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Mainstreaming Human Security in the New Security Landscape

The discursive struggle for "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want"

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Abstract

After the failure to respond adequately to the changing patterns of conflict and violence after the end of the Cold War, human security was popularized in the 1990s as an alternative concept to security more suitable to face threats to individual security. Ever since, the question about what human security should entail has seen much discussion. This paper examines the different discourses which influence human security as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". It situates the concept in what can be understood as the new security landscape, and examines how the different understandings of human security have influenced policy at the level of the United Nations. Performing an analysis based in the theoretical foundation of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory, this paper presents how human security is the target of a discursive struggle, as different discourses seek to hegemonize the concept. The paper goes on to analyze at a discursive level the hegemonization of human security within the UN, and concludes by presenting several reasons to why human security has increasingly been seen as a preventive approach.

Key words: human security, freedom from fear, freedom from want, new security landscape, Responsibility to Protect, Laclau and Mouffe, discourse theory, discursive struggle, hegemony.

Words: 21069

Abbreviations

CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CHS	Commission on Human Security
HSN	The Human Security Network
ICISS	The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IR	International Relations
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General

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1. Introduction

This thesis examines the discursive struggle for human security. The concept has been debated ever since its popularization in the mid-1990s, and the discussion about what human security should entail and how it should be operationalized has been ongoing since. The conceptualization of human security is still characterized by much contestation, and its relevance is debated in a changed security landscape, as human security shares the spotlight with similar, alternative, conceptions of security. This has led human security into a state of flux, as policymakers ask; is human security still relevant, and if so, what role should it play?

1.1. Background and significance

The popularization of human security can be traced to the 1994 Human Development Report, as it made evident how several security challenges could not be dealt with from a traditional state centric understanding of security, but required a revised security agenda which could provide solutions towards individual, human, security. In the scholarly debate on security, human security emerged as an alternative approach to traditional realist security, and can therefore be seen as one of the critical approaches to security getting foothold in the 1990s, as it was increasingly believed that new conceptions of security were required in order to respond to a "new" Rwanda or Srebrenica. Alternative conceptions of security can be traced even further back, and in 1983 Richard Ullman got much attention with his article "Redefining Security" (1983) in which he sought to widen the definition of security, by stressing the need to move away from a purely militarized understanding of state security.

While human security has been seen as a tool for policymaking better suited to face the new threats to individuals in what can be referred to as "the new security landscape" (Piciotto et al. 2007: 105ff) and the "new wars" (Kaldor 2007), the concept has been questioned due to the confusion regarding different interpretations of human security. Alkire (2004) discusses how there are over thirty definitions of human security, and the unclarity surrounding the concept has led some scholars to argue for the possibility to treat human security as a "political leitmotif". This means that human security would constitute a discourse containing a loose set of values which can *influence* security policy, instead of being treated as a policy agenda in itself (see Ewan 2007; Floyd 2007; Werthes & Debiel 2006).

Despite being criticized for conceptual unclarity, human security helped its main advocators Japan and Canada to strengthen their international security profile without being permanent members of the UN Security Council. This was evident in how the Canadian conception of human security was highly influential in the emergence of the concept "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), outlining guidelines for humanitarian intervention (Remacle 2008: 6-14; Suhrke 2004: 365). Still, the vagueness and the differing conceptualizations of human security have been debated on many levels, not least within the UN where frequent discussions regarding the importance of human security mainstreaming within various UN bodies have taken place (UN News Centre 2010; Timothy 2004). The applicability of human security is believed to hinge on a common understanding of the concept (Piciotto et al. 2007; Tadjbakhsh 2009), and agreeing on such a common understanding has been a major focus of deliberation within the UN over the two last decades. Still, Kettemann (2011) argues that the international community failed to make proper use of its human security mainstreaming agenda during the intervention in Libya, and points to a "conflict gap" between a preventive human security application and aspects of humanitarian intervention.

Keeping the history of human security in mind, it seems that the interpretation of the concept in many ways remain in a state of flux. Thus, the

question about how to conceptualize human security is crucial for the concept to be effective as a policy agenda.

1.2. Purpose and research questions

The purpose of the thesis is to examine how human security is constructed and understood, and how this understanding affects human security policy. In order to understand the origins and development of policies we need to "identify the discourses that dominate in them, how they come to do so, and which discourses are excluded and marginalized in the process" (Paul 2009: 243). Policy texts can be understood as "an arena of struggle over meaning" (Taylor 2004: 435), and the outcome of policies as the result of struggles "between contenders of competing objectives, where language - or more specifically discourse - is used tactically" (Fulcher 1989: 7). The rift in human security and the vagueness of the concept has had implications for its utilization as coherent policy. Therefore, my thesis will study how human security discourse is presented as policy, by analyzing the evolution of the concept. I will scrutinize the context in which human security originated as one of many alternative conceptions of security, and analyze how different discourses seek to fill human security with meaning, to define and hegemonize the concept. When the main discourses have been identified, I will perform a discursive analysis of the understanding of human security within the UN. Thus, this paper is situated in an ongoing research environment scrutinizing the conceptual debate on human security, as well as human security mainstreaming within the UN. It builds on a literature where notable earlier contributions consists of Acharya (2001), Alkire (2004), Bellamy and Williams (2006), Ewan (2007), Kaldor (2007, 2012), Kettemann (2011), Krause (2007), Piciotto et al. (2007), Remacle (2008), Ryerson (2010) and Tadjbakhsh (2007, 2009) among others.

It is my intention that this study will elucidate the conceptual struggle for human security, and point to how this struggle is translated into UN policy,

through human security mainstreaming of a certain understanding of the concept. Thus, the main research questions for the thesis are:

1. Examining the conceptual understandings that shape human security; how, and in what context, has the concept of human security evolved?
2. To what extent is it possible to identify competing discourses fighting for hegemony over human security; what are their arguments and differences, and how do these differences affect human security as policy?
3. Which conceptualization of human security enjoys hegemony within the UN? How can the consensus for this conceptualization be explained, and what implications does it have for the operationalization of human security as policy?

1.3. Structure

The thesis begins with an introduction outlining the problem area, followed by a declaration of background and significance, and purpose and research questions. I will then present the theoretical and methodological foundations for the thesis, as well as delimitations and justification of material. After these introductory chapters, the thesis will turn to the conceptual debate seen within security studies, presenting differing views on how to conceptualize security, and situate human security within academia. I will then point to how the need for alternative conceptions of security arose. I will do so by presenting the changing conditions of what can be referred to as "the new security landscape" (Piciotto et al. 2007), and how a changed world order after the Cold War presents challenges that requires new conceptualizations of, and solutions to, security in order to be met. Here I will elaborate on overarching trends influencing the popularity of human security, and also discuss the concept responsibility to protect (R2P) and its relation to, and implications for, human security. Chapters 3 and 4 will illustrate the application of human security in this new security landscape, by analyzing

how human security policy is articulated in accordance with different conceptualizations, and finally analyze which conceptualization that enjoys hegemony within the UN. In chapter 4.2 the main findings of the analysis will be interpreted against the background of the previous discussion. The paper ends with concluding reflections, where I also point to future considerations within this area of research.

1.4. Theory and methods

Critical security theory; a constructivist view of security

The theoretical positioning for the thesis is stemming from the constructivist paradigm within qualitative research (Creswell 2014: 8). By examining the conceptual understandings that shape the debate about human security through a constructivist mindset, I intend to present patterns in this debate that could reveal how human security is translated into policy, a process similar to deconstruction. Turning to Derrida's concept of deconstruction, Laclau describes the unveiling of hegemonic discourses by pointing to how deconstruction and hegemony are "two sides of a single operation" (Laclau 1993: 281). Similarly, human security can be understood as an effort to reconstruct the interpretations of what constitutes the roots of insecurity, underdevelopment and poverty, themes of interest for constructivism (Tadjbakhsh 2007: 88-89). Dillon argues that there is no such thing as objective security, since the question about security is a discursive one; "*There are always political discourses of (in)security which constitute the subjectivities on whose behalf they claim to speak and act, in the image of dangers they discursively specify*" (Dillon 1990: 108). Therefore, it is vital to examine how a subject in need of security is created, as well as what threats this subject is in need of security from in order to identify differentiating positions about how the security concept should be constructed, understood and utilized. Thus, the constructivist approach is used to analyze the "culture of security", and how discursive change happens as elements of existing discourses are articulated

together to form new inter-discursive mixes (Steans & Pettiford 2005: 197; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 157). As stressed by Krause and Williams, a fundamental question the constructivist position within critical security asks is: What is the referent object of security? Who or what is to be secured? (Mutimer 2007: 57). Since different understandings of human security disagree on the threat perception against human security - that is, the nature and scope of threats to account for - a similar question is; *what does "human" security entail - what is the individual to be secured from, under what circumstances, and with what means?* The question is essential for this thesis, as it is imperative to the construction of the human security concept, and to the formulation of policy based on this construction. It can be understood as a process of (in)securitization, which takes place when actors talk about human security, and frames it as a subject position in need of securitizing against a certain perception of threats. (In)securitization, coined by the Paris school within critical security, views the concept of "security" as fought over by (in)security professionals. Thus, its definition depends on the differing opinions of what is seen as the most urgent security threat, worthy of securitizing (Baylis 2008: 162-171; Bigo 2008: 125-127).

Considering this constructivist view of security, this thesis will examine the concept of human security by taking its overarching theoretical positioning from the constructivist view within critical security studies, and draw on aspects visible in both the Paris school and a broader understanding of critical security as described by Krause and Williams. I will further discuss these approaches in chapter 2, but some principles that describe the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis can be found in Krause's guidelines to critical security studies: Principal actors are social constructs; These actors are constituted through political practices; The structures of world politics are neither unchanging nor determining because they too are socially constructed; Knowledge of the social world is not objective, as there is no divide between the social world and the knowledge of that world; Natural science methodology is not appropriate for social science, which requires an interpretative method (Mutimer 2007: 67).

Discourse and qualitative text analysis: some acknowledgements

The study will be carried out through a qualitative text analytical method based in discourse analysis, as this paper identifies and partially deconstructs two different discourses struggling for influence on human security policy. As Punch (2005: 224) puts it, discourse analysis is similar to deconstruction, as dismantling constructions unveil connections to ideology. In this paper a discourse is understood as a particular way of representing certain parts or aspects of the world. Thus, a discourse constitutes an important resource for actors interested in *reproducing* or *challenging* the social or political status quo. This definition is essentially in line with Fairclough (1992, 2005), although the paper will conceptualize the nature and structure of a discourse by departing from Fairclough's theoretical framework and instead draw upon Laclau and Mouffe's work, for reasons that will be elaborated on in chapter 1.4.2.

Discourse analysis is suitable to examine changes in perspectives over time to highlight contrasting views within a particular field, and unveil hegemonic patterns in a particular discourse, elucidating challenges for alternative approaches within this discourse. Thus, discourse analysis does not merely analyze the linguistic features of the text under scrutiny, but is able to situate the meaning of the text into a larger discursive environment, showing how language generated in a specific context is used to construct different meanings (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 357; Fairclough 2003: 3). Esaiasson et al. stress the importance of applying a "careful reading" of the text, and to be aware of different interpretations of the same word in different contexts. This is an essential part of my analysis, as it ultimately scrutinizes different interpretations of "human security". During the analysis I will pay attention to what Esaiasson et al. call latent content, in order to elucidate the hegemonic understanding of the different discourses on human security (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 221-224). A text presenting one understanding of a concept automatically excludes another, thus the need to look for what is missing from the discursive articulations; what is the text *not* saying, and what can be found in the discourse's surplus? Presenting the analyses in chapters 3 and 4, I

will utilize the format suggested by Esaiasson et al. (2012: 224) and Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 50-54), combining quotations and encapsulations with my own analysis. The conclusions drawn are summarized by showcasing key passages in the text, and the quotations will be used for the sake of transparency, to show that it is not my own presuppositions that are the foundation for the analysis.

