In addition, as Fairclough claims, texts are a constitutive part of the social world and influence people's opinions, beliefs and knowledge.[66] My interest lies in what kind of representations appear of the EU and EU-Hungarian relations and how newspapers shape the discourse on these topics.

I have chosen to investigate the online versions because they are easily accessible and because specific search criteria can be applied through the search engine of the sites. My choice to include these, and not other Hungarian newspapers, depends on two factors. Firstly, a larger data sample including other newspapers would require more time to analyse, and would require a larger study. As time restrictions allow me to process only a limited amount of data, I needed to narrow down my focus. As a derivation of this, my priority is to collect data from newspapers that are most likely to have the biggest impact on Hungarian public opinion. Based on the discussion in the previous section, I expect that

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[65]
        Hooghe and Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," 10.

[66]
        Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, 8.

Népszabadság and *Magyar Nemzet* are best suited to analyse because they have the largest readership and circulation in Hungary, in addition to representing two different ideologies, centre-left and centre-right respectively.

3.3.1. *Népszabadság*

Népszabadság was first published under the name of *SzabadNép* in 1942, at that time illegally. After seven illegal issues published, it became legally distributed 1945. In 1956, it changed name to *Népszabadság* and became the Socialist Workers Party's official paper. Up until 1989, the newspaper was led by the party, but in 1990 it became a joint stock company and changed its label to be a socialist daily. After four years, the socialist label was abandoned and changed to be a "national daily". In 2001, the Swiss Ringier Publishing House bought a 49.9 percent stake and today, it is owns a 70.77 percent stake.[67] *Népszabadság* defines itself as independent from political movements and parties, left-oriented liberal modern daily newspaper. It has the largest pool of journalists in Hungary and has 300 000 readers. The online version is described to be a quality news portal and a complement to the printed version of the newspaper.[68]

3.3.2. *Magyar Nemzet*

Magyar Nemzet is slightly more difficult to define in details, as there is very little verifiable data that is available to the public about the newspaper. Although I have directly asked the editorial office to send me details about the newspaper, I did not get a reply. The newspaper's history, however, began in 1938, when it started with the motto: "The Hungarian nation fights for Hungary to stay Hungarian." It was banned in 1944 with the German occupation but started again after the war, and became the newspaper of the People's Patriotic Front, which was a non-communist but state approved organisation.

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[67] "Cég és Laptörténet," Népszabadság, accessed 12 May, 2014, http://www.nepszabadsagzrt.hu/oldal/4-cg-s-laptrtnet.html

[68] Ibid.

During the Cold-War years, it served as the newspaper of the intelligentsia. After 1989 the newspaper became privatised as well.[69] Today, *Magyar Nemzet* is labelled as a "civic daily" and is the second largest newspaper in Hungary. It serves as the main platform for conservative journalism in the Hungarian press.[70]

3.3.3. Collection of material

Because of time restrictions, I set the data collection period between 1 March and 5 May 2014. The articles that gave the data for my analysis were found through the search engines of the newspapers' online versions. I have set three criteria for narrowing down the number of articles to an amount that is sufficient for my scope and aims. The first criteria was that the articles had to be found through the search engine of the respective sites and include the terms 'Hungary-EU, 'Hungarian-EU', 'EU-Hungarian' 'EU' and 'European Union'. The second criteria I set was that the EU, European politics or EU-Hungarian relations needed to be an indispensable part of the article, i.e., the meaning or overall message of the article would have been lost if the paragraphs about the EU, European politics or EU-Hungarian relations were omitted. This enabled me to liquidate articles from my dataset that only mentioned these in passing but were not integral parts of the texts. Many articles contained the word 'European' in a completely different context, for instance sports or financial news. These were also eliminated because they did not carry any direct implications to my interest in this study. The third criteria was to limit the number of articles to be analysed by omitting repetitive articles. I encountered several articles that were based on the same source and reported on the same events with some variation on the amount of information disclosed. I consider this a naturally occurring phenomenon as online news media are interactive and constantly updated in order to give immediate coverage of the news of the world, as opposed to print media which is not as easily updated or altered.

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[69] "A Napilapok Története a XX. Században," accessed 12 May, 2014. http://mmi.elte.hu/szabadbolcseszet/index.php?option=com_tanelem&id_tanelem=546&tip=0

[70] "The Press in Hungary," BBC, 29 Apr. 2004, accessed 15 May, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3616011.stm

My selected time frame also meant that major events that took place at this time was likely to be largely represented in the newspaper. After my search terms were applied, I found that three events were widely represented among the articles: the Hungarian national elections, the tenth anniversary of Hungary joining the EU in 2004, and the upcoming EU parliamentary elections on 25 May, 2014. In order to narrow down my focus, I have chosen to collect articles that were about two of these main topics: the national elections in Hungary in April 2014 and the 10th anniversary of Hungary joining the EU. The choice of topics was based on Checkel and Katzenstein's claim that national elections serve as platform to politicise Europe and European identity and belonging.[71] Discourse on the national elections, therefore, should reveal patterns of representations on the EU and EU-Hungarian relations. The second topic was chosen because the 10th anniversary of the 2004 Enlargement received an extensive coverage in international media, paired with a vast promotion effort from the EU institutions, signalling the significance of this event in today's Europe. As I am interested in the Hungarian representation of the EU, and European integration by extension, the commemoration of the very event that enabled this subject of inquiry (the accession of Hungary to the EU) seems to be a suitable topic to investigate. The decision to exclude the third large topic (the EU elections) was based on the fact that my time restrictions did not allow me to extend my data collection period, and this meant that most articles covering this event were likely to appear after my set time limit of 5 May, 2014.

There were two decisions concerning the analysis of the online versions I needed to make, both depending on the fact that the online version differs from the printed version of texts. A feature that I spotted in some articles of the online version of *Magyar Nemzet* were links embedded into the text of the article. This feature allows readers to click on certain words within the text and be transferred to related articles elsewhere on the website. This is a feature that was only present in *Magyar Nemzet* and not in *Népszabadság* and was therefore ignored during the analysis. Nonetheless, it is worthy to mention that these links might be of importance in an extended analysis as they highlight certain words the writer deemed important in the context. The second feature was also unique to *Magyar Nemzet*, one that I would call an information box placed next to the text, highlighted with a separate background colour. These short blocks of texts were related to the articles but not inherent

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71
        Checkel and Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," 15-16.

part of them, as the separation of colours also showed. The content was mostly aimed at explaining certain terms in the article that readers might have a problem comprehending. As this feature was also missing from *Népszabadság*, I decided to exclude them from the analysis.

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1. The EU as an Economic Benefactor

The topic of economy is salient in both newspapers when writing about Hungary's tenth anniversary in the EU. This is understandable as economic progress is measurable within a ten-year span and it is closely associated with citizens' well-being. However, the prominence of this topic overshadows other aspects of EU membership and is part of the discussion even when other aspects (governance, democracy, geo-political considerations) are considered in this set of articles.

The two newspapers differ in their topical structures within the overall topic of Hungary's tenth anniversary in the EU, and these topical structures have an implication as to what is considered important when presenting the subject, and this in turn has a great influence on how the actors and events are represented. Actors such as the Hungarian government and the European Union are given very different roles, as are the Hungarian public, and the other nine states that joined the EU at the same time. All of these representations add up to an almost contrasting picture of the way the event of Hungary's accession to the EU is pictured.

