Policy Impact of the Radical Right:

Refugee reception in Sweden

Kalle Ekholm

Abstract

The radical right has established themselves as permanent actors in the European party system over the last decade. The determinant factors explaining their increased electoral success have been thoroughly researched. Despite this fact the knowledge of their policy impact is largely unknown. This thesis argues that the local level in Sweden offers unique opportunity to study the policy impact of the radical right as refugee reception is decided by the municipal councils. In addition the use of municipalities as units of study bypasses the usual issue of comparing across different context and institutional arrangements. By theoretically differentiating between direct and indirect policy impact this study aims at exploring under which circumstances the radical right has the ability to change policy. With the use of TSCS-analysis this thesis find support for two scenarios in which the SD negatively affect the level of refugee reception in Swedish municipalities; when they hold the balance of power and when local right-wing coalition representatives have tough view on refugee reception. The results indicate that the SD has direct policy impact through collaboration with the mainstream parties or indirect through policy co-optation by right-wing parties.

Key words: Radical right, policy impact, Sweden Democrats, balance of power, refugee reception.
Words: 16574

Contents

List of Abbreviations

BNP	British National Party
C	Center party (Sweden) *(Centerpartiet)*
DFP	Danish People's Party *(Dansk Folkeparti)*
DV	Dependent variable
FN	National Front *(Front National)*
FP	People's Party (Sweden) *(Folkpartiet liberalerna)*
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria *(Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)*
IV	Independent variable
KD	Christian Democrats (Sweden) *(Kristdemokraterna)*
KOLFU	Municipal- and County Council Study *(Kommun- och landstings-fullmäktigeundersökningen)*
M	Moderate Party (Sweden) *(Moderata samlingspartiet)*
MP	Green Party (Sweden) *(Miljöpartiet de gröna)*
S	Social Democratic Party (Sweden) *(Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarparti)*
SD	Sweden Democrats *(Sverigedemokraterna)*
TSCS	Time-series cross-sectional
V	Left party (Sweden) *(Vänsterpartiet)*

Figures, charts and tables

1   Introduction

The most successful new member of the post-war western-European party family is the populist radical right (Mudde 2013). These parties share an authoritarian and nativist agenda which stir up feelings and create new lines of political conflict all over Europe. Europe is taking a "right turn" according to some commentators (Bale 2008; Schulz 2011). The research trying to explain how and why these parties have been able to break the freezing of Europe's party system is vast (Mudde 2007). But one question has not been answered fruitfully have the populist radical right had any impact on European politics (Bolin et.al 2014; Mudde 2013)?

Sweden is the stage on which the latest emergence of a radical right party took place with the breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats (SD). The party had a national breakthrough in the 2010 election gaining 5.7% of the votes. In the 2014 election the party became the third largest party in the national parliament with a total of 12.9% of the votes. Since their breakthrough in 2010 there has been a general consensus among the mainstream parties to isolate the SD from any influence. On a local level this may be an impossible task as the SD gained as over 20 % of the votes in several of the Swedish municipal councils. [1] Swedish municipal councils offer a unique case to study the policy impact of the SD as the level of refugee acceptance is a question for the local governments in Sweden. Although the SD is not a single-issue party nativist policies are the focal point of their political existence (Erlingsson et al. 2014). If the SD has had any policy impact it is most likely in a policy such as refugee reception. The 290 municipal councils in Sweden thus constitute a great opportunity to study the policy impact of the SD. The research question in the center of this thesis is:

- Has the SD affected the level of refugee reception in Swedish municipalities?

The purpose of this thesis is to examine if the SD has had any impact on policy in Swedish municipalities. Local refugee acceptance will be the policy studied since it is a question in the hands of the municipal council and the fact that it is an issue closely linked to the SD and other radical right parties (Mudde 1999).

[1] See http://www.val.se/sprak/engelska/index.html for election results.

2   Theory

2.1   Policy impact

This section aims at building a theoretical framework in order to understand how new parties, especially radical right parties (such as the SD), can influence policy. Policy impact is usually understood in terms of direct- and indirect impact. Schain (2009) defines direct policy impact as "policy making capabilities", in other terms, gaining the capability to influence policy directly (i.e. by voting) in institutions such as national or subnational parliaments. Direct policy impact is in this thesis defined as being an active part of successful policy formation. New political actors can influence policy indirectly in a number of ways such as portraying an issue in a new fashion thus increasing its importance on the agenda or shifting the preference of mainstream parties (Bale 2008; Camus 2011; Kingdon 2011). The following section will shed a light on the different ways in which new actors can impact policy, directly and indirectly.

The rise of the radical right in Europe have put pressure on the traditionally very solid party system in Europe and the mainstream parties have been forced to deal with the new contenders in one way or an other. Mainstream parties have to decide whether or not they wish to engage radical right parties at all. This initial choice can be seen as part of a larger strategy that limits or grants the radical right policy making capabilities. The radical right can be ignored or isolated if the mainstream parties choose to disengage them. If they on the other hand decide to engage them they can either collaborate or co-opt their policies in an effort not to lose voters to the radical right (Downs 2001).

Figure 1: Mainstream party reaction to the radical right

Comments: Source: (Downs 2001).

If the radical right is disengaged by the mainstream parties their chance of direct policy impcat is limited. Logically, if the radical right is being ignored or isolated they have no chance of changing policy in the parliament. Isolation can be achieved either legal or political means. Legal restrictions of isolation can be to outlaw a specific party or increasing the electral threshold to keep new actors out. This strategy along with ignoration is generally seen as democraticlly dubios thus, political isolation is more common (Downs 2001). A *cordon sanitarie* is the the usual strategy employed by mainstream parites in order to politically isolate radical right parties. By cooprating in a "blocking" or "grand" coalition mainstream parties can ensure that the radical right do not gain any direct policy making capabilities (Downs 2001; Schain 2009). The risk with the use of grand coalitions is the potetial ideological convergence among the mainstream parties creating long term political opportunity structures for the radical right (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1997, 2007).

If mainstream parties choose to engage the radical right there are two strategies which can be utilized; policy co-optatition or collaration (Downs 2001). A party which has lost voters to the radical right can choose to take a change their stance in certain policy questions with the goal to reattract the lost voters. The final strategy which can be used by mainstream parties when reacting to radical right parties is to collaborate with them. Collaboration can occur in parliament or in government. Collaboration is the only way in which the radical right is given direct policy making capabilites unless they gain a majority by considering the definition used in this study. In figure 2 below the different outcomes of the strategies decibed is illustrated.

Figure 2: Mainstream party strategy and policy decision

Comments: The figure illustrates a spatial model of legislation, coalition (*a*) & (*b*) and a radical right party (*rr*) and their respective preferred positions (ticks) on a policy preference line. Source: (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997).

Figure 2 illustrates the various policy outcomes that can occur depending on the strategies employed by mainstream parties. The figure displays a simplified scenario in which two coalitions (*a* and *b*) reacts to a radical right party (*rr)* that enters the party system. The actors' preferences are displayed by their positions on the preference line. Scenario (A) is an illustration of a political isolation, the formation of a *cordon sanitarie*, where the two coalitions decide to cooperate in order to shut out the radical right party; this is illustrated by *rr*'s remoteness to the policy decision on the preference line. The result is a policy decision the radical right party has no direct way of impacting. An empirical example of this is the Swedish general migration agreement from 2011. The former Swedish rightwing minority government decided to collaborate with the green party (MP) in order to reach a general agreement in the area of migration, in other words, the mainstream parties decided to cooperate in a *cordon sanitarie* to shut out the radical right party (SD) from any influence in the decision (Regeringen 2011).

Scenario (B) illustrates the policy outcome of collaboration between coalition *b* and the radical right party (*rr*). By collaborating the radical right is given direct policy impact. An empirical example of this scenario is the Danish people's party's (DFP) support of the Conservative-Liberal coalition government following the 2001 Danish election. The government lead by the Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (*Venstre)* was supported by the DPP in exchange for policy impact in areas such as immigration policy (Akkerman and de Lange 2013).

The third scenario (C) illustrated in figure 2 displays the change in policy preference in actor *b* when the co-optation strategy is employed in order to woo back lost voters (or attract new). If a party changes its views on a specific issue and alters its policies in order to (re)attract voters the radical right exhibits indirect policy impact, in the form of policy co-optation by mainstream parties. This process is at large referred to as the *verrechtsing* thesis in the literature (Mudde 2013). The idea of mainstream parties taking a right turn is thoroughly theorized and highly debated. Some claim only right-wing parties have changed their policy preferences as a consequence to the rise of the radical right (Camus 2011; Schain 2006) while some argue that the whole political spectrum has taken a right turn (van Spanje 2010).

As mentioned above, the radical right is only deemed as having the potential of direct policy impact in the case of collaboration (unless they have a majority in a parliamentary setting on their own), scenario (B). The empirical cases of the radical right parties being in a position where they can directly influence policy in Europe (as a member of government of formally supporting a minority government) can be counted on two hands. In fact, up until 2012 this had only occurred seven times in Western Europe, twice in Austria and Denmark and one time in Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Akkerman & de Lange 2012). The extent of their direct policy impact when given the opportunity is linked to the capability of the radical right party. Radical right parties with a solid organization and professional and capable representatives have the tools in place to more effectively impact policy. DFP in Denmark and the Freedom Party of Austria

(FPÖ) is seen as examples of well-functioning parties that were able to impact policy to their favor. Their counterparts in Italy and Switzerland is an example of the opposite, they had close to no impact on policy, scholars attribute this to their lacking organization and capability (Akkerman & de Lange 2012; Art 2011). Despite the instances of potential direct policy impact being so few, the impact of the radical right has according to many scholars been widespread across Europe, in other terms; most of the impact of the radical right has been indirect (Mudde 2013). The following section examines the different ways in which the radical right can indirectly influence policy.

The *verrechtsing* thesis described briefly on the previous page is arguably the most studied form of indirect policy impact (Bale 2008; Camus 2011; Schain 2006; van Spanje 2010; Mudde 2013, 2007). The argument is that some (or most) party families in Europe have taken a right turn as a response to the rise of the radical right. As a part of the co-optation strategy parties have adopted policy positions closer to the radical right in order to woo back lost voters.

The increased competition caused by the mere existence of the radical right and thus their ability to affect the agenda can be seen as a part of the *verrechsting* arguably seen in Europe. Agenda setting is a crucial term in case of policy reform and political change in general and should be seen as a way towards indirect policy impact through co-optation of policy (Minkenberg 2011; Kingdon 2011; Pierson 2004). The radical right has with their increased electoral success been able to push to put the immigration question further up on the agenda in Europe forcing parties to address nativist policies in order to keep voters (Minkenberg 2011). In 2014 33% of the Swedish voters thought that refugees and immigration had a very large importance when deciding who they should give their vote to, compared to 19% in 1998 (Gustafson 2014).

Various institutional arrangements can both hinder and grant the radical right the ability to impact policy. For example it is hard for the British National Party (BNP) and the Front National (FN) to achieve impact on policy compared to similar radical right parties in other European countries due to the plurality voting systems used in in France and Great Britain (Hague and Harrop 2010: 181). Proportional representation voting system, such as the Swedish, can create a situation where no coalition or single party holds the majority if there is a party none of the sides wishes to actively collaborate with, such as a radical right party. In such a situation the radical right party holds the balance of power (Loxbo 2010). Following the 2014 general election in Sweden the SD got 12.9% of the votes while none of the other coalitions gaining over 50% of the votes. The SD decided to support the right-wing oppositions' budget causing a government crisis. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven initially decided to call for a re-election, a decision which was revoked at the last minute due to an agreement with the right-wing opposition. This example illustrates two things. First, the disproportional amount of power granted by the balance of power position. With merely 12.9% of the votes the pariah party SD almost caused a government crisis. Second, the last minute agreement (referred to as the "December agreement") is a perfect example of political isolation (Larsson 2014).

