

**Rhetorical Themes and Features**  
**in the Speeches**  
**of Julius Caesar's**  
***De Bello Gallico***  
**and**  
***De Bello Civili***

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26/02/2015

## **Abstract**

The aim of this study is to examine what rhetorical themes and features are present in the speeches of Julius Caesar's *De bello Gallico* and *De bello civili*. The investigation is based on the 172 speeches found in *De Bello Gallico* and the 83 speeches found in *De Bello Civili*. Lausberg's *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study* provides the theoretical framework for the analysis. The analysis also entails a study and comparison of the 255 speeches.

The investigation shows, among other things, that Caesar, through the use of rhetorical themes and features, in connection with the use of certain keywords is keen to show that his actions are justified, i.e. that he is "in the right". The use of rhetorical features and propagandistic elements increases in those sections where Caesar's position could be described as tenuous. There are also several recurring themes, some scenes tend toward the formulaic; Caesar's opponents, whether Gallic or Pompeian, are given the same inherent traits, e.g. greed, cruelty and hubris. In his work *Caesars Commentarii – Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede*, Detlev Rasmussen makes the claim that the style becomes more rhetorical as the two works progress. The current investigation cannot find anything to support this claim.

Keywords: Julius Caesar, Latin, style, rhetorics, direct and indirect discourse

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## 1. Introduction

When setting out to write a thesis on Caesar's two works, about the campaigns in Gaul, *De bello Gallico*, and the Civil War, *De bello civili*, hereafter referred to as *BG* and *BC*, it is impossible not to feel dwarfed and daunted by the sheer amount of existing secondary literature about the man and his *Commentarii*. Helga Gesche's bibliography in *Caesar - Erträge der Forschung* contains 1907(!) entries and, as it was published in 1976, does not account for any research published in the last 40 odd years. Furthermore, Luca Grillo's *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile: Literature, Ideology and Community*, which was published in 2012, is described as "[p]articipating in a *new wave* of Caesar studies" (Cambridge Classical Studies catalogue 2012, p. 7, my italics) and its bibliography is 23 pages long. Having said that, it is still my hope that this effort will add something to the existing literature.

In my bachelor thesis I argued that Cicero's *Pro Caelio* contains a great number of metaphors, thus contradicting the statement made by von Albrecht in *Cicero's style - A Synopsis* (2003) "For civil cases the plain style is most appropriate...Of course, pure Latin is a requirement, and aphorisms, witticism, irony and humour are not forbidden; *even* metaphors may occur, but no neologisms" (22). The aim here is to prove that there is plenty of rhetorical adornment in the direct and indirect speeches in the *BG* and *BC*, contrary to Cicero's comment in *Brutus* (*Valde quidem, inquam, probandos; nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta* (262)) and Conte's statement: "The unadorned style of Caesar's *Commentarii*, the rejection of rhetorical embellishments characteristic of true *historia*, the notable reduction of evaluative language - all contribute greatly to the apparently objective, impassive tone of Caesar's narration" (229).

## 2. Caesar and the *Commentarii* – A short background

A few words must be said about Caesar himself, his rhetorical abilities and the *commentarii*. For a brief summary of the separate books of the *BG* and a chronology of events in the *BC*, please see Appendix II.

Adcock provides a succinct summary of Caesar's life up to the point when he set off for Gaul: "He had been an adventurous politician, who had evaded or surmounted the dangers that beset the advance to high office of a man whose early connexions had been suspect, who had been a spendthrift, a fashionable gallant, not made respectable by bribing his way to the headship of the State religion" (1). To this can be added the fact that Caesar, particularly because of his tempestuous consulship in 59, had made many powerful enemies, including L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, one of the "villains" in the *BC*, who wanted to annul Caesar's laws and later, when announcing his intention to run for consul in 55, demanded that Caesar be recalled from Gaul and prosecuted<sup>1</sup>. And then there was of course Cato, who, after Caesar's campaigns against the Tencteri and the Usipetes (described in book 4 of the *BG*), wanted Caesar to be handed over to the Germans "to atone for his infamous breach of faith so that the curse might fall not on Rome but on the guilty party"<sup>2</sup>. It is therefore not far-fetched to believe that Caesar wanted the senate and indeed the citizens of Rome to believe that his pro-consulship in Gaul was a successful one.

Caesar's reputation as a very accomplished speaker is well-documented; his rhetorical skills are praised by Cicero, Suetonius, Quintilianus and others. His tutor, Marcus Antonius Gnipho, was a master of Greek and Latin rhetoric. Caesar also travelled to Rhodes and received training from the rhetorician Apollonius

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<sup>1</sup> Gesche, 58-61.

<sup>2</sup> Gelzer, 131.

Molon, who also was Cicero's teacher at one stage<sup>3</sup>. Adcock says of Caesar's achievements as a public speaker: "When Caesar set out for Gaul he was not yet in the first rank of generals, but he was an orator of an acknowledged eminence at a time when oratorical power was one hall-mark of literary distinction...As between the florid style of the Asianic school and the austere plain style of the Atticists Caesar was inclined to the Atticists, if not slavishly or to excess" (14). Nordling (17) points out that the preserved fragments of Caesar's speeches, other than the *commentarii*, prove that Caesar was versatile and well able to use any style he liked when it suited him.

The *BG* consists of 7 books plus a supplementary eighth book by Aulus Hirtius, one of Caesar's commanders (never mentioned by Caesar in the *BG* or the *BC*) written after Caesar's death. The *BC* consists of three books. The exact dates of composition and publication of Caesar's efforts are not known<sup>4</sup>, but they were written closely after the occurrence of the events they describe and irrespective of when they were published it is clear from the description of Labienus, who goes from being perhaps Caesar's most reliable commander in the *BG* to a cruel and bloodthirsty Pompeian in the *BC*<sup>5</sup>, that Caesar wrote the *BG* before the civil war started. Regarding the genre and Caesar's contributions to it, Conte says: "The term *commentarius*, a calque on the Greek *hypomnema*, indicated a type of narration intermediate between the collection of raw materials...and their elaboration in the artistic form typical of true historiography, that is to say, enriched with stylistic and rhetorical embellishments...In fact Caesar's attitude may have concealed a certain trickery: beneath the humble clothing, the *commentarius* as he conceived and practiced it probably came close to *historia*. This is evidenced by his dramatization of certain scenes and by his recourse to direct speeches in certain passages" (Conte, 226).

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<sup>3</sup> Gelzer, 23.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. chapter 3.1.

<sup>5</sup> Welch (104) states that Labienus in the *BC* is described as a "vicious buffoon".

Why Caesar chose this particular literary form is something we can only speculate on, and it is also outside the scope of this work. However, Welch<sup>6</sup> puts forward the interesting hypothesis that the *BG* was Caesar's "presentation of himself as the great Roman Emperor to the Roman people, in a manner befitting a literary stylist and major orator. Most importantly, it was his answer to the popularity and reputation of Pompey, perhaps especially as that reputation was given literary permanence by Cicero's speech of 66, *De Imperio Cn. Pompeii*"<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Levick echoes Welch's theory on p. 71 in the same work.

<sup>7</sup> Welch & Powell, 85.



### 3. Overview of Existing Research

The judgement on the literary qualities of Caesar's *commentarii* has been varied over the years. Caesar's contemporaries were impressed with his style and later Suetonius remarked "*Eloquentia militarique re aut aequavit prestantissimorum gloriam aut excessit*" (*Divus Julius*, 55). During the Middle Ages Caesar's works were not widely known; he was "rediscovered" as a writer during the Renaissance, but later his reputation sank<sup>8</sup>: during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the prevalent opinion was that Caesar was suitable for schoolboys learning Latin, but little else. Conte wittily finishes his chapter on Caesar with the following words: "[S]tarting in the nineteenth century, the *De Bello Gallico* has become one of the standard school texts for beginning students of Latin prose...We cannot know how many potential readers Caesar thereby lost" (232). N.J. DeWitt said of the *commentarii* in 1942 "there is no rhetorical elaboration"<sup>9</sup>. The publication of such works as Adcock's *Caesar as a Man of Letters* (1956), Welch's & Powell's *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter* (1998) and Grillo's *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile* (2012) has meant that this opinion by and large has been re-evaluated, although it should be noted that Hall says "there is little by way of fancy rhetorical elaboration"<sup>10</sup>. Conte makes the important point that Caesar's style is "deceptively easy" (232). The re-evaluation of the role of rhetorics in the *commentarii* makes perfect sense as Caesar was a consummate speaker with a thorough schooling in rhetoric.

Most of the scholarly works which deal with rhetoric in Caesar's texts focus on the *BG*, perhaps because the text is longer and more "subtle" in its argumentation, thus providing a richer material for analysis. Luca Grillo's *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile* (2012) is one of the exceptions. Grillo argues that the polarised values, such as integrity vs. shamelessness, loyalty vs. treachery and mercy vs. cruelty which

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<sup>8</sup> Conte, p. 232

<sup>9</sup> Nordling, p IV, note 1.

<sup>10</sup> Welch, Powell (ed.), p. 17.

are ascribed to the Romans and the Gauls respectively in the *BG* are applied in a similar fashion in the *BC*, and that the Pompeians, and Pompey himself in particular, are given the same traits as the Gauls. Caesar's *amicitia* and *lenitas* is contrasted with Pompey's threats towards Caesar's allies and those who remained neutral (cf. *BC* 1.33), something which served to evoke memories of the Sullan proscriptions. Grillo also argues that Caesar rearranges the chronology of events to suit his message: Book 1 ends with Caesar's merciful treatment of the Pompeian soldiers after the battle of Ilerda, although the battle of Massilia, which is described in book 2, happened before this. Similarly, the Battle of Bagradas, where Caesar's men are unmercifully slaughtered at the hands of Pompey's barbarian ally, king Juba, ends book 2, although Caesar's arrival in Spain, which is described earlier in book 2, happened after this. The "unsatisfactory"<sup>11</sup> end to book 3 serves as a reminder to the readers that "Caesar wins a battle but not the war"<sup>12</sup>. The validity of this statement obviously depends on whether the *BC* was published during Caesar's lifetime or not, an issue which scholars have not been able to agree on<sup>13</sup>, (see chapter 3.1. 'Disputed issues' for more about this).

One of the most important studies of the rhetorics of the direct speeches, i.e. speeches reported in *oratio recta* (OR), as opposed to *oratio obliqua* (OO), in *BG* and *BC* is Detlef Rasmussen's *Caesars Commentarii – Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede* (1963) from which I will be quoting liberally in the analysis (chapter 6). Earlier scholars like Klotz had argued that the direct speeches did not belong in the *commentarii*-genre<sup>14</sup>. Rasmussen refutes this and argues convincingly that the 21 direct speeches in the *BG* and the *BC* cannot be seen as simply later interpolations or exceptions<sup>15</sup>. Rasmussen's main argument is that the direct

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<sup>11</sup> Grillo, 168.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

<sup>13</sup> See Gesche, pp. 122-4.

<sup>14</sup> Rasmussen, 15 (the word he uses when discussing Klotz's argument is 'Stilwidrigkeit').

<sup>15</sup> Rasmussen, 160.

speeches play a central role in the text; those who use direct speech achieve what they want (see for example pp. 116-7). Furthermore, he argues that the direct speeches are turning points in the narrative (134) and “ein Mittel der Intensivierung und Steigerung” (135). According to Rasmussen, the *BG* and the *BC* have the same structure when it comes to direct speech. “Im bellum Gallicum wird die direkte Rede bei einem Gesamtumfang von 348 Kapiteln in den ersten 141 Kapiteln, das sind etwa 40%, vermeiden. Beim bellum civile wird in 117 von 243 Kapiteln, also bei etwa 48%, die oratio recta nicht gebraucht” (144). The argument is thus that there is a steady increase<sup>16</sup> in the use of direct speech towards the end of both works.

By means of a comparison with the geographical/ethnological excursions in the *BG*, Rasmussen argues that these excursions develop in parallel with the direct speeches: “Die geographisch-ethnographischen Partien unterliegen dem gleichen Gesetz eines allmählichen Stilwandels; sie formieren sich – bei genetischer Betrachtung – zum Bild einer Kurve, die der stetig ansteigenden Kurve der Reden weitgehend parallelläuft” (79). Rasmussen does not quite manage to establish the purported connection between these excursions and the direct speeches, except to say that “Beide Stilformen werden im Laufe der Darstellung ausführlicher und somit auch umfangreicher” (103).

Rasmussen attributes less importance to the indirect speeches: “Die indirekte Rede ist zwar nicht so rhetorisch wie die direkte: Sie ist jedoch gleichsam angelegt in Richtung auf die direkte Rede” (62-63). A comparison between OO and OR according to Rasmussen shows the following difference: “Ist die direkte Rede gekennzeichnet durch Schärfe, Bedeutsamkeit und Pathos, so eignet der indirekten gemeinhin Ebenmass, Ruhe, Distanz. Die indirekte Rede ist im allgemeinen konzentrierter als die emphatische direkte; sie enthält mehr Gedanken-Dinge, ist sachlicher” (137). Conversely, “[d]er indirekt Redende vertritt die schwächere Sache” (116), a

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<sup>16</sup> Rasmussen uses the term “ansteigende Kurve”.

statement which is somewhat remarkable seeing as Caesar speaks in *Oratio Recta* only once in *BC* and never in the *BG*, but in *OO* a total of approximately 70 times, of which 9 speeches are longer than 100 words. Why, for example, does Caesar not speak in *OR* in book 7 of the *BG*? It should also be noted that the 21 instances of direct speeches in the two works, with the exception of Labienus (one speech in *BG* and two in *BC*), Vercingetorix (one speech), Curio (one speech), Pompeius (two speeches) and Caesar himself (one speech) are often delivered by characters who appear in the text to deliver their speech and then disappear from the narrative, e.g. the unnamed aquilifer in *BG* 4.25, the Gallic leader Critognatus in *BG* 7.77 and Crastinus, the veteran soldier in Caesar's army, in *BC* 3.94. Furthermore, the last instance of *OR* in the *BC* is Pompeius's despondent words when he realises that the battle at Pharsalus is lost (3.94), hardly an example of someone using *Oratio Recta* to achieve what they want. Rasmussen does not explain how this fits his theory.

Rasmussen also seems to contradict his argument regarding the difference between the direct and indirect speeches when he states that "Diese indirekte Rede verzichtet keineswegs auf rhetorischen Schmuck" (p.67, referring to the indirect speech in the *BG*, 1.17) and "Man fragt sich, warum der *quidam* die oratio recta vermeide, wo doch hier alles auf dem Spiel mit Worten beruht" (p.68-9, referring to the speech in the *BG*, 1.42). Rasmussen also goes on to say that the indirect speeches are divided into various "stages" (Ger. *Stufen*) and that "Vom knappen Bericht, in dem nur die Hauptpunkte der Rede zur Sprache kommen, bis zur breit angelegten, fast wortgetreuen Wiedergabe gibt es fein abgestufte Grade der Ausführlichkeit. Die letzte Stufe der indirekten Reden unterscheidet sich in diesem Punkte kaum von der oratio recta" (63). Exactly what Rasmussen means by "fast wortgetreuen Wiedergabe" is not explained, however.

Perhaps the main criticism that can be levelled at Rasmussen is that his empirical data is rather scant and that his conclusions are too far-reaching and adjusted to suit his theory; Rasmussen does seem to find a way of neatly fitting the various speeches into his model and the reader is sometimes left with the feeling that it is

all perhaps a little too neat to be true. Rasmussen also seems to give Caesar too much credit at times (eg. pp. 120-1): Every word in the direct speeches seems perfectly placed according to Rasmussen, but he still goes on to say that “[d]em schnell niedergeschriebenen commentaries wird man ein gewisses Mass an Fehlbarkeit zugestehen müssen” (151). Somehow the equation does not quite add up.

Mutschler in his very thorough *Erzählstil und Propaganda in Caesars Kommentarien*<sup>17</sup> draws on Rasmussen’s research but comes across as more nuanced and less hasty to reach conclusions. He investigates the occurrence in each of the ten books of the *BG* and the *BC* of six stylistic features which he refers to as “nicht-kommentarienhaft” (i.e. in his opinion not suitable for the *commentarii* genre<sup>18</sup>), e.g. direct speech, unusual positions of the verb and vocabulary from another, higher register (words predominately used in poetry and “high” prose) and concludes, in contrast to Rasmussen, “die Konzentration der katalogisierten Stilelemente in bestimmten Partien der Kommentarien, scheint auf ein *formales* Prinzip nicht zurückführbar” (147). Mutschler does, however, not investigate the indirect speeches.

