



Lund University

Faculty of Humanities and Theology  
Centre for Languages and Linguistics

“Historical Memory as a Political Tool for Legitimacy  
by FIDESZ Government in Hungary”

By

Ittipol Jungwatanawong  
Master of Arts in European Studies  
August 2014

Supervisor:  
Spyros Sofos

## **Acknowledgement**

This thesis will never become real without the help of Spyros Sofos, my advisor, who helped me a lot in making it. I own him very much. I would like to thank Mattias Nowak for giving me a chance to come to Sweden and study in Sweden, in this programme. I have learnt a lot, whether in academic or life lessons. Thanks to Lund University who provides me the scholarship, and everyone at SOL and the programme; Sanna, Lars, Anamaria, and others who provide good assistance and education. Thanks to my friends who have studied with me in the past two years. And thank you Sweden for good nature and environment.

I also have to thank all my Thai and Swedish friends: Thian, Wicky, P' Aum, P' Tas, P' Jan, P' Yui, Ponn, Tudtu, P' Chompoo, P' Chon, N' Kok, N' Am, N' May, N' Amp, Fai, Macus, N' Pipe, and many who I can't remember their names. You all have made my life in Sweden warmer than colder. Thank you very much.

Finally, I would like to thank you my parents who have supported my whole life for allowing and helping me to come here, far away from home. Both of you are my strong support, not giving my life, but raising me to come to this far. I love you. Thank you for everything.

For any fault of this thesis, I as the author am solely responsible for it.

Lund, Sweden

August 2014

## Table of Content

<b>Content</b>	<b>Page</b>
Abstract .....	4
Chapter 1: Hungary under an ill-liberal democratic practice .....	4
Aim and research question .....	7
Chapter 2: Methodologies and theories .....	9
History and the Nation .....	9
Literature Review .....	10
Cultural Trauma .....	11
Critical Discourse Analysis and sources for analysis page .....	11
Chapter 3: A historical background .....	13
Chapter 4: Literature Review .....	23
Concept of political legitimacy .....	23
Previous studies on political legitimacy of Hungary .....	24
Cultural Trauma .....	28
Chapter 5: History as a political tool for legitimacy of FIDESZ and Prime Minister Orbán	31
1) Historical memories in the constitution .....	32
2) Historical reference in Orbán's speeches.....	36
Chapter 6: Conclusion .....	45
Bibliography .....	47

## **Abstract**

This research will try to examine the strategy of FIDESZ government, the current government of Hungary, in acquiring political legitimacy. The thesis found that political legitimacy of Hungary has a pattern of relation between the regime and historical memory; this relation can be seen since the end of communist regime in 1989, which has been centred at the representations of historical memory to the public by political actors. The representations have become a tool for political actors to make them legitimate and gain popularity among the public. Thus, this paper will elaborate the political legitimacy of Hungary by focusing on the use of historical memory of the present government. In order to do so, it will analyse the text within the new constitution of 2011 and the speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as he is the major political actor of the current government and, as the premier, he has opportunities to communicate with Hungarians very often. Thus, he has more opportunities to control political discourses for his and his party's interest.

## **Chapter 1: Hungary under an ill-liberal democratic practice**

After four decades of state socialist rule, Hungary adopted a liberal democratic system of governance following the collapse of Soviet hegemony over East-Central Europe in the late 1980s. Despite the institutional transition from the state socialist system to a liberal democratic polity, concerns have been expressed over what commentators have often identified as authoritarian elements in contemporary Hungarian politics. Hungarian politics seems to be marked by an ill-democratic development due to many reasons; the major condition of this concern is the adoption of the new constitution, “the Fundamental Law,” in 2011 and came into force in 2012 with an additional modification in 2013. It has been questioned over the violation of check and balance system, especially the limitation of power and independence of the Constitutional Court, and Human Rights' principles. Hungary has been and is still being governed by the government of the Federation of Young Democrat-Hungarian Civic Alliance Party or FIDESZ<sup>1</sup> led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán since 2010. With the majority in the House of Representatives after the election in 2010 and again in 2014, the FIDESZ government

---

<sup>1</sup> Fiala Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar Polgári Szövetség

has been able to implement and amend crucial laws. Not only EU bodies like the Venice Commission, scholars within the country also pledged their concerns over the government due to the new constitution and its policies (Dalos, 2012; Halmai, 2012).

An assessment of the democratic performance of the country in 2013 indicated that Hungarian democratic institutions have been weakened since EU accession in 2004, more than any other member state according to the Freedom House Report, *Nations in Transit 2013* (Ágh, 2013; FH, 2013). Yet, the government of Prime Minister Orbán has been able to maintain popularity among Hungarian people. This is proved by the election of April 2014, where FIDESZ Party had again gained parliamentary majority, resulting to a third term for Orbán as premier<sup>2</sup>. If the concerns from the EU and Hungarian scholars are true, the major question here is why Hungarian voters have been confident in the ability of FIDESZ and Viktor Orbán to administer for the second consecutive term (Ágh, Ibid).

There are currently various researches and academic articles trying to explain the situation in recent Hungary (Ágh, 2013; Bozóki, 2011; Dalos, 2012; Halmai, 2012; Széky, 2014; Tartakoff, 2012). They aim the study at government's policies and the new constitution. For example, Bozóki (2011) observed the Orbán government through its national policies; he explains that the government by the Prime Minister declared the national cooperation in order to unite the whole country; but to achieve this declaration, the government adopted the new constitution which allows the parliament to appoint major officers in independent institutions, such as the Constitutional Court. With the majority in the parliament, FIDESZ is able to change any officer it wants. This also includes the President of Hungary. Meanwhile, other controversial laws are implemented, such as the media law of 2010, which sets up the media supervisory board, in which the government appointed anyone who is close to them. Meanwhile, with the power from the constitution, the FIDESZ government filled the National Electoral Commission, the body which is responsible for conducting clean and smooth elections, with its own people, and implemented new election law to limit the chance for minor parties to gain seats in the parliament. As a result, the new constitution has been criticised as the source of absolute power of the government and Prime Minister Orbán; György Dalos with other Hungarian intellectuals (2012) and Gábor Halmai (2012) also wrote articles published in eurozine.com, stating that the current constitution of Hungary is controversial and that the country is going under

---

<sup>2</sup> Orbán's first term as Prime Minister was between 1998 and 2002 with FIDESZ

authoritarianism and ill-liberal democratic practice. They said that the new constitution makes changes in three branches of the state, and that the media law and electoral law help FIDESZ strengthen its power in the country. It is obvious that to unite the country, FIDESZ government has expelled anyone who opposed them out of important positions and limited the voice of the oppositions.

According to Bozóki (Ibid), the concept of “national unification” thus seems to be the core issue the Prime Minister had emphasised. There is a manifestation here: National unification refers to both symbolic and literal importance, in which the major events of the past, whether the Revolution of 1848 against the Habsburg rule, the Treaty of Trianon, the 1956 Revolution against the communist ruler, communism’s legacy and the force of globalisation, especially the integration with the EU, have been often mentioned by the Prime Minister.

In other words, it seems history is crucial for Orbán in making messages to Hungarian public. According to its history, from the struggle in 1848 to democratic transition in 1989, Hungarians had experienced a multiple of emotions, whether good or bad. These memories are still mentioned by the state through at least the national holidays of March 15 for the commemoration of 1848 and October 23 for 1956.

This research argues that historical reference might be a political tool for Hungarian politicians and governments in gaining political power, but the power can’t derive without the approval of Hungarians. Therefore, the communication from the government to Hungarians is the key to gain popular support. With political support, a government is legitimate to exercise the power through general elections, and it is certain that the government of FIDESZ party is legitimate due to democratic elections in 2010 and 2014. The main interest of this thesis therefore is to understand how the regime of FIDESZ party and Prime Minister Orbán are trusted by Hungarians to administer their country. The research believes that historical memories are crucial to Hungarian politics and the application of those memories as a political tool will help political actors gaining political power. Thus, the argument of this thesis is historical memory can help Hungarian regime to be legitimate, and it is necessary for political actors to make reference to the past memories in order to gain support or maintain the legitimacy.

In this first chapter, the thesis will discuss and unpack the aims and the main research question of this study as well as attempt to sketch of the outline of this thesis. The second chapter will discuss the methodologies, the selection of the source for analysis, and will take a closer

look at the theory that underlies the work presented in the dissertation, whereas the third chapter will examine Hungary's history over the last century, from the traumatic breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the establishment of modern Hungary to the imposition of Soviet rule after the second World War, the collapse of communism, Hungary's transition to a liberal democratic polity, and after EU-membership to contemporary political developments. This chapter aims to understand the major events and get a better sense of the historical background of the hold of contemporary ideologies of nationalism in Hungary.

The fourth chapter will be literature review which aims to demonstrate the politics of legitimacy of Hungary before and after the FIDESZ government by looking at researches relevant to historical memories and political legitimacy in Hungary as a significant political factor in contemporary Hungary with an argument of the reason why it is crucial through a literature review of relevant academic researches. The fifth chapter will take a closer look into the application of historical memory and reference to it via the constitution and political addresses of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán; it will be divided into two parts with the first section will take a close look at the statements within the constitution relevant to historical events, where the second section will analysis political speeches of the Prime Minister in order to see any reference to history and the conformity between his speeches, his government's policies, and the constitution. The sixth chapter will attempt to bring together the various strands of the earlier discussion and summarize the findings of this project.

### Aim and Research Questions

Széky (2014) wrote in his article "the Tradition of Nationalism":

"It is quite difficult to understand present-day Hungarian public affairs without being familiar with the particular nature of Hungarian nationalism, while it is impossible to understand its nature without knowing its centuries-old historical roots."

The nature he is referring to is what the thesis will try to investigate and analyse with the aim to understand the current politics of this country. The focus of this study will try to investigate the development of Hungarian politics from a historical perspective with an assumption that

historical memories constitute a very significant political resource in Hungarian politics, whether pertaining to the communist or post-communist democratic political life. The case studies of the utilisation of historical memories in Hungarian politics will be discussed in the literature review.

After investigating the relation between legitimacy and historical memory in Hungarian politics, the thesis will look more closely on the use of historical memories by the FIDESZ government and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in their communication with the Hungarian people. The thesis will focus on the constitution and Prime Minister's speeches to examine that how the government and the premier utilises the memories to make him and his government legitimate in ruling the country and implementing laws and policies. A relevant and appropriate tool in the discussion of these questions and in addressing the hypothesis underlying this thesis can be located in the concept of political legitimacy, the theory of cultural trauma, and critical discourse analysis as the approach method to analyse the sources. Drawing upon the relevant literature (Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, & Sztompka, 2004; Ciobanu, 2010; Dienstag, 1996; Dogan, 2009; Eyerman, 2001; Fossen, 2013; Pittaway, 2004; Sigwart, 2013; Sztompka, 2000; Tota, 2006; Yankova, 2008), my assumption here is that historical memories became a massive factor of political legitimacy because they have been used to nurture, cultivate and propagate a sense of national trauma. Thus, the major hypothesis is: "the FIDESZ party obtains political legitimacy by using historical memory as the core concept of uniting Hungarian society" and "the historical memory strategy is capable of arousing national memory through a sense of national trauma it conveys". To prove the hypothesis, I will endeavour to answer the following questions:

1. What are the memories the government have drawing upon in order to gain political legitimacy?
2. Why are these memories chosen as part of the political strategy of the government?
3. How does the government use those memories for political legitimacy?