1.4.1. Methodological considerations

Epistemological acknowledgements and reflexivity

In the next sub-chapter I will point to how Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory combined with aspects of critical discourse analysis (CDA) can be operationalized in a critical discursive analysis of texts on human security policy. Before going into how the two methods can be fruitfully combined, I would like to acknowledge the epistemological differences between the two approaches. While CDA recognizes a distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, Laclau and Mouffe reject such a distinction and views the social world as being completely constituted by discourse. However, the focus Laclau and Mouffe put on the contingent nature of discourses is also acknowledged by Chouliaraki and Fairclough, as they see how discourse theory offer valuable tools to analyze the process of discursive change; "[w]e regard Laclau and Mouffe as providing valuable conceptual resources for the analysis of change in discourse - in particular their conceptualization of 'articulation' and 'equivalence/difference'" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 124). The use of articulations dissolves the distinction between Fairclough's three dimensions of text, discursive practice and social practice (see Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 66ff), and it gives shifting elements of the social relative permanence into moments within a certain discourse. Moments can take on shifting shapes when combined with each other in new ways, and equivalence/difference makes visible how signifiers produce different degrees of stability in discourses, as the moments are tied together in intertextual chains.

In terms of validity and reliability, Laclau and Mouffe speak little of this. However, as is custom to most discourse analytical practice, it is important to apply the principle of "reflexivity" throughout the research. While this could constitute a problem as a researcher cannot claim to be free from pre-existing knowledge and our social position, it is important to point out that the results and interpretations resulting from deconstructing discourse and analyzing its implications are the responsibility of the researcher. According to Esaiasson et al. (2012: 215), it is the researcher that tells a story drawing from the text; not the text that tells a story to the researcher. It is therefore important to be transparent in the analytical process, by clearly explaining the use of the methodological and analytical tools as well as the use of theory, and where I as a researcher position myself within the field of research. Reflexivity is a major part of this process, as it is crucial to reflect over the choices I make as a researcher and why (Jørgensen & Phillips 2012: 49, 116-119; Creswell 2014: 186). I intend to present this process clearly in the discussion about theory and methods, throughout the practical analysis in chapters 3 and 4, and during the presentation of my conclusions.

1.4.2. Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory

While constructivism can be seen as an overarching theoretical standpoint for my thesis, the choice of discourse theory as method also has implications for the use of theory. Discourse theory is not only a theoretical framework which can be used to research a specific question, but also constitutes a methodological tradition. Therefore, theory and method become intertwined in a study using discourse theory. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 33) stress that "the starting point of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory is that we construct objectivity through the discursive production of meaning. It is that construction process that should be the target of analysis". This will be further elaborated on now.

Discourse according to Laclau and Mouffe

Laclau and Mouffe define discourse, and presents the aspects of their discourse theory, in the following sense; "We will call *articulation* any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call *discourse*. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we call *moments*. By contrast, we will call *element* any difference that is not discursively articulated" (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 91). Discourse theory is influenced by the linguist scholar Ferdinand de Saussure, who presented a model to explain the relationship between language and material reality. Saussure argued that words - *signs* - have no meaning in themselves, but get their meaning when connected to other words (or *signs*) similar to knots in a fishing-net (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 315). While Laclau and Mouffe's post-structuralist belief rejects the idea that signs in language can ever be completely fixed, the fishing-net metaphor can help understand discourse theory since the creation of meaning as a social process "is about the fixation of meaning, *as if* a Saussurian structure existed" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 25). Thus, while Laclau and Mouffe see a long-term fixation of discourse as impossible, a discourse can come to a temporary fixed state through articulations bringing *closure*. However, Laclau and Mouffe stress that the transition from the "elements" to the "moments" is never entirely fulfilled because "neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible" (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 97).

The analysis of discursive struggles

A major aim for this thesis is to examine the discursive struggle taking place over what the human security concept should include, in order to reach closure on the concept. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 29) points to how "there is always room for *struggles* over what the structure should look like, what discourses should prevail, and how meaning should be ascribed to the individual signs". Thus, the focus of this thesis is on the "essentially contested concepts" that Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2014) call "floating signifiers". Discourse theory offers tools to elucidate these discursive struggles, for example by identifying nodal points

which specify key points of a specific discourse. Nodal points are "privileged discursive points" (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 98-99) of the partial fixation, central signs "around which the other signs are organised and derive their meaning and which exclude other possible meanings" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 165-166). Antagonistic viewpoints bring about the discursive struggle of meaning. After choosing the nodal points, the researcher looks for the master signifiers organizing identity and myths organizing social space, thus bringing clarity to various positions within the discourse; "What different understandings of reality are at stake, where are they in antagonistic opposition to one another?" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 51). It is thus important to analyze how discourses are influencing policy which can provide this human security. Hence Laclau and Mouffe's concept of subject position and identity can be used to analyze how the identity of the individual human being in need of human security is influenced discursively; what is the referent object of security (the individual) to be secured from, and in what circumstances?

Some points of Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of identity (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 43) are of special importance for my research questions, and need to be clarified in the context of this thesis, understood as a process similar to (in)securitization: As a subject acquires its identity by being *represented* discursively, the subject position of the individual in need of human security is being discursively represented every time advocates of a certain understanding of human security are seeking to hegemonize this particular understanding, through discursive articulation. Thus, the identity of the subject in need of human security is fragmented as agents of differing conceptions of human security seek to determine what the subject position is to be secured from, and what characteristics security measures - policy - take. Since the subject is overdetermined, a certain conceptualization of human security is always *contingent*; possible, but not always necessary, allowing different conceptualizations of human security to exist within different contexts.

In the analysis of discursive struggles, it is the combination with other signs that gives the key signifiers meaning, through chains of signification; of

equivalence/difference (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 50). These chains of meaning ultimately strengthen the connections between language and discourse, as they elucidate how the key signifiers are rooted in a specific discourse within human security. This connection is reinforced by examining the discourses' surplus of meaning, elucidating what is *included* in the discourse based on what is *excluded*. During my analysis of human security policy documents in chapter 3, I will identify the nodal points of the different discourses fighting for influence over human security within these documents, and trace their chains of signification to structure how the signs are tied together to construct a certain understanding of human security, drawing on a specific discourse. As Laclau and Mouffe view discourses as seeking to fix a web of meaning in a particular field, the process of identifying discursive struggles also elucidates what discourse a specific articulation draws on, which shows what discourse it either reproduces or challenges. If it challenges a discourse, the articulation will seek to transform an existing discourse by redefining some of its moments (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 29-30). This will be explicit during my analysis of the 2013 Human Security report, as I will elaborate on how the articulations made in the report reproduces one discourse or conceptualization of human security, while challenging another, by redefining its moments. All other possible meanings excluded by a particular discourse are surpassed to the surplus of meaning, "the field of discursivity"; "Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre" (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2001: 112). This process is called "hegemonization", and will be discussed next.

Hegemony

The concept of hegemony can be understood as the organization of consent (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 32), or as "the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces" (Torfing 1999: 101). While stemming from Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe use "hegemony" in a modified way by not

distinguishing between a discursive and a non-discursive field. This brings about the fundamental worldview of discourse theory that the perception of reality is stemming from discourse, and depends upon the structuring of a discursive field (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 94). Hereby, Laclau and Mouffe do not deny that objects exist externally to thought, but argue that their meaning is perceived through discursive practice.

Discursive hegemony is achieved by relatively stable fixation of the meanings of polysemous and contested signifiers around a nodal point. "The practices of articulation through which a given order is created and the meaning of social institutions is fixed, are what we call 'hegemonic practices' [...] What is at a given moment accepted as the 'natural order', jointly with the common sense that accompanies it, is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices" (Mouffe 2008: 4). Through these discursive practices and the production of meaning, power relations can become almost naturalized through hegemonic interventions (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 48). This will be visible during my analysis of the 2013 Human Security report, elucidating the hegemonic conceptualization of human security, and how hegemonic interventions are performed in order to reproduce or exclude certain understandings of human security, to reach closure on the concept. As this process of "hegemonization" excludes other possible meanings, the other meanings are appointed to the field of discursivity. The way my thesis uses and understands the meaning of "hegemony" in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, should therefore not be confused with understandings of hegemony in a traditional "top-down"-sense. Instead, it should be understood as the structuring and temporary fixation of meaning in a discourse which excludes other meanings. "Power is not understood as something which people possess and exercises over others, but as that which produces the social [...] power produces an inhabitable world for us, and, on the other hand, it precludes alternative possibilities" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 37).

Hegemonization is most effective on ambivalent signifiers existing simultaneously in different discourses. The signifier "vulnerable" exists in both "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want", but are connected to respective

discourse's nodal point in different ways. Therefore, hegemonization of the signifier "vulnerable" through articulation transforms the sign from polysemic to fixed, as its meaning is tied to a specific understanding of human security. However, in line with the arguments made by Swales (1990), the wider discursive field where human security constitutes a floating signifier makes human security "up for grabs", as different hegemonizing discourses attempt to conscript and appropriate it, by using the concept tendentiously and opportunistically in contexts that constrain their inherent meaning potential and align it with the broader values and interest of the discourse and the discourse community or interest group that it serves (Rear & Jones 2014: 10-11). Thus, while the meaning of the sign "vulnerable" is relatively stable within a human development discourse, it is constituting a floating signifier within a wider discourse on human security which includes signs from both a more traditional discourse of security and a human development discourse. Since "human security" is essentially the contested signifier which the two discourses seek to hegemonize, it also constitutes a floating signifier. Going back to the constructivist underpinnings of this thesis, that security is essentially a social construction, also "security" is thus an example of an expression that is often used in ways that *seem* consensual, but is in essence highly dependent on what it relates to. Therefore, the expression "security" can be incoherent and sometimes even contradictory; "[s]uch semiotic disconnection is especially likely to happen when circulating referring expressions are entextualized, particularly in institutional discourses, and when the phenomena in reference to which they are used are complex, fluid and indeterminate" (Urciuoli 2010: 48).

1.4.3. Combining aspects of discourse theory and critical discourse analysis into an analytical framework

I will now present how the combination of concepts from Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory such as *articulations* and *chains of equivalence* with Fairclough's critical discourse analytical concepts *intertextuality*, *interdiscursivity* and *order of*

discourse create an empirically grounded framework making these analytical tools stronger in concert (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 56). The intention is to focus on an "essentially contested concept" that Laclau and Mouffe calls a "floating signifier"; the concept of human security. Thus, my analytical framework is constructed similarly to how Rear and Jones (2014) apply a combination of the two methods in their analysis of education policy. Rear and Jones theorize policymaking by using Taylor's definition, as "an arena of struggle over meaning" (Taylor 2004: 435) - a definition also suitable for this thesis' understanding of the struggle over human security as a concept and policy.

Intertextual analysis in order to identify different discourses within documents

While articulations can help identify various conceptions of human security in order to find the different discourses the documents draw upon, consciously or unconsciously, we need to be able to showcase the existence of such a discourse beyond the text under scrutiny. This can be achieved through an intertextual analysis, by identifying the nodal points and moments within the analyzed text, and how these are related to previous texts. Intertextuality means that no text can be understood in isolation, but has to be understood in relation to other similar texts; "Intertextuality is basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth" (Fairclough 1992: 84). Examining texts intertextually, we also come across the aspect of *interdiscursivity*, by identifying what discourses the texts draw on (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 82). These concepts are designed to study change in discourse, in a similar way as Laclau and Mouffe's articulations bring on discursive change. Even if an articulation is reproducing a discourse, "[e]very discursive practice is an articulation since no practice is an exact repetition of earlier structures. Every apparent reproduction involves an element of change, however minimal. Like Fairclough's concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity, 'articulation' encapsulates the point that discursive practice both draws on, and destabilises, earlier patterns" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 140).

Identifying discourses through the application and use of key signifiers in a text reveal the discursive struggle by analyzing how meaning are ascribed to these signifiers. By using discourse theory's term for a contested sign - a floating signifier - an analyst can thus trace the chains of signification constituting this floating signifier, and hereby reveal how meaning is ascribed to the floating signifier in different discourses, drawing on the intertextuality between texts. Articulatory processes bring about the reinforcement or the dissolution of a certain meaning for the contested sign, through hegemonic intervention leading to closure. Using intertextuality as a comparison strategy elucidates in what ways the text under study is different from other texts, what consequences it has, which understanding of the world that is taken for granted, and which understandings that are ignored (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 149).