In his dissertation “Indirect Discourse and Rhetorical Strategies in Caesar’s *Bellum Gallicum* and *Bellum Civile*” John G. Nordling points out the importance of Rasmussen’s research: “Before Rasmussen’s important contribution scholars were apt to exclude direct speech from Caesar altogether as an aberration of the *commentarius* genre...Rasmussen’s scholarship ingeniously transformed the existence of those previously suspected direct speeches into a powerful argument for the stylistic unity of the two works (77-78)”. Nordling, like Mutschler, however, goes on to argue that Rasmussen overstates the importance of the direct speeches,

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<sup>17</sup> Mutschler, 1975.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. p. 7. For a more thorough discussion on the genre of the *commentarius*, see Batstone & Damon, pp 8-11.

and that indirect speech is equally important: “If Caesar wrote both types of discourse in unique *commentarii* which, in composition and rhetorical astuteness, rivalled formal *historiae*, why could he not have applied his rhetorical skill to both written types of discourse also?” (81).

While it is quite easy to find the 21 instances of direct speeches in the *BG* and the *BC*, it is considerably more difficult to find all the passages containing indirect speeches, as they “constitute a much larger and more amorphous body of discourse” (Nordling, 96). To elucidate the different speeches (direct and indirect) in the *BG* and the *BC* Nordling uses “a kind of continuum” (102) consisting of five levels (and a “miscellaneous” category), where the higher levels (C-E) contain the longer and more easily analysable speeches:

Miscellaneous: Self-Reflection; Private Audience; Rumors and Gossip: Challenges and Insults, etc.

Level E: Exhortations and Harangues

Level D: Council Speeches

Level C: Legations

Level B: Military Intelligence, Orders, Letters

Level A: "Discourse" Ablative Absolutes

According to Nordling, whose study focuses on “the higher level of the continuum” and on those speeches where Caesar himself is involved, Caesar uses the direct and indirect speeches to present himself as the “ideal imperator”. Nordling divides Caesar’s idealized self-image into four categories. The first category is Caesar as the self-consistent thinker (pp. 159-170); here Nordling deals with Caesar’s inner thoughts, which in the continuum Nordling refers to as Self-Reflection. My study will focus on the speeches delivered by the various characters and therefore this category will be of less interest here. The second category is Caesar as the well-informed and decisive commander (pp 170-183), corresponding to Level B in Nordling’s continuum; there are 178 occurrences of the finite forms of the word

*'iubere'* – Caesar is the subject 128 times. This, coupled with Caesar's "elaborate intelligence network", conveys the image of Caesar as a spider in the centre of its web. The third category is Caesar the diplomat (pp. 183-192), which corresponds to level C of the continuum. Nordling's main observations here are that Caesar, eager to portray himself as the ideal emperor, never sends any legations of submission himself, although he and his army are many times portrayed as being "underdogs". However, Caesar is always ready to receive these legations and Nordling shows that they often contain "unmistakeable signs of propagandistic distortion" (191): Caesar portrays himself as the party who is willing to avoid confrontation at any cost, but if negotiations fail, he is never satisfied with less than the complete surrender of the enemy. The fourth and final category, which corresponds to levels D&E in the continuum, is probably the most important category, at least as far as a study of Caesar's rhetoric goes: Caesar as the inspirer of men, by which is most often meant his soldiers. Here can be found some of the most rhetorically sophisticated speeches. Nordling points out that Caesar uses two main arguments to appeal to his soldiers: their greed for booty and the inherent justness of the fight (197). Caesar downplays the first argument, and when he does use it, e.g. before the sacking of Gomphi towards the end of the *BC* (chapter 3.80), Nordling says that Caesar manages to "convert the destructive potential of the mobbish soldiery to positive political advantage" (198); after the sacking of Gomphi Caesar is quick to point out that this one act of ruthlessness leads to many other *civitates* willingly submitting to Caesar and thus many people's lives are spared. Caesar also uses the discourse in this category to emphasize the different leadership styles of Caesar and Pompey/the Pompeians. Before the battle at Pharsalus the Pompeians are preoccupied with the future, dividing the spoils of the victory, whereas Caesar focuses on winning the day. This part of the *commentarii* contain Caesar's only speech in *Oratio Recta* (3.86). The speech is very short and stands in stark contrast to the long speeches by Pompey and Labienus which follow immediately after. Nordling finishes with the remark "If Caesar was not the leading rhetorician at Rome (right behind Cicero) he may well have been the greatest *propagandist* of antiquity, due to his ability to

translate his skills as a speaker into the quite persuasive written works of propaganda the *commentarii* are” (213).

Nordling and Rasmussen both draw heavily on Rambaud’s *L’Art de la Deformation Historique dans les Commentaires de Cesar* (1953) while at the same time being critical of his findings. As can be evinced by the title, Rambaud’s thesis is that Caesar is “guilty of” historical distortion (fr. *deformation*). The various speeches in the *commentarii* play an important role in this distortion, Rambaud argues. For example, Caesar always occupies the second position in the exchanges with Germanic or Gallic enemies, which means that “this pattern of discourse forces the reader to sympathize with Caesar, whose reasonable and Roman response, always freshest in the reader’s mind, clashes with the counter-proposals (or even threats and insults) of antagonists” (Nordling, 69). It must be admitted that Caesar’s character seems nearly always to react to the threats and invitations of others rather than initiate narrative action himself. The overall effect of this is to make Caesar’s story seem all the more impartial, credible, and, therefore, suspicious – as far as Rambaud is concerned. Nordling argues that “Rambaud has his own ‘axe to grind’ – [As] Rambaud must derive the bulk of his evidence from the *commentarii*, it seems to me that Rambaud’s constant criticism of Caesar, while extremely well-informed, useful, and interesting, should not be preferred to Caesar’s own record of the events described. This seems to be the virtually unanimous opinion of most Caesar scholars nowadays” (60-61).

### **3.1 Disputed issues**

Although modern scholars seem to agree on the validity of Caesar’s accounts, at least in broad terms, there are still some issues that are subject to debate, e.g: when were the works written, were they written all at once or year by year; when were they published; what audience did Caesar have in mind; did Caesar intend them to be the final version or did he write them for later embellishment by a



historian<sup>19</sup>; even the division of the individual books are not set in stone – some argue that the *BC* originally consisted of two books and not three.

Regarding the publication, T.P. Wiseman says about the *BG* that “[t]he *prima facie* assumption ought to be that the books of the commentaries were written and published year by year, and the onus of proof ought to be on those who believe otherwise” (2). Wiseman believes that books 1-4 and books 5-7 should be seen as two different “stages”, and that “[i]n the latter, with the political stakes rising remorselessly, Caesar’s style rises too, from *commentarius* proper (providing the material for a ‘real’ historian) to something which comes close to the status of full-scale historiography. Wiseman also launches the theory that the “commentaries were written to be delivered by a speaker at a public meeting”, (8), which would explain why the narrative is in the third person. However, this does not explain the occasional first person verb forms, which often occur when Caesar refers back to previous events, e.g. *BG* 2.24 (...*quos primo hostium impeto pulsus dixeram...*) and *BG* 4.16 (*Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam supra commemoravi praedandi frumentandi causa Mosam transisse*)).

Rasmussen is of the opposing opinion and uses the ‘ansteigende Kurve’ (see “Previous research”, p.9) as an argument that the books of *BG* were all written at the same time (157). Von Albrecht (332-333) also adheres to this theory with the argument that “if changes in indirect discourse in *De Bello Gallico* are replayed over the course of Caesar’s later Civil War commentary, it is hard to attribute either development to mere change over time”. Riggsby (9-11) gives credit to both viewpoints, but concludes “[n]evertheless, I am inclined to accept the theory of serial composition, simply because of the obvious value to Caesar in keeping the public aware of his deeds throughout the war”.

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<sup>19</sup> Nordling discusses this question on pp. 71-77; see also Gesche, p. 71.

## 4. Method

By means of a close study of the direct and indirect speeches in the *BG* and the *BC*, with the help of Lausberg's *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, I hope to answer the questions posited in chapter 4.1, "Research questions", below. I will analyse the result book by book in the hope that some interesting inter- and intratextual patterns will occur. It should be noted here that many speeches are too short to divide into different parts in accordance with classic rhetoric, e.g. *exordium*, *narratio*, *argumentation*, *peroratio*. Rather it is the *elocutio* and *ornatus* of these speeches which are worth studying (cf. chapter 5, "Theory/Rhetorics"). There are also some speeches which are too short or do not contain any rhetorical "finery" to warrant an analysis. These can be found in Appendix I.

### 4.1 Research questions

The questions I hope to answer are manyfold: How many speeches are there in each book? Who are the speakers? Are there any persons who are not allowed to speak? Is there a difference between the speeches of Caesar and the speeches of other persons, and if so, what? Do the speeches reveal any bias or propaganda on Caesar's part and if so, what? Are there any differences between the speeches in direct and indirect discourse? What rhetorical themes and figures occur in the direct and indirect speeches in the two works? What are the differences and similarities regarding the use of rhetorical themes and figures in the the two works, if any? How does Hirtius approach direct and indirect speech? Are there any discernible differences between the individual books, if so does it shed any light on some of the disputed issues mentioned in chapter 3.1, e.g. the year of production, publication, Caesar's intended audience, etc?

## 4.2 Limitation

As mentioned above in 4.1, there are a number of speeches or representations of speeches which are very brief, for example *BG 1.25*, “*cohortatus suos proelium commisit*” or the three short speeches in *BG 1.27 Helvetii...legatos de deditioe ad eum miserunt...seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, paruerunt. Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent, poposcit*. In my opinion, these segments are too short to merit any analysis.

In his study Nordling has included self-reflection and rumors and gossip (see appendix 2). These will be of less interest here as the focus is on how Caesar’s representations of the spoken word (whether in direct or indirect discourse) is used to affect the audience and the reader. Thus, segments like *BG 4.13* and *6.9* will not be included<sup>20</sup>.

*BC 2.29* will also be excluded as it is known that the text is corrupt.

Rasmussen makes the important argument that Caesar’s contemporary audience was more attuned to rhetorical fineries: “Der antike Leser, der ein Hörender war, hat diese feinen klanglichen Nuances genauer aufgenommen, als uns das heute möglich ist” (17). A thorough analysis in the vein of Gallo’s discussion of the metrics of the speeches in *BC 1.84-1.85* (pp. 90-91) would therefore most probably be rewarding, but I feel it is beyond the scope of the current study to cover this.

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<sup>20</sup> See Nordling 143-149 for further detail.

## 5. Theory/Rhetorics

In one sense, Cicero, de Witt et al.<sup>21</sup>, are of course right when they say there is very little in the form of rhetorical elaboration: Caesar avoids some of the more artful rhetorical features like *correctio*<sup>22</sup> or *prosopopoeia* (lat. *fictio personae*)<sup>23</sup> (cf. Cicero's *In Catilinam*, 1.18) and some of the speeches are quite "dry". However, as we will see in the analysis (chapter 6), it is clear that Caesar is well familiar with rhetorics and certainly knows how to use it. Here follows a short summary of those aspects of rhetorical theory which seem most relevant in an analysis of Caesar's texts. This chapter will mainly be based on Lausberg's *A Handbook of Literary History – A Foundation for Literary Study*, with some examples from *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.

One very important tenet of ancient rhetoric is the idea that a good speaker needs *virtus*. This means that there is a strong link between the character of the speaker and the quality of the *opus*. Quintilianus uses the definition "*vir bonus dicendi peritus*" (*Institutio Oratoria*, 12.1.1, my emphasis), i.e. it is not enough to be skilled, the orator also needs to be of good moral character<sup>24</sup>. The other virtues which the orator must be in possession of in order to create and deliver a speech which meets the requirements of *elocutio* are *latinitas*, the idiomatically correct manner of expression, *perspicuitas*, intellectual comprehensibility, and most importantly *ornatus*, the ability to deliver an embellished speech, the purpose of which is to grab the listeners' attention. We need not ask whether Caesar, in the view of his contemporaries (with the possible exception of his most vehement enemies, e.g. Cato and Ahenobarbus), possessed these qualities: clearly he did, as he was considered the most prominent speaker in Rome after Cicero.

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<sup>21</sup> See p. 5 and 9

<sup>22</sup> Lausberg 346-349.

<sup>23</sup> Lausberg, 369-372.

<sup>24</sup> Lausberg, p. 4, 17, 502.

The *officium* of the orator is to exert influence over the audience, or more precisely to *persuadere*, to convince. There are three different ways of doing this: *docere*, *delectare*, *movere* – teach, delight and move (emotionally). Caesar uses all three methods, but, as we shall see, *delectare* and *movere* to a lesser extent than *docere*. Knoche argues that in a comparison with Cicero: “Caesars Ziel ist das ‘docere’. Ciceros oberstes Ziel das ‘movere’, das Hinreißen”<sup>25</sup>. In the case of literary speeches, such as Caesar’s accounts, there are two audiences: The actual (or fictional<sup>26</sup>) audience when the speeches were delivered and, upon publication of the books, the reader/listener. For Caesar the author the main aim is of course to influence his readers/listeners.

There are three types of speeches: *demonstrativum*, *deliberativum*, *iudiciale*. The *demonstrativum* deals with praise or censure of a certain person; the *deliberativum* involves the persuasion or dissuasion in a particular matter and the *iudiciale* is a speech before a court of law, either for the prosecution or the defence. (*Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 1.2). Much rhetorical theory deals with juridical speeches, i.e. the *genus iudiciale*, which is understandable as the courts were important “battlefields” for aspiring politicians – Caesar made his name by prosecuting. This type of speech is not very common in the *BG* and the *BC*<sup>27</sup>, where a majority of the speeches belong to, or form a part of, the *genus deliberativum* (Lausberg, §§289-348) or *genus demonstrativum* (Lausberg, §§239-254).

The ancient rhetoricians are not in agreement when it comes to what parts a speech contains. Cicero, in *de Inventione*, and the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* state that there are six parts: *exordium*, *narratio*, *divisio*, *confirmatio*, *confutatio*, *peroratio*, but Lausberg list 9 different types of divisions, ranging from two in Aristoteles to seven in the works of the grammarian Martianus Capella. Lausberg himself uses a

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<sup>25</sup> In Mutschler, 81.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *sermocinatio* on p. 25

<sup>27</sup> Although, note for example Ariovistus’s and Caesar’s speeches in book 1 of the *BG*, discussed in chapter 6.1.1

division consisting of 4 parts: *Exordium*, the beginning of the speech, which is used to gain the sympathy of the audience, *narratio*, which is the (biased) statement of facts, *argumentatio*, the central decisive part of the speech and *peroratio*, the conclusion in which the speaker refreshes the memory of the listeners and tries to influence their emotions. As mentioned in “Limitations” (chapter 4.2), few of the speeches in *BG* and *BC* can be given the full rhetorical analysis because of their brevity, i.e. they do not contain all parts of a speech; in fact, some speeches are so short they only contain a fragment of one of these four parts, therefore the focus of this study will be on the words and phrases used in the speeches and the *elocutio*, the “linguistic garment”<sup>28</sup>, i.e. how the orator (or rather in this case, the author, i.e. Caesar) chooses to express his ideas.

Central to the concept of *elocutio*, of which *ornatus* is the most important element (cf. p. 19), is the idea of the four categories of change (Lausberg, 217), *quadripartita ratio*. These four categories are: *adiectio* (addition), *detractio* (detraction), *transmutatio* (internal change) and *immutatio* (change using external elements). To create a speech which contains *ornatus*, the orator has a number of tools at his disposal, which can be applied in two different domains: *verba singula* and *verba coniuncta*, i.e. single words and groups of words.

*Tropi* are examples of *immutatio* and apply to single words. Included here are familiar concepts like metaphor, metonymy, irony, emphasis, hyperbole and others which might need some explanation: *antonomasia* is the use of a periphrasis instead of a proper name, Lausberg gives “*Romanae eloquentiae princeps*” (i.e. Cicero) as an example (265); *litotes* is the combination of emphasis and irony, e.g. “not small” for the meaning “very large”<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> Lausberg, 215.

<sup>29</sup> Lausberg, 268.

In addition to *tropi* there are also various *figurae* available to the orator, divided into *figurae elocutionis* and *figurae sententiae*. As opposed to *tropi* these pertain to *verba coniuncta* rather than *verba singula*, they also refer to the other categories of change, *adiectio*, *detractio* and *transmutatio*. The distinction between the two *figurae* lies in the level of concretization: *figurae elocutionis* are concerned with linguistic formulation, whereas *figurae sententiae* deal with the conception of ideas<sup>30</sup>.