4.1.1. *Népszabadság*

In Népszabadság, the analysed articles all contained a discussion on the economic benefits of being an EU member for Hungary and Hungarian people. Making this distinction is significant. Dividing the political unit of Hungary and the Hungarian people into two actors (or group of actors), the representation achieves a separation of a unity that would

seem self-evident otherwise: the Hungarian people is not equal to Hungary as a unit and vice versa. As a result, while the economic benefits received from the EU are discussed, there is an attempt to separate the social from the political benefits of economic progress. The first is represented by a discussion on living standards, the second is represented by a discussion on investments, capital, GDP, trade and other economic factors. On the other hand, it is fairly difficult to completely separate these two dimensions as economic growth influences living standards and living standards are connected to economic progress as buying power of citizens grows. Nevertheless, the separation is achieved by the level of abstraction in the representation.

Social benefits are elaborated on in terms of living standards which are never represented by concrete numbers or measurable facts. In the article titled *European Supermarketunion*, Pócs represents social differences of Eastern and Western Europeans by elaborating on shopping experiences.[72] Western European pensioners out on their shopping trips are described as well-dressed, cheerful and well-groomed, and they own modern and well-tended cars. The Eastern Europeans, on the other hand, are represented as the jealous spectators only hoping to achieve this standard of living. This motif reappears in other articles as well. A left-wing politician is quoted talking about affordable food, wages and pensions above subsistence levels and youth employment, while a Jobbik-politician is quoted blaming Western European multinational corporations for giving too low wages in their Hungarian branches .[73] [74] In another article, Hungarian doctors' wages are compared to Check doctors' wages, and is implied that higher wages bring higher social and living standards with a more developed sense of democratic participation.[75] Lastly, in the article entitled *Invisible Birthday*, the living standards are described to be "faraway from

[72]
       Balázs Pócs, "Európai Közértunió," *Népszabadság*, 2 May, 2014 accessed 2 May, 2014, http://nol.hu/velemeny/europai-kozertunio-1459683.

[73]
       "Szanyi az Uniós Csatlakozás Évfordulójának Szomorú Aktualitásáról," *Népszabadság*, 2 May, 2014, accessed 2 May, 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/szanyi-az-unios-csatlakozas-evfordulojanak-szomoru-aktualitasarol-1459749.

[74]
       "Jobbik: Ennyi Náci Ember Nincs Magyarországon," *Népszabadság*, 2 May, 2014, accessed 2 May 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/jobbik-ennyi-naci-ember-nincs-magyarorszagon-1459733.

[75]
       Edit Inotai, "EU-csatlakozás: Gyorsan Változó Sikersztrorik," *Népszabadság*, 2 May, 2014, accessed 2 May, 2014, http://nol.hu/kulfold/gyorsan-valtozo-sikersztorik-1459637.

European standards".[76] Because these are all phrased by immeasurable terms, the focus is not on exact numbers or figures but on notions that are deemed prominent when describing the social aspects of economic integration.

Political benefits enabled by EU funding, on the other hand, are represented in terms of measurable outcomes and less abstract concepts such as GDP, numeral representation of invested capital, and the statistics of developing political regions. What makes it possible to talk about political benefits of economic integration separately from social benefits is the focus on Hungary as an economic competitor with other newly joined member states. This elevates the description of economic features to the political entity of the state, especially in those cases when states are described in terms of their economic policies.

In an article entitled *EU-accession: Quickly Changing Success-stories*, Hungary is identified as a rather unsuccessful actor while the EU is characterised as the source of opportunities and as profitable to members.[77] This profitable membership, however, is represented in a square where Hungary is compared to other states that accessed the EU at the same time. In this comparison, Hungary is depicted to have limited success while the others, despite obstacles, managed to take advantage of the economic integration and developed. This seems to be a rather surprising outcome, given that Hungary is interchangeably used with the pronoun "we", where "we" denotes Hungary as a political group.[78]

Van Dijk describes the ideological square where representation of "we" (the in-group) is attributed with positive self-representation by emphasising our good characteristics or actions and denying or ignoring our bad characteristics or actions, while "the other" (out-group) is given a negative other-presentation with an emphasis on their bad characteristics or actions and ignorance of their good characteristics or actions.[79] According to this, "we",

76
        Balázs Pócs, "Láthatatlan Születésnap," *Népszabadság*, 1 May, 2014, accessed 1 May, 2014, http://nol.hu/kulfold/lathatatlan-szuletesnap-1459507.

77
        Inotai, "EU-csatlakozás: Gyorsan Változó Sikersztrorik"

78
        Ibid.

79

Hungary, should be represented as positively as possible while "the others" should be characterised negatively. The opposite is observable in this case. A viable explanation is that Hungary as a political unit is represented in order to highlight the failings of the political leaders to make use of the advantageous economic climate. In the article, EU funding and regional integration is described in terms of figures and numbers and is claimed to have been used better by the others. In addition, the recent financial crisis is depicted to have caused serious difficulties in all these states, but Hungary was the first to file for IMF help. Meanwhile, the other member states, despite their equally difficult situation, managed to overcome their financial problems. Although it is discernable that Hungary did progress during the last ten years, this achievement fades when compared to "the others".[80] So the representation of Hungary as a rather unsuccessful state might have an underlying ideological motive, and that is to criticise the government's actions and economic policies.

Furthermore, the EU is described with metaphors of a well-functioning immune system in the same article. The EU has a "safety umbrella" to protect the body of the member states against external threats, and the economic structure that the EU helped to bring about is described as "healthy".[81] In addition, both the EU and the IMF are represented as helpers in times of economic difficulty, suggesting that their support generates a better outcome.[82]

4.1.1.1. Summary

The above analysis showed two separate benefits attributed to EU membership: social and political. The social benefits are based on two perspectives. The first is the basic suggestion that living standards in Hungary are not solely based on membership in the EU and the other is that EU funding should have brought a more marked effect on Hungarian

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van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," 32-33.

[80] Inotai, "EU-csatlakozás: Gyorsan Változó Sikersztrorik"

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

people's economic situation. Both of these are subtle and unsaid criticisms to the current and past governments' ability to use EU funding for the benefit of the people. The EU is described as the wasted opportunity and a social structure of Western European states to be admired and whose standards are worth to aim to reach. Hungarian people are in no way represented to be the losers of economic integration, rather as bystanders waiting to be given the possibility to feel the benefits of economic integration and EU funding.

The political benefits of Hungary's EU membership are described with different tools. The EU's representation is based on the concept of the EU as a source of economic development and as a safeguard from economic failure. This representation is achieved by presuppositions that suggest that EU membership is profitable and that EU membership is desirable despite economic obstacles in the last years. An implication of the beneficial nature of cooperation between newer member states also underlines this.

Apart from these representations of the EU, the representation of Hungary itself is relevant here because it is likely to have an implication on Hungarian public opinion. As I stated above, there is a distinction between the representations of Hungary as a political entity and the Hungarian people as a group. This distinction suggests that Hungarian individuals are not equal to the Hungarian state and are treated as a separate social group. As a result, Hungarian people as a group assume separate identity characteristics from that of the Hungarian state. This view denies that all Hungarians with a Hungarian citizenship are defined by a collective identity based on the political conception of citizenship and suggests that Hungarian identity can exist outside of this type of identification. By allowing this separation, this representation also suggests that the monopole of identity-creation does not reside with the nation state and social groupings are as relevant as political ones.

