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A Chinese Soft Power Discourse Forced to Dig Deeper

Critical Discourse Analysis of the Power Struggles in
Relation to China's Investments in Zambian Mines

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Abstract

The first aim of this thesis were to analyze China's discourse of soft power in relation to their investments in the Zambian mining industry from the year 2000 to 2012. From a combination of Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis and Joseph Nye's soft power theory, I can conclude, that in the 12 years period the Chinese soft power discourse was dominating and China could persuade and attract Zambia into more cooperation and trade.

The second aim of my thesis were to analyze the discourses constructed in the Zambian media, public and government as a reaction to the Chinese mining investments. Here I found that the tensions, shooting incidents and strikes among Zambian mine workers, together with the Zambian authorities acting against the law, have been constructing an anti-Chinese discourse and a non-functioning authority discourse. Moreover, did the Zambian President change from being the frontier of the anti-Chinese discourse to constructing a light soft power discourse.

Finally, from analyzing the Human Rights Watch report, I found that it clearly has constituted an anti-Chinese discourse, which has forced China to stand against the bad reputation in this particular case. I found that China has focused much more on their attractive culture, but more is needed against the anti-Chinese discourse, so it seems as they have to dig deeper.

Contents

1	Introduction	4
1.1	Aim	5
1.2	Research Questions	5
1.3	Approach and Limitations	5
2	Theoretical Framework and Concept	7
2.1	Globalization and World Polity	8
2.1.1	The Nation-State and International Organizations	9
2.2	Soft Power	10
2.2.1	Resources of Soft Power	11
2.2.2	Public Diplomacy and Soft Power	14
3	Social Constructionist Approach	16
4	Critical Discourse Analysis	17
4.0.3	The Discourse Dimensions	20
4.0.4	Text Analysis	20
4.0.5	Discursive Practice	21
4.0.6	Social Practice	21
4.0.7	Discourse, Hegemony and Power	22
4.0.8	Interpretation	23
5	Critical Discourse Analysis of Struggling Power Relations	23
5.1	Chinese Soft power Discourse When Investing in Zambian Mine Industry	23
5.1.1	Political Values in the Speeches	24
5.1.2	Attractive Culture Exchange in the Speeches	27
5.1.3	Foreign Policies in the Speeches	29
5.1.4	Discursive Practice in the Speeches	31
5.2	Zambian Reaction to Chinese Mining Investments	36
5.2.1	Zambian Public's and Media's Reaction	36
5.2.2	Zambian Government's Reaction	38
5.2.3	Discursive Practice in Zambian Media and Public	40
5.2.4	Discursive Practice in Zambian Government	42
5.3	Non-governmental organizations' interference	43

5.3.1	Text Analysis	43
5.3.2	Discursive Practice	46
5.4	Social Practice Analysis of All Material	48
6	Conclusion	52

1 Introduction

The American and European countries was not invited in October 2000 when representatives from 44 African countries met with their Chinese host, President Jiang Zemin, in Beijing, to open the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (FOCAC 2004). The conference was a political statement and outlined the direction for the development of the long-term partnership between China and Africa, based upon historical similarities, mutual benefit and equality.

China has become the most active foreign investor in the Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War, and the China-Africa trade grew over 100 billion USD in 2008 (Lim 2012, p. 548). Furthermore, the African countries are expecting continuously large investments from China, and with FOCAC China has showed the political will to strengthen Chinese investments in Africa even further.

Zambia is one of the oldest diplomatic partners of China, which has been present in Zambia since the Zambian independence in 1964. Apart from South Africa, Zambia is the main destination for non-oil investment in Africa, and in 2006, China was the largest investor in Zambia (Kragelund & Bastholm 2008, p. 68). In 2013 the Chinese Ambassador said that *"[a]bout 2.6 billion US dollars of FDI have been channelled into Zambia's economy, creating more than 50,000 job opportunities."* (Yuxiao 2013). Although China is active in construction, agriculture, energy supply, manufacturing, and telecommunications, the heart of its involvement in Zambia remains in mining industry, and the Zambian Copperbelt also remains the "backbone of the Zambian economy", contributing to nearly 75 percent of the country's exports and two-thirds of the central government revenue during years of strong copper prices (HRW 2011, pp. 17-20).

However, the China-Zambian partnership has received notable attention for the reported anti-Chinese sentiment among the Zambian population (Bracht 2012, pp. 55). Especially in 2011, when Human Rights Watch published a report titled *"You'll Be Fired if You Refuse" - Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines* with the clear message of China's firms to be Zambian copper mining's "worst employers" (HRW 2011, pp. 3).

1.1 Aim

The aim of this thesis is to analyze China's discourse of soft power in relation to their investments in the Zambian mining industry from the year 2000 to 2012. Moreover, I want to analyze the discourses constructed in the same period in the Zambian media, public and government as a reaction to the Chinese mining investments. Finally, I want to analyze the role that Human Rights Watch plays as an NGO in the struggle between the discourses constructed in relation to China's investments in Zambian mines.

1.2 Research Questions

1. How are the discourse of soft power dominant in relation to China's investments in Zambian mines from the year 2000 to 2012?
2. Which discourses are constructed in the Zambian media, public and government as an reaction to China's investments in Zambian mines from the year 2000 to 2012?
3. Which role does an international non-governmental organization as Human Rights Watch play in the struggle between the discourses constructed in relation to China's investments in Zambian mines?

1.3 Approach and Limitations

There is an incredibly large number of studies and research papers done on the topic of Chinese Soft power, which made me focus on China's investments only in the country Zambia. As described above in the introduction, China have been investing in Zambia since 1964, mostly in the mining industry. Well-knowing that my theory and methodology is within a social constructionist approach and therefore highly determined on the specific context, I am then leaving out all other kind of discussions and discourses that could be found in all the other African countries, in which China also are investing. There has also been a boom in Chinese investments in Africa concerning textiles, machinery and electrical goods, which may have drawn on other discourses, but I have left these other industries out of my discussion as well (TheEconomist2013 2013).

As mentioned in my introduction the mining industry in Zambia, is the industry must invested in, and if the safety and health concerns are not taking

seriously by the investors, the society will complaint and revolt. Unfortunately, this is the reason why Zambia, in my case, is very interesting, because the Chinese mining investments has affected the Zambian public, media and government together with the rest of the world society and especially the non-governmental organizations.

Below I will explain the reasons for choosing a critical discourse analysis even though it will be based on few materials such as speeches, web based news articles and a non-governmental organization research report.

Firstly, the China's soft power approach in Africa, has been a very discussed and researched theme and concept over the last decade. However, I do not find other papers combining the Chinese soft power approach with a discourse analysis, and how this soft power discourse struggles with other discursive power relations, which I find really interesting. I therefore, first have to analyze and find the different discourses within this field of Chinese investments in Zambian mines, and that alone could take up a whole thesis. However, with a focus on a limited, but specifically selected, aspect of material, I still find it enough to clarify the different discourses, and furthermore to analyze the struggles in between these discourses.

Secondly, it was unfortunately difficult for me to find speeches, statements or laws from the Zambian government or qualitative studies of the Zambian inhabitants' opinions in relation to the Chinese mining investments. It must be due to the lack of transparency in the Zambian government, together with the needed specific focus of such a qualitative study of the Zambian public opinions. However, I still think my critical discourse analysis of the Zambian reactions to the Chinese mining investments can be based on few web based news articles, because it gives an insight into the produced discourses, which I can use in my further analysis. Then when I make my conclusions, I have to bare in mind, that it is based on a limited material, which also can be biased and have a specific intention when produced ¹. Moreover, the total adult literacy rate in Zambia was 61.4% in 2012 and 13.5% of the Zambian population were internet users in 2012, which also affects my conclusions(Unicef 2013).

Thirdly, I didn't have the possibility to travel to Zambia and do my own field study of either the government officials opinions or the Zambian people's,

¹The following Zambian newspapers are government owned: Zambia Daily Mail, The Post, Times of Zambia, ZANIS

which would have been the most optimal basis for a discourse analysis, but based on the speeches and articles I will be able to create a foundation for such an analysis.

Finally, I will base my critical discourse analysis of the NGO's role in the discourse struggle on a report published in 2011 by the NGO Human Rights Watch. There are of course other NGOs working and affecting the discourses surrounding China's mine investments in Zambia. However, Human Rights Watch is a large and known NGO, which many other international organizations and politicians rely on. Therefore, did this report, titled "*You'll Be Fired if You Refuse*" - *Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines*", create a lot of international awareness and discussion, also from the Chinese government, who felt the need to comment the accusations against them in the report. I therefore find it very relevant to analyze what kind of discourse it has constituted, well knowing that it only shows the discourse constituted from one NGO, which makes it impossible for me to generalize a broad picture of all NGOs working in Zambia.

With my chosen methodology and materials I still think I can give an insight into the different discourses, how they have changed and how they are affecting each other and struggling in this specific part of the globalized world society of conflicting discourses.

2 Theoretical Framework and Concept

As indicated above, my key concepts of globalization and soft power are complex terms and I will therefore explain these in my theoretical framework below, before I continue with my methodology and analysis.

Economic globalization combined with digital communication networks are often seen as the leading driving force of processes of globalization, especially regarding the development of new products, services, and markets. The nation-states are no longer in full control of the industrial processes and financial exchanges, because the national economies are engaged in attracting multinational corporations, by providing good infrastructure, corporate tax breaks, well-skilled labour forces etc. (Nash 2010, pp. 43-44). However, different theorists also describes other underlining structures in the globalized world society.

The sociologist John W. Meyer (Born 1935) and other "World Polity" the-

orists like John Boli and George M. Thomas have theorized about how to understand globalization and the different actors, from an understanding of the underlying cultural structures.

According to Meyer, other theorists explain global development as matters exclusively of power and influence relations. However, the American political scientist Joseph Nye (Born 1937) theorizes about power relations in connection to culture (Nash 2010, p. 61).

In my theoretic framework, I will combine both Meyer's theory about the world polity and Nye's soft power theory.

2.1 Globalization and World Polity

According to the world polity theorists, globalization is not caused by capitalism, but due to *"the effective influence of individuals and organizations since the nineteenth century who have successfully spread universal ideas around the world"* (Nash 2010, p. 59). Meyer, who was leading in the world polity theory, therefore deals with cultural processes and how they change at a global level.

I will here describe his view on globalization, and the dominant actors; the nation-states and the international organizations.

Meyer believes globalization is based on actorhood, where nation-states and organizations are actors together with individual persons. He describes globalization as a number of dimensions with different actors involved. Globalization means interdependence between both nation-states, regarding political and military affairs, and between national and subnational economies including different multilateral and international public and private organizations. Additionally, it also means an enlarged number of individual persons migrating and traveling, along with culture spreading through the intensified global means of communication (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 156).