To begin with *figurae elocutionis*, these can be used as additions or repetitions for the sake of emphasis, with the omission of words to achieve economy of expression, but also with the arrangement of words in a certain order to achieve certain effects. Here are some of the most pertinent examples: *Geminatio* is the “repetition of the same word or word group in one place in the sentence, usually at the beginning of the sentence” (Lausberg, 275); *anaphora* and *epiphora* are the repetition of the beginning and the end of a clause. There are also different types of play on word, such as *annominatio* where small phonetic changes of the words create different meaning, e.g. *non emissus ex urbe, sed immissus in urbem esse videatur* (Cicero, *In Catilinam*, 1.27, my emphasis)<sup>31</sup>. Alliteration also falls within this category, but it is worth noting that the term didn’t exist in antiquity; it was coined by the humanist Pontanus in the 15<sup>th</sup> century<sup>32</sup>. The Romans were nevertheless aware of the existence of the phenomenon; as Peck points out: “the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4.12)<sup>33</sup> calls it ‘eiusdem litterae nimia assiduitas’”<sup>34</sup>. Lausberg also connects alliteration with *homoeoprophoron*, which is defined as: “the frequent repetition of the same consonant chiefly the initial consonant, in a sequence of several words” (432). This is in fact considered an error and something that should be avoided, which the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* also agrees with (*nimia*

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<sup>30</sup> Lausberg, 273.

<sup>31</sup> Lausberg, 287.

<sup>32</sup> Lausberg, 847.

<sup>33</sup> Incorrect source reference. Correct reference should be: 4.18

<sup>34</sup> Peck, 59.

*assiduitas*). Another type of word play is *polyptoton*, in which the inflected form of the word is changed to create *variatio*, e.g. *pater hic tuus? patrem hunc appellas? patris tui filius es?*<sup>35</sup> The change of the words themselves is known as *synonymia*, which hardly needs any explanations. Related to *synonymia* is *adiectio* where the same phenomenon is described, with different, i.e. non-synonymous, words, e.g. *multa simul eum revocabant: officia, consuetudo, tempus, existimatio, periculum, religio*<sup>36</sup>. Here *multa* is expounded on, not with synonyms, but with added clarification. *Polysyndeton* is a special type of *adiectio* where the conjunction is repeated throughout the sentence. The opposite of *polysyndeton* is *asyndeton* which involves the omission of conjunctions. Further *figurae* include *anastrophe*: the reversal of the natural/normal word order; *commutatio* (in modern rhetorics called chiasm), which is the cross arrangement of words or clause element (e.g. *pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur*<sup>37</sup>); *hyperbaton*, the separation of words which normally belong together, by the insertion of one or two words. *Homoeoteleuton* is the homonymous ending of successive clauses or word groups (cola), e.g. *audaciter territas, humiliter placas*<sup>38</sup>.

*Figurae sententiae*, as mentioned above, deal with the concept of ideas, including figures such as *obsecratio*, *licentia* and apostrophe (turning away from the normal audience to address another audience)<sup>39</sup> which are orientated towards the audience. However, as these do not occur in Caesar they don't need to be expounded on here. Of more importance are figures orientated towards the matter and figures of questions, which include, i.a., *antitheton*, the opposition of two contrasting concepts, and oxymorons. Included here are also emotive figures, such as

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<sup>35</sup> Lausberg 289.

<sup>36</sup> Lausberg 301.

<sup>37</sup> Lausberg, 322 (taken from *BG* 6:16)

<sup>38</sup> Lausberg 323.

<sup>39</sup> Lausberg, 336-39.



*exclamatio* (e.g. Cicero's *O tempora, o mores!*), *interrogatio* (the use of rhetorical questions), *subiectio* (mock dialogue) and *conciliatio*, the exploiting of an argument of the opposing party for the benefit of one's own party. Perhaps most important in the context of Caesar and the genre of history-writing is *sermocinatio*<sup>40</sup> – the fabrication of statements and conversations, etc.

In the same way that words or groups of words can be subjected to the four categories of change, so can ideas. Worth mentioning among the addition of ideas are *interpositio* (the introduction of a parenthesis), *subnexio* (addition of an explanatory idea) and *sententia* (the introduction of a universal truth; “a piece of wisdom with the same authority as a legal judgement or a written law” (Lausberg, 388). As regards the removal of ideas the following seem relevant for Caesar's writings: *percursorio* (the brief enumeration of ideas which would merit a more thorough treatment), *praeteritio* (an announcement of the intention not to mention something), *reticentia* (breaking off a sentence to hold back on information). Figures involving the expression of ideas by means of other ideas (*immutatio*), includes a few which are likely to be familiar also to those who have not studied ancient rhetorics such as *allegoria*, *ironia*, emphasis and hyperbole. Synecdoche (quantitative metonymy) is also included in this category.

One important aspect of rhetorics, with particular regard to Caesar and his supposed impartiality, is *amplificatio* – perhaps also that very phenomenon which in the end gave rhetorics a bad name for a very long period of time – the strengthening of the own argument and weakening of the opponent's argument. There are four types of *amplificatio*: *incrementum* – the gradual build-up of the item/event etc. described to make it more favourable to the speaker's cause; *comparatio* where an

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<sup>40</sup> In this thesis I use the term *sermocinatio* in the sense defined by Lausberg in §§820-825: “*Sermocinatio* is the fabrication – serving to characterize natural (historical or invented) persons – of statements, conversations and soliloquies or unexpressed mental reflections of the person concerned” (366).

*exemplum* is surpassed by the matter at hand; *ratiocinatio* – an indirect *amplificatio*, in the case of BG, for example Caesar’s praise of the strength of the Gauls and Germans<sup>41</sup>, and *congeries* – the piling up of synonymous words and sentences<sup>42</sup>.

*Compositio* (also called *structura*) refers to the formation of sentences. The highest form of sentence is called *periodus*, familiar to all students of Latin, which can consist of *cola* and *commas*. In this category Lausberg also includes *numerus*, i.e. the use of short and long syllables to create a speech which contains *pedes* (metrical feet) pleasing to the ear, but as mentioned in “Limitations” (chapter 4.2) I will not be covering this matter.

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<sup>41</sup> It should be noted that *ratiocinatio* is a term with many meanings (cf. Lausberg, pp. 753-54). Here and elsewhere in this thesis, I use the term as defined in Lausberg §405: “*Ratiocinatio* is an indirect *amplificatio* via *coniectura* (Quint. *Inst.* 8.4.26) based upon attendant circumstances of the intended object: the attendant circumstances of the object are amplified” (192).

<sup>42</sup> Lausberg, 189-193.

## 6. Analysis

I will analyse the speeches/utterances, book by book and state who speaks and how many words their speeches/utterances contain. As it is sometimes difficult to determine exactly what words belong to the actual speeches and what words are used to introduce the speeches, the number of words will be approximations of 5. I believe this will still give a good overview of the different speeches and their importance. After the tables detailing the speeches in each book, there follows an analysis of those speeches/utterances which I feel merit further comment. These speeches/utterances are marked in bold in the tables. Relevant/interesting parts in these quotes are either underlined and/or in **bold**. Speeches/utterances which I have felt merit no further analysis can be found in Appendix I. The speeches in *OR* are marked with an asterisk (\*).

### 6.1 De Bello Gallico

Here follows an account of the speeches in the 8 books of *BG*, the seven books written by Caesar and Hirtius's supplement. In chapter 6.1.9 can be found a summary of the findings, together with comparisons between the books and my conclusions.

#### 6.1.1 Book 1

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
<b>1.2</b>	<b>Orgetorix (leader of the Helvetii)</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>1.3</b>	<b>Orgetorix</b>	<b>30</b>
1.7	Nammeius and Verucloetius, <i>legati</i> from the Helvetii	25
<b>1.7</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1.8</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>20</b>

1.10	<i>nuntius/nuntii</i> <sup>43</sup>	25
<b>1.11</b>	<b>legati from the Aedui</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>1.13</b>	<b>Divico, leader of the Helvetii</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>1.14</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>1.14</b>	<b>Divico</b>	<b>20</b>
1.16	Caesar	35
<b>1.17</b>	<b>Liscus, magistrate of the Aedui</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>1.18</b>	<b>alii (Gauls)</b>	<b>190</b>
1.19	Caesar	40
1.20	Diviciacus, magistrate of the Aedui	95
<b>1.20</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>55</b>
1.22	Considius, experienced soldier in Caesar's army	15
1.26	Caesar, via messengers	15
1.28	Caesar	25
<b>1.30</b>	<b>Chiefs of the Gallic states</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>1.31</b>	<b>Diviciacus/Gallic chiefs</b>	<b>400</b>
<b>1.32</b>	<b>Diviciacus</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>1.33</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>1.34</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>1.34</b>	<b>Ariovistus, king of the Germans</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>1.35</b>	<b>Caesar (through legates)</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>1.36</b>	<b>Ariovistus (presumably through legates<sup>44</sup>)</b>	<b>145</b>
1.37	Legates from the Aedui and the Treveri	40
<b>1.39</b>	<b>Gauls and traders</b>	<b>30</b>

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<sup>43</sup> The verb is 'renuntiatur' so it is not possible to say who the messenger(s) is/are.

<sup>44</sup> The preceding speech by Caesar is made through legates and this speech begins with "*ad haec Ariovistus respondit*", but there is nothing to suggest that Ariovistus delivered the speech himself.

<b>1.39</b>	<b>People in Caesar's camp with no experience of combat</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>1.40</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>370</b>
1.41	Tribunes of the various legions	40
1.42	Ariovistus	45
1.42	Soldier in the 10 <sup>th</sup> legion	20
<b>1.43</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>1.44</b>	<b>Ariovistus</b>	<b>360</b>
<b>1.45</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>80</b>
1.47	Ariovistus	35
1.50	German prisoners	35
1.53	Procillus, legate sent by Caesar to Ariovistus	25

Number of speeches: 40

Total number of words spoken: 3165

Total number of words in Book I: 8200

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 35-40

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 14 (2 of which through legates)

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 1140

1.2 *civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent: perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri*

Already in the first speech, although short, delivered by Orgetorix, leader of the Helvetii, we find several rhetorical features: assonance (‘i’-sounds) and consonance (‘p’-sounds), antitheton in *finibus suis* and *omnibus copiis* and again in *omnibus praestarent* and *totius Galliae*. There is also *commutatio* in *cum omnibus copiis* and

*cum virtute omnibus*. Torigian<sup>45</sup> points out that the word *perfacile* only occurs three times in the *BG* – twice spoken by Orgetorix (cf. discussion on chapter 1.3 below) and once by Vercingetorix in 7.64. It could be argued that Caesar is using *rationatio* here – already in 1.1 Caesar states that the Helvetii and the Belgae are the bravest of the Gallic tribes, yet in less than 30 chapters (1.27) the Helvetii will be throwing themselves at the feet of Caesar asking for mercy.

1.3 *Perfacile factu esse illis probat conata perficere, propterea quod ipse suae civitatis imperium obtenturus esset: non esse dubium quin totius Galliae plurimum Helvetii possent; se suis copiis suoque exercitu illis regna conciliaturum confirmat.*

Again the word ‘*perfacile*’ is used, which together with *perficio* in the same clause adds emphasis to the ambitions of Orgetorix and the Helvetii. The contrast between *totius Galliae* and *plurimum Helvetii possent* is enhanced through juxtaposition. In these two short speeches Caesar shows that the Helvetii pose a serious threat to the Roman province; the use of words and phrases like *imperium potiri/obtinere, regnum* and *tota Gallia* (twice) will most likely have served as a proverbial red flag to the Roman readers, whose fear of Gallic marauding was well-known<sup>46</sup>.

1.7 *respondit diem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: si quid vellent, ad Idus Apriles reverterentur*

This is Caesar first appearance in the *BG* and it is worth noting how inconspicuous he is; this is a short order to the legates of the Helvetii to return in a few days, the purpose of which is to save himself time to gather more troops.

1.8 *negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et si vim facere conentur, prohibitorium ostendit.*

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<sup>45</sup> Welch, Powell, ed., p. 53

<sup>46</sup> Catilina’s conspiracy, which involved the Allobroges, will have been fresh in the minds of the readers.

Caesar's second "speech" is also very brief. Here one of the most important themes of the first book is introduced: *populus Romanus*, a phrase Caesar will be repeating no less than 14 times in book 1 (for more on Caesar's use of these words, see chapter 6.1.9). By using the phrase *more et exemplo* Caesar states that he is not acting in his own interest, rather he is forced by precedent not to allow the Helvetii to travel through the Roman province. There is also a strong contrast between the finite verbs used by Caesar here and in 1.7 (*respondeo, nego, ostendo*) and those used by Orgetorix in 1.2 and 1.3 (*persuadeo, probo, confirmo*). The Gauls are portrayed as the aggressors, the active party, whereas Caesar is the defender, reacting to the threat posed by the Gauls. Torigian<sup>47</sup> thoroughly analyses Orgetorix speeches in 1.2 and 1.3 and contrasts "the rhetorical dazzle of Orgetorix before his various listeners" with "the impression of a straightforward, frank, and completely non-rhetorical account created by Caesar's own use of Latin". She goes on to say: "If Orgetorix treachery is promulgated through rhetoric, then Caesar's claim of validity for the Gallic campaigns, by contrast, is only enhanced by his plain and simple style" (56). This may be true of Caesar's initial comments (i.e. here and in 1.7), but he is certainly no stranger to employing his knowledge of "rhetorical dazzle" in his own speeches (in book 1 see in particular 1.14, 1.40 and 1.43).

1.11 *legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium: ita se omni tempore de populo Romano meritis esse, ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi eorum in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint.*

Again Caesar is assuming the role of the defender; here he is expected to react to the plea of the Aedui, who in their request for help also state that it is because of their services to the Roman people they deserve Caesar's help.

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<sup>47</sup> Welch, Powell (ed.), pp 53-56.

1.13-1.14 *is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque esse voluisset; sin bello persequi perseveraret, reminisceretur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. Quod improvise unum pagum adortus esset, cum ii qui flumen transissent suis auxilium ferre non possent, ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere virtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret. Se ita a patribus maioribusque suis didicisse, ut magis virtute quam dolo contenderent aut insidiis niterentur<sup>48</sup>. Quare ne committeret, ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi Romani et internecone exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet. [1.14] His Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii commemorassent, memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre, quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent; qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellegeret quare timeret, neque sine causa timendum putaret. **Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, memoriam deponere posse? Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere. Consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere.** Cum ea ita sint, tamen, si obsides ab iis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur facturos intellegat, et si Haeduis de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allobrogibus satisfaciant, sese cum iis pacem esse facturum. Divico respondit: ita Helvetios a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare consuerint; eius rei populum Romanum esse testem.*

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<sup>48</sup> Both Caesar (1.40) and Vercingetorix (7.29) will later use a similar turn of phrase.



Here we find striking antitheton in *et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum* and again in *veteris contumelia*, which refers to 1.12-13 where Caesar explains that Divico had been the commander of the Helvetii in their campaign against Lucius Cassius, which had ended in the latter's slaying and his army being put under the yoke, and *recentium iniuriarum*. In the section in bold the rhetorical features abound: there are no less than seven anaphoras, a rhetorical question (*interrogatio*) as well as a *sententia* (*consuesse enim deos immortales...*) Caesar also accuses the Helvetii of *iniuria*, no less than four times. *Iniuria* is a powerful word thanks to its connotations with *ius*. By making this accusation, Caesar is stating that he needs to correct these injustices; he is giving himself the right to turn from defender to aggressor. The accusations of *iniuria* are conveniently used again by Caesar in 1.31, 1.33, 1.35 and 1.36 (see below), but there it applies to Ariovistus, the German king<sup>49</sup>. The purpose of this exchange is most likely also to set a precedent; as Nordling discusses on pp. 183-85 and 191-92, Caesar always presents himself as the party who receives legations of submission, he never sends them<sup>50</sup>. Obviously it would not befit a Roman proconsul to have any terms and conditions dictated to him by the leader of a Gallic tribe. Last but not least, the reader is given a premonition by the vocabulary which Caesar uses: words like *impune*, *impunitas*, *vetus contumelia*, *ulciscor*, and, fairly unusually for Caesar, a reference to the *deos immortales*, sets the reader up for the imminent downfall of the hubristic Helvetii.

1.17 *Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: esse nonnullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus possint quam ipsi magistratus. Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem deterrere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant: praestare, si iam principatum Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre, neque dubitare [debeant] quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una cum reliqua Gallia*

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<sup>49</sup> See chapter 6.1.9 for a further discussion on *ius* and *iniuria*

<sup>50</sup> Although, please note the exceptions in 1.34 and 1.35

*Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi. Ab isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse. Quin etiam, quod necessariam rem coactus Caesari enuntiarit, intellegere sese quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam causam quam diu potuerit tacuisse.*

In this speech by Liscus, one of the magistrates of the Aedui, Caesar seems to use *incrementum* – note the change from *proponit* and *adductus* in the first sentence to *enuntiarit* and *coactus* in the last sentence. There is also alliteration in the first sentence, *plebem plurimum...privatim plus possint*, which perhaps is intended to emphasize the strength of these *non nulli*. The purpose of this speech is most likely to impart the message that the Gauls pose a real threat (cf. 1.30)<sup>51</sup>.