As this newspaper is traditionally associated with a left-wing ideology and as the current government is right-wing, this representation might have an effect on the readers that already tend to disagree with the policies of the current government. These readers are more disposed to accept a conception of multiple identities which are based on other identity formation processes than what the state utilizes. Furthermore, since the representation of the EU in relation to the social group of Hungarian people suggests that the political entity of Hungary is failing to enable them to take advantage of the

opportunities offered by EU membership, they might find it more suitable to bypass an identification with the political entity of the Hungarian state and turn directly to the one where their opportunities are more salient. This may result in a more positive attitude towards a European identity than to what is on offer in Hungary.

4.1.2. *Magyar Nemzet*

The same overall topic of economic benefits of EU membership is treated quite differently in *Magyar Nemzet*. Here, as I mentioned earlier, the topic is salient in the articles discussing the tenth anniversary of Hungary's accession as well. The general representation of the economic benefits of being an EU member is represented to be unquestionable. There is also a suggestion that the Hungarian membership did not use the economic advantage to its fullest, the reasons behind this are represented dissimilarly to how *Népszabadság* treated the question.

The main reasons for Hungary failing to take full advantage of EU benefits are implied by *Magyar Nemzet* to be too weak political rule in Hungary before Fidesz took over and the fact that the EU opposed Hungarian suggestions or economic policies. [83] [84] These two motifs reoccur regularly, along with an emphasis on Hungary's ruling party as the successful executor of Hungarian economic policies and as a successful winner of EU funding.[85] [86] A rather unrepresentative article of the dataset citing José Manuel Barosso and Martin Schulz on the tenth anniversary of the 2004 enlargement does not mention Hungary individually, but focuses on the benefits of EU membership for all those joining in 2004.[87]

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[83]
"Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát," *Magyar Nemzet*, 1 May, 2014, accessed 1 May 2014, http://mno.hu/belfold/gyori-folytatni-kell-az-eurorealista-politikat-1224218.

[84]
Gábor Stier, "Földre Szállt Álmok," *Magyar Nemzet*, 30 Apr. 2014, accessed 30 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/vezercikk/foldre-szallt-almok-1223998.

[85]
"Jól Jártunk az Unióval," *Magyar Nemzet*, 29 Apr. 2014, accessed 29 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/eu/jol-jartunk-az-unioval-1223806.

[86]
"Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát"

[87]

However, this article also presents EU membership largely in terms of economic benefits for members, again, underlined with facts and figures.[88] The overall representation of EU-membership for those states joining in 2004, therefore, suggests that economic benefits are considered most important even by politicians representing the EU level. This underlines the tendencies presented elsewhere in the articles in the dataset.

Articles pondering the question of whether Hungary's accession was beneficial, the answer is positive, and this answer is supported by factual data, numbers and statistics showing the economic benefits and progress of the country.[89] [90] The positive self-representation of the Hungarian government utilizes these data to support that their governance is aimed at making the most of EU membership. In the article discussing Hungary's so called "Eurorealistic politics", Fidesz is claimed to have achieved the most in terms of compliance with the Maastricht Criteria, first in 2001 during their first term of governance, then again in their second and third term since 2010.[91] Furthermore, the last four years in the EU are represented in terms of the accomplishments the Hungarian government achieved using EU funding. The fact that Hungary needed to negotiate with the IMF is represented by a vague sentence omitting the word "IMF" and putting the blame on the previous left-wing government, quoted from a politician in the ministry of foreign affairs: "[…] by the time the crisis began, 'the country was already in an impossible situation', the exchequer was empty, so Hungary was the first member state in need of financial help".[92]

The ending of the excessive deficit procedure against Hungary is also described in terms of

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"Barroso: Tíz Év Alatt az EU Gazdagabb és Biztonságosabb Lett," Magyar Nemzet, 30 Apr. 2014, accessed 30 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/eu/barroso-tiz-ev-alatt-az-eu-gazdagabb-es-biztonsagosabb-lett-1224112.

88
    Ibid.

89
    "Jól Jártunk az Unióval"

90
    "Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát"

91
    Ibid.

92
    Ibid.

the success of the current government. The accomplishments of the government are in part contributed to the fact that the Hungarian economic policies "became accepted".[93] By deleting the agent who carries out the action of accepting, it is generalised to mean that anyone and everyone accepts them. By building up a representation of the Hungarian government as a successful negotiator of its policies, Hungary becomes an actor that is unopposed by choice.

Similar techniques are used whenever de-emphasising or omitting counterarguments would serve the cause of positive self-representation. This is best seen in the article entitled *We Benefitted From the EU*, where the economic progress of those countries joining the EU at the same time as Hungary is also dealt with.[94] While *Népszabadság* went into details on regional development, GDPs, growing trade and detailing both the Visegrád group's (Check Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the Baltic states' progress, *Magyar Nemzet* focuses on only two aspects: the fact that Hungary is the biggest benefactor of EU funding, and that Hungary was ready to cooperate with these countries at the budgetary negotiations for 2014 to 2020.[95] Again, by emphasising Hungary's benefits and positive attitude, and by omitting contradicting data and de-emphasising the achievements of other states joining in 2004, an overall positive self-representation is achieved. The EU, again, is the economic benefactor that made the success of the Hungarian government's economic policies possible.

There is only one exception to this tendency, an article entitled *The West Benefitted From the 2004 Enlargement.*[96] The article, describes several aspects of the 2004 enlargement to be beneficial to Western member states but negative to Eastern member states. These aspects all have to do with economic dependency of the Eastern states. The Eastern member states are referred to as "market outlets" which serve the economic development

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93
        Ibid.

94
        "Jól Jártunk az Unióval"

95
        Ibid.

96
        "A Nyugat Járt Jól a 2004-es Bővítéssel," *Magyar Nemzet*, 29 Apr. 2014, accessed 29 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/eu/a-nyugat-jart-jol-a-2004-es-bovitessel-1223950.

of Western companies.[97] Furthermore, the Eastern states are claimed to be "largely dependent on Western banks".[98] The final sentence of the article encourages Eastern states to "take their own fate into their hands".[99] The implications and meaning of this article is only possible to decipher with understanding the political context in which this fits. At first sight, this article seems to be going completely against the rest of the articles in the dataset. However, when related to the rest of the general discourse on Hungarian economic policies in *Magyar Nemzet*, it becomes clear that it serves a purpose. This might be described as a negative example, a warning, to show that in case the agenda of "strict economic policies" of the current government laid out in other articles would not be carried out,[100] this might be the sad reality for the Eastern member states.

4.1.2.1. Summary

To understand what the above analysis means in terms of discourse on the EU and Hungarian EU-relations, van Dijk's ideological square does come to use. The positive self-representation of Hungary, which in this case is fully equivalent to the Hungarian government, and the EU as "the other" is detectable throughout the articles. However, the equation is not as simple as the positive self (Hungary) and the negative other (the EU). The analysis shows that the Hungarian membership is represented in positive terms motivated by the success of the Hungarian government in its EU-politics and any positive feature or action of the EU is represented to be down to the negotiating skills of the Hungarian government. Whenever the EU is represented in a negative light, it is because the EU is opposing the Hungarian government and is ignorant to the benefits of the Hungarian stance on the question. (I return to this tendency when discussing political aspects of EU membership as well.)

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[97]
　　　Ibid.

[98]
　　　Ibid.

[99]
　　　Ibid.

