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“The power of memory and the political dialogue in Greece;
The rise of radicalism”

by

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Abstract

This study explores the contexts in which the conflict evolved and how history was perceived, narrated and used by institutions, communities and individuals who sought to influence public opinion and policymakers. The theoretical point of departure is the concept of collective memory, defined as the totality of discourses through which a society makes sense of itself, the present and the future through the interpretation of the past. In the study of collective memory, the notions of narratives and uses of history have been employed, with the notion of boundary-work as a supplementing analytical tool. The material of the study is primarily drawn from parliamentary speeches, but also includes historiography. The study shows how the memory of World War II and Greek Civil War affects political discourse, how many references are and tries to analyze why this is happening or not. Particular attention is paid to the emergence of a narrative on war reparations from Germany. This happened in an age when traditional notions of national pride were being challenged by transnational history-cultural concerns about human rights and the notion of national guilt.

Key Words: Civil War, Golden Dawn, history, Independent Greeks, KKE, memory, nationalism, Nazi Occupation, SYRIZA. Words: 19,417.

Abbreviations

DSE – (Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas), Democratic Army of Greece; communist guerrilla 1946-1950.

EAM – (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo), National Liberation Front; leftwing national resistance organisation 1941-1945.

EC (European Commission)

ECB- (European Central Bank)

EFSF (European Financial Stability Fund)

ELAS – (Ellinikos Laïkos Apeleftherotikos Stratos), Greek Popular Liberation Army; the armed wing of EAM.

EU (European Union)

IMF- (International Monetary Fund)

KKE – (Kommounistiko Komma tis Elladas), Communist Party of Greece.

ND – (Nea Dimokratia), New Democracy (centre-right).

PASOK – (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima), Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (centre left)

SYRIZA – (Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis Aristeras), Coalition of the Radical Left.

Contents**1. Introduction**

1.1. Aim and research questions.....6

1.2. The political and ideological context of SYRIZA, KKE, Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn.....7

2. Historical background

2.1. Nazi Occupation of Greece.....12

2.2. Civil War.....15

3. Memory framework.....17

4. Methodological considerations.....24

5. Data Analysis**5.1. Contemporary Germany/Occupation discourse**

5.1.1. The Left- Left comparison.....26

5.1.2. Rightwing approaches.....32

5.1.3. Left- Right comparison.....36

5.1.4. War's compensations discourse.....38

5.1.5. Civil War: Golden Dawn against Left and vice versa.....40

6. Conclusion and future studies.....45

7. Bibliography.....46

1. Introduction

1.1. Aim and research question

The main task of this paper is to examine the relation between collective memory and political discourse in Greece. With other words, how collective memory of World War II and Greek Civil War affects nowadays political discourse in Greece. The main idea is to follow the political debates about the causes of the current economic situation and to focus on the political rhetoric that is being used by various parties to depict the EU. This means to underline how the political parties are depicting the EU throughout the last 2 years, when the crisis deepened. Also to try to explain how the different political choices influenced the development of political society in different ways after 2010 and the signing of memorandum with troika. The time frame was not chosen randomly. Moreover, 2012 is taken as a starting point, that is when the general elections of May and June 2012 were held. Further, 2013 is the year that the strife between the pro-EU and anti-EU parties reached zenith. Another aspect that will be taken into consideration is the rise of political extremes and the political action of an openly neo-Nazi party in the Parliament. Nationalism has gained momentum after years of financial instability, and in most European countries extreme-right parties are now represented in either local, regional or national assemblies. This paper will also endeavour to shed some light on why these things happened so soon after the Euro currency was introduced.

In the case of Greece, the trauma of the occupation of Greece by the Axis Powers (Greek: Η Κατοχή, I Katochi, meaning "The Occupation") began in April 1941 and affected the political discourse in the coming decades. However after 2010 the impact of WWII trauma dominates the political dialogue, because of the use of a rhetoric that opposes austerity measures and identifies contemporary Germany with Nazi Germany. Stereotypes dominate the discussions and the image of Greece in the European media makes anti-German syndrome in Greece even worse. The power of memory dictates the discourse and the populist parties like Independent Greeks and far-right Golden Dawn expect to have election profits by adopting such a rhetoric. German atrocities during Second World War such as the Massacres of Kalavryta and Distomo are being used in order to persuade the electoral that Germany is to be blamed for the devastations Greece is still facing. Also there are formed accusations such as: "Quislings" or dosilogoι (δωσίλογοι, traitors, and collaborators with the Nazis) against the governments which implemented the agreement with the troika of lenders (EU, ECB and IMF).

1.2. The political and ideological context of SYRIZA, KKE, Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn.

The economic crisis beginning in 2008 has drastically affected Europe. Governments have risen and fallen and economic depression remains still present and threatens the political and economic stability of certain European countries. A high percentage of the population in many EU countries –mostly the PIGS¹- has been traumatized by the widespread rise in unemployment, inequality and poverty. One of the noticed consequences of this crisis has been the rise of European radical left and right parties. The most dramatic example is of course Greece, where SYRIZA shot from 5 to 26 percent in 2012. The Greek SYRIZA remains the most successful example of a leftwing party exploiting the complete collapse of its social democratic competitor to present itself as a leftwing governing alternative.² The coalition comprises a broad array of groups (thirteen in total), including social democrats and green-left groups, as well as Maoist and euro-communists influenced by Gramsci³. Its political leader is Alexis Tsipras. The defining moment for the birth of SYRIZA came with the elections of 2004. Most of the participants of the leftwing space wished to form a common platform that could lead to a political alliance.⁴ This led to the formation of the Coalition of the Radical Left, in January 2004.⁵

In the general elections of October 2009, SYRIZA won 4.6% of the vote and 13 MPs. Some months later, in June 2010, the Ananeotiki ("Renewing Wing") of radical social democrats decided leaving SYRIZA. This reduced SYRIZA's parliamentary group to 9 MPs. The 4 MPs who left formed a new party, the Democratic Left⁶.

In the general elections of May 2012, the party polled over 16% and quadrupled its number of seats, becoming the main Opposition party of Greece. For the following elections of June 2012, SYRIZA registered as a single party instead of as a coalition.⁷ However, although SYRIZA increased its share of the vote to fewer than 27%, New Democracy polled 2.8% more than SYRIZA. With 71 seats, SYRIZA became the main Opposition party, facing a governing coalition of ND, PASOK, and the Democratic Left.

A Congress of SYRIZA was held in July 2013. Important outcomes included a decision in principle to dissolve the participating parties in SYRIZA in favor of a unitary party. Analyzing the international situation, the Congress comes to a conclusion that Europe is involved in the turmoil of the "global capitalist crisis" and

¹ Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain.

² <http://www.opendemocracy.net/luke-march/european-radical-left-and-international-economic-crisis-opportunity-wasted>, retrieved on 04-04-2014.

³ Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) Italian Marxist theoretician and philosopher.

⁴ Synaspismós press release, 17 December 2003

⁵ 15/01/2004 Article from the Greek language edition of the BBC

⁶ Democratic Left (Greek: Δημοκρατική Αριστερά - ΔΗΜ.ΑΡ., Dimokratiki Aristera, DIMAR) is a social-democratic political party in Greece.

⁷ Ενιάιο κόμμα ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ (SYRIZA a single party)" (in Greek). Ta Nea. 22 May 2012.

the euro currency is treated mainly as a vehicle of German policy, intensifying inequalities between countries and class disparities, and applied in European societies “Asian norms” in favor of capital. Thus SYRIZA members accuse politics of austerity and recession of disintegrating ties between European countries, reinforcing euroscepticism, anti-Europeanism, exacerbating nationalistic conflicts and facilitating the revival of fascism. It is also mentioned that:

“Imposed in Greece, with the dominant role of Germany in the European strategy, by the troika of the European Union, the IMF and the European Central Bank, hardest steps lead to large sections of people in humanitarian crisis.”⁸

According to SYRIZA party, national wealth, public goods and services placed under a privatization / divestiture, while at the same time:

“...Production collapses, tens of thousands of small and medium-sized businesses are closing, public services are dissolved, the welfare state increasingly limited, health, education, pension, and insurance removed large sections of the population. The civil party system, accountable for scandals and corruption, based on interlocking media and forces suppression, requires a peculiar state of emergency that violates any democratic legitimacy.”⁹

The only alternative that SYRIZA members see is the proposal of the Government of the left in the political field:

“That defines the new dividing social services and suggests an alternative way of social salvation, social, production and ecological reconstruction in the interests of large social majority.”¹⁰

On the other hand the Communist Party of Greece, (KKE) -faced a critical loss of its presentences from 8,48% to 4,50%¹¹- founded on 4 November 1918 as the Socialist Labour Party of Greece, it is the oldest party on the Greek political scene. KKE is currently trying to follow a purely Marxist-Leninist line; since its 18th Congress (February 2009) KKE has opened up a discussion within the members of the party on the future evolution of communism in the 21st century, with a particular emphasis being given on examining the causes of the collapse of the Socialist system in the former Soviet Union.

The Communist Party led by the revolutionary ideology of Marxism - Leninism. The 19th Congress of KKE in April 2013 defines as the primary and foremost goal of the party to conquer the revolutionary workers' power, the dictatorship of the proletariat,

⁸ http://www.syriza.gr/pdfs/politiki_apofasi_idrytikou_synedriou_syriza.pdf, retrieved on 04-04-2014.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ [http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/#{"cls":"main","params":{}}](http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/#{) and [http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html#{"cls":"main","params":{}}](http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html#{). retrieved on 04-04-2014.

socialist construction as immature stage of communist society.¹² Since its founding, the Communist Party is committed to the principle of proletarian internationalism:

“It defended the socialist construction in the USSR, in the other countries of Europe, Asia and Cuba. It participated in the Communist International, expressed his solidarity with the struggles of the global working class, the people who fought for national liberation, socialism. In critical and difficult stages of the race, was internationalist solidarity and support of the international communist and workers' movement. He fights for the reconstruction of the International Communist Movement, following the decline and crisis suffered and suffered until now, especially after the victory of the counterrevolution 1989-1991.”¹³

Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn are two relatively young rightwing parties located on the right of the political spectrum. Independent Greeks (Greek: Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες, *Anexartitoi Ellines*) are a Greek right-wing anti-austerity political party. The party was created by Panos Kammenos, a former MP of New Democracy party on 24 February 2012.¹⁴ Kammenos had been expelled from New Democracy parliamentary group after voting against Papademos coalition government in a vote of confidence. The founding declaration was presented on March 11.¹⁵

In terms of political beliefs, they stand against immigration and multiculturalism, they demand the repatriation of all illegal immigrants and the development of a Christian Orthodox oriented educational system.¹⁶ Economically, the party is focused on the rejection of the loan agreement between Greece, the EU and the IMF.¹⁷ Kammenos proclaimed also a “national awakening and uprising”, and supposed that Greece had fallen victim to an “international conspiracy”.¹⁸

Independent Greeks call for the protection of national sovereignty, for German war reparations, for cancelling the memorandum which it deems illegal, and for building Greece anew.¹⁹ The party has announced that they will initiate working so as to create a patriotic Democratic Front, whose aim would be to save “Greece from the neo-liberal avalanche.”²⁰

¹² <http://www.kke.gr/taytothta/> retrieved on 06-04-2014.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Ousted New Democracy MP starts own party", Ekathimerini, 24 February 2012

¹⁵ "Kammenos introduces Independent Greeks", Athens News, 11 March 2012

¹⁶ <http://anexartitioellines.gr/files/parousiasi.pdf>, retrieved on 06-04-2014.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ "Kammenos introduces Independent Greeks", Athens News, 11 March 2012.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ http://www.grreporter.info/en/independent_greeks_respond_scenarios_collapse_party_founding_congress/8461, retrieved on 06-04-2014.