To answer the first question, the thesis will discuss the previous researches in literature review in order to manifest the pattern of political strategies used by prior regimes to gain political interest and political legitimacy. In order to answer the second question, it is necessary to make a ground of historical development of Hungary; the thesis will describe a brief history of Hungary and



sketch the construction of national identity and current politics of Hungary. The third question will be discussed to seek the answer via the analysis of the sources the thesis will acquire. The sources for analysis will be explained in the methodology chapter.

## **Chapter 2: Methodologies and theories**

This chapter will describe the methodologies in making this research and theories for analysing the sources it will examine. The type of research is qualitative as it will not analyse the data in terms of number or quantity, but texts and the conclusions of relevant literature as it aims to examine the utilisation of historical memories through political messages by FIDESZ Government and Prime Minister Orbán; it will study the constitution with a consultation with researches on the new constitution of Hungary, including the criticism (Dalos, 2012; Halmai, 2012; Pogány, 2013; Tartakoff, 2012), because this Fundamental Law was drafted and adopted by FIDESZ party and it is accused of power abuse by the party as the ruling government party at present, whereas the analysis of the Prime Minister's speeches will require critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the main approach for the analysis. The thesis will limit its examination on the speeches of the premier to be between 2010 and 2014 prior the election of 2014. CDA will be discussed in this chapter to present its concept and the relevant issue to this thesis. The main theory for analysis will be "cultural trauma" and political legitimacy will be the main idea of the thesis argument which will be conceptualised; both will be discussed in the literature review. To begin with, the thesis will try to lay out a background of history of Hungary in order to illustrate the development of Hungarian nation, especially from the nineteenth century. Review of literature is the major foundation for the concept of the relation between political legitimacy and historical memory in Hungarian politics, whereas the notion of cultural trauma will be resorted to in order to analyse the text in the fifth chapter to demonstrate what the current government has created to gain their popularity.

### History and the Nation

As this research will try to examine Hungarian politics from a historical perspective of its development and the significance of history to the politics, it is necessary to observe the

development of Hungarian history in order to visualise the image of Hungarian nation, identity, and politics. The main sources of historical reference here are “A Concise History of Hungary” by Miklós Molnár (2001) and “State of the Art and Historical Report” by Hunyady and Kiss (2003) with additional sources, such as academic journals, for more recent situations in Hungary prior to the 2010 election. This chapter will present the experiences Hungarians had encountered, which eventually created common identity, memories and nationalism which will be useful for later analysis in this paper.

The chapter will roughly begin by briefly mentioning the history of Hungary prior the nineteenth century and will emphasise the story from the Habsburg rule in the nineteenth century, where the Revolution for Independence of 1848 occurred. It will cover all the major events and incidents of the twentieth century from the separation from Austria, the Trianon Hungary, the communist rule, the 1956 Revolution, the transition to democracy, and democratic Hungary prior to 2010.

### Reviewing the literature

Reviewing the literature will be divided into two sections: one will discuss political legitimacy and historical memories in Hungarian politics, and the other cultural trauma. The first section will try to conceptualise political legitimacy, and discuss relevant theories and historical memories as political legitimacy in Hungary. The thesis will discuss the use of historical memories in Hungarian politics from the transition to democracy between 1989 and 1990 to the recent politics before 2010. In order to prove the argument on historical memories and legitimacy in Hungarian politics, the thesis will examine the major events like “the Pozsgay affair” and the 2006 demonstration, which links to the 1956 Revolution. Also, the thesis will discuss the concept democratic legitimacy and the theory of legitimacy by Max Weber to make a clear understanding in the conception of legitimacy (Bartel, 1989; Buck, 2012; Ciobanu, 2010; Dienstag, 1996; Dogan, 2009; Fossen, 2013; Gaus, 2011; Pittaway, 2004; Pribersky, 2008; Sigwart, 2013).

## Cultural Trauma

This section of the literature review will try to demonstrate why historical memories have been pivotal to Hungarian politics by discussing the theory and concepts of cultural trauma in order to answer the second question of this thesis: why historical memories have been chosen to represent in politics of Hungary? It will try to elaborate the concept of cultural trauma in terms of national trauma because the thesis believe there is an association between national trauma and political discourse used by Hungarian government which have been referred to within the constitution and the Hungarian Prime Minister's speeches; the sources for analysis seem to be political, but the messages within them are historical. It is necessary to point out the purpose of historical references in the texts, and to do so this thesis believes the theory of cultural trauma will be useful for the understanding of the application of historical memories within the texts.

The theory of cultural trauma will be discussed from relevant researches with the concept of collective memory and collective identity (Alexander et al., 2004; Eyerman, 2001; Sztompka, 2000; Tota, 2006). The theory will be discussed mainly in the fourth chapter of literature review with the aim to link the analysis part in the fifth chapter.

## Critical Discourse Analysis and sources for analysis

Apart from the analysis on historical reference in the constitution, the research will try to analyse the speeches of Prime Minister Orbán because he is the major political figure of the government who made several speeches to Hungarians, private sectors and international community. However, in order to study the effect of historical memories to political legitimacy, which can be approved by popular support, the research will focus on his addresses to general public; therefore, it will analyse national addresses of each year, especially on the two major public holidays of March 15 and October 23. It will also try to study his speeches in other events like the commemoration to the victims of communism, during his election campaign prior to the 2014 election, for example. The major problem of this analysis is language barrier due to the inability in Hungarian language of the author's thesis. Fortunately, the official website of the

Hungarian government<sup>3</sup> is providing the premier's speeches in English language. It is crucial for the Prime Minister to communicate with his supporters directly in order to gain popularity, which resulted to his victory in the latest election of 2014.

In order to analysis the Prime Minister's speech, discourse analysis is suitable for analysis as discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se. Thus, discourse analysis is a study on the messages or purposes embedded in texts, documents, conversation, or concrete things like monuments or statue (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). However, this thesis will not study the speeches of the Hungarian premier in terms of linguistic study, but social and political context. Thus, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the best approach from discourse analysis study because CDA is not interested in investigating a linguistic unit but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach (Wodak & Meyer, Ibid).

According to Teun A. Van Dijk (1993), CDA is a study on social power abuse, dominance, and social inequality under a social and political context. It is an approach to study and analyse the relation between society and dominated group of a society, which refers to the elites or institutions of such society. In other word, it is the study of how elites or institution control or use their power within the society with discourses. There are two levels of CDA: macro and micro levels. Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the micro level of the social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro level of analysis (Van Dijk, 2001). In the context of macro level of CDA, social power of an institution or a group will control social discourse through laws, rules, norms or habits, for example. Thus, those who control most influential discourse have more chances to control minds, actions and power of the society. Regarding this, anybody who makes speeches, texts, or communications to the society mostly will be able to control the discourse of the society, and, possibly, control the society.

Thus, politicians in today politics are able to control the discourses in their society because they have to usually speak to the public or implement policies in order to gain support. Their purposes of communication, according to CDA concept, are under discursive study, which

---

<sup>3</sup> <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches>

aims at purpose study of messages. Also, CDA will try to study how messages will affect to the society under the “preferred” context (Van Dijk, 1993, 2001); that is the recipients of each message will interpret the message in their own interpretation. Thus, in order to control the society, discourse speakers must think of the message the majority of the society will respond into the same way, and that requires a proper message in a proper context, which the majority of the society understand in the same direction. As the thesis focus on the application of historical memory for political interest and will look at historical reference in the speeches of Prime Minister Orbán, historical event he will refer or mention to must be public memory or major events of the past which the whole society knows or remembers.

### **Chapter 3: A historical background**

In order to understand Hungary nowadays it requires more understanding in the concept of nationalism, national ideology and identity, which exist behind each major event. Modern history of Hungary is inundated with the emotion of freedom spirit, which had been aroused by revolutions for independence and the failures of revolutionaries. Due to the country’s location in between Western and Eastern Europe, the lives of Magyars had been shaped, controlled, and managed by superpower from both sides, from the Habsburg to the Tsar, from the Allied power to the Allies and Nazi Germany before the domination of Soviet Union. Currently, the European Union is the latest international actor coming to shape the future of this country. As a result of history, nationalism is still the core of the nation, which can be proved by the movement of extreme right group like JOBBIK and its connection with centre-right party like FIDESZ.

#### Pre-1848: the formation of nationalism

In the sixteenth century onward, central Hungarian state was occupied by Ottoman Turks, dividing the country into two parts: one belonged to the Habsburg in the West and the eastern parts in Transylvania. There were also buffer states between the two camps, where majority of the population was Magyars. This separation had developed nationalist ideas into two concepts as well: The west would assimilate itself with the Habsburg rule and became a type of conservatism which aimed to maintain the relation with the Habsburg, whereas in the east the

ideology of patriotism played a crucial role for nationalism to set Hungarians free from the Turks (Széky, 2014). When the Turks were forced out of the area, Hungarians were united with Austria. It was followed by Hungarian movement for independence soon. The first Hungarian nationalism under the Habsburg was noticeable in the struggle of Imre Thököly, leader of anti-Habsburg uprising, and Prince Rákóczi of Transylvania, in the seventeenth century, plus the Protestant spiritual movement which bore the first literary fruits of the Magyar language (Vambery, 1944).

### 1848 Revolution and its aftermath

The French revolution of 1789 and 1848 boosted Magyar nationalism as well as the reform of the Hungarian language in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The trend of revolution in 1848 was the most crucial for Hungarian movement in this century; as revolutions was waving across Europe, from Paris to Vienna, and from there to Budapest, the ideology of liberalism shaped the ideas of nationalists and revolutionaries (Molnár, 2001: 183; Vambery, Ibid). Hungarian scholars and politicians began the revolution in order to establish independent Hungary. This time it was led by Lajos Kossuth, the leader of the revolution with a slogan “the fatherland is in danger”, which ignited the fire of patriotism among Hungarians. At first, it was a peaceful revolution with the establishment of autonomy within Hungarian territories; the revolutionaries had tried to legitimate their plan. However, in November of the same year the war between Hungary and Austria was broke out.

In the beginning of the war campaign, it seemed that Hungarian army was able to handle the situation, but the cause of war was changed by the Russian Empire. Russian army invaded the east of Hungary, resulting to the caught between Habsburg and Russian troops. Hungarian diplomats failed to persuade international supports from the Western powers like the United Kingdom, France, or the United States. As a result, Hungarian army was defeated by the Russians and the revolution was failed. It would not be the last time the struggle for sovereignty of Hungary was shattered by the Russians and ignored by the West (Molnár, Ibid: 197 - 199). The Russians would return again in the twentieth century, depriving the sovereignty of Hungarians for the second time. The other factor that led to the loss in this revolution was the distrust of revolution leaders in other national minorities, such as Slovenian or Czech and Croat

people, which resulted to the lack of supports and troops to fight against the combination between Austrian and Russian troops (Vambéry, Ibid).