The nature of the ideology of the radical right is highly debated among scholars but one of the most impactful accounts of radical right nature is given by Cas Mudde (2007: 18ff, 2010). Mudde argues that three ideas are at the core of the radical right; nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nativism is an idea stating that a nation-state belongs to a specific people with a specific culture. Authoritarianism refers to a belief in a society that is strictly ordered in which infringements with regard to this order are to be punished harshly. Populism is, in this context, the idea of society being divided into to two groups, the just commoners and the corrupt elite. The radical right represents the just commoners and sees it as their mission to make the *volonté général (*general will) of the people to triumph of the wishes and ambitions of the corrupt elite (Ibid). Mudde (2010) argues that these ideas are not alien to the traditional mainstream ideologies of Western Europe; on the contrary they are closely linked and embedded in our societies. A *verrechsting* as a response from the mainstream parties might not be a far stretch. In fact, it has been acknowledged that European countries have been adopting stricter immigration laws in the passing decades (Schain 2006). This is generally not attributed to the direct impact of the radical right, they merely seen as catalysts, in other words indirect impact (Bale 2008; Mudde 2013). The pressure caused by the existence of the radical right has made mainstream parties to implement policies favored by the radical right. The ideological nature of the radical right gives us a hint on which policy issues the radical right focus on. The policy question studied in this thesis, refugee reception, is an example of nativist policy which radical right parties want to affect negatively (i.e. reducing the level of refugee reception) (Mudde 1999).

The above discussion has mostly focused on the theoretical possibilities of policy impact for the radical right. In terms of the actual empirical evidence of the impact of the radical right the conclusions are few and often contradictory (Bolin et. al 2014: 325ff). For instance, Duncan (2010) concludes that regulation regarding immigration has not become stricter by the hands of FPÖ, a view not shared by Akkerman & de Lange (2012). This may be due to the hardship of comparing across national borders (i.e. differing institutions) (Bolin et.al. 2014: 326). As aforementioned, the number of cases where radical right parties have been in government or actively supported a government was up until 2012 only seven (Ibid). This has made any large n-analysis impossible, thus the empirical analysis are mostly consisting of national case studies and sub-national analysis.

The sub-national level is very interesting to study as it is the arena in which most radical right parties gain their initial and often their biggest electoral success. But when studying policy impact the local level of governing is not an ideal context to study, to cite Cas Mudde:

> "[…] [O]ne of the few points standing out among virtually all cases of populist radical right rule at the local level is the emphasis on symbolic measures. As the parties rapidly notice that local power is highly limited, particularly with regard to the nativist policies at the core of their program […]"
>
> (Mudde 2007: 279)

The case of Sweden is unique in this regard as refugee reception is a process which involves both the national and municipal level but in the end is a question decided in the local municipal councils. In other words, the local level in Sweden offers a unique opportunity to study the policy impact of the radical right. The following section aims at describing this process.

2.2   The Process of Refugee Reception in Sweden

The process of refugee reception in Sweden is an ongoing collaboration between national institutions and the local municipalities.[2] The migration board is the national authority which grants residence permits to refugees. When a person is granted residence permit the first step of the process is to find a place of residence. The central decision of this part of the process is the "county number"[3]. Based on the national need the Swedish Public Employment Service[4], in collaboration with the Migration Board[5] and the county administrations, are to distribute the number of refugees every county is to receive. The calculation of the county number takes four variables into account and weighs them differently: Labor market (45%), housing market (15%), demography (10%) and population size (30%). In addition the spatial distribution of refugees registered at the Migration Board is taken into account; some manual adjustments are also made (Swedish Employment Service 2013b). Based on these variables each of the 21 county administration boards is given a certain number of refugees to find accommodation for (Swedish Employment Service 2013a). The county administration boards are institutions representing the national government in the Swedish counties. At this point of the process the county administrations have to find municipalities who are willing to accommodate the refugees appointed to each county administration in the county number (Ericsson 2011).

Immigrants and refugees are allowed to reside anywhere they want, thus the county number is divided into two categories of refugees: assigned refugees and self-residence refugees. Assigned refugees consist of people who cannot find accommodation for themselves, one of the 290 municipalities will have to accommodate them. The self-residence spots consist of people who can find a place to live on their own. The county number is accordingly divided into assigned refugees and expected self-residence refugees. The municipality in which an assigned refugee or a self-residence refugee resides in must supply the necessary services for the person in question. The services include among other things; education in the Swedish language, primary and secondary education and social services. The municipality is granted compensation by the national government for the services they provide. The county administration boards have

---

[2] A telephone interview with Gisela Andersson (gisela.andersson@lansstyrelsen.se), Integration Director of the County Administration in Kronoberg, was conducted the 21/10-2014. This interview is in addition to sources listed the main source of this section.

[3] (sv ="länstal")

[4] (sv = "Arbetsförmedlingen)

[5] (sv =) "Migrationsverket"

to come to an agreement with the municipalities when it comes to finding housing for assigned refugees. In order to obtain political support the county administration boards usually meet with municipal executive branch and high ranking municipal civil servants (Swedish Employment Service 2013b). The decision whether or not to accept the number of assigned refugees proposed by the county administration board is being made by the municipal council. In some rare instances they can delegate this decision to a municipal committee, but they maintain the chance of revoking this delegation. The county administration boards are the representatives of the national government in the negotiations, if an agreement is reached it is between the Migration Board (another national institution) and the municipalities (Ericsson 2011). Below, in figure 1, a simplified version of the process is illustrated.

Figure 3: The Process of Refugee Reception in Sweden

Comment: Simplified illustration of the actors participating in the process of refugee acceptance in Sweden. Source: (Swedish employment service 2013a; 2013b) & interview with Gisela Andersson (see footnote on previous page).

Since the municipal council can decide how many assigned refugees they will accommodate, this thesis will distinguish between assigned refugees and self-residence refugees; this has not been done in any study examining the question of policy impact by the SD on local refugee reception (Bolin et al. 2014). The following section aims at theoretically understand how the SD possibly could influence and alter the outcome of the process of assigned refugee reception based on the theoretical framework presented thus far and the process described above.

2.3 The SD and refugee reception in Swedish municipalities

Assigned refugee reception in Sweden is, as stated above, a question for the municipal council on the one side and the national government on the other. The SD has had a strong presence in many Swedish municipal councils' since 2010. In the 2014 election they gained over 20 % of the seats in a few municipal councils

(Swedish Election Authorites 2014). It is probable that they, in cases where they have a large portion of the seats, have the ability to impact the municipal council's decision in whether or not to make a deal with the county administration boards in the question of supplying housing to assigned refugees. The research that has been done on the policy impact by the SD has failed to identify any correlation between lowered refugee reception and SD seat share (Bolin et al. 2014). The reason for the lack of correlation may be the fact that the SD has a hard time finding candidates to fill their seats in the municipal council and the dropout out rate their candidates are higher than mainstream parties (Lundahl 2014). A lacking organization and empty seats is not likely to result in policy impact, an example of this is the Swiss and Italian case, their respective radical right parties were in government but did not achieve any major policy change (Akkerman and de Lange 2013). Research support the notion that a strong, especially local, organizational ability is one of the essential requirements for radical right parties to gain electoral success and achieve policy impact (Akkerman and de Lange 2013; Art 2011). By having a stable and professional local organization the SD could have an impact on the municipal council's decision to supply assigned refugees with housing.

Sweden has a proportional electoral system. Decisions are generally made by majority rule; the municipal councils are no exception. This can system produces the potential outcome of no party or coalition holding a majority in the assembly if a third actor is present, in this scenario the third party holds the balance of power (Loxbo 2010). This so called institutional opportunity structure is a consequence of the electoral system (Mudde 2007: 232f). If the SD holds the balance of power it forces the mainstream parties to make a decision, cooperate with the SD, find support in former opponents (a so called *cordon sanitaire*) or change their policies (policy co-optation) (Downs 2001; Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2009). Research has shown that if the SD obtains the balance of power in the municipal council refugee reception is reduced (Bolin et al. 2014). This could be explained by two things, cooperation between the SD and the other actors in the party system or an adjustment in policy by the mainstream parties in reaction to the presence of the SD (a fear of losing electoral support) (Mudde 2013; Schain 2009).

As aforementioned, the traditional actors in a party system react in one of three ways when a radical right party breaks through, by isolating them, collaborating with them or adjusting their policy in the direction of the new contender. Research has shown that the potential direct policy impact of radical right parties is limited when they are isolated (Mudde 2013). If, on the other hand, mainstream parties take a right-turn in issues close at heart to radical right parties their chances of success increases, previous studies have demonstrated that when the authoritarian views on the radical right parties' main issue (immigration) are shared by mainstream parties it serves as a facilitation of the radical right thus increasing their electoral support (Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). Furthermore, a tougher view on immigration amongst local mainstream politicians correlates negatively with local refugee reception (Bolin et al. 2014). There are arguments supporting the notion that traditional right-wing parties are more prone to lean towards the policies and attitudes of the radical right (Bale 2008). Based on the above section, three hypotheses that will guide the research question are formulated.

2.4   Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework three hypotheses are constructed. The first hypothesis is derived from the organizational theory stating that a stable and professional (local) organization could enable the SD to impact the policy question at the center of the issue formulation (Art 2013; Akkerman & de Lange 2012). This factor has not been utilized by other studies examining the relationship at the centre of this thesis (Bolin et.al. 2014):

- <u>H1</u>: The SD effects refugee reception negatively in municipalities where they have a strong local presence (supply).

The second hypothesis is built on the theory of the opportunity structure granted by the power of balance (Loxbo 2010; Bolin et.al. 2014). By holding the balance of power the SD can take advantage of this opportunity structure by either being the deciding factor in assembly voting's (by collaborating) or by influencing mainstream to move closer to the position of the SD (co-optation) in fear of losing electoral support (Schain 2009). The SD can be shut out if the mainstream parties form a *cordon sanitaire*. Research has shown that a grand coalition is not the most common response when the SD holds the balance of power in the municipal council; instead minority rule is the most common response (Loxbo 2010). The potential policy impact could thus be both direct (collaboration) and indirect (co-optation):

- <u>H2</u>: The SD effects refugee reception negatively in municipalities where they have a balance of power position (political opportunity structure).

The third hypothesis, H3, states that in municipalities where a negative attitude towards immigration is shared by right-wing mainstream parties' refugee reception is reduced. Research has shown that a negative attitude amongst mainstream local party representatives towards accepting refugee's in one's municipality increase the electoral support for the SD and reduces refugee reception (Bolin et al. 2014; Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). In other words, a negative view on refugee reception among mainstream party candidates creates an opportunity structure which the SD can utilize to potentially increase their policy impact. The traditional right-wing parties are according to some scholar more likely to adjust their views and policies towards the radical right (Bale 2008). Thus, if the hypothesis below is supported there is reason to believe it is due to indirect policy impact by the SD through co-optation of policy by the right-wing parties:

- <u>H3</u>: Refugee reception is reduced in municipalities where right-wing mainstream party representatives share the authoritarian view towards immigration held by the SD.