1.18 *Eadem secreto ab aliis quaerit; reperit esse vera: ipsum esse Dumnorigem, summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum. Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Haeduorum vectigalia parvo pretio redempta habere, propterea quod illo licente contra liceri audeat nemo. His rebus et suam rem familiarem auxisse et facultates ad largiendum magnas comparasse; magnum numerum equitatus suo sumptu semper alere et circum se habere, neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates largiter posse, atque huius potentiae causa matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo conlocasse; ipsum ex Helvetiis uxorem habere, sororem ex matre et propinquas suas nuptum in alias civitates conlocasse. Favere et cupere Helvetiis propter eam adfinitatem, odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos, quod eorum adventu potentia eius deminuta et Diviciacus frater in antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris sit restitutus. Si quid accidat Romanis, summam in spem per Helvetios regni obtinendi venire; imperio populi Romani non modo de regno, sed etiam de ea quam habeat gratia desperare. Reperiebat etiam in quaerendo Caesar, quod proelium equestre adversum paucis ante diebus esset factum, initium eius fugae factum a Dumnorige atque eius*

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<sup>51</sup> See also Mutschler 151-54.

*equitibus – nam equitatu, quem auxilio Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix praeerat – ; eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum.*

This is the longest speech so far in the book and Caesar uses it to deliver a character assassination of Dumnorix, which includes giving him the blame for the lost cavalry battle and shows his persistent work to increase his personal power (*complures annos; neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates*). There are quite a few examples of hyperbole (see underlined) and *antitheton*: Dumnorix is both loved and feared, has great ambitions and hates the Romans and Caesar. In short, in this speech belonging to the *genus demonstrativum* Dumnorix is portrayed as the perfect villain. To make matters worse, he also wants *regnum* – the word is repeated twice in the same sentence, but *imperio populi Romani* is neatly wedged between them, almost like a road block.

1.20 *consolatus rogat finem orandi faciat; tanti eius apud se gratiam esse ostendit uti et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius voluntati ac precibus condonet. Dumnorigem ad se vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse intellegat, quae civitas queratur proponit; monet ut in reliquum tempus omnes suspensiones vitet; praeterita se Diviciaco fratri condonare dicit.*

Worth noting in this segment are the anaphors and the dual wrong-doings of Diviciacus – both to Caesar and the Roman republic and that Caesar puts the *rei publicae iniuriam* in the first position (at least in the text).

1.30 *intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu terrae Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse, propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent. Petiverunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese*

*habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent. Ea re permissa diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt.*

This segment sets the scene for what follows in 1.31, the repeated mentions of phrases like *omnia Gallia* and *tota Gallia* serve to alert the reader to the fact that what Caesar is about to find out about Ariovistus in 1.31 will pose a threat not only to the Gallic tribes but also to the Roman province; the threat posed by the Helvetii, which in 1.10 makes Caesar think that “*magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet*” is repeating itself – just like the Helvetii, Ariovistus’s goal is *imperio potiri* (cf 1.2). The above speech by the Gallic chiefs could also be said to show the recurring pattern of the Gauls not telling the whole story, promising something they do not intend to keep or even resorting to outright lies (cf. 2.32, 5.26-27, 7.38, etc.).

1.31 *idem princeps civitatum qui ante [ad]fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret. Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: [exordium] non minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent. Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduos: [narratio] Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab Arvernibus Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur. Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad centum et viginti milium numerum. [argumentatio] Cum his Haeduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum armis contendisse; magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse. Quibus proeliis calamitatibusque fractos, qui et sua virtute et populi Romani hospitio atque amicitia plurimum ante in Gallia potuissent, coactos esse Sequanis obsides dare nobilissimos civitatis et iure*

*iurando civitatem obstringere sese neque obsides repetituros neque auxilium a populo Romano imploraturos neque recusatu*ros quo minus perpetuo sub illorum ditione atque imperio essent. Unum se esse ex omni civitate Haeduorum qui adduci non potuerit ut iuraret aut liberos suos obsides daret. Ob eam rem se ex civitate profugisse et Romam ad senatum venisse auxilium postulatum, quod solus neque iure iurando neque obsidibus teneretur. Sed peius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis accidisse, propterea quod Ariovistus, rex Germanorum, in eorum finibus consedisset tertiamque partem agri Sequani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupavisset et nunc de altera parte tertia Sequanos decedere iuberet, propterea quod paucis mensibus ante Harudum milia hominum XXIII ad eum venissent, quibus locus ac sedes pararentur. Futurum esse paucis annis uti omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent; neque enim conferendum esse Gallicum cum Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem victus cum illa comparandam. Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque liberos poscere et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad voluntatem eius facta sit. Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium: non posse eius imperia, diutius sustineri. [peroratio] Nisi quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit auxilii, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a Germanis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accadat, experiantur. Haec si enuntiata Ariovisto sint, non dubitare quin de omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint gravissimum supplicium sumat. Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Romani deterrere posse ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere.

As soon as Caesar has set right the first *iniuria* (c.f. 1.30 *pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani*) he is presented with a new one, this time committed by Ariovistus (see underlined in the last sentence). The justification for the attack on the Germans merits a long speech by the Gallic chief, Diviciacus, which is a fine example of a well-structured speech of the *genus deliberativum* (where the

recommended action is that Caesar stop the Germans) with *exordium*, *narratio*, *argumentatio* and *peroratio*: In the *exordium* the Gallic leaders are looking to gain Caesar's sympathy, Diviciacus gives the background information in the *narratio*, a description of the current situation follows in the *argumentatio* and the speech concludes with a summary and an emotional appeal to Caesar in the *peroratio*. In the text I have suggested where the various parts of the speech begin, but the exact division can of course be discussed. The speech does not really contain anything which can be classified as *delectare* (which is not surprising, considering the subject matter), but there are elements of both *movere* and *docere*. When it comes to the *ornatus* of the speech it can be noted that Caesar the author, in order to heighten the contrast between the Germans and the Romans, uses polysyndeton (*vel...atque...vel...vel*) for himself and asyndeton for Ariovistus (*barbarum, iracundum, temerarium*), which could also be seen as an example of *congeries* and that some expressions tend towards hyperbole and antitheton (see underlined in the text). There are also no modifiers used to describe the qualities of Caesar and the Romans, i.e no adjectives are appended to nouns like *auxilium*, *hospitium* and *amicitia*, whereas Ariovistus and the Germans and their actions are only described by adjectives or adverbs: *barbarus, feras, superbe, crudeliter, iracundus, temerarius*. Caesar would of course have welcomed this speech – the call for help fits his purpose perfectly, and perhaps it is all a little too neat; I strongly suspect that Caesar is using at least a certain amount of *sermocinatio* here.

1.32 *Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque ullam omnino vocem exprimere posset, idem Diviciacus Haeduus respondit: hoc esse miseriorem et graviorem fortunam Sequanorum quam reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem, velut si cora adesset, horrerent, propterea quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas daretur, Sequanis vero, qui intra fines suos Ariovistum recepissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestate eius essent, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi.*

Muschler points out that Caesar's involvement in the exchange in 1.30 – 1.32 is minimal: "Caesar erscheint nur einmal als Subjekt...vor ihm als Zuschauer agieren die anderen Gesprächsteilnehmer" (150). Caesar thus continues to describe himself as the reacting, rather than the acting, party. As opposed to the speech in 1.31 which contained both *docere* and *movere*, here Diviciacus is focusing on the *movere* (see underlined words) and I would say that the fulcrum around which everything in this speech revolves is the phrase *Ariovisti crudelitatem*.

1.33 *Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum.*

Caesar here emphasizes the contrast between right (himself) and wrong (Ariovistus) and this also serves as a prelude of sorts to his speech in 1.40 (see below) where he extols his leadership skills. The word *iniuria* is again applied to the actions of the enemy.

1.34 *placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis utriusque rebus cum eo agere. Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se venire oportere. Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno commeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse. Sibi autem mirum videri quid in sua Gallia, quam bello vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Romano negotii esset.*

This and the following speech in 1.35 are unique in the *BG*: Nowhere else does Caesar send legates to ask for a conference. Although Caesar cloaks the decision in the phrases *placuit ei* and *ab eo postulet* to make it sound more commanding, Caesar still takes a very timid position in comparison to his later *modus operandi*. As Nordling (pp. 160-70) and Mutschler (pp. 148-51) point out, Caesar needs to

tread carefully here: In 59 BC when Caesar himself was consul, Ariovistus was honoured by the Roman senate (*in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset*, see below) and thus he cannot treat him like a common enemy. Worth noting in this speech is also the last sentence: That Ariovistus calls it *sua Gallia* will no doubt have grated on the ears and eyes of the Roman readers. *Mirum videri* is a *periphrasis* for *miror* to emphasize Ariovistus's superciliousness and *omnino* serves to strengthen the link (and thus Caesar's mandate) between Caesar and *populus Romanus*. Perhaps the omission of the senate in this context also serves to distance himself from the senate's/his own previous decision, which no longer suits his purposes.

1.35 *iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit: quoniam tanto suo populique Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eo postularet: primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis redderet Sequanisque permetteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret. Si id ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum.*

This is Caesar first reply to Ariovstus and the start of an exchange of words which continues in 1.36, 1.43, 1.44, 1.45 and ends in 1.47. As Rambaud points out<sup>52</sup>, Caesar lets Ariovistus have the first and the last word. These exchanges between

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<sup>52</sup> Nordling 69-70.



Caesar and Ariovistus can be likened to the verbal battle between two lawyers in court; these speeches thus belong to the *genus iudiciale* and the question before the judge (i.e. the readers) is who has the right of possession to Gaul, or in rhetorical terms the *status qualitatis* of the case is to judge whether the actions are *iure* or *non iure*. Caesar accuses Ariovistus of *iniuria* (cf. discussion of the speech in 1.13-14) and continues to link himself to the *populus Romanus* and states that his actions are based on a decision by the senate and carried out in the interest of the republic; in short, this is a justification for the inevitable battle (1.50-1.53).

1.36 *Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. Si ipse populo Romano non praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in suo iure impediri. Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortunam temptassent et armis congressi ac superati essent, stipendiarios esse factos. Magnam Caesarem iniuriam facere, qui suo adventu vectigalia sibi deteriora faceret. Haeduis se obsides redditurum non esse neque his neque eorum sociis iniuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo manerent quod convenisset stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id non fecissent, longe his fraternum nomen populi Romani a futurum. Quod sibi Caesar denuntiaret se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse. Cum vellet, congregederetur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos XIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent.*

Ariovistus starts his speech with a *sententia*. He then goes on to respond to Caesar's allegations of *iniuria* with a counterallegation and at the end of the speech brushes aside Caesar's accusation with a boastful threat that those who had tried to defeat him in battle had only lead to their own destruction (*sine sua pernicie*). Worth noting are also the repetitions of the phrases *populus Romanus* and *suo iure* and the alliteration in *non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua...* Although Ariovistus argues well in the beginning of the speech, the end smacks of *superbia*, something which obviously must (and will) be punished.

1.39 *ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse praedicabant – saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse [...] quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret [...] abditi in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis commune periculum miserabantur [...] Qui se ex his minus timidos existimari volebant, non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam, ut satis commode supportari posset, timere dicebant. Non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientes milites neque propter timorem signa laturos.*

This chapter is a good example of *ratiocinatio*: the Germans are described as having exceptional powers and characteristics. When they have been defeated at the end of the book, it will make the feat of the Romans seem even more impressive (although it must be admitted that they come across as anything but impressive in this chapter). Caesar also grabs the opportunity to take a swipe at those in his camp with no battle experience. T.P Wiseman<sup>53</sup> argues that Caesar here shows that he is a *popularis* and makes a connection to the fact that Caesar so often repeats the phrase *populus Romanus* in book 1. It also serves as a contrast to the praise given to the regular soldiers of the 10<sup>th</sup> legion in the following chapter and the remark in chapter 1.42 (see below).

1.40 *Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent.*

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<sup>53</sup> In: Welch and Powell, ed., p 3.

Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret? Sibi quidem persuaderi cognitis suis postulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi Romani gratiam repudiaturum. Quod si furore atque amentia impulsus bellum intulisset, quid tandem vererentur? Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent? Factum eius hostis periculum patrum nostrorum memoria Cimbris et Teutonis a Gaio Mario pulsus non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritus videbatur; factum etiam nuper in Italia servili tumultu, quos tamen aliquid usus ac disciplina, quam a nobis accepissent, sublevarint. Ex quo iudicari posse quantum haberet in se boni constantia, propterea quod quos aliquam diu inermes sine causa timuissent hos postea armatos ac victores superassent. Denique hos esse eosdem Germanos quibuscum saepe numero Helvetii congressi non solum in suis sed etiam in illorum finibus plerumque superassent, qui tamen pares esse nostro exercitui non potuerint. Si quos adversum proelium et fuga Gallorum commoveret, hos, si quaerent, reperire posse diuturnitate belli defatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset neque sui potestatem fecisset, desperantes iam de pugna et dispersos subito adortum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse<sup>54</sup>. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros atque imperitos locus fuisset, hac ne ipsum quidem sperare nostros exercitus capi posse. Qui suum timorem in rei frumentariae simulationem angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum aut de officio imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur. Haec sibi esse curae; frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura; de itinere ipsos brevi tempore iudicatuos. Quod non fore dicto audientes neque signa laturo dicantur, nihil se ea re commoveri: scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam. Itaque se quod in longiorem diem conlaturus fuisset repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta, vigilia castra

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<sup>54</sup> For a similar turn of phrase, see 1.13 and 7.29

*moturum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an timor plus valeret. Quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua non dubitaret, sibi que eam praetoriam cohortem futuram.*

This is arguably one of the most important speeches in the whole of the *BG*. Welch convincingly argues that Caesar in this speech claims for himself many of the qualities outlined by Cicero in *De Imperio Cn. Pompeii*<sup>55</sup>: *in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere,—scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem (28); Neque enim illae sunt solae virtutes imperatoriae, quae volgo existimantur,—labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo (29); Ac primum, quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores? quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia? quanta fide? quanta facilitate? quanto ingenio? quanta humanitate? (36); ego enim sic existimo: Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, et ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata atque exercitus esse commissos (47). In an echo of Cicero's description of the *summus imperator* Caesar compares himself with Marius (Caesar's uncle), states that he knows how to deal with the German enemy in case of war, he mentions his *virtus* (in a rhetorical question, for added emphasis), he asserts his authority (*vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent* and again in *haec sibi curae esse*) and he asserts his *felicitas* in the campaign against the Helvetii. Furthermore, he points out the *aequitas* of the terms he has given Ariovistus (which shows his *temperantia* and *humanitas*) and he ends the speech by showing his decisiveness/swiftness, something which was to become one of his trademarks. From a rhetorical perspective, Caesar demonstrates that he is a *vir bonus*. This is an effective speech which greatly influences the mood in the camp as Caesar states in the beginning of the next chapter (*hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes*). Not only does the speech serve to*

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<sup>55</sup> Welch and Powell, ed. n. 21, p. 105

remind the soldiers of Caesar's splendid qualities as a commander, Caesar also uses it to strengthen the bond between himself and his soldiers (*Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent?; non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritus videbatur*), and yet again the connection to the *populus Romanus* (mentioned twice) is made. Last but not least, the speech emphasizes the contrast between himself/the Romans and Ariovistus; the words Caesar uses to describe his own/Roman traits are: *virtus, diligentia, constantia, innocentia*, whereas Ariovistus could start the war because of his *furore atque amentia* and he managed to defeat the Gauls *magis ratione et consilio quam virtute* (the *virtus* that Ariovistus boasts about at the end of his speech in 1.36 is thus debunked). Ariovistus is also shown to be anything but swift and decisive: "*cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset*".

1.43 *Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex appellatus esset a senatu, quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat; illum, cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iustam haberet, beneficio ac liberalitate sua ac senatus ea praemia consecutum. Docebat etiam quam veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercederent, quae senatus consulta quotiens quamque honorifica in eos facta essent, ut omni tempore totius Galliae principatum Haedui tenuissent, prius etiam quam nostram amicitiam adpetissent. Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse; quod vero ad amicitiam populi Romani attulissent, id iis eripi quis pati posset? Postulavit deinde eadem quae legatis in mandatis dederat: ne aut Haeduis aut eorum sociis bellum inferret, obsides redderet, si nullam partem Germanorum domum remittere posset, at ne quos amplius Rhenum transire pateretur.*

Caesar more or less repeats his speech from 1.35, with the important difference that the *beneficia* bestowed upon Ariovistus were awarded by Caesar and the senate and not, as in 1.35, by Caesar and the Roman people. It seems the two terms are

interchangable and Caesar thus establishes a trinity where he, the Roman senate and the Roman people are acting as one, which is not surprising, considering that the standard phrase was *senatus populusque Romanus*, but it does emphasize how important Caesar seems to think it is to show that he is acting not for himself, but in the interest of the Roman republic, or rather its people and its senate (together they are mentioned no less than six times in this short speech, see underlined). The speech also contains a rhetorical question and repeated anaphoras in both the first (*quod...quod...quod...quam*) and the second sentences (*quam...quamque...quae...quamque*). Worth noting are the striking similarities in the use of rhetorical features in this speech and in the speech before the battle against the Helvetii in 1.13-1.14.