[100]
　　　"Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát" and "Jól Jártunk az Unióval"

By focusing on the description of the Hungarian government as the actor within and in relation to the EU, the representation of the Hungarian government is deeply embedded into a representation of the EU. As it is revealed by the analysis, whenever the accomplishments of the government are cited, it is in connection with how successfully they managed in the EU. There is also another significance of this strategy of self-representation, namely, that it takes away the focus from the EU as an actor and establishes it as an external influence that assumes the form of an economic benefactor. So the "other" in this sense is not an equally powerful actor but a source of Hungarian national progress. In this sense, the EU is de-emphasised in its political importance and structure and is backgrounded. This is supported by the omission of any voice in these articles criticising the Hungarian government from the angle of the EU.

When criticism from the EU takes legal action, like the excessive deficit procedure, the description is formed to express that the Hungarian government already managed to address or even solve those problems. The overall message is that Hungary is doing well; whenever there is a dispute, it is solved, and the EU continues to fund Hungary and accept Hungarian economic policies. By legitimising Hungarian policies this way and presenting Hungary as an exclusive actor, the EU is represented as a mere container of nation states. Because the EU is reduced to an external influence, the main actor is the nation state and thus has the exclusive claim over economic progress or economic policies, even with the help of EU sponsorship. Because the Hungarian actions are cited imbedded in a representation of the EU, a complex picture is presented to the reader where decoding is complicated. As *Magyar Nemzet* is a right-wing newspaper, the readers might accept this representation of the successful Hungarian government readily, as they are already disposed to agree with the current right-wing government.

4.2. The EU as a Political Actor

The above discussion on Hungary as a nation state leads my discussion into the representation of the EU as a political actor. What kind of political actor the EU is claimed to be is relevant because public opinion takes this into account when deciding what influence the EU should or could have on their lives. This, in turn, might be important when they define themselves in relation to the EU as well.

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In both sets of articles on Hungary's tenth anniversary and on the Hungarian elections, there is a wealth of detail when attributing and representing the EU as a political actor. *Népszabadság* seems to give a quite nuanced picture of the EU in its articles. As I described above, however, the representation by *Magyar Nemzet* is slightly problematic in this sense, because the EU is not so much a political actor as rather a container. I develop this further here. Both *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Nemzet* is consistent with their representations throughout, regardless which main topic (Hungarian elections or Hungary's anniversary) is discussed.

4.2.1. *Népszabadság*

The EU as a political actor is depicted in two ways in *Népszabadság*: the political-economic-democratic union whose members are able and willing to take part in its moulding, and the democratic union which is unable to enforce its values in its member states. The EU as a political-economic union whose members are willing to take part in its moulding appears mostly in the articles on the tenth anniversary of Hungary in the EU and only marginally in the articles on the Hungarian elections. This representation is achieved less by the topical structure of the articles and more by referencing, attributes, predication, presuppositions, implications, and metaphors.

Referencing is important, according to Richardson, because it can have an impact on how actors are viewed. Identifying an actor by certain roles or characteristics chosen from a range of equally accurate roles and characteristics is a way to achieve emphasis the writer wants to achieve, as well as a way to signal relationships between actors. This choice also performs a function of projecting social values and social meaning onto the named.[101] *Népszabadság* invariably refers to the EU as "one of the biggest economic-political organisation in the world", a "democratic club with 500 million members", "economic-political community" or an "economic-politic-democratic club. [102] [103] [104] [105] All of these

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[101] Richardson*, Analysing Newspapers: an Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis,* 49-50.

[102] Pócs,"Láthatatlan Születésnap"

names occur regularly in the texts. Looking at them closer, they are quite similar and project a few, emphasised, characteristics of the EU. By referring to the size of the EU both as one of the biggest organisations in the world and as a club with as many members as 500 million, the representation achieves a connotation where sheer size seems to be a guarantee for value. After all, 500 million members is a huge number, and so many members cannot belong to the same "club" if there was something seriously wrong with it. Furthermore, the size of the organisation, referred to as one of the biggest in the world, connotes an impressive capacity as an actor.

The adjectives that qualify the noun phrases (organisation, club, or polity) emphasise three qualities: economic, political and democratic. "Economic" is fairly unproblematic as the European Union started out as an economic organisation and still promotes economic values such as liberal market values and free trade. My analysis on the EU as an economic benefactor also showed that the connotation to this quality is overall positive because the EU is viewed as a source of economic benefits and help in economic progress.

The other two qualities, political and democratic, carry a wider range of connotations. A political community suggests that the EU is a political actor. By establishing the EU as a political actor, it is emphasised that it has political powers and political legitimacy. Being a member in this political entity also assumes that Hungarian political allegiance lies with the EU (and not with anything else). This does not, by definition, suggest that the nation state is forgotten or melted into this entity, but since nothing contradicts this in the representation of the EU in *Népszabadság*, it seems that the prominence of the EU as a political actor is overarching and is emphasised above the nation state. This might be another way to express criticism to the Hungarian state headed by the current government, but also a way to suggest that political decisions and power is contributed to the EU as an alternative to the nation state. The third adjective, democratic, extends this line of thought. By emphasising the fact that the EU is a democratically operating organisation, the

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103
      Ibid.

104
      Inotai, "EU-csatlakozás: Gyorsan Változó Sikersztrorik"

105
      Pócs, "Európai Közértunió"

connoted meanings of democracy are foregrounded.

Népszabadság does bring up the assumed lack of democratic choice during the elections, and by foregrounding elsewhere that the EU is democratic, this might be a suggestion to an alternative where those unsatisfied with the current government can turn to.[106] There is another aspect of these names describing the EU, namely, the connoted meaning of the noun phrases themselves. By describing the EU as an organisation, club or community, its nature as a social construction is emphasised. It is a representation that invites a connotation of a social entity where individuals are the building blocks of a community. This is an addition to the rather faceless and detached description of a political union which adds a dimension that suggest inclusiveness and social belonging, apart from political belonging.

The second way of representing derives from the above, namely, that the EU is a democratic actor unable to enforce its values on its members. This representation is particularly salient in the articles discussing the Hungarian elections. This is expected since a left-leaning newspaper is bound to raise issues when a right-wing government wins the elections, but the matter goes much further than that. The criticism is explicitly aimed at the EU as a political actor, but implicitly aimed at the current government whose actions necessitate the debate on the abilities of the EU. The issue, therefore, is not only the representation of the EU as a weak promoter of democracy, but also the underlying suggestion that the nation state and nationalistic policies are against the very essence of democracy.

This representation is achieved mainly by implications, presuppositions, predication and attribution that contrast these two political actors. The title of one of the articles, *Europe is silent*, is highly suggestive.[107] The Hungarian word "néma" may have two denoted meanings here: "silent" by choice or "mute" because unable to speak. This ambiguity is

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106
        Ildikó Csuhaj, "Az Orbáni Szűrőn Átment a Kétharmad és a Brüsszeli Csata," *Népszabadság*, 7 Apr. 2014, accessed 7 Apr. 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/az-orbani-szuron-atment-ketharmad-es-a-brusszeli-csata-1455147.

107
        Eszter Zalán, "Európa Néma," *Népszabadság*, 10 Apr. 2014, accessed 10 Apr. 2014, http://nol.hu/velemeny/europa-nema-1455715.

referred back to throughout the article. By suggesting that Europe, i.e., the EU, is silent by choice, it is implied that it either does not care or too careful to utter. To support this argument, Zalán claims that the avoidance may be down to the fact that the European elections are approaching and the European Commission "cannot start a battle with Viktor Orbán" because they attribute the power to Orbán to steal voters from the "total Eurosceptic" Jobbik for the European Parliament (EP) elections.[108] It is also implied that avoiding confrontation with Orbán would give a higher number of mandates for the European People's Party in the elections.[109] This explicit criticism, however, also carries an implicit suggestion that the structure of the EU depends on the nation state and cooperation between the EU and its members.