3   Data

The following pages will present the operationalization based on data availability and the theoretical framework that has been presented.

3.1   Operationalization

The research problem at the center of this thesis is radical right parties and their potential to impact policy in the question of local assigned refugee reception. Thus, the dependent variable that will be used in this thesis is:

- *Dependent variable: Number of assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants*

Assigned refugees will be used instead of total number of refugees (assigned and self-residence refugees) due to the fact that the municipal council can decide how many assigned refugees their municipality will accommodate, other refugees are free to live wherever they find a place to reside (Ericsson 2011). This variable is divided by 10000 inhabitants to account for the discrepancy in size that exist among Swedish municipalities. The study which is most closely related to this (Bolin et.al. 2014) used the total number of refugees (assigned plus self-residence) as a dependent variable. The choice to use only assigned refugees is motivated by the fact that municipal council have a direct political power to decide how many assigned refugees they are willing to accommodate, they have no way of controlling how many self-residence refugees choose to live in their respective municipality.

As illustrated in chart 1 the assigned number of refugees on a national level has been fairly constant (except for 2006) in the time period presented while the total number is fluctuating. The potential effect the SD might have had in deciding the number of assigned refugees could be "hidden" in the total number of refugees residing in a municipality, a process in which they have no direct say in (since most refugees find accommodation on their own). I argue that looking at only the assigned refugees allows us to study the policy in which the SD logically have a desire and ability to impact policy in, to them, the best way possible. It would be wrong to assume that number of assigned refugees and self-residence refugees is not connected at all. For example, early in the process of refugee reception (the county numbers) the county administration boards are given a number of assigned refugees to find accommodation for; this is based on a prediction of the number of refugees to reside in the county (Swedish Employment Service 2013a).

Chart 1: Total number of refugees & assigned refugees (national level)

Comment: Dashed line = Total number of refugees (assigned + self-residence refugees), filled line = assigned refugees. (Source: Swedish Migration Board)

Furthermore, self-residence refugees require the same services as assigned refugees (aside from accommodation) such as Swedish lesson, social services and healthcare, it is a possibility that a municipality which is inhabited by a lot of self-residence refugees to provide services for are less inclined to accommodate assigned refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013). On the contrary, it is also plausible that municipalities who accommodate a lot of self-residence refugees already have the tradition and experience (services in place etc.) which allows them to accommodate more assigned refugees (Ibid). This theoretical ambiguity motivates the choice to include self-residence refugees as control variable (see page 17).

3.2 Main explanatory variables

Since the number of refugees is decided in negotiations between the municipal council and the county administration board (Ericsson 2011) it is be necessary to measure the share of SD seats in the municipal council:

- *1ˢᵗ Independent variable: Share of SD seats in the municipal council*

This measures the proportion of seats the gained by the SD in the municipal councils. This variable is necessary to include but its solidity is questionable based on prior research (Bolin et.al. 2014), theoretical reasoning and empirical reality. Empirically, SD has a hard time attracting people to represent them in municipal councils all around the country. As many as 157 SD seats in 97 municipal councils are empty following the 2014 election (Quensel and Vergara 2014). Theoretically SD needs to supply a well-functioning organization in order to be successful and have policy impact this factor needs to be taken into account (Art 2013; Akkerman & de Lange 2012). It is logically improbable to assume that SD

can impact refuge reception, even if they theoretically maintain balance of power, if they do not have anyone representing them. Thus, the second independent variable is derived from the organizational theoretical tradition regarding radical right parties (Art 2011). This theoretical perspective argues that the electoral success and thus the policy impact of the radical right is decided by their ability to supply a well-organized choice to the voters (Ibid). The second independent variable is:

- *2nd Independent variable: Organizational ability (Number of SD candidates/total number of seats in municipal council)*

This variable is calculated by dividing the number of seats occupied by SD representatives in the municipal council by the total share of seats in the municipal council. This is the independent variable related to H1.

As aforementioned, a balance of power position strengthens the position of SD. Research has shown that this may have an effect on refugee reception on a local level (Bolin et.al. 2014). Previous studies have also shown that a balance of power position enables SD to be more politically relevant (Loxbo 2012). This institutional opportunity structure is important to include in the research design and thus constitute the third independent variable:

- *3rd independent variable: Balance of power (SD)*

The above variable is a dichotomous variable. The balance of power is an institutional opportunity structure that arises when no other coalition or party has the majority in a parliamentary setting. This is the independent variable related to H2.

To illustrate the potential outcomes of the balance of power position in a graphic manner the spatial model of legislation described in the theory section can be used. The theory section stated that mainstream parties have three (main) strategies to when a radical right party; isolation, collaboration and co-optation (Downs 2001). Figure 4 on the following page illustrates how policy decisions theoretically can change when the SD holds balance of power. The reason this model is reintroduced is the due to the fact we have theoretical anchored scenario on which it can be applied upon, SD holds balance of power.

This rational choice model (page 14) is a simplification of the reality but can help us illustrate the processes graphically (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). Let us assume a parliamentary position (pure majority) after an election where coalition *a* obtains 45% of the votes, coalition *b* obtains 45% of the votes and a third (new) actor, *SD,* has 10% of the votes in the parliament thus holding the balance of power. The first strategy the mainstream coalitions can employ is political isolation through a *cordon sanitaire* (A). In this case the SD is prevented from any influence in the policy decision as coalition *a* and *b* has a majority on their own. Theory suggests that an ostracizing strategy such as the one described creates political opportunity structures in the long run and may thus not be a viable long-

Figure 4: Policy outcome when the SD holds balance of power

Political isolation

(A)

Collaboration

(B)

Co-optation

(C)

Policy decision
(Political isolation)

Policy decision
(Collaboration)

Comment: The figure illustrates a spatial model of legislation, coalition (*a*) & (*b*) and a radical right party (*SD*) and their respective preferred positions (ticks) on a policy preference line. Source: (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997).

term strategy for the mainstream parties when dealing with radical right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1997, 2007; Loxbo 2014; Minkenberg 2001). This is not the usual strategy employed in Swedish municipal councils (Loxbo 2010)

The second strategy (B) that may be used by mainstream parties is to collaborate with the SD in order to gain a majority in the municipal council (Downs 2001). This would grant the SD direct policy influence and allows them to make a policy decision favorable to them; this is illustrated by the policy decision's proximity to the SD preferred outcome on the preference line (*SD*).

Strategy C, co-optation, illustrates the two possible policy outcomes that can occur when mainstream party change their stance in issues towards a view that is closer to the SD. The reason for this would be to pursue voters not to vote for the radical right (in this case the SD). If the mainstream parties choose to employ such a strategy they still have to choose whether or not to collaborate or isolate the radical right in order to reach a policy decision in a parliamentary setting where

the radical right holds the balance of power. Both of these choices yields a policy decision that is favorable to the SD, collaboration more so than isolation (Figure 5, C). Summa summarum, policy co-optation by the mainstream parties gives the SD indirect policy influence in a parliamentary setting where they hold balance of power. The above model (C) show a scenario where both coalitions (*a* and *b*) adjust their policy position, in reality if only one of the coalitions would adjust their position SD's policy impact is still increased, just not as much (see the varied remoteness of SD's preferred position to the two potential outcomes).

When the SD holds balance of power they can either have no policy influence (isolation), direct policy influence (collaboration) or indirect policy influence (co-optation).

Yet another opportunity structure that needs to be taken into account is the mainstream parties' views on the radical right's core issue, immigration. Opposing parties' policy position is essential for party strategy and success (Meguid 2008). Recent studies have highlighted that a tough and negative stance on immigration within mainstream parties, on a local level, correlates with increased support for SD on a local level (Dahlström and Sundell 2012). Furthermore, recent studies have shown some support that a widespread negative stance towards immigration among local politicians in municipal councils may have a negative effect on local refugee reception (Bolin et.al. 2014). This variable, connected to H3, was collected as a part of the KOLFU survey which is presented in publications from the University of Gothenburg (Gilljam et al. 2010). All municipal council members in Sweden were asked to respond to the statement "receive less refugees to the municipality" and rate how good they believed the statement was on scale of one to five, with one being "very good", three "neutral" and five "very bad". The variable has been transformed into a variable ranging from 0 (very bad) to 100 (very good). SDs municipal council member have been excluded from this variable as they would probably skew the result in municipal councils they have a lot of representation. Furthermore, this variable has been divided into two parts, one measuring the attitude among the left coalition members and one the attitude among their traditional antagonists. The parties in the left coalition are the Social Democratic Party (S), the Green Party (MP) and the Left Party (V). The parties in the right coalition are the Moderate Party (M), the Christian Democratic Party (KD), the Peoples Party (FP) and the Center Party (C).[6] The division between these two coalitions is ideological and empirical (Hadenius 2008). Traditionally these parties have been ideological antagonists, since 2006 the division is empirically solid since the formal right coalition called the "Alliance"[7] received a majority of the votes in the national election. They kept the incumbency until the 2014 when S and MP formed a minority government with the support of V following the general election (Swedish Election Authorites 2014). Studies have shown that the right local representatives are generally more negative towards immigration than their left counterparts, but in the cases where the left have negative attitudes the facilitating effect of the SD is increased (Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). The two independent variables derived from this theoretical background are:

---

[6] *(sv=) Socialdemokraterna (S), Miljöpartiet (MP), Vänsterpartiet (V), Moderaterna (M), Kristdemokraterna (KD), Folkpartiet (FP)* and *Centerpartiet (C).*

[7] *(sv=) Alliansen*

- *4th independent variable:* Attitude towards immigration among right-wing coalition municipal council members.

- *5th independent variable:* Attitude towards immigration among left-wing coalition municipal council members.

A negative attitude among right-wing representatives is thought to have a negative impact on the dependent variable, assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (H3) (Bolin et al. 2014; Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012).

3.3   Control variables

Below, the theoretically anchored control variables are presented. They all stem from structural explanations on refugee reception; in short these theories state that refugee reception is determined by non-political structural factors (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).

- *1st control variable:* Unemployment rate

This variable measures the unemployment rate in all of the 290 Swedish municipalities. A high unemployment rate is thought to have a negative impact on refugee reception (Freeman 2011).

The financial state of a municipality can theoretically have an effect on how willing a municipality is to accommodate refugees. Deriving from theories from the neo-classical tradition it can be assumed that municipalities with a rich population have a high demand for a workforce. Poorer municipality could on the other hand be incentivized by the compensations from the national government associated with refugee reception (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013). The distribution and equality of resources (i.e. income) is associated with the quality of and trust in public institutions (Rothstein 2011). This could in extension lead to the outcome that an equal distribution of resources increases a municipality's refugee reception (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).   Two control variables can be derived from this reasoning:

- *2nd control variable: Average income*

- *3rd control variable: Gini-coefficient*

In order to accept assigned refugees available housing is a necessity. Many of the municipalities who do not accept a lot of assigned refugees claim that it is due to lack of available housing (Delby and Wrede 2013).

- *4th control variable: Share of free apartments among the local housing companies*

Theoretically, a large share of the population with a foreign background is connected to the dependent variable as a large share of the population with foreign background signals a tradition of receiving immigrants. This would lead to a higher ambition and competence in the reception of refugees (Massey et al. 1993). A person with a foreign background is in this thesis defined as a person born abroad or a person with both parents born abroad.