1.44 *Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit: transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed rogatum et arcessitum a Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint. Non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas esse. Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerit. Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, idque se hac spe petisse. Si per populum Romanum stipendium remittatur et dediticii subtrahantur, non minus se libenter recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam quam adpetierit. Quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam traducat, id se sui muniendi, non Galliae oppugnandae causa facere; eius rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogatus non venerit et quod bellum non intulerit sed defenderit. Se prius in Galliam venisse quam populum Romanum. Numquam ante hoc tempus exercitum populi Romani Galliae [provinciae] finibus egressum. Quid sibi vellet? Cur in suas possessiones veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut illam nostram. Ut ipsi concedi non oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos, quod in suo iure se interpellaremus. Quod a se[natu] fratres Haeduos appellatos diceret, non se*

*tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos in his contentionibus quas Aedui secum et cum Sequanis habuissent auxilio populi Romani usos esse. Debere se suspicari simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi causa habere. Qui nisi decedat atque exercitum deducat ex his regionibus, sese illum non pro amico sed pro hoste habiturum. Quod si eum interfecerit, multis se nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum – id se ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere – quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset. Quod si decessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi tradidisset, magno se illum praemio remuneraturum et quaecumque bella geri vellet sine ullo eius labore et periculo confecturum.*

Ariovistus likewise sticks to his guns; he repeats his claim that this part of Gaul is his. Caesar is most likely using *sermocinatio* here. That Ariovistus would have delivered a speech in fluent Latin, complete with *annominatio*<sup>56</sup>, *commutatio* and *interrogatio* seems implausible. The frequent mentions of the people of Rome continues (7 times), but the last instance also includes *nobiles principesque*, which does not occur elsewhere and the context in which it is mentioned (that these groups would be happy to see Caesar dead) could be said to support Wiseman's theory that Caesar is writing for the people and not the nobility (cf. comments to chapter 1.39).

1.45 *Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redeisset neque stipendium posuisset. Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse*

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<sup>56</sup> It should however be noted that not all manuscripts contain the second *iterum*.

*in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset.*

This speech is interrupted by Ariovistus’s men throwing stones and darts at Caesar’s troops. Caesar refutes Ariovistus’s claim of having the right to Gaul through precedent; again it is in the interest of the Roman people and the senate, rather than his own, that Caesar is acting. Caesar states that he spoke at length, but we are not told what he said: “*multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt...*” It is not clear to me why Caesar does not deliver his speech in full here, but perhaps the idea is that what Ariovistus says in 1.44 is tantamount to a declaration of war, which means that there is no longer any need for rhetorical niceties. The remaining speeches in the book (in 1.47, 1.50 and 1.53) are certainly very short and do not contain anything worth commenting on, as far as rhetorics is concerned.

### 6.1.2 Book 2

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
<b>2.1</b>	<b>Frequent rumours and dispatches from Labienus</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>2.3</b>	<b>Iccius and Andecombogius, legates of the Remi</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>2.4</b>	<b>Iccius and Andecombogius</b>	<b>210</b>
<b>2.5</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>2.5</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>40</b>
2.13	The people of Bratuspantium	15
<b>2.14</b>	<b>Diviciacus</b>	<b>85</b>
2.15	Caesar	30
2.15	The Belgae	20
2.16	Prisoners of Caesar’s	65
<b>2.21</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>15</b>



<b>2.25</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>15</b>
2.28	Legates of the Nervi	30
2.28	Caesar	20
<b>2.30</b>	<b>The Aduatuci</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>2.31</b>	<b>Legates of the Aduatuci</b>	<b>90</b>
2.32	Caesar	40

Number of speeches: 17

Total number of words spoken: 940

Total number of words in Book II: 4150

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 20-25

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 7

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 180

2.1 *crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat omnes Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra populum Romanum coniurare obsidesque inter se dare. Coniurandi has esse causas: primum quod vererentur ne, omni pacata Gallia, ad eos exercitus noster adduceretur; deinde quod ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui, ut Germanos diutius in Gallia versari noluerant, ita populi Romani exercitum hiemare atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant, partim qui mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant; ab non nullis etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro consequi poterant.*

The most conspicuous phrase in this chapter is *omni pacata Gallia*. Is this a statement of intent from Caesar? Although this is uttered by the Gallic chiefs, Caesar actions in this and the following books do nothing to contradict this impression. There is certainly a strong contrast to the timid entrance on to the stage

at the beginning of book 1<sup>57</sup>. The contrast between the Romans and the Gauls is also shown in the antithetic *inveterascere* and *novis imperiis*. Caesar is however still careful to point out that the conspiracy is against the Roman people and that the army does not belong to him, but to the Roman people.

2.3 *Remi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum legatos Iccium et Andecombogium, primos civitatis, miserunt, qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra populum Romanum omnino coniurasse, paratosque esse et obsides dare et imperata facere et oppidis recipere et frumento ceterisque rebus iuvare; reliquos omnes Belgas in armis esse, Germanosque qui cis Rhenum incolant sese cum his coniunxisse, tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem ut ne Suessiones quidem, fratres consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, deterrere potuerint quin cum iis consentirent.*

This speech, by the legates of Caesar's allies, the Remi, is designed to show the strength and unity of the enemy, emphasized by the repeated use of the prefix *con* (see underlined). The enemy is also united in their fury (*furor*), which is worth noting because of the contrast to what follows in the very next speech:

2.4 *plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter loci fertilitatem ibi consedissee Gallosque qui ea loca incolerent expulisse, solosque esse qui, patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata, Teutonos Cimbrosque intra suos fines ingredi prohibuerint; qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent. De numero eorum omnia se*

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<sup>57</sup> In this context it is worth noting that Caesar uses the phrases *omni Gallia pacata* in 2.35 and 3.28 and *pacatam Galliam* in 3.7, but in these cases the meaning of the word is "peaceful [for the moment]" rather than "pacified/subjugated". In 2.35, Caesar has not conquered the whole of Gaul, but the uprisings have been quelled temporarily. In 3.7 and 3.28 the claims of *pacata* are modified by *subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est* (3.7) and *Morini Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent* (3.28).

*habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus adfinitatibusque coniuncti quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint. Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia centum, pollicitos ex eo numero electa milia sexaginta totiusque belli imperium sibi postulare. Suessiones suos esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere. Apud eos fuisse regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae potentissimum, qui cum magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse regem Galbam: ad hunc propter iustitiam prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium voluntate deferri; oppida habere numero XII, polliceri milia armata quinquaginta; totidem Nervios, qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint; quindecim milia Atrebates, Ambianos decem milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios novem milia, Caletos X milia, Veliocasses et Viromanduos totidem, Atuaticos decem et novem milia; Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur, arbitrari ad XL milia.*

The *furor* of 2.3 and the *mobilitate et levitate animi* of 2.1 has been replaced with *auctoritas*, *virtus*, *iustitia* and *prudentia*. This, it could be argued, suggests that Caesar may be a somewhat unreliable narrator, who adapts the story to suit his needs; in 2.1 and 2.3 he wants to show that the enemy is fickle and untrustworthy and, having achieved this, he moves on to *ratiocinatio* in 2.4: Caesar now wants to convince the reader that the enemy is strong and a worthy opponent of the Roman army.

2.5 Caesar Remos cohortatus liberaliterque oratione prosecutus omnem senatum ad se convenire principumque liberos obsides ad se adduci iussit. [...] Ipse Diviciacum Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet quanto opere rei publicae communisque salutis intersit manus hostium distineri, ne cum tanta multitudine uno tempore confligendum sit. Id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum agros populari coeperint.

2.21 *Milites non longiore oratione cohortatus quam uti suae pristinae virtutis memoriam retinerent neu perturbarentur animo hostiumque impetum fortiter sustinerent*

2.25 *in primam aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus milites signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti possent.*

These four speeches (chapter 2.5 contains two speeches) constitute more than 50% of Caesar's speeches in book 2. In the heat of the battle in 2.25 it is understandable that Caesar does not deliver a long speech, but even before the battle he points out the briefness of his speech, by means of a litotes. Caesar is content with short exhortations and does not see the need for a big speech in the vein of the one he delivered in 1.40.

2.13 *omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum Romanum armis contendere.*

2.14 *Bellovacos omni tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse; impulsos ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitatem redactos. Omnes indignitates contumeliasque perferre, et ab Haeduis defecisse et populo Romano bellum intulisse. Qui eius consilii principes fuissent, quod intellegerent quantam calamitatem civitati intulissent, in Britanniam profugisse. Petere non solum Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Haeduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur. Quod si fecerit, Haeduorum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare consuerint.*

2.15 *Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduorum causa sese eos in fidem recepturum et conservaturum dixit, et quod erat civitas magna inter Belgas auctoritate atque hominum multitudine praestabat, sescentos obsides poposcit.*

Just like the exchanges before the battles in 2.5, 2.21 and 2.25 shorten, so do the exchanges after the battles; Caesar's *clementia* is appealed to, most often granted and then Caesar asks for hostages, see for example 2.32, 4.9, 4.22, 4.27, 6.9, 7.12.

2.30 *quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae [...] tanti oneris turrim in muro sese conlocare confiderent?*

2.31 *non se existimare Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere et ex propinquitate pugnare possent; se suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt. Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Aduatucos esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret. Sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos ac suae virtuti invidere; a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent. Sibi praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati quam ab iis per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consuessent.*

Here is another example of Caesar's use of *ratiocinatio*: An enemy which Caesar has subjugated by means of Roman engineering skills (which the Aduatuci refer to as *ope divina*) state that all the other tribes in the area envy their *virtus*. There is also a certain element of comedy to this exchange: The only thing that matches the speed with which the Romans move the machine is the change of fortune for the Aduatuci; the open scorn and contempt quickly turns into dismay and outright surrender.

### 6.1.3. Book 3

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
3.2	Servius Galba's scouts	115
3.3	Some of those present at the council of war	30

3.5	P. Sextius Baculus and Gaius Volusenus	10
3.5	Galba	30
<b>3.8</b>	<b>The Veneti</b>	<b>30</b>
3.18	Pretend deserter	30
3.18	Gauls	10

Number of speeches: 7

Total number of words spoken: 255

Total number of words in Book III: 3600

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 0

3.2 subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri. Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent: primum, quod legionem neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant; tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant. Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.

The reasoning and the modus operandi of the Gauls are interesting – the suddenness of their actions are twice mentioned (*subito*). Furthermore, their main reason (*primum*) for attacking the Roman camp is because they despise (*despicio*) the size of the legion (i.e. it is small). The secondary reason is because they expect

it will be easy to win the battle, thanks to their attacking from higher ground. The fact that they have been forced to hand over their children as hostages and that they suspect that the Romans intend to permanently occupy their land are added almost as an afterthought (*accedebat quod...*). Caesar probably describes the actions of the Gauls in this fashion to emphasize the irrational nature of the Gauls; the use of the word *despicio* in this context is likely to make the reader suspicious about the reasoning of the Gauls.

3.8 *celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos, reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint.*

In the same way the exchanges between Caesar and the Gauls become “standardized” (cf. discussion of chapters 2.13-15), the discussions among the Gauls themselves follow a very similar pattern. Conspiracies, rashness, promises to endure any hardship, the yearning for freedom, given to them by their forefathers, and the indignity of Roman enslavement are brought up in almost every conversation between the Gauls when Caesar or other Romans are not present. To this list of themes can be added how easy it will be to achieve their goals (cf. the discussions among the Helvetii in 1.2 and 1.3), which will be a recurring theme in later intra-Gallic discussions, particularly evident in book 7<sup>58</sup>.

#### 6.1.4 Book 4

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
4.7	German deputies	80
4.8	Caesar	70

<sup>58</sup> Elements hereof can also be seen in 2.14 and 4.34

<b>4.9</b>	<b>German deputies</b>	<b>20</b>
4.11	German deputies	60
4.11	Caesar	50
<b>4.16</b>	<b>The Sugambri</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>4.16</b>	<b>The Ubii</b>	<b>70</b>
4.19	The Ubii	55
4.21	Caesar	15
4.21	Caesar	15
4.21	Caesar	15
4.22	Legates from the Morini	25
4.23	Caesar	40
<b>*4.25</b>	<b>Eagle-bearer of the 10<sup>th</sup> legion</b>	<b>15</b>
4.27	Legates of the Britons	10
4.27	Caesar	20
4.34	Messenger of the <i>barbari</i>	20

Number of speeches: 17

Total number of words spoken: 605

Total number of words in Book IV: 4600

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 10-15

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 7

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 225

4.7 *quorum haec fuit oratio: Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre neque tamen recusare, si lacessantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum consuetudo haec sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invites, eiectos domo; si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur tenere eos quos armis possederint: sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales*



*pares esse possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint.*

The first speech of book 4 contains another good example of *ratiocinatio*, very similar to 2.31. The Germans state that not even the immortal gods are equal to the Suebi, but of course Caesar conveniently defeated them in book 1. Here the use of *ratiocinatio* serves a double purpose: not only does it give the reader a premonition of the Roman supremacy, it also shows the arrogance and ignorance of the enemy. It could also be argued that, just like in 2.31, there is a certain element of comedy to the naivety of the enemy.

4.8 *Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent; neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint; sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considerare, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturus.*

4.9 *Legati haec se ad suos relatueros dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt. Ne id quidem Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit.*

The exchanges in 4.8 and 4.9 show how Caesar's attitude has changed. Compared to Caesar's careful response in 1.7, his refusal to accommodate any of the wishes of the enemy is quite striking. The pattern is the same – legates arrive and ask for Caesar's permission – but the response is completely different<sup>59</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> See Powell 127 for an interesting insight into how Caesar's adventures in Germany were received by the senate in Rome (and Cato in particular).

4.16 *Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliae bellum intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt: populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet? Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur; vel, si id facere occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id sibi auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum. Tantum esse nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint. Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur.*

Caesar uses the intrusion of the Germanic tribes in Gauls as an excuse to march across the Rhine. The exchange of arguments is reminiscent of the conflict with Ariovistus in book 1. The segment contains a rhetorical question and the start of that sentence which would no doubt have been pleasant to the Roman ear with its alliteration. This statement is also indirectly giving the Romans/Caesar the right to subjugate Gaul: everything which is *not* on the other side of the Rhine is within the *imperium* and *potestas* of the Romans. Caesar seems to have moved the goalposts, and quite a lot, at that.

4.25 *'desilite', inquit, 'commilitones, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.'*

This is the first instance of *oratio recta* in the *BG*. Rasmussen discusses these few words in detail on pp. 21-23. His perhaps most important argument is that “Der Soldat tritt für Augenblicke an die Stelle seines Feldherrn” (23). There is little that needs to be added to this, except possibly to echo Nordling’s argument that the reason *oratio recta* is used here is because the soldier needs to raise his voice to be heard in the heat of the battle. As to why Caesar chooses this particular point to

introduce *oratio recta*, my only theory is that this is the moment when Romans for the first time set foot in England and the use of *OR* adds emphasis to this fact.

### 6.1.5 Book 5

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
<b>5.1</b>	<b>Legates of the Pirustae</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>15</b>
5.2	Caesar	15
5.3	Cingetorix	20
5.3	Indutiomarus	45
5.6	Dumnorix	20
5.6	Dumnorix	55
5.20	Trinobantes	20
<b>5.26</b>	<b>Eburones</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>5.27</b>	<b>Ambiorix</b>	<b>240</b>
<b>5.28</b>	<b>Lucius Aurunculeius, several tribunes and centurions of the first grade</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>5.29</b>	<b>Titurius</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>*5.30</b>	<b>Sabinus</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>5.31</b>	<b>Participants of the Roman council of war</b>	<b>30</b>
5.34	Leaders of the Belgae <sup>60</sup>	20

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<sup>60</sup> Presumably; this speech is introduced with the words *at barbaris consilium defuit*.