"Order of discourse"; the study's approach to the surplus of meaning

Since "the field of discursivity" can provide an overwhelming amount of alternative conceptions to be found in the discourse's surplus, this study makes use of Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 27) suggestion and combines this aspect of discourse theory with Fairclough's critical discourse analytical concept "order of discourse". "Order of discourse" denotes a limited range of discourses which struggles in the same terrain, such as various conceptions of security, thus providing a more manageable and relevant surplus of meaning. "Order of discourse" can be fruitfully combined with discourse theory because not all possibilities are equally likely in a given situation. Since Laclau and Mouffe do not acknowledge this aspect of likelihood, "an order of discourse denotes a group of discourses that operate in the same social terrain - both in conflict and in concordance with one another" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 57). It is therefore my intention to map human security's "order of discourse" by presenting how various discourses relating to human security are struggling to fix meaning in competing ways. This will be visible during the analysis of human security policy in chapter 3. In the analysis of the 2013 Human Security report in chapter 4, I will point to the different discourses previously identified. I will show how a certain

understanding of human security is reproduced, by identifying how the articulations in the report categorize certain aspects essential for one conceptualization as part of the discourse, while others - belonging to a different discourse - are seen as outside of the discourse, and thus surpassed to the order of discourse.

Motivation of choice of method

While chapter 2 share characteristics of a conceptual history, a pure choice of method based in concept analysis would not be ideal for the thesis' aims. Instead, the theoretical overview will present opportunities for a discursive analysis combining discourse theory and aspects of CDA, as my discourse theoretical framework is designed to identify the discursive struggle for human security. Thus, my choice of analytical tools allows me to go deeper into the documents under scrutiny, in order to elucidate how the years of differing interpretations are influencing a common understanding of human security and its implementation within the UN. In essence, this thesis is interested in the analysis of the referent object, or subject position, of human security; the individual human being in need of security. Therefore, this subject position is constantly overdetermined (to refer to Laclau and Mouffe), in the sense that there are a vast array of threats posed against the security of the subject position. It is my intention to analyze how different conceptualizations of human security, influenced by different discourses, are trying to pin down the subject position of human security; *i.e. what is the subject position of security to be secured from, and under what circumstances?* Since the two main approaches within human security differ in their view of "threat perception", it is the essential task for this thesis to analyze how "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" are engaged in a discursive struggle over the meaning of human security.

In this struggle, both approaches seek to hegemonize their view of human security through hegemonic intervention which eventually will lead to closure on the concept. Used in such fashion, discourse theory "takes its lead from interpretative methods of social inquiry in which emphasis is placed on

understanding and explaining the emergence and logic of discourses, and the socially constructed identities they confer upon social agents” (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 10). Thus, if the social agent is the individual human being in need of human security; how are discourses influencing policy which can provide this human security? Discourse analytical concepts and tools such as articulations, intertextuality, discursive struggle, hegemony, antagonism and order of discourse will all contribute to this process in a way that I do not see other choices of method being as suitable for. The analysis of the fluctuating nature of human security points to the element of partial fixation of human security; it is a concept which has been ascribed a variety of meanings. Therefore, a method based in discourse theory is well suited to analyze these partial fixations.

1.5. Delimitations and justification of material

While there are several understandings of how to interpret human security, I have chosen to focus on ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” since these are the most profiled conceptions over the last decades. Besides prominent books written within security studies, Chapter 2 will mainly draw on scientific texts and articles from article databases such as JSTOR, Ebrary and Scopus, as material from such sources strengthens the reliability of the material, considering the verifiability of such sources. Since Japan is the main advocator of human security as ”freedom from want”, whereas Canada (especially) and Norway are the two main advocators of ”freedom from fear”, the policy documents in chapter 3 will mainly be originating from the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian government, as well as the Norwegian political life. The material for analysis in chapter 4 consists of the 2013 Human Security report from the United Nations Secretary General.

Motivating the choice of material, chapter 2 utilizes texts written within the field of International Relations (IR) and its sub-discipline Security Studies. A variety of material is scrutinized to identify trends influencing the conceptual

debate of security in general, and human security in particular, focusing on scholars both within traditional and critical approaches. The literature on human security under scrutiny consists of texts written by human security advocates such as Picciotto and Kaldor, but also by scholars who sees some question marks attached to the concept, such as Paris. The material used to identify the main trends influencing human security is purposefully wide in scope, a decision made in order to include as large a quantity of relevant material as possible, to make sure to present a comprehensive understanding of the different views influencing human security. On the other hand, the material in chapters 3 and 4 will be subject to a closer discourse analysis, therefore that material can be considered "narrow and safe" (Esaiasson 2012: 220-221).

2. The evolution of human security: locating human security in theory and practice

This chapter will present a quick overview of the main trends influencing contemporary security studies, by first discussing traditional security theory, and then move on to non-traditional approaches, broadening the meaning of security. Later, I will turn to the role of human security within the new security landscape.

2.1. Traditional vs. non-traditional security theory

The traditional realist perspective within International Relations (IR) has been the dominant perspective of security in international politics for the last decades (Morgan 2007: 16), and the state centric focus of traditional security thinking can be traced to the peace of Westphalia in 1648, and the birth of the nation state. It was from this point onwards that states slowly took the place of religion as the central point of social identity in a new world order (Campbell 1998: 40-46; Hettne 2010: 35-37). With the emergence of states, *intra-state* sources of conflict changed to *inter-state* conflicts. Within this approach, security is seen from a westernized or Eurocentric realist perspective, and the referent object of security is the state (Baldwin 1997; Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 331; Jackson 2008: 374). The Hobbesian tradition is strong within the realist perspective and the theory of the social contract between the state and its people is still referred to in different fields of security studies (see Campbell 1998; Krause & Williams 1997; Morgan 2007). Hobbes' theory of the social contract elaborates on how the state offers protection

for its citizens in exchange for legitimacy, as the state is the ultimate provider of security for its inhabitants within its territory. This also makes security in the traditional realist perspective a matter of absolute sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, as security is a matter for the state alone (Herring 2007). The focus of traditional security is on physical violence, and military threats to the state, even though there are different conceptions of security also within the realist perspective, such as neo-realism and "offensive" and "defensive" realists (proponents of either expansionism or defensive conduct by states, see Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, inter-state military conflict and physical violence are the point of focus in traditional realist security.

Critical Security: shifting the referent object of security

As a response to the state-centric realist perspective, contemporary security studies holds several non-traditional and critical approaches to security, mainly influenced by constructivist and post-modernist scholars such as Derrida and Foucault. The state still holds a prominent position within many critical approaches, however, the role of the state is treated differently compared to traditional security theory. While the realist view of security advocates a "static" view of security, critical security scholars argue that security needs to be contextually sensitive and is highly dependent on changing circumstances (Krause & Williams 1997; Mutimer 2007). A good example is Richard Ullman's influential article "Redefining Security" from 1983, in which he argued that the military focus of security would obstruct the realization that non-military threats could have a deterring effect on nations (Ullman 1983: 130). Ullman argued that nation states can constitute a threat towards its own population, pointing to how Hobbes' theory of the social contract could work in reverse. In the 1990s several critical approaches followed in the footsteps of Ullman, emphasizing the need to acknowledge changing circumstances in the range of threats (see Collins 2007; Hettne 2010; Sheehan 2005: 56ff). As I discussed in chapter 1.4, Krause and Williams advocate a broader interpretation of critical security studies (adequately labelled *Critical Security Studies*), which was introduced in 1997 as a

theoretically inclusive approach. Even though Critical Security Studies include different schools and traditions, efforts have been made to further specify what Critical Security Studies should hold, with a specific focus on the constructivist nature of security. The Aberystwyth (or Welsh) School, however, downplays the constructivist focus by instead linking security to critical theory, focusing on human emancipation. As other critical approaches they criticize the traditional realist state centric assumptions of the sovereign state as the main provider of security - instead, they see states as a potential cause for insecurity, a notion evident in many critical security perspectives (Mutimer 2007: 62-65; Wyn Jones 2001: 5-10).

Also the Copenhagen School seeks to broaden the conception of security, as their theory of “securitization” explains how non-military issues can be considered matters of security, even if they are not posing a direct threat to the state. This process occurs when an actor presents an issue as an existential threat towards an objects survival, and ”securitizes” the issue through a speech-act, but does not presuppose the existence of an objective threat (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998; Emmers 2007: 111-113). The idea of securitization was further developed by the Paris school. Advocating a constructionist approach (Baylis 2008: 162-171), the Paris school argues that security is the result of (in)securitization. Paris scholar Didier Bigo stresses that speech acts alone are insufficient when addressing security, and emphasizes the need to also acknowledge how ”(in)security” professionals utilize technology and strategy when framing threats to security. These professionals are not limited to powerful actors such as politicians or the military sector, but also includes intermediary actors such as intelligence agencies or private companies (Bigo 2008: 125-127). According to Bigo, the concept of ”security” is being fought over by these (in)security professionals, and its definition depends on the differing opinions of what is the most urgent existential security threat worthy of securitizing. While this process is reminiscent of the Copenhagen School’s securitization act, there are some differences. As the process of securitization needs the public’s approval, the process of (in)securitization is often carried out unknowingly to the public, as

a part of the process of Governmentality (Bigo 2008). The process of (in)securitization can be seen to take place when actors talk about human security, thus framing it as a subject position in need of securitizing against a certain perception of threats - which brings us to the discussion about human security.

2.1.1. Human security

Human security differentiates itself from traditional state-centric approaches by putting the individual as the referent object of security, thus basing its definition of security on human-centric arguments. That is not to say that human security discard the importance of state-security, but human security argues that state-centric realism is insufficient to explain and meet the security challenges posed in a post-Cold War era, stressing the need to meet insecurities both between and within states. As a theoretical approach, Newman (2010: 90) describes how human security is being consequentialist while critical security studies are structurally revisionist, pointing to how critical approaches to security tend to challenge the epistemological and ontological assumptions of realism (Newman 2010: 83-84). Since human security takes many of the existing structures and institutions for granted, much for policy reasons, critical security scholars often see human security as “uncritical” and less sophisticated than other critical approaches within security studies.

The concept gained increasing attention as a part of the UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report, which was the result of the scholarship by economic scholar Mahbub ul Haq (Kerr 2007; Tadjbakhsh 2009). The UNDP report describes human security as an approach that not only addresses the results but also the root-causes for human insecurities, and as a bridging approach between security and development given the explicit link between (human) security and (human) development (Werthes & Debiel 2006). In the report human security is advocated to constitute the backbone of a new development paradigm, and ul Haq expressed how human security could be achieved through development, not through arms (UNDP 1994: chapter 2; ul Haq 1995: 115). At its core the concept

consists of the two foundational freedoms outlined in the 1945 adoption of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "freedom from fear" and freedom from want" (UNDHR). In this sense, human security is a multidimensional framework including matters of rights, security, development and humanitarian concerns, which at the same time are dynamic and sensitive to the changing nature and realities of insecurity. Thus, the concept was designed focusing on inclusiveness, and the UNDP report explained the seemingly ambiguous concept by stating; "Like other fundamental concepts [...] human security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence. And most people instinctively understand what security means", and offers a more explicit definition, by stating that human security means "first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP 1994: 23). The report defined human security according to seven dimensions; personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health and food security (UNDP 1994: 24-25).

2.1.1.1. Divisions within human security: an introduction to "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want"

The conceptual debate within human security can be categorized as a narrow school and a broad school, or as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". This distinction is a general categorization of the two main conceptualizations influencing human security on a discursive level, and has been referred to and identified by for example Acharya (2001), Kerr (2007) and Tadjbakhsh (2009) among several others. These conceptualizations of human security are not viewed as completely mutually exclusive, however, they are constituted by several differences, and can be understood as competing for the hegemonic understanding of human security. The definition discussed so far, drawing on the work of ul Haq, is often understood as constituting the "broader school" of human security, labelled "freedom from want". This approach see human security not only as

”freedom from fear” but also as ”freedom from want”. Still, there are scholars advocating a narrow understanding of human security, as ”freedom from fear”, an expression stemming from foundational human rights treaties (Spigelman 2010). It defines human security as protection from violence and physical aggression, emphasizing ”direct threats to individuals’ safety and their physical integrity: armed conflict, human rights abuses, public insecurity and organized crime” Tadjbakhsh (2009: 1).

The previous discussion serves as an introduction to the differences between the two main conceptualizations of human security, and constitutes an overarching guide to the following discussion on the discursive struggle for human security. I will now continue to explore these varying conceptions, by discussing how a changed security landscape influences the discursive struggle for human security.