### 1867 – 1914: The year of compromise and dualist system

Despite the failure of revolution and the suffering loss in the war for independence, Hungarians were still able to maintain their status in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a major national along with the Austrians. In order to ease the tension between the two, Hungarian thinkers and politicians paved the way for compromise with the Habsburg Empire. Both parties reached the agreement in 1867, which established the dualist system between the two countries in one empire: Both Austria and Hungary had their parliaments, which were able to manage domestic affairs, but for foreign, monetary and military affairs must be under the command of the Habsburg in Vienna. This period was called a peaceful time for both societies (Molnár, Ibid: 208; Székely, 2014). Meanwhile, the compromise gave a new start for Hungarian nationalism. Francis Deák, who was the instrumental in this compromise, realised that Hungarian nationalism could not survive without granting autonomy to the minorities, which formed the majority of population in Austro-Hungarian Empire, because without nationalism of other minorities Hungarians could not stand against the Habsburg; the failure of 1848 Revolution was a result of the lack of support from other nationalities, and the sense of nationalism might be fade away if all nationalities allowed the Austrian ruler to control in terms of culture and legality. He thus tried to suggest cultural autonomy law to minorities, but was refused by public opinion of Hungarian community due to the idea of superiority above other minorities (Vambéry, Ibid).

Actually, during the dualist system Hungary became one half of a middle-ranking European power. The country also gained more territories; for example, Transylvania, where some Hungarians lived there. The economy got stronger, though the ruling system was undemocratic due to six-per cent right voters. It was not a surprise for the sense of superiority above other nationalities, except Austrian, within Hungarian community. The period also experienced the atmosphere of a liberal and capitalist success story as other minorities, especially Jewish people, were able to assimilate into the society. Unfortunately, the tension of Europe politics led to the broke of the First World War and Hungary had to join the campaign with Austria.

### The First World War and Independence from Austria

Hungary had to join the war campaign with Austria without a choice, but the result of the war opened the opportunity for Hungary to split from the Habsburg. By 1918, it was clear that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was losing the war. As a result, Charles the IV of Hungary (Charles I of Austria), whose reign came after the death of Francis Joseph in 1916, declared the transformation of Austria into a federation in order to save his reign and his country. This encouraged the Hungarian parliament to declare the separation from Austria. The independence from Austria by late 1918 came with emotional mixture between joyful and disappointment; for Eastern part of the country, where Calvinists were strong, Hungarian were celebrating the first independence in many hundred years. On the other hand, there were people who disappointed with the situation; they missed the “good old day” of Hungary under the Habsburg. An economic research found that the dualism during 1867 – 1918 was favourable to modernisation and growth of economy (Molnár, Ibid: 242 - 246). Unfortunately, it was inevitable for the country to avoid the consequence of the First World War as a part of originators of the campaign.

The separation of Austro-Hungarian Empire might be what Hungary was waiting for such a long time, but there was also a huge price to pay. The nationalism of Hungary and the Hungarian status could stand because of the pillar by the Habsburg. Without this pillar, Hungarian nation on its own could not face the Western power (Vambery, 1944). And by late 1918 under the presidency of Mihaly Karolyi, the country gave way to the second Bolshevik dictatorship in the world, but even that could not survive the political and military pressure of the Entente. Besides, there was a small civil war in 1919 between communism and aristocrat with the intervention from the Romanian Army, who supported a former military leader Austro-Hungarian Empire, Miklós Horthy. The victory of the Romanian troops opened the gate for Horthy to power in Hungary. He ruled the country as the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary without king and his power was absolutism. The national system that emerged during his prime maintained the feudal symbols of the past, and large estates survived within the restricted borders of the country, but a multi-party parliament still operated (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003).



### Hungary under the Trianon Treaty

The separation from Austria left Hungary to counter its fate alone during the peace conference in 1920, where Hungarian representatives failed to make any negotiation and were forced to accept the Peace Treaty of Trianon, which resulted as the loss of two-third of Hungarian territories to successor states of former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Széky, 2014). The size of the country then was deteriorated to be roughly like the present Hungary. The loss of territories through the Trianon Treaty and millions of ethnic Hungarians laid the foundations for the anti-socialist and anti-liberal system consolidating its power in a kingdom without a king to follow a policy demanding the revision of the newly established national borders

The loss of territories did not only affect the country, but also Hungarians who lived in those losing areas. They became minorities by a day. Today Hungarian minorities in Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic are the children of those Hungarians. It was also the end of Historical Hungary with the loss of those territories and the end of the monarchical rule. This loss spurred another wave of nationalism. The elites of Hungarian society blamed liberal side and Jewish people as the principal of this national disaster, whereas the traditionalism of Hungarian society was raised as an uncontested value (Széky, 2014).

From 1920 – 1944, under the Regent Miklós Horthy, former naval admiral of Austro-Hungarian Empire, the concept of “Greater Hungary” was revived to arouse national feeling among Hungarians; the concept was changed from civic imagination into violence and raised the emotion of ethnocentrism among Hungarians and Hungarian authorities which later went against minorities in Hungary, including Jews (Segal, 2014), but it was the desire to recover territories lost under the Trianon Treaty, not anti-Semitism, that led him to side with Hitler and because his attempt to negotiate with Western powers, particularly Great Britain and France, to reclaim those lost territories was ignored (Tartakoff, 2012).

Actually, the generation which lived through the Trianon Treaty could not cope with this destruction of their historical traditions; they yearned for the continuation of statehood and economic integration, and the irredentist demand for territorial revision enjoyed unanimous support. Later, the foreign policy of Horthy's regime drifted towards Italian and German fascism,

which was seen as the only hope of breaking the restrictions imposed by the Little Entente. (Vambery, Ibid).

Therefore, the promise from Adolf Hitler, the leader of Nazi Germany, to Horthy that he would be able to tack back those territories to Hungary was the reason of Hungarian decision prior to the Second World War. The result of the war proved that Horthy's decision to seek ally with Hitler was a huge mistake, but there was a real hope that this ally would bring back the historical Hungary; between 1938 and 1941, Hungary regained some lost territories back with the help of Nazi army. However, this resulted to the subordination to German foreign policy, which Hungarian troops joined the campaign of the war, including the invasion to Soviet territories (Jeszenszky, 2006). Then, when Soviet army turned the tide of the battle, the situation was changed. Horthy later was hesitate about extending the cooperation with Hitler and finally decided to withdraw the agreement between the two countries. This led to the German invasion in Hungary in 1944. The whole country was turned into battles between the German and Soviet armies. Budapest was ruined by bombardment. By late 1944, Soviet troops liberated the country, but Hungary since then could not be an independent state again for almost 50 years.

### After the Second World War

The result of the Second World War had been terrible for Hungary than the First World War's. The country this time did not lose further territories, but what it lost was higher: its sovereignty. Despite the first free election in 1945, the country was forcefully handed itself to communism. Stalin insisted on restoring the Trianon border, which meant Hungary again had to hand back those territories it received during the first stage of the war back (Széky, 2014). Again, the country's fate was decided by superpowers from both the East and the West. Kremlin had asked for its responsibility over Hungary and Eastern part of Europe, which the West granted. After the war, Hungary needed to rebuild the country from the ruin, but it was still able to hold an election and form a new government. Even with Soviet support, the Hungarian Communist Party was unable to win a swift electoral victory. A multi-party coalition government existed between 1945 and 1948, but the communists took possession of the key positions within the government; Moscow sent in people who called Muscovites, or Hungarian communists who were trained or taught in Soviet Union, to play political roles in Hungary. , As a result, elected government of

Hungary was forced to hand the ruling power to the communist party of Hungary in 1948, and one-party dictatorship of the proletariat was eventually instituted in Hungary as in other countries (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003).

Besides, Istvan Bibó in between 1945 and 1956 analysed historical developments in order to learn from a historic downfall. He blamed the social structure and the counter-selection of the elite, alienated and divided from the people. In searching for the causes of the revolution of 1956, the official ideology blamed the previous nationalism, which was anti-German, for the uprising. Jenő Szucs pointed out that national character is not eternal, but is a consequence of a given historical development. It doesn't explain anything in a nation's history, but national character itself needs explanation (Hunyady & Kiss, *Ibid*).

### 1956 Hungarian Uprising

The first ten years under the dominance of Soviet Union ended with another tragedy, but very heroism. The death of Stalin in 1953 led to de-Stalinisation in Eastern Europe. In 1956, there was a large protest in Hungary due to anti-Stalinist group and the situation in Poland, where the Polish dissidents were forced to be members of the Polish Communist Party. People in Budapest supported those dissidents by protesting the Soviet control on the streets of Budapest (Molnár, 2001: 311). The protest developed into a genuine nationalist and anti-communist revolutionary events (Ciobanu, 2010); not only in Budapest, where people fought against Soviet troops, but also around the country saw the same thing. This became the headlines of media around the globe; they praised what Hungarians were doing. There was a belief that this revolution might accomplish and the country would become independent. Imre Nagy as the interim Prime Minister announced the neutrality of Hungary and the resignation from the Warsaw Pact of the communist side (Molnár, 2001). This made Kremlin made the reaction with the decision to invade Hungary (Dienstag, 1996).

The dramatic events of 1956 were the outcome of several years of fermentation. They left two unforgettable memories with all those who lived them through and participated in them. The first was the feeling of unprecedented national unity on 23 October, when hundreds of thousands of people expressed their unanimous wish to break with Stalinism. The troubled and repeatedly reformed government of Imre Nagy followed events rather than directed them, and after initial

hesitation the government committed itself to political pluralism and national independence. With the Soviet military intervention, the second fundamental truth of 1956 emerged, one which was to become the determining political experience of a whole generation: the loneliness and defencelessness of a country, being entirely on its own, the knowledge that despite their reassurances, declarations of solidarity, and real humanitarian intentions, not one other country was prepared to help Hungary (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003).

The invasion on November 4, 1956, gave an abrupt end to the national revolution; even though Hungarians succeeded in expelling the Soviet troops and the communist government during the first phase of the revolution, the full deployment of soldiers and tanks of Soviet Union trashed their hope of independence. They tried to fight back, but failed. It was not the first failure of Hungarians for independence, but this was very recent in its long history and pain from this memory still exists in present Hungary.

#### After 1956 toward the democratic transition

After the repression of the anti-communist revolution in 1956, the mechanism for legitimating the communist system adopted by Janos Kadar was to avoid a similar revolutionary explosion and ensure passive consent. Janos Kadar became the head of a new puppet government. In the name of the so called "two-front struggle", he prevented a second return of the Stalinist Rakosi from Soviet exile, but he also cooperated in the arrest, trial and execution of Imre Nagy. After 1960s, nationalised heavy industry was preserved and expanded, but the rigidity of the centrally planned economy was relaxed, the independence of companies increased, and foreign trade relationships were opened up. Hungary became the most open country in the Soviet block to the international flow of information (Hunyady & Kiss, Ibid). Kadar was quick to transform his role from oppressor of the revolution into a reformer (Ciobanu, 2010). His famous 1961 declaration "Whoever is not against us is with us!" was an open invitation for reconciliation and compromise. He introduced a degree of cultural liberalism and opened the economy towards the West (Molnár, 2001: 330).