- *5th control variable: Share of population with foreign background*
- *6th control variable: Self-residence refugees received per 10000 inhabitants*

The above (6th) variable could theoretically have a be connected to the dependent variable under the same reasoning as the above (5th control) variable. But it could also have a negative effect as municipalities with a large portion of self-residence refugees have to supply a lot of resources to accommodate the refugees they did not actively choose to receive. This could result in an unwillingness to actively receive assigned refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013). The following section discusses the general nature of the data.

3.4   A note on the data and data set

The data used in this thesis contains information from two consecutive Swedish terms of office, the first following the term subsequent the 2006 election and the second the term following the 2010 election. Elections are held late in the year in Sweden (September) and the first year that will be studied is thus 2007. The logical argument behind this choice is the fact that it is unlikely for changes in the municipal council to have an effect on policy the minute they enter office in September. The potential effect is more than likely seen starting the following year (new budget etc.). This yields a seven year time-period that will be studied (2007-2013). All variables used in the TSCS data uses the unique data from each municipality each year[8].

The unit of study in this thesis is Swedish municipalities, as of today, Sweden has 290 municipalities. Each value used is the unique value for the municipality in question for each year, 290 municipalities studied over seven years yields 2030 total observations. For detailed descriptive statistics of all the independent variables see Appendix 1.

One of the advantages connected to a sub-national statistical analysis is the fact several factors that have to be taken into account are held at a constant, the best example of this is institutional arrangements and number of parties studied (this study only have concern itself with the SD) that generally vary in cross-national studies (Bolin et. al. 2014: 326). In addition to this the number of units observed are much greater than any cross-national study ever would when studying policy

---

[8] The exceptions are "Average income" and "Gini-coefficient-coefficient" as the data for 2013 for these two variables is unavailable (Statistics Sweden 2013).

impact of the radical right in Europe. These two reasons are generally seen as the main reason for the inconstancy found in the literature on this subject (Ibid).

A note on validity in terms of data collection, most of the data was downloaded and used in its original form from the sources presented in the thesis (in tables and in Appendix 1). The data from the Migration Board had to be sorted manually due to a different original sorting compared to all the other sources. In order to control for any possible mistakes an external reviewer was asked to sample the manually sorted variables, no errors were found. All statistical models were computed by STATA 12.[9]

The usual method section (describing the various methodological decisions) seen in theses such as this one has been incorporated into the result section. The reason behind this choice is the fact that a many different statistical methods and instruments will be used in order to analyze the research question at hand, ranging from very simple but effective bivariate descriptive statistics to data demanding TSCS-analysis. To present all the methodological decision separately in section prior to the results would be ill-advised as they are better presented and understood as the analysis progresses onwards.

---

[9] For contact details to the external reviewer and STATA-logs of all the computations, contact sam13kek@student.lu.se

4   Results and Method

The results from the statistical models are presented in this section. As stated in the previous chapter a lot of different statistical methods will be used including descriptive statistics and various TSCS-analysis in order to examine the research question in a fruitful manner. The idea behind using all of these different instruments is to logically build a comprehensive statistical model that tackles the research question in a holistic manner.

4.1   Descriptive statistics

The first of the main explanatory variables is SD seat share. Based on the theoretical logic claiming that in parliamentary situation where the SD obtain a large proportion of the seats in the municipal council they will increase their potential policy impact, i.e. reducing the number of assigned refugees received in the municipality. In chart 2 below, the relationship is explored with the use descriptive statistics.

Chart 2: DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants & Share of SD seats

Comment: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Years (2007-2013). Dashed line SD seat share (4th quartile), filled line average (all municipalities). (Source: & Migration Board (2013))

As seen in chart 2 above the level of assigned refugee reception in the municipalities where the SD has the strongest support (4th quartile) is lower than

the average in all Swedish municipalities. According to these findings the SD's sheer share of seat seats has a negative effect on the level of assigned refugees received in a municipality.

Theory suggests that a well-functioning organization is key for the radical right in terms of electoral success and policy impact (Akkerman and de Lange 2013; Art 2011; Mudde 2010). Chart 3 below graphically presents the bivariate relationship between the independent variable connected to H1 (organizational capacity) and the dependent variable.

Chart 3: DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants & Organizational capacity

Comments: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Organizational capacity. Bivariate regressions (2006: $y = 9.106 + (-0.197 \times X)$ significant at the [***] level $p < 0.01$, 2010: $y = 12.88 + (-0.286 \times X)$ significant at the [***] level $p < 0.01$. Adjusted R^2 0.033 (2006) & 0.087 (2010). N = 290. Source: Swedish Migration Board (2013) & Swedish Election Authority (2013).

As illustrated by graph 3 the number of assigned refugees is negatively correlated with the organizational capacity of the SD on a local level. In other words, if the SD is better organized on a local level fewer assigned refugees will be received in the municipality. The effect is increased in the second time period, (2007-2010) but the results are negative and significant in both cases. The results presented in chart 3 shows support for H1 connected to the organizational capacity of the radical right.

The explanatory variable related to H2 is the dummy variable SD balance of power. The theoretical framework argues that the SD can use this institutional opportunity structure to leverage their power in order to influence policy (potentially both direct and indirect) (Bolin et al. 2014; Loxbo 2010). Chart 4 on the following page displays the number of assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants in all municipalities (filled line) and in the municipalities where the SD holds the balance of power (dashed line).

Chart 4: DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants in all municipalities & balance of power (SD)

Comment: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Years (2007-2013) Dashed line = SD in balance of power, filled line = SD not in balance of power. (Source: Statistics Sweden & Swedish Migration Board)

Chart 4 clearly demonstrates that in municipalities where the SD holds the balance of power the level of assigned refugee reception is lower compared to the national average. In the municipalities where SD holds the balance of power the average assigned refugee level is around 4 to 6 per 10000 inhabitants. The national average varies from around 8 to 11 per 10000 inhabitants in the studied time period. The evidence presented in chart 4 shows support for H2.

In the case of the mainstream parties views on immigration the theoretical framework suggests that in municipalities where the mainstream party representatives have a negative view on refugee reception the level of assigned refugee reception is lower (Bolin et al. 2014). Furthermore, right-wing party representatives are generally assumed to have a tougher view on immigration than left-wing party representatives. Research has shown that in cases where both right-wing and left-wing parties the radical right is facilitated and legitimized (Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). Chart 5 examines the number of assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants in municipalities where mainstream party representatives have a negative view on refugee reception compared to the national average (4th quartile).

Chart 5: DV: Assigned refugee reception/10000 inhabitants & Mainstream party toughness towards immigration (4th quartiles)

Comment: Y-axis: (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants, X-axis: Years (2007-2013) Filled line average (all municipalities), short dashed line (rightwing coalition 48.44), long dashed line (leftwing coalition 31.25). (Source: (Gilljam et al. 2010) & Swedish Migration board (2013)).

As seen in chart 5 in the municipalities where right-wing representatives have a negative view towards receiving more refugees in their municipality the actual level of assigned refugees is lower than the national average. In the case of left-wing representatives with the most negative attitudes the level of assigned refugee reception is actually higher than the national average. The result presented in chart 5 gives support to H3, where right-wing representatives are the most negative towards receiving more refugees the actual number of assigned refugees is slightly lower than the national average; this relationship is supported by previous research (Dahlström & Sundell 2012; Bolin et.al 2014).

The descriptive statistics presented above have supplied a first glance at the supposed relationship being investigated in this study. In the next section the results from the linear regression models are presented in order to further examine the research question and hypotheses.

22

4.2   Linear regression model

Prior to TSCS analysis some issues related to the data will be discussed. Some of the variables are subject to problems connected to distribution. Since the data used in this study is not a random sample but a complete sample this is a problem that cannot be avoided, but dealt with. The variables that suffer from this problem will be transformed using their natural logarithm.[10] This is also one way of dealing with the issue of heteroskedasticity (Edling and Hedström 2003). Heteroskedasticity is issue of non-constant errors skewing the effect of the Y-variable in a regression model. In short, if the variance in Y is affected by non-constant errors in an independent variable it is an issue of heteroskedasticity (Ibid). This causes some units to affect the dependent variable more than others; the relationship appears to be linear when it, in fact, is not. One way of dealing with this is to, as mentioned above, transform the variables using their natural logarithm. An even more fruitful way is to use robust (panel corrected) standard errors. In short, robust standard errors correct the standard errors of the regression function making them reliable even when heteroskedasticity is a potential issue (Ibid). The useful characteristic about TSCS-data is the fact that we can observe the data both through time and space, some considerations need to be taken into account though.[11]

4.3   TSCS analysis

The most widely used model used when dealing with TSCS data is the so-called "Beck-Katz" standard model (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996; Plumper et al. 2005). This standard model incorporates panel corrected (robust) standard errors and a lagged dependent variable. The use of a lagged dependent variable is generally to account for the dynamics of the relationship (Djurfeldt & Barmark, 2009: 174). In addition, the model stresses that fixed effects should be used in order to account for non-spherical errors (Beck and Katz 1996). Basically, this assumes that values are fixed (non-random) in contrast to other models which assume random effects. This is done by including unit dummies in the equation, in the case of this study; the spatial unit is municipalities ("fixed effects" is also called within estimation). Fixed effects absorbs the effect of the unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable that are constant and bound to the unit of study, in our case, municipalities. An example of such an effect is geographical location (Wooldridge 2012: 459f). A linear regression model using "Beck-Katz standard" described above, is presented on the following page.

---

[10] The variables transformed are: Assigned refugees, Average income, self-residence refugees and the lagged dependent variable (t-1). Prior to the transformation all variables were added by 1.

[11] Linear regression models examining both of the terms of office studied in this thesis is presented when run separately in appendix 2 & 3. This type of analysis utilizes averages of all variables over the time periods and thus loses data.