2.2. Characteristics of the new security landscape and its implications

It is widely believed that the security climate has changed in the last decades, especially since the end of the Cold War. States as well as individuals are facing new kinds of threats for their survival, and I will now elaborate on what is believed to be *new* with the ”new security landscape”. This chapter will provide answers to why traditional conceptions of security are no longer enough - *why* there is a need for human security - and showcase what context the concept of human security has originated from as well as evolved in.

From an inter- towards an intrastate logic

The nature of armed conflicts around the world saw a change after the end of World War 2, as interstate wars were surpassed by intrastate wars as the most common type of conflict. This is illustrated in Appendix 1, showing numbers from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on armed conflicts by type between

1946-2013. The UCDP defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 1). The statistics shows a vast increase of intrastate conflicts after 1945 peaking in the early 1990s, as interstate conflicts experienced an uneven but relatively steady decline (Appendix 1). In its definition, the UCDP includes the government of a state as one essential part of a conflict. However, the line between state- and non-state actors is becoming increasingly blurred in the contemporary security landscape. Statistics from the Vancouver-based Human Security Research Group show trends in post-Cold War assaults on civilians, but also elucidates conflicts where governments have a downplayed role, pondering the question if organized criminal violence is becoming a greater threat than war (HSRP 2013: 7). Crime and war are increasingly intertwined in contemporary conflicts, and while pointing to how many conflicts stem from ethnic and religious cleavages, Mittelman (2012: 230) argues that they often, at least in part, can be explained by fighting deriving from criminal activity.

However, while civil wars are potential breeding grounds for organized criminal violence, governments still play an important role in the new security landscape. Stokke explains the peak in intrastate conflicts in the early 1990s by pointing to how the post-Cold War world order caused imminent conflicts based in nationalism to break out. These conflicts are often seen as “typical examples” of post-Cold War conflicts, and includes the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, the Horn of Africa, southern Sudan and the Great Lakes region in Central Africa (Stokke 2009: 424). It is believed that such conflicts were aggravated by the increasing second-hand weapon trade, as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact at the end of the Cold War caused a downsizing of official arms stocks. Small-arms and other weapons became readily available for guerrilla groups or other factions in civil wars, hence sustaining the intrastate conflicts of the last decades (Picciotto et al. 2007: 97-98). The targeting of civilians by various fighting groups is increasingly seen in today’s intrastate conflicts, purposely forcing the people to

realize that the sitting regime no longer can provide security. The aim is to rally opposition against the regime which undermines state legitimacy and forces regime change (Karlsson 2004: 107-109).

Threats without a passport

The new security landscape is also characterized by "threats without a passport", as Mahbub ul Haq used this metaphor to illustrate how consequences of poverty - such as drugs, AIDS, pollution and terrorism - cannot be stopped by borders, but will "travel without a passport" (ul Haq 1995: 115). ul Haq saw it to be a global responsibility to safeguard individuals, an opinion shared by Kaldor, declaring how "[t]he kind of security that Americans and Europeans expect to enjoy at home has to spread to the rest of the world [...] The world is interconnected through social media, transportation, and basic human sympathy. In other words, human security is about the blurring of the domestic and the international" (Kaldor 2012: 5). Thus, the securitization of transnational threats such as international terrorism, infectious disease and transnational crime elucidates how insecurity is increasingly stemming from sources other than nation states (Jackson 2008: 378-386), which questions the adequacy of a solely traditional realist perspective of security.

Using Al-Qaeda as a case in point, Barkawi and Laffey stresses how "Southern" resistance movements becomes increasingly global in their formation. While such groups used to rebel against colonialism or an oppressive rule, they are no longer restricted to nations or regions (Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 330), which forces a re-thinking of security relations. The spread of technology through globalization is benefitting these organizations, which can be likened to modern, transnational corporations (Kurzman 2012: 394). Currently, in Iraq and Syria the group known as the Islamic State (IS) is now being treated as a global security concern. The United States' vice president Joe Biden illustrated the "threats without a passport"-characteristic of the new security landscape, claiming that IS (or ISIL) is on par with the Ebola virus in terms of global security concerns, warning that "threats as diverse as terrorism and pandemic disease" are crossing

borders at "blinding speed" (CNN 2014a). As the administration received critique for the way several security threats were treated in its early stages, among them the Ebola crisis as well as the threat posed by the IS (NY Times 2014), it was made public in November 2014 that the United States' Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel intended to step down, as the administration recognized that a different skill set was required to meet the threat posed by IS. This is another example of how the effects of changing threats force traditional agents of security to adjust.

Change of actors involved

Non-state actors play a bigger role in conflicts today, both directly and indirectly. In the first camp we find a difference in the constitution of the fighting parties, as many conflicts today include a variety of actors partaking in what can be likened to guerrilla warfare. Examples are private security forces (sometimes thought of as a "re-privatization of war", see Karlsson 2004: 113) and other paramilitary groups, as well as an increase in groups tied to traditional and religious leaders (Karlsson 2004: 113-114). The conflict in Syria is one example of a conflict involving, besides the Syrian military, a myriad of actors not easily distinguished; the diverse Syrian opposition, the Free Syrian Army, Jihadist groups and the Hezbollah, along with the presence of IS (CBC 2014; CNN, 2014b). In the "new wars" (Kaldor 2007), complex alliances are formed which makes it hard to distinguish who is siding with whom. Similarly, there are signs that the conflict in Syria has turned into a sectarian conflict, and while the biggest sectarian divide is between the Sunni and the Alawite communities, also other minority groups have seen increasing involvement in the conflict (Tveit 2013; Lekic 2012; Mestou 2012). Thus, the conflict in Syria can be understood as what Kaldor (2007) calls a "new war"; highly pronounced ethnic nationalistic signatures, based in identity disparities; widespread and systematic killings of "the other"; identity politics are used to gain and reinforce power (e.g. Alawite support to Assad despite discontent with the regime, see Baker 2013). According to Kaldor, the logic of the new wars is more about claiming identity than about claiming territory, and she points to how the war in Bosnia Hercegovina between 1992 and 1995 is a typical example

of a new war (Kaldor 2007: 7, 33ff). The Yugoslav wars in the 1990s elucidate one of the main characteristics of modern conflict and the "new wars", that the casualties are overwhelmingly civilian and non-combatants (Kaldor 2007: 33ff; Bellamy & Williams 2006: 144-145). Some of the most violent modern conflicts are based on claiming ethnicity and identity through ethnic cleansing (as seen in Rwanda, Kosovo, Sudan etc.), which has led to increase civilian casualties (Karlsson 2004: 115). In October 2014 the UN Special Envoy for Syria compared the situation in the Syrian city of Kobane to the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 (SES 2014).

Various NGOs are an example of actors playing an indirect role in modern conflict. Relating to the divisions between humanitarianism and realism seen in the contemporary security debate, de Jong Oudraat and Haufler (2012: 333) contribute the success of the Ban the Landmine campaign to how various NGOs strategically reframed the issue, and "transformed" it from a military security issue to a humanitarian concern. This points to the transnational influence in the security debate, as well as to the tension between humanism and realism within security discourse. The promotion of policies to ban Landmines is a subject traditionally advocated by proponents of the approach of human security as "freedom from fear" (see Kilgour 1999). This further acknowledges the notion that traditional security no longer is sufficient to meet the challenges of a changed security landscape. I will now discuss how a security discourse based in humanitarianism has evolved in this landscape, and what implications the new security landscape has had on the development of human security.

2.3. Ensuring human security in the new security landscape: humanitarian intervention and the ICISS' "responsibility to protect"

The end of the Cold War saw hope for the birth of a new world order promoting human rights and democracy. It was believed that the international community (and especially Western states) had a responsibility for bringing such values, and protect people in other areas of the world, making the use of military force a moral duty (Karlsson 2004: 117). A post-national logic emerged where human security was contrasted to traditional state security (Hettne 2010; Pattison 2008). Thus, the 1990s is considered an important time that promoted tools to further ensure human security through humanitarian intervention, and to an extent combining development and security matters (Ewan 2007; Hussein et al. 2004: 11; Molier 2006; Waddell 2006: 535).

While the United Nations Security Council has legal right to authorize humanitarian intervention in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the topic is still surrounded by much debate. The current situation in Syria has sparked much contestation between different camps within the Security Council concerning *when* humanitarian crisis should trigger armed intervention. Military intervention without the approval of the Security Council has in some cases been viewed as "illegal but legitimate"; the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo did not have the blessing of the Security Council, but was approved on moral grounds (Bellamy 2005: 35). Kosovo came to signify a watershed moment in humanitarian intervention (ICISS 2001: vii), and it has since been argued that the principle of sovereignty cannot excuse genocide and crimes against humanity. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was formed in September 2000 under the sponsorship of the Canadian government. In December 2001 the ICISS published the report *The Responsibility to Protect* (ICISS 2001). After the troubling circumstances in both Rwanda and Kosovo where the international response was characterized by slow moving negotiations and disagreement on the course of action, the ICISS report was put together to offer guidelines to humanitarian intervention (see Appendix 2). The purpose was to prevent policymakers from being tangled up in time consuming discussions about human rights on the one hand and state sovereignty on the other. Instead, the principle of responsibility to protect ("R2P") should be activated, and the

international community should legitimately intervene if a state proved "unwilling or unable" to fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens (ICISS 2001: xi). The difficulty, however, with R2P has been the judgement over when the transfer of "responsibility to protect" from host state to the Security Council is justified, and there is a lack of consensus regarding when this threshold is crossed (see Wheeler 2000).

When the principle of R2P finally was adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, it was revised, and not as firm of a principle as the ICISS report had proposed. However, the main principle remained and was stipulated into three pillars. States carry the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide and war crimes, and the international community should encourage individual states to carry out this responsibility. If states failed to do so, the responsibility to protect falls on the international community, adopting measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN: The Responsibility to Protect; United Nations Charter). Thus, R2P emphasizes mechanisms of conflict prevention and support (pillars one and two), but also acknowledges coercive force under Chapter VII as a final destination (pillar three). It was utilized as a legitimator for military interventions for the first time in 2011, when the Security Council applied the principle of R2P in the conflict in Libya to mandate aerial intervention. While proponents saw the intervention as necessary, Russia and China claimed that the principle of R2P was misused in order to achieve regime change in Libya. Russia proclaimed the willingness to use its veto in the Security Council to prevent future intervention, if the unbiasedness of the international community could not be guaranteed. This has been evident in the ongoing conflict in Syria, as both Russia and China stopped several resolutions using their veto (Morris 2013: 1274-1275).

Claims of misuse of human security discourse and fears of arbitrary intervention have been increasingly creeping up after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, which will be elaborated on next.

The humanitarian turn coming to an end post-9/11: the moral aspect of humanitarian intervention

While some scholars predicted an even greater convergence of human and national security at the time for the attacks (see Liotta 2002), a turn in that discourse is widely recognized after 9/11, with increasing focus on unipolarity and unilateralism (see Duffield 2006; Hobden 2008; Liotta 2005; Molier 2006; Rogers 2007). The discourse shifted from "humanitarian intervention" to "pre-emptive intervention" and "war against terrorism" (Hettne 2010: 45). While 9/11 illustrates a typical threat in the new security landscape - carried out by a non-state actor, use of unconventional force, targeting civilians - many scholars point to how the response to these attacks was based in traditional security discourse, by declaring war on a foreign nation state. Some saw this as a way to recapture the traditional security discourse (McDonald 2002: 290) considering the importance of state-legitimization in traditional realist security thinking. The following "war on terror" is frequently believed to showcase the problems with meeting non-traditional security matters with solutions based in traditional security discourse, and its potential moral dilemmas. For example, Piciotto argues that the interventions in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003, while using humanitarian rhetoric, "were not initially motivated by a desire to address the deep-rooted conflicts of these societies" (Piciotto et al. 2007: 211).