This leads into the other denoted meaning of the word "néma", where the EU is silent because it is unable to speak. It is stated explicitly that wherever legal procedure was possible against the Hungarian government, it was done, which implies that legal procedures are the only viable way for the EU because it has no power of coercion.[110] The sentence "[m]aybe from Brussels (or from somewhere else), something should be said as to why the rest of Europe views the decision of the Hungarian voters as the wrong direction" implies that the outcome of the election is viewed all over Europe as an error.[111] Furthermore, by inviting Brussels, or any other European capital, to comment on the proceedings, there is an indication that they should be able to have a say. Together with the suggestion that all viable solutions were already used, there is an indication that the EU is not acting because it cannot.

The other dimension of this discussion is the critique aimed at the Hungarian government. There is also a presupposition in the above example, namely, that Hungarian voters have chosen the wrong direction. This becomes significant because it is not left as comment on

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[108]
    Ibid.

[109]
    Ibid.

[110]
    Ibid.

[111]
    Ibid.

the internal affairs of Hungarian politics but is framed as a problem by European measures. As a result, the discussion is lifted onto the European level which, thus, is legitimised by attributing importance and relevance to it. The nation state, meanwhile, is being subordinated to the European level by suggesting that violating European-wide norms should be corrected. Supposing that Hungary was not part of the EU, the European norms could be cited as a point of comparison but never used to suggest that the behaviour of the nation state should be corrected after them. Given that Hungary is a member state, its political practices cannot avoid the relevance of the European norms the EU stands for.

Further articles carry this implication as well.[112] An article on the upcoming report by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Dési presents problematic elements during the national elections and describes that the European organisation is investigating these.[113] This implies that the European opinion is influential, even when reporting on the national elections. Another article details an event in Brussels hosted by Rui Tavares and Ulrike Lunacek, where writer Karl Pfeifer read passages of his book and discussed Hungarian democracy and anti-Semitism.[114] The article represents the discussion led by Tavares and Lunacek as a platform for expressing worries on current Hungarian tendencies, and connects its significance with the upcoming OSCE report on the Hungarian elections. This representation gives an impression that several issues of Hungarian politics are being addressed at the European level, strengthening the relevance of Hungarian politics in a European context. (This event is also described in *Magyar Nemzet* which I will return to in the relevant section later.)

A further illustrative example of the significance of the European level interest in Hungarian politics is represented in an article entitled *Fidesz paved the ground for*

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[112]
       Csuhaj, "Az Orbáni Szűrőn Átment a Kétharmad és a Brüsszeli Csata"

[113]
       András Dési, "EBESZ: 'Jogtalan előnyt élvezett a kormánypárt'," *Népszabadság*, 7 Apr. 2014, accessed 7 Apr. 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/ebesz-megfigyelok-elonyt-elvezett-a-kormanypart-1455193.

[114]
       Eszter Zalán, ""Orbán állítása ellenére nyilasokat akarnak tisztára mosni"," *Népszabadság*, 8 Apr. 2014, accessed 8 Apr. 2014, http://nol.hu/kulfold/orban-allitasa-ellenere-nyilasokat-akarnak-tisztara-mosni-1455429.

Jobbik.[115] A citation from Financial Times describes that silence on the European side legitimises Orbán's provocation against European liberal democracy.[116] It is accompanied by several warnings that without being able to enforce compliance with its democratic norms, the EU risks to disintegrate from within.[117] Although the EU is not given a flattering representation, this does presuppose something worth noting: that the EU is expected to be promoting democratic values and democratic governance not only on its own level of operation, but among the member states as well. By lamenting its failure to live up to this expectation, *Népszabadság* suggests that the EU should be equipped with tools to make sure that member states comply with its norms.

4.2.1.1. Summary

The above analysis shows that *Népszabadság* builds a discourse on the political nature of the EU that is based on positive connotations: democracy, social membership and legitimate political power. In addition, according to *Népszabadság*, the EU should be given more power as a political actor even if this power would challenge the nation state. De-legitimising the nation state by implying that it does not promote those democratic values that are so positively connoted, and legitimising the EU as a political actor precisely because it is associated with those positive values creates a shift in the power structures between the EU and its member states. Placing more power to the supra-national actor could possibly weaken the power of the nation state. This might be exactly what sovereign states want to avoid. However, the fact that the discussion is extended not only on the Hungarian but also on the European level shows that negotiating ways and practices is on-going. It shows that the process of power negotiation is not finished and that actors do influence each other. However, supranational power is given to the EU by its member states for now, and it is tied to legal procedures when it decides to interfere in a nation

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115

        Eszter Zalán, "A Fidesz készítette elő a terepet a Jobbiknak," *Népszabadság*, 7 Apr. 2014, accessed 7 Apr. 2014, http://nol.hu/kulfold/a-tisztessegtelen-valasztasi-rendszer-bebetonozta-orban-baljos-nemzeti-populizmusat-1455191.

116

        Ibid.

117

        Ibid.

state.

4.2.2. *Magyar Nemzet*

The representation of the EU as a political actor in *Magyar Nemzet* is the clear opposite to *Népszabadság*. The analysis on the economic aspect of EU membership showed in *Magyar Nemzet* that the EU is represented less as an actor and more as an external influence. Analysis from the political point of view confirms this, but also extends it further. Both the articles on the tenth anniversary of Hungary in the EU and on the Hungarian elections treat the subject of the political power of the EU. The EU is represented as an external power whose dominance must be avoided at any cost and as a source of unfounded accusations and criticism. Both representations serve the aim to strengthen the importance of the nation state, i.e., the government, and to imply that external influence is dangerous to Hungarian sovereignty and the well-being of Hungarian people.

The way that EU is referred to supports the above most clearly. There are two main strategies within this category. The first is where the EU is referred to as a unit and the second is where EU-politicians are singled out as actors. In an article discussing Hungary's anniversary in the EU, the EU is referred to as a "company formally based on equal rights", and EU governance is described as weakening to sovereignty.[118] Naming the entity a "company" suggests that it is an economic, rather than a social or political cooperation. By implying that it is based on equal rights only formally, the EU is suggested to be a collection of member states whose rights are unequally distributed in practice. Stier goes further than this and describes the difference between member states not so much to be a quality distinction but to be down to political power which decides whether a state is strong or weak.[119] The claim that the responsibility for Hungary's weakness does not lie by Brussels is followed by an encouragement to prove Hungary's strength by action.[120]

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[118]   Stier, "Földre Szállt Álmok,"

[119]   Ibid.

[120]   Ibid.

Furthermore, by describing EU governance as weakening to sovereignty, it is implied that a state may be strengthened if it takes actions against the interference of EU governance.[121] In addition to this ominous pronouncement, there is, again, an ideological divide between "us" and "them" throughout the article. Hungary and the Hungarian government is treated as one entity and is referred to as "we", "us" and "our".[122] (Although Hungarian does not require to use pronouns, the inflection of words shows that the author refers to "we", "us" and "our".) The trend of depicting the EU as an external influence rather than an actor itself reoccurs here as well. The EU, thus, is stripped of its political nature and is even represented as threat to "us", the nation state.[123]

The alternative to referring to the EU as unit is naming EU politicians. These politicians are overwhelmingly represented to be criticising or worrying about Hungarian policies and as opposed to the EU as a unit, they are given the status of actors. At the few occasions when this is not their function, then they are cited to be impressed by how well the government managed to respond to their criticisms. Especially the articles on the Hungarian elections show this. Both before and after the election, reports on international reaction included quoting criticism from individuals.[124] In an article entitled *Are the European Critics of the Orbán-government Subduing?* one week after the election, "[o]nly Daniel-Cohn Bendit is worried about Hungarian democracy in Strasbourg" and "Hannes Swoboda commentates almost positively".[125] Furthermore, "critical, vilifying voices" from the European Parliament are also reported to be subduing.[126] The figure of Daniel-Cohn

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121
    Ibid.