Notis Marias²¹ said that it is necessary to establish a government of national salvation which should tackle the write-off of external debt, the cancellation of the Memorandum and loan contracts, the payment of German war reparations and the loan from Germany during the occupation at the expense of Greece, the announcement of an Exclusive Economic Zone and the punishment of those who violated the Constitution and laws related to memoranda and loan contracts.²²

The Popular Association – Golden Dawn (Greek: Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος – Χρυσή Αυγή, *Laikós Síndesmos - Chrysí Avgí*), is a far-right²³ political party in Greece. It is led by Nikolaos Michaloliakos. Scholars and media have described it as neo-Nazi²⁴ and fascist,²⁵ though the formation rejects these labels.²⁶ Members have

²¹ Notis Marias, born 1957, is shadow minister of Finance of Independent Greeks. He is Professor of European Union Institutions in the Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, University of Crete and he elected to the European Parliament with the 2014 European Elections.

²² The Independent Greeks party Conference.

²³ Gemenis, Kostas; Nezi, Roula (January 2012), *The 2011 Political Parties Expert Survey in Greece*, University of Twente, p. 4, “Interestingly, the placement of the extreme right *Chrysi Avgi* does not seem to be influenced by this bias, although this has more to do with the lack of variance in the data (32 out of 33 experts placed the party on 10)” – Repoussi, Maria; (2009), “Battles over the national past of Greeks: The Greek History Textbook Controversy 2006–2007”, *Geschichte für heute. Zeitschrift für historisch-politische Bildung* (1): 5. – Grumke, Tomas; (2003), “The transatlantic dimension of right-wing extremism”, *Human Rights Review* 4 (4): 56–72, doi:10.1007/s12142-003-1021-x, “On October 24, 1998 the Greek right-wing extremist organization *Chrysi Avgi* (“Golden Dawn”) was the host for the “5th European Youth Congress” in Thessaloniki.”

²⁴ Dalakoglou, Dimitris (2013), “Neo-Nazism and neoliberalism: A Few Comments on Violence in Athens at the Time of Crisis”, *WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society* 16(2). - Miliopoulos, Lazaros (2011), “Extremismus in Griechenland”, *Extremismus in den EU-Staaten* (in German) (VS Verlag): 154, doi:10.1007/978-3-531-92746-6_9, “...mit der seit 1993 als Partei anerkannten offen neonationalsozialistischen Gruppierung *Goldene Morgenröte (Chryssi Avgí, Χρυσή Αυγή)* kooperierte... [...cooperated with the openly neo-National Socialist group *Golden Dawn (Chryssi Avgí, Χρυσή Αυγή)*, which has been recognized as a party since 1993...]” - Davies, Peter; Jackson, Paul (2008), *The Far Right in Europe: An Encyclopedia*, Greenwood World Press, p. 173. - Chalk, Peter (2003), “Non-Military Security in the Wider Middle East”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26 (3): 197–214, doi:10.1080/10576100390211428, “Reflecting these perceptions has been a growing sub-culture of support for neo-Nazi hate groups such as *Troiseme Voie* in France, *Golden Dawn* in Greece, *Combat 18 (C18)* in the United Kingdom...” - Porat, Dina; Stauber, Roni (2002), *Antisemitism Worldwide 2000/1*, University of Nebraska Press, p. 123, “The neo-Nazi *Chryssi Avgí* (Golden Dawn) was the only far right group active in 2000. It was responsible for at least one antisemitic act and for attacks against left-wing targets.” – “Greek minister warns of neo-Nazi political threat”, *B92*, 31 March 2012. – “Ακροδεξιά απειλή για τη Δημοκρατία (Right-wing threat to Democracy)”, *Ethnos*, 31 March 2012” – “Migration woes take centre stage ahead of Greek election”, *The Sun Daily*, 4 April 2012. - Donadio, Rachel; Kitsantonis, Niki (6 May 2012), “Greek Voters Punish 2 Main Parties for Economic Collapse”, *New York Times*.

²⁵ Dalakoglou, Dimitris (2012), “Beyond Spontaneity: Crisis, Violence and Collective Action in Athens”, *CITY* 16 (5): 535–545, “The use of the terms extreme-Right, neo-Nazi and fascist as synonymous is on purpose. Historically in Greece the terms have been used alternatively in reference to the para-state apparatuses, but not only. (p: 542)” - Xenakis, Sappho (2012), “A New Dawn? Change and Continuity in Political Violence in Greece”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (3): 437–64, doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.633133, “...Nikolaos Michaloliakos, who in the early 1980s established the fascist far-right party *Chrysi Avgi* (“Golden Dawn”).” - Kravva, Vasiliki (2003), “The Construction of Otherness in Modern Greece”, *The Ethics of Anthropology: Debates and dilemmas* (Routledge): 169, “For example, during the summer of 2000 members of *Chryssi Avgi*, the most widespread fascist organization in Greece, destroyed part of the third cemetery in Athens...” - Smith, Helena (16 December 2011), “Rise of the Greek far right raises fears of further turmoil”, *The Guardian* (London).

expressed admiration of the former Greek leader Ioannis Metaxas²⁷, who ruled Greece from 1936 until 1941.²⁸ They have also made use of Nazi symbols, and have praised figures of Nazi Germany in the past. According to academic sources, the group is racist and xenophobic,²⁹ while the party's leader has openly identified it as nationalist and racist.³⁰

Michaloliakos began the foundations of what would become Golden Dawn in 1980. It first received widespread attention in 1991, and in 1993 registered as a political party. It temporarily ceased political operations in 2005. Golden Dawn held its sixth congress, in March 2007, where party officials announced the resumption of political activism. At local elections on 7 November 2010 Golden Dawn got 5.3% of the vote in the municipality of Athens, winning a seat at the City Council. In some neighborhoods with large immigrant communities it reached 20%.³¹

The party ran a campaign during the general elections of 2012 based on an anti-austerity rhetoric as well as posing the issues of unemployment and immigration which gained a large increase in support from the Greek electorate. It received 7% of the votes, enough for the party to enter the Hellenic Parliament for the first time with 21 seats. Following another general election in June, this was reduced to 18 seats. Following an investigation into the murder of Pavlos Fyssas³² in September 2013, Michaloliakos and other prominent Golden Dawn members were arrested and prosecuted with the accusation of forming a criminal/terrorist organization.³³

²⁶ *Greek far-right leader savors electoral success*, Reuters, 6 May 2012, "... the group — which denies it is neo-Nazi — one of the biggest winners in an election..."

²⁷ Ioannis Metaxas, has been Dictator of Greece from 1936-1941.

²⁸ Renee Maltezou (25 April 2012), "Greece: Secretive far-right party taps into Greeks' anger, fear", *AFP*, archived from the original on 27 June 2012, "Set up in 1992 and relaunched in 2007, the party admires Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas, who refused to surrender to the Axis powers in 1940. It calls itself nationalist and insists its logo is the ancient Greek meander symbolizing bravery and endless struggle." - Nikos Chasapopoulos (4 August 2012), "Next Door's Fuhrer, (In Greek). "Fascism is demonology. Fascism in Italy meant that behind him lies the state. We here in Greece believe in the nation, the national state. Besides Greek Metaxas, so Sir Oswald Mosley, leader of British Union of fascists, saluted the same way but fought the Germans?"

²⁹ Sitaropoulos, Nicholas (2004), "Equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin: the transposition in Greece of EU Directive 2000/43", *The International Journal of Human Rights* 8 (2): 123–58, doi:10.1080/1364298042000240834, "Clearly extreme racist groups are, inter alia, political groups such as *Chrysi Avgi* and *Elliniko Metopo*." - Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A., *Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece* (PDF), London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 16, "Firstly, there is a youth organization which is titled Golden Dawn (in Greek, *Chryssi Avgi*) and which is explicitly racist and xenophobic..."

³⁰ Greek far-right leader vows to 'take back' Istanbul, Izmir", *Today's Zaman*, 15 June 2012, retrieved 12 September 2012.

³¹ Kitsantonis, Niki (2010-12-01). "Attacks on Immigrants on the Rise in Greece". *New York Times*. Retrieved 2011-06-27.

³² Ibid.

³³ "Golden Dawn leader jailed ahead of Greek criminal trial". *The Guardian*. 3 October 2013. Retrieved 02-11-2013.

2. Historical background.

2.1. Nazi Occupation of Greece.

From April 1941 until October 1944, when Greece was liberated by the Allied Forces, almost all of the territory was under triple Occupation (German, Bulgarian and Italian). In the winter of 1942-1943, the German occupation authorities began the persecution of Greek Jews, who kept 28 affluent communities in the mainland and the island nation. In March 1943 the mass arrests of Jews and Greeks culminated then took place in the displacement camps abroad and mainly in Auschwitz, Poland. In some Israelite community, persecution continued even during the summer of 1944, ie a few months before the Liberation. In particular, the deportations from Corfu completed on 17 July 1944, while Rhodes and Kos a week later. Before the German invasion, the number of Greek Jews stood at about 77,400. After the Holocaust, the number had decreased and numbered about 10,225 people. This means that during the occupation as well as the concentration camps, more than 85% of the Jews were exterminated,³⁴ a figure that ranks Greece among European countries with more victims. Today, the total number of Jews living in the country does not exceed 5,000. Although as a percentage of the total population (approximately 7,000,000 in 1940) the Jews were only a small part, their economic power was clearly bigger.³⁵ This applies primarily to the city of Thessaloniki, where Jews have a long and special history, which dates back to the time of exit from the Iberian Peninsula in the late 15th century because of the then persecution by the Inquisition.³⁶ In April 1941, the city of Thessaloniki numbered 260,000 inhabitants, of whom about 56,000 were Jews.³⁷

With the first outbreaks of guerrilla resistance to German rule, and the ruthless German response, life in the countryside became precarious.³⁸ The infamous German

³⁴ For detailed data for Jewish Community, see Central Board of Jewish Communities, *The Holocaust of Greek Jews - Monuments and Memories*, Athens, 2006, pp. 22-23, (In Greek).

³⁵ Stavroulakis, *The Jews of Greece*, Talos, Athens, 1990, pp. 39-44, (In Greek).

³⁶ M. Franco, *Essai sur l'Histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman*, 1897, réédité par le Centre d'études Don Isaac Abravanel, Paris, 1980, pp. 41-42.