During 1960s - 1970s, the Bolshevik totalitarianism was engaged with national traditions. Thus, nationalism itself appeared even before the democratic change in East Europe. Part of this nationalist turn was the revival of nineteenth century mythology, the upgrading of the importance

of independent statehood, the undervaluation of neighbouring nations and minorities, and the use of the totalitarian means to extinguish these minorities. By the time, Hungary on 15 March, the day for remembering the civic revolution of 1848, was not an officially recognised holiday. Discussing the problems of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries remained a taboo for decades. It was a form of resistance of the intellectuals to express solidarity toward these Hungarian minorities. In the 1980s the value of national independence and democracy were connected to each other (Hunyady & Kiss, *Ibid*).

The Democratic movement returned to the country in by early 1980s, especially among scholars and writers. The country had gradually changed throughout 1980s; reformist factions finally defeated Kadar and the moderate Karoly Grosz succeeded to the leadership of the party in 1988. In 1989, Imre Pozsgay interpreted the 1956 revolt as a popular uprising, which led to an extraordinary meeting in which members of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) agreed to introduce a multi-party system (Dienstag, 1996). It is significant also that the final demise of the regime was deeply affected by the symbolism of the 1956 revolution. It was the commemoration of this event that attracted street demonstrations, protests from civil society groups and the refusal of hardliners to acknowledge its revolutionary importance that determined the Central Committee to take radical decisions in favour of reform at its meeting in February 1989. Fortunately, the Soviet Union faced an economic crisis and the Soviet Empire was split gradually from 1989. As a result of the mass demonstrations commemorating the 1956 and 1848 revolutions, the communist party decided to make actual concessions to the opposition at the roundtable (Yankova, 2008). Meanwhile, the parliament of Hungary and Hungarians repeated the act for independence by asking Soviet troops to withdraw from Hungarian territories and the parliament announced the first free election since 1945 and turned the country to the hand of democracy.

Hungary was the first country in the region to start changing, but the significance of Hungary's pioneering role soon decreased. During the transition, the values of independence were stressed, and traditionally national values were revitalised in the reestablishment of national symbols. Regarding national days, the foundation of the Hungarian state and the revolutions of 1948 and 1956 have become celebrated as a means of expressing historical continuity (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003).

### Post-communist era

In 1990, there was the first free election since 1945 and the first democratic government was elected. The communist party disappeared, but came under the new form as the Socialist Party (MSZP), whereas there were other parties coming for the election, whether FIDESZ or the Young Democrats, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and Christian Democrats. In the first election, MDF received the victory and formed the government with Christian Democrats and FIDESZ. József Antall became the first Prime Minister of the third republic of Hungary. In general, the development of democratic polity of Hungary was going well; liberal democracy was under progress characterized by a multiparty system, free elections, representational government, a strong opposition, and free media with credible institutions that protected the rule of law and independent courts. The politics has developed into two poles between the left of socialist and liberal parties and the right of conservative and nationalist parties (Palonen, 2009). During the two decades after 1989, incumbent governments had lost every election (with the exception of 2006), the media criticized politicians heavily, democracy was consolidated; and in 2004, Hungary joined the European Union. There was a conclusion that prior to 2010 Hungarian democracy is a successful story of democratic consolidation (Bozóki, 2011). The crisis of democratic era began in 2006 with the lying speech of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the Prime Minister from the Socialist Party, MSZP, who confessed that he lied about the country's economic figure, leading to street protests and the movement of the centre-right and extreme right groups. Since then, the right groups have gained stronger support toward the victory in the 2010 election of FIDESZ party and the appearance of extreme right group like JOBBIK, which has brought concerns to the EU due to its extreme nationalist policies to protect the sovereignty of Hungary and protest against the European integration. Currently, the government of FIDESZ party and Prime Minister Orbán are taking charge of the country with the majority in the parliament. The adoption of new Fundamental Law in 2011 has given absolute power to the government and there are more concerns that Hungary might be a problem of anti-integration despite its full EU-member status. The nationalist policies of the current government and the movement of extreme right groups will be the major focus of the country during these years and there is no sign that the opposition or other forces can make a change to the current situation, which leads to the propose

of EU intervention to its member state's domestic affair. This is the story to be continued in the years to come.

## **Chapter 4: Literature Review**

### Concept of political legitimacy

At first, the definition and concept of political legitimacy will be discussed to make it clear in the meaning and the usage of its concept for this research in the case of Hungary. There are several scholars discussing the political legitimacy; for example, Fabienne Peter (2014) states that political legitimacy is a virtue of political institution and of the decisions – about laws, policies, and candidates for political office – made within them, whereas Thomas Fossen (2013) refers to it as the right of political authority to rule over citizens and territory. Legitimacy can be related to morality as well according to Buckley who points out that legitimacy of a regime can be accepted by citizens based on the morality in a certain context of the society (Buckley, 2013).

Jürgen Habermas states that legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to be recognised, which need good arguments for a claim of political order to be recognised as right and just (in Gaus, 2011). According to Habermas, orders in this sense are from political regimes, and they must be recognised by citizens of a regime as "correct" orders, which, in other word, mean they must be acceptable. However, the acceptance of each society is different due to specific factors of each one, such as historical development, cultures, and geography; thus, the "virtue" of institutions and decisions of each political regime within a particular realm will be different: if members of a particular society accept a political order, the order, according to Peter's definition, would be interpreted as the representation of 'virtue' by the political regime of such society by its members. The virtue, or the legitimacy in this sense, requires 'reason' or 'explanation' members of a political order view it as acceptable, which Barker (In Gaus, *ibid*) states that political actors will make an explanation or a claim of legitimacy. Thus, political actors are central of the claim for political legitimacy.

A main question over political legitimacy is the measurement of legitimacy of a regime. Max Weber's theory of legitimacy has been the standard to make the measurement; he classifies the source of legitimacy into three categories: the tradition of society, the charisma of leaders,

and the legality (In Couto, 2010). However, Mattei Dogan (2009) argues that the first two sources are scarcely applicable to the present global politics, which means Weber's typology of legitimacy sources is anachronism. This is because the idea of Weber in traditional legitimacy is mainly based on monarchical rules, whereas leaders with charisma today are unclear due to the majority of democratic regimes in the world. Thus, the legality of the law is likely to be the only applicable proposal from Weber's theory in today politics.

Apart from the legality, Mark Pittaway (2004) and Morris (2008) argues that social norms can be the measurement of legitimacy; Pittaway refers to David Beethem that legitimate power can be discerned if the exercise of power conforms to rules that are established legally or socially, while Mark Philip argues that the concept of legitimacy intricately connected with the value in political domain of a society (In Sigwart, 2013). A government must act accordingly to the society's demand or desire. Thus, people within the society will be a factor to legitimate status of a political regime. It is the relation between citizens and government, in which Danial Gaus (2011) argues that legitimacy refers to the beliefs of individuals in the rightness of political order. In a democratic system, this belief conforms to the election of a country. Buck (2012) argues that in democratic system citizens are the effective source of political authority to be legitimate as citizens elect the government according to the rule of law. However, it is not just an election for a democratic regime to be legitimate. The political performance of the regime is a factor to the loss or gain of legitimacy as well.

In the case of Hungary, despite a low democratic performance measured by democratic watchdogs (Ágh, 2013; FH, 2013), the government of FIDESZ party is thus far successful in politics. It has recently gained the majority in the parliament from the 2014 election once again. The election is the legitimacy according to the democratic system because the people approve the right to rule the power of a regime. Thus, according to this measurement, the current government of Hungary is legitimate. The main question is how it is able to gain this legitimacy despite many accusations of ill-liberal democratic practice.

#### Previous studies on political legitimacy of Hungary

This research will focus on the impact of historical memories since 1989 or the transition from communism to democracy of Hungary. From reviewing the literature on political legitimacy in



Hungary related to historical memories, it appears that historical memories had been represented and interpreted by political actors with an intention to make changes in politics, whether political reform or political campaigns to criticise political opponents. The first case is the situation of 1989; Joshua Dienstag (1996) examines the “Pozgay Affair” which is a clear example of the relation between political legitimacy and historical memory in Hungarian politics. In 1989, Imre Pozgay as the Minister of State of Hungary mentioned the 1956 event, where Hungarian people spurred an uprising against the communist regime and soviet troops with an aim to be independent from the Soviet Bloc. The event was officially called by the regime after 1956 as “counter-revolution”, but Pozgay called it as “popular uprising” which raised the question of the true meaning of the uprising. Dienstag states that the political legitimacy of the communist government of Hungary is to present itself as the true representative of Hungarians. If the communist government was behind the suppression of the 1956 uprising, which according to Pozgay was a popular or “people” uprising, then the communist regime is not the representative of Hungarians, but Soviet domination. The Pozgay Affair had threatened the legitimacy of the communist regime, which later led to a multi-party system, the first free election, and the end of communism in Hungary in 1990.

Monica Ciobanu (2010) studied the communist regimes of Eastern Europe prior to the transition of 1989 that the communist regimes claimed their right to rule through a combination of traditional and rational-legal forms of institutional practice and normative. The discussion of the relationship between serious problems of legitimacy and the collapse of communism in Hungary was reformulated because the elites of Hungarian society had lost its confidence in the regime and decided to withdraw their support for it. During the transition, the communist political authorities in Eastern Europe failed in establishing rational-legal forms of legitimacy based on formal rational bureaucratic administration. They allowed an increase in popular dissatisfaction that had taken open forms of social protest, which came as the form of 1956 commemoration. The de-legitimation of East European regimes was also affected by on-going criticism and subversive of dissident activities by segments of the intelligentsia.

Gregana Yankova (2008) studied the impact of historical memory during the transition period from communism to democracy of Hungary and Soviet Union. She refers to the Pozgay affair as a new interpretation of the 1956 protests, which expressed the feeling and thought of Hungarians to the regime. Thus, the regime that forcefully crushed the uprising was therefore

illegitimate, which regarding the Pozgay affair led to the transition of the political system between 1989 and 1990. Moreover, she suggests that history is an instrument for political actors to make impacts on political atmosphere, and there are only political actors who are able to recollect historical memory according to actor-oriented theories in her research.

In 2006, there were large protests against the socialist government in Hungary. Andreas Pribersky (2008) studied the protest and found that both the government and the main opposition party of Hungary had competed in interpreting and presenting national history in order to gain political legitimacy. The protests in the year were also related to the 1956 Revolution; they began on October 23, the same day the revolution began fifty years ago; it was not only to refer to the past, but also for delegitimising the current government as the opposition party had tried to link the socialist government with the communist regime of prior 1989. The key bridge between the 1956 and 2006 protests was the outcry against lying as an instrument of acquiring and legitimising political power: the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe have been seen as lying governments about the countries' conditions and history. There were battles for memory-politics between the government and the opposition party; the 1956 Revolution was the core message of the protests in order to delegitimise the government as the heir of the communist regime, which was illegitimate for the suppression of the 1956 Uprising. Meanwhile, Ferenc Gyurcsány, the Prime Minister from MSZP government party, had tried to legitimise himself by referring his political heritage to be akin to Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister in 1956 and the representative of Hungarians during the Revolution.