This moral aspect of humanitarian intervention has seen frequent debate post-9/11, in a context of "war on terror", and regarding the question "whose responsibility to protect". Within this debate Bellamy (2005) identifies two conceptions of humanitarian intervention; as "responsibility to protect" or as a "Trojan horse". The ethical perspective is seen in a debate about "norm-carriers", and states engaging in humanitarian intervention are judged by their earlier track-record. Bellamy (2005: 32-33) argues that the United States and the United Kingdom lost some credibility as norm-carriers after the 2003 intervention in Iraq, which hurt these states' possibilities to take future action and to form future coalitions. Thus, the Western state conglomerate (to refer to Shaw 2000: 199ff), faced declining moral legitimacy after the invasion in Iraq, which can constitute a

credibility crisis for strong advocates of humanitarian intervention. Declining legitimacy can seriously delay or even hinder humanitarian intervention since questions are raised over where morality lies (which actor has the moral responsibility to protect?), and which moral assumptions should underpin decisions regarding intervention (Bellamy 2005: 33). Just as the NATO intervention in Kosovo was seen as a breaking point in the norms of humanitarian intervention, Rengger (2002) describes the events on 9/11 as another breaking point, but in a different way. He argues that Western states came to treat the just war tradition as a "luxury" they could no longer afford, thus also relating to the discussion surrounding Bellamy's Trojan Horse-argument. This implies that humanitarian intervention and the principle of R2P could be utilized unethically, a discussion I will touch on more next, in relation to human security.

2.3.1. What implications does human security have for humanitarian intervention and the R2P?

The principle of R2P is not only debated within traditional approaches to security, favoring sovereignty and non-interventionism, but has also seen antagonistic debate within human security. While humanitarian intervention is a notion close to the Canadian advocacy of "freedom from fear", advocates of "freedom from want" argue that if the justification of interventions in conflicts is based on its implications for international stability, it might lead to a prioritization of conflicts deemed strategically more important to international order. There is a risk that potentially more deadly and violent conflicts are overlooked if they are considered as having lesser implications for international stability (Kerr 2007: 97). The way the principles of R2P have been put into practice has seen criticism on these grounds, for example in relation to the lack of action taken in Darfur (see Bellamy & Williams 2006, Ben Simon 2008). The argument that R2P makes sovereignty conditional has been put forth by the developing world and the G77 (a critique the G77 already pointed against the concept of human security at the Copenhagen Summit in 1995; see Tadjbakhsh 2009: 4), and that R2P can be utilized by

powerful states as a way into internal affairs of weaker states (Kerr 2007: 98; Shaw 2000: 261). Use of human security rhetoric leading to humanitarian intervention can be related to “securitization”. Development issues can be used as a pretext for security concerns if powerful international actors see underdevelopment as a security threat to their own national, as well as to global, security, showcasing the imbalance of the so called security-development nexus (see Barkawi & Laffey 2006; Beall et al. 2006; Dóchas 2007; Duffield 2006). Similarly, while some view the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo as “illegal but legitimate”, Noam Chomsky (1999) challenges the “New Humanism” by labeling it the “New Military Humanism” in his analysis of the NATO bombings. Chomsky reveals how selective the intervention in human rights violations are, and ponders the question if it is guided by power interest rather than humanitarian concern. This is one clear divide between the different conceptions of human security, as “freedom from fear”, emphasizing intervention to put an end to internal violence, is sometimes looked at with suspicion by developing countries and proponents of “freedom from want”.

The criticism emanating from “freedom from want” against R2P has increased in the post-9/11 security landscape, as the so called “Bush-doctrine” saw greater influence. This foreign policy, emphasizing pre-emptive intervention as a mean to secure the United States, saw criticism for reducing the normative significance of sovereignty. While some scholars foresaw an increasing number of interventions, a contrasting view emerged which claimed that the “sun has set” on the humanitarian interventionist agenda. This view questioned the humanitarian argument to justify the U.S. invasion in Iraq, and argued that it made R2P and humanitarian intervention even more prone to accusations of being abused. According to human rights groups these events also hampers the U.S.’s ability to justify future military intervention (Bellamy 2005: 37-39; Kaldor 2007: 120). In Darfur, for example, the call for responsibility to protect the people of Darfur came mainly from human rights groups, Western journalists and some states, but it was harder to pinpoint upon whom this responsibility lay. To be sure to not take on any obligations, many core Western states were careful to suggest the Sudanese

government's inability or unwillingness to fulfill that responsibility (to relate to the ICISS report). Sudanese actors warned that foreign (as in non-African) intervention risked causing another situation similar to the one in Iraq. The Sudanese government referred to a potential Western intervention as a Trojan horse, drawing parallels between U.S. activism in Darfur and Iraq (Bellamy 2005: 42-48). Such rhetoric was seen both before and after the intervention in Iraq (see CNN 2013a; CNN 2013b), again pointing to the weakened credibility of Western coalitions in matters of humanitarian intervention. Here, the statement of Hannah Arendt holds true, that power rests on legitimacy, not on violence (Arendt 1979: 50-51). While a humanitarian intervention is different to a classic military intervention, since it is built within an international mandate and the framework of international law (Kaldor 2012: 12), several scholars argue that the 2011 intervention in Libya once again showcased the problems with humanitarian intervention.

The 2011 intervention in Libya; a missed opportunity for human security mainstreaming?

According to Morris "Libya has served as less a showcase for the potential of R2P and more as a warning of its dangers" (Morris 2013: 1280). He argues that the intervention further spurred the suspicion against Western powers use of force to violate the sovereignty of weaker states, and points to the aftermath reactions of the BRICS, and especially the propensity for Russia and China to block future R2P-initiatives. Looking back, the conflict in Libya was in many ways a test case for human security in peace operations, after the commitment in 2010 from the UN Secretary General and the United Nations system to mainstream human security (Kettemann 2011). However, Kettemann's findings show how the preventive focus of the human security agenda in the case of Libya ended up creating a "conflict gap" which R2P in its current state is unable to fill. Going forward, Kettemann stresses the need to mainstream human security within peace operations, by including human security also at the conflict-level, not only at a pre- and post-conflict level. Relating to how the original principle of R2P from

2001 was revised, Kettemann points to how none of the original principles (see Appendix 2) for military intervention made it in to the "watered down" R2P outcome document. For example, the "just cause threshold", the "right intention", "last resort" or "reasonable prospect", are all original R2P principles closely related to the narrow conceptualization of human security as "freedom from fear". Kettemann states how "[e]xcluding human security in peace operations thus means blocking one of the channels through which principles dear to the original conception of the responsibility to protect may flow" (Kettemann 2011: 46). He argues that if human security was mainstreamed into the UNSC resolutions before they were adopted, a better strategy could have been utilized and the abstaining states could have been joining the majority vote. Kettemann suggests a checklist to facilitate mainstreaming the concept into Security Council action under chapter VII, based on principles from the original ICISS report from 2001 along with the Madrid report (see Kettemann 2011 for details). He argues that the coalition's outspoken goal of regime-change in Libya instead should have been formulated in line with human security principles, motivated through the "right intention" principle outlined in the now obsolete original ICISS report from 2001.

The reasons that five important international actors (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia) decided to abstain from voting on resolution 1973 (2011) can also be derived to matters fundamental to human security. Among the reasons were claims to respect the internal political process (thus, non-interventionism) and the unwillingness to risk a prolonged conflict with international interference, but also protection of civilians, as representatives from Brazil claimed that more interference in the conflict could cause "more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting" (UNSC 2011). The German position also stressed the "likelihood of large-scale loss of life", and how the countries voting for and participating in the enforcement of a resolution in favor of intervention could be caught in an prolonged military conflict which risked to spread across a wider region (Kettemann 2011: 47-48). This shows how human security rhetoric also can be used to *hinder* humanitarian intervention.

3. Analyzing human security as policy: obstacles due to conceptual vagueness?

In the previous chapter I elaborated on how the popularity of human security can be related to a changed security landscape, and how fluctuations in the appeal of human security is related to events taking place in this new security landscape. Examining human security from a policy point-of-view, there are obstacles to human security as a policy agenda that are frequently occurring in the debate surrounding the applicability of human security. The conceptualization of human security as "freedom from want" has seen most criticism in this regard, due to its vague and "all-encompassing" nature (see Floyd 2007; Kerr 2007; Paris 2001 & 2004; Remacle 2008; Tadjbakhsh 2009). It is sometimes pointed to how the broad school of human security "encompasses everything from substance abuse to genocide" (Kerr 2007: 95), and that this broad agenda makes human security lose its appeal to policymakers (McDonald 2002: 283). On the other hand, Kaldor's view of human security has been criticized for being *too* focused on "freedom from fear" at the expense of "freedom from want", leading to labels such as the "Kaldorian interventionist" approach (Kerkkänen 2014: 8). For example, Ryerson (2010) argues that approaches to human security stemming from "freedom from fear" are adopted to meet the needs and ends of a Northern, masculinized liberal system, and is therefore structured in a way that is similar to the state-centric traditional view of security, focusing on physical violence. Also Richmond (2007) points to the "top-down" aspect of the Kaldorian approach, as it is tied to strong states and internationally-driven institutions which are to provide the basic need of human security - protection from physical violence. However, Kaldor's own definition acknowledges principles of a "bottom-up" approach; "Notions of 'partnership', 'local ownership', and 'participation' are already key concepts in

development policy. These concepts should also apply to security policies” (Kaldor 2012: 8). Still, Kaldor’s focus on interventionism leads some scholars to categorize it as an institutional approach.

Picciotto, Olonisakin and Clarke stress that a new, common, definition should be broad enough to encompass a variety of concerns seen by several countries, but also narrow enough to be useful as an analytical framework (Picciotto et al. 2007: 35). Evidently, translating human security into policy is painstaking considering the friction within human security. In an effort to categorize and elucidate these diffusing aspects, I will take a closer look at human security policy as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want”.

3.1. Key signifiers in discourses influencing human security as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want”

I will now introduce some of the key discourses, nodal points and moments that have been prominent in the ongoing debate concerning human security since its inception. Seen in the context built up by the previous chapters of this thesis, the following chapter will mainly elucidate the conceptual debate on human security from a policy standpoint, and showcase how policy texts can be understood as an arena of struggle ”between contenders of competing objectives, where language - or more specifically discourse - is used tactically” (Fulcher 1989: 7). The sources for this part consists of documents referring to human security policy as ”freedom from fear” or ”freedom from want”; policy documents on human security, speeches on policy directions in human security as well as secondary documents referring to human security policy. Regarding policy based in an understanding of human security as ”freedom from want” I will mainly analyze material from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Policy based on human security as ”freedom from fear” will be analyzed through examination of policy documents

originating mainly from the Canadian government, but also sources from the Norwegian political life are of interest here, due to its advocacy of human security as "freedom from fear". I will also examine secondary sources comparing "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". Although space and time limitation prevent a full intertextual analysis, I will seek to trace key signifiers through the chains of texts, highlighting the chains of signification constituted by discursive nodal points seen in the two differing conceptualizations of human security policy.

To elucidate the differences between "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" as clearly as possible, I will utilize my analytical framework drawing on discourse theory and CDA to identify contested signifiers, and show how they are "up for grabs" by both discourses. For example, the sign "vulnerability" - a polysemic element which exists in both conceptualizations - has been situated antagonistically between the different approaches. I will make visible how both advocates of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" have sought to transform it from a polysemic element into a moment in accordance with their particular understanding of human security, through articulatory hegemonization.

3.2. "Freedom from want" policy

Discussing human security at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World in Ulan Bator on May 8 2000, the Japanese Foreign Ministry acknowledged that: *"[t]here are two basic aspects to human security - freedom from fear and freedom from want [and while] some countries seem to focus solely on the first aspect [in] Japan's view, however, human security is a much broader concept. We believe that freedom from want is no less critical than freedom from fear. So long as its objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict situations"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2000).

In 2007, Yukio Takasu, Ambassador of Japan in charge of Human Security, talked at the Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network. Takasu commented on the increasing support of human security, both within the UN and regionally. Describing the essence of human security as being dependent on the interconnected pillars of peace (*"free from conflict"*), development (*"free from poverty and diseases"*), and human rights (*"free from violence and discrimination"*), Takasu once again stressed the holistic nature of the Japanese understanding of human security. This was further clarified as he acknowledged that; *"[b]eing a broad concept, and major concern and insecurity vary from one to another, each human security initiative must have a clear order of priority [and] the most serious insecurity has to be identified for each case for action, reflecting capacity to realize change [...] In my view, post-conflict peace building is one such area. Human trafficking is another area. Achievement of MDGs is also another important challenge. Japan will develop concrete actions in these areas"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007).