Meyer develops his theory on a strong background of two properties: *"...the fact that the modern world is stateless [In the sense of a single overruling world state] and that it is made out of strong, culturally constituted actors."* (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 158). The world has some important organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, together with some powerful nation-states and economies, which all are influencing this system. However, there are

no single authority dominant and sovereign to the whole world. Meyer does not see a push for a stronger world state bureaucracy, but a broad world polity, with shared rules and norms defining what are proper actions of nation-states, organizations and individuals. This is also his explanation of an explosion in international governmental and non-governmental associations. However, when there is no sovereign world polity determining one single world policy, there will always arise issues on subjects such as human rights offenses or economic exploitation (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 158-59).

Furthermore, Meyer understands culture as underlying all sectors and social practices of society, but he operationalizes culture down to mainly Western understood principles, such as human rights and rule of law. The principles manifest themselves in scientific, professional, and legal knowledge at all dimensions about the operation of states, societies and individuals. He sees these cultural practices as universal and highly consensual, and thereby also as generally recognized and potentially applicable worldwide (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 177).

2.1.1 The Nation-State and International Organizations

According to Meyer, all nation-states as well as other national and local actors in all areas of society from economy, politics, education, health and science, to family and religion are shaped by this global models of the world culture principles (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 177).

Meyer foresees, that the homogeneity of these world cultural principles and scripts leads to an increasing structural adaptation of behaviors around the world. He calls this process for "isomorphism", and the main understanding of his world polity approach is that nation-states, and other actors around the globe, become increasingly similar or isomorphic. It will happen since they are increasingly shaped by the shared global cultural principles, models and scripts, which are considered of all to be legitimate or appropriate (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 160). However, the nation-states, organizations, and individuals also contributes to the content and structure of the world culture, as well as to the change of this world culture (Meyer et al. 2008, p. 80).

The nation-state seeks external recognition from other specific dominant

powers, and they must show international actors such as the United Nations, that they demonstrate to control their population and territory, at the same time, as having proper aims and purposes for their country's development. In that way the guidance for a nation-state consists of all the other nation-states in the world, as well as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other associations.

If a nation-state neglects to adopt any world-approved policies, there will be not only a general pressure from the world society, as well as local units and actors like schools, religious groups, and activists groups, but also a call for action and changes (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 177), (Nash 2010, p.60).

Even though the nation-state is the focus of Meyer's world polity theory, international non-governmental organizations are very important too, because they also represent, carries out and develop these global principles (Nash 2010, p.60). As mentioned above, he found, that the number of governmental and non-governmental organizations have expanded significantly since 1945, covering a broad range of issues such as education, economic development, human rights, science, and health. Moreover, does several of the international non-governmental organizations have a "social movement" character, where they fight for a specific issue (Krücken & Drori 2009, p. 190).

If I were to take a critical standpoint regarding Meyer's world polity theory, I would question if it fully explains globalization, and here I mostly think about his definition and description of the universal, global, and cultural principles and how local values and culture are affecting the undergoing global cultural principles.

2.2 Soft Power

Power is a very complex term in social sciences and politics. So is the term soft power, which I am focusing on in this thesis.

There are different definitions of soft power and it can vary depending on geographic contexts; Western or Asian. In this thesis the concept of soft power will be based upon Nye's approach, who in the 1990's was the first to systematically theorize about soft power based on U.S. politics. To understand soft power Nye starts by defining power as "*...the ability to influence the behavior*

of others to get the outcomes one wants." (Nye 2004, p. 2).

Nye splits power into hard power and soft power. Hard power is the common way of thinking of power, as the action where you command people to something, and thereby get the outcome you want. In that case it will rest on *"...inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks")"* (Nye 2004, p. 5). Soft power, on the other side, is the ability to get what you want through attraction and seduction, rather than coercion or payments" (Nye 2004, p. 5). However, it is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by arguments, even though it can be a part of it. He describes soft power as attractive power, and an appealing attraction, which persuades someone to go along with others' purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place (Nye 2004, p. 6).

When talking about commanding versus attracting, Nye thinks of behavioral power, but to produce the power Nye also speaks about soft power resources, as well as hard power resources, as assets to influence the desirable outcomes. Furthermore, he claims that soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of a spectrum of behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behaviors (Nye 2004, p. 7). However, he also makes it clear that hard power and soft power are related. They both could be considered to be affecting others' behaviors in order to achieve the outcomes one wants. On the other hand, soft power does not depend on hard power. You can have great soft power, without having hard power resources, or a country can have a large population, a lot of land, economic growth, a strong military force and social stability, without getting the outcomes it wants (Nye 2004, p. 9).

2.2.1 Resources of Soft Power

To go more into depth with the power resources, Nye describes how a country's hard power consist of military forces including weapons, troops, tactics, manpower and treaths, and the economically power resources as sanctions, bribes, payments, natural resources as gas and oil (Nye 2004, pp. 6, 31), (Nye 2011, pp. 42, 62). Regarding a country's soft power, he mentions three primary resources:

"Its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political

values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)”

(Nye 2004, p. 11)

Culture is a very broad term, which makes it vague and hard to define. Nye is also well known of the many definitions of culture, but he chooses a definition of culture from the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, saying that culture is *“the pattern of social behaviors by which groups transmit knowledge and values, and it exists at multiple levels”* (Nye 2011, p. 84). Lifestyle, media as TV, movies and news, religion, language, education, and food are all involved in his definition of culture. It can be universal and attractive to all human beings, or it can be nationally oriented or even concentrated to a smaller group of people. Culture is never static. According to Nye the politicians and other officials are always promoting their policies with cultural aspects, and thereby promoting their own interests. Culture is, however, difficult for them to control and it is not enough with culture alone, but it helps to export and transmit culture, ideas and values (Nye 2004, pp. 11-13), (Nye 2011, pp. 84-85).

Nye are not defining political values as clear as culture in his works, but it is in a high degree connected to culture. He does not define political values as universal. However, due to globalization, he mentions American political values such as democratic participation and freedom of speech becoming more or less universal. Nevertheless, conflicts and wars are proof of different countries have different political values (Nye 2011, p. 87).

Regarding foreign policy Nye is quite clear in describing it as an important resource, enhancing a country’s soft power. If a nation-state succeeds in influencing and shaping international rules and agendas through international organizations, they will also have a greater possibility to affect others with their own culture and political values. Furthermore, he argues that a nation-state will be able to save money on otherwise costly hard power resources. However, policies can both have a long-term and a short-term effect, which depend on the context (Nye 2004, p. 13).

Many different factors are affecting soft power, and soft power does not necessarily belong to a government in the same degree as hard power does. At

the same time, soft power is not as controllable as hard power. This is highly due to the connection to policies, which instead makes soft power resources work indirectly to affect and shape the receiving audience to accept and change (Nye 2004, p. 14). Also, there can be other resources playing a role as well. A successful growing economy and a competent military are resources, that can be converted into soft power, and it can be very hard to distinguish, what part economy plays in a power relationship (Nye 2011, pp. 85, 99).

This is therefore also one of the critiques of Nye's soft power concept. That, when the governments are not in control of how, for example, their culture is influencing others, they have no practical use of the term soft power. Furthermore, it is also less relevant for them in some areas as for example preventing attacks, policing borders and protection of allies or specific persons. Nye is responding to this critique by saying, that the governments cannot, and should not control the culture, but they should instead control their actions and policies in the way as it supports the civil society's soft power, rather than undercutting it (Nye 2004, p. 17).

Other people criticizes Nye's theory, by saying, that attraction and imitation are simply that, and that there is no need to make it as complex, as he does. Nye are already aware of that, but it is also why he emphasizes, that you always have to look at the context. In some conditions, an attraction will lead to the expected outcome, but in others it will not. It is thereby important to look at, who relates to whom, and under what circumstances. Moreover, soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers (Nye 2004, pp. 15-16).

When taking this into consideration, I still find Nye's soft power theory highly relevant in my thesis, because I am focusing on how the Zambian government, public, media and international non-governmental organizations as Human Rights Watch are receivers and interpreters of China's soft power, and questioning whether they are producing a soft power discourse as well. Nye also proclaims, that in order to discover and prove soft power, you will also have to look at the broad public opinion and cultural attitudes, because the states have to involve the public and non-state actors in order to ensure a soft power result (Nye 2011, pp. 95-97).

2.2.2 Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

Soft power sometimes works passive for a nation-state or another actor, but often an actor must do an active effort in order to create attraction and persist soft power. This is possible through different strategies as for example public diplomacy, broadcasting or exchanges (Nye 2011, p. 94). It is not a new thing, that nation-states are promoting themselves with a positive image, but the technological ways of doing this, and the larger amount of people in the world being able to access information has changed. Therefore, credibility and reputation has become very important, when exercising soft power. This fight for credibility is not only between governments, but also includes non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, media, corporations, and scientific communities (Nye 2011, pp. 103-4).

As mentioned above, incorporation of soft power into a government strategy is hard, because you have less control of the outcomes, than compared to hard power. Moreover, the target of your soft power strategies also has some kind of control too. In addition, soft power is working slower than hard power, which is also slowing the visible results. This makes Nye emphasize, that soft power *"is often hard to use, easy to lose, and costly to reestablish"* (Nye 2011, pp. 83, 100).

According to Nye, attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility are key words when producing soft power. Those who appeal most to the global norms will attract most power (Nye 2004, pp. 31-32). On the other hand, the governments or other actors loses credibility, whenever their strategies and public diplomacy instead are perceived as manipulative and their information as propaganda (Nye 2011, p. 83).

In order to enhance their success, soft power actors have to know the preferences and the context, that they are working within, because that influences the ability to get positive attraction. Therefore, actors have to make sure that they have the skills to convert the right soft power resources into the preferred behavioral outcomes. The same actions in another context, would not have the same outcomes (Nye 2011, p. 22).

Nye refers to three ways that soft power resources can be converted into soft power behavior, and thereby attract and create credibility and trust. The

three ways are "attraction", "persuasion", and "framing" an agenda (Nye 2011, p. 91).

Attraction is a complex term, but in this case it is all about generating positive attraction, instead of negative. Nye uses a definition from the political scientist Alexander Vuving, who describes three actions that creates attraction, which is to be perceived by others as kind and favorable, act with competence, and have and use charisma.

Secondly, Nye defines persuasion as the use of arguments to influence the beliefs and actions of others without the threats, use of force, or promises of payments.

The third way to create soft power behavior, is by framing an agenda or an argument through narratives, that are promoting certain understandings and at the same time appeals to people's emotions, instead of using hardcore facts and difficult academic reasoning (Nye 2011, pp. 92-94).