The common issue each study related together is the 1956 Revolution. The meaning of this event had made impacts to both the end of the communist regime between 1989 and 1990 and the protest in 2006. The democratic transition was mainly driven by the commemoration of the event and the studies on this transition clear show the importance of historical memory and political legitimacy of Hungarian communist regime. As for the 2006 protests, the study of Pribersky presents a clear picture of the battle for political legitimacy through historical memory between the then socialist government and centre-right opposition party, which was led by FIDESZ Party, the current ruling party of the government.

Udi Lebel study political movement in Israel by using historical memory for political purposes; he points out that national memory are not social institutions that formed spontaneously, democratically or pluralistically, but rational projects featuring power

relationships, shaped by actors promoting political interests through it and legitimising their preferential social status and political dominance. He also indicates that the application of the memory-screening strategies is needed to make the public memory and public historiography controllable resources and to exclude political rivals from the national pantheon. Also, it is necessary to supervise national historiography, including history textbooks and commemorative literature (Lebel, 2009). Besides, he refers to previous studies on public memory; for example, James Young (1993) who wrote that 'Memory is not formed in a vacuum', in the introduction to his book, "The Texture of Memory," and that 'the motives of memory are never pure'. It means that historical memory can be represented for a purpose, and if it is repeated by political actors, it is highly possible to be for political interest.

Another recent obvious example of political movement related to historical memory in Hungary in the protests of 2006. According to the article by Pribersky (Ibid), he proposes that the movement of the demonstration in 2006 led by the opposition had been spurred by the remembrance of the 1956 Revolution; he mentions the term "memory politics" as an instrument of public mobilisation; for example, the radical right group during the protest in 2006 mentioned Hungarian history in terms of distortion, falsification, and misuse of it by the communist regime before 1989 and tried to link this regime to the 2006 socialist government. This is an attempt to raise social and political movement by memories of Hungarian society, which is a political tool for the opposition party and the radical right group to fight against the 2006 government. Anna Tota (2006) proposes that a public memory can add a specific focus on the relation with the public sphere, and the capacity of memory work to intervene and affect the public discourse of a nation. Thus, public memory is an instrument for political actors to make a change on public discourse which is able to make a political move within a society. This can work if the members such society have experienced the memory together or have been related to the memory. It leads to "collective memory", which, according to Pribersky, fastens distinct political and social groups to the same history, historic places, and archives. Collective memory of the groups will eventually lead to common identities or collective identities of such society.

According to Pavlaković (2013), the selection of particular dates and events which are commemorated, in other words, the construction of a national calendar provides significant insight into how a state seeks to define its past. He refers to the words by Serbian sociologist Todor Kuljic', "the calendar is, therefore, a symbolic manifestation of invented history."

Therefore, national holidays related to historical events are an elemental construction of a country's memories, especially if they are anniversaries of major historical events. They can help the country form its identity through historical memories, and the study on public and national holidays can help scholars understand better about the country they are studying as well.

The work of Khazanov and Payne (2008) might be a good summarisation about historical memory; they state that collective or historical memories are in fact constructions, very often fabrications, by elites, whether of states, political interests or the media. Not surprisingly, scholars will tend to dismiss them as, at best, myths. In addition, the legitimacy of the emerging democratic order becomes stronger if the new political elite have genuine democratic credentials at the highest level. Political regimes are created, supported and changed not by blind political forces but by human beings responsible for their actions and inactions. Also, the incidents of the twentieth century are not distant far enough for the atrocities, crimes, and repressions of this century to be forgotten or forgiven. And there is also a danger that this past may be revised and manipulated by partisan political forces.

To conclude, regarding all relevant literature above, historical memory is a memory of a nation or a society which has been constructed and represented by influential factions of the country or the society with purpose. This purpose might be for nationalism or for political interest in a crucial moment like general election or political transition. The memory will be selected carefully and it must be an event which once caused or generated a massive impact to the whole society or nation. Thus, it seems historical memory mentioned in a particular moment will not coincidentally appear, and it is likely that this kind of memory can be often a political tool in the game of political power. In the next section, the paper will discuss how historical memory becomes a political tool for political actors in Hungary.

### Cultural Trauma

A historical memory can be a collective or common memory of a society. In the case of Hungary, the 1956 Revolution is obviously a historical memory with an impact to politics. Not only the 1956, the revolution of 1848 has been also commemorated each year on March 15, whereas the events after the First World War, like the Trianon Treaty, and during the Second World War, like the deportation of Hungarian Jews, have been the issues to politics from time to

time. The recent historical events of Hungary were related to wars, revolutions, and the loss of territories. They were negative experiences of the country, but also have been repeated by political actors since 1989, especially during a political conflict. The negative feeling has been transformed into political movements which press the regime to make changes depending on the situation. In order to understand this process, the paper will adapt the theory of cultural trauma to explain the use of historical memory by political actors for political interest with an assumption that the public memory of Hungarian society is comprised of traumatically historical memories. With the memory of trauma in history, Hungarian political actors are able to repeat it again when they are in need of political interest.

Alexander et al (InTota, Ibid) investigates the relation between memory, identity, and public discourse to find the formation of collective identities; their model explores the mark of permanent memories and identities of the collectivity of a society. It is assumable that a negative experience or controversial issue will mark itself inside the memory of a society as Alexander argues (Alexander et al, 2004: 1) that, “cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.”

As for the definition, trauma is a collective memory, a form of remembrance that grounds the identity-formation of a people. As cultural process, trauma is mediated through various forms of representation and linked to the reformation of collective identity and the reworking of collective memory. Cultural trauma refers to a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved some degree of cohesion. Its traumatic meaning must be established and accepted, process which requires time, as well as mediation and representation (Eyerman, 2001). Besides, trauma doesn't naturally exist, but it is socially constructed (Tota, Ibid).

According to social change theories, Piotr (Sztompka (2000)) explains the concept of trauma as an event with negative, dysfunctional, and adverse effects to the society, becoming a trauma of change which inflicts on the society. He refers to the trauma as an impact on the cultural tissue of a society, which makes changes within such society and appears as an aftermath of a negative event or incident. This trauma will become a cultural phenomenon, which is in need of an interpretation of the meaning that caused the trauma. Cultural trauma can be

preserved in collective memory of a society; it will gain salience when there is any conducive circumstance occurring, which can cause a movement among members of a society to commemorate it negatively or positively. There are many cases that can become a trauma for a society, such as wars, revolutions, genocide, assassination of political leaders, collapse of the market, etc.

A trauma can become a cultural trauma through the trauma process, which is the process of representation of a horrendous event of a society; a carrier group of the negative memory will project the trauma claim to the public. A process must deal with the nature of the pain, the nature of the victim, the relation of the victim to the wider audience, and the attribution of responsibility. There are six arenas a trauma will be produced: religious, aesthetic, legal, scientific, mass media, and state bureaucracy. Through this process, the collective memories and the national identities will be affected (Tota, Ibid). And such collective memory will function to create social solidarity in the present because it is a recollection of a shared past, retained by members of a group that experienced the past event. Such event will be interpreted from the perspective of the group depending on its need and interest (Eyerman, Ibid). Thus, in terms of a political group, political interest will be the centre of interpretation of a past event. In the case of Hungary, the right-wing group of 2006 or the reformer of 1989 had interpreted the 1956 Revolution and represented its new interpretation to the public with the objective of political interest for the group. Their strategy was viable because the event was a negative experience of being suppressed and suffered by a large group of Hungarian society, which has been passed on as a historical memory among Hungarians till the present. This memory is also a relation between the political power and the subjects which caused movements and changes in political regimes.

In the case of Hungary, there are some researches discussing national trauma of the past. For example, Marta Erdos (2010) studies the legacy of state socialism in Hungary; one legacy is the memory of 1956 which she states in her article that the 1956 Revolution is a trauma which had been kept in silence after the year by the communist regime led by Janos Kadar. He needed to reformulate the society and prevent the uprising, so he produced a statement, “he who is not against us is with us” in order to compromise the atmosphere in the then Hungarian society after the uprising. According to her article, it is clear that the 1956 is a national trauma of Hungary, but during the communist regime it was necessary for the government to deflect the memory by

constructing discursive messages to cover it up and prevent another chaos for the regime and the society. The other example is the work of Jeszenszky (2006) who observed that there has been a persistent perception about the lives of Hungarian minorities, whose lives were the result of the Trianon Treaty after the end of the First World War. The perception had been perceived since 1970s. However, after the revolution of 1956 the discussion about Hungarian minorities was seen as a taboo because the government tried to prevent any nationalist ideology among Hungarians. The perception of Hungarian minorities came to life again by Hungarian intellectuals, such as István Bibó in 1978 who mentioned the lives of Hungarian minorities in Hungary's neighbours. The concern of Hungarian diaspora has been spoken openly again after the transition to democracy, and FIDESZ government has captured the point of this issue by claiming the day of national unity through the Treaty of Trianon, which was announced by the Prime Minister himself, as well as the approval of citizenships to Hungarian diaspora in other states (Bozóki, 2011).

This thesis believes that cultural trauma is a good reason to understand why the government of Hungary selects historical memories and represents them as political dialogue in Prime Minister's speeches and texts in the constitution; it is because recent history of Hungary was comprised of tragedy and failure of revolutionaries, such as the 1848 and 1956 Revolution, especially the latter event in which Hungarians were suppressed heavily by the Soviet Union. In the next chapter, the thesis will try to prove this argument as well as answer the research questions of the thesis.

## **Chapter 5: History as a political tool for legitimacy of FIDESZ and Prime Minister Orbán**

Everywhere has history and history lies everywhere. One question here: How will people remember history, especially the one that is far distant from the present? The answer might be the representation of history. Then, who will represent history? According to Lebel (2009), Pavlaković (2013), and Khazanov and Payne (2008), historical memory is represented by influential actors of a society with a purpose, and historical memories are intentionally constructed. Certainly, historical memories or historical events really occurred, but their details and meaning will be reinterpreted by the society under the representation of events or memories by the actors. Thus, chosen historical memories to the public will directly or indirectly manifest

the purposes of spoken actors. In this analysis part, the thesis will try to examine texts and messages in order to extract the purposes by using the theory of cultural trauma, the concept of political legitimacy and critical discourse analysis.