Table 1: Linear regression model (PCSE, fixed effects & lagged DV) – DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (log)

	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)	(5)	(6a)	(6b)
Share of SD seats	-0.00542 (0.00624)	-0.0109 (0.0145)							0.00714 (0.00715)	-0.0117 (0.0149)
Balance of power (SD)			-0.168*** (0.0510)	-0.176** (0.0828)					-0.175*** (0.0603)	-0.187** (0.0829)
Organizational capacity					0.00180 (0.00549)	0.0213*** (0.00802)			0.00590 (0.00578)	0.0227*** (0.00810)
Toughness (left coalition)							-0.000229 (0.00229)		0.000236 (0.00219)	-
Toughness (right coalition)								-0.00643*** (0.00229)	-0.00638*** (0.00241)	-
Unemployment rate	0.0596*** (0.00932)	-0.00480 (0.0194)	0.0596*** (0.00901)	-0.00270 (0.0188)	0.0583*** (0.00923)	-0.00155 (0.0189)	0.0580*** (0.00912)	0.0580*** (0.00896)	0.0586*** (0.00971)	-0.00419 (0.0194)
Share of population with foreign background	-0.00605** (0.00287)	0.0618 (0.0562)	-0.00610** (0.00290)	0.0571 (0.0521)	-0.00656** (0.00290)	0.0612 (0.0520)	-0.00646** (0.00283)	-0.00493* (0.00294)	-0.00529* (0.00365)	0.0785 (0.0562)
Share of free apartments	0.00936 (0.00867)	-0.00802 (0.0182)	0.00863 (0.00868)	-0.00740 (0.0182)	0.0105 (0.00868)	-0.00559 (0.0182)	0.0104 (0.00864)	0.0120 (0.00826)	0.0117 (0.00841)	-0.00592 (0.0183)
Population (log)	-0.135*** (0.0247)	-9.145*** (1.581)	-0.131*** (0.0245)	-9.203*** (1.585)	-0.137*** (0.0247)	-8.404*** (1.611)	-0.137*** (0.0237)	-0.150*** (0.0271)	-0.149*** (0.0266)	-8.488*** (1.610)
Self-residence refugees (log)	0.0570** (0.0249)	0.0286 (0.0354)	0.0586** (0.0248)	0.0324 (0.0353)	0.0593** (0.0248)	0.0278 (0.0349)	0.0592** (0.0249)	0.0514** (0.0245)	0.0537** (0.0250)	0.0274 (0.0350)
Gini-coefficient	-0.432 (0.614)	-2.578 (1.687)	-0.295 (0.605)	-2.344 (1.697)	-0.463 (0.200)	-1.651 (1.699)	-0.462 (0.616)	-0.0998 (0.624)	0.0296 (0.620)	-1.745 (1.715)
Average income (log)	0.0916 (0.195)	3.290*** (0.980)	0.0111 (0.194)	3.016*** (0.975)	0.118 (0.263)	3.248*** (0.969)	0.106 (0.194)	-0.00502 (0.199)	-0.0488 (0.198)	3.357*** (0.989)
Lagged dependent variable (t-1)	0.507*** (0.0281)	0.102*** (0.0371)	0.502*** (0.0278)	0.100*** (0.0371)	0.505*** (0.0277)	0.0970*** (0.0369)	0.505*** (0.0282)	0.501*** (0.0281)	0.494*** (0.0296)	0.0945** (0.0368)
Constant	1.502 (1.041)	-	1.869* (1.044)	-	1.383 (1.070)	-	1.453 (1.018)	2.340** (1.097)	2.523** (1.080)	-
Unit dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations (n)	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697
R^2	0.411	0.099	0.413	0.101	0.411	0.105	0.4106	0.415	0.4176	0.108

Comments: Standard errors in parentheses, $^{*} p < 0.10$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$, values replaced with " – " were omitted. Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014).

Since the variable measuring the toughness of mainstream party representatives uses the 2008 value in all years (due to data availability) fixed effects cannot incorporate them into the calculations, they are therefore omitted.

Model 1 in table 1 analysis the relationship between the variable measuring the share of SD seats in the 290 municipal councils and the dependent variable. The theoretical argument connected to this variable argues that as representation increases for the SD in parliaments, their potential policy impact increases with it (Bolin et al. 2014). Other studies have not found this relationship to be significant in the case of Sweden (ibid). The results from model (1) indicate that the level of assigned refugee reception is not lowered as the SD's proportional representation increases, there is no significant correlation. Using fixed effects does not alter the correlation between the independent and dependent variable (model 1b).

The variable connected to H2, balance of power, is examined in model 2 in table 1. The institutional opportunity structure created by the parliamentary system in Sweden is theoretically linked to increased policy impact of the SD. By holding the balance of power none of the other actors can reach a decision in a pure majority parliamentary setting without either collaborating with the SD or creating a so called *cordon sanitaire* (Loxbo 2010). The finding presented in table 1 demonstrate that in municipalities in which the SD holds the balance of power there is a decrease in the level of assigned refugees received in the municipality, the correlation is significant. Since the dependent variable has been subject to logarithmic transformation we have to use the exponential function of the result to observe the actual effect (in percent) of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The interpreted result is that if the SD holds the balance of power the number of assigned refugees is lowered by about 17-19%[12]. The effect is maintained even with fixed effects (model 2b). In regard to the theoretical basis of this hypothesis it seems like the SD gains either policy impact directly by collaboration or indirectly through other parties co-opting their policies when they hold the balance of power.

Model 3a demonstrates that the variable associated with H1, organizational capacity, does not correlate significantly with the dependent variable. Theoretically this variable relies on the logics of organizational theories of the radical right (Art 2011). These theories state that the radical right will thrive if they can organize well and by doing so supplying a serious choice to the voters and increase their potential policy impact. Interestingly, the effect of the variable in question is positive when fixed effects are calculated (model 3b). In other words in municipalities where SD has a lot of candidates on their ballot paper (weighted with the total number of mandates) the level of assigned refugees is received is

---

[12] To calculate the effect on the y-variable (DV) at an increase of one unit of the x-variable (IV) of a "Log-level" model (where the DV is a logarithmic variable and the IV level variable) you multiply the β-coefficient of x by 100 (Wooldrigdge 2012: 44)

increased, contrary to the predicted theoretical argument, the effect is significant. This may be a case of reversed causality. The SD might attract more people to represent them in areas where more assigned refugees are received.

Model 4 and 5 analyzes the effect of the attitudes regarding refugee reception of mainstream (right-wing) party representatives (H3) and how it correlates with the level of assigned refugee reception. As displayed in table 1 the attitudes of left-wing coalition representatives does not have an effect on assigned refugee reception (model 4). The toughness of right-wing representatives does have negative effect on assigned refugee reception. Presented in model (5), a tougher view on refugee reception among right-wing representatives has a significantly negative effect on assigned refugee reception in their respective municipality. A one percent increase in toughness among right-wing representatives translates into 0.7% less assigned refugees into their municipality. Theoretically this could be explained by the *verrechtsing* thesis that argues that the radical right has forced mainstream (especially right-wing) parties to adjust their policies in order to not lose voters to the radical right, in other words; indirect policy impact by the SD (Bale 2008).

Model 6 in table 1 includes all independent variables, the results show that the correlations which were significant on their own, SD balance of power and toughness (right-wing coalition), still are significant. In terms of the control variables the results are fairly consistent in all models; the difference can be seen in random and fixed effects models. In models applying random effects (models "a") unemployment rate is significantly positively correlates with assigned refugee reception, as unemployment rises, so does assigned refugee reception. Share of population with foreign background negatively correlates with assigned refugee reception, as shown in table X, so does a larger population. In the case of fixed effects population is the only control variable that remains significantly correlated. The control variable measuring average income is positively correlated with the dependent when fixing the effects.

In terms of the coefficient of determination (R^2) which measures how good data fits a model (Edling and Hedström 2003), when assuming random effects the R^2 value is fairly high with a value ranging from 0.427 to 0.433 (table 1). The R^2 values presented by the models using fixed effects cannot be compared to the values granted by the models using random effects as they display another value (within R^2).

At this stage of the analysis a few interesting points can be made. First, the variable measuring balance of power seems to be strongly and significantly correlated with the dependent variable, both when the models assume random and fixed effects. In other words, if the SD holds the balance of power in the municipal the level of assigned refugee reception is lowered. Theoretically, this could be understood as the SD having policy impact through co-optation of policy or collaboration. If the mainstream parties would politically isolate the SD would

not have any effect when holding balance of power (Downs 2001; Loxbo 2010). Second, the right-wing coalitions' toughness toward refugee reception is negatively correlated with assigned refugee acceptance, this is supported by the theoretical framework related to H3. H2 and H3 seem to be the hypotheses that hold up the best according to the results presented in table 1; this is when using the "Beck-Katz standard".

The relationship studied in this paper is a dynamic relationship, in other words, we are looking at a relationship that is changing over time. In table 1 a lagged version dependent variable (t-1) was used to control for the dynamics. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable when using fixed effects cause a bias usually called a Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). Beck and Katz (2009) argue that their standard model is not problematic when T is fairly high (around 30-40), in those cases the Nickell bias is only a few percent. In our case when the time period only includes 8 years, the downward biased caused by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects could potentially be much larger than a few percent (Nickell 1981). Another technique that can be used in an effort to control for and dynamic nature of the relationship is to include a series of time dummies (Plumper et al. 2005). A series of time dummies captures all factors that are unobserved and constant but

Table 2: Linear regression model (fixed effects & time dummies) DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (log)

	(1a)	(1b)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Share of SD seats				-0.00977	-0.0234
				(0.00993)	(0.0160)
Balance of power (SD)	-0.230***	-0.188**		-0.217**	-0.180**
	(0.0822)	(0.0882)		(0.0881)	(0.0889)
Organizational capacity				0.0202**	0.0124
				(0.00789)	(0.00872)
Toughness (left coalition)				0.00724*	-
				(0.00375)	
Toughness (right coalition)			-0.0105***	-0.00942**	-
			(0.00389)	(0.00406)	
Unemployment rate	-0.0125	-0.0711*	-0.0167	-0.0162	-0.0677*
	(0.0236)	(0.0403)	(0.0235)	(0.0233)	(0.0405)
Share of population with foreign background	-0.00949*	0.0753	-0.00762	-0.00830	0.0925
	(0.00545)	(0.0620)	(0.00547)	(0.00542)	(0.0643)
Share of free apartments	0.00859	-0.00348	0.0114	0.0105	-0.00316
	(0.0145)	(0.0185)	(0.0143)	(0.0144)	(0.0185)
Population (log)	-0.145***	-10.80***	-0.176***	-0.142***	-10.27***
	(0.0475)	(1.681)	(0.0502)	(0.0502)	(1.711)
Self-residence refugees (log)	0.179***	0.0815**	0.173***	0.168***	0.0765**
	(0.0319)	(0.0359)	(0.0320)	(0.0312)	(0.0355)
Gini-coefficient	-0.609	-0.263	-0.395	-0.303	-0.254
	(1.061)	(1.900)	(1.069)	(1.058)	(1.912)
Average income (log)	-1.518***	3.606	-1.567***	-1.625***	3.437
	(0.403)	(3.904)	(0.398)	(0.396)	(3.878)
Unit dummies	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (n)	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697
R^2	0.2100	0.118	0.4435	0.4463	0.118

Comments: Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$," - " = Omitted Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014).

bound to the time-variable which affects the dependent variable, an example of this in our case could be an exogenous shock such as a war causing an increase in refugees (Wooldrigde 2012: 460).

In table 2 on the previous page time and unit dummies are incorporated into the equation along with random and fixed effects (unit dummies). The effect of the various time dummies are not presented in table 2, but they are significant. [13]

As seen in table 2, the correlation between the level of assigned refugees and the balance of power maintains negative and significant (model 1) even when time and unit dummies are included. The effect remains significant when all variables are included (model 3), translated into percent the negative effect on the dependent variable around 18-23%.

In the case of the variable connected to H3, the attitude towards refugee reception of mainstream (right-wing) party representatives, the previously presented effect (table 1) maintains its effect when time dummies are taken into account, the effect on the dependent variable is around 0.7% with every percent increase in toughness among right-wing local representatives. As stated previously, the unit dummy cannot account for the variables associated with H3 (toughness) since the value is the same for all years (2008 value). The results presented in table 2 support the previous findings, how can the hypotheses be further tested?

The usage of time dummies and uniform lagged dependent variables is also associated with a few potential concerns. Plumper et. al. (2005) demonstrates that the inclusion of these two instruments often absorbs parts of the trend in the dependent variable and, that a uniform lagged dependent variable especially, cause bias estimates when used with a lagged dependent variable. Plumper et.al. (2005) recommend the usage of a Prais-Winsten (AR1) transformation instead of a uniformed lagged dependent variable. The main advantage with the Prais-Winsten regression is that it corrects for potential serial correlation of the errors which otherwise can make the result of a regression misleading (Wooldridge 2012: 439f). In table 3 on the following a Prais-Winsten regression model with AR1 auto-correction is presented.