According to Nye there are two ways in which soft power affects its targets; direct and indirect. This is important to keep in mind, when thinking of the context an actor is working within. The direct form is when leaders and governments are attracted and persuaded by other leaders, while the indirect and more often seen form is when non-governmental actors and the public are affected and involved, which then is putting a pressure on the leaders (Nye 2011, pp. 94-95).

Furthermore, the non-state actors within and outside a country are affecting both the public and governing elites. Therefore, communicating and working with non-state actors are important when carrying out public diplomacy (Nye 2011, pp. 101-2).

Nye emphasizes that public diplomacy is not simple propaganda or a single public relations campaign. There are three equally important stages in public diplomacy, which support the environment for creating soft power. Daily communication to explain contexts of decisions, strategic communication to "campaign" for different themes, and thirdly a development of lasting partnerships with key individuals (Nye 2011, pp. 105-6).

3 Social Constructionist Approach

Nye directly says that *"Attraction and persuasion are socially constructed"* (Nye 2011, p. 84), because the production of soft power depends on the actors involved, and how it is interpreted by the audience or target (Nye 2011, p. 92). Therefore, with my theoretical approach - I am here referring to Meyer's view of globalization and world polity, as well as Nye's soft power approach - I inscribes myself into a social constructionist position regarding philosophy of science.

Social constructionism is a very broad approach including a large range of different theories about culture and society and I will briefly explain the approach (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 4).

According to the social scientist Alfred Schütz (Born 1899), facts are constructed in our mind, and thereby it is said, that the reality is created by us, and only exist because we perceive it. This does not mean that it is made from scratch every time, because as he says, we are using categories.

"All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, namely, a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple."

(Schütz 1953, p. 2)

The two sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann says, that we have been socialized with these categories, which we also then reproduced in our everyday life (Berger & Luckmann 1967, pp. 38-39).

From a social constructionists position the process of gaining knowledge is not automatically driven by the forces of nature, but is the result of individuals interacting together (Gergen 1985, p. 267). As the psychologist Kenneth J. Gergen said *"Knowledge is not something people possess somewhere in their heads, but rather, something people do together"* (Gergen 1985, p. 270). So because all individuals have different minds, phenomena also relate to us differently, depending on social context and individual experiences.

According to social constructionism the scientists have access to the world through language and linguistic practices. They are concerned with understanding the social processes, by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world and themselves in their everyday life (Gergen 1985, pp. 266-67).

A discursive practice is a social practice that shapes the social world. Discursive practices reproduces or changes other processes of social practices, just as other social processes shapes the discursive dimension. *"Together, the discursive dimension and the other dimensions of social practice constitute our world"* (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, pp. 18-19).

4 Critical Discourse Analysis

Michel Foucault has played a central role in the development of discourse analysis through both theoretical work and in almost all discourse analytical approaches, Foucault has become a figure to quote, relate to, comment on, modify and criticize (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 12). Foucault's many writings involves the description and analysis of the different historical relationships between power, knowledge and subjectivity, and these three concepts remain his main themes.

According to Foucault, power exist in every social relation, and any relationship is thus a power relationship. At the same time power is decentered and spread across various social practices and distributed at all levels in all domains of social life. Power always produce resistance and life is a struggle between these power relations. Power do not belong a particular class in society and it is not used to oppress other groups. *"In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege', acquired or preserved[...]"*(Foucault 1979, pp. 26-27).

An important part of my thesis is to connect Nye's soft power concept with a discourse analysis in order to analyze the struggle of discourses when China invests in the Zambian mine industry. As described in the theoretical framework, an important part of Nye's soft power approach is power resources. Nye's definition of power therefore differs from Foucault's, whose view on power discards the possibility to possess power resources.

The different discourse analysis approaches also differ in their position in

the debate about the relationship between structures and agents. Foucault is viewing the individual as determined by structures, whereas critical discourse analysis and Norman Fairclough (Born 1941) sees individuals both determined by the structures and affecting and controlling the structures of language. Critical discourse analysis thereby stresses that people use discourses as resources with which they create new constellations of words and sentences that have never before been uttered. When using language people are able to draw from different discourses, which may result in new hybrid discourses. Through producing new discourses in this way, people function as agents of discursive and cultural change. Critical discourse analysis then present a theoretical foundation and specific methods for analysis of the dynamic discursive practices through which language users act as both discursive products and producers in the reproduction and transformation of discourses and thereby in social and cultural change (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 17).

This perspective, in combination with the textual dimension with linguistic analysis, makes Fairclough's model of critical discourse analysis particularly appropriate to apply to my thesis analysis.

Similarly to Nye, Fairclough notices, that there has been a shift in the relationship between language and politics. He therefore also puts particular focus on how language is used as a means to achieve political goals:

"Political differences have always been constituted as differences in language, political struggles over the dominant language, and both the theory and practice of political rhetoric go back to ancient times. Language has therefore always been a relevant consideration in political analysis"

(Fairclough 2000, p. 3)

The critical discourse approach is in that way politically committed to social change, and Fairclough is then taking the side of the oppressed social groups (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 64). Discourse analysis is also just one among the many social constructionist approaches, however one of the most used approaches within social constructionism (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 4).

I will in this thesis draw upon Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, because it emphasizes the role of language in power relations and provides a

useful analytical framework for discovering the power discourses when China invest in Zambian mines. This analysis will, however, only involve those theoretical and methodological aspects, that are required for the specific purposes of the thesis' subject.

Fairclough's approach to discourse analysis is *"...that language is an irreducible part of social life..."* (Fairclough 2003, p. 2). In the construction of the discourses, he is partly focusing on the linguistic understanding of discourses as large fragments of a spoken dialogue or text. This differs from the traditional linguistic focus, which consist of analyzing every single sentence and grammatical unit in detail. The focus is then on the relation between the persons communicating, together with the production and interpretation processes associated with the text as well as the context, in which the given language ranks within (Fairclough 1992, p. 3), (Fairclough 2001, pp. 5-6).

He complements this linguistic approach with social theory and analysis, where discourses are seen as an important form of social practice. Language helps to reproduce and transform identities, social relations and knowledge, including power relations. Furthermore, language is seen as a part of society, not external to it (Fairclough 2001, pp. 18-19).

As a scientist Fairclough sees it as his task to reveal the role of discursive practice, which helps to maintain unequal power relations in the social world. This is what makes his discourse analysis considered as critical (Fairclough 2010, p. 50), (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 63).

Fairclough sees discourses as a practice that not only represents the world, but which constitutes and constructs the world of meaning (Fairclough 1992, p. 64). He distinguishes between three aspects of discourses' constructive effect, which also corresponds with the three functions of language; an identity function, a relational function and an ideological function. Firstly, discourses contribute to the construction of social identities and positions as social subjects. Secondly, it constructs social relationships between people, and thirdly, discourses contributes to systems of knowledge. In linguistic contexts, the identity function deals with how social identities are constructed in a discourse. The relational function deals with how social relations between discursive individuals are negotiated and played out. The ideological function deals with how texts are naming the world, its processes and relationships (Fairclough 1992,

p. 64).

4.0.3 The Discourse Dimensions

When doing a discourse analysis, Fairclough divides it into two dimensions. Firstly, the communicative event, which in this case could be a speech by the Chinese president, while the other dimension is called discourse orders. Communicative events then reproduce orders of discourse, but can also change them through creative use of language. The discourse orders is the sum of all the genres and discourses which are in use within a specific social domain (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, pp. 71-72). So when the Chinese president draws upon a discourse, which is often spoken about within Chinese foreign politics, the president also takes part in the reproduction of that same discourse.

Every communicative event then has three dimensions to be analyzed, which are the text itself, the discursive practice, and the social practice.

The text analysis, is a light linguistic analysis of the text. Text is here seen as both the spoken and the written language, possibly combined with pictures. The dimension of discursive practice, specifies the processes involved in text production, distribution and text interpretation, for example, the discourses drawn on the text and how they are combined. The social practice is oriented towards the context, and thereby towards the institutional and organizational circumstances in which the communicative event is placed, and how these creates the discursive practices (Fairclough 1992, p. 4), (Fairclough 2001, pp. 20-21).

4.0.4 Text Analysis

Fairclough is in his text analysis inspired by the linguist Michael Halliday (Born 1925), and his way of doing text analysis called systemic linguistics, including systemic grammar. However, Fairclough also takes some text analytical concepts from other critical linguistics, and he describes the text analysis as complex and rather technical, incorporating several different types of analytical techniques (Fairclough 1992, p. 74).

Fairclough finds it necessary in the text analysis also to focus on for example "interactional control". When looking in the text you would also have to focus on who controls the interaction, as well as the organizational factors that

affect the interaction (Fairclough 2010, pp. 420-421). The study of interaction control is very oriented to determine who is powerful in the interaction, that takes place during a dialogue. There are many ways to explore this dominance relation, and thus many ways that power can be constituted.

When doing a text analysis with Fairclough's critical discourse approach, it has to be done according to four main parts: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. I will not go through these different terms here, but explain them in the analysis, as I use them.

4.0.5 Discursive Practice

The discursive practice deals with the production, distribution and interpretation of the texts. The discursive practice makes further use of discourse types. Discourses and genres combined in certain ways, in which discourse types together form an order of discourses (Fairclough 1992, p. 78).

The production of texts and interpretations depends on the specific social context. Therefore, it is important to examine the conditions for the production and interpretation, as they can provide insight into the implicit rules and routines, that the text has gone through. This would also cover the producer's background for representing the text in that specific way. Moreover, does the interpreter's position determines how the text will be consumed. The distribution of a text, may also have an influence on the form and the content, which makes it important to investigate how the text in the distribution are being reformulated and transformed (Fairclough 1992, p. 79).

Fairclough introduces three terms, when analyzing discursive practices, which is force, coherence and intertextuality. Again, I will wait with describing these terms, until I make use of them in the analysis.

4.0.6 Social Practice

As mentioned before, the discourses are very much seen as an important form of social practice, which helps to reproduce and transform identities, social relations and knowledge, including power relations.

The social practice is what Fairclough calls the non-discursive, because you have to find the partially non-discursive social and cultural relations and structures, which then provide the framework for the discursive practice. This can only be done by involving other relevant theories than discourse theory

(Fairclough 1992, p. 64). The relationship between the discourse and the social structures is not a one-way relationship, but a dialectical one. That is also why power relationships and power struggles are important to critical discourse analysis, because they affect each other. Therefore *"...social structures not only determine discourse, they are also a product of discourse"* (Fairclough 2001, p. 31).

4.0.7 Discourse, Hegemony and Power

Fairclough finds the concept of hegemony central in critical discourse analysis, because it gives a picture of the most powerful discourses in the society or in a specific social relation.