At the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security on May 22 2008 Ambassador Takasu stated how human security was to be distinguished from the responsibility to protect, elaborating on how: *"[i]t is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and promoted in full respect of national sovereignty. Human security is complimentary to state security [and] it embraces a culture of empowerment and prevention to avoid the outbreak of humanitarian crisis"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008). Here, human security is seen to be understood as fully committed to respect national sovereignty, and as to foster preventive policies based on empowerment in order to meet humanitarian crises. Discussing the essence of human security, Takasu stated three key points; *"First, it is a human-centered approach in tackling global issues, putting the livelihood and dignity of individuals and communities at the center of our focus. Second, it requires us to take not a piecemeal approach but an integrated, holistic and multi-sectoral approach, comprising of physical security, development and human rights [responding to] a wide range of threats such as conflict and violence, poverty, underdevelopment, infectious disease, human rights*

violations and natural disasters. Third, the strategy we should follow is to protect and empower individuals and their communities. Protective strategies shield people from harm. Empowerment strategies help people to increase their resilience [...] [H]uman security puts the emphasis on prevention through empowerment of individuals and communities” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008). While mentioning aspects also found in the understanding of human security as ”freedom from fear” (”conflict” and ”violence”), Takasu emphasized the holistic nature of the concept, stressing the need to also acknowledge threats stemming from a human development discourse, such as ”poverty”, ”underdevelopment”, ”infectious disease” and ”natural disasters”, and to meet those threats with ”protective” and ”empowerment strategies”.

A similar view of human security is shared by Norwegian scholar Astri Suhrke. She stresses ”vulnerability” as a vital component of human security, defining three categories of victims; ”1. victims of war and internal conflict; 2. people living at or below subsistence levels; and 3. victims of natural disasters” (Suhrke 1999). While aspects of war and internal conflict are present in this definition, it can be understood as drawing on a conceptualization of human security as ”freedom from want”, as it blends the conflict aspect with threats constituted by matters closely tied to a human development discourse and underdevelopment, but also threats originating from natural disasters, which can give rise to hardships catapulting people in to underdevelopment.

Intertextual chains identifying the nodal point and privileged signs of human security as ”freedom from want”

Examining the intertextual chains of ”freedom from want”-policy, it is visibly influenced by a non-traditional understanding of security situated in a human development discourse, drawing on the work of Mahbub ul Haq. Human security from ”underdevelopment” is identified as the nodal point binding the discourse influencing ”freedom from want” together. Other privileged signs making up the chain of signification to this nodal point are ”poverty”, ”vulnerability”, (structural and direct) ”violence”, ”hunger”, ”disease”, ”sovereignty”, ”empowerment” and

”environmental issues”. Also (internal) ”conflict” is a sign which is frequently occurring in this discourse, often tied to the prefixes ”pre-” and ”post-”. With its focus on full respect for sovereignty, signs such as (humanitarian and military) ”intervention”, ”responsibility to protect” and ”coercive (hard) force” can be found in the order of discourse of ”freedom from want”.

3.3. ”Freedom from fear” policy

In her study of the conceptual underpinnings of human security policy, Acharya (2001) quotes the former Canadian minister of foreign affairs Lloyd Axworthy as acknowledging the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report for being responsible for coining the term ”human security”, but that it focused too much on threats originating from underdevelopment at the expense of *”human insecurity resulting from violent conflict”* (Acharya 2001: 445). In 1999 the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stated in a report how: *”[t]he concept of human security has increasingly centered on the cost of human conflict”* (DFAIT 1999). In a speech¹ on the topic human security and Canadian foreign policy, former Canadian member of parliament David Kilgour outlined the underpinnings of the Canadian human security initiative. Pointing to the changed nature of conflicts after the end of the Cold War, Kilgour reaffirmed Axworthy’s focus on human security as an integral part of Canada’s international agenda, and stated how *”armed conflict has taken on a different shape, often rooted in religious or ethnic discord. While the number of armed conflicts between states has declined over the last 25 years, the number of intra-state conflicts has increased dramatically”* (Kilgour 1999).

The speech continued by stressing how *”[i]ndividuals are increasingly the principal victims, targets and instruments of modern war. [...] [T]he state-sponsored murders and disappearances perpetrated against thousands of innocent people [...] underscores the fact that in our world, civilians suffer the most from*

¹ for the sake of transparency, the speech was presented by Senator Nick Taylor on Kilgour’s behalf.

violent conflict [and] bear the brunt of the new practices of war [...] And they suffer most from the inexpensive yet all-too-readily-available weapons of modern war, such as landmines and military small arms and light weapons. As minister Axworthy said recently, civilian casualties and mass displacement are [...] often explicit in the strategy of combatants” (Kilgour 1999).

While acknowledging the mutual benefits that can be reached by seeing state and human security as mutually supportive, Kilgour’s speech was firm on the topic of humanitarian intervention; *”In the face of massive state-sponsored murders [...] the humanitarian imperative to act cannot be ignored and can outweigh concerns about state sovereignty”* and continued to stress the potential need for hard power; *”[h]ard power -- even military force -- is sometimes needed to achieve human security goals. Pursuing human security involves using a variety of tools. Some rely more on persuasion -- as with the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines [...] while others are more robust, such as sanctions or military intervention. Similarly, support for military force does not mean abandoning human security. In Kosovo, clearly the opposite is true. The decision to pursue the military option was made precisely to ensure the security of Kosovo's population. Our support for the UN mission currently being deployed to East Timor is based on the same logic” (Kilgour 1999).*

Finally, Kilgour discusses ”vulnerability”, which also is a prominent sign in the understanding of human security as ”freedom from want”. However, Kilgour ties it in to a discourse of traditional, physical, threats to human security; *”In the new global environment, it is the most vulnerable [...] whose security is most at risk [...] Nowhere is this more true than in situations of armed conflict” (Kilgour 1999).*

Kilgour’s speech reaffirms the focus on physical violence as the main focal point of human security as ”freedom from fear”. It is the integral threat which is to be secured, as suggested solutions are transformed into human security policy. Policy to ban anti-personnel Landmines is one example (as ”freedom from fear” was highly influential in the adoption of the 1997 Ottawa convention), and the stance on humanitarian intervention shows that the Canadian conception of

human security is to be seen as an instrument in policy outlining peace operations. Current Canadian PM Stephen Harper initially proclaimed to keep Canada out of foreign interventions, and downplayed the human security agenda to instead focus on national security matters (Kelly 2011). However, in 2011 this strategy shifted as Harper committed Canada to join the intervention in Libya on humanitarian grounds, and began to accentuate values such as human rights as a cornerstone to Canada's foreign policy. Thus, scholars argue that the human security agenda still remains largely intact in Canada's foreign policy, albeit with less explicit reference to the term (see MacLean 2009). As such, human security as "freedom from fear" is still actively promoted, especially as a tool in the humanitarian interventionist tool-box.

Sverre Lodgaard of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs shares the Canadian understanding of human security as "freedom from fear", stressing that human security should not be mixed with human development. Defining human security as "*freedom from fear of physical violence*", in the paper "Human Security: Concept and Operationalization" (2007) Lodgaard states how the core of human security corresponds to the core of state security; "*both of them centre on material means – usually referred to as military force in the context of state security, physical violence in the case of human security*" (Lodgaard 2007). Lodgaard elaborates on the interlinkages between state- and human security, but stresses that oppressive regimes may undermine the security of its own people. He points to the importance of international law, and of the United Nations to have effective mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, since "*the state is no longer able to monopolize the concept and practice of security*" (Lodgaard 2007). Still, Lodgaard rejects a broadening of human security to include non-traditional threats stemming from underdevelopment and environmental degradation, since "*proposals to incorporate such challenges into the general, universal usage of security are misguided: first, because the concept tends to become all-inclusive and therefore empty of contents, and second, because the issues and their solutions do not necessarily benefit from being securitized*", stating how the field of human security "*has become overcrowded*" (Lodgaard 2007). Also Kaldor

touches on the debate between "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" outlining policy suggestions for human security, but ultimately points to the need for effective and "*robust interventionist policy [...] to prevent a repeat of future Srebrenicas or Rwandas*" (Kaldor 2012: 7), hence echoing an understanding of human security similar to "freedom from fear".

Intertextual chains identifying the nodal point and privileged signs of human security as "freedom from fear"

Examining the intertextual chains of "freedom from fear"-policy, it is influenced by an understanding of security similar to traditional security discourse, with the vital distinction that the referent object of security is the individual instead of the state. This view has been referred to as "security with a human face" (Neufeld 2004), implying the humanitarian influence on a more traditional security discourse; thus, this can be dubbed a "humanitarian security discourse". Human security from "physical violence" is identified as the nodal point binding the discourse influencing human security as "freedom from fear" together (e.g. "*freedom from fear of physical violence constitutes the core of human security*"). Other privileged signs making up the chain of signification to this nodal point are "vulnerability" (to physical violence), (internal and military) "conflict", (coercive use of) "hard force", "military force", (humanitarian and military) "intervention" and "peacekeeping". In the order of discourse we find signs connected to a discourse of "human development", such as "poverty", "hunger", "disease" and "environmental issues".

3.4. Contested signification and discursive hegemonization: hybridity in human security policy texts

Several scholars stress the need for conceptual clarity in order for human security to have political impact. Lodgaard points to how it risks being discredited because it is used in a broad and varying way, and that; *"[t]his is not a problem that scholars can resolve on their own. Uniform usage and political clout can only be achieved if there is broad international agreement among political and public leaders to promote it with one voice"* (Lodgaard 2007). I will now exemplify the discursive struggle for human security, as different understandings seek to hegemonize the concept. Lodgaard stresses that it is important to apply a narrow understanding of human security for the sake of conceptual clarity, and warns to include aspects stemming from a development discourse - such as structural violence or environmental issues - into the concept;

"Many agree that freedom from fear of physical violence constitutes the core of human security. Fewer agree that the concept should be limited to that. For instance, there are those who emphasize that for most people of the world, hunger, disease and environmental contamination represent graver security concerns than physical violence. They hold that the concept should include freedom from structural as well as direct violence. Astrid Suhrke has suggested that 'vulnerability' could be the defining characteristic, homing in on three categories of extremely vulnerable people: victims of war and internal conflict; those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster; and victims of natural disaster" (Lodgaard 2007). In the following section Lodgaard performs a hegemonic intervention in this debate, as he challenges Suhrke's "vulnerability" approach to human security by making articulations that ties "vulnerability" to a narrow understanding of human security; *"In support of this approach, it is claimed that the condition of abject poverty or powerlessness is not qualitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during conflict. Defined this way, humanitarian assistance and emergency aid become matters of security policy. Per consequence, the distinction between human security and human development becomes somewhat unclear, just as the distinction between humanitarian aid and development aid may be hard to define in accurate terms. [...] Humanitarian aid usually benefits from being*

depoliticized, cutting clear of political objectives and security concerns. Most of it flows under the banner of impartiality and neutrality, for good reason: it would be counterproductive to lump it into the realm of security policy. Moreover, to be at the edge of socio-economic disaster may or may not lead to violent actions. Obviously, to clarify the conditions under which they do or don't is a matter of importance in order to avoid physical violence. But to be analytically equipped to do so, human security should not be mixed with the precarious human conditions that may threaten it. Threats must remain external to the concept. Once again, the limited definition seems preferable” (Lodgaard 2007).

By challenging Suhrke's vulnerability approach Lodgaard seeks to reformulate the element "vulnerability" into a moment corresponding to human security as "freedom from fear", and thus designate the signs of human security tied to a human development discourse into the order of discourse. Lodgaard contrasts security for "vulnerable" people with signifiers such as "poverty". Further, by stressing the need for human security to also retain its analytical applicability, Lodgaard argues that threats stemming from an unpredictable ("*precarious conditions*" that "*may*" pose a threat) source of underdevelopment therefore are too broad and speculative to be included into the concept. Thus, while "vulnerability" has a place in Lodgaard's narrow understanding of human security, it is tied to a discourse drawing on traditional security threats. It is connected to the nodal point "physical violence", hence surpassing signs connected to a "human development" discourse to human security's order of discourse, since Lodgaard made a hegemonic intervention when he dismissed Suhrke's use of the sign "vulnerability" together with signs originating from a development discourse. Thus, Lodgaard's statement that it "*would be counterproductive to lump it into the realm of security policy*" designates signs situated in a human development discourse (such as "poverty", "hunger", "disease", "structural violence" and "environmental contamination") to the order of discourse of the narrow understanding of human security. It reformulates the sign "vulnerability" into a moment connected to "freedom from fears" nodal point

”physical violence” through a hegemonic intervention, and ultimately seeks to hegemonize a narrow perception of human security.