As seen in table 3 presented on the following page the two variables which were found have the most significant effect according to the "Beck-Katz" model, "Balance of power (SD)" and "Toughness" of the rightwing coalition, maintain their effect when the Prais-Winsten regression is introduced. This is confirmed in model 2 and model 5 in table 3. The actual effect in terms of percent is a 36% decrease in assigned refugees in a municipality in which the SD holds the balance of power as seen in model 6 in in which all variables are taken into account (26%).

---

[13] Only the most theoretically and empirically interesting models are included in Table 4 (above). See appendix 4 for the remaining models.

Table 3: Prais-Winsten regression model (AR1 & PCSE) – DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (log)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share of SD seats	0.00862 (0.0130)					0.0264* (0.0141)
Balance of power (SD)		-0.261*** (0.0677)				-0.359*** (0.0781)
Organizational capacity			0.0120 (0.00852)			0.0147* (0.00807)
Toughness (left coalition)				0.00513 (0.00316)		0.00486* (0.00266)
Toughness (right coalition)					-0.00953*** (0.00294)	-0.0108*** (0.00319)
Unemployment rate	0.0527* (0.0280)	0.0532* (0.0290)	0.0532* (0.0284)	0.0494* (0.0288)	0.0509* (0.0288)	0.0497* (0.0260)
Share of population with foreign background	-0.00993*** (0.00367)	-0.00835** (0.00414)	-0.00938** (0.00419)	-0.0105** (0.00426)	-0.00680 (0.00456)	-0.00957** (0.00423)
Share of free apartments	0.0177 (0.0171)	0.0135 (0.0182)	0.0166 (0.0179)	0.0162 (0.0180)	0.0176 (0.0179)	0.0200 (0.0166)
Population (log)	-0.174*** (0.0370)	-0.164*** (0.0373)	-0.184*** (0.0368)	-0.155*** (0.0432)	-0.194*** (0.0382)	-0.185*** (0.0398)
Self-residence refugees (log)	0.157*** (0.0541)	0.153*** (0.0535)	0.154*** (0.0538)	0.155*** (0.0542)	0.148*** (0.0525)	0.150*** (0.0516)
Gini-coefficient	-1.731 (1.191)	-1.496 (1.248)	-1.668 (1.207)	-1.707 (1.227)	-1.279 (1.299)	-0.796 (1.230)
Average income (log)	-0.249 (0.441)	-0.401 (0.469)	-0.184 (0.462)	-0.212 (0.460)	-0.398 (0.474)	-0.414 (0.446)
Constant	4.942** (2.301)	5.631** (2.432)	4.656* (2.389)	4.451* (2.484)	6.206** (2.515)	5.962** (2.407)
Unit dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations (n)	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697
R^2	0.139	0.143	0.139	0.140	0.145	0.157

Comments: , * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014).

The effect of the toughness of right-wing representatives is about a 1 % decrease in assigned refugee reception per 1% increase in the independent variable, toughness (right-wing coalition) towards refugee reception in the municipality.

The variable measuring the share of SD seats is positively correlated with the dependent variable, according to model 6. As the SDs proportional representation increases, the percent of assigned refugees increase with it. A 1% increase in SD representation equals 2.7% increase in assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants.

A similarly surprising result presented in table 3 is the variable measuring organizational capacity a larger local organization translates into higher level of assigned refugee reception, 1% increase in the independent variable (organizational capacity) equates to 1.5% increase in the dependent variable, as seen in model 6.

The toughness of left-wing coalition representatives does not have a negative impact on assigned refugee reception; in fact a tougher stance translates into increased assigned refugee reception (model 4 and 6).

In terms of the control variables table 3 presents that unemployment rate is positively correlated to the dependent variable. Theoretically this could be understood as poorer municipalities (with higher unemployment) are more inclined to accept refugees in order to be benefit from the various national subsidies connected to refugee reception (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).

Share of population with foreign background is negatively correlated with the dependent variable; a higher share of the population with a foreign background translates into less assigned refugees (model 6). But self-residence refugee reception is positively correlated with the dependent variable. Combined this can be interpreted as; municipalities which have a lower total share of inhabitants with a foreign background but a higher share of self-residence refugee receptions are inclined to accept assigned refugees. This could be explained by the fact that if a municipality is inhabited by a large share of self-residence refugees they have the instruments and institutions (social services etc.) already in place and can thus accept more assigned refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2013).

Last of the significant control variables is the one measuring population. Municipalities with a smaller population are more inclined to accept Self-residence refugees. This result is confirmed in table 3 and the variable has remained significant throughout the statistical analysis.

4.4   Revisiting the hypotheses

The first hypothesis, H1, is connected to the organizational theoretical framework claiming that the success of the radical right is dependent on their capability to supply a well-functioning organization (Akkerman and de Lange 2013; Art 2011). The variable measuring the number of names on the SDs ballot paper divided by the number of total seats in the municipal council was predicted to have a negative effect on the dependent variable, the actual empirical results presented in this paper shows no effect or a reversed effect. H1 finds no support in this study.

The theoretical framework supporting the organizational argument is strong and should be included into studies of this nature in the future. The total lack of support in this study could be due to the nature of the variable used in this paper. The variable "Organizational capacity" only captures the quantity of the local organization during one period of office. Art (2011) argues that not only the quantity of the organization should be taken into account, but also the quality. In order to capture the quality of the local organization two options seem appropriate to utilize as proxies. First, in Sweden every candidate on the ballot paper for any party specifies their occupation. This could be used as information on the candidates' level of education and presumed socio-economic status. Theory claims

that when the radical right can attract representatives with a high socio-economic status their chance of success increases (Art 2011). Second, in order to capture the consistency of the local organization it is possible to compare the ballot papers in the same municipalities over time. This would make it possible to capture the consistency of the local representatives and thus local organization. Summa summarum, even though the supply-driven theoretical framework did not find any support in this study the theoretical arguments are strong and should be revisited in other studies.

The hypothesis examining the institutional opportunity structure balance of power, H2, found strong support in this study. The "Beck-Katz" standard model showed that the level of assigned refugees decreased by about 17% in municipalities where the SD held the balance of power in the municipal council (see table 1). Using an arguably more accurate statistical model (Prais-Winsten regression) the effect was increased to 31% (see table 3). The theoretically anchored predictions deemed that three scenarios were likely to occur when the SD hold balance of power. First, the mainstream parties can, if the SD holds the balance of power, choose to cooperate in a grand coalition in order to nullify the potential power the SD gains from this institutional opportunity structure (a so-called *cordon sanitaire*). Second, the SD can cooperate with either one of the sides in order to gain influence of policy. This could lead to a decision favored by the SD (i.e. less assigned refugees). Third, the mere party competitive pressure by the existence of an active radical right party in the balance of power position can force mainstream parties to co-opt their policies in a *verrechtsing* manner, thus gaining SD indirect policy impact. The evidence presented in this thesis does not support the formation of a successful *cordon sanitare* in municipal councils when the SD holds balance of power, a conclusion which is supported by Loxbo (2010). SD is thus given direct or indirect or direct policy impact by either collaboration or co-optation. Needless to say; the balance of power position increases the power and potential of SD in many shapes and forms, policy impact is one of them.

The empirical analysis in this thesis found no significant negative correlation between assigned refugee reception and the share of SD seats. A similar result was found in the only other study looking at roughly the same relationship (Bolin et.al. 2014). The size of the SD does not matter; they need to obtain the balance of power in order to have policy impact in the question of refugee reception. But does their size affect the policy impact when they hold the balance of power? In order to answer this question a multiplicative interaction model can be used (Brambor et.al. 2006; Berry et.al. 2012). By utilizing this method the two independent variables (Balance of power SD & Share of SD seats) are multiplied in a Prais-Winsten regression, chart (5) illustrates how the effect of the balance of power position on the dependent variable is changing with regards to the SD's seat

Chart 6: Marginal effect of Balance of power (SD) on (DV) Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants

share, the so-called marginal effect.[14] At 3% (roughly the mean of the variable, see appendix 1) of the total seats in the municipal council, the level of assigned refugees is decreased with about 15% when they hold the balance of power. When the SD has 15% of the seat share, the decrease is 35%. To summarize, in contrast to previous research (Bolin et. al. 2014) the result of this thesis concludes that the seat share of the SD matter in terms of policy impact when they hold the balance of power.

In the case of the last hypothesis, H3, which analysis how the attitudes towards refugee reception of right-wing party local representatives affect the level of refugee reception the empirical analysis found interesting results. The theoretical prediction stated that a tougher stance on refugee reception among mainstream party officials would result in fewer assigned refugees received in the municipality (Bolin et al. 2014; Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). Contrary to the other study on this subject this thesis distinguishes between the two opposite coalitions in Sweden, right-wing and left-wing. The statistical analysis presents a conclusive result that shows that the views of the mainstream coalition representatives matter

---

[14] The reason the chart is displayed instead of the table is due to the fact that the table only reports the marginal effect (and corresponding standard errors) of X (Balance of power (SD)) when the conditional variable Z (Share of SD seats) is 0. Using a chart allows for presentation in a more readable format (Brambor et.al. 2006).

in terms of effect on level of assigned refugees in Swedish municipalities but different ways. If left-wing local representatives have tough attitude towards refugee reception it has no effect (table 1 & 2) or a positive effect ("Prais-Winsten", table 3) on assigned refugee reception. In the case of a right-wing politician the results are quite different. If right-wing representatives have a tough view on refugee reception the actual number of assigned refugees received in the municipality decreases (table 1, 2 & 3). Theoretically this result gives us reason to believe this is caused by co-optation of policy by the right-wing parties (Bale 2008). There is a way to further examine this in a very simple but effective way. This study and other have shown that SD's potential policy impact is to large extent dependent on whether or not they hold the balance of power (Bolin et al. 2014; Loxbo 2010). Chart 6 below demonstrates that in municipalities where the SD holds the balance of power mainstream party officials are generally tougher on refugee reception in their municipality.

Chart 6: Toughness towards refugee among mainstream party representatives' reception & balance of power (SD)

Comments: Y-axis: Toughness towards refugee reception, X-axis: SD balance of power. Sources: Swedish Election Authorities (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010).

Chart 6 indicates that the SD have influenced mainstream party repreentatives to adopt a tougher views on refugee reception in municpalites where they hold balance of power. This would be indirect policy influence by the SD as a the empircal analyiss showed that the level of assigned refugees decreases if right-wing party offcials have a tougher view on refugee reception. The above chart does not measure the change across time (due to data availability) and as more data becomes avaible the relationship should be further examined. [15]

The result presented in this thesis indicate that the SD have had direct (through collaboration) or indirect (co-optation) policy impact in municpalties where they

---

[15] The survey measuring the party representatives' attitude towards immigration (KOLFU) was conducted in 2008. KOLFU2 was conducted in 2012 and allows for a future study in the matter; unfortunately this survey data is to be made available to external researchers in the spring of 2015 and can thus not be included in this thesis.

hold the balance of power. In terms of the opportunity structure created by tough view on refugee reception by right-wing party representatives, there is reason to belive that the SD have caused especially right-wing party officials to sway towards a tougher attitude towards immigration and by doing so gaining indirect policy impact and reducing assigned refugee reception.