As previously mentioned does the order of discourses covers a total number of discourses in the social practice, where the different discourse types struggle for power. The concept of hegemony is indicative of this power struggle, which Fairclough elaborates as follows:

"A particular way (...) of conceptualizing power and the struggle for power in capitalist societies, which emphasizes how power depends on consent or acquiescence rather than just force, and the importance of ideology"

(Fairclough 2003, p. 218)

You can establish hegemony by creating alliances and establish one's own ideology rather than others through strategic struggles (Fairclough 1992, p. 92). The struggle continues constantly, because it is a dynamic process, where the outcome always will be temporary and open to change. Hegemony is never stable. One or more discourses may have a brief ascendancy through consent or negotiation, but a real victory will never take place because the struggle will continue (Fairclough 1992, p. 94).

According to Fairclough the concept of hegemony will help us to analyze, how discursive practices are parts of a larger social practice in which power relations are also parts of. He is also emphasizing, that there definitely is produced power discourses, when talking and acting face-to-face, but it is also possible to find power discourses as hidden power in the written language (Fairclough 2001, p. 41).

4.0.8 Interpretation

As a consequence of my choice of theoretical framework and philosophy of science approach, well knowing, that these theories are constructed, I am at the same time also myself constructing reality, when producing knowledge. As an analyst, I will always take a position in relation to the field I am studying, and that position plays a part in the determination of my analytical results. There will always be other positions in terms of how the reality will look (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 22).

When I interpret a text, it is a combination of what is in the text and what is inside me (Generally known as background knowledge, but what Fairclough calls interpretative procedures) (Fairclough 2001, p. 118). When interpreting a text, it is very important to also interpret the context.

Fairclough finds a difference between "description" and "interpretation". According to him interpretation is when analyzing the discursive and social practices (Fairclough 1992, p. 73). So it is expected of an analyst, to be as self-conscious as possible about the resources and discourses drawn upon, that you yourself is a part of (Fairclough 1992, p. 199). I am born and raised in Denmark, and I will therefore be interpreting from a Western discourse, because it is impossible to be totally neutral, but I will try to be as objective as possible and focus on the contexts of my analytical material.

5 Critical Discourse Analysis of Struggling Power Relations

With my theoretical foundation in Meyer's world polity theory describing the role of different actors in the globalized world society and Nye's soft power theory, I will in my analysis combine those theories with Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, which I can use as an analytical partly linguistic method to discover power relations.

5.1 Chinese Soft power Discourse When Investing in Zambian Mine Industry

In this first part of my analysis, I will analyze how the Chinese soft power discourse is expressed in a period of 12 years ranging from 2000 when Chi-

nese and African leaders established The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC is functioning as a diplomatic platform for consultation and formalization of Sino-African relations. Furthermore, is it complementing China's bilateral relations with individual African countries by creating this forum for Chinese and African leaders, where they can utilize the partnership to the fullest in terms of the potential of the available market and the business opportunities (Jansson 2009, p. 1).

Zambia is a member of FOCAC and they are thereby affected by the decisions and diplomatic discussions in FOCAC. Furthermore, the time period of 12 years is long enough to see a change in China's diplomatic approach to the Sino-African cooperation and the Chinese Ambassador in Zambia is also referring to FOCAC.

I have chosen four texts for this first part of my analysis. The two first texts are two opening speeches from both FOCAC's first ministerial conference in 2000 and the latest and fifth ministerial conference, held by the at that time of the speech current Chinese President. These two speeches are addressed to all the African member states of FOCAC, and not specifically Zambia. However, Zambia will be affected of the decisions and discussions in this forum, and I have chosen also to include a press briefing covering the fifth FOCAC ministerial conference, held by the Chinese Ambassador in Zambia in 2012, in this critical discourse analysis in order to show, what information from the forum are brought forward to Zambia specifically.

Finally, I also include another opening speech from a ceremony of "Zambia International Construction Materials and Light Industrial Trade Fair", held by the same Chinese Ambassador in Zambia as mentioned beforehand. This last speech is chosen because it is centralized about Chinese mining investments in Zambia. All four texts are available from the online archives of the Chinese governmental website.

5.1.1 Political Values in the Speeches

Nye describes that political values as democracy and human rights can be powerful sources for attraction, but it is not enough only to proclaim them. If they are not being carried out you will seem as a hypocritical and not attract any valuable power (Nye 2004, p. 55).

The first distinctly values in the speech by the, at that time, current Pres-

ident Jiang Zemin at the FOCAC first ministerial conference, is cooperation and friendship. According to President Zemin, China and Africa have had friendly cooperation in a 100 years. In the beginning of the speech he talks about Africa's and China's history, which is different, but there are however some similarities in their common past, like that they were oppressed and "the peoples" fought for independence and got it. He does not exactly say they were "oppressed", but uses a metaphor when describing how "[f]eudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism" was "[...]weighing down on the backs of the Chinese people". It is also important to notice that he mentions "the people" several times in these sections, and thereby includes every African and Chinese individual, emphasizing that it was the whole Chinese country and the whole continent of Africa, who were oppressed and fighting, and not only the military or particular groups or tribes. Another way of indicating the old fellowship between the two, is when he often uses the personal pronouns "we", "us", and "our" which supports the perception of China's and Africa's fellowship in this world (Zemin 2000).

Fairclough talks about the concept of modality, which has to do with the writer's authority. He divides modality into two dimensions, the first called relational modality, which is about the authority in a relation of participants. The second dimension is called expressive modality and where it is a matter of the "[...]writer's authority with respect to the truth or probability of a representation of reality[...]" (Fairclough 2001, p. 104). So the following sentence is illustrating expressive modality, when using the word "is", which makes the sentence seem as a fact:

"China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries."

(Zemin 2000)

Therefore, according to the President, it is a fact that China and Africa is equal, in the sense that they are both developing countries. In that way, he is relating to all the African countries in FOCAC, saying that they all are at same position in the world and opposed to the developed countries in the West. Africa fought the "colonial rule" and China the "imperialism", and this similar history reinforces their now common values of development, independence, equality and justice.

The values of peace are also key elements in the speech and it is connected to the value of responsibility, because if Africa and China work together and develops their friendship and cooperation, they will create "[...]the trend towards world peace and development[...]" (Zemin 2000). He is then implying, that they have to take the lead for world peace.

When looking at the speech held 12 years later at the same forum's conference, but with a new Chinese President the most distinctive value is again friendship and again the adjective "traditional" is added on as seen in the following sentence:

"Facts have shown that the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership is the result of continuous growth of the traditional friendship between the two sides."

(Jintao 2012)

Fairclough is in his linguistic analysis dealing with words, and how some words are articulated, rather than other alternatives (Fairclough 1992, p. 77). Moreover, he also speaks about "word meanings", when words are perceived to have other potential meanings. The meaning conferred to a word depends on the social practice, and thereby both the social practice of the writer or speaker, who can choose between several words, and the interpreter, who can interpret the word in different ways (Fairclough 1992, pp. 185-190).

In the speech from 2000, President Zemin spoke about how "[...]the traditional friendship between China and Africa will be passed on from generation to generation." (Zemin 2000), but now the type of friendship has changed from the "traditional" to "strategic". The adjective "traditional" then gives the meaning of an unserious friendship or a friendship, which is simply there because of a common past. Now it is not enough for China just to have a traditional friendship to Africa, it must now evolve to a strategic friendship, which, according to China, both partners will benefit more from.

Another change from the speech at FOCAC in 2000 to the speech in 2012 is, that there is not only the value of friendship, but also a brotherhood. President Jintao, thereby emphasizes the change from traditional friendship to more than just a friendship, namely family.

In the press briefing held by the Chinese Ambassador Yuxiao, I am also able to find friendship expressed as a key value. He begins the briefing by greeting

the audience "*[f]riends from the media*" (Yuxiao 2012), and then he uses several sentences to explain, that he calls them his friends, because he is always open for an interview. He is therefore really keen on showing how available he is in producing transparency.

The vast majority of this press briefing is going through the various initiatives and achievements of the lifespan of FOCAC. It is therefore representing the same values as mentioned above in the two FOCAC speeches. However, in the end, Yuxiao is referring to different development initiatives the next three years, which he then foresees as a value the Zambian people will experience.

The fourth speech I will include in this analysis is an opening speech by the same Chinese ambassador to Zambia as above, Yuxiao, held at a trade fair. In this speech friendship and solidarity are also expressed as key values. A related and much expressed value in this speech is cooperation as for example when he says: "*China wishes to enjoy a better cooperation environment with Zambia for its own development.*" (Yuxiao 2013).

He is furthermore almost only using personal pronouns, which is making his speech very subjective and supports his statements as trustworthy.

5.1.2 Attractive Culture Exchange in the Speeches

As mentioned in section 2, Nye sees politicians promoting their opinions and policies with a cultural aspect. It is therefore also relevant in my analysis of these four Chinese speeches to determine in which degree cultural exchanges are expressed.

President Zemin mentions culture few times in his speech, but when he does, it is divided into African culture and Chinese culture, for example when saying that "*[t]heir time-honored histories and cultures an important part of world civilization*" (Zemin 2000). Moreover, in the end of the speech, he concludes that the younger generations will be taught about the African and Chinese friendship in order to pass this through from generation to generation (Zemin 2000). The only time he mentions cultural exchange, is when he refers to their past history with an "*[...]exchange of high-level visits[...]*" (Zemin 2000), so on the basis of this speech, they only had focus on exchange of culture through the elite groups in the countries at that time.

China has changed radically regarding this topic since the year 2000, which is an obvious focus in the 5th ministerial conference speech. Here is mentioned directly that *"China and Africa have conducted increasing people-to-people and cultural exchanges featuring mutual learning."* (Jintao 2012). They will do this in various ways between all levels of *"[...]youth, women, people's organizations, media and academic institutions[...]"* (Jintao 2012). Among other things, he said that they will set up a China-Africa Press Exchange Center in China and sponsor 100 programs for research, exchange and cooperation by academic institutions. He even told, that the clear goal of doing this, is to *"[...]win even greater popular support for China-Africa friendship."* The question is, if this is the only reason for doing this, or if they could be doing it to get a better image in the West and by the international organizations as well. I will return to this question later in the analysis.

The whole press briefing from the Chinese Ambassador could be interpreted as an exchange of culture in itself, because the Ambassador is representing the Chinese government's opinions and activities relating to FOCAC to the Zambian media. It is also very clear, that he wants to make an example as a person who is open, accommodating and friendly to the Zambian media. At the same time he speaks about all the good initiatives and activities China has done to Africa. Thereby, he is sending the image of how open and good the culture of the Chinese government is. The ambassador uses a metaphor in the end of the press briefing saying:

"I hope many of you here today will be the early birds to catch the worm, experiencing the practical benefits that FOCAC programs can bring about."