5.34	Ambiorix	30
<b>5.36</b>	<b>Ambiorix</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>5.36</b>	<b>Titurius</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>5.38</b>	<b>Ambiorix</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>5.41</b>	<b>Leaders of the Nervii</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>5.41</b>	<b>Cicero</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>*5.44</b>	<b>Titus Pullo</b>	<b>20</b>
5.52	Caesar	20
<b>5.52</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>30</b>
5.56	Indutiomarus	30

Number of speeches: 25

Total number of words spoken: 1090

Total number of words in Book V: 7400

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 10-15

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 4

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 80

5.1 *Qua re nuntiata Pirustae legatos ad eum mittunt qui doceant nihil earum rerum publico factum consilio, seseque paratos esse demonstrant omnibus rationibus de iniuriis satisfacere. Accepta oratione eorum Caesar obsides imperat eosque ad certam diem adduci iubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat.*

This is very similar to previous exchanges between Caesar and Gallic legates, but in this case Caesar is dealing with an uprising in the Illyrian province and Caesar is more aggressive in his response than in the exchanges with the Gauls. Perhaps it could be argued that this exchange sets the tone for the rest of the book.

5.26 *Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui posse sperarent.*

Chapter 5.26 marks the start of the uprising of the Eburones, whose deceit will lead to the near annihilation of one of Caesar's legions, commanded by Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, both of whom are killed by the Gauls (chapter 5.37). The apt choice of the word *prodiret* (appear) with its similarities to *prodo* (betray) gives the reader a premonition of what is to come.

5.27 *apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est: Sese pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuisset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius a Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud se in servitute et catenis tenuissent; neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem. Civitati porro hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat. Sed esse Galliae commune consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset. Non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur. Quibus quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem officii pro beneficiis Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospicio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat. Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo. Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab iis absit. Illud se polliceri et iureiurando confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum. Quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre.*

Ambiorix's speech is similar to Diviciacus's speech in 1.31, albeit shorter (240 vs. 400 words). In the description of the Gauls' actions three of the elements from 3.27 occur: Speed, conspiracy and the longing for freedom. The purpose of this speech of the *genus deliberativum* is to make the Romans leave the camp in order to give the Eburones the possibility of ambushing the legion. In good oratorical style Ambiorix starts off with praising Caesar (*exordium* with *captatio benevolentiae*), followed by a *narratio* which contains a strongly biased account of events and the speech ends with an *argumentatio/peroratio* where Caesar's *beneficia* and *merita* are mentioned again and where Ambiorix warns and begs Sabinus to leave the camp followed by a promise and a solemn oath that no harm will befall him or his soldiers. In addition to being well-structured, the speech also contains two examples of polyptoton (*in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem* and *non facile Gallos Gallis negare*), two examples of incrementum (*monere, orare* and *polliceri et iureiurando confirmare*) and the impressive m- and n-alliterations in the phrase *magnum manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum*. The reader, helped by the premonition in chapter 26 will know that the message is not to trust the Gauls, even when they're making promises.

5.28 *Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magnaue inter eos existit controversia. Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: quantavis [Gallorum] magnas etiam copias Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?*

Ambiorix's speech causes an argument in the camp between the commanders. Cotta, who will be proved right in chapter 5.32, argues against leaving the camp. The key phrase here is *iniussu Caesaris* and the accusation of levity and

shamefulness of taking advice from the enemy is given further emphasis by being in the form of a rhetorical question.

5.29 *Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium adiunctis Germanis convenissent aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam; neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. Non hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum; magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias; ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris exstincta. Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa spe Amborigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse? Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem. Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda.*

Sabinus argues that speed is the key to safety and his speech contains a dichotomy between speed and sloth. Speed is normally something which Caesar strongly favours, but in this case it comes across as rashness, a trait often given to the Gauls, and thus something negative, rather than swiftness. Sabinus focuses on *movere* in his speech. In addition to the two rhetorical questions there is also an elaborate and emotive metaphor (*ardere Gallia... superior Gloria rei militaris exstincta*), which would not have been out of place in a speech by Cicero.

5.30 *Hac in utramque partem disputatione habita, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus acriter resisteretur, "Vincite," inquit, "si ita vultis," Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret; "neque is sum," inquit, "qui gravissime ex vobis mortis periculo terrear: hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, qui, si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis*

*belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe a ceteris aut ferro aut fame intereant.*"

This is the second instance of oratio recta, which Rasmussen analyses on pp. 23-27. It could be argued that direct speech is used here, like the previous occurrence in 4.23, to emphasize the fact that the speaker raised his voice, *clariore voce*, although, with that reasoning Sabinus's previous speech, which is introduced with the word *clamitabat*, should also have been in OR. Powell calls this "an artful little speech, at once flattering the common soldiery and appealing to their self-pity. It is given demagogic punch by numerous alliterative phrases"<sup>61</sup> and just like Sabinus's previous speech it contains an artful metaphor (*aut ferro aut fame intereant*).

5.36 *Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; sperare a multitudine impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri, inque eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta saucio communicat, si videatur, pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una colloquantur: sperare se ab eo de sua ac militum salute impetrari posse.*

Ambiorix's promise and solemn oath in 5.27 has now been reduced to feeble hope, which Sabinus foolishly clings on to. His only reward is to be slowly surrounded and killed by the enemy in the very next chapter.

5.38 *postero die in Nervios pervenit hortaturque, ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque ulciscendi Romanos pro iis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant: interfectos esse legatos duos magnamque partem exercitus interisse demonstrat; nihil esse negoti subito oppressam legionem quae cum Cicerone hiemet interfici; se ad eam rem profitetur adiutorem.*

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<sup>61</sup> Powell & Welch, ed., 118.



Ambiorix arrives in the land of the Nervii and stirs up their will to fight, using the same arguments used by the Veneti in 3.8 (see above): eternal liberty, the need for haste and how easy it will be. By this stage the reader knows that the Gauls are foolish to believe this.

5.41 *Facta potestate eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant: omnem esse in armis Galliam; Germanos Rhenum transisse; Caesaris reliquorumque hiberna oppugnari. Addunt etiam de Sabini morte: Ambiorigem ostentant fidei faciendae causa. Errare eos dicunt, si quidquam ab his praesidi sperent, qui suis rebus diffidant; sese tamen hoc esse in Ciceronem populumque Romanum animo, ut nihil nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere consuetudinem nolint: licere illis incolumibus per se ex hibernis discedere et quascumque in partes velint sine metu proficisci. Cicero ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem: si ab armis discedere velint, se adiutore utantur legatosque ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae petierint, impetraturos.*

Cicero is faced with the same dilemma as Sabinus, but unlike the latter he does everything right, including not putting any hope on being helped by the Gauls. Echoing Cotta's sentiment in 5.28, Cicero refuses to yield to the suggestions/threats made by the Gauls and refers them to Caesar. Worth noting is also the phrase about refusing winter camps: This exact sentiment is propounded in 2.1. By repeating it here, Caesar shows that the Romans are setting the agenda.

5.44 *Ex his Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, "Quid dubitas," inquit, "Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas? hic dies de nostris controversiis iudicabit."*

Rasmussen deals with this short exchange on pp. 27-29. Again it could be argued that direct speech is used by the speaker to make himself heard in the din which would have been caused by the *cum acerrime...pugnaretur*.

5.52 *Postero die contione habita rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat: quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetitia neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur.*

All's well that ends well. Caesar finishes off the campaign with a short speech, which puts all the blame on the legates and praises the gods and the bravery of the soldiers. Could it be that the reference to the Gods is made because Caesar himself to a large extent was not involved in the battle<sup>62</sup>?

### 6.1.6 Book 6

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
6.1	Caesar	25
<b>6.8</b>	<b>Galli</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>*6.8</b>	<b>Labienus</b>	<b>30</b>
6.9	Ubi	30
6.10	Ubi	20
6.10	Ubi	55
6.32	Segni and Condrusi	25
6.32	Caesar	20
6.33	Caesar	30
<b>6.33</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>*6.35</b>	<b>A prisoner (unus ex captivis)</b>	<b>40</b>
6.40	Campfollowers	30
6.41	Caesar's troops	15
<b>6.42</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>35</b>

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<sup>62</sup> Cf. 6.42

Number of speeches: 13

Total number of words spoken: 385

Total number of words in Book VI: 5500 (without the digression in chapters 11-28: 3400)

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10 (without the digression: 10-15%)

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 4

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 155

6.8 *Galli cohortati inter se, ne speratam praedam ex manibus dimitterent – longum esse perterritis Romanis Germanorum auxilium exspectare, neque suam pati dignitatem ut tantis copiis tam exiguam manum praesertim fugientem atque impeditam adoriri non audeant [...] "Habetis", inquit, "milites, quam petistis facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis: praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperator praestitistis, atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate."*

Again we see an example of “strange” reasoning on the part of the Gauls<sup>63</sup>. It is an outrage to their dignity to let a small host of enemies get away, especially when the Gauls outnumber them heavily. In contrast to the spurious *dignitas* of the Gaul, Labienus in his short speech appeals to the *virtus* of the Roman soldiers. This is perhaps the best example of a speech which shows Caesar as the inspirer of men (cf. Nordling’s continuum, levels D and E, and Rasmussen, pp 29-31). Just by mentioning Caesar, who is not even present, Labienus manages to put the soldiers in fighting mood<sup>64</sup>. Although the valour of both the Romans and the Gauls are

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. 3.2

<sup>64</sup> Labienus more or less repeats the same speech in 7.62

referred to in this chapter, the use of different words, *dignitas* and *virtus* is probably deliberate to avoid a direct comparison between Romans and Gauls.

6.35 *Atque unus ex captivis "Quid vos," inquit, "hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamini praedam, quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? Tribus horis Aduatucam venire potestis: huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit: praesidi tantum est, ut ne murus quidem cingi possit, neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat."*

This speech is mostly worth including here because it is in *oratio recta*. Apart from this, it contains little rhetorical flair, but Rasmussen argues that the prisoner, through this speech becomes the leader of the German army and that this speech is the beginning of “die Reihe der weit umfangreicheren und gewichtigeren Barbarenreden, die nur noch von der als Kontrast wirkenden direkten Rede des sterbend sich opferenden Centurionen Petronius unterbrochen wird” (31).

6.42 *unum, quod cohortes ex statione et praesidio essent emissae, questus ne minimo quidem casu locum relinquere debuisset, multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse iudicavit, multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum barbaros avertisset.*

The similarities to the speech in 5.52 are striking; here is another speech after a battle which Caesar did not participate in and again he talks about the effect of external/supernatural powers, made stronger in this case through the personification of *fortuna*.

### 6.1.7 Book 7

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no of words
7.1	Gallic chiefs	85
7.2	The Carnutes	50

7.4	Vercingetorix	25
<b>7.5</b>	<b>Soldiers of the Aedui</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>7.8</b>	<b>The Arveni</b>	<b>15</b>
7.9	Caesar	20
7.12	Deputies from the town of Noviodunum	25
<b>7.14</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>7.15</b>	<b>Convention of the Gauls</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>7.15</b>	<b>The Bituriges</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>7.17</b>	<b>Caesar's soldiers</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>7.19</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>7.20</b>	<b>Vercingetorix's followers</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>*7.20</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>145</b>
<b>7.20</b>	<b>Slaves forced by Vercingetorix to pose as Roman soldiers</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>*7.20</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>7.21</b>	<b>Vercingetorix's followers</b>	<b>45</b>
7.27	Caesar	20
<b>7.29</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>115</b>
<b>7.32</b>	<b>Chiefs of the Aedui</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>7.34</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>7.37</b>	<b>Convictolitavis of the Aedui</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>*7.38</b>	<b>Litaviccus of the Arveni</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>7.38</b>	<b>Men induced by Litaviccus to lie about Roman treachery</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>7.38</b>	<b>Litaviccus</b>	<b>50</b>
7.39	Eporedorix of the Aedui	35
7.41	Knights sent by Fabius	65
7.43	The Aedui	20
7.43	Caesar	15
7.44	Gallic deserters	60

7.45	Caesar	30
7.45	Caesar	30
<b>*7.50</b>	<b>Marcus Petronius, centurion</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>7.52-3</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>125</b>
7.54	Viridomanus and Eporedorix	15
7.54	Caesar	50
7.60	Caesar	60
7.61	unknown <sup>65</sup>	25
<b>7.62</b>	<b>Labienus</b>	<b>25</b>
7.64	Vercingetorix	60
<b>7.66</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>7.71</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>80</b>
7.75	The Bellovaci	15
<b>*7.77</b>	<b>Critognatus</b>	<b>330</b>
<b>7.86</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7.86</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7.89</b>	<b>Vercingetorix</b>	<b>30</b>

Number of speeches: 48

Total number of words spoken: 2585

Total number of words in Book VII: 11500

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 20-25

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 12

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 415

Speeches/utterances by Vercingetorix: 9

Number of words spoken by Vercingetorix: 785

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<sup>65</sup> This speech is introduced only by the verb *nuntiatur*

7.1 *Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis queruntur de Acconis morte; posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant: miserantur communem Galliae fortunam: omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deprecantur qui belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent. Eius in primis rationem esse habendam dicunt, priusquam eorum clandestina consilia efferantur, ut Caesar ab exercitu intercludatur. Id esse facile, quod neque legiones audeant absente imperatore ex hibernis egredi, neque imperator sine praesidio ad legiones pervenire possit. Postremo in acie praestare interfici quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare.*

As mentioned in the discussion of chapter 3.8, when Caesar reports internal discussions among the Gauls, their exchanges are nearly always the same. This chapter is another good example of this: The Gallic leaders show their underhandedness (*clandestine consilia*) and hubris (*id esse facile*) and also that they are united in their cause (*commune Galliae fortunam*). Everything is at stake – it is better to die in battle than not to have the glory and freedom bestowed on them by their ancestors. They also accuse the Romans of cowardice (*neque legiones audeant*).

7.2 *His rebus agitatatis profitentur Carnutes se nullum periculum communis salutis causa recusare principesque ex omnibus bellum facturos pollicentur et, quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint ne res efferatur, at iureiurando ac fide sanciantur, petunt, collatis militaribus signis, quo more eorum gravissima caerimonia continetur, ne facto initio belli ab reliquis deserantur.*

The Carnutes' speech is a continuation of the opening statement in 7.1. Again the joint cause of the Gauls is mentioned (*communis salutis*) and the fact that the matter is very serious is emphasised by the demand for a *gravissima caerimonia*. For all their talk of unity the last phrase (*ab reliquis deserantur*) shows that the Gauls are neither to be trusted nor do they completely trust each other. In 7.5. Caesar points out that not even his supposed allies, the Aedui, can be trusted:

7.5 *legatisque nostris renuntiant se Biturigum perfidiam veritos revertisse, quibus id consili fuisse cognoverint, ut, si flumen transissent, una ex parte ipsi, altera Arverni se circumstarent.*

The sentence following this speech is: *Id eane de causa, quam legatis pronuntiaverint, an perfidia adducti fecerint, quod nihil nobis constat, non videtur pro certo esse ponendum.* Caesar admits that he doesn't know if treachery is involved or not, but by mentioning that this could be the cause he further emphasizes how untrustworthy the Gauls are.

7.8 *quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumstarent atque obsecrant, ut suis fortunis consulat, neu se ab hostibus diripiantur, praesertim cum videat omne ad se bellum translatum.*

Not only are the Gauls treacherous and hubristic, they are also fickle and cowardly. As soon as the first set-back strikes the Arverni, they become panic-stricken and despondent.

7.14 *Vercingetorix tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat. Docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea gestum sit. Omnibus modis huic rei studendum, ut pabulatione et comteatu Romani prohibeantur. Id esse facile, quod equitatu ipsi abundant et quod anni tempore subleventur. Pabulum secari non posse; necessario dispersos hostes ex aedificiis petere: hos omnes cotidie ab equitibus deleri posse. Praeterea salutis causa rei familiaris commoda negligenda: vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatium a via quoque versus, quo pabulandi causa adire posse videantur. Harum ipsis rerum copiam suppetere, quod, quorum in finibus bellum geratur, eorum opibus subleventur: Romanos aut inopiam non laturos aut magno periculo longius ab castris processuros; neque interesse, ipsosne interficiant, impedimentisne exuant, quibus amissis bellum geri non possit. Praeterea oppida incendi oportere, quae non munitione et loci natura ab omni sint periculo tuta, neu suis sint ad detractandam militiam receptacula neu*



*Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus praedamque tollendam. Haec si gravia aut acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimare, liberos, coniuges in servitutum abstrahi, ipsos interfici; quae sit necesse accidere victis.*

Vercingetorix states that the Gauls need to change their tactics. Just like in 7.1 the phrase *id esse facile* is used, but Vercingetorix's suggestions turn out to be anything but easy; what starts off with the need to disregard (*neglegenda*) for private property quickly escalates to the burning of whole towns. At the end of the speech, Vercingetorix paints a vivid picture of what could happen if the Gauls lose, which serves as a premonition for the reader and ties in with the start of the segment (*tot continuis incommodis*).