5 Conclusion

This thesis has studied whether or not the SD has had any policy impact in the question of local assigned refugee reception. The results presented by the statistical analysis are conclusive; the SD has affected the number of assigned refugees accepted by Swedish municipalities. Two of the three hypotheses found support in the statistical.

No support was found for the hypothesis related to organizational capacity of the SD. I believe that this relationship should be studied further as the theoretical framework supporting this argument is strong (Art 2011). The hypothesis related to the balance of power position found strong support in this thesis. In addition to adding to the existing knowledge on the power granted by this institutional opportunity structure (Bolin et al. 2014; Loxbo 2010), the evidence from this thesis suggest that the size of the SD matters, in terms of policy influence, when they hold the balance of power and that mainstream party members tend to have a tougher view on refugee reception in these municipalities. The change in attitude is especially interesting due to the results related to the third hypothesis. These results support the hypothesis stating that when right-wing politicians have a tougher view on refugee reception, the number of assigned refugees decreases. In other words, SD has indirect policy impact through co-optation by right-wing parties.

As aforementioned, this study cannot determine if the SD has any direct policy impact through collaboration with mainstream parties. More studies are needed in order to determine the causal mechanism behind the relationship supported by the evidence in this thesis. Qualitative methods such as case studies should be conducted in order to determine how the SD gains policy impact in the municipal councils. Furthermore, as time goes on and more data accumulates more statistical analysis should examine this research question.

In regards to the generalizability of the results a few things need to be taken into account. First, there is a difference between local and national governments. I.e. Swedish municipalities have a formal executive (*kommunstyrelse*) that is composed by members of all parties this probably alters the dynamics and competition among parties which distinguishes it from national politics (Loxbo 2010: 302; Bolin 2014 et al). Despite the possible differences the result support by this and other similar studies (Bolin et. al. 2014) should be further tested in other contexts. Local politics in Sweden presents a unique opportunity to study the policy impact of the radical right using large n-analysis, the causal relationships discovered due to this should be further analyzed and developed.

In terms of empirical implications of the results of this study there are a few things that come to mind. First, this study used data from the two preceding terms of office and the SD has grown since then, thus gaining the balance of power position in twice as many municipalities (Ekman et al. 2014). In addition, over 20000 expected assigned refugees with residence permits are thought to be in need of accommodation by the end of next year (2015), a decision taken by the municipal councils (Swedish Migration Board 2014). In the seven year period studied in this thesis the SD affected policy, if they continue to exert the same impact the coming term of office it will be an almost impossible task to accommodate all the assigned refugees. Furthermore, the events that took place in the national arena following the 2014 election showed that the SD is not going to be bystanders this coming term of office.

.

6 References

Akkerman, Tjitske and de Lange, Sarah L. (2013), 'Radical Right Parties in Office: Incumbency Records and the Electoral Cost of Governing', *Government and Opposition,* 47 (04), 574-96.

Art, David (2011), *Inside the Radical Right : the development of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe* (New York ; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) xvi, 272 p.

Arzheimer, K. and Carter, E. (2006), 'Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success', *European Journal of Political Research,* 45 (3), 419-43.

Bale, T. (2008), 'Turning round the telescope. Centre-right parties and immigration and integration policy in Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy,* 15 (3), 315-30.

Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (1995), 'What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data', *American Political Science Review,* 89 (3), 634-47.

--- (1996), 'Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models', *Political Analysis,* Vol. 6, 1-36.

Bolin, N., Liden, G., and Nyhlen, J. (2014), 'Do Anti-immigration Parties Matter? The Case of the Sweden Democrats and Local Refugee Policy', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 37 (3), 323-43.

Camus, J.-Y. (2011), 'The extreme right in France: Redrawing the map to be expected. In N. Langenberger & B. Schellenberg (eds), Is Europe on the 'right' path? Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe.', *Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.*

Dahlstrom, C. and Sundell, A. (2012), 'A losing gamble. How mainstream parties facilitate anti-immigrant party success', *Electoral Studies,* 31 (2), 353-63.

Delby, Johan. and Wrede, Magnus. (2013), '8 av 10 kommuner vill inte ha fler flyktingar', *Dagens Samhälle.*

Downs, William M. (2001), 'Pariahs in Their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties Eeact to Extremist Threats', *West European Politics,* 24 (3), 23-42.

Edling, Christofer and Hedström, Peter (2003), *Kvantitativa metoder : grundläggande analysmetoder för samhälls- och beteendevetare* (Lund: Studentlitteratur) 205 s.

Ekman, Johan., Larsson, Ida., and Svensson, Anna. (2014), 'SD vågmästare i var fjärde kommun', *SVT.se [http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/sd-vagmastare-i-var-fjarde-kommun] 2014-11-10.*

Ericsson, J. (2011), 'Genomförande av Etableringsreformen – Delrapport (2011:24)', *Statskontoret.*

Erlingsson, G. O., Vernby, K., and Ohrvall, R. (2014), 'The single-issue party thesis and the Sweden Democrats', *Acta Politica,* 49 (2), 196-216.

Freeman, G. P. (2011), 'Comparative Analysis of Immigration Politics: A Retrospective', *American Behavioral Scientist,* 55 (12), 1541-60.

Gilljam, Mikael, Karlsson, David, and Sundell, Anders (2010), *Politik på hemmaplan : tiotusen fullmäktigeledamöter tycker om politik och demokrati* (Stockholm: SKL Kommentus) 172 s.

Gustafson, T. (2014), 'SVT:s vallokalsundersökning Riksdagsvalet 2014', *Sveriges Television [http://www.svt.se/svts/article2323667.svt/binary/SVT_ValuResultat_riksdagsval_201 4_PK_0914.pdf] 2014-09-18*.

Hadenius, Stig (2008), *Modern svensk politisk historia : konflikt och samförstånd* (7., [rev. och aktualiserade] uppl. edn.; Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg) 326 s.

Hague, Rod and Harrop, Martin (2010), *Comparative government and politics : an introduction* (8th edn.; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) xiii, 442 p.

Kingdon, John W. (2011), *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies* (Updated 2nd edn., Longman classics in political science; Boston: Longman) xx, 273 p.

Kitschelt, Herbert (1997), 'The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis', *University of Michigan Press*.

--- (2007), 'Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research', *West European Politics,* 30 (5).

Larsson, Mats J. (2014), 'Så fungerar decemberöverenskommelsen', *Dagens Nyheter*.

Lidén, Gustav and Nyhlén, Jon (2013), 'Explaining Local Swedish Refugee Policy', *Journal of International Migration and Integration,* 15 (3), 547-65.

Loxbo, K. (2010), 'The Impact of the Radical Right: Lessons from the Local Level in Sweden, 2002-2006', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 33 (3), 295-315.

--- (2014), 'Voters' Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short-term Opportunities of Anti-immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 37 (3), 239-62.

Lundahl, Karin. (2014), '159 SD-stolar tomma i kommunerna', *Dagens Samhälle*.

Massey, D. S., et al. (1993), 'Theories of International Migration - a Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review,* 19 (3), 431-66.

Meguid, B. M. (2008), 'An Unequal Battle of Opposing Forces Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of the Scottish National Party', *Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*, 192-246.

Minkenberg, Michael (2001), 'The radical right in public office: Agenda-setting and policy effects', *West European Politics,* 24 (4), 1-21.

Mudde, C. (1999), 'The single-issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue', *West European Politics,* 22 (3), 182-97.

--- (2007), 'Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe', *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 1-385.

--- (2010), 'The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy', *West European Politics,* 33 (6), 1167-86.

--- (2013), 'Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?', *European Journal of Political Research,* 52 (1), 1-19.

Nickell, S. (1981), 'Biases in Dynamic-Models with Fixed Effects', *Econometrica,* 49 (6), 1417-26.

Plumper, T., Troeger, V. E., and Manow, P. (2005), 'Panel data analysis in comparative politics: Linking method to theory', *European Journal of Political Research,* 44 (2), 327-54.

Quensel, Anna-Sofia. and Vergara, Daniel. (2014), 'SD riskerar hundratals tomma stolar', *Expo*.

Regeringen (2011), 'Ramöverenskommelse mellan regeringen och Miljöpartiet de gröna om migrationspolitik', *[http://www.regeringen.se/download/26c80039.pdf?major=1&minor=162140&cn=at tachmentDuplicator_0_attachment] 2011-03-03*.

Rothstein, Bo (2011), *The quality of government : corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) xiii, 285 p.

Schain, M. A. (2009), 'The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union', *European Journal of International Law,* 20 (1), 93-109.

Schulz, M. (2011), 'Combating right-wing extremism as a task for European policy making. In N. Langenberger & B. Schellenberg (eds), Is Europe on the 'right' path? Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe.', *Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.*

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Bonchek, Mark S. (1997), *Analyzing politics : rationality, behavior, and institutions* (New York ; London: W.W. Norton) viii, 472 p.

Swedish Election Authorites, . (2014), 'Val till kommunfullmäktige - Röster', *[http://www.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/K/rike/index.html] 2014-09-19.*

Swedish Employment Service, . (2013a), 'Länstal 2014', *[http://projektwebbar.lansstyrelsen.se/integration/SiteCollectionDocuments/ovrigt/Fas tst%C3%A4llda%20l%C3%A4nstal%202014.pdf] 2013-10-03.*

--- (2013b), 'Länstal 2014: Förklaringar och kommentarer', *[http://projektwebbar.lansstyrelsen.se/integration/SiteCollectionDocuments/ovrigt/Fas tst%C3%A4llda%20l%C3%A4nstal%202014%20- %20F%C3%B6rklaringar%20och%20kommentarer.pdf] 2013-10-03.*

Swedish Migration Board, . (2014), 'Verksamhets- och kostnadsprognos November 2014', *[http://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.20cfdbe014887632b911514/141509615 1765/Migrationsverkets+novemberprognos+2014.pdf] 2014-11-04.*

Van Spanje, J. and Van der Brug, W. (2009), 'Being intolerant of the intolerant. The exclusion of Western European anti-immigration parties and its consequences for party choice', *Acta Politica,* 44 (4), 353-84.