(Yuxiao 2012)

He is thereby promoting the culture exchanges with journalists and media people, and making it sound exclusive for the few "lucky birds".

In the speech from the Zambian trade fair the Ambassador is telling about cultural exchanges specific for Zambia and China. The Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones set up in Zambia by China, is according to the Ambassador,

creating a cultural exchange in relation to trading and business culture through *"[a]bout 500 Chinese companies, big or small, [which] have been set up in Zambia."* (Yuxiao 2013).

5.1.3 Foreign Policies in the Speeches

As mentioned before Nye does find foreign policies very important in relation to a country's soft power. Through FOCAC China is already strengthening its political, economic, cultural, direct exchanges with Africa, and at the same time they are largely influencing the African leadership and businessmen. China has put itself in the operation of the organization and then drawn attention to their own development.

As mentioned in the sections above all four speeches talk about the old friendship and cooperation between China and Africa, and they use it as a base to say how this cooperation should be evolved to everyone's benefit.

Nye describes how the use of "framing" of an agenda or argument is useful when persuading someone, and it is often done the best with emotional appeals and narratives, rather than pure logic and hardcore facts (Nye 2011, pp. 92-94). He in fact finds narratives more and more used in relation to soft power and says it is "the currency of soft power" (Nye 2011, p. 104). So when the Chinese Presidents and Ambassador to Zambia are telling the stories of their past relations with Africa, they are framing the speech with the narratives of historically events and using these narratives as an argument for continuing the cooperation. Furthermore, they are also using the personal pronouns "we", "us", and "our", when using these narratives, which thereby creates an historically and culturally affinity and attraction, because they seem very committed to their own statements.

Together with this affinity the speeches also shows, that the Chinese Presidents and the Ambassador is very polite, which is supporting their attraction strategy even more. Fairclough also speaks about politeness, when analyzing critically discourses, and according to him politeness is also used as strategies in social relations. He distinguish between positive and negative politeness. Politeness strategies are both helping to constitute and also constituted of dominance and authority in relationships between the participants (Fairclough 1992, pp. 162-166). In speeches like these, it is general custom to

be polite in the beginning and thereby thanking for the opportunity to speak. All of the speeches also have a polite beginning, but there is a politeness underlining everything in the speeches. They all tell how Africa is as big a part of the development of both FOCAC and China. An example is from the fifth FOCAC ministerial conference:

"We will always remember and we are grateful from the bottom of our heart for the vigorous support and help the African countries and people have given to our development effort."

(Jintao 2012)

It is also worth mentioning, that the Chinese often say "the African people" or "the African countries" when using narratives, praising the cooperation or being polite. In that way, they are sending the message to every African individual, and not just the African governments or political elites.

Another way China is relating directly to the African public, is when president Jintao is telling how China have *"[...]built over 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa"* (Jintao 2012). In the same speech he also promise among others to train African medical personnel, built training facilities and offer government scholarships. Furthermore, China *"[...]will remain unchanged in its commitment to supporting Africa's peace, stability, development and unity."* (Jintao 2012). China's aid therefore have benefitted Africa, and China have added to their positive image.

The same image is visible in the speech by the Ambassador at the "International Construction Materials and Light Industrial Trade Fair", where the Ambassador speaks about the Special Economic Zone in Zambia with different business and trade laws to increase trade and foreign investment.

"As friends, we should share what we have in hands and minds. By establishing ZCCZ, we wish to share with Zambia our practical experiences in economic development."

(Yuxiao 2013)

At one point in his speech, he is also trying to use a common and understandable language, and at the same time make sure it does not get too boring.

He makes a comparison between the economic zones and a road sign to make the point more public friendly:

"[...]policies are just like road signs. If road users can not find their destinations easily, that means the road signs are not clear or good enough. Likewise, if investors are reluctant to make investment into the zones, it tells us that government policies towards the zones may not be favorable enough."

(Yuxiao 2013)

When looking at modality again, it can be both "subjective" and "objective". In that relation it is notable that the Ambassador is very subjective in the trade fair speech. As an example, when he says: *"I sincerely hope that Zambia can do as well as China has done, or to do even better as Zambia can draw on our experiences and avoid our mistakes."* (Yuxiao 2013). This subjective approach makes it personal and confident, and we as audience beliefs more in his statements (Fairclough 2001, p. 159). However, it does makes him responsible for the promises he makes.

In contrast to this speech is the speech by President Zemin. Here is used what Fairclough calls "relative modality", when Zemin speaks about "the new international order". He is using the modal verb "should" 16 times in the paragraphs about the new international order, and referring to the actions a new international order should take. However, when he is using the word "should", he is distancing himself from the responsibility of these actions and promises.

When reading all four speeches it is remarkable, that they only speak about the actions and help China have done to Africa and not the other way around; *"China's assistance to Africa has been growing steadily."* (Jintao 2012). They only mention the mutual benefits, when speaking about their friendship, but never give any concrete and specific examples with numbers or facts on how Africa have benefitted China.

5.1.4 Discursive Practice in the Speeches

When analyzing the discursive practice, you have to look at the production, distribution and consumption associated with the text. A text always draw on

existing discourses and genres, while the reader at the same time also draws on available discourses and genres in the consumption and interpretation of the texts (Fairclough 1992, p. 79).

The speech by the Chinese Ambassador named Yuxiao is a press briefing and a speech for people working in the Zambian media. As mentioned above it does not differ much from the speech by the Chinese President at the 5th FOCAC ministerial conference in the choice of words, grammar and so on. However, it still shows, what China want the Zambian media to know about FOCAC, and how they thereby want to influence the media.

A speech is written from specific conventions. The speeches from FOCAC is the opening speeches held by the current president. Therefore it has to set the theme for the whole conference. It also has to be catching and inspiring.

The press briefing is more informative than the opening speeches, because the ambassador has to make sure that the media get all the necessary information about the FOCAC conference as possible. At the same time he has to deliver the information as clear and simple as possible. There is not the same demand of being inspiring as in the other speeches.

The speech at the trade fair is quite similar to the FOCAC speeches, because it as well is an opening speech. However, it differs in the way that it has to be much more specific and context related to the event. The President at the FOCAC conference has to be inspiring, where the Ambassador at such a trade fair has to act attractive to the foreign investors and sell and promote the idea of a good investment.

Regarding the consumption there is also a difference between the different genres. At the FOCAC conferences the direct consumers are the member state leaders and other people from the member governments, together with the political elites. There will also be media present, whom then indirectly are sending the politicians' messages further on to the member state publics and to the international community reading news pages on the internet. The press briefing is obviously for the Zambian press and maybe also press from other African countries, together with the Chinese press. There were also employees from the Chinese embassy in Zambia present. The Trade fair is mainly for the Zambian government, including the Zambian Vice president, the Zambian Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry and other Zambian

government officials. Also present were the Vice President of China Nonferrous Metal Mining, the Economic and Commercial counselor of the Chinese Embassy, General Manager of ZCCZ, the media and then all kinds of interested local, national and international companies in that industry.

It is, according to Fairclough, important to clarify how the text with the distribution and interpretation is being reformulated and transformed (Fairclough 1992, p. 79). In that relation he defines "intertextuality" as the text's feature to refer directly or indirectly, to other texts, which thereby becomes a constituted part of the existing intertextual chain (Fairclough 1992, p. 84).

Intertextuality is seen in the speech from the first FOCAC conference, where the president refers to historic events as: *"During the Second World War, the Chinese people and the African people fought an anti-Fascist war[...]"* and *"The past five decades have witnessed frequent exchange of high-level visits between China and African countries."* (Zemin 2000).

Fairclough calls it manifest intertextuality when a text directly draws on specific other texts (Fairclough 1992, p. 85). This is also present when the President is speaking about the new international order, where he refers to *"The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the principles and spirit enshrined in the OAU Charter[...]"* (Zemin 2000). These references are supporting his arguments, without his need to explain them further.

Intertextuality is also seen in the speech from the fifth FOCAC conference, firstly when the president Jintao refers to the past FOCAC conferences as *"When we met here six years ago at the FOCAC Beijing Summit[...]"* and *"[...].since we met here six years ago"* (Jintao 2012).

Manifest intertextuality is also seen in the same speech, when referring to "the Millennium Development Goals".

In some texts it is possible to see different factors used to persuade individuals to perform a particular action, or get a specific attitude on a subject. Fairclough calls this for "force" (Fairclough 1992, p. 82). In the fifth FOCAC speech the "force" is used, when China *"[...].encourage exchanges and interactions between our[China and Africa] two great civilizations[...]"* (Jintao 2012), *"[...].provide 20 billion dollars of credit line to African countries[...]"*

(Jintao 2012) and *"[...]carry out well-drilling and water supply projects[...]"* (Jintao 2012) which is only three promises of actions out of many more. When China promises all these goods, they do it in order to *"[...]win even greater popular support for China-Africa friendship."* (Jintao 2012). Furthermore, I also see it as a part of China's strategic friendship plan, which especially are focusing on China to get a better image among the African public.

In the press briefing by the Ambassador there is definitely also used manifest intertextuality, because its focus is on representing the information from the 5th FOCAC conference and thereby also the President's opening speech *"[a]t the opening ceremony, my President Hu Jintao announced 5 priority areas[...]"* (Yuxiao 2012). It is the same when he is referring to the past by saying *"[o]ver the past 12 years, FOCAC has instituted a number of Conferences and dialogue mechanisms[...]"* (Yuxiao 2012), and in the rest of the press briefing he continues with describing each FOCAC conference and its initiatives and achievements.

In the same way, I also see the use of force in this speech, because the Ambassador mentions the same actions China will take in order to develop the relationship with Africa into a more strategic friendship. Finally, he is pointing out the *"[...]exchange of correspondents by media organizations"* (Yuxiao 2012), because the audience consists of media people. He is therefore promoting this culture exchange specifically towards them.

In the fourth speech, which is the trade fair speech, the Chinese Ambassador also refers to the past *"China's opening and reform policies were initiated by our late reform architect Deng Xiaoping in 1978"* and *"ZCCZ was the first one set up in 2007 under the framework of China-Africa Cooperation Forum."* (Yuxiao 2013). Again these small, historically narratives are leading up to an argument for the strengthening of the Chinese and Zambian cooperation.

The most significant discourse which all four speeches draws upon is the friendship discourse. The words "friends" and "friendship" are to be found many times in each speech as *"China and Zambia are all-weather friends[...]"*, *"[...]boost China-Africa friendship[...]"* (Jintao 2012) and *"[...]this great China-Africa friendship."* (Zemin 2000).