³⁷ E. Benbassa, "De Séville a Salonique: itinéraires séfarades" σε *Israël – De Moïse aux accords d'Oslo*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1998, p. 237.

³⁸ Massacre of Kalavryta , Dec. 13, 1943 . One of the darkest days of the Nazi - Fascist occupation . The Nazi occupiers in flames deliver the beautiful , historic town and kill all the male population of 14 years and above. 1,104 are innocent victims. Massacre of the village Kommeno of Arta , Of the 680 residents were massacred by 317 . 317 Of the 74 were children from 1 to 10 years . Slaughtered and the two priests of the village . 20 families were killed completely . They blew up and burned and 181 homes in the village.

Massacre of Viannou and Ierapetra , Crete , 1943 , 14 , 15 and 16 September , 5000 soldiers killed 325 men in Viannou and 126 in other villages at the district of Ierapetra. Following blasting with dynamite the houses and burn their villages.

Massacre of Distomo, Deceased people at Distomo reached 228 , of whom 117 women and 111 men , including 53 children under 16 years . The testimony of Representative of the International Red Cross George Wehrly who arrived in Distomo few days after talking for 600 deaths in the region. The head of the International Red Cross in Greece, Sture Linnér, in his book *The Odyssey* writes:

"The controller Greek Committee , Emil Sandstrom showed me a telegram he had just received : Germans slaughtered for three days the population of Distomo , in Delphi , and then burned the village. Possible survivors in need of immediate assistance. Distomo was within the limits of the area which , at that time , I was responsible to stoke food and medicines In every tree along the road for hundreds

massacres at Kalavryta, Kommeno and Distomo show that Nazi Occupation of Greece has been quite brutal.³⁹ The Office for War Criminals writes, in fact, that: “the destructive mania of the Germans was nothing but the curtain rise of a tragedy that would continue at an ever faster pace.”⁴⁰

Across Europe exiles and refugees returned to take power and policies were imposed from above. “The most striking case of all was Greece, where the British-backed royalist government actually fought with the left-wing EAM/ELAS in Athens in December 1944, crushing the main wartime resistance movement there.”⁴¹

From the very beginning of the occupation there was a violent upsurge in anti-monarchical sentiment. This was intense mainly because King George II was regarded as responsible both for the Metaxas dictatorship and the horrors of the subsequent occupation which was associated with a terrible famine. As Hagen Fleischer puts it very clearly:

“There were at the time two large categories of people capable of inspiring and activating the paralyzed majority and transforming the existing potential for action into a coherent resistance movement. The first group was composed of the nation’s traditional leaders, the politicians and the military caste; the other consisted of revolutionary and subversive elements of diverse ideological orientation. It would prove tragic for Greece that only those in the second category would undertake to fulfill their patriotic obligations.”⁴²

KKE took the lead in the resistance movement. A National Liberation Front (EAM), with its military arm (ELAS), was created, as well as a number of smaller, resistance groups, such as EDES. EAM, as the largest group, sought to monopolize the resistance struggle, and in the winter of 1943–4 civil strife broke out in the mountains between EAM and the much smaller EDES, in what has been called ‘the first round’

of feet, hung human bodies , with bayonets fixed , some of whom were still alive were the villagers who are punished in this way: were suspected of helping the rebels in the region , who attacked a force of SS . The smell was unbearable.” Black Book of occupation, available at http://library.antibaro.gr/text/History/1940/Mavri_Vivlos_Katochis.pdf (In Greek). retrieved on 15-04-2014.

³⁹ National Hellenic Office for War Criminals [Office National Hellénique des Criminels de Guerre], *The Atrocities of the Four Invaders of Greece: Germans, Italians, Bulgarians, Albanians* [Les Atrocités des Quatre Envahisseurs de la Grèce: Allemands, Italiens, Bulgares, Albanais] (Athens: [n.p.], 1946):devoted 70 pages to Germans, 46 to Italians, 45 to Bulgarians (and 27 to Albanians who were added to support the Government’s territorial claims to Northern Epirus). p.68 (Kalavryta: 12 December 1943, c.689 dead), p.64 (Kommeno: 16 August 1943, 317 dead); p.71 (Distomo: 10 June 1944, 282 dead in broader area), p.98, p.106 (Domenico: 16 February 1943, 105 houses destroyed, 115 dead plus 50 in surrounding area). - Constantine A. Doxiadis, *The Sacrifices of Greece in the Second World War*, Ministry for Reconstruction Publication Series, no.9, Athens: 1946, p.37 (In Greek).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.107-8.

⁴¹ Mazower, Mark: *Dark Continent* p.196-197.

⁴² “The National Liberation Front (EAM), 1941–1947: A Reassessment” in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley ed., *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 49.

of the Civil War.⁴³ Thanks to British intervention an uneasy peace was restored. None of the resistance groups could achieve total political and military control of the country, and it was clear that when the liberation came, the power struggle between the Communist-controlled EAM/ELAS and their opponents, republicans and loyalists, would be inevitable. Nevertheless, as Richard Clogg says: “the course of events in Greece was to be shaped...not so much by the internal balance of power as by the complex pattern of Great Power relations.”⁴⁴ The German forces began the retreat and evacuated Athens on 12 October, while a British advance force reached the city two days later. On 18 October George Papandreou⁴⁵ landed in Piraeus but, -as Lars Baerentzen and David H. Close state- “it was soon apparent that Papandreou’s government faced at least three outstanding problems: the need to satisfy the demand from the Left for power and revenge in a manner acceptable to the Right; the economic problem of creating a stable currency, and finding supplies to prevent deprivation and get production going; and finally the problem of disarming the guerrilla forces and creating a new national army.”⁴⁶

2.2. Civil War

The country was partitioned between what were in effect two systems of government, each with its own police and armed forces. That division and the demobilization of the guerrilla forces led to the battle for Athens, or Dekemvriana, the ‘second round’ of the Civil War. This second round was characterized by fierce fighting between Communist guerrillas and the British and Greek State forces that were at the disposal of the national government. The outcome of the battle was eventually determined by the immense superiority in men and materiel of the British. On 15 February 1945, in negotiations in the seaside village of Varkiza, the EAM representatives were forced to demobilize ELAS, to abandon their hope of participation in the government, and to accept responsibility for those individuals found guilty of common crimes. The elections of March 1946 were being boycotted by the Left, this led to a victory of the Right and Centre parties. Six months later a referendum, “which could not be regarded as a fair reflection of public opinion,” led to the return of king George II, who had left Greece with the German invasion in 1941.⁴⁷

⁴³ Ole L. Smith, “‘The First Round’—Civil War during the Occupation” in David H. Close ed., *The Greek Civil War, 1943–1950: Studies of Polarization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 58–71.

⁴⁴ Clogg, *Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 3, 29.

⁴⁵ George Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece 1944-1945 and 1963-1965.

⁴⁶ Lars Baerentzen and David H. Close “The British Defeat of EAM, 1944–5” in Close, *The Greek Civil War*, op. cit. n. 5, 81.

⁴⁷ Clogg, *Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 3, 30.

The defeat of EAM-ELAS in December 1944, and the ensuing demobilization of the guerrilla forces, marked the beginning of a 'white terror' campaign. It was 'a sort of miniature counter-revolution', as William H. McNeill wrote in 1947.⁴⁸ In order to restore its authority, the government built up an anti- communist state apparatus that, together with paramilitary rightist bands, became the agent of vengeance and terrorization against members of the resistance. In 1945 alone, 80,000 warrants were issued, 50,000 people were arrested, of whom 17,000 were in prison, most awaiting trial for political reasons.⁴⁹ Moreover, between February 1945 and February 1946, according to EAM sources, 1192 people were killed, 159 women raped, 6413 people injured, and 551 offices and printing shops raided.⁵⁰ The wave of 'white terror' came to support the persistence of the Communist Party on the 'revolutionary road', and the first leftist armed groups appeared in the countryside. The combination of political and military means used by the Communist Party and the recalcitrance of the government escalated the conflict, and the polarization led to a full-scale Civil War between 1947 and 1949.

In Clogg's words: "the elections exacerbated rather than resolved the continuing political crisis, and in the summer of 1946 Greece gradually drifted towards civil war" (the third, and decisive, round). With the support of Greece's communist neighbors, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, the Democratic Army, founded in the autumn of that year, was able to maintain an effective campaign of guerrilla warfare. The Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, set up in the mountains in December 1947, was not recognized by any of the Eastern countries. President Truman took up the challenge and proclaimed the Truman Doctrine under which the United States guaranteed support for governments threatened with armed (or communist) subversion. The massive flow of American military and economic aid began to turn the tide slowly against the Democratic Army. Internal dissension in the communist camp and disputes about Russia's role in Eastern Europe also undermined the Greek Communist Party (KKE). The Party sided with the Kremlin in its quarrel with Tito in 1948. Because of this the Yugoslav frontier was closed in 1949, and the Democratic Army was cut off from its main source of logistical support. In October 1949 Nikos Zakhariadis, the secretary general of the KKE, announced that large-scale military operations had ended, and tens of thousands of people fled into exile in Eastern Europe.

⁴⁸ William H. McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma. War and Aftermath* (Philadelphia and New York 1947), 199.

⁴⁹ Report of the British Legal Mission to Greece (London, His Majesty Stationery Office), 17 January 1946, 11, 15.

⁵⁰ Rizospastis, 12 February 1946. Available at: <http://www1.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=4752054&publDate=5/10/2008>, retrieved on 04-04-2014.

A British Parliamentary Legal Mission reported in early 1946 that the Greek government had arrested over 50,000 citizens "in the most arbitrary fashion."⁵¹ It appeared that "extremism of the right had grown alongside extremism of the left. There was no place for moderates in the political life of postwar Greece."⁵²

One of the measures that the government introduced for political prisoners' punishment and was the establishment of mass internment camps on the islands of Makronisos, Giaros and Trikeri (the last one for female political exiles). The camps on the island of Makronisos were established in 1947 and were destined, for the inmates' "rehabilitation through enlightenment and education".⁵³ "Rehabilitation", as defined by the language and propaganda of the time, was the transformation of leftist prisoners into nationalist and loyal subjects. The ordeal of internment in the Makronisos camps is illustrated in many inmates' memoirs which cite torture, solitary confinement, propaganda, hard labour, wretched living conditions, and, in one instance, mass killing.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Cited in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 221.

⁵² John C. Campbell, et. al., *The United States in World Affairs. 1947-1948* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 29.

⁵³ Resolution 73, *Government Gazette*, 226, 14 October 1949, article 2.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Antonis Flountzis, *Sto kolastirio tis Makronisou* (Athens 1984); Nikos Margaris, *Istoria tis Makronisou* (Athens 1966); Vardis Vardinogiannis and Panagiotis Aronis (eds), *Oi misoi sta sidera* (Athens 1996); Vardis Vardinogiannis, *Makronissos, Octovris 1948-Mais 1949* (Athens 1983); Lefteris Raftopoulos, *To mikos tis nychtas. Makronisos '48-'50* (Athens 1995).