3.5. Prospects for a unified approach of human security?

As suggested by Acharya (2001: 443-444), while the different interpretations of human security might not necessarily be incompatible, they do spur controversy. A general difference is that ”freedom from fear” relates human security to direct violence, as ”freedom from want” mainly focuses on structural violence, thus, in a bigger debate the floating signifier ”human security” is the focus of a discursive struggle. Regarding social space for the differing opinions on human security, Tadjbakhsh (2009: 7) see a ”North-South”-divide in the discursive struggle on human security, as countries in the west (such as Canada and European countries) are adopting the ”freedom from fear” agenda, while Japan and developing countries are advocating the ”freedom from want” approach. Acharya points to a divide in conception of human security between East and West, but that disagreements also can be seen as ”West-West”, or ”East-East” (Acharya 2001: 445-447). Antagonistic understandings of human security within the same social space was seen in how Lodgaard questions Suhrke’s ”vulnerability”-aspect of human security.

This chapter has shown that even though the two policy agendas overlap on several issues (protection from physical violence, most notably), the means to meet such challenges differ to a considerable extent. For human security to be valuable, both as an analytical concept as well as policy, it is important that it is used uniformly and with ”one voice”, as stated by Lodgaard. However, human security is currently a concept advocated mainly by ”middle-powers”. Muggah and Krause (2006: 114) have documented the American, Chinese, Russian, Iranian and Egyptian (among others) unease towards human security, as it is believed to encroach on their sovereignty and freedom of action, thus limiting the declaratory

use of the concept. Still, the human security approach remains relevant due to a changed security landscape which demands new solutions to ensure security across and within borders, the interest in the concept within policy circles, and the outspoken goal of the UN to mainstream human security within several UN bodies (Krause 2007; UN News Centre 2010). However, while widespread use of a label or slogan in itself not necessarily have to equate relevance, the hesitation by major political players of a concept does not necessitate irrelevance. Instead, as Ruggie (1998) pointed to in a different context, the importance is the combination of "social purpose" (in this case human security) and institutional power. It is therefore relevant here to examine to what extent human security has been mainstreamed into policymaking at the multilateral level.

Thus, I will now turn to an analysis of the current understanding of human security within the UN. The nodal points and the chains of signification identified in the previous chapter constitute the foundation for the discourse analysis of the 2013 Human Security report. The previous identification of discourses influencing human security as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" will provide nuances to the text and the claims made in the report, that could not be truly understood without knowledge of the contexts from which they arrived - their "intertextual roots" (Rear & Jones 2014: 20). It is important to be able to interpret such nuances, since the aim of the Human Security report is to hegemonize human security, by discursively appropriate signifiers in a way that lead to the fixation of meaning, and thus the consensual understanding of human security.

4. Analyzing human security within the United Nations

In the beginning of this paper it was stated that in order to understand the origins and development of policies we need to "identify the discourses that dominate in them, how they come to do so, and which discourses are excluded and marginalized in the process" (Paul 2009: 243). So far I have examined the development of human security, and while it is believed that alternative conceptions of security are needed in the new security landscape, it is clear that the concept has seen much debate and contestation due to conceptual unclarity. This is also the case within the UN. Efforts of "human security mainstreaming" (UN News Centre 2010) have been promoted through various bodies, but the vagueness of the concept is often brought up as a factor slowing the concepts momentum. When a "goal" for security was left out of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), several scholars described this as a blatant overlook (see Hill et al. 2010), and some called for an adoption of what could be called "Millennium Security Goals" (Picciotto 2006), based on a human security agenda.

4.1. Towards a common understanding of human security

In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan compiled the report *In Larger Freedom*, emphasizing the need to realize three "freedoms"; the "freedom from want" and the "freedom from fear" (corresponding to human security), as well as the "freedom to live in

dignity”. The report further argued that today’s threats demanded “broad, deep and sustained global cooperation. Thus the nations of the world must create a collective security system to prevent terrorism, strengthen non-proliferation, and bring peace to war-torn areas, while also promoting human rights, democracy and development” (UN Larger Freedom 2005; Global Policy Forum). A big step towards conceptual clarification was taken during the Summit, as the General Assembly decided to further a process to define the notion of human security, stressing “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair” pointing to how “all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their potential” (UN General Assembly resolution 60/1, paragraph 143). After these rather broad acknowledgements, the Heads of State and Government made a commitment to continue to discuss and define human security in the General Assembly. Since then, a major source of discussion within the Human Security reports have been the contested nature of the concept, with calls for coherence and consensual understanding of human security and its implementation. In September 2012 resolution 66/290 was adopted, in which the Assembly agreed on a common understanding of human security. I will now present the analysis of the 2013 Human Security report. In these reports the Secretary General outlines the progress of the human security agenda and points to challenges ahead, by summarizing previously adopted resolutions and how these resolutions have gained further ground in the effort to reach consensus on human security. Being the most recent report, the 2013 report echoes the statements of resolution 66/290, and its understanding of human security.

Analytical tools

I will analyze the 2013 Human Security report against the background of the conceptual debate about human security scrutinized in the previous stages of this paper. The analytical framework discussed in chapters 1.4.2-1.4.3 will be used to answer the question of which conceptualization of human security that enjoys

hegemony within the UN. The analysis will especially focus on the discourse theoretical concepts "antagonism" and "hegemony", as well as the critical discourse analytical concepts "intertextuality", "interdiscursivity" and "order of discourse" as analytical tools. The understanding of human security presented in the 2013 Human Security report will be intertextually compared to the previously identified discourses and nodal points within human security as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". The reports struggle to fix meaning "in terms of one discourse rather than another" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 165-166) will give the discourse theoretical concept of "hegemony" particular interest in this analysis, since I will examine if the Secretary-General performs a hegemonic intervention against either "freedom from fear" or "freedom from want" when presenting the consensual understanding of human security.

4.1.1. Analysis of the 2013 Human Security Report: consensus on human security within the United Nations

The common understanding of human security, agreed on by the General Assembly, is considered a major breakthrough for the conceptual debate on human security. The 2013 Human Security report states how the definition and common understanding of human security "draws on 7 years of discussion on human security at the General Assembly and builds on nearly 20 years of experience of implementing the human security approach within the United Nations system and beyond" (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3). The report is based on information gathered through questionnaires and discussions on human security at the General Assembly, and draws on experiences from various human security projects. Thus, the diffusion surrounding the status of human security over the last decades can be understood according to the discourse theoretical position pointed to by Laclau and Mouffe that the subject position (in this case the referent object for human security) is *fragmented* and *overdetermined*, and has finally been given an identity within the UN, although this identity might be *contingent* outside of the UN.

Under the heading "A common understanding of human security", and paragraphs 4 a-h, several statements are made which define the newfound understanding of human security. An analysis of the statements shows how the report from the Secretary General hegemonizes human security:

4 (a) "[...] *the Assembly agreed on a common understanding of human security which included the following: (a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want*" (UN Secretary-General 2013: 2).

4 (b) "*Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context specific and prevention oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities*" (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3).

In paragraph 4 (b), the common understanding of human security is said to foster policy responses based on a "comprehensive", "context specific" and "prevention oriented" understanding of human security. Examining these statements intertextually and interdiscursively to the previous chapters' presentation of the discursive struggle for human security, we find that they are mainly in line with the discourse influencing human security as "freedom from want". The statements echo the definition offered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which mainly draws on a similar understanding of human security as the human development agenda. As we saw in the earlier chapters outlining the different discourses influencing human security, signs such as "prevention oriented" and "comprehensive" are closely tied to the nodal point human security from "underdevelopment", treating human security as "freedom from want".

Turning to the statements under paragraph 4 (a), the agreed upon definition of human security stresses the need for "*vulnerable*" people to enjoy "*freedom from fear and freedom from want*". Here, the Secretary General

stresses "vulnerability" as an especially important condition in need of attention from human security. Intertextually, "vulnerability" can be found both in the narrow and the broad conceptualization of human security, and can thus be understood both within a more traditional (albeit humanitarian) security discourse, as well as in a human development discourse. The statement "*[a]ll individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want*", thus need some elaboration. By relating back to the earlier discussion throughout this paper it seems as if the report of the Secretary General strives to merge the two schools of human security. However, remembering the qualitative text analytical premise of the need to be aware of different interpretations of the same word in different contexts (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 224), the use of the labels "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" in this context rather refers to the pillars of which the UN was founded, as the expressions are found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as I discussed in chapter 2. This becomes clear as the report further states how;

4 (d) "*The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation*" and, under section 4 (e), "*human security does not entail the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security*" (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3).

Here, two major statements are made about the understanding of human security. First, by claiming that human security is to be contrasted to the responsibility to protect, the Secretary General essentially rules out the implementation of human security in peace operations, including interventions such as the one in Libya in 2011. Second, the statement that human security does not entail the use of force or coercive measures further clarifies the newly reached agreement on what human security should mean. It seems that the conceptualization of human security as "freedom from fear" discussed earlier in this paper, is now to be replaced with responsibility to protect. The meaning of human security presented here is distinctly excluding signs connected to the nodal point "physical violence" of

”freedom from fear” - the aspect of hard force, and active protection against direct violence found in the understanding of human security as ”freedom from fear”. Thus, the UN definition rejects the understanding of human security within a humanitarian discourse based on a definition of security in more traditional terms, and thus as similar to the R2P-agenda. Here, the report also performs a hegemonic intervention in the use of the sign ”vulnerable” (mentioned in paragraph 4 (a)), as it is now to be understood that efforts to ensure human security for vulnerable people are incompatible with the ”use of force” and actions that are connected to humanitarian intervention. It can thus be seen as if the report, by drawing on a human development discourse influencing human security as ”freedom from want”, is hegemonizing the contested signifier ”vulnerability” by excluding it from a discourse advocating a narrow understanding of human security, and instead aligns it with an understanding of human security as ”freedom from want”.

This argument is further strengthened when the report goes on to conceptualize human security as being based on national ownership and non-interference in state matters;

4 (g) *”Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity for their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society”* (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3).

4 (h) *”Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security*

does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3).

These two statements can be intertextually traced to Japan’s human security policy as “freedom from want”. For example, at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security on May 22 in 2008, Ambassador Yukio Takasu stated how human security was to be distinguished from the responsibility to protect, since it: *“is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and promoted in full respect of national sovereignty”* and how the international community should work together with governments to foster preventive policies built on human security to respond to emerging threats; *“Human security is complimentary to state security. [It should] provide the environment under which individuals can develop fully their potential to enjoy a healthy and happy life, and communities become more resilient against sudden downfall. And it embraces a culture of empowerment and prevention”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008).

Considering the apparent focus within the UN to disconnect human security from the humanitarian interventionist agenda, an observation can be made about how the report refers to the ongoing conflict in Syria. However, while the ongoing internal conflict in Syria was highly profiled by the time of the release of the report (December 23rd 2013), the Syrian civil war is not mentioned. This, in turn, leads us to examine how human security is situated in relation to the post-conflict situation in Libya, to see if human security policy is seen as applicable in this case. The report states the following, stressing how human security initiatives are seen as an empowering tool for vulnerable groups, again highlighting the link between human security and human development;

“In Libya, the United Nations country team identified the human security approach as the most appropriate strategic framework for addressing competing national priorities. The strategic framework 2013-2014 highlights the importance of empowering conflict-affected communities to participate in the country’s

transition while building on the capacity of the Transitional Government to meet the various challenges and provide the necessary protection and empowerment for vulnerable groups” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 6).

While environmental issues are not explicitly stated in the common understanding of human security, it is acknowledged as an area encompassed by human security, further strengthening its connection to the nodal point human security as “underdevelopment”;

”In the Pacific region, where climate change continues to threaten sustainable economic development, the Pacific Islands Forum adopted the Human Security Framework [which improves] the understanding and implementation of the human security approach in the region and outlines a framework for the integration of peace, security, development and environmental initiatives in the Pacific context” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 8).