The fact that their friendship is not new is emphasized through the times

they draw on a historical discourse. Especially, in the first FOCAC conference, where President Zemin says, that *"[t]he 20th century has witnessed earth-shaking changes in both China and Africa."* and *"[i]t was Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ding Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders of the older generation and the forerunners of the African movement for national liberation who forged and nurtured this great China-Africa friendship."* (Zemin 2000).

All of the speeches are also mentioning and constituting a discourse about development, both how they have developed over time, and how they can further develop. The Chinese President wants to *"[...]/promote common development."* (Yuxiao 2012) in his speeches and another example is that *"China wishes to enjoy a better cooperation environment with Zambia for its own development."* (Yuxiao 2013), but also stating that China it self *"[...]/is the largest developing country"* (Zemin 2000).

Connected to the development discourse, I find that the speeches are drawing on an aid discourse. Even though they declare themselves, as just mentioned, the biggest developing country they promotes a lot of ways to help Africa, including Zambia even more. *"China will implement the "African Talents Program" to train 30,000 personnel in various sectors for Africa, offer 18,000 government scholarships, and build cultural and vocational skills training facilities in African countries."* (Jintao 2012). Moreover, in Zambia *"US\$ 140 million have been put into infrastructure construction in the Chambishi and Lusaka zones."* (Yuxiao 2013).

The soft power discourse is seen through a combination of all the discourses above. According to the four Chinese speeches, China and Zambia share values, which have been a basis for the already long-term friendship and cooperation. From the first FOCAC conference in 2000 to the 5th in 2012 China is focusing more and more on the culture exchange, and they are promising a lot of different initiatives for exchange of media, academic and political culture in the speech from the 5th conference. Their foreign policies has also changed in the 12 years to the more strategic minded ones and they draw on the different discourses to persuade and maintain the long-term political cooperation.

5.2 **Zambian Reaction to Chinese Mining Investments**

Nye describes credibility and legitimacy as significantly important when producing soft power, I therefore find the reactions from Zambian media, public and government interesting and determined in my analysis of how the Chinese soft power approach is positioning in the discourse struggles.

As mentioned I were not able to find relevant, objective and specific enough speeches or qualitative studies of the Zambian public or government reactions to Chinas mining investments. Therefore, I have chosen to focus first on a combined Zambian media and public discourse constitution, because it was difficult in the chosen news articles to separate the media produced discourse and the public produced discourse. Secondly, I have focused on the constituted Zambian government discourse using as objective and yet relevant news web articles as possible. The limited available material have the consequences that this part of my analysis only gives an moderate insight of the discourses, which leads up to a a potential for further studies.

5.2.1 **Zambian Public's and Media's Reaction**

The news article called "*Strike continues at Chinese Collum Coal Mine*" published at Lusaka Times is using the three first sections to make a status of the situation of miners at the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine. The mine workers are striking because, they have not gotten the salary raise, they were promised in the negotiations between the Chinese mining management and the Zambian miner's workers Union. Then the remaining sections in the article are all beginning with the words of the workers union President Nyumbu.

Fairclough talks about "transitivity", which is when a text is generally focused on one person (Fairclough 2010, p. 94). It is quite clear that this news article is centered on the workers Union President Nyumbu. Even though other people, who Nyumbu are referring to is presented in the article the focus of the article is on Nyumbu's opinions. He thereby appear as a trusted, loyal and hardworking spokesman for the mining workers. Especially, because he says the situation is "unfortunate" and that "the Chinese", had suggested a new salary amount in their negotiation, which he found "[...]far below the agreed amount[...]" (ZANIS 2008).

However, the only statement by the workers Union President, that are within quotation marks, and thereby to be trusted correctly quoted, is as

follows:

"The situation is purely a violation of industrial matter the police should not get involved if the workers are peaceful."

(ZANIS 2008).

The quote contents the modal verb "should", and Nyumbu is also asking a question, saying *"if the workers are peaceful"*. The modal verb is showing a distancing to the statement, and he is also questioning whether the mining workers actually were peaceful.

Another web based news article called *"Tensions Rise between Zambian Miners and Chinese Investors"* is solely referring to an article from The Wall Street Journal (Udoh 2012). When I again looks at the modality in the text, there are no modal verbs or adverbs. On the other hand the most verbs are in present tense as in the title, showing what Fairclough calls "categorical modality" (Fairclough 1992, pp. 158-162). It thereby gives the writer full acceptance of the proposition written in the Wall Street Journal.

The last news article, I will look at in this section is called *"Workers Complain of China Jiangsu's Importing of Labour"*. The writer of the news article only explains one side of the story in this article, and it is from the victim's point of view. One mine worker tells that *"The ministry of labour must visit this place[The Chinese-owned mine] and verify these things because even our safety is not guaranteed. These Chinese are the very big problem[...]"* (Sakala 2014). In these two paragraphs does the mine worker change the modality approach. The ministry "must" visit the mine, he says, but when using this modal verb gives me reason to believe, that he is taking distance to this statement, which may be caused by the assessment that the Ministry will never visit.

In the last sentence we see his own truly opinion, when he uses the present tense about "these Chinese", as the big problem.

The writer of the article seems to agree with the mining workers. It is seen especially in the second last paragraph saying that *"[t]he Chinese who refused to reveal their names were not friendly during the request for an interview threatened to harm this reporter"* (Sakala 2014). Again if I look at transitivity

and which events are connected to which subjects, "the Chinese" are mentioned seven times just as "the Chinese" without mentioning if it is the Chinese investors or mining management team. In that way the articles is referring to and accusing all Chinese people. In this above sentence from the article, the writer is referring to an incident where the research reporter from this news platform was deliberately threatened by "the Chinese", who refused to reveal their name and thereby remain anonymous. By telling this incident the writer is taking "interactional control" according to Fairclough, because it is obvious that it is the writer who speaks directly instead of representing, what others opinions or statements are.

5.2.2 **Zambian Government's Reaction**

The news article called *"Sata now says Zambia has alot to learn from China"* published in *ZambianEye*, a web newspaper, is completely focusing on the present Zambian President Michael Sata, before and after the election of him as president ². The article is almost objective, but since there is not used any quotes or direct references, it is the writer, who has the interactional control and thereby the power to tell the story from his point of view. Especially, the last paragraph supports the writers opinion stating:

"President Sata is now facing reality, a number of things he opposed is exactly what he is doing. The events of his ascendancy to power and the last one and half year of his presidency has shown that while others say he cheated his way to power using ignorance of the people."

(ZambianEye2013 2013)

The use of the adverb "exactly" is underlining the writer's surprise of how the president have done, and an accusation of him cheating his way to power. However, I still think this article can be used to show the change in President Sata's discursive power.

The writer has structured the article in a way by first describing Sata's past actions when denouncing the Zambian government for having created too close links to China, threatening to get rid of the Chinese investors and

²The current Zambian President, Michael Sata, was elected as president in September 2011. He is the leader and founder of the political party Patriotic Front

aligning himself with Taiwan's struggle for independence from China. Then secondly, the article states that Sata, as a President, were having meetings with different Chinese officials together with exchange visits. The structure makes the President's change in opinions and actions clear.

Another news article by *ZambianEye* titled *"We don't know how to thank you, Sata tells China's Vice president."* is also focusing entirely on President Sata's actions and statements to the Chinese officials. The article is referring to several quotes made by Sata, and it shows his friendly and devoting attitude towards the Chinese Vice President. This supports what Fairclough mentions as a positive politeness strategy, which means that Sata is trying to constitute dominance and authority in the relationship to the Chinese government (Fairclough 1992, pp. 162-166). Sata is quoted for saying that the Vice President is a *"[...]partner to Zambia for a long time[...]"* (*ZambianEye2014(a)* 2014) and even go further to tell *"[...]that if one wants to kill China, he or she has to kill him first."* (*ZambianEye2014(a)* 2014), and Sata thereby is devoting his life for "China" as a whole country.

The third article is connecting the Zambian government to the Zambian mining industry, that China is investing in, because the Zambian Vice President Guy Scott held a speech at a "Mining, Energy conference and Exhibition". The article is called *"Vice president Scott opens Zambia International Mining Conference"*. Again when looking at the transitivity in the article it is clearly centralized around the Vice President and using quotes from his speech. One of the quotes is saying that it is a *"[...]fact that the rapid growth in the mining sector has not translated into improved living standards for ordinary Zambians."* (*ZambianEye2014(b)* 2014). When saying it is a "fact" makes it a confession to the audience, so he wants to seem sincere and maybe win some credibility.

However, he also praises the event by saying that it is *"[...]the only platform that brings stakeholders together in a quest to ensure growth and sustainability in the mining and energy sectors."* (*ZambianEye2014(b)* 2014). So he emphasize the values of development, openness and possibilities around the Zambian mining industry.

5.2.3 Discursive Practice in Zambian Media and Public

The articles used to analyze the discourse in the Zambian media and public is from two different Zambian news web sites.

Lusaka Times is an electronic news platform covering day to day current issues in Zambia. The news site was launched in 1998, but due to different problems re-launched in January 2007. Lusaka Times is run by a number of people from around the world, working in an open source type of structure, out of ambition to provide Zambians around the world with current news. They are also connected to Facebook where they have 38,614 people following their site which could be both Zambian and non-Zambian people living around the world. The most day to day news content they post at their website are however from government owned Zambian news papers like Zambia Daily-Mail, Times of Zambia, ZNBC and ZANIS. This also applies to the article used in this thesis, which originally came from ZANIS, but which is not to be found on ZANIS anymore. As said in the introduction of this thesis, the articles from government owned news papers will have the consequence of my analysis results in the way that the news are not to be considered as coming from the public. A governmental owned newspaper will produce articles framed with the government's own opinions and positions in order to affect the public. In this case I have also involved two articles from the private and independent news site Zambia Reports.

Zambia Reports as said above, is a privately owned and operated independent news website, featuring both aggregated and originally sourced articles. They describe their aim as providing "[...]critical, political and economic intelligence both for the foreign investment community as well as the domestic and regional audience." The news site was launched in March 2012 by a freelance foreign correspondent with an obsession of African politics, and several Zambian journalists who felt that the media environment in the country would benefit from unconventional and fresh perspectives outside the other mainstream voices in the Zambian public. They are as well in Facebook with 114,997 people following their site. They have a lot more people following them, but it does not necessary have to be Zambian citizens.

If looking at intertextuality the article from Lusaka Times is referring back in time as for example stating that "[...]the new salary increment that was

signed in September 2007[...]” (ZANIS 2008).

In relation to the other article *”Tensions Rise between Zambian Miners and Chinese Investors”* which is highly manifest intertextual, because it is based upon a new report published in the Wall Street Journal, from where it both draws on quotes and a list of safety incidents (Udoh 2012). There is not a link to the report or Wall Street Journal’s own articles about it, so as a reader, you have to trust Zambia Reports for referring correctly.