3. Memory framework

I will try to approach my research question by using the theoretical framework of memory studies. Memory Studies is an international and interdisciplinary convergence field. It addresses – broadly speaking – the interplay of past and present. Memory Studies is interested in the social shape of individual memory as well as in the collective generation of past, present, and future. As Astrid Erll mentions collective memory could be depicted as “the interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts.”⁵⁵ As he argues below the very understanding of the term allows us to define *mémoire collective* as the science that investigates phenomena that focus on individual acts of remembering in a social context such as family gatherings to national myths.⁵⁶

Mnemosyne is the mother of the muses. Cleo was one of her daughters and protector of the story. The science of memory, mnemonic, attributed to Simonides of Ceos, was the basis of the learning process.⁵⁷ Aristotle gave a privileged position in the fields of thought. He distinguished two types of conscious memory and unconscious memory.⁵⁸ For the student of society, memory is a tool and in research, that one of the means and the goal of the study.

Even individual memory is not just a personal memory. The memories that make up our identity and we provide a framework for thinking and action is not only our own; we learned that we need to borrow and we somehow inherited through families, communities and cultures.

It is a matter of great importance to realize that the human memory is composed of several levels. The first level relates to our biological memory, things that happened and affected the feelings, views or even injured much our culture as human beings. The second form of memory associated with the “symbolic order, the media, institutions and practices that social groups engage in a common past.”⁵⁹ It is that sense of a shared past that forges the notion of identity. And by identity we mean “the choice that is involved in the sense that we deliberate and decide whether to define ourselves as, and seek to become this or that kind of person”.⁶⁰

Memory includes various ways of remembering and one of them is the textual representation. Novels configure memory representations by selecting and editing elements of culturally given discourse, such as the combination of the real and the

⁵⁵ Erll, A. *Cultural Memory Studies*, New York, 2008, p.2.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ The Mnemosyne, goddess of memory, and yet was the goddess of wisdom, mother of the Muses, who gave birth along with Zeus when he stayed overnight on Mount Helicon.

⁵⁸ Raphael Samuel, *Theatres of Memory*, vol. 1, Past and Present in Contemporary Culture, London-New York: Verso, 1994, p.7.

⁵⁹ Erll, A., p.5.

⁶⁰ Parekh, B. *A New Politics of Identity, Political Principles for an Interdependent World*, New York, 2008, p.11.

imaginary the remembered and the forgotten.⁶¹ Literature still remains a form of cultural expression of reality that includes ideas of memory, in an aesthetically condensed way.⁶² Thus Neumann continues arguing that, from a narrative psychological perspective, novels by using their plot-lines provide a model of self-narration self-interpretation of *Funktionsgeschichte*.⁶³

The notion of locus where everything takes place dominates the discourse. The first who realized the significance of localization of memory was Simonides, who is being mentioned in Cicero's *De Oratore*. There Cicero writes that *loci memoriae* are important, since "acerrimus ex omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum videndi"⁶⁴. It is what Pierre Nora introduces in 1977 *lieux de mémoire*, a term that points out that localization of memory could be characterized as ideological or in some cases directly linked to the nation-state building.⁶⁵

Memory matters politically in ways that affect domestic politics and foreign policy.⁶⁶ This means that the relations between two sovereign states could be severely traumatized by an intense wartime trauma and these nations might face difficulties in order to recover from this stage. Collective myths, narratives of past events in general provide the society with a sense of order and purpose in a world marked by ambiguity and threat.⁶⁷ Thus this need for belonging and meaning in the global arena brings on the surface the need for legitimization of certain regimes. Identity itself is being better understood by establishing what is remembered and also by making pasts forgotten. What is identity? As Parekh says "Identity involves choice in the sense that we deliberate and decide whether to define ourselves as, and seek to become this or that kind of person"⁶⁸. According to Renan, remembrance and forgetting depend on each other.⁶⁹ So by other words, an individual or a social community remembers and forgets according to what is most or less traumatic, respectively.

One of the most significant and influential works in memory studies area is Maurice Halbwachs' "*On Collective Memory*". There, collective memory is being discussed as a social phenomenon, where history and memory are opposing each other. History's purpose relies on objectivity, while in collective memory what matters is how to

⁶¹ Neumann, B. The Literaly Representation of Memory in *Cultural Memory Studies*, New York, 2008, p.334.

⁶² Neumann, B., p.335.

⁶³ Neumann, B., p.341.

⁶⁴ "The keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight" Cicero, *De Oratore*, (2.87.357.)

⁶⁵ Den Boer, P. *Loci Memoriae- Lieux de mémoire* in *Cultural Memory Studies*, New York, 2008, p.21.

⁶⁶ Frei, N., *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS- Vergangenheit*, Munich, C.H. Beck, 1996.

⁶⁷ Sherlock, T., "Unhealed Wounds: The Struggle over the Memory of the World War II," *Ab Imperio*, 2, 2009, p. 461.

⁶⁸ Parekh, B., *A New Politics of Identity; Political Principles for an Independent World*, Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p.11.

⁶⁹ Burke, P., *Varieties of Cultural History*, Cambridge, Polity, 1997, 43- 59.

bridge the past with the present.⁷⁰ This perceived difference between memory and history has had an enduring impact on subsequent research on what is called ‘memory politics’. Thus, influenced by Halbwachs’ work, French historian Pierre Nora has expressed this relation in the form of a double rivalry between memory and history. According to him the absence of *milieux de mémoire* in a society characterised by globalization and democratisation has been replaced by *lieux de mémoire*, places of memory, meaning that the once genuine ‘memory’ which was living has been succeeded by artificial ‘history’, with the result that “the past is a world from which we are fundamentally cut off.”⁷¹

For this reason I believe that memory, a socio-cultural construct, is not an individual behavior but a shared experience; its existence results from a direct or imagined interaction among mnemonic others within their mnemonic community. Our social environment affects the way we remember the past⁷². With its social characteristics, memory is designated as "collective memory"⁷³, "social memory"⁷⁴, or "public memory"⁷⁵ Also there rises another question of what is the active role to play for other sciences such as archeology in the cultural tradition of a country.

The political role of archaeology is part of the modern state's general effort to foster a national identity⁷⁶. Every social group develops the memory of its own past, as distinct from that of other groups. To distinguish themselves from outsiders, the group recovers from the past available to reconstruct a collective memory which is the main component of its group identity. Among the new independent states the urgent need to stabilize a society becomes the driving force for the reconstruction of collective memory that can articulate a new set of values and a common destiny for what Benedict Anderson calls “imagined community.”⁷⁷ A social group’s identity is constructed with narratives and traditions that are created to give its members a sense of a community, or in other words a sense of belonging. The social group may be either a small, cohesive unit like a family whose members are all known or an Andersonian “imaginary community” that is based on nationalism. Regardless of the size and complexity of the social group, the group needs to construct and maintain an identity that unites its members. In the wake of nationalist movements in each new

⁷⁰ Halbwachs, M., *On Collective Memory*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1992, p.40.

⁷¹ Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, vol. 1, English language edition edited and with a foreword by Lawrence D. Kritzman, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, New York: Columbia University Press 1996, p. 12.

⁷² Zerubavel, Eviatar; *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the social shape of the Past*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 283.

⁷³ Halbwachs, M., *On Collective Memory*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1992.

⁷⁴ Fentress, J. and Wickham, C., *Social Memory*, Cambridge MA USA 1992.

⁷⁵ Bodnar, J., *Remaking America, Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton University Press, 1992.

⁷⁶ (Zerubavel, Eviatar; *Time Maps, Collective Memory and the social shape of the Past*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 292.

⁷⁷ Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition. New York, Verso, 2006.

nation "engaged in manufacturing a distinctive national identity and culture, recreated its roots in the past. By repudiating a European past, they justified their newly independent status. With an "invented tradition," the states "established continuity with a suitable historic past."⁷⁸

Halbwachs argues that "collective memory reconstructs its various recollections to accord with contemporary ideas and preoccupations."⁷⁹ The present, for Halbwachs, is the mental frame where people reconstruct their own past with regard to the concerns and needs of the present. These needs of the present are what he defines as "presentism" focus on the "use value" of the past for the solution of the present's problems. Halbwachs also emphasizes how our present thoughts and generally our concerns enter the framework of our memories of past events. The image of a person or event continually evolves in our memory, for we perceive our past in light of the present. To be more specific as we change, we belong to new groups or occupy new positions in the group to which we belong, (for example, when we become parents), the way we perceive the world changes.⁸⁰ To remember, one therefore needs to situate oneself within a current of collective thought.⁸¹ As a result, Halbwachs concludes that there are no purely individual memories, such as for example, memories that would belong only to the individual, and of which this specific person would be the unique source.⁸² We are therefore not the authentic subjects of attribution of our memories, since we are affected by other factors as well. The past's mutability is also evidenced by many other researchers who have examined a wide range of cultural forms.

Pierre Nora, in his study of the relation between history and memory, remarks that collective memory is "in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being dormant and periodically revived."⁸³

⁷⁸ (Hobsbawm, E and Ranger, T. *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.1.

⁷⁹ Halbwachs M., *On Collective Memory*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. p. 224.

⁸⁰ Halbwachs, M., *On Collective Memory*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. pp. 57-66.

⁸¹ Forgetting would thus be caused by keeping one's distance from the group and from social interactions.

⁸² Halbwachs's theories have been criticised by numerous scholars, including Joël Candau, who admits the existence of a collective memory but who is hostile to what he has called "holistic rhetorics." Candau especially dislikes Halbwachs's claim that individual memories are fragments of collective memory. Nonetheless, Candau admits that Halbwachs is right to emphasize the importance of the social frameworks of memory and the influence of social thought on a person's recollections. Moreover, Candau argues that the metaphorical term "collective memory" would be acceptable if it were true that all the members of a given group were able to share, through social communication, a determined number of representations of the past, but in Candau's view, this is hard to conceive. In his opinion, it would therefore be more appropriate to speak (as Todorov does) of "public" or "common" memory. Candau, J., *Mémoire et Identité*, Paris, PUF, 1998.

⁸³ Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History", in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, vol. 1, English language edition edited and with a foreword by Lawrence D. Kritzman, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, New York: Columbia University Press 1996, p. 8.

Other writers, such as Marcel Proust, who was directly influenced by Bergson, believe in the existence of “pure memory.” They understand memory as a mental procedure that is always faithful to the past and can thus be reconstructed in its entirety, as long as one holds the key to that past, or as he maintains its ability to remember.⁸⁴ In general, contemporary social scientists do not agree with this speculation. For them, there is no pure memory totally faithful to the past; memory is instead always a reconstruction of the past based on present concerns and purposes. Research in neuroscience has shown that memory does not retain and does not reconstruct the original impression. D.L. Schacter explains that memory only uses parts of the past, that later serve as a foundation for the reconstruction of past experiences.⁸⁵ New ideas and memories that originate from other persons in our environment can also modify our already existing memories. This constant change of our memories on both the individual and collective levels according to our present concerns is an unconscious phenomenon: the image of the past that stems from this modification therefore seems real.⁸⁶ Memory is thus a dynamic and evolving phenomenon.