### 1) Historical memories in the constitution

The new constitution or the Fundamental Law of Hungary cited in this thesis is extracted from the official translation by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, which is published via the Hungarian government's website on April 16, 2013<sup>4</sup>. This section will try to analyse historical reference in the constitution with a discussion with researches studying on it. The thesis found that the law emphasises the foundation of Hungarian state, the commemoration of major historical events: 1848, 1956, and the foundation date of Hungarian state, and the legacy of communist regime and its crimes against Hungarian people. The section will present each part as follow:

#### The foundation of the country

Religion has become one important message in the Fundamental Law of 2011 of Hungary. Christianity and Saint Stephen are mentioned in the preamble of the new constitution as the foundation of the country,

We are proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago... We recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the various religious traditions of our country.

This statement is not only reminding the beginning of the state of Hungary thousand years ago, but it also intentionally links Hungary to Europe, but there is the remark that it is "Christian Europe," which is likely to be the old Europe as this "Christian Europe" reminds of religious

---

<sup>4</sup> The law can be downloaded at: <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-public-administration-and-justice>



state, not secular states Europe is today. Besides, the holy crown of Saint Stephen is also mentioned,

We honour the achievements of our historical constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary's statehood and the unity of the nation.

Here the constitution refers to the 'historical constitution' and the Holy Crown. The latter is the Crown of Saint Stephen, the founding father of Hungarian nation in 1000 A.D., which is promoted as the source of the continuity of Hungarian nation and the unity of the nation. As the historical constitution, it is possible to refer to the Golden Bull of 1222, the law issued by King Andrew II of Hungary; it was about the rights of nobility in the state of Hungary and also limited the power of the king in the same way that Magna Charta of England in 1215. The Golden Bull thus was one of the first constitutional documents in European continent, which granted more rights to nobility, and became later the foundation of present constitutions.

Christianity, Saint Stephen, and the Holy Crown are the key words to remind of the foundation of Hungary, re-establishing the concept of where Hungarians were from. According to Halmai (2012), the constitution characterises the nation referred to as the subject of the constitution as a Christian community, narrowing even further the range of people able to recognise themselves as belonging to it. The intentional discursive message in this part of law is to stamp that, 'Hungary is a Christian country and Hungarians are Christians,' using historical foundation to stand the value of the whole society.

Laura Ymayo Tartakoff (2012) refers to the opinion of Viktor Szigetvári, chief of staff to PM Gordon Bajnai in 2009 and campaigns director of the Hungarian Socialist Party during the parliamentary and municipal elections of 2006 and 2010, who said, "There is, politically speaking, in the new constitution too much taking care of our historical past. This is not in agreement with my values. However, it's legitimate." He did not disagree with this preamble as said that it was legitimate to him, but it was also historical. Thus, according to this constitution, Hungary under FIDESZ government is trying to promote Christian value and preserving Christian tradition of the country, and this attempt is likely to be legitimate via its historical foundation.

### The beginning of present Hungary

After the foundation of the country, the preamble states another born of present day Hungary by mentioning the 1956 event as the beginning of today Hungary,

We agree with the Members of the first free Parliament, which proclaimed as its first decision that our current liberty was born of our 1956 Revolution.

Despite the tragedy of the revolution, the constitution represents it in a positive outlook as the beginning of the liberty of Hungary. This is a new interpretation and representation of the event by drafters of the constitution because it is obvious that the 1956 Revolution ended with failure of revolutionaries and it is clearly a national trauma for Hungarians. The liberty of 1956 is different from the foundation by Saint Stephen, which gave birth to the nation, as the 1956, according to the law, is the year of freedom of Hungarians under communist rulers. In order to emphasise the liberation of the country, in the preamble it denies the legitimacy of the communist rulers,

We deny any statute of limitations for the inhuman crimes committed against the Hungarian nation and its citizens under the national socialist and the communist dictatorship. We do not recognise the communist constitution of 1949, since it was the basis for tyrannical rule; therefore we proclaim it to be invalid.

And in article U of this constitution states the detail of this revolution by mentioning the crime of communist dictatorship for suppressing the 1956 Revolution,

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and its legal predecessors and the other political organisations established to serve them in the spirit of communist ideology were criminal organisations, and their leaders have responsibility without statute of limitations for:...

h) suppressing with bloodshed, in cooperation with Soviet occupying forces, the Revolution and War of Independence, which broke out on 23 October 1956, the ensuing reign of terror and retaliation, and the forced flight of two hundred thousand Hungarian people from their native country;

This article mentions the communist regime as the criminal organisations and one of their crimes was the suppression of 1956 Revolution, or of the liberty of Hungarians according to the constitution. It is understandable for the definition of “criminal organisations,” aiming to emphasise that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSzMP) was the enemy of Hungarians and Hungarian liberty. Moreover, MSzMP after 1990 was divided into two successors; one of them is the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which became the government of Hungary between 2006 and 2010. As the successor of the criminal organisations, MSZP is likely to be pressed down by the constitution, though it didn’t directly mention MSZP. According to Pribersky (2008), FIDESZ had criticised MSZP before during the protests of 2006 as the legacy of the communist regime; thus, this constitution as the tool of FIDESZ is repeating the same discourse from 2006. It is likely that under this constitution, the chance for MSZP to return to the parliament as the majority or the ruling party is less due to the dominate discourse as the successor of the criminals of Hungary.

#### Commemoration of the past

In article J, it states the national holidays, which are all related to historical events of the past,

(1) The national holidays of Hungary are:

- a) the 15th day of March, in memory of the 1848–49 Revolution and War of Independence,
- b) the 20th day of August, in memory of the foundation of the State and King Saint Stephen the State Founder, and
- c) the 23rd day of October, in memory of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence.

Both 1848 and 1956 are mentioned in the same category as the revolution and war of independence, but there is a remark that 1848 is not as crucial as 1956 because in this constitution it is mentioned only one time. It appears that the constitution intends to refer to the communist era and the revolution of 1956. Thus, the law emphasises the memory of communist era as the time of terror and crimes against Hungarians and as the beginning of liberty of the present Hungary, whereas the revolution of 1848, though it is still important to be the national day and the commemoration, seems to be far more distant memory and less important for the present politics, especially for FIDESZ in preserving its ruling status and forming the image of MSZP as the successor of criminal communist rulers.

## 2) Historical reference in Orbán's speeches

The analysis of this section intends to 1) seek historical reference in the premier's speeches, 2) the context he is speaking and the relation between the context and his reference to history, and 3) examine the conformity of his reference to the reference of history in the Fundamental Law. 9 speeches have been examined and analysed; they were addressed in front of the public during the national holidays or national addresses and religious commemoration. As it has stated earlier, CDA will be the approach for this analysis.

The analysis will begin with his speech on the celebration of National Day on July 1, 2010. The core message he mentioned to the past is "freedom" and "independence" which came by "fight". These three words are related, referring to the struggle of the past. He didn't mention the years of struggles but he tried to repeat the "faith" or "spirit" of fight in Hungarians, despite the fact that there is no more war and Hungarians are now an independent state. Then, the reason he usually referred to "freedom" and "independence" is the present fight, which is likely to be international politics more than domestic politics because the domestic issues seem to be under control by his party.

"The Hungarian nation has also been created based on this credo, on strong faith, and this faith made us capable of offering protection in times when Europe required it. This strong faith helped our nation to get always back on its feet after devastating tragedies, crises,

and wars, and never, not even in the most depressing moments of our history let us give up our freedom and our independence.” (Orbán, 2010)

In this speech, he emphasised that the Hungarian nation had been through ‘tragedies,’ ‘cries,’ and ‘wars’ by strong faith. Because of this faith, the nation of Hungary survived and never gave up being free and independent. He also compared the fight for freedom of Hungarians to the Americans’.

“...since we had to fight so many times, even against large powers for our freedom and our independence. Just as the Americans we also have never given up, not even in periods it seemed hopeless for decades or even for centuries, regardless of how many attempts there has been to deprive the American and the Hungarian people of their freedom and of their faith in freedom.” (Orbán, Ibid)

Then, in 2011, he made the State of Nation Address on February 7 talking about the reborn of Hungarian nation:

“Renewal means that we will put Hungarian life back on its feet. We could also say that renewal is about being born again. A nation being born again... Born again is when a nation gathers its resources, national traditions, the valiant and successful moments of its history, the lessons learned from its failures and sufferings into one great gesture to shake itself, to stop drifting and to change the world around it.” (Orbán, 2011)

He did not directly mention the past events, but referred to the past failure and the need to revive the country from the failure. He mentioned to the great events like the French Revolution, the English Industrial Revolution, and the American Independence. Despite the successful stories of the three major historical events, he would like to emphasize that Hungary was able to rebound from the failure to be a greater nation like the three events by mentioning to “spirit” again.

“Yes, we know the wonderful manifestations of the Hungarian spirit, the thousand-year Christian state organization, the valiant protection of Europe, Rákóczi’s liberation

movement, the nation building by Széchenyi, the '48 and '56 revolutions, our world famous scientists, artists and athletes. The Hungarian spirit is what gave numerous new things to the world. After every historic tribulation, it was the strength of the Hungarian spirit that was able to put the country back on its feet.” (Orbán, Ibid)

He referred to this spirit and said there was no legal document writing about the spirit. Thus it is necessary to write it into the constitution of the country. The then Hungarian Constitution was written from 1989 and he said “it is not the work of the Hungarian spirit”, and that the present spirit of Hungarians came from the 1956 Revolution, which was not mentioned by the then constitution. Therefore, Hungary, according to PM, needed a new constitution with Hungarian spirit inside “that provides closure for the past and creates a final foundation, thereby secures the future of Hungary. This is how renewal will lead to being born again.” (Orbán, Ibid)

Thus, his address aimed to legitimate his government’s decision in drafting the new constitution by mentioning the Hungarian spirit, which was originated from the past, especially the 1956 Revolution.

“Hungarian life today is built on the foundations of the '56 revolution. Our constitution does not mention a single word about it. Hungary needs a new constitution that manifests the Hungarian spirit,” (Orbán, Ibid)

In total, he combined the idea of Hungarian spirit to the revolution of 1848 and 1956 as the liberation movement to rebuild the nation. Despite the failure of both revolutions, the spirit of fight of Hungarians didn’t end; it begins again and this time the nation has been reborn in the present day, but to be born again it needs to remind of the spirit. Here he clearly stated that the foundation of today Hungary is the 1956 revolution, and to remind this foundation it is necessary to talk about this year. That’s the reason why the new constitution is needed; to manifest the Hungarian spirit. Thus, the new constitution, or the Fundamental Law, is also the representative of the 1956 Revolution and Hungarian spirit, and he and his party, FIDESZ, as the adopters, can be seen as the representatives of Hungarians, not only of the present, but of the 1956 revolutionaries at the same time.

He still repeated the discourse of 1956 Revolution. On October 23, 2012, on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution, he again praised the event as “the fight for independence made the world a better place” with an attempt to link the communist regime with socialist government by saying that the communist regime repressed Hungarian democracy and those who fought on October 23 were the model of fighters for independence. The discourse of fighters for independence was mentioned too in the protests of 2006 against the socialist government, the event which his party was the leading opposition party in the parliament and led the protests.