122
    Ibid.

123
    Ibid.

124
    "Csendesednek az Orbán-kormány Európai Kritikusai?," *Magyar Nemzet*, 15 Apr. 2014, accessed 15 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/eu/csendesednek-az-orban-kormany-europai-kritikusai-1221630, and Richárd Szilágyi, "Április Hatodika Után," *Magyar Nemzet*, 3 Apr. 2014, accessed 3 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/vezercikk/aprilis-hatodika-utan-1219336, and "Megint Magyarország Miatt Aggódtak," *Magyar Nemzet*, 26 Mar. 2014, accessed 26 Mar. 2014, http://mno.hu/kulfold/megint-magyarorszag-miatt-aggodtak-1217982.

125
    "Csendesednek az Orbán-kormány Európai Kritikusai?"

126

Bendit, which is given the role of the last person in Strasbourg to be worrying about Hungary is described in detail, while other voices who are represented to be not critical anymore are not specified any further. The function of specifying further details on Daniel-Cohn Bendit is to de-legitimise him. He is referred to as a "blustering politician", and "unrelenting critic" and a "soon-to-be pensioner". [127] By being referenced like these, Daniel-Cohn Bendit is stripped of his professional capabilities as a politician. Blustering and unrelenting refer to someone without the capability to negotiate and listen to reason, and the fact that he is reaching retiring age is mentioned to suggest that his opinions will not be relevant in the near future. However, even with his de-legitimised voice, he is represented as an actor, while the European Parliament in the same article is represented to be a forum of critical and vilifying voices, unnamed and actionless.[128]

Another example appears in an article describing an event happening in Brussels lead by Rui Tavares and Ulrike Lunacek. The event is to introduce a book written by Karl Pfeifer.[129] The book is only referred to once in the whole article as "by the way, it does not seem to have too much to do with Hungary".[130] Instead, Tavares and Lunacek are named several times. Tavares is referred to as an "ex-communist" and the author of a report about Hungary that was "full of countless slips and errors".[131] Lunacek is described as a green party politician who "have burst out against our home country many times as well".[132]

The impression of a powerless EU is further strengthened by how action is allocated across

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Ibid.

[127]
Ibid.

[128]
Ibid.

[129]
"Tavaresék Támadásra Készülnek," *Magyar Nemzet*, 3 Apr. 2014 accessed 3 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/tavaresek-tamadasra-keszulnek-1219339.

[130]
Ibid.

[131]
Ibid.

[132]
Ibid.

the texts. The voices representing the EU are assigned actions with negative connotations and examples are plentiful throughout, but are most prominent in texts on the Hungarian election. The most distinct of these is an article entitled *After 6 April*, published on 3 April, which details accusations that have not even been said yet.[133] The topic is the expectation of international election monitors to arrive to Hungary for the 6 April elections and their report of the election later. "We can only hope that they will do a thorough and objective work just as before. If it did not happen that way, Fidesz must be prepared, if they do not want to govern in an international headwind another four years, since down here even victory needs to be accounted for".[134] These two sentences exemplify the whole article, especially because the first sentence appears twice, at the beginning and at the end of the article. By stating that "we can only hope" it is implied that it is less than evident that international monitors do a thorough and objective work. The hypothetical scenario includes two presuppositions: that Fidesz is to win the elections and that they have been governing against international obstacles so far. Presupposing that Fidesz would win the elections three days before the elections presents this as an unquestionable, decided fact, especially since no alternative is presented in the article. The second presupposition, that the last four years were rendered more difficult by foreign obstacles suggests that governance in Hungary is difficult because of foreign influence. To underline this, several foreign commentators are cited, among them Vivien Reding, who is claimed to have said she will do everything to weaken the legitimacy of the results of the Hungarian elections.[135] Her denial of this is framed to be a "statement appearing to be a refutation". This formulation suggests that she did not deny it after all.[136]

The motif of negative foreign influence on Hungarian governance appears often and so does the representation of Hungary, i.e., Viktor Orbán, working to repair this harmful

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[133]
    Szilágyi, "Április Hatodika Után,"

[134]
    Ibid.

[135]
    Ibid.

[136]
    Ibid.

influence and protect against further damage to Hungary.[137] Wherever negative comments or criticism is reported on, it is Orbán or the Hungarian government, or Hungary that acts, while the EU is represented to be actionless. Where the EU is mentioned, it is associated with actions happening to it as a passive entity, mostly by the Hungarian state. It is remarkable that *Magyar Nemzet* does not, at any point, make a difference between Hungary and the Hungarian government and nor do they separate Hungarian action from Viktor Orbán's actions. The action in relation to the EU are, thus, represented by the action carried out on the EU, by Hungary. Hungary is described to have "proven to be working for the common European goals", "emerged from the excessive deficit procedure" (as opposed to the EU stopping the procedure against Hungary), "made a commitment to implement the judgement from the European Court of Justice" (as opposed to the European Court of Justice passing a judgment) and "been prepared to enter into dialogue".[138] [139] [140] [141] Hungary is further represented be "correcting criticism", "expressing itself more powerful and conducting itself more determined", "if necessary, protecting the Hungarian cause in Brussels" and finally that Hungary supports EU membership. [142] [143] [144] [145] This last point, that Hungary is supporting EU membership or that it does not wish to leave the EU occurs in a context that specifies the condition under which this is relevant: "there is a

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137
"Orbán: ez Egyértelmű Felhatalmazás," *Magyar Nemzet*, 7 Apr. 2014, accessed 7 Apr. 2014, http://mno.hu/parlamenti_valasztas_2014/orban-ez-egyertelmu-felhatalmazas-1220144.

138
"Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát"

139
"Jól Jártunk az Unióval"

140
Ibid.

141
"Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát"

142
Ibid.

143
"Orbán: ez Egyértelmű Felhatalmazás"

144
"Győri: Folytatni Kell az Eurorealista Politikát"

145
Ibid.

need for a Europe where member states are strong and cooperate on those areas where the cooperation serves the needs of citizens. This cooperation should be coordinated by strong European institutions".[146] The first sentence suggests that the EU should be composed of strong nation states that are only cooperating in those areas where it serves their citizens and not in areas where it does not serve the national interest, thus limiting its scope and power. The second sentence might seem to be flattering to the EU, but those EU institutions that are supposed to be strong are only those that serve strong nation states. Thus, the EU becomes subordinated to nation states and its existence is only desired as long as the nation states can decide what areas it should function in. Again, the actor is the nation state, and the EU is represented to be where the action is carried out. Even if the EU is given the function of coordinating, this power stems from the nation state, which, thus is in control of its actions.