Data Sources:

Gilljam, Mikael, Karlsson, David, and Sundell, Anders (2010)
- *Politik på hemmaplan : tiotusen fullmäktigeledamöter tycker om politik och demokrati* (Stockholm: SKL Kommentus) 172 s

KOLADA (2014)
- Inkomststatistisk:[https://www.kolada.se/portal.php?page=news/show&id=163&all=]

Statistics Sweden (2014)
- Demokrati: Allmänna val [http://scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Demokrati/]
- Boende Byggande och Bebyggelse [http://scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Boende-byggande-och-bebyggelse/]
- Inkomster och Skatter [http://scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Hushallens-ekonomi/Inkomster-och-inkomstfordelning/Inkomster-och-skatter/]
- Befolkning [http://scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Befolkning/]

Swedish Migration Board (2014)
- Kommunmottagna tidigare år: [http://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Statistik/Oversikter-och-statistik-fran-tidigare-ar/Kommunmottagna--tidigare-ar.html]

Swedish Election Authority (2014)

- Val till kommunfullmäktige (2014)
  [http://www.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/K/rike/index.html]
- Val till kommunfullmäktige (2006 & 2010):
  [http://www.val.se/tidigare_val/]

Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Minimum	Maximum	Source	Years covered
Assigned refugees per 10000 inhabitants (log)	1.88	0.99	2030	0	4.67	Swedish Migration Board (2014)	2007-2013
Share of SD seats	3.15	3.56	2030	0	23.53	Statistics Sweden (2014), Swedish Election Authority (2014)	2007-2013
Balance of power (SD)	0.11	0.32	2030	0	1	Swedish Election Authority (2014); Loxbo (2010)	2007-2013
Organizational capacity	0.62	3.09	2030	0	49.23	Swedish Election Authority (2014)	2007-2013
Toughness (left coalition)	25.25	10.58	2030	0	71.43	Giljam et.al (2010)	2008
Toughness (right coalition)	41.36	11.06	2030	0	83.33	Giljam et.al (2010)	2008
Unemployment rate	5.78	2.27	2030	0.95	14.33	Statistcs Sweden (2014)	2007-2013
Share of population with foreign background	13.63	7.54	2030	3.77	55.76	Statistics Sweden (2014)	2007-2013
Share of free apartments	2.27	2.87	1987	0	21.20	Statistics Sweden (2014)	2007-2013*
Population (log)	9.82	0.94	2030	7.79	13.71	Statistics Sweden (2014)	2007-2013
Self-residence refugees per 10000 inhabitants (log)	2.26	1.15	2030	1.58	5.70	Swedish Migration Board (2014)	2007-2013
Gini-coefficient	0.31	0.04	1740	0.24	0.60	Statistics Sweden (2014); KOLADA (2014)	2007-2012
Average income (log)	5.48	0.12	1740	5.26	6.20	Statistics Sweden (2014)	2007-2012
Lagged dependent varaibale (t-1)	1.87	1.05	2030	0.00	2.64	Statistics Sweden (2014)	2006-2012

Note: Annual survey from 2007-2009, biennial from 2010.

Appendix 2: Multiple regression 2007-2010 averages - DV: Assigned refugees/1000 inhabitants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share of SD seats	-0.00958					-0.00451
	(0.0156)					(0.0223)
Balance of power (SD)		-0.187				-0.168
		(0.129)				(0.145)
Organizational capacity			-0.000945			0.00129
			(0.00602)			(0.00772)
Toughness (left coalition)				-0.00618		-0.00908**
				(0.00419)		(0.00453)
Toughness (right coalition)					0.00594	0.00694*
					(0.00383)	(0.00412)
Unemployment rate	-0.0776**	-0.0770**	-0.0777**	-0.0802**	-0.0784**	-0.0804**
	(0.0342)	(0.0341)	(0.0345)	(0.0341)	(0.0341)	(0.0343)
Share of population with	-0.00479	-0.00488	-0.00523	-0.00808	-0.00250	-0.00555
foreign background	(0.00638)	(0.00630)	(0.00635)	(0.00657)	(0.00655)	(0.00669)
Share of free apartments	0.0343**	0.0332**	0.0351**	0.0348**	0.0350**	0.0323**
	(0.0163)	(0.0162)	(0.0163)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0162)
Population (log)	-0.212***	-0.209***	-0.214***	-0.212***	-0.219***	-0.209***
	(0.0557)	(0.0554)	(0.0568)	(0.0553)	(0.0552)	(0.0568)
Self-residence refugees	0.216***	0.216***	0.218***	0.212***	0.220***	0.210***
	(0.0320)	(0.0316)	(0.0318)	(0.0318)	(0.0316)	(0.0323)
Gini-coefficient	0.0736	0.169	0.0132	0.359	0.319	1.161
	(1.819)	(1.808)	(1.861)	(1.823)	(1.817)	(1.912)
Average income (log)	-0.00444**	-0.00459**	-0.00423**	-0.00362*	-0.00477**	-0.00449**
	(0.00206)	(0.00203)	(0.00205)	(0.00205)	(0.00205)	(0.00208)
Constant	4.050***	4.021***	4.015***	4.227***	3.735***	3.977***
	(0.664)	(0.662)	(0.686)	(0.674)	(0.691)	(3.66)
Adjusted r2	0.316	0.320	0.315	0.320	0.321	0.3364
N	290	290	290	290	290	290

Comments: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Appendix 3: Multiple regression 2011-2013 averages - DV: Assigned refugees/1000 inhabitants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share of SD seats	-0.0489***					-0.0544***
	(0.0135)					(0.0198)
Balance of power (SD)		-0.371***				-0.234
		(0.135)				(0.151)
Organizational capacity			-0.00748			0.0108
			(0.00510)			(0.00688)
Toughness (left coalition)				0.00500		-0.00186
				(0.00455)		(0.00478)
Toughness (right coalition)					0.00919**	0.00518
					(0.00409)	(0.00431)
Unemployment rate	0.0592*	0.0551*	0.0508	0.0481	0.0538*	0.0611*
	(0.0313)	(0.0316)	(0.0321)	(0.0321)	(0.0318)	(0.0319)
Share of population with	-0.00579	-0.00864	-0.00826	-0.00797	-0.00606	-0.00546
foreign background	(0.00645)	(0.00643)	(0.00657)	(0.00672)	(0.00666)	(0.00671)
Share of free apartments	0.0689***	0.0747***	0.0758***	0.0793***	0.0778***	0.0692***
	(0.0213)	(0.0214)	(0.0217)	(0.0215)	(0.0214)	(0.0213)
Population (log)	-0.323***	-0.336***	-0.313***	-0.341***	-0.345***	-0.358***
	(0.0582)	(0.0586)	(0.0613)	(0.0595)	(0.0590)	(0.0614)
Self-residence refugees	0.115***	0.120***	0.119***	0.127***	0.122***	0.117***
	(0.0262)	(0.0264)	(0.0269)	(0.0267)	(0.0265)	(0.0265)
Gini-coefficient	-1.345	-1.340	-1.434	-2.225	-1.348	-1.173
	(1.672)	(1.694)	(1.727)	(1.724)	(1.707)	(1.753)
Average income (log)	-0.00125	-0.000571	-0.000552	-0.000215	-0.000440	-0.00110
	(0.00197)	(0.00197)	(0.00202)	(0.00199)	(0.00198)	(0.00198)
Constant	4.540***	4.361***	4.196***	4.227***	3.830***	4.582***
	(0.709)	(0.716)	(0.739)	(0.745)	(0.765)	(0.812)
Adjusted r2	0.475	0.465	0.455	0.453	0.460	0.478
N	290	290	290	290	290	290

Comments: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix 4: Time and unit dummies (full table)

	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)	(5)	(6a)	(6b)
Share of SD seats	-0.0199**	-0.0268*							-0.00977	-0.0234
	(0.00873)	(0.0156)							(0.00993)	(0.0160)
Balance of power (SD)			-0.230***	-0.188**					-0.217**	-0.180**
			(0.0822)	(0.0882)					(0.0881)	(0.0889)
Organizational capacity					0.0177**	0.0115			0.0202**	0.0124
					(0.00751)	(0.00868)			(0.00789)	(0.00872)
Toughness (left coalition)							0.00574		0.00724*	*Omitted*
							(0.00393)		(0.00375)	
Toughness (right coalition)								-0.0105***	-0.00942**	*Omitted*
								(0.00389)	(0.00406)	
Unemployment rate	-0.0133	-0.0709*	-0.0125	-0.0711*	-0.0157	-0.0722*	-0.0176	-0.0167	-0.0162	-0.0677*
	(0.0237)	(0.0405)	(0.0236)	(0.0403)	(0.0238)	(0.0405)	(0.0236)	(0.0235)	(0.0233)	(0.0405)
Share of population with foreign background	-0.00854	0.0809	-0.00949*	0.0753	-0.0101*	0.0775	-0.0116**	-0.00762	-0.00830	0.0925
	(0.00556)	(0.0635)	(0.00545)	(0.0620)	(0.00543)	(0.0624)	(0.00535)	(0.00547)	(0.00542)	(0.0643)
Share of free apartments	0.00812	-0.00399	0.00859	-0.00348	0.0113	-0.00306	0.0102	0.0114	0.0105	-0.00316
	(0.0146)	(0.0185)	(0.0145)	(0.0185)	(0.0145)	(0.0186)	(0.0146)	(0.0143)	(0.0144)	(0.0185)
Population (log)	-0.144***	-10.64***	-0.145***	-10.80***	-0.160***	-10.35***	-0.133***	-0.176***	-0.142***	-10.27***
	(0.0479)	(1.688)	(0.0475)	(1.681)	(0.0477)	(1.711)	(0.0467)	(0.0502)	(0.0502)	(1.711)
Self-residence refugees (log)	0.176***	0.0790**	0.179***	0.0815**	0.175***	0.0768**	0.181***	0.173***	0.168***	0.0765**
	(0.0319)	(0.0358)	(0.0319)	(0.0359)	(0.0317)	(0.0355)	(0.0320)	(0.0320)	(0.0312)	(0.0355)
Gini-coefficient	-0.721	-0.453	-0.609	-0.263	-0.966	-0.291	-0.827	-0.395	-0.303	-0.254
	(1.067)	(1.898)	(1.061)	(1.900)	(1.081)	(1.900)	(1.069)	(1.069)	(1.058)	(1.912)
Average income (log)	-1.551***	3.230	-1.518***	3.606	-1.365***	3.754	-1.355***	-1.567***	-1.625***	3.437
	(0.412)	(3.879)	(0.403)	(3.904)	(0.410)	(3.908)	(0.403)	(0.398)	(0.396)	(3.878)
Constant	11.64***	-	11.43***	-	10.80***	-	10.36***	12.35***	12.07***	-
	(2.109)		(2.059)		(2.098)		(2.050)	(2.039)	(2.022)	
Unit dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (n)	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697
R^2	0.2022	0.118	0.2100	0.118	0.2020	0.117	0.2060	0.2134	0.2219	0.122

Comments: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, values replaced with " – " were omitted.

Appendix 5: Prais-Winsten regression (AR1, interactions) DV: Assigned refugees/10000 inhabitants (log)

	(1)	(2)
Share of SD seats (when SD holds balance of power)	-0.0344**	-0.0360**
	(0.0154)	(0.0162)
Share of SD seats (when SD does not hold balance of power)	0.0311**	0.0364**
	(0.0151)	(0.0164)
Balance of power (SD)	-0.139*	-0.138*
	(0.0842)	(0.0786)
Organizational capacity		0.0141*
		(0.00786)
Toughness (left coalition)		0.00517*
		(0.00267)
Toughness (right coalition)		-0.0109***
		(0.00321)
Unemployment rate	0.0492*	0.0494*
	(0.0261)	(0.0253)
Average income (log)	-0.427	-0.433
	(0.408)	(0.427)
Population (log)	-0.166***	-0.186***
	(0.0360)	(0.0396)
Share of population with foreign background	-0.0102***	-0.00964**
	(0.00343)	(0.00413)
Share of free apartments	0.0168	0.0200
	(0.0168)	(0.0162)
Self-residence refugees	0.159***	0.151***
	(0.0535)	(0.0517)
Gini-coefficient	-1.330	-0.710
	(1.173)	(1.233)
Constant	5.691***	6.020***
	(2.122)	(2.315)
R^2	0.148	0.159
N	1697	1697

Comments: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ Sources: Swedish Migration Board (2014), Statistics Sweden (2014), KOLADA (2014), (Gilljam et al. 2010), Swedish Election authority (2014).