There is intertextuality found in the other article chosen from Zambia Reports in the end of the article where it refers to an incident between the news reporter and some Chinese people from the company Jiangsu International Limited, when asking for an interview. The incident is actually adding support for the discourse about the anti-Chinese in the article (Sakala 2014).

Fairclough’s term of “force” is only seen in the article from Lusaka Times, when it refers to a demand from the Zambian mine workers: *”On Friday the miners said they do not want to belong to the Mine Union of Zambia (MUZ) because they failed to improve their conditions of service with management.”* (ZANIS 2008).

The three articles are drawing on three different discourses. The most referred too is the anti-Chinese discourse, and I will only pick some of the quotes highlighting this discourse, because there are several to choose from.

One of the Zambia Reports articles are referring to a quote where China is described as “colonialist”, and *”[t]he Chinese are just here to make a profit, to make their country rich.”* (Udoh 2012). The list previously mentioned from the Wall Street Journal are also supporting this anti-Chinese discourse with *”China Nonferrous suffered an explosion, killing 40 Zambian workers”, “Six Zambians were shot by “mine personnel” in Chambishi”, and “China Nonferrous Metals was forced to rehire 1,000 miners it had fired”* (Udoh 2012).

The other article from Zambia Reports is referring to similar quotes from Zambian mine workers that *”Chinese supervisors at the mining site were also verbally and physically abusing the few Zambian workers.”* (Sakala 2014) together with *”[t]hese Chinese are the very big problem”* (Sakala 2014).

In contrast to this discourse is another of victimized mine workers discourse. In the Lusaka Times article the Zambian mine workers are several times described as “friendly”, “peaceful” and “not violent” (ZANIS 2008). In

one of the *Zambian Reports* articles there is used a quote saying that *"We [Zambian mine workers] are slaves in our own country."* (Udoh 2012).

The third discourse drawn upon is a non-functioning authority discourse where the authority is the police in the *Lusaka Times* article and a *Zambian* chief attorney in the *Zambian Reports* article. In the first mentioned article it is even the President of a workers union saying that *"[...]the police should not get involved if the workers are peaceful"* (ZANIS 2008). In the other article the Chinese-owned company have *"[...]close links with senior Chief attorney Nkomeshya, who had assured them[the Chinese-owned company] of immunity to conduct illegal activities"* (Sakala 2014).

5.2.4 Discursive Practice in *Zambian Government*

All three articles are from an online news publication called *Zambia Eye*, and it is both covering general news from around the world and *Zambian* news, which also is its focus. It is privately owned and driven by journalists based in *Zambia*. It has a forum on Facebook with 49,009 members following and contributing to the news site. The news site was started in December 2011 and is fairly new. Once again when it is a news site on the internet it is difficult to define the readers, because it could be anyone with interest in *Zambian* news.

The three articles do not use intertextuality in the same extent as the other articles. The one named *"Sata now says Zambia has alot to learn from China"* is using historically intertextuality when referring to the past of president Sata as *"[i]n 2006 on the eve of the elections[...]"* (ZambianEye2013 2013).

In one of the other articles there is a clear use of what Fairclough calls "force". President Sata is saying that *"[...]if one wants to kill China, he or she has to kill him first."* (ZambianEye2014(a) 2014). He is then showing all his critics, that he is entirely devoted to the cooperation with *China*, and he will give up his life in order to protect that partnership.

When I am looking at the discourses, that the *Zambian* government draws on in the articles, and not the journalists and news site's, it is clear that there is a *Chinese* friendly discourse. *"We don't know how to thank you, Sata tells China's Vice president"* (ZambianEye2014(a) 2014) is the title of one of the

articles, and in the same article he *"[...]hailed the Chinese government for helping Zambia."* (ZambianEye2014(a) 2014). So the president is grateful to China, and not long time after he became President he *"[...]held [a] feast for the Chinese business community living in Zambia."* (ZambianEye2013 2013). When the Chinese Vice president came to Zambia President Sata also announced that *"[t]he Zambian government has also given 5 acres of land to the Chinese Vice president."* (ZambianEye2014(a) 2014).

Furthermore, the Zambian government emphasizes the development Zambia has undergone the past decade, and they thereby relates to a development discourse. The vice president told at the trade fair that the *"[...]copper production is projected to increase to 1.5 million tonnes in the next five years."* (ZambianEye2014(b) 2014). The president also refers to a development discourse by saying Zambia *"[...]is expected to yield many bilateral agreements between the two countries[China and Zambia]."* (ZambianEye2013 2013).

The third discourse, I find in the articles is related to how they draw on a political discourse. The Zambian President began his political cooperation with China right after he won the election, because *"[...]the first meeting Sata[the Zambian president] had after being sworn in was with the Chinese Ambassador."* (ZambianEye2013 2013). He is also focusing on a political exchange visits in China, when he *"[...]instructed Finance Minister Alexander Chikwanda and his Commerce counterpart Bob Sichinga to go to China to learn how to create jobs."* (ZambianEye2014(a) 2014).

5.3 Non-governmental organizations' interference

In this third part of my critical discourse analysis, I will seek to discover the discourse constituted in the recognized report made by the international non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch.

5.3.1 Text Analysis

The Human Rights Watch report is 122 pages long and the structure of the report is supporting the message of the report. This is for example seen after a summary where they give their recommendations to the Zambian government

and relevant ministries, the Chinese government, the chosen Chinese state-owned enterprise and China's state council, which quite clearly point out the found problems.

The first recommendation for the Chinese government is to *"[i]ntegrate international human rights standards into foreign investment and foreign infrastructure and development initiatives, particularly with regard to labor rights."* (HRW 2011, p. 8). Human Right Watch thereby accuses China for not following the international human rights at all regarding any of their foreign investments all over the world, because they are not specifying it to Zambia only. The language used is directly and in imperative, which is underlying the seriousness.

Following is a background section with, among others, these section titles:

- Labor Problems and Low Wages in the Chinese Mines,
- Exporting Abuses?: Similar Labor Problems in China's Mining Industry
- "Good Investors, but Bad Employers": Dichotomy between Welcomed Chinese Investment and Abusive Labor Practices

Based on the titles it does not sound as background information, but as part of an analysis, because it is describing problems with the Chinese as employers and questioning abuses on the basis of a comparison between Zambian and Chinese mines.

The section *"Labor Problems and Low Wages in the Chinese Mines"* also have the following sentence in the beginning:

"While some of the anti-Chinese vitriol seemed to reflect racism fueled by cultural differences, the Chinese companies were - and, as this report shows, remain - the biggest violator of workers' rights among Zambian copper industry employers"

(HRW 2011, p. 22).

The subordinate clause in this sentence is supporting the key message of the report that China is abusing the Zambian mine workers rights, and it continues through out the report with small partial conclusions. As for example in the section *"Deliberate Failure to Report Accidents"*, concerning problems

at Chinese-owned mines regarding missing reports of accidents, compared with other foreign-owned mines, it is said: *"As with other bad safety practices, the problems appear most acute at the Chinese-run mines."* (HRW 2011, p. 63). Fairclough calls this "cohesion", when looking at the way some phrases and query clauses are composed in sentences, and how these are combined into larger text structures (Fairclough 1992, pp. 176-77).

The third section title above, is based on a quote from a miner, they interviewed (HRW 2011, p. 31). The section is describing how many of the miners they interviewed always praised the Chinese investments, because it had create more jobs and growth in the local communities. However, they were at the same time frustrated about the Chinese did *"[...]not pay workers anywhere near the salaries that other copper mining companies pay."* (HRW 2011, p. 31).

The report are also continuously comparing the qualitative data from the Chinese owned mines, with the mines owned by other foreign companies. They have several "best-practices text boxes" (HRW 2011, pp. 49, 61, 67-68), with examples from the other foreign-owned mines and they have also asked the respondents in their interviews for comparisons: *"[...]even government representatives who spoke to Human Rights Watch all said that the Chinese copper operations were the worst for health and safety conditions."* (HRW 2011, p. 32).

When looking at interactional control in the report it is always clear whose opinion and statements, that are referring to. Something notable regarding this, is that Human Right Watch are referring to themselves in third person instead of "we" and "our", as seen below:

"Workers at the Chinese-run mines told Human Rights Watch that their bosses repeatedly forced them to work in unsafe places, under threat of being fired if they refused. Several miners told Human Rights Watch that they had suffered consequences, including termination, for failing to work in potentially dangerous environments."

(HRW 2011, p. 54)

All the statements and opinions in the report is thereby corresponding to the entire organization's opinion.

The conclusion of the report is clear and if referring to the interactional control, they are making the conclusion with authority when saying:

"[...]there is likewise no question that they remain in routine violation of Zambian and international law on these same issues, and perform considerably worse from a labor standpoint than their competitors from other multinationals in Zambia's copper industry."

(HRW 2011, p. 97).

5.3.2 Discursive Practice

Human Rights Watch represents itself as a fully independent non-governmental organization (NGO), supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. They emphasize that they do not accept any money from any government, directly or indirectly. They describe their work as accurate, sober, and impartial. According to themselves that is also why so many reporters, columnists, broadcasters, and editors, as well as policymakers of concerned governments, the United Nations, and other intergovernmental entities worldwide rely on our reports, citing our findings in their work (HRW n.d.).

Intertextuality is found many times in the Human Rights Watch's report to support their arguments, and they are especially found in the background section. As an example they refers directly to *"[a] 2008 report uncovered abuses and safety risks in Chinese coal mines."* (HRW 2011, p. 25), which then is "manifest intertextuality" according to Fairclough.

In the conclusion they states that *"[...]in Zambia, while other multinationals are responsible for certain labor abuses, the Chinese-run companies are generally the worst on issues involving health and safety, hours of work, and the right to organize."* (HRW 2011, p. 97). There is a footnote connected to this sentence saying that *"The UK-based organization RAID published similar findings in a study[...]"*, which shows they once again are supporting their conclusions drawn on their own study.

Human Rights Watch do not have the possibility to demand anything from the Zambian or Chinese governments or the Chinese mining companies, but they can set up recommendations, as they also did in this case. Thereby, you do not find a directly put "force" in the report. However, Fairclough also define force as a way to generate specific opinions about a subject (Fairclough 1992,

p. 82). That is just what the recommendations in the report does. They are simple, short and clear, and thereby easy for other people and organizations to refer to.

The report draws on several similar discourses, as mentioned before in this critical discourse analysis.

The development discourse is brought to attention, when they say that a Chinese investment in a copper smelter are *"[...]employing 900 workers - with ongoing construction to expand further"* (HRW 2011, p. 30), and many of the interviewed mine workers *"[...]expressed appreciation for the large amount of capital investment that the Chinese investors have brought to the copper industry."* (HRW 2011, p. 30). So there is also a picturing of the Chinese government helping to boost Zambia development.