4.2.2.1. Summary

The EU's role defined by *Magyar Nemzet* is that of a weak, actionless container. Where political actors are presented and discussed, it is only Hungary that is represented to be a legitimate political actor, while the EU is reduced to be a subordinated servant. Where the EU is associated with action, then this is carried out by individual politicians representing the EU and never by the political entity of the EU. The importance of elevating individual politicians to the position of actors is significant because it has a function. If individuals are acting separately and on their own accord, then their actions are not as significant because they are less powerful political actors compared to the state. By giving individuals the possibility to represent political power, while depriving the EU of its political power as a legitimate actor, the negative voices and criticisms that are aimed at the government's policies are weakened. If the EU as a politically powerful actor would be voicing these, the level of importance and influence contributed to them would also rise. However, since they are voiced by de-legitimised individuals, they become considerably less important. These individuals are represented with references or attributes with a negative connotation that strips them of their professional capacity. When they are described to be praising Hungary, they are only represented by this action and no references, attributes or any other negative

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146
      Ibid.

connotations.

The fact, however, that it is emphasised that they are EU politicians also serves a function. Their weakened criticism does represent the EU, but in a powerless way. The identification of "us", the nation, and "them", the EU, builds up a rhetoric where national political representatives clash with foreign political representatives. Thus, Viktor Orbán, the representative of "us" is elevated to the status of the protector of national values while the EU becomes "the other", criticising and interfering with the government's work for Hungary.

The actions represented in the text also have an implication to the nature of the EU as a political actor. The emphasis on Hungary as an actor is paired with de-emphasising the EU as an actor. Those individuals that represent action from the side of the EU are also de-legitimised by describing their performance as doubtfully fair or by suggesting their harmfulness to Hungary. The construction of the Hungarian state as the victim of the foreign meddlers is also strengthened by the description of the Hungarian government as the successful actor in the face of these difficulties. This strategy of positive self-representation is achieved by using verbs with positive connotations in relation to Hungary. This associates the Hungarian actions with a positive attitude against those with a negative attitude. Even in relation to the EU, Hungary is represented to be the actor while the EU is reduced to be the subordinate subject of these actions. This is further confirmed by a description of the EU on and in which nation states carry out their actions. The EU is only required to act in the servitude of the nation state, and only in those instances when this is desired by the nation state. Since this is the description of the Hungarian government's approach to EU politics for the next four years, it is presumable that EU-Hungarian relations will be based on Hungary's resistance to further political integration and further opposition to the widening of the EU's scope and function.

Another important aspect of the representation in *Magyar Nemzet* is the fact, that there is no difference made between Hungary and the Hungarian government. These are interchangeable both in referencing strategies and the description of actions. Their identity melts together and they both become one entity and one actor. This is also noticeable wherever the pronoun "we" and its derivates ("us", "our") are used in relation to Hungary, the nation state, the Hungarian government and the Hungarian people. This, in effect,

achieves a representation where state and government are not separated anymore and where Hungarian citizens are equal to their representatives in politics. This representation of Hungarian citizens being one with Hungary, and Hungary being one with the Hungarian government, the identity of Hungarian citizens is monopolised to one understanding and to one political party. Since the EU is described to be inferior to Hungary, its nature, its politics and its very existence is treated to be below the level of Hungary's power and ability to act. This forms an allegiance where the best interest of the citizens, both explicitly and implicitly, is claimed to be fulfilled by the Hungarian government and not by the EU. By forming this allegiance, Hungarian national identity is represented to be fairly exclusive in relation to the EU.

The question might arise, then, why the Hungarian government still supports EU membership. The answer lies in my analysis on the economic aspect of membership and the representation of the EU as an economic benefactor. The representation of the Hungarian government showed that it is described to be the successful negotiator for EU funding and economic benefits arriving from the EU. The EU, although reduced to be less than a powerful actor here as well, was represented to be an economic benefactor. This way, it was the Hungarian government that was depicted to be a political actor working for Hungary's economic development, while the EU was depicted as a mere assistant in this process. There is a key momentum in this representation. Although the EU membership is characterised by economic benefits, the action that was carried out in order to achieve this progress still lies with the nation state and thus the Hungarian government. This associates the Hungarian government to be the one that secures the EU funding and thus economic progress and not the EU itself. EU funding is the tool, but the actor remains the state. The Hungarian government, thus, becomes indispensable for economic progress. By emphasising its crucial importance in the process, the government secures citizens' allegiance as well. Since the Hungarian public, by and large, is aware of the economic benefits EU membership entails, as it is continually repeated in all the articles analysed, it is not conceivable for the government to abandon this source of development. However, to avoid losing political power, it needs to secure that citizens view the EU as less powerful than the state. By reducing the EU to be the tool for this success, the representation eliminates the chance for changing alliances towards the EU in place of the nation state. Instead, the Hungarian state is represented to be the one that is responsible for bringing EU benefits to the citizens.

4.3. Implications to the Future of European Integration and EU-Hungarian Relations

Although it is a difficult task, there may be some general assumptions made on the basis of the above analysis. As the dataset is limited because both the time frame of the collection and the number of sources are limited, it is not possible to suggest that my findings are universal, rather to be representing a small chunk of the whole. However, I consider my findings an appropriate starting point on a discussion on the future of European integration and EU-Hungarian relations. This stems from the very nature of discourse and discourse analysis: society and discourse mutually shape each other. As this is a continual process of negotiation, the implications that are found by discourse analysis may be used to understand implications on how societal structures are developing. My specific findings, therefore, may show, however small, indications as to how this development may continue.

To be able to relate my findings to the overall topic of European integration and EU-Hungarian relations, they need to be related to the social realities they are embedded in. According to Fairclough, texts are a constitutive part of the social world but their effect on social reality depends on aspects such as power and context.[147] Van Dijk suggests that the power of discourse to shape social reality is not coercive but *mental.* Controlling the minds (knowledge, attitude and beliefs) results in individuals acting as if on their own accord and this is done through discourse.[148] This means that discourse has a shaping effect on European integration because it prompts individuals to shape their beliefs and attitudes according to how discourse is constructed on the subject.

Although my analysis was based on only two newspapers in Hungary, these newspapers are the largest ones so their representations are significant in shaping social reality. Representational strategies of *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Nemzet* are different, but the overall outcome is consistent in the respective newspapers. This means that when describing representations of a certain newspaper, I am able to generalise to a certain

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[147]   Fairclough, *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, 8-10.

[148]   van Dijk, "Discourse as Interaction in Society," 16.

extent as well.

The analysis of *Népszabadság* showed that EU-Hungarian relations are represented to be based on an economic-political relationship in which the EU is represented to be a powerful actor. The Hungarian government, on the other hand, is subtly and implicitly criticised for its inability to take better advantage of Hungary's EU membership and is suggested to be far away from reaching European standards both economically and politically. By emphasising that the EU is a democratically governed social community, *Népszabadság* connotes social and political benefits with an alliance with the EU. Furthermore, originating from the implicit criticism of Hungarian governance, there are implications to the superiority of the EU's democratic governance as opposed to that of the Hungarian state. This might prompt readers to consider by-passing national alliances and appeal directly to the European level both for economic and political benefits that the state is failing to provide. For the future of European integration, this representation has many details that might be significant.

First of all, the balance of power between the nation state and the EU is represented to be slightly in favour of the EU which suggests that European politics weighs more in citizens' everyday lives. This does not necessarily mean that nation state is outdated as a political power, rather that it does not influence every political domain anymore.

Secondly, by the fact the European Union is given the status of a political actor, readers are prompted to accept the legitimacy of European decision-making, thereby enabling a better compliance of citizens with EU regulations. Accepting the legitimacy of the EU also means that citizens are less likely to oppose political influence and power associated with the EU as well.