For Candau memory is more of a constantly updated reconstruction of the past than its faithful reconstitution.⁸⁷ Forgetting also plays a major role in this reconstruction process. Todorov remarked that forgetting is an integral part of memory, for the latter is selective in its reading of the past.⁸⁸ This notion of the plasticity of memory is essential for literary research, for it introduces the idea of reinvention of history into the very material of literature, i.e. personal and collective history.⁸⁹ For instance, Candau claims that collective memory can only emerge when individual memories interact, and that this process inevitably leads to the partial homogenisation of the representations of the past.⁹⁰ From this point of view collective memory can be seen as a structure of individual memories. Opposed to the concept of the subjective nature of memory is a school that Joël Candau has come to call “holistic rhetorics,” which

⁸⁴ See G. Poulet, *L'Espace proustien*, Paris, Gallimard, 1982 and *Études sur le temps humain*, Paris, Plon, 1968, vol. I, pp. 364-404 and vol. IV, pp. 299-337.

⁸⁵ See Schacter, pp. 112-116 and pp. 345-350.

⁸⁶ This phenomenon is especially visible in the literature of the inner life, i.e. autobiographies and diaries. The way a person perceives and gives meaning to his or her past can evolve and sometimes change radically with time. Sand's numerous autobiographical works provide many examples of this phenomenon. On the collective level, a group's perception of its past can also alter following a present event that leads to the revaluation of the past. For instance, the myth of the Edwardian age as an era of perfect bliss emerged after and in contrast to the Great War.

⁸⁷ Candau, J., *Mémoire et Identité*, Paris, PUF, 1998, p. 5.

⁸⁸ T. Todorov, “La Mémoire et ses Abus,” in *Esprit*, 7, July 1993, pp. 34-44. Memory is selective; it cannot store all the elements of one's life, or it would be totally overloaded. For Joël Candau (p. 86), “if one can always choose between memory and forgetting, it is certainly because not all that can be remembered is memorable [...]. It is the construction of identity based on memoranda, i.e. things ‘worthy of being remembered’, that is responsible for this selection of meaningful events, this ordering of mnemonic points of reference”

⁸⁹ Candau, J., *Mémoire et Identité*, Paris, PUF, 1998, pp. 25-46.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

argues for the existence of a collective consciousness and thus asserts the primacy of the collective aspect of memory.⁹¹

This school, which Ricoeur calls that of “le regard extérieur”, (the external gaze), opposes the very notion of individual memory. For example, Paul Ricoeur argues that memory does belong to the realm of interiority, for we see ourselves as the true possessors of our own memories.⁹² However, memory also involves “the other” and fully bears its mark.⁹³ From this phase, memory enters the public sphere because a testimony is always presented to, and received by, another.⁹⁴ He therefore draws the conclusion that social groups are both involved at the same time.⁹⁵ Some scholars go further, emphasizing the fluidity and reciprocity that characterize exchanges between individual and collective memories, and argue that they mutually influence one another in their construction.⁹⁶ On the one hand, the school that Ricoeur calls “the tradition of inwardness” (la tradition du regard intérieur)⁹⁷ has argued that memory is an individual phenomenon. This tradition is based on the conviction, already enunciated by Aristotle that it is in the very depths of his soul that an individual expresses what he has heard, felt or thought in the past. According to Aristotle, the memory is reconstruction of past experience accompanied by consciousness, that experience that it existed previously. The reminder of the voluntary reconstruction the same experience based on thought. Having the first and the lower the animals, the second only human. Of people at some mnemonic, ie having mnemonic faithfully guard performances, To booster others, ie easily recreate past performances when they want. Memory virtue is accuracy and convenience is characteristic of remembrance, in the general which helps the will. And Plato passive remodeling pictures considered the memory, not the active remembrance, which finally made them all the knowledge.⁹⁸

⁹¹ Joël Candau, *Mémoire et Identité*, Paris, PUF, 1998, pp. 21-25 and Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 120-124.

⁹² Ricoeur, P., *Memory, History, Forgetting*, transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 124-132.

⁹³ In Ricoeur’s view, the experience of others is a given as primal as the experience of the self p. 130.

⁹⁴ Halbwachs, M., *On Collective Memory*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 1-15 and Ricoeur, P., *Memory, History, Forgetting*, transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 124-132. Halbwachs and Ricoeur both highlight the fact that the past can be brought back more easily when recalled in groups, for the members of the group will help one another to remember past events.

⁹⁵ Ricoeur, P., *Memory, History, Forgetting*, transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 131-132.

⁹⁶ H. Rousso argues in *La Hantise du Passé* (in Fr. Barret-Ducrocq (ed.), *Pourquoi se Souvenir ?* Paris: Grasset, 1999, p. 18) that “collective memory cannot be grasped without individual memory” (our translation)

⁹⁷ Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 96-120.

⁹⁸ Aristotle, *Memory and Commemoration*, (*Περί Μνήμης και Αναμνήσεως*), 449b4. Also in Augustine: As Augustine pointed out, the notion of reflexivity thus lies at the root of memory. The development of this conception of the mnemonic phenomenon is linked to the emergence of the emphasis on

In addition, A.J. Mayer⁹⁹ and N. Roussiau¹⁰⁰ have pointed out that individuals adopt the memory of the groups in which they live: an individual's personal memories will always interweave with the impersonal memories of the group, for memory is inherently shared and thus social in character. Collective memory thus functions as a framework within which individual memory is built and structured.¹⁰¹

In his research on American public memory, Bodnar discovers that any representation of the past is a product of "elite manipulation"; the past is a product of the present.¹⁰² His review of official culture and vernacular culture supports his proposal that "public memory will change again as political power and social arrangements change"¹⁰³. He further argues that new formations are in need of new symbols in order to reshape the present, and old ones need to be translated with new meanings. A new version of the past is achieved by a continuous process of replacing, rewriting or even recreating the past in a more eloquent way that serves the purposes of the new political class.¹⁰⁴ Theorists like Bodnar belong to the camp of constructionist theory, "which locates the significance of events from the standpoint of the observer".¹⁰⁵ It remains common to most constructionists that people construct their beliefs to serve their own real interests.¹⁰⁶

subjectivity, giving to the concept of consciousness turning back upon itself, even to the point of solipsism.

⁹⁹ A.J. Mayer, "Les Pièges du Souvenir," in *Esprit*, July 1993 (7), pp. 45-59.

¹⁰⁰ Chr. Bonardi and N. Roussiau, "Quelle Place Occupe la Mémoire Sociale dans le Champ des Représentations Sociales ?" in S. Laurens and N. Roussiau (eds.), *La Mémoire Sociale: Identités et Représentations Sociales* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2002), pp. 33-49.

¹⁰¹ In A.J. Mayer's view, an individual is never alone and is thus always deeply influenced by the memories of his peers in the reconstruction of his autobiographical memories. Moreover, those who want to perpetuate the memory of a past event on a large scale (even if they have not experienced it themselves) have to rebuild and restructure the personal memories of the people who have directly witnessed it; otherwise these individual recollections cannot function in a collective memory.

¹⁰² Bodnar, J., *Remaking America, Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 20.

¹⁰³ Bodnar, J., *Remaking America, Public Memory, Commemoration and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 252.

¹⁰⁴ Lewis, 1975:55.

¹⁰⁵ Schwartz, B., *The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory*, *Social Forces*, in *Jstor*, Vol. 61, No. 2. (Dec., 1982), pp. 374-402. 1982: available at:

<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2578232?uid=3738128&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104497212557>
retrieved on 20-4-2014.

¹⁰⁶ Geertz, C., *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Basic Books Inc, New York, 1973, p. 201-203.

4. Methodological considerations.

The main sources of information that will be used in this master thesis are going to be related publications, articles and books to support my research. I want to get information from the political speeches of the parliamentary parties from January 1st until December 31st 2012, in order to understand why and how rightwing and leftwing parties are using EU as the other and try to form an anti-European agenda in the country. The methodology used in the drafting process of this paper was mostly based on a desk review of existing documents, studies and available data. The methodology which will be in place will be that of a content analysis.

Content analysis is a method in the social sciences for studying the content of those types of empirical documentation which can be briefly referred to written texts. Harold Lasswell formulated the core questions of content analysis: "Who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?"¹⁰⁷ Ole Holsti offers a broad definition of content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages"¹⁰⁸

The material of the study consists of 50 parliamentary plenary speeches of Panos Kammenos, 30 of Alexis Tsipras, 22 of Aleka Papariga and 12 of Nikolaos Michaloliakos¹⁰⁹ in the Greek Parliament held between June 2012 and December 2013. This material was chosen mainly because it covers a whole parliamentary year and because within this year there rear held two national elections on May and June 2012. So by having as a start point July 2012 it covers all the debates in the Parliament right after the last elections.

I focused on the political leaders since they are the head of the parties. These political leaders were in charge of their parties during the campaign period and would have been of a great interest to analyse the language used by them in the National Assembly. At this point somebody might wonder why there is this specific focus on the parliamentary debates. This is mainly because of the importance of a political speech in the Parliament since it remains the highest form of political performance.

At this point I will justify my selection of political parties. I have chosen 2 rightwing and leftwing parties to compare and contrast the different political views or approaches to the EU that they might have. These parties belong to the opposition and they oppose the bailout agreement between Greece and Troika (EU, ECB and IMF), however there is also another reason as well. Among these four political parties there are parties like Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn that enter the Parliament for first time in 2012, while a party that belongs to the Left, SYRIZA, became the main opposition party. The traditional Communist Party of Greece faced a loss of 50% between the May- June double elections of 2012. So there is a radical change in the

¹⁰⁷ Lasswell, Harold Dwight, *Power and Personality*. New York, 1948.

¹⁰⁸ Holsti, Ole R, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

¹⁰⁹ 17/7/2013. He was imprisoned in November 2013.

Greek political system and thus I found it interesting to research their political speeches.

At the first stage I did a descriptive linguistic analysis, where I identified names of actors, attributes of actors, types of arguments, and finally different perspectives (who is saying what and to whom). My second step was to try to find how many references on Germany, Angela Merkel, World War II, Nazism, Civil War and national sovereignty, there are and whether or not there any. At a third stage I intended to distinguish the negative and the positive references towards Germany. And finally I tried to explain why this is happening. At the same time there was a specific focus on institutions and memory framework as well. All the political speeches were available online at the official site of the Hellenic Parliament.

In my research I have counted how many times there have been references to the memory of Second World War and Civil War as well as anti-German and anti-European references. There are also included pies in graphs to show the percentages of these references per party. Each party leader used idioms to describe either its political opponents or the EU. Idioms that have been encountered are referring to the current government as “gauleiters”, “traitors”, “merkelists” or accusing the “german hegemony” in Europe. What notion of the Greek citizen do the opposition parties convey? A notion of a civilian who is devastated, deceived and full of anger. What kind of understanding of society do the opposition leaders underlie? The Greek society seems ready to explode.