“Every year, October 23 reminds us that the ambitions of those who put down the revolution and fight for independence have not disappeared from Hungarian public life. It is enough to recall the events of 23 October 2006: mounted police charges, teargas, iron bars and plastic bullets, followed by the decoration and rewarding of those who were at the forefront of the brutality. We would do well to keep this in mind.” (Orbán, 2012)

Meanwhile, he mentioned to the whole Europe under the direction of the European Union. He referred to Christianity and said without this religion, Europe had no soul. And he also implied that Europe was likely to rule and control Hungary again like what happened after the end of the Second World War with the Paris Treaties.

“Let us consider the fact that if in 1956, ten years after the Second World War, the signing of the Paris Peace Treaties and the Russian occupation, the Hungarian nation was capable of taking up arms to fight for its freedom then we, the Hungarians of today, should have no reason to doubt our own strength.” (Orbán, Ibid)

Then, he mentioned the 1956 Revolution as the revolution for freedom; he mentioned the Trianon Treaty, in which Hungary was separated by the agreement of European powers to point out that today now Hungary can stand on its feet and Europe has no right to take control Hungary and Hungarians again, and the crisis of Eurozone can't harm Hungary if all citizens here believe in their hearts and faith in the country.

“Yes, ninety years after the Treaty of Trianon we were able to give hundreds of thousands of Hungarians back their nationality through cross-border consolidation of the nation.” (Orbán, Ibid)

Thus, in this speech he tried to conceptualise that Hungary had been under control of external forces, whether Western Europe or the Soviet Union. It is the time not to repeat that experiences again. It is the reason for him to mention the Trianon Treaty, which resulted to the separation of Historical Hungary after the First World War. In this context, he wanted to protect Hungarian sovereignty and economy from the outside force, so he mentioned the trauma of the past to remind Hungarians not to go back, but believe in today power of the country and themselves. However, he as the Prime Minister seemed to convince people to believe in him and follow his and his party’s path as well.

During the national address in 2013, he mentioned the mistake of the communist regime of making the country’s economy down by borrowing foreign funds. He promised that Hungary will not repeat the same mistake again. Moreover, he linked the crisis of economy of Hungary to Europe and said the turning point was in 2010, when his party was elected as ruling party in the parliament. This is an attempt to present the leading role and the righteousness of his FIDESZ in leading the country with legitimacy because his party and his term is the new route of Hungary and the country will unite to move forward again after the failure for almost 20 years after the transition to democracy. At the same time, he also criticised the socialist government, which he usually mentioned as the children of communist regime; this is likely to be his intention to prevent the return to power of the Socialist Party and maintain his power as the government.

“What our great-grandparents built was swept away by World War II and the peace system. What our grandparents and parents built was swept away by the incompetent economic policies of the Communist system, which lured us into a debt trap and confined the entire country to a caged existence. The failure of Socialism took its toll on the economy even if Hungary was a reservation in the Eastern part of Europe which seemed to be an unsteady mixture of a forced labour camp and a trade union holiday resort. And finally, what we constructed after the change of political system until 2002 collapsed between 2002 and 2010. If we think of our nerve-endings, corroded by historical life



experiences and much like the worn-out brakes of a bicycle, over fifty percent satisfaction in a quality-of-life survey is not so bad after all.” (Orbán, 2013b)

“...We will never again commit the mistake of the Kádár administration and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party; we will never finance welfare expenditure by taking on loans, foreign loans. ... The underlying reason for the collapse of the Hungarian economy in 2008 was that after 2002, the Socialists broke this historical agreement.” (Orbán, Ibid)

He mentioned the foreign invasions and external factors to the change of the country. In this sense, he implies to the EU in coming to control the economic policies of the country and he seems to convey a message that he will not allow the EU to rule over the country’s policies, especially in economic policies. He wants to guarantee this in front of Hungarians to confirm the strength of the country and the unity of Hungarians. Why he did so? It seems he wants to stand in front of the citizens to prove the strength of his government and raise nationalism, which is the main ideology supporting this government.

The confirmation of the legitimacy of the new Fundamental Law was mentioned again during the speech on Memorial Day of the Victims of Communism.

“Our task today is to build a country in which no one can be discriminated against because of their gender, origin, religion, political views and national or linguistic affiliations. This is why we have created a new Fundamental Law that assures more rights than ever before and declares the inviolability of human dignity, the rights to freedom and personal safety and the protection of property.” (Orbán, 2013a)

He mentioned the brutality and the suppression of freedom during communist era, and the acts by the communist regime was to destroy human dignity and freedom of Hungarians. Thus, in this new era, the country needs to establish and reassure those two things. It is the reason why the country needs new supreme law to guarantee better lives of Hungarians (Orbán, 2013a).

Christian value and Saint Stephen have been promoted as written in the constitution. Moreover, the speech to mark the Saint Stephen Memorial Year also raised the unity of the Hungarian nation through Christianity,

“When Stephen was chosen as monarch, the federation of Hungarian tribes was in a state of disintegration and the Hungarian tribes were at war with each other while pieces of the territory we had already occupied were being slowly bitten away by the neighbouring Czech, Polish and German princes and kings. We imagine a divided association of tribes which is being weakened from within and under constant attack from neighbouring states, and which is continuously losing its power, its territories and its internal strength. Saint Stephen, looking forward well beyond the problems of everyday life, his political struggles and petty bickering, began by taking the lead and thus saving his homeland and its people from disintegration.” (Orbán, 2013c)

Thus, Saint Stephen prevented the Hungarian nation from the disintegration, and he is also the representative of Christian value in the society. In other word, Christianity is the guard of Hungarian nation and the key of unity of the Hungarian nation. He again emphasises the importance of Christianity on March 4, 2014,

“In our view, Christian culture is the guiding force of Hungarian history. We aren't European on account of geographical reasons; we are European because we are Christians, and we are guided by the firm belief that we can only build a strong and successful Hungary on these traditions, on these national, Christian and European traditions.” (Orbán, 2014a)

At this point, he seemed to criticise Europe for lacking the value of Christianity and this can be interesting that he did not welcome to join with Europe that lacks of Christian value,

“Yet Europe today needs a simultaneous combination of courageous resolve, common sense and the uplifting of hearts. Europe should recognise that without nations it has no

heart, and without Christianity it has no soul. A special thank you to the Peace March, which made a stand for this vision of a European Hungary.” (Orbán, 2012)

He directly mentioned MSZP, or the Socialist Party, as the communists in his state of the Nation Address in 2014,

“The communists came back to power, or rather the socialists, along with their sidecar liberals. They came back to power and by 2010 they had brought the country to ruin. Financial collapse, an economic nosedive, dwindling pensions and salaries, an IMF lifeline and a whole country on life support”

He mentions the mistake of the Socialist regime and its failure; this time he goes through economic issue. Besides, the liberal parties which become allies with the Socialist Party are mentioned in the same category of the Socialist as the opponent or the enemy of his party and Hungarians. He also goes further that,

“We can safely say that if anything, this is certainly a true revolution and a true regime change. Hungary has become rejuvenated both in soul and in spirit. This is no longer the country it was four years ago... We have won many battles, but we have yet to win the war. What has happened is simply that instead of retreating, we have begun to fight back.” (Orbán, 2014b)

What ‘war’ he means here is the war against multinational corporations and foreign banks, which he criticises as the enemy of Hungary. In general, this speech is about economic issues, which needs a protection from foreign corporations, but in order to link his economic policies he mentions the mistake of the Socialist Party (MSZP) for bringing the country into an economic ruin with foreign debts. This also links to international relations with the European Union about the sovereignty of Hungary and economic issue.

On March 15, 2014, now he spoke a lot about the 1848 Revolution; he put details of the liberators and the movement by a girl from Pest in 1972 which led to the resistance against the communist regime again since 1956.

“On 15 March 1848, once the Youths of March had ... finished printing the National Song and the Twelve Points ... they went home to have lunch. In the afternoon, in the pouring rain, the upstanding citizens of Pest gathered once again here, on these very steps. And this is the 165th time we have celebrated their courage ... The historians are also searching for the answer to who planted the bulbs of freedom in the humus of the Hungarian people and when. They recorded the fact that in 1972, in the middle of the communist oppression, a girl from Pest braided a ribbon bearing the colours of the national flag into her hair and walked out to 15 March Square with a violet in her hand. Nobody knows who that girl was. They sang the National Anthem and the Kossuth Song, and that was the beginning of the resistance against the Soviet tyranny... It is interesting that our heroes are often not the victors, and in fact at first glance may seem to be the losers. They were defeated, beaten back, exiled and executed. But regardless, in some form it is nevertheless they who rewrote the book of fate. What was written in the book of fate in 1848 was that there is nothing we can do against the Habsburg Empire. And if the people of the time had accepted this, then that fate would have come to pass and the Hungarians would have been engulfed by the German ocean.” (Orbán, 2014c)

This time he accepts that the revolutionaries of 1848 were the losers, but the point is that those revolutionaries didn't accept their fate. They fought on, and because of the fight Hungarians have today. Then, he also mentioned the unity of the nation. According to Bozóki (2011), Orbán once in 2012 said that the day the Treaty of Trianon was in effect was also the day of national unity. This time he didn't mention the treaty but telling his audience that to strengthen the country the country needs unity: “And today, the name of unity is 6 April (Orbán, 2014c),” which was actually the day of general election of 2014.

He reminds of the past not for depriving his nation, but to repeat the Hungarians not to go back to the communists, or in this context, the Socialist. And at the same time, he recalls the past of 1956 and 1848 for the spirit of freedom fighter.

To conclude, his public discourse surrounds the word of spirit, freedom, fighters, unity, Christianity, communists, and revolutions of 1956. The communist legacy and the 1956 revolution were mentioned to attack the communists and its successor, MSZP, whereas he used

other words to confirm the stability and the future of present Hungary as well as the need for the new Fundamental Law, which has become the strong foundation for the power of his government. Also, he tried to convince Hungarians not to be under the rule of foreign powers again, which in this context is the EU and foreign companies. The political messages of Viktor Orbán are likely to arouse confidence of Hungarians in their nation and in his government. He tried to turn the emotion of tragic moments of the country, especially the 1956 Revolution, into the sign of country's uprising in the present against national burdens from the inside and outside. Meanwhile, the texts in the constitution try to set a new foundation of the country by referring the past and, in the same time, to remind Hungarians about the struggles of the past. However, the texts can't present emotion or the sense of national trauma like people, whereas the speeches of Orbán, despite many references to the failures of Hungarian struggles, are not a remembrance of pain or trauma; instead, they are more nationalism awakening. Besides, as a political actor he is the producer of this historical discourse, which means he uses historical memories for the interest of his own and his party.

## **Chapter 6: Conclusion**

This thesis has tried to observe that how historical memories have been used by the current government of Hungary by arguing that the memories are a tool for political interest, especially legitimacy of the government, with cultural trauma as the theory for analysing the texts in the constitution of Hungary and speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán.