4.1.2. Hegemonizing human security: reaching closure on human security within the United Nations

Analyzing the statements taken from the 2013 Human Security report using the analytical framework outlined in chapters 1.4.2-1.4.3, the analysis shows how the report from the Secretary General is reaching closure on some key elements for the ongoing discursive struggle over the floating signifier human security. While it draws on a broad definition of human security, it cannot, however, be said that this definition represents an “anything goes” agenda. Instead, by analyzing what the report assigns to the order of discourse (i.e. what is left out of the discourse) of human security, it becomes clear that these are signs that also can be found in the order of discourse of the Japanese understanding of human security as “freedom from want”. For example, the statement that human security does not entail the use of force, and is distinct from responsibility to protect, alludes to how the military aspects of the Canadian conception of human security as “freedom from

fear” are no longer seen as compatible with the human security concept. Thus, the floating signifier human security is being tied to values similar to the conception of human security as ”freedom from want”, drawing on a human development discourse and a broader comprehension of human security. Thus, the signs found in the order of discourse for the UN conception of human security, are signs which constitute human security as ”freedom from fear”.

Moreover, the understanding of human security described under section 4 (h) as a matter for the state and a concept strictly obedient to national sovereignty of states also shifts the focus and interpretation of human security from the original ”freedom from fear”-agenda, by articulating human security around signs such as ”sovereignty”, ”territorial integrity” and ”non-interference”. Therefore, a conclusion that can be drawn in regards to the discursive struggle for human security, is that the humanitarian discourse of human security as ”freedom from fear” is being challenged. It is being restructured, and its moments are being reformulated through articulations and tied to other signs which are more in line with the intertextual chains of a ”freedom from want” conceptualization of human security. By ruling out the use of force or coercive measures, within this discourse human security is being tied to a chain of equivalence of values such as ”sovereignty”, ”non-interference” and ”non-coercive”. It thus becomes evident how the consensual understanding of human security within the UN stands in antagonistic relationship to the notion and application of humanitarian intervention. While important aspects of human security as ”freedom from fear” is pointed to in the report (joint international cooperation on small arms and light weapons are given as an example of the work of the Human Security Network), the overall message from the report is that the consensual understanding of human security is considered a holistic, context specific approach, situated in a human development discourse.

Examining the statements how human security is to be understood as the *”right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair”*, and the safeguarding of *”[a]ll individuals, in particular vulnerable people”*, we find a definition that draws on a human development discourse, similar to how

Suhrke's sees "vulnerability" as a defining characteristic of human security. A chain of equivalence can thus be found, where vulnerability is constituting a key signifier by drawing on a human security discourse connected to the nodal point human security from "underdevelopment", with signs such as "poverty" and "despair". Thus, while "vulnerability" is also a privileged sign within the humanitarian discourse influencing "freedom from fear", the 2013 Human Security report is performing a hegemonic intervention concerning the sign "vulnerability". It is performed in an opposite fashion compared to the hegemonic intervention Lodgaard performed against Suhrke on this particular sign in chapter 3.4. Lodgaard tied "vulnerability" to a narrow understanding and the nodal point human security from "physical violence", by disconnecting it from signs related to a human development discourse, in an attempt to hegemonize human security. Thus, the hegemonization of human security within the UN ties the concept to "freedom from want's" nodal point - human security from "underdevelopment" - and signs such as "poverty", "hunger", "disease" and "environmental issues".

4.2. Interpreting the analysis: implications of the UN consensus on human security for the discursive struggle between "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want"

A careful reading of the UNSG's 2013 Human Security report reveals several implications for the discursive struggle between the two main conceptualizations of human security. A major conclusion that can be made concerning the definition of human security within the UN is how this definition contrasts human security from responsibility to protect "and its implementation". Going back to earlier chapters of this paper, this means that human security no longer contains several aspects seen in the narrow "freedom from fear"-perspective, and is no longer envisioned in cases of humanitarian intervention. Thinking about the

consequences this use of human security might bring, we can return to chapter 3 to see some potential outcomes of mainstreaming human security in the UN within policy closely tied to a development agenda. There is a reason for treating humanitarian aid as depoliticized and neutral, thus decoupling it from political or security objectives (most of it "flows under the banner of impartiality and neutrality for good reason", as Lodgaard puts it). It remains to be seen how future human security operations are treated, considering previous arguments from the G77 about human security as a "Trojan Horse".

However, this argument could be understood as one of the main reasons to why human security is being delinked from the principle of R2P; to prevent coalitions to intervene in foreign affairs of other nations under the banner of human security. While the support for humanitarianism was strong in the light of Rwanda and Srebrenica, after the intervention in Iraq in 2003 the view that the "sun has set" on the humanitarian interventionist agenda gained stronger support. The reasons for the intervention were put into question, which also affected the concept of R2P. The credibility of Western coalitions as norm-carriers has weakened in the 21st century, mainly following the "war on terror", but also since the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Similar controversy surrounded the 2011 intervention in Libya, which is believed to have hampered the possibilities for humanitarian intervention in Syria. Thus, referring back to the discussion about the discursive struggle within the humanitarian security paradigm, and the humanitarian turn coming to an end after the events on 9/11, the analysis of the Human Security report shows how the concept of human security is even more tied to values in line with the "freedom from want"-approach. Hence, the statement that human security is to be distinct from responsibility to protect, and that the use of force is not envisioned in relation to human security, will, if upheld, stop the questions about immoral and arbitrary use of human security.

The decoupling of human security from coercive use could also be explained by the importance of the concept within the UN, and the outspoken goal to mainstream human security within several UN bodies. This task is easier to achieve on a broader scale if coercive measures encroaching on state sovereignty

are taken out of the principle of human security. On the other hand, this rules out human security mainstreaming on the level which many regard as the most important - the level of ongoing conflict (see e.g. Kettemann 2011). Thus, the "conflict gap" pointed to by Kettemann, which R2P failed to fill in the case of Libya, will still exist in future peace operations. As we saw, no mention of the conflict in Syria is to be found in the report. Applying the text analytical principle of latent meanings in texts, the absence of a reference to the conflict in Syria can be interpreted as rendering human security irrelevant for ongoing conflicts, further strengthening Kettemann's point about the conflict gap, and the missed opportunity for human security mainstreaming in the 2011 conflict in Libya. It also remains firm to the definition of human security presented in the 2013 Human Security report, as a tool suited in the pre- and post-stages of a conflict, but not during the actual conflict itself.

It could be argued that the human security paradigm no longer is a tool in the tool-box of humanitarian intervention, that R2P has "branched out" from human security, and taken its place. In this sense, at least within the UN, "freedom from fear" as previously understood, needs to be reevaluated. It is important to note that this is true within the UN, since a given definition of human security is *contingent* (possible but not necessary), and can therefore take a different shape outside of UN applicability of human security policy. As became evident in the intertextual analysis of human security policy as "freedom from fear", the Canadian human security policy agenda has been closely tied to, and instrumental for, the humanitarian intervention agenda. While the newfound consensus on human security within the UN will not end the "paradigm" of humanitarian intervention (since the principle of R2P is still advocated), distancing human security from R2P does have implications for both concepts, especially since human security was such an instrumental concept in the creation of the ICISS report and R2P. The discourse on human security presented in the 2013 Human Security report is performing a hegemonic intervention, as several signs connected to the discourse influencing human security as "freedom from fear" is now to be surpassed to the order of discourse of the UN definition of human

security; signs such as "coercive force" and "humanitarian intervention". Still, the report reaffirms the work of the Human Security Network, which includes aspects of the "freedom from fear" agenda, such as the work against proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Even so, a fundamental principle of "freedom from fear" is the safeguarding of individuals in their most vulnerable state, and therefore the delinking of R2P from human security is noteworthy indeed, and sends a signal concerning what the concept of human security should entail.

The focus on "empowerment" can be traced to human security as "freedom from want". Human security policy should, therefore, be based on empowering the civil society, and individuals therein in need of human security leading to empowerment from a bottom-up perspective. The report points to several examples of how human security can help empower communities in the aftermath of conflict, strengthening local ownership and public participation through community-based self-help groups. Such strategies are underway in Timor-Leste, Burundi, Liberia and Uganda. This aspect brings up another reflection; as individuals in conflict situations are among the most vulnerable, and thus in desperate need of human security and freedom from fear, there is a need for these individuals to control their circumstances and to become part of a civil society which can bring about social change. This control is, needless to say, hard to come by in the midst of ongoing civil war, and the prospects for people suffering from violence first hand to constitute equal partners in an empowerment process stemming from government policy are unlikely. This points to the difficulty of designing inclusive human security policy during high-intensity conflict, and could constitute another reason for the distinction between human security and R2P within the UN.

A final thought stemming from critical security theory elucidates something of a paradox; by multilaterally advocating policy to strengthen states where human (in)security is an issue could potentially become counterproductive, as the state can be diagnosed as a source of human insecurity, as seen in earlier chapters of this paper. While the obvious goal is to foster strong legitimate states which can provide security for its citizens, involuntary effects of human security

policy must however be regarded as a possibility. Therefore, while critics could call for the execution of the "Trojan Horse", there is no guarantee that human security is stripped of all its side effects by decoupling it from the agenda of humanitarian intervention.

5. Concluding reflections

As stated in the beginning of this paper, policy texts can be understood as "an arena of struggle over meaning" (Taylor 2004: 435), and that the outcome of policies and their directions is the result of struggles "between contenders of competing objectives, where language - or more specifically discourse - is used tactically" (Fulcher 1989: 7). In Wodak's (2000) terms, the outlining of a consensual definition of human security presented in the 2013 Human Security report can be understood as evaluating different aspects of human security policy and move "from conflict to consensus", by settling on a common definition of what human security should entail. This process has been analyzed by performing a discourse analysis which revealed both the discursive struggle for, as well as the intertextual roots of, the consensual definition of human security within the UN. After years of debate, dating back to 1994, the UN Assembly agreed on a definition of human security by adopting resolution 66/290. This finally brings more clarity to the discursive struggle for human security seen over the last two decades, and is considered a major breakthrough for the concept and its ability to be translated into policy.

The analysis has situated the current understanding of human security in the UN firmly within a human development discourse, to some extent at the expense of a more traditional, humanitarian, security discourse. It highlighted how the report hegemonizes the concept, and reaches closure on the discursive struggle for human security within the UN by reproducing a broader understanding of human security as "freedom from want" over a narrower understanding as "freedom from fear". I elaborated on potential reasons for this outcome by relating back to the discussion about diminishing support for a humanitarian interventionist agenda. Human security rhetoric was used by some of the states who abstained from voting on resolution 1973 (2011) for intervention in Libya, thus showcasing fears that humanitarian intervention can further increase human

insecurity. However, while respect for national sovereignty is crucial for mobilizing broad support for human security within the General Assembly, this paper also acknowledges that the strengthening of states could have unintended side-effects, since states also can constitute a main source for human insecurity. This was seen during the Arab Spring, and is currently seen in the conflict in Syria.

Considering that the 2013 Human Security report does not mention the ongoing conflict in Syria, future research could very well further examine the applicability of human security in post-conflict situations. Since several scholars points to how human security mainstreaming failed in Libya and how it is currently "failing" in Syria (see Kettemann 2011; Kerkkänen 2014), human security has gone from being a potentially "hard" policy alternative to prevent a new Rwanda to even more take the shape of a tool in the human development tool-box, focusing on policy in pre- and post-conflict situations. While the missing "human security goals" has been described as a blatant overlook in the original MDGs, it seems like human security will play a bigger role in the Post-2015 Development Agenda. In 2013 UNDP administrator Helen Clark stressed the value of human security, as it could lead to deeper analysis of the root causes and consequences of insecurities that threatens people's lives (UNDP 2013). Thus, going forward, human security seem to have found a more profound role in development policy. This belief is in line with this paper's conclusions about the current state of human security, seeing how it is increasingly situated in a human development discourse, and decoupled from the more traditional humanitarian security discourse within the UN. Whatever the place for human security might be in the future, it is clear that the new security landscape demand a broadening of the security agenda, as several threats cannot be met and understood with traditional means of security.

6. References

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
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Appendix 1: diagram showing conflicts by type

Armed Conflict by Type, 1946-2013



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Source: Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen, 2014 "Armed Conflict, 1946-2013." *Journal of Peace Research* 51(4).

Appendix 2: ICISS principles of "Responsibility to Protect" (2001)

The Responsibility to Protect: Principles for Military Intervention

(1) The Just Cause Threshold

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

B. large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

(2) The Precautionary Principles

A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.

C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.

D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

(3) Right Authority

A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.

B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.

C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.

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D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.

E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are:

I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and

II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.

F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation – and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.

(4) Operational Principles

A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.

B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.

C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.

D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.

E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.

F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.

Source: *ICISS 2001. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. pp. xii-xiii. [WWW]. Available: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>. Accessed: 2014-10-05*