The report has a section covering the politicization of the Chinese investments and it therefore also several times draws upon a political discourse. They, among others, refers to how *"President Sata has promised to take action to ensure the improvement of workers' conditions"*(HRW 2011, p. 5). However, they conclude that not many political actions has been done *"Zambia has not effectively enforced either domestic or international labor law in the Chinese-owned copper mines in Zambia."* (HRW 2011, p. 32).

The historical discourse is used in different ways to support the report's message. Linked to the development discourse they talk about how *"[...]the Chinese government financed and constructed between 1970 and 1975 the US\$ 500 million Tanzam Railway that linked Zambia's mines to Dar es Salaam's port."* (HRW 2011, p. 14). However, they also use it to show, how the abuses is not a new problem, because *"[a]lmost immediately after production began at NFCA[A Chinese-owned mine] in 2003, the Chinese companies faced complaints about labor abuses, particularly low pay, poor safety conditions, and union busting."* (HRW 2011, p. 22).

The dominant discourse in the Human Rights Watch report is the anti-Chinese discourse, which is already seen on the reports cover page. The title *"You'll Be Fired if You Refuse - Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines"*, which singles out the Chinese-owned mines as the ones critical. The picture used in the cover page is also showing the anti-Chinese discourse, because it shows a Chinese looking down on a dark-skinned, hard

working man digging in a whole. The following sentence from the introduction is also saying the message quite clear:

”While accidents are not unique to Chinese-run mines, nearly all the Zambian workers and union officials who spoke to Human Rights Watch said the Chinese copper operations were the country’s worst when it comes to health and safety.”

(HRW 2011, p. 3)

5.4 Social Practice Analysis of All Material

The last part of my critical discourse analysis is analyzing how the discourses are interrogating and struggling for power, and I will therefore refer to all of the analysis material and use non discourse theory to put the discourses into the social practices.

Since 1990 hundreds of articles and essays on soft power have been published in China, and the term has been included in the official language (Nye 2011, p. 88).

I have done a text- and discourse analysis according to Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis approach, but combined it with Nye’s theory about soft power. I have done this by dividing the text analysis into Nye’s three soft power resources, which a nation-state can seek to obtain. The resources are political values, when living up to them, culture, which is attractive to other, and legitimate foreign policies (Nye 2004, p. 11), (Nye 2011, p. 84).

My text analysis of four speeches in the period from year 2000 to 2012, held by one former Chinese president and one current Chinese president and the Chinese ambassador of Zambia, shows that China do have all of these three resources and that they come to terms in relation to mining investments in Zambia. Especially, President Jiang Zemin spoke in 2000 about values as friendship, world peace, development and cooperation. Regarding the attractive culture I found that China has focused more on that in the speech from 2012 than in the one from 2000. President Jintao promised several different culture exchange visits from academic researchers to journalist conferences. Nye also refers to the fact that in the year 2009, 220,000 foreign students inrolled into Chinese universities and they have created several hundred institutes around the world where they teach Chinese language and culture (Nye 2011, p. 88).

Two of the speeches was from the opening speeches at FOCAC ministerial conferences, which in itself counts as a Chinese success of spreading its foreign policies and cooperation. The establishment of the FOCAC is one example of how China's soft power is attractive, because they have managed to create a long-term friendship and cooperation with Africa, and especially with Zambia.

My text- and discourse analysis also showed how China is framing its values, culture and political ideas and thereby also doing everything to persuade Zambia into more cooperation and trade. Nye also states that China invested 8.9 billion USD in external publicity work in 2009-2010. Furthermore, since 1990's China joined the World Trade Organization and contributed with more than 3,000 troops to serve in UN peacekeeping operations (Nye 2011, p. 88).

China is in the speeches I have chosen, drawing on all the right discourses in order to construct a soft power discourse. According to Nye, soft power makes an attraction which then for China should persuade Zambia to go along with China's ideas without any explicit threat or exchange taking place (Nye 2011, p. 6). It is then questionable if it is that easy for China considering the other discourses and actors in the struggle for power.

The chosen Zambian articles for my text- and discourse analysis shows partly the discourses in the Zambian media and partly the discourses in the Zambian public. The articles both use quotes from the Zambian mine workers and workers union and the writing journalists are also relatively subjective or writing in a way that shows their affiliation to the statements. The articles refers to tensions, shooting incidents and strikes among Zambian mine workers. The articles shows disagreements and threats between the Chinese managers and the Zambian mine workers and, according to a research report in Zambia, "*[d]isputes and threat are often seen as a cause for prejudice and ethnic conflict*" (Bracht 2012, p. 75). The experiences with authorities like the police and a Zambian chief attorney, who are acting against the law and even corruption is supporting the two discourses I found; The anti-Chinese discourse and the non-functioning authority discourse.

The discourses found in the articles about the Zambian government are also affecting the Zambian media and public discourses, because it is describing the opinions of the present president Sata before and after his election. As

an opposition leader he was to a great extent drawing on the anti-Chinese discourse and had a huge support from the Zambian mine workers (Bracht 2012, pp. 80-81). Then after he was elected there is a change of discourse, which my text- and discourse analysis shows, Sata then had political meetings with the Chinese government and their officials.

Moreover, his speeches and comments to the press praised the Chinese co-operation together with arrangements of exchange visits and framing and persuading actions in his statements and thereby drawing upon a soft discourse, however a much lighter version than what is seen in the Chinese speeches.

What I found from analyzing the Human rights Watch report was that it has clearly constituted an anti-Chinese discourse with several clear conclusions that the Chine-owned mines in Zambia was much worse than the other foreign-owned mines in Zambia. The Zambian mine workers were being abused when it came to health and safety. They were supporting this conclusion on both a historical discourse saying it was not a new problem and a political discourse showing that the Zambian government failed in complying with the international laws and the national promised law changes.

So even though the Zambian media and public had constituted the anti-Chinese discourse for quite some years, the Human Rights Watch reproduced the discourse, the context of the Human Rights Watch report, with the international organizations relying on their research created a scattering around the world. Human Rights Watch thereby wrote themselves into a struggle against China's soft power discourse.

According to Fairclough, hegemony is a concept to be used when analyzing discursive practices in a larger social practice in which power relations also are part of (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 76). In this case the NGO, Human Rights Watch, is taking part of the hegemonic struggle and thereby intervening China's soft power discourse in Zambia.

As described in my theory section (Meyer et al. 2008) explains how NGO's plays an increasing role in the globalized society, because they develop global principles and at the same time are putting a pressure on nation-states if they do not adopt these world-approved principles. At the same time media, internet and social medias play an important role for NGO's soft power development. It connects so many more people, attractiveness and pressure,

mobilizing money, support and actions (Nye 2011, p. 92).

My critical discourse analysis finds that China actually are supporting Zambia development and growth, however when Human Rights Watch have constituted a discourse about them not adapting the global principles of human rights and the Chinese president as an example speaks about contribution to a new international order where *"[a]ll ethnic groups and civilizations should respect each other, treat each other as equals."* (Zemin 2000), the Chinese are losing some credibility in front of the world society including other nation-states and NGO's (Nye 2011, pp. 103-4). The anti-Chinese discourse has shown to be reproduced and transformed to include the accusation of the Chinese being good at framing and persuading African countries with their investments in order to create closer relations and thereby profit more on these investments (CCS 2006), (Kragelund & Bastholm 2008, p. 74).

China is then forced to stand against this reputation and in this particular case the Chinese Embassy in Zambia had remarks on the Human Rights Watch Report saying:

"Regrettably, the relevant contents of the report is not faithful to the truth. The Chinese companies concerned have already made written responses and clarified the unjust critics raised by H.R.W."

(CEZ 2011)

Notable to this is that in none of the Chinese speeches used in this thesis were the value of human rights mentioned. Maybe it has been a deliberate strategic move from the Chinese government, that they do not mention the words human rights, knowing that it may be used against them in the discourse struggle. However, this is a subjective interpretation of me.

However, it is not only the Chinese government who joins the struggle of discourse powers. Other studies are trying to reproduce China's soft power discourse or at least criticizing Human Rights Watch's anti-Chinese discourse as for example the political scientists Yan Hairong and Barry Sautman in their report *"The Beginning of a World Empire? Contesting the Discourse of Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia"*. They are criticizing Human Rights Watch for singling out one Chinese firm without comparing methodological correct

with other foreign-owned mines in Zambia (Hairong & Sautman 2013, p. 150). They are also claiming that Human Right Watch are biased in their research conclusion because three-fourths of their fundings are from North America and one-fourth from Western Europe (Hairong & Sautman 2013, p. 135-136).

According to Fairclough as mentioned in my methodology section, the hegemony struggle of discourses is never stable, and a real victory will never take place because the struggle will continue with transformed and reproduced discourses. China's next move could involve more Chinese NGO's going international and thereby playing a role in the hegemony struggle of discourses as Human Rights Watch (TheEconomist2014 2014).

6 Conclusion

The first aim of this thesis were first to analyze China's discourse of soft power in relation to their investments in the Zambian mining industry from the year 2000 to 2012. From a combination of Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis and Joseph Nye's soft power theory, I divided the text analysis into Nye's three soft power resources; political values, attractive culture, and legitimate foreign policies. I can conclude, that the four speeches in the period from year 2000 to 2012, held by one former Chinese President and one current Chinese President and the Chinese Ambassador of Zambia, shows that China do have all of these three soft power resources, and that the Chinese soft power discourse is framed in order for China to persuade and attract Zambia into more cooperation and trade.

The second aim of my thesis were to analyze the discourses constructed from the year 2000 to 2012 in the Zambian media, public and government as a reaction to the Chinese mining investments.

The critical discourse analysis of the chosen Zambian news articles found that the tensions, shooting incidents and strikes among Zambian mine workers, together with the Zambian authorities acting against the law, have been constructing an anti-Chinese discourse and a non-functioning authority discourse. Moreover, I focused my critical discourse analysis on the present Zambian President Michael Sata before and after his election, because he changed from being the frontier of the anti-Chinese discourse to constructing a light soft power discourse.

Finally, I wanted to analyze the role that Human Rights Watch played as an non-governmental organization in the struggle between the discourses constructed in relation to China's investments in Zambian mines. What I found from analyzing the Human Rights Watch report was, that it clearly has constituted an anti-Chinese discourse on the basis, that the Chinese-owned mines in Zambia, are much worse than the other foreign-owned mines in Zambia.

I can conclude that there is a struggle between the power discourses in relation to China's investments in the Zambian mining industry. Human Rights Watch has reproduced and transformed the anti-Chinese discourse, which has forced China to stand against this bad reputation and in this particular case. I found that China has focused much more on their attractive culture, but it seems as they have to dig deeper.

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