*7.15 quae etsi magno cum dolore omnes ferebant, tamen hoc sibi solati proponebant, quod se prope explorata victoria celeriter amissa recuperaturos confidebant. Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeret an defendi. Procumbunt omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges, ne pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem, quae praesidio et ornamento sit civitati, suis manibus succendere cogantur: facile se loci natura defensuros dicunt, quod prope ex omnibus partibus flumine et palude circumdata unum habeat et perangustum aditum.*

In spite of the set-backs that causes Vercingetorix to suggest drastic measures, the hubris of the Gauls quickly returns. The use of *facile* again combined with the phrase *prope explorata victoria* gives the impression of hopeless optimism.

*7.17 Quin etiam Caesar cum in opere singulas legiones appellaret et, si acerbius inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret, universi ab eo, ne id faceret, petebant: sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam acciperent, nusquam infecta re discederent: hoc se ignominiae loco laturos, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent: praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis, qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent, parentarent. Haec*

*eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum mandabant, ut per eos ad Caesarem deferrentur.*

7.19 Indignantem militem Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli exposcentes docet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam; quos cum sic animo paratos videat, ut nullum pro sua laude periculum recusent, summae se iniquitatis condemnari debere, nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem.

In 7.17 and 7.19 Caesar contrasts the behaviour of the Gauls with the upstanding attitude of his soldiers – *perfidia Gallorum* is the antithesis of *nullam ignominiam acciperent* and where the Arverni are *perterriti* (cf. 7.8) Caesar is flattered that his soldiers do not shy away from any danger (*nullum pro sua laude periculum recusant*).

7.20 Vercingetorix, cum ad suos redisset, prodicionis insimulatus, quod castra propius Romanos movisset, quod cum omni equitatu discessisset, quod sine imperio tantas copias reliquisset, quod eius discessu Romani tanta opportunitate et celeritate venissent: non haec omnia fortuito aut sine consilio accidere potuisse; regnum illum Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio – tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit: Quod castra movisset, factum inopia pabuli etiam ipsis hortantibus; quod propius Romanos accessisset, persuasum loci opportunitate, qui se ipsum sine munitione defenderet: equitum vero operam neque in loco palustri desiderari debuisse et illic fuisse utilem, quo sint profecti. Summam imperi se consulto nulli discedentem tradidisse, ne is multitudinis studio ad dimicandum impelleretur; cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non possent. Romani si casu intervenerint, fortunae, si alicuius indicio vocati, huic habendam gratiam, quod et paucitatem eorum ex loco superiore cognoscere et virtutem despiciere potuerint, qui dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint. Imperium se a Caesare per prodicionem nullum desiderare, quod habere victoria posset, quae iam sit sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata: quin etiam ipsis remittere, si sibi magis honorem tribuere, quam ab se salutem accipere videantur. "Haec ut intellegatis,"

*inquit, "a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites." Producit servos, quos in pabulatione paucis ante diebus exceperat et fame vinculisque excrucieverat. Hi iam ante edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent, milites se esse legionarios dicunt; fame et inopia adductos clam ex castris exisse, si quid frumenti aut pecoris in agris reperire possent: simili omnem exercitum inopia premi, nec iam vires sufficere cuiusquam nec ferre operis laborem posse: itaque statuisse imperatorem, si nihil in oppugnatione oppidi profecissent, triduo exercitum deducere. "Haec," inquit, "a me," Vercingetorix, "beneficia habetis, quem prodicionis insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine tantum exercitum victorem fame paene consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex hac fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est."*

Vercingetorix returns and is accused of treason on four counts, enumerated with the anaforic *quod*. The speeches in this chapter contains the same elements as chapters 7.1, 7.2, 7.14 and 7.15: The fear of treachery (cf. 7.2), the weakness of the Gauls (*animi mollitiem, diutius laborem ferre non possent*), the hubris – the phrase *victoria explorata* (7.15) is used again<sup>66</sup> – and the contempt for the Romans is repeated (*dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint*). Vercingetorix uses pretend deserters to convince his allies that he is on top of the situation. This practice was also used by Sabinus in 3.18, although the methods used to induce the pretenders to deliver their messages differ: Sabinus uses *magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque*, whereas Vercingetorix resorts to torture: *quos...fame vinculisque excrucieverat*.

7.21 *Conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo consuerunt cuius orationem approbant: summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem, nec de eius fide dubitandum, nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse. Statuunt, ut X milia hominum delecta ex omnibus copiis in oppidum submittantur, nec solis*

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<sup>66</sup> See also 7.37, although the phrase used in this chapter is *certicissima victoria*.

*Biturigibus communem salutem committendam censent, quod penes eos, si id oppidum retinuissent, summam victoriae constare intellegebant.*

Convinced by the lies, the Gauls state that Vercingetorix is a consummate leader and that they were wrong to doubt him. Through his rhetorical skills Vercingetorix manages to turn what is a very dangerous situation in his favour, but while the Gauls may have been fooled, the reader knows the truth. The sudden change of fortune, from traitor to consummate leader, which yet again highlights the fickleness of the Gauls is further emphasized by the antitheses of *omnis*, *communis* and *solus*, and the superlative *summus*. The use of the latter in the phrase *summam victoriae constare intellegebant* also suggests that situation is quite critical for the Gauls, in spite of Vercingetorix's claims of an assured victory. Rasmussen argues that Caesar in 7.20 shows "Sympathie für seinen großen Gegner" (40), which I find somewhat difficult to understand; although he wins a great rhetorical victory by clearing himself of the accusations of treachery, Vercingetorix has not managed to achieve anything. In 7.4 Caesar states that Vercingetorix's followers call him king (*rex*) and considering the Roman aversion to all things royal it seems unlikely that Caesar is interested in showing any sympathy towards Vercingetorix<sup>67</sup>.

*7.29 Postero die concilio convocato consolatus cohortatusque est ne se admodum animo dmitterent, neve perturbarentur incommodo. Non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis<sup>68</sup>, cuius rei fuerint ipsi imperiti. Errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus exspectent. Sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudencia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum*

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<sup>67</sup> Arne Jönsson puts forward the interesting theory that Caesar wants to drum up interest for his imminent triumph in Rome, at which Vercingetorix would be the "main attraction".

<sup>68</sup> Cf. 1.13 and 1.40 That Caesar uses a similar phrase to describe the Gauls/Germans and the Romans I cannot ascribe to anything other than *interdum bonus dormitat Homerus*. There is also a certain echo of chapter 2.31: *qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere et ex propinquitate pugnare possent*

*acciperetur. Id tamen se celeriter maioribus commodis sanaturum. Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere. Interea aequum esse ab iis communis salutis causa impetrari ut castra munire instituerent, quo facilius repentinos hostium impetus sustinerent.*

The pattern is yet again repeated; the Romans are scorned and although Vercingetorix's aim is to encourage his troops, he has a backhanded way of doing this: the reason the Romans won the battle was because of Gallic *imperitia* (not much of a consolation in defeat), and he also accuses them of *imprudencia* and *nimia obsequentia*. Vercingetorix however still has a plan for certain victory (*ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere*). After this grand-standing, the Gauls (and the readers) are brought back to "reality"; the plans for world domination will have to wait as they first need to worry about the sudden attacks of the Romans.

7.32 *legati ad eum principes Haeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario tempore civitati subveniat: summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat. Horum esse alterum Convictolitavem, florentem et illustrem adulescentem, alterum Cotum, antiquissima familia natum atque ipsum hominem summae potentiae et magnae cognationis, cuius frater Valetiacus proximo anno eundem magistratum gesserit. Civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas. Quod si diutius alatur controversia, fore uti pars cum parte civitatis confligat. Id ne accidat, positum in eius diligentia atque auctoritate.*

Just like in 1.11 the Aedui send legates to Caesar asking for help. At this stage, however, Caesar does not need them as an excuse to join the battle. By using words like *maxime*, *singulis*, *summus*, *omnis* and *divisus* Caesar shows how strained the

situation is. In the penultimate sentence, an elegant polyptoton is used, where Caesar simply could have said *inter se*.

7.34 *cohortatus Haeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque omnibus omissis iis rebus huic bello servirent ea[que] quae meruissent praemia ab se devicta Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter mitterent*

Caesar responds to the plea from the Aedui with a short speech. The most interesting phrase here is *devicta Gallia*. In chapter 2.1 Caesar uses the phrase *omni pacata Gallia*, which in light of his careful speeches in book 1 sounds quite aggressive. Here Caesar goes one step further. It is doubtful how encouraging the Aedui will have found the promise of a defeated Gaul, even if it involved receiving booty from Caesar.

7.38 *"Quo proficiscimur", inquit, "milites? Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit; principes civitatis, Eporedorix et Viridomarus, insimulati proditionis ab Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt. Haec ab his cognoscite, qui ex ipsa caede fugerunt: nam ego fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore prohibeor, quae gesta sunt, pronuntiare." Producentur ii quos ille edocuerat quae dici vellet, atque eadem, quae Litaviccus pronuntiaverat, multitudini exponunt: multos equites Aeduorum interfectos, quod colloqui cum Arvernibus dicerentur; ipsos se inter multitudinem militum occultasse atque ex media caede fugisse. Conclamant Haedui et Litavicum obsecrant ut sibi consulat. "Quasi vero", inquit ille, "consili sit res, ac non necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernibus nosmet coniungere. An dubitamus quin nefario facinore admissio Romani iam ad nos interficiendos concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est, persequamur eorum mortem qui indignissime interiierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus."*

This is very similar to the set-up of Vercingetorix's speech in 7.20, although there is no explicit mention of torture here and the focus is on stirring up anti-Roman

sentiment. Rasmussen describes it as “eine zweite, verbesserte Auflage der Rede des Vercingetorix” (40). Litaviccus seems to use words that to the Roman reader better would describe his own deeds rather than those of the Romans. Caesar’s use of *sermocinatio* thus includes elements of irony. Lausberg refers to this type of *ironia* as rhetorical irony, which “aims to expose the opposing party in the eyes of the audience by demonstrating the absurdity of the opponent’s analytical terminology” (405). Apart from the courtroom elements of the above definition this seems to me a very fitting description of the effect this speech has on the reader.

7.50 *"Quoniam," inquit, "me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. Vos data facultate vobis consulite." [...]* *"Frustra," inquit, "meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem recipite."*

Caesar manages to use an episode in which his soldiers’ rashness lead to a serious set-back (which he will severely criticize in 7.52-53) to show the valour and courage of the Roman soldiers, in stark contrast to the treacherous actions of the Gauls. It is also interesting to note that the speaker, the centurion Petronius, admits to *cupiditatis*, the same error which Caesar will later criticize his soldiers of (see below).

7.52-53 *Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque a tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent. Exposuit quid iniquitas loci posset, quod ipse ad Avaricum sensisset, cum sine duce et sine equitatu deprehensis hostibus exploratam victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione propter iniquitatem loci accideret. Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; non minus se a milite modestiam et*

*continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare. [7.53] Hac habita contione et ad extremam orationem confirmatis militibus, ne ob hanc causam animo permoverentur neu quod iniquitas loci attulisset id virtuti hostium tribuerent eadem de profectione cogitans quae ante senserat*

Caesar's task is not an easy one: He needs to portray the Gauls as inferior to the Romans, but also show that they pose a real threat. Here Caesar uses many of the traits he has previously ascribed to the Gauls to criticize his own soldiers; his main criticism is that the soldiers believe that they know better than their commander, the same criticism he made in 1.40. In 7.45 Caesar orders his legates to make sure the soldiers do not advance too far and that the inequality of the ground is a problem, the very same issues that Caesar is pointing out here. It seems as if Caesar is covering his tracks. Towards the end of the speech Caesar makes sure to point out that it was not because of the enemy, but the unfavourable ground that this setback occurred, so as not to give any credit to the Gauls. In order to soften the criticism he also makes sure to encourage his soldiers and twice mentions their courage (*animi magnitudinem*). There are some interesting parallels to Vercingetorix's speech in 7.29 here: Just like Vercingetorix, Caesar criticizes his troops but does not accept any personal blame for the set-back and they are both quick to point out that it was not because of *virtus* that the enemy won the day. There is however one important difference: Where Caesar does not give any credit to the Gauls, and explicitly states this, Vercingetorix talks about the *scientia oppugnationis* of the Romans – obviously a clever use of *sermocinatio* on Caesar's part.

*7.62 Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum proeliorum retinerent memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent, dat signum proeli.*

Labienus repeats his speech from 6.8, with good effect.



7.64 *Ille imperat reliquis civitatibus obsides. denique ei rei constituit diem. Huc omnes equites, quindecim milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet; peditatu quem antea habuerit se fore contentum dicit, neque fortunam temptaturum aut acie dimicaturum, sed, quoniam abundet equitatu, perfacile esse factu frumentationibus pabulationibusque Romanos prohibere, aequo modo animo sua ipsi frumenta corrumpant aedificiaque incendant, qua rei familiaris iactura perpetuum imperium libertatemque se consequi videant.*

7.66 *Vercingetorix consedit convocatisque ad concilium praefectis equitum venisse tempus victoriae demonstrat. Fugere in provinciam Romanos Galliaque excedere. Id sibi ad praesentem obtinendam libertatem satis esse; ad reliqui temporis pacem atque otium parum profici: maioribus enim coactis copiis reversuros neque finem bellandi facturos. Proinde agmine impeditos adorirantur. Si pedites suis auxilium ferant atque in eo morentur, iter confici non posse; si, id quod magis futurum confidat, relictis impedimentis suae saluti consulant, et usu rerum necessariorum et dignitate spoliatum iri. Nam de equitibus hostium, quin nemo eorum progredi modo extra agmen audeat, ne ipsos quidem non debere dubitare. Id quo maiore faciant animo, copias se omnes pro castris habiturum et terrori hostibus futurum. Conclamant equites sanctissimo iureiurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos, ne ad parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium perequitasset.*

The content of Vercingetorix's speeches are familiar to the reader at this stage. There is talk of freedom, displays of confidence and how easily it will be to achieve freedom, contempt of the Romans and the enthusiastic cheering of the troops at the end.

7.71 *Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant. Sua in illos merita proponit obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem habeant neu se optime de communi libertate meritum in cruciatum hostibus dedant. Quod si indiligentiores fuerint, milia hominum delecta octoginta una secum interitura demonstrat. Ratione inita se exigue dierum*

*triginta habere frumentum, sed paulo etiam longius tolerari posse parcendo. [...] Frumentum omne ad se referri iubet; capitis poenam eis qui non paruerint constituit:*

Excluding the short command in 7.4, this is Vercingetorix's seventh speech and his last words before the showdown at Alesia, but unlike all the other ones, the self-assured posturing is completely gone and instead he mainly talks about himself. Where the reader would expect a rousing speech on the eve of the battle, Vercingetorix dispenses with all talk about guaranteed victory and the unity of all Gaul and delivers a plea not to be handed over to the enemy if their battle plan fails.

*7.77 concilio coacto de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Apud quos variis dictis sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppeterent, eruptionem censebat, non praetereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter eius singularem et nefariam crudelitatem. Hic summo in Arvernibus ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis, "Nihil," inquit, "de eorum sententia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam servitatem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad concilium adhibendos censeo. Cum his mihi res sit, qui eruptionem probant; quorum in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinam residere virtutis memoria videtur. Animi est ista mollitia, non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. Atque ego hanc sententiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae nostrae iacturam fieri viderem: sed in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus. Quid enim hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis consanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur? Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetuae servituti addicere. An, quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis? Si illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepo, his utimini testibus appropinquare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere*

*versantur. Quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari bello Cimbrorum Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt neque se hostibus tradiderunt. Cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen libertatis causa institui et posteris prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem. Nam quid illi simile bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaue illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reliquerunt. Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considerare atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim umquam alia condicione bella gesserunt. Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute."*

This is the longest speech in book 7 (but shorter than the three big speeches in book 1 by Diviciacus, Caesar and Ariovistus) and a lot has been written about it. As Rasmussen points out on p. 15, some have argued that this speech, because of its length and the fact that it is in *OR*, is more in the vein of history-writing and thus does not really fit into the *commentarii* genre. I would however argue that if one studies the themes of the speech, it fits in perfectly and serves as a climax to the Gallic speeches in 7.1, 7.2, 7.14, 7.15, 7.20, 7.29, 7.37 and 7.66. Rasmussen gives a good summary of the speech and its rhetorical features on pp. 47-54. To this could perhaps be added that the speech starts with an elegant *praeteritio* and that Critognatus, like Vercingetorix in 7.71 by their defeatist approach, emphasized by the idea to resort to cannibalism and the elaborate metaphor, replete with alliteration in the final noun phrase, seem to forebode the impending disaster. Thanks to Caesar's *sermocinatio*, the reader is prepared for the Gallic defeat/Roman victory.