At this point I would like to mention that there might be some limitations in my research. One of these limitations is referring to my Greek nationality; therefore a national from another country might achieve the goal of objectivity in a more eloquent way, although I tried my best not to be biased. I have also to admit that since this master thesis is discussing the impact of memory in the political debate between 2012- 2013 there is lack of prior research studies on the topic. Apart from Aristos Doxiadis and Manos Matsaganis, who are discussing the issue of the 2012 elections outcome, there are not so many scholars that have made serious research on the topic yet. This is the main reason that this limitation can serve as an important opportunity to describe the need for further research. Another issue that limited my research was the arrest of Nikos Michaloliakos, the leader of Golden Dawn in November 2013, because this deprives us from the chance to follow some more speeches of him in the Parliament, since he was imprisoned. Another factor that should be counted in this research could become more efficient by combining also interviews along with the content analysis of the political speeches. Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge that because English is not my mother tongue, therefore might be language mistakes.


5. Data Analysis

5.1. Contemporary Germany/Occupation discourse

5.1.1. The Left- Left comparison

One of the least noticed consequences of this crisis has been the rise of European radical left parties. The most dramatic example is of course Greece, where SYRIZA shot from 5 to 26 percent in 2012. The Greek SYRIZA is the most successful example of an radical leftwing party exploiting the complete collapse of its social democratic competitor to present itself as a credible left governing alternative.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ <http://www.opendemocracy.net/luke-march/european-radical-left-and-international-economic-crisis-opportunity-wasted>, retrieved on 22-04-2014



SYRIZA Poster 1: Angela Merkel and Antonis Samaras are depicted. It is implied here that the government follows the German political orders.

On the other hand the Communist Party of Greece, (KKE) faced a critical loss of its percentages from 8,48% to 4,50%¹¹¹, mainly because of the rise of SYRIZA and the successful slogan for the *government of the Left*. At the same time the anti-German sentiment in the country grew stronger mainly because Germans were accused of being the ones who were corrupted the politicians through SIEMENS case or because they “were always hating Greeks”, an accusation that goes back to the Nazi Occupation of Greece and World War II. Thus I analysed 22 parliamentary speeches of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece and 30 parliamentary speeches of Alexis Tsipras, Leader of the Opposition and President of SYRIZA. All the political speeches were being held right after the June 2012 General elections until December 2013.

Comparing the speeches of the leaders of two leftwing parties one could expect to find more similarities the differences in terms of approach, however this might not be the case in this research. More specifically I found a strong memory background in Alexis Tsipras texts, while the approach in Papanigou's case remains strongly Marxist and touches slightly upon the issue of World War II losses and compensations. According to Papanigou capitalism is to be blamed for the current crisis and not Merkel or Germany because even if Greece has been a leading country in the EU,

¹¹¹ [http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/#{"cls":"main","params":{}}](http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/#{) and <http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html#{'cls':'main','params':{}}> retrieved on 22-04-2014.

would definitely act with the same way like Germany.¹¹² And she continues by arguing “the interests of a section of the bourgeoisie, are the most important, even if Greece was at the same place like Germany, the same strategy would be followed like Germany. Do not imagine that we will be ready to divide our clothes in other countries.”




KKE poster: It is written “we are killing capitalism”. As I mentioned for KKE the real “enemy” is capitalism and not Germany.

Tsipras adopts a quite different strategy, he uses stronger words to describe what according to him is the cause of the crisis. In a speech at the Hellenic Parliament shortly after the elections he addresses the cabinet by saying: “In this debate, you here, who govern us, take the part of the European North and Mrs Merkel and blame us as anti-Europeans. You are not Europeans, you are merkelists and Mrs Merkel and Berlin today is what's most anti-European in Europe, because they lead Europe to dissolution.”¹¹³ In another speech of him in October 2012 he depicts the relation between Greece and Germany as an axis of subordination to Germany following a policy (Germany) of a German Europe and not of a European Germany. Here the worst fears of Second World War are totally dominant. In both examples Tsipras describes Germany not as an EU member, but as the real threat that is present in Europe, which is willing to defeat the other European countries, especially those of the South. He takes advantage of the memory of Nazi Occupation by stating that “children are going hungry to school, we are seeing scenes of Occupation, hunger is spreading.”


¹¹² Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 11-11-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹¹³ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 08-07-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.



Going back to Papariga and comparing the two political figures of the Left, we find out that in her text Nazi Occupation remains totally upsent. There are nine references to Second World War only by using historical examples to justify her anti-capitalist analysis. She mentions war as project of *capitalist powers* to solve a series of questions between them and she claims that the United States decided to enter the war-when they saw the soviet victory in Stalingrand, and were afraid of the advent of Soviet Union everywhere in Europe. Papariga differentiates Communist Party from SYRIZA in terms of political rhetoric, when she adresses the Greek Prime Minister and clarifies that “although we are political and class rivals, nevertheless, we do not treat you as a political leader who is hiding under the skirts of Merkel or the pants, I have not seen and never dress. It does not matter. We're not saying traitors, slaves, etc. frightened. Not telling you all personally, interlaced with alpha or beta interests.”¹¹⁴I think that this is the most crucial difference. The Communist party’s leading figure addresses the national assembly and opposes the choices that are being made by the government being based on a Marxist point of view, while avoiding to get back to memory to gain political benefits.

¹¹⁴ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 16-07-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.




On the other hand the president of SYRIZA is using a great amount of references to memory including personal criticism to the German officials and offensive accusations to the Greek government. A good example of this is the extract of a speech held in July 2013:


“Tomorrow Mr. Schäuble comes to Greece. This man has elections in a few days in Germany. So he is campaigning. Samaras behaves as a Christian Democrat Union of Germany campaign leader and is preparing election rally for Mr Schauble in the province. Obviously, he comes to hit you on the back and say, 'Well done."He comes to support the disastrous policy of yours.”¹¹⁵Memory dominates Tsipras’ discourse, mainly for populist reasons, since by using this kind of critique the percentages of the party went to 26% while the ones of KKE faced a huge loss. Why is this happening? Mainly because the people need somebody to accuse, they need an Other.

In Tsipras’ 30 performances at the Parliament, there were 78 references to Germans, Angela Merkel, Nazi Occupation and Wolfgang Schäuble, with a negative way up to 83,33%. Merkel, or Germany generally is being well understood as an actor who forces the subject to obey, submit and finally to follow her will. He is making usage of strong words in terms of vocabulary, economic protectorate, German colony, campaign leader of CDU. Society is being coloured as ready to collapse, while in the same political texts Tsipras’ notion of crisis-time citizen is of a person who is devastated and full of anger, thus he comes to the conclusion that the only solution passes through overthrowing the signed memoranda between Greece and Troika.

¹¹⁵ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 17-07-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.



Papariga held 22 speeches in front of the National Assembly, as mentioned above the approach is quite different from Tsipras. There are only 33 references either to Germans/Merkel (24) or to World War II from a Marxist perspective (9). In total there is only one negative comment on Germany, when she explains that “Germany exceeded the 3% margin for deficit for euro zone members and they did not do anything and it’s natural, because is a leading power.” In Papariga’s texts there is one main actor/player who is most of the times capitalism, and capitalism is promoting its own interests no matter what the leading powers or the governments in the global system. In terms of vocabulary her words are related to capitalism, monopolies, proletariat or their derivatives. Society here again is depicted as ready to collapse, but in Papariga’s thought the solution is not similar to Tsipras’ it goes far beyond. For KKE the solution remains not to tear the pacts with European Union and IMF but to overthrow capitalism and establish a communist regime, to reach a radical overthrow.



Closing my analysis regarding the two left parties of Greece, I would like to mention that in the case of SYRIZA, memory dominates the discourse. There is a great amount of references that depicting the German leading figures in Berlin, or Germany as a whole, as players that want to conquer and dominate not only Greece but the whole European Union. Tsipras is referring to Germany again by using a historical example is when he proposes Greek debt cancellations like the one happened in 1953 at London Summit, where German Debt cut. From these 78 times that he is referring to Germans, only once he is referring to contemporary Germans not relating them to World War II or not depicting them as bulimic for dominance in EU, and this happens in November 2012 when German workers protested outside of the General Consulate of Greece in Hamburg, “showing their solidarity to Greeks.”¹¹⁶ This anti-German sentiment that is present in Tsipras parliamentary speeches is strongly related to populism. He uses memory to polarize the political agenda in Greece and to win the next general elections.

5.1.2. Rightwing approaches

The rightist radicalism is a political ideology that revolves around the myth of a homogeneous nation, a populist nationalism that opposes liberal, pluralist democracy with fundamental principles of individualism, tolerance and respect of Human Rights. I agree when Michael Minkenberg says that rightist radicalism is opposing liberal progressive ideas by using means of exclusion or inclusion from/in the community.¹¹⁷ This radicalization of the society in Greece is linked with the current economic crisis


¹¹⁶ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 29-11-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹¹⁷ Michael Minkenberg, *Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich: USA, Frankreich, Deutschland*, Wiesbaden, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998, p. 29-47.

that the country faces. This idea that in times of accelerated economic change there is a rise of xenophobic or right-wing parties happens to be true especially if we consider for example that such trends occurred in Eastern Europe after 1989. However rightwing parties still differentiate from each other in terms of the use of violence for political reasons or open hostility towards democratic institutions. For Independent Greeks categorize themselves as an ethnocentric and populist right but not fascist, while Golden Dawn could be explained as a fascist neo-Nazi movement with clear autocratic hierarchy under one leader.


I analyzed the speeches of Panos Kammenos, leader of the Independent Greeks party and of the secretary general of Golden Dawn, Nikos Michaloliakos. Both of them are political leaders of rightwing parties with nationalistic positions.. Independent Greeks, a vociferously nationalist formation calling for the unilateral denunciation of the bailout package, which had only shortly before come to life as a splinter group of New Democracy, saw its share of the vote reach 10.61%, briefly emerging as the fourth largest party in the country. Independent Greeks did particularly well in Northern Greece, Greater Athens and some island regions. The party scored best (10%) among voters aged 25–44, and. In terms of occupation, it was over-represented among the unemployed (11%). Independent Greeks were supported by 9% of those reporting that ‘they found it difficult to make ends meet’, versus 5% of those stating that ‘they got by / lived comfortably’. Members of the Parliament that belong to the political group of Independent Greeks, including their leader, mention German atrocities during Second World War like the Massacres of Kalavryta and Distomo in order to persuade the electoral that Germany is to be blamed for the devastations Greece is still facing. Also there are formed accusations such as: “Quislings” or dosilogoι (δωσίλογοι, traitors, and collaborators with the Nazis) against the governments which implemented the agreement with the troika of lenders (EU, ECB and IMF). Independent Greeks use also a rhetoric that opposes austerity measures and identifies contemporary Germany with Nazi Germany. Stereotypes dominate the discussions and the image of Greece in the European media makes anti-German syndrome in Greece even worse. The power of memory dictates the discourse and the populist parties like Independent Greeks expect to have election profits by adopting such rhetoric.