The thesis found that that 1956 Revolution and communist terror are the major reference of the past four years of FIDESZ and the Prime Minister. The 1956 is not mentioned as a tragedy or trauma. On the other hand, it is mentioned as the beginning of the present Hungary; the liberty of the nation and the spirit of Hungarians as a new representation of history of Hungary. This spirit is referred to as the key for drafting the new Fundamental Law as Orbán tried to convince his audience that the previous constitution of 1989 didn't mention anything about the spirit. He used this revolution to back up the legitimacy of his government in drafting the new constitution, which has given a similar-dictatorial power to his government. Meanwhile, he attacked opposition party like the Socialist Party (MSZP) several times by calling the party as the

communists. It is clear that he tried to link the communist regime to MSZP; this is an attempt to prevent the return of MSZP in election and politics of the country.

Apart from the 1956, he mentioned Christian value and criticised Europe without this value as non-true Europe. Meanwhile, he talked about the Treaty of Trianon and the 1848 Revolution as the experience of external forces controlling Hungary. In other words, he is trying to expel the influence of the European Union and it seems that he rather disagree with the European integration by saying that Europe doesn't have the value of Christianity. Meanwhile, he proclaimed the unity of the nation through historical experiences, especially prior the election of 2014.

Thus, history has become a tool for Viktor Orbán and his government in making himself and his party legitimate in drafting the supreme law, whereas attacking his opponent. Also, he uses history to guard the national property and sovereignty from the EU's influence. With the constitution as his back up, it is likely that FIDESZ government will be able to rule the country longer, bringing more worries to Europe and pro-liberals democracy in Hungary.

However, it is unfortunate for the thesis to find any crossing with the theory of cultural trauma. This is because the Prime Minister and the constitution are producers of the messages, which according to Pavlaković (2013) and Khazanov and Payne (2008) they should be selected carefully by the premier and the drafters of the Fundamental Law. It can state that the government select those memories to refer to in the constitution and in the speeches because they were once tragedies of the nation; certainly, 1848 and 1956 Revolutions were the failures of Hungarian revolutionaries, but others like Saint Stephen or Christianity were not. Besides, the representation of historical memories from the sources this thesis examine is for arousing nationalism atmosphere and stance to fight against national burdens, not for remembering the past with sorrow or tragic emotion. In order to measure the impact of cultural trauma, it might be better useful of the theory of cultural trauma with Hungarian responses to the speech of Prime Minister and the details of the constitution. Due to the limitation of time in writing this thesis, the author could not run for the responses. In addition, the language burden is the most major problem the author has encountered in finding sources.

Thus, the thesis can only conclude that it is certain for the utilisation of historical memory in political discourse of Hungarian constitution and Prime Minister, which aims to make both the constitution and the government legitimate, whether by attacking the socialist opposition party or

giving chauvinist political messages to the public like unity, liberty, or freedom. However, it is unable to prove clearly that cultural trauma has a massive impact to the selection of historical memories as it lacks of reaction from Hungarians.

### Suggestion for further research

The major research that should be done further from this project is the survey on the perception of Hungarians toward historical discourse presented by FIDESZ government and the constitution. It is really crucial to prove whether cultural trauma affects to Hungarians or not, which will help this thesis to be better complete. Next is comparative studies between the current Fundamental Law and the previous constitution of 1989, which is a reform version of 1949, would be interesting case in order to see the texts inside both supreme laws and comparing what messages they intend to state, especially the context of historical references. It is certain that the new Fundamental Law of 2011 states about historical memories of 1848 and 1956, but what is about the constitution of 1989. Another suggestion is other policies relevant to history by FIDESZ government, especially those relevant to the Treaty of Trianon. This thesis has found a little mentions of the treaty, but as Nora Berend (2014) wrote in *History Today* that the current Hungarian government has established its own historical research institute, Veritas, which is keen to erect a state commemoration of the German Invasion of Hungary on 19<sup>th</sup> March 1944. The FIDESZ party is trying to manipulate history by connecting to the interwar authoritarian regime of Admiral Miklós Horthy. So, what is the reason behind this move or what the government will gain from this move which is actually causing objections from Jewish community as Horthy was accused of Jewish deportation during the Second World War.

### **Bibliography**

- Ágh, A. (2013). The triple crisis in Hungary: The "Backsliding" of Hungarian Democracy after Twenty Years. *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, 13(1), 27-51.
- Alexander, J. C., Eyerman, R., Giesen, B., Smelser, N. J., & Sztompka, P. (2004). *Cultural trauma and collective identity*. Univ of California Press.
- Bartel, R. D. (1989). In Search of Legitimacy (Vol. 32, pp. 10): M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- Berend, N. (2014). Magyar Myth Makers. *History Today*, 64(3), 3-4.

- Bozóki, A. (2011). Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary. *Debatte*, 19(3), 649-663. doi: 10.1080/0965156X.2012.703415
- Buck, R. M. (2012). Democratic Legitimacy: The Limits of Instrumentalist Accounts. *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 46(2), 223-236. doi: 10.1007/s10790-012-9336-y
- Buckley, M. (2013). The Priority of Legitimacy in Times of Political Transition. *Human Rights Review*, 14(4), 327-345. doi: 10.1007/s12142-013-0276-0
- Ciobanu, M. (2010). Communist regimes, legitimacy and the transition to democracy in eastern Europe. *Nationalities Papers*, 38(1), 3-21.
- Couto, R. A. (2010). The Politics of Terrorism: Power, Legitimacy, and Violence. *Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary & Transcultural Journal for New Thought, Research, & Praxis*, 6(1), 63-81.
- Dalos, G., Haraszi, Miklós, Konrád, György, and Rajk, László (2012). The decline of democracy – the rise of dictatorship. Retrieved 30 April, 2014, from <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-01-25-rajk-en.html>
- Dienstag, J. F. (1996). "The Pozsgay Affair": Historical Memory and Political Legitimacy. *History and Memory*, 51-66.
- Dogan, M. (2009). Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories. *International Social Science Journal*, 60(196), 195-210. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01722.x
- Erdos, M. B. (2010). CHA (LLE) NGE. The legacy of state socialism in Hungary: A discourse analysis. *Europolis, Journal Of Political Science And Theory*(4 (1), 73-99.
- Eyerman, R. (2001). *Cultural trauma : slavery and the formation of African American identity / Ron Eyerman*: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- FH. (2013). Nations in Transit 2013: Authoritarian Aggression and the Pressures of Austerity: Freedom House.
- Fossen, T. (2013). Taking Stances, Contesting Commitments: Political Legitimacy and the Pragmatic Turn. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 21(4), 426-450.
- Gaus, D. (2011). The Dynamics of Legitimation: Why the Study of Political Legitimacy Needs More Realism. *RECON Online Working Paper Series*(15), 1-16.
- Halmai, G. (2012). Toward an illiberal democracy. Retrieved May 2, 2014, from <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-01-25-halmai-en.html>
- Hunyady, G., & Kiss, P. (2003). Nation, State and National Identity in Modern Hungary. *REPRESENTATIONS OF EUROPE AND THE NATION IN CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEMBER-STATES: MEDIA, ELITES AND CIVIL SOCIETY*, 171.
- Jeszszky, G. (2006). The Afterlife of the Treaty of Trianon. *Hungarian Quarterly*, 47(184), 101-111.
- Khazanov, A. M., & Payne, S. G. (2008). How to Deal with the Past? *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions*, 9(2/3), 411-431. doi: 10.1080/14690760802094909
- Lebel, U. (2009). Exile from national identity: memory exclusion as political. *National Identities*, 11(3), 241-262. doi: 10.1080/14608940903081150
- Molnár, M. (2001). *A concise history of Hungary / Miklós Molnár ; translated by Anna Magyar*: Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001.
- Morris, C. (2008). State Legitimacy and Social Order. In J. Kühnelt (Ed.), *Political Legitimization without Morality?* : Dordrecht : Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
- Orbán, V. (2010). Speech of Viktor Orbán on the Celebration of National Day. Retrieved June 15, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/speech-of-viktor-orban-on-the-celebration-of-national-day>



- Orbán, V. (2011). Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation address. February 7, 2011. Retrieved June 15, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-address>
- Orbán, V. (2012). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech in Budapest on October 23. Retrieved June 18, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-in-budapest-on-october-23>
- Orbán, V. (2013a). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech on Memorial Day for the Victims of Communism. Retrieved June 20, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-on-memorial-day-for-the-victims-of-communism>
- Orbán, V. (2013b). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation Speech. Retrieved July 20, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-speech>
- Orbán, V. (2013c). Speech to mark the Saint Stephen Memorial Year. Retrieved August 1, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/speech-to-mark-the-saint-stephen-memorial-year>
- Orbán, V. (2014a). Christian Culture is the Guiding Force of Hungarian History. Retrieved August 1, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/christian-culture-is-the-guiding-force-of-hungarian-history>
- Orbán, V. (2014b). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation Address. Retrieved August 1, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-address>
- Orbán, V. (2014c). We are the Most Unified Country in Europe. Retrieved August 2, 2014, from <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/we-are-the-most-unified-country-in-europe>
- Palonen, E. (2009). Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62(2), 318-334.
- Pavlaković, V. (2013). Symbols and the culture of memory in Republika Srpska Krajina. *Nationalities Papers*, 41(6), 893-909. doi: 10.1080/00905992.2012.743511
- Peter, F. (2014). Political Legitimacy. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Spring 2014. Retrieved May 1, 2014, from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/legitimacy/>
- Pittaway, M. (2004). The Politics of Legitimacy and Hungary's Postwar Transition. *Contemporary European History*(4), 453. doi: 10.2307/20081232
- Pogány, I. (2013). The Crisis of Democracy in East Central Europe: The 'New Constitutionalism' in Hungary. *European Public Law*, 19(2), 341-367.
- Pribersky, A. (2008). The Fight for the National Legacy becomes a Fight for Political Legitimacy: Hungary 2006 as a (Central) European Example. *Politicka Misao: Croatian Political Science Review*, 45(5), 219-234.
- Segal, R. (2014). Beyond Holocaust Studies: rethinking the Holocaust in Hungary. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 16(1), 1-23.
- Sigwart, H.-J. (2013). The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism. *Review of Politics*, 75(3), 407-432.
- Székely, J. (2014). A tradition of nationalism: The case of Hungary. Retrieved 1 May 2014, from <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-04-11-szeky-en.html>

- Sztompka, P. (2000). Cultural Trauma The Other Face of Social Change. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 3(4), 449.
- Tartakoff, L. Y. (2012). Religion, Nationalism, History, and Politics in Hungary's New Constitution. *Society*, 49(4), 360-366. doi: 10.1007/s12115-012-9553-9
- Tota, A. L. (2006). PUBLIC MEMORY AND CULTURAL TRAUMA. *Javnost-The Public*, 13(3), 81-94.
- Vambery, R. (1944). Nationalism in Hungary. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 77-85.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & society*, 4(2), 249-283.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical discourse analysis. *The handbook of discourse analysis*, 352-371.
- Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2009). *Methods for critical discourse analysis*: Sage.
- Yankova, G. (2008). Can the Memory of a Historical Uprising Reduce Transitional Uncertainty?: A Comparative Study of Hungary and the Former Soviet Union. *Demokratizatsiya*, 16(2), 183-200.