Thirdly, by representing the EU as a social-democratic community, readers may evaluate the EU as both a social and a political construction. By adding a social dimension to the political one, citizens presented with the conception that the EU is a community where membership is based on social inclusion. This, in turn, suggests that the EU is a social construction where citizens are able to influence its nature and future development. Overall, these basic implications derived from the representation of the EU in *Népszabadság* suggest a rather pro-European attitude. This positive attitude suggests that

future support for further European integration is likely among the readers of *Népszabadság*. As to the question of the future of Hungary's membership, this general support for the European Union is likely to be too insignificant. As *Népszabadság* is associated with the left-wing ideology, its readership might not weigh much in the shaping of the overall national attitude since support for left-wing politics in Hungary is at an all-time low.

The analysis of *Magyar Nemzet*, on the other hand, shows a very different outcome. Representational strategies in *Magyar Nemzet* result in an image of the EU as a politically powerless container of nation states and as an economic benefactor. The nation state, on the other hand, is represented to be the successful negotiator of economic benefits from the EU and a strong political actor in relation to the EU. As a result, the EU is represented to be a mere assistant or simply a harmful foreign influence in Hungarian politics. Both of these representations serve to emphasise the importance of the nation state and to de-emphasise the EU as a political actor. This representation suggests three implications to the future of the EU-integration process and to EU-Hungarian relations.

Firstly, by reducing the nature of the EU to be an assistant of Hungarian politics, rather than an equally potent political actor may prompt citizens to dismiss or refuse European political influence on their everyday lives. Since the EU's image as a powerful political actor is greatly weakened, any political power is associated with the nation state instead. This may result in citizens strengthening their alliances with the nation state and deny further identification with an external influence. The result is a rather exclusive identity politics which favours national identities and dismisses the relevance of any other type of political identification.

Secondly, as the EU is not given the status of a political actor and thus citizens' alliance, further European integration is difficult to conceive, or in this case, is even opposed to. The representation of the ideal function of the EU is for it to be an assistant to help the cooperation of nation states. Even this function is preferred to be limited by the nation state. In this climate, readers are suggested that it is not desirable to strengthen the political influence of the EU. Furthermore, by depicting the EU already as a threat at this stage of European integration, citizens are likely to be opposed to widening the scope of European influence as well.

Thirdly, there is an implication that EU-Hungarian relations will not change much in the next years, at least not towards a strengthened support for the EU. The Hungarian government is depicted to be keen on sustaining its current influence in Hungary and resistant to deeper cooperation with the EU. By melting Hungarian politics, the Hungarian state and Hungarian citizens into one entity, *Magyar Nemzet* represents the interests of the current government to be the interest of the state which is in turn represented to be the interests of Hungarian citizens. By creating an image of the government as the architect of successful EU-politics and as the successful winner of economic benefits from the EU, citizens are prompted that their allegiance is in good hands with the government, as they are working for the benefit of Hungary. However, as my analysis showed that the economic benefits of being an EU member is a key component in this equation, it is possible to assume that the Hungarian attitude towards EU membership largely depends on this aspect. Citizens are likely to support EU membership in the future if economic progress is the consequence of this. Meanwhile, the Hungarian government is likely to continue its rhetoric to be the successful negotiator for EU funding which would win them popular votes as well. By embedding the representation of the Hungarian government as a crucial element of receiving EU funding and of economic progress, the Hungarian government did not only win votes but also established itself as an indispensable element for the well-being of Hungary and its citizens. In addition, it has also established a rhetoric that unites the identity of Hungary, its government and its citizens. In this climate, there is little chance that European allegiance can develop much further.

5. Conclusion

I set out to examine the representations of the EU and the representation of EU-Hungarian relations in the two largest dailies in Hungary, *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Nemzet*. My aim with this investigation was to gain an insight into discourses on the EU and EU-Hungarian relations in the Hungarian media. During my data collection period, 1 March and 5 May, two main topics were salient in my chosen newspapers: the Hungarian national elections and the tenth anniversary of Hungary as an EU member. They have, therefore, created the ground for my dataset for discourse analysis.

My analysis revealed a wealth of details in both newspapers. However, the most important aspect of these two separate topics is that they both contributed to the same, linear representations in both newspapers. This shows that not so much the specific topic, but rather the context of the topics decided the outcome of the analysis. By the context of the topics, I refer to van Dijk's definition of global contexts, which means the overall social, political and cultural structure the texts are embedded in.[149] This also implies that the particular discourses I investigated were not isolated but were shaped by wider influences than the topics themselves. My analysis and my discussion showed, however, that it is not only discourse that is shaped by context, but also that discourse shapes social reality. Although I investigated only a sliver of the Hungarian discourse in these newspapers, my findings could be applied to address my initial research question.

The analysis of the discourse in *Népszabadság*, the largest left-leaning daily in Hungary, revealed a pro-European attitude that is strengthened by a dissatisfaction with the current right-wing government. The discourse on the EU and EU-Hungarian relations is shaped by a representation of the EU as an economic-political union that is based on democratic principles and evokes a sense of social belonging. Although criticism of the Hungarian government was subtle and only achieved by implication, the outcome was a representation of the nation state as a less powerful political actor. This, and the portrayal of the current government failing its citizens both socially and economically, suggested a more positive attitude towards political and social citizenship in the EU. Furthermore, it suggests that citizens' allegiances might bring a more beneficial outcome if they were placed with the EU instead of the nation state. National identities, thus are complemented with an inclusive, social and political identification with the EU. This might bring a more positive attitude towards the EU as a political actor and to the further deepening of the European integration process. The only hindrance to this is the fact that support for the political left in Hungary has dropped to extremely low levels, so this pro-European attitude might not be relevant to the larger portion of society.

The analysis of the discourse in *Magyar Nemzet*, on the other hand, revealed quite contrasting attitudes. The EU, according to my findings, is portrayed as powerless actor in relation to the Hungarian government, which in this newspaper was used synonymously

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        van Dijk, "Multidisciplinary CDA," 108-113.

with the Hungarian state and Hungarian citizens. The EU was reduced to be an economic benefactor and a coordinating assistant between sovereign nation states. Instead, it was the strength and ability of the state that was emphasised. Hungarian economic progress was described to be the success of the current government, where the EU functioned as an external economic benefactor. When political cooperation between the EU and Hungary was discussed, it was only the Hungarian state that was presented as political actor, while the EU was diminished to be the coordinating assistant of national politics among its member states through its institutions. By presenting European-wide criticism of Hungary by the voices of individual European politicians, the legitimacy of these criticisms was also reduced because they were not produced by powerful political actors, although still represented the EU. However, when criticism from the EU resulted in legal procedures, the reporting presented how successfully the Hungarian government responded and cooperated. This positive self-representation and the negative representation of a de-legitimised EU produced a rather unbalanced power-relation. Hungary, as the nation state, was represented to be the only successful political actor, leaving no option for citizens to build allegiance to the European level. This was paired with the representation of the Hungarian state embedded into European level politics, which rendered the nation state indispensable in relation to the EU. My findings also show that the economic benefits of being an EU-member helped develop the Hungarian economy. The current government utilises this and represent this crucial aspect of EU membership to be attributed to their hard work for their citizens. The continued representation of Hungary as a strong, successful state overshadows any political-social aspects of the EU. This means that while the nation monopolises representations and allegiance of their citizens, it is likely to continue an exclusive national identity formation process where the European level is insignificant.

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