In contradiction to Independent Greeks, Golden Dawn is not a new party. Golden Dawn was founded in 1985 by Nikos Michaloliakos It first received widespread attention in 1991, and in 1993 registered as a political party. The party ran a campaign during the Greek national elections of 2012 based on concerns for unemployment, austerity and the economy, as well as virulent anti-immigration rhetoric, which gained a large increase in support from the Greek electorate. It received 7% of the popular vote, enough for the party to enter the Hellenic Parliament for the first time with 21 seats. Following a second election in June, this was reduced to 18 seats.




Kammenos held 50 speeches in the Hellenic parliament from June 2012 until December 2013 and he referred to Germany- Angela Merkel and German officials included- 54 times. Most of them (50 out of 54) had a negative tone. According to Kammenos, “Germany intends to enslave the people of Europe, as it was unable to do so in First and Second World War. For this reason, wants to control the economies of these countries with the new world order and bankers. This is the game you play, ladies and gentlemen, if you vote the current budget.”¹¹⁸ In this phrase, it is far more than clear that he is using a concrete anti-German rhetoric combined with hyperbole for populist reasons. There are many idioms, sayings and clichés used: traitors, gauleiter, merkelists, german hegemony, quislings, 4th German Reich and subordination to Germany. Kammenos identifies contemporary Germany with Nazi Germany of 40’s and depicts Angela Merkel as a political figure that is promoting german control over Europe and has the same political and economical directions with the Nazi one. The phrase 4th German Reich is being used quite often in Kammenos’ speeches, but when this happens 3 times at the highest level, which is the speech in front of the National Assembly; this leads us to conclude that the identification of EU’s Germany with Nazi Germany in the minds of Independent Greeks is obvious.

¹¹⁸ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 07-12-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.



On the other hand, Golden Dawn's leader is making only 12 parliamentary speeches. In these 12 speeches things are totally different, although an extreme right party, there are no anti-German references at all, on the contrary there are being expressed accusations to the government that is delivering the national sovereignty to the troika of lenders. For 12 times in 12 speeches Michaloliakos is speaking about the issue of national sovereignty, without attacking Germany for memory reasons at all, unlike Kammenos. Kammenos is always making usage of the notion of national sovereignty for 14 times accusing at the same time the government as traitors for delivering sovereignty not only to the Troika of lenders but to Germany. Both movements are rightwing and both are imposing the issue of national sovereignty, but only Kammenos identifies Germany to Nazism. For Michaloliakos there is a guilty silence upon the issue of Nazism. Whenever he is being accused as a Nazi (3 times) he declines it directly: Our ideology is not Nazism. The individual right of self-determination seems not to be respected for us. We declare that we are nationalists."At this point I have to remind that Michaloliakos is imprisoned since November 2013 after there were charges against him creating of a neonazi terrorist group. However in his political speeches there are no references or accusations to Germany/Nazi Germany. The memory element of Occupation is absent in Mikos Michaloliakos texts.




Comparing the two leaders from the one side we have a crystal clear opposition to the austerity measures and the European status quo by accusing specific countries or political actors of being willing to harm significantly Greece. Kammenos clearly serves this agenda. The neo-Nazi movement, on the other hand avoids attacking openly Germany. Here allow me to risk a speculation. This might happen because of the romantic-fascist idea of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, since many of the members of the party- Michaloliakos included- praised openly Nazi Germany of 30's. Their agenda for Greece is to leave the EU and establish an undemocratic openly fascist regime with clear nationalist program. Both parties are rightwing however only Golden Dawn belongs to neo-Nazi right. Kammenos' party is an anti-austerity rightwing party, something like Nigel Farage's UKIP in Britain.

Yet both parties ideology includes nostalgia for the loss of national sovereignty and the lack of greatness of ancient times. This common ground of nostalgia for the glorious past along with the tendency of extreme Right to reinvent itself from elections to elections makes the boundary between right-wing parties and movements as well as between the extreme right and mainstream right quite fluid.

5.1.3. Left- Right comparison

We discussed the Left-Left and Right-Extreme Right approaches to memory. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the perception of World War II memory from leftwing and rightwing parties and mostly to compare Left and Right. From the left parties SYRIZA had a strong impact of memory and anti-German references and from the rightwing parties Independent Greeks were identifying openly Germany as a threat and connecting contemporary Germany with Hitler's Germany. That's why in this chapter we will discuss and compare SYRIZA with Independent Greeks.



Both parties are criticizing strongly the German chancellor for the austerity policy that is implementing in Europe, however they go beyond that and accusing the German political elites of imposing their political control over Europe. The clear distinction among them is that for Kammenos, Germany has the same goal like in World War II, a notion that Greeks have resist and fight against by overthrowing the current government that collaborates with the German EU. Here Tsipras agrees that EU is under German control, however he doesn't connect directly contemporary Germany to Nazi Germany.



Independent Greeks poster; Angela Merkel is persona non grata.

Both political leaders don't like the current EU, but for different reasons. Tsipras opposes the "Europe of austerity" implemented by *merkelists* all over Europe and accuses the German Chancellor that with this agenda triggers the dissolution of the Union. This shows that he is not anti-European, -though he is cultivating anti-German sentiments in greek society with his speeches, mainly for electoral benefits- but he believes in a leftwing European Union with no privatizations and less Free Market.

Kammenos is opposing EU for another reason. He stands for national sovereignty. In his eyes the current government surrenders the national sovereignty to supranational institutions, controlled by Germans, and the country is under occupation, like in 40's.

In order to connect this idea of occupation to nazi occupation he is using terms such as gauleiters, collaborators, etc. Kammenos also demands at the highest level from the government to impose the issue of compensations for World War II and the devastation of the country. A claim also supported by Tsipras.

Right wing populists, according to the work of Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser¹¹⁹, often invoke the overthrow of popular sovereignty in order to accentuate the catalytic effect of migration while with the same concept, leftist populists emphasize the dissolution of the nation state as a result of the memorandum imposed by the IMF, the ECB and the EC. The factors that favor the emergence of populists in Greece have found fertile ground during the last four years due to the economic downturn. The increase in both poverty and inequality has inspired populist political discourse, leading to the rise of support for both left and right populist parties such as “Independent Greeks” and SYRIZA. Their political discourse aims at convincing people that they offer the only solution to the economic crisis and in addition, Golden Dawn tries to attract votes by citing the expulsion of immigrants as a solution to several problems.¹²⁰



SYRIZA poster 2: “Go away Government,Troika, Memorandum; We will not become a german protectorate. The poster belongs to KOE, a communist movement that is one of the founding movements of SYRIZA. Here the German Chancellor is depicting as Nazi.

¹¹⁹ Mudde,C and Kaltwasser,C.R (ed), Populism in Europe and the Americas; Threat or Corrective for the Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

¹²⁰ <http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/manolis-mavrozaharakis-stelios-tzagkarakis-apostolos-kamekis/greek-modern-populism>.

It is remarkable that two such different ideologically parties, they reach common ground on the issue of compensations and anti-German rhetoric. In my opinion there is plenty of common ground when extremism is rising. Left radicalism and Right nationalism they interact with each other in terms of usage of populist rhetoric for political reasons. They look different, but the one extreme needs the other. Before 2012 radical left and nationalist right were marginalized, however when the crisis deepened voters from the centre-left PASOK went to SYRIZA and from ND to Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn. That was the moment when the debate regarding German atrocities from Second World War came to surface. It was brought up from extreme political movements that couldn't understand this very idea of United in Diversity and didn't like the control of Brussels in the EU member states. Austerity policy and 40% cuts in incomes of the civilians brought much audience to the arms of radical Left and Right that exploited this anger in their profit, clash with EU.

5.1.4. War's compensations discourse

The discourse about war compensations and forced loans returned to the surface after many years passed since 1945. The discussion recalled after the election results of 2012. Political parties of radical left and extreme right pressed the government to pose this issue to the German government at the most formal level. Thus, on 24th of April 2013, there was held a parliamentary debate regarding the war compensations in which foreign minister, Dimitris Avramopoulos, told the parliament in Athens on Wednesday: "We will exhaust every means available to arrive at a settlement. One can't compare the times, but also one cannot erase the memories."¹²¹ In the same discussion, Avramopoulos has launched the claim for damages in response to taunts by German policymakers that Athens must fork out such vast sums for the country's recklessness before and after the banking crash.

In this master thesis I am researching for the references in German compensations in 4 political parties of the Opposition. The Leader of the Opposition is referring to the issue of compensations 18 times in 55 speeches. Tsipras is expressing his party will to pose the compensations claim to all the German officials:

"Certainly, this bothers you, not because we met a political opponent, but because we had the pleasure and honor to be the only ones we were against an officer of the

¹²¹ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 24-04-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

German government and said that we loose ends not only Greece to Germany, but also Germany to Greece in connection with the occupation loan. This bothers.”

He continues below addressing the National Assembly:

“Here we are not in front of a conventional random omission on the part of Germany. This constant effort to evade against a moral obligation, a historic obligation towards the Greek people regarding the core of postwar argument of Germany, the perception of the building of Europe, in the perception of the role and participation in it.”

But Tsipras does not only accusing Germany of forgetting a moral debt towards Greece, he is saying that is a national issue that we have to say that all governments from 1946 onwards as claimed, not raised, not quick to claim. For SYRIZA’s president, throughout this period, there was not a single government, not even one Foreign Minister, to put seriously this major issue. Tsipras in April 2013 demanded from the President of the Parliament under Article 44 of the Rules of the Parliament, to form on the recommendation bipartisan Parliamentary Committee for the assertion of German reparations.

Acting under pressure from the public opinion and the opposition parties, the Greek government revived last year a long-dormant quest for war reparations but has not adopted claims raised by some parties and war-victim groups regarding the height of the bill (approximately 162 billion euros). In an interview to the Greek newspaper *Kathimerini* (May 12, 2013), the German ambassador to Greece, Wolfgang Dold, said:

“On this subject there is a legal aspect and a moral and political one. Concerning the legal aspect, the essence is that there is no legal base for Greece to claim reparations from Germany. The legal reasons are complex and I would not like to elaborate because of this complexity and because I have to be absolutely accurate... I understand that there are different approaches on the legality of the claims... as Germans we always accepted our moral responsibility for what happened in Greece.... when we go to all these villages whose inhabitants were martyred, we completely understand the magnitude of the sorrow inflicted, because the wounds are still open. On a moral basis, I understand that Greece can claim and Germany can do more to prove that undertakes responsibility of her past.... The official position of the federal government is that there is no difference between the forced occupation loan and the remaining claims for reparations.... As a lawyer I know that there are some legal questions that need to be answered. That is, if the claims have a legal basis, and if they do, whether they have been satisfied, but even if they have not been satisfied, if they can be satisfied although they exist.”

According to “*To Vima*”, the commission, responsible for the calculation of the height of the war reparations, arrived at a clear conclusion: “Greece never received any compensation, either for the loans it was forced to provide to Germany or for the

damages it suffered during the war.” The research is based on 761 volumes of archival material, including documents, agreements, court decisions and legal texts. The newspaper did not offer any concrete information regarding the possible extent of reparation demands. Earlier calculations though from Greek organizations have set the total owed by Germany at €108 billion for reconstruction of the country's destroyed infrastructure and a further €54 billion resulting from forced loans paid by Greece to Nazi Germany between 1942 and 1944.¹²²

5.1.5. Civil War: Golden Dawn against Left and vice versa.



Alta sedent civilis vulnera dextrae, will say Marcus Annaeus Lucanus in order to underline the importance of the wounds caused by a civil strife.¹²³ These exactly wounds are being present in the Greek political sphere right after the end of the Civil War in 1949. However after the end of the military dictatorship in 1974 and the entry of Greece to the European family in 1981 these discussions started to be forgotten. What happened to Greece in terms of economy brought also political instability and the come-back of the ghosts of the past. After 2010 the leftwing parties of the Opposition opposed the austerity and the bailout agreement followed by the Government and used rhetoric that for the first time after decades demanded a government of the Left and were referring to the civil war leftwing figures of that period. At the same time activists of the extreme Right and in many cases openly neo-Nazi were pretending to be nationalists who were eager to overthrow the “quisling” pro EU government and to deal with the “anarchists and communists” of the Left who wished to transform Greece to a socialist country. To be clear Golden Dawnists entered the political debate with openly anti-left agenda similar to the one of the Civil War and the postwar period.

I counted the civil war, the antifascist references and the anti-left references from the four political leaders as well. And I found out that the two left parties criticize strongly Golden Dawn for their Nazi affiliation and on the other hand Golden Dawn replies back by accusing the Left of being enemies of the state. Also Independent Greeks are criticizing the Golden Dawn party strongly. There is a chart below:

Civil War references in the Greek Parliament from the political leaders of the groups from June 2012 to December 2013.

¹²² The loans were issued by the Bank of Greece and were used to pay for supplies and wages for the German occupation force

¹²³ Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (November 3, 39– April 30, 65), one of the outstanding figures of the Imperial Latin period. His epic poem *Pharsalia* deals with the civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey. The wounds of civil war are deeply felt. *Pharsalia* (I, 32) He will also write *Omnibus hostes Reddite nos populis--civile avertite bellum*. (Make us enemies of every people on earth, but prevent a civil war), *Pharsalia* (II, 52)





The head of Golden Dawn, Nikos Michaloliakos uses a strong language to verbally attack to the left parties. He is saying “I wonder what you have to say the components of Trotsky, Mao, Lenin and Stalin with this famous "I'll troublemakers to legitimacy." What a shame not to know a hundred years ago, not to have their revolution, waiting to rock the legality Kerensky.”¹²⁴ Here identifies the Greek left with the soviet regimes

¹²⁴ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 07-07-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

of Cold War. He will not stop here the provocations towards them. On April the 28th 2013 he will make fun of them by saying: You can light a candle to Lenin in the evening, to have quiet your conscience!”¹²⁵ He implies that leftwing ideas are dead like their founder and he identify left with soviet terror. “The other side we have left, which makes either Marxist analyzes in this Chamber for an ideology that has historically bankrupt...”¹²⁶ “Proletarians gaggle longer exist in this country, too many. Why not make a revolution? How to make the revolution? Visiting Mr. Schäuble and the International Monetary Fund? So will rise proles? Anyway, let's consider the leftists who choose and whom I honor, if they remain true to their ideology.”¹²⁷

Michaloliakos openly admits the antileft and fascist character of its party by saying that: We proudly say that we are Greek nationalists and anti-capitalist and anti-Marxist.¹²⁸ Although he does not accept the accusation of being Nazi, something that the political group that is in charge of will be accused and imprisoned for committing criminal actions against leftwing civilians and refugees.



¹²⁵ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 28-04-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 11-11-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

Here comes a poster from Golden Dawn, where it is being clarified that a similar poster was used by the Nazis. It is saying: For every immigrant employee, there is one Greek unemployed.

Independent Greeks as I mentioned above are a nationalist formation. Why are they attacking Golden Dawn in the Parliament and accusing them of being Nazi? The answer is that Panos Kammenos wishes to collaborate with the major opposition party, which remains SYRIZA in order to form an anti-austerity government. Kammenos understands the Left not as a political and ideological enemy but as a necessary ally to overthrow the “quislings” of the government. He addressed the National Assembly: “Finish “left” and “right”. Come together, beneath the Greek flag, to liberate their homeland.¹²⁹ At the same time, both Kammenos and Michaloliakos they gain votes from the same political family and they understand each other as opponent. Thus although Kammenos uses nationalist references in the Parliament, he supports the political claims of SYRIZA and opposes the Golden Dawn MP’s as Nazis. More specifically he will say: Ask us not to hate the Greeks. We as Independent Greeks, we ask you to unite, to confront racism and Nazism who came to the Greek Parliament and from this podium said they did not recognize the Holocaust. And there again: “We cannot put the Nazis to create the bad with the good. Why those who want to subjugate the country will use the good old recipe for discord, we paid our fathers and our grandfathers.”¹³⁰ He will also call the government to stop this economic policy, threatening them that a civil strife might raise. “The solution is to tell them that the continuation of this policy will lead to an uprising of the Greek people and a civil war. There will result.”¹³¹

SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras are collaborating in the Parliament with the political group of Independent Greeks but they are attacking the neo-Nazi political group. Tsipras condemns the racist ideology of the Nazis, asks for the exception of the pro-Nazi party in Parliament and believes that “A great shame for the country that are here, the defenders of the Nazis, those who previously told us that the children are the losers of World War II and today changed our hymn and say that children are the winners of the civil war.¹³² He is underlying that “democracy today is threatened not only by all those who saw the light and came from these bigots who until yesterday we were told that the children are the losers of World War II and today suddenly

¹²⁹ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 06-06-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 08-07-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹³² Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 24-04-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

changed hymn and tell us that children are the winners of the civil War, sowing hatred and division in the country.”¹³³

Tsipras used historical examples to argue that there is a danger that modern left is facing from the current government and which is the identification of communism with fascism. “In a historical period”, he argues, “that official ideology of the state was anticommunism and international orientation of the country was the wholehearted commitment to the western camp of the Cold War, the ideas were considered some extreme, not legal. Much more these ideas excite the post-civil war deep state, which at that time was powerful, a deep state with strong ties to the political system, with strong connections in the Army and Security Forces, with a furious anti-communist oriented, violent, illegal, offensive practice , a not-insignificant-para-led former collaborators of the occupying troops, who in any other European country were sentenced to prison, only in our country colleagues losers of WWII were proud winners of the Civil War.”¹³⁴

This fear of an anti-left syndrome is present not only in Tsipras’ but in Pappariga’s speeches as well. Both they warn the government to stop posing the issue of the two extremes and they don’t accept the equitation of communism and fascism. Pappariga warned that “Equations communism and fascism not try to expand in Greece, as has been the official state ideology in Europe”¹³⁵ and “We got a past that we can not underestimate. But will not this out. We are not the Golden Dawn to go and say: 'No! we? Deco was the swastika. "We would say: "The hammer and sickle pick it up because we believe.”¹³⁶ She said the latter one to attack the Golden Dawn’s MPs of not supporting their ideology and deny in in front of the Court in order to avoid being imprisoned.

¹³³ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 17-05-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹³⁴ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 18-06-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹³⁵ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 08-07-2012. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

¹³⁶ Season of Presidential Parliamentary Republic on 17-10-2013. Available at: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/I-Bibliothiki/Koinovouleftiki-Syllogi/Praktika-Synedriaseon/>, retrieved on 05-05-2014.

6. Conclusion and future studies

The economic crisis affects everybody. Poverty, unemployment and insecurity can be fertile ground for the rise of radical political parties. The politics of anger and blame are keen on luring the electorate on the directions they wish. Under such a situation people need somebody to blame, people need an other. This other in the Greek case has many names (Germany, Merkel, Troika officials, EU officials, IMF). Not only they find this other by depicting EU or Germany but they are driven to this path by various populists, nationalists and survivors of World War II and Civil War. Political leaders like Kammenos and Tsipras make use of rhetoric of memory along with populist and in certain cases totally anti-European cries. A unique phenomenon that two different political actors from totally opposite political start-points they combine their powers in Parliament to demand what according to them is right, the end of austerity. In an era that human devastation becomes more and more present these two politicians promote anti-Germanism throughout their speeches and their political actions. At the same time another force comes on the surface to threaten the foundations of democracy, to disrespect human rights and to oppose the loss of national sovereignty. Golden Dawn, a political establishment of the extreme Right reminds us of their presence as well as of what they are willing to do. According to the analysis part regarding Civil War references, Golden Dawn MPs bring back an anti-left hate that was absent from the political sphere.

For Independent Greeks, Golden Dawn and SYRIZA to some extent, the Andersonian imaginary community exists. A notion of a nation, which places his greatest achievements in the distant past. What they don't understand is the absence of the true collective memory, since whatever we may call "memory of X" is given and constructed. Something that in a certain society has been remembered as a trauma for somebody else in another society might be of zero importance. Also there is need to point out that what we may call "collective memory" does not necessarily mean that has ever happened or has anything to do with reality. National myths were being constructed for the sake of unity among the population of a nation. Also traumatic events need to be erased from memory in order to continue the long journey of brotherhood and peaceful co-existence in the European Family. Political leaders and deputies from either Independent Greeks, Golden Dawn or even SYRIZA feed the paranoia and the illusions of a national greatness without considering the consequences. However there have been cases when European counterparts who from time to time found it expedient to fan the flames of nationalism ethnical divisions and finger-pointing.

The power of memory affects political discourse in such a way that in that is located at the heart of political debate, especially after the deepening crisis in the last two years, which proves that it is difficult to forget and more devastating to remember. As our continent continues its journey to a further integration, cohesion and solidarity come on the surface, however due to many socio-economic factors that lead to the rise of Euro-skepticism, the traumas and shadows of the past enter the main core of the

political debates in various European member states and especially to ones that are being affected more of the current economic crisis. Greece is one of them and the main purpose of this master thesis proposal has been to analyze all the parameters and to come to a conclusion about why and how are the mnemonic references coming to the surface and what is the intention that is being served by such a choice.

Concluding I would like to mention that for further research on this topic in the future might be of great interest to do a comparative study of the phenomenon of rightwing extremism in Greece, France and Hungary, where the extreme right movements get high percentages and also where this rightwing extremism does not shape itself with the form of a simple populist right, but of one of openly nationalistic origin. Among the parties intended to study are Golden Dawn and Independent Greeks as well as Front National and Jobbik. Also, endeavour to research the impact of past memory and greatness, within the theoretical framework of memory studies, on their attitudes towards the EU. As this master thesis did, for future research I would like to use as material the political speeches of the party representatives in the national parliaments. The time framework also will cover the post 2009 period, when the international economic crisis has started.

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