7.86 *imperat, si sustinere non posset, deductis cohortibus eruptione pugnet; id nisi necessario ne faciat. Ipse adit reliquos, cohortatur ne labori succumbant; omnium superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere.*

Caesar's last words before the battle are short, just like his speeches in book 2. To the brevity a prophetic tone is added, just as we will see is the case in Caesar's speech before the battle of Pharsalus in book 3 of the *BC*<sup>69</sup> (cf. discussion on chapters 3.85, 3.89 and 3.90 of the *BC*). Unlike Vercingetorix and Critognatus, he does not talk about himself: The hour is at hand, the time of talking is over he seems to say.

7.89 *Postero die Vercingetorix concilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatium, sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat, et quoniam sit fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint.*

After the defeat, Vercingetorix still talks about himself, but points out that he undertook the campaign for the sake of their common freedom, rather than for his own sake. All that remains for Vercingetorix and the Gauls now that the guaranteed victory failed to materialize is to yield to fortune. It might also be worth noticing the differences in Caesar's behaviour towards Vercingetorix and Ariovistus in book 1: Caesar never says a word to Vercingetorix, not even after he has been handed over. He clearly sees no need to dignify Vercingetorix with any words. The two barbarian kings are defeated, but the way Caesar deals with them differ greatly.

### 6.1.8 Book 8

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no. of words
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<sup>69</sup> Cf. also 7.27

<b>8.7</b>	<b>Spies of the Bellovaci</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>8.21</b>	<b>Gallic legates</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>8.22</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>8.48</b>	<b>Commius</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>8.50</b>	<b>Caesar's opponents</b>	<b>35</b>

Number of speeches: 5

Total number of words spoken: 345

Total number of words in Book VIII: 6300

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 1

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 65

8.7 *A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse, itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses, Atrebates; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in ulteriores silvas contulisse. Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent. Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita. Constituisset autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebei cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur; si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos.*

The two main adversaries of the Romans in book 8 are Correus and Commius. Just like Dumnorix in book 1<sup>70</sup>, they are both described as being driven by hatred of all things Roman (cf. 8.48). Hirtius thus seems to adapt the stock descriptions and characterisations used by Caesar.

8.21 *Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus. Adflictas opes equestri proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios caedis. Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse.*

8.22 *Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditioe esse perductos. Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent.*

The description of the Gauls in 8.7 and 8.48 follow the pattern established by Caesar and so does the only exchange where Caesar is involved in book 8: The Gauls plead for Caesar's mercy and he, in this case, however reluctantly, grants it<sup>71</sup>.

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<sup>70</sup> See 1.18

<sup>71</sup> Cf. discussion on 2.14-15

8.48 *Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus datis firmat; unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani.*

Mark Anthony indulges the request of Commius, on the grounds that this was based on legitimate fear (*iusto nasci timore*). Thus ends Caesar's campaigns in Gaul.

8.50 *insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragii valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset.*

In the final chapters of book 8 (chapters 49-55) Hirtius changes the focus from Gaul to the situation in Rome, which is clearly shown in this speech. The rhetoric however stays the same – Caesar's *honor* and *dignitas* is emphasized and his adversaries are described in terms previously used for the Gauls. As we shall see in chapter 6.2, Luca Grillo argues that in the *BC*, Caesar gives the traits of the Gauls to his Roman adversaries. So where Hirtius in the previous speeches looked to the *BG* for inspiration, he is now taking a leaf from the *BC*.

### **6.1.9 Summary of the results of the analysis of the excerpts from *De Bello Gallico***

A recap and overview of the raw data might be in order:

Book	No. of speeches	Total no. of words spoken	Total no. of words in the book	% of the book which consists of speeches	No. of speeches by Caesar
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1	40	3165	8200	35-40	14 <sup>72</sup>
2	17	940	4150	20-25	7
3	7	255	3600	5-10	0
4	17	605	4600	10-15	7
5	25	1090	7400	10-15	4
6	13	385	5500	5-10	4
7	48	2585	11500	20-25	12
8	5	345	6300	5-10	1
Total	172	9370	51250	avg: 15-20	49

What strikes me most is that there are so many speeches in book 1 and so few in books 3 and 6. Caesar does more talking in book 1 (approx. 1150 words) than in all the other books, including book 8, together (approx. 1100 words). Even in comparison with book 7, which is 40% longer, there are more words spoken in book 1. That Hirtius does not include as many speeches as Caesar is less surprising; as he wrote (or at least finished and published<sup>73</sup>) his supplement after Caesar's death he was probably more interested in relating what had happened (albeit with a pro-Caesarian slant) rather than adding any rhetorical flair to the narrative. What few speeches there are in book 8 seem closely modelled on the speeches in the previous books, and in the case of the speech in 8.50, as we shall see, on the speeches of the *BC*.

So, in terms of the number of speeches books 1 and 7 seem to merit a closer look<sup>74</sup>. When trying to analyse the speeches in book 1, it struck me that the phrases *populus*

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<sup>72</sup> Two of which through legates

<sup>73</sup> Welch (88) states that Hirtius produced book 8 in 44 BC, after Caesar's death, but suggests that it might be a reworking of an earlier draft and bases this assumption on "the bland portrait in [book 8] of Labienus" (104).

<sup>74</sup> For the relatively high number of speeches in book 5, please see my quote from Mutschler below on pp. 90-91.



*Romanus* and *senatus* seemed very frequent. A search for variations of the phrases *populus Romanus* and *senatus* gives this result:

Book	Occurrences of the phrase <i>populus Romanus</i> (or inflected variations thereof)	Occurrences of the word <i>senatus</i> (or inflected variations thereof) referring to the Roman senate <sup>75</sup>
1	46	11
2	10	1
3	1	0
4	8	2
5	9	0
6	2	1
7	4	2
8	3	10 <sup>76</sup>

Of the 46 occurrences of the phrase *populus Romanus* in book 1, 38 of these appear in speeches, and most notably in the build-up to the battle against Arivistus: in the speeches in chapters 1.34 – 1.45, *populus Romanus* is referred to no less than 24 times (12 times by Caesar and 12 times by Ariovistus). Wiseman notes the frequent occurrence of the phrase in book one (but has the count at 41 rather than 46<sup>77</sup>), but he fails to address why the frequency of the phrase is so dramatically different in book 1 compared to the other books. It seems to me that if, as Wiseman argues, Caesar’s purpose is to champion the cause of the *populares* he would make sure to mention the *populus Romanus* to the same extent throughout the *BG*, but this is not

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<sup>75</sup> There are a few rare occurrences where the word *senatus* refers to the leadership of a Gallic tribe, e.g. 5.54

<sup>76</sup> The 10 occurrences in book 8 all occur in the last four chapters where Hirtius turns his focus away from Gaul to the situation in Rome which would lead to the civil war.

<sup>77</sup> Wiseman states that there are 41 occurrences, but listed in the footnote are only 40 occurrences. Not included in Wiseman’s list are the occurrences of the phrase in 1.3 and 1.6 and the fact that the phrase occurs twice in 1.30 (not once), four times in 1.31 (not three times), twice in 1.33 (not once) and seven times in 1.44 (not six times).

the case. Nordling also comments on the frequency of the phrase *populus Romanus*: “After BG 1 there are few explicit links of this sort – not because Caesar breaks the link between himself and the Roman state after BG 1, but more probably because it is not in the author's best interests to hit his reader over the head with the presumed oneness between himself and the Roman state when the reader can be trusted to draw this conclusion on his own” (167). More plausible to me seems the possibility that Caesar is using the *populus Romanus* as a justification for being the aggressor. Once Caesar’s campaigns have won the approval of the readers, there is no longer any need for the justification. Worth noting in this context as well is the fact that *populus Romanus* is not mentioned after chapter 1.45, i.e. neither during the battle nor after it does Caesar see the need to invoke the name of the Roman people.

In the same way it seems Caesar wants to show that he is in the right; a search for the use of the word *ius* and *iniuria* yields the following result:

Book	Occurrences of the word <i>iniuria</i> (or inflections thereof)	Occurrences of the words <i>ius</i> , <i>iustus</i> , <i>iustitiae</i> (or inflections thereof)
1	15 <sup>78</sup>	8 <sup>79</sup>
2	3	1
3	1	1
4	1	1
5	3	1

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<sup>78</sup> 6 times the *iniurias* refer to the Helvetii, 4 times to Ariovistus. In 1.36 Ariovistus accuses Caesar of *iniuria*. In addition to this Caesar talks about avenging personal *iniurias* in 1.12 and in 1.20 Diviacus admits the *iniurias* of his brother, Dumnorix. Apart from these, the remaining mention of *iniuria* in book 1 is in chapter 1.9 and pertains to an agreement between the Helvetii and the Sequani and thus of less relevance in this context.

<sup>79</sup> The eight occurrences are all in the chapters 1.36-1.45 in the discussions between Caesar and Ariovistus (3 times in 1.36, twice in 1.43, twice in 1.44 and once in 1.45). Who is in the right is clearly important to Caesar.

6	4	4 <sup>80</sup>
7	2	7 <sup>81</sup>
8	0	5 <sup>82</sup>

The conclusion seems to be that Caesar in book 1 is very eager to establish that he is acting on behalf of the Roman people (and the senate) and that he is in the right. Both these themes are given a lot less focus in the other books. In the same sense, Caesar does not extol his own virtues to the same extent as he does in the big speech in 1.40 anywhere else; in the other books, he seems to content to point out his leniency and his swiftness.

There is further evidence of the aberrant character of book 1: Caesar sends deputies to Ariovistus to request a parley. This does not happen anywhere else in the *BG*. The reason why Ariovistus is treated with what could be described as unusual deference is of course because of the special status awarded to him by Caesar and the senate. When Caesar elsewhere in *BG* mentions *legatus* it is always in the sense of deputy or lieutenant-general, never legate or ambassador. Labienus is for example referred to as *legatus*, but he is never sent on any diplomatic missions, his tasks are strictly military. Variations of the phrase *legatos ad Caesarem miserunt/venerunt* with the purpose of surrendering, offering hostages, asking for help or the like are on the other hand very common. 9 times in book 1; 6 times in book 2; in book 3 where Caesar is largely absent from the "plot", the legates are sent to Galba and Crassus (once each); 9 times in book 4; 7 times in book 5; 5 times in

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<sup>80</sup> All the occurrences of *ius* and *iniuria*, with one exception in 6.10, appear in the digression in chapters 11-28.

<sup>81</sup> Only once does Caesar refer to "de iure belli" (7.41), the other occurrences (once in 7.33, twice in 7.37, once in 7.76 and twice in 7.77), all refer to Gallic laws.

<sup>82</sup> Twice the phrase "ius dicere" is used about Caesar (8.4 and 8.23), the other three occurrences appear in 8.50, 8.52 and 8.55, where Hirtius is referring to the wrong-doings of the Pompeians, where again Caesar is eager to show that he is in the right. See chapter 6.2 for more on this.

book 6; 6 times in book 7 and in book 8 5 times plus once to Marc Anthony. On a few occasions<sup>83</sup> Caesar does send messengers (*nuntii*) to the various tribes, but these are sent with the purpose of ordering them to do something or giving them an ultimatum. Caesar also extends this practice to tribes which are supposed to be his allies and in book 4, Caesar even goes so far as to say: *Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent* (4.13).

If Caesar's justifications of his actions are what set book 1 apart from the rest, the many reproduced speeches among the Gauls in book 7 stand out. In previous books the Gauls are of course allowed to speak, but with very few exceptions the party they are speaking to is Caesar or another Roman:

Book	Total no. of speeches	No. of speeches among Gauls, no Romans present
1	40	2
2	17	0
3	7	1
4	17	0
5	25	6
6	13	1
7	48	24
8	5	0

Given free rein the Gauls only seem to have two things on their mind: Victory will be easy and freedom will be eternal. The Gauls are not described as rounded characters, which is why the speeches become somewhat repetitive. To Caesar's

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<sup>83</sup> The only instances I have found are 1,26, 4.16, 6.34 and 7.41.

intended audience, this was probably of no importance<sup>84</sup>, just like a proper Hollywood film needs a villain, if the simile is allowed. What should be pointed out in this context is also: When Caesar relates a speech which he cannot have heard, it means he is using *sermocinatio*. This probably explains why Vercingetorix, for all his considerable influence and previous rhetorical mastery (e.g. the speech in 7.20 where he manages to turn the charge of treason into a unanimous declaration of confidence) delivers such a lousy speech in 7.71 before the final face-off with the Romans at Alesia. I strongly suspect that Caesar is distorting the truth here to put himself in a better light and the Gauls in a worse light.

So, to summarize the findings in *BG*, I cannot find any evidence in the *BG* in support of Rasmussen's theory of an "ansteigende Kurve"<sup>85</sup>, at least as far as the use of rhetorical features is concerned. It seems to me that books 1 and 7 stand out. I am therefore much more inclined to agree with Mutschler:

Da die Vernichtung des Sabinus und des Cotta, der Überfall der Sugambrier auf das Lager Ciceros und die Niederlage bei Gergovia auch objektiv gesehen die drei für die Römer unglücklichsten und verlustreichsten Ereignisse während des Gallischen Krieges waren, kann man also sagen, daß Caesar innerhalb des *BG* da am intensivsten auf den Leser Einfluß zu nehmen sucht, wo die Erreichung des einen und im *BG* vorrangigen seiner Darstellungsziele, "to show that he was successful", am meisten gefährdet ist. (238)

I would perhaps go even further and state that Caesar, by means of rhetorical finery, tries to gloss over the weak spots in his narrative, therefore the rhetoric is more abundant in book 1, especially in 1.13-14 and in 1.43 because Caesar wants to give himself the right to be the aggressor, and in books 5 and 7, as Mutschler mentions, to cover up the dire straits he was in.

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<sup>84</sup> I find Grillo's quote (106, n.3) from Vasaly quite fitting in this context: "no Roman orator ever came to grief overestimating his audience's prejudices toward ethnic minorities".

<sup>85</sup> Cf. p. 9

## 6.2 De Bello Civili

This chapters contains an analysis of the three books of the *BC*. The analysis of the results follows in chapter 6.3, which also includes a comparison with the results from the analysis of the *BG*. It should also be noted that Rasmussen, Mutschler and Grillo cover many of the rhetorical features in the speeches, so the focus in the analysis will be on aspects and themes they have not already discussed, but also on parallels and similarities to the *BG*.

### 6.2.1. Book 1

<b>Chapter</b>	<b>Speaker</b>	<b>Approx no. of words</b>
<b>1.1</b>	<b>Lentulus</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>1.1</b>	<b>Scipio</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>1.2</b>	<b>Marcellus</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>1.2</b>	<b>Calidius</b>	<b>30</b>
1.3	Pompeius	20
1.6	Pompeius	40
<b>1.7</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>160</b>
<b>1.7</b>	<b>Caesar's soldiers</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>1.8</b>	<b>Pompeius, through L. Caesar</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>1.9</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>170</b>
1.10	The consuls (Lentulus and Marcellus) and Pompeius	30
1.13	The decurions at Auximum	35
1.17	Domitius, through messenger	30
1.19	Domitius	15
1.19	Pompeius	30
<b>1.20</b>	<b>Domitius's soldiers</b>	<b>30</b>

1.20	Domitius's soldiers	15
<b>1.22</b>	<b>Lentulus</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>1.22</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>1.22</b>	<b>Lentulus</b>	<b>20</b>
1.23	Caesar	15
1.24	Caesar, through N. Magius, Pompeius's chief engineer	40
1.26	Caesar, through Caninius Rebilus	50
<b>1.30</b>	<b>Cato</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>1.32</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>190</b>
1.33	Pompeius	15
<b>1.35</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>30</b>
1.35	The Massilians	70
<b>1.64</b>	<b>Caesar's soldiers, through the centurions and tribunes</b>	<b>20</b>
1.66	Scouts, from Caesar's and Afranius's and Petreius's camps	25
<b>1.67</b>	<b>Participants at the council in Afranius's and Petreius's camp</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>1.71</b>	<b>Caesar's legates, tribunes and centurions</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>1.72</b>	<b>Caesar's soldiers</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>1.74</b>	<b>Soldiers in Petreius's and Afranius's camp</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>1.76</b>	<b>Petreius</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>1.84</b>	<b>Afranius</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>1.85</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>340</b>
1.87	Caesar	30

Number of speeches: 37

Total number of words spoken: 2,090

Total number of words in Book I: 10,900

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 15-20

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 10, of which 2 through legates/messengers

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 1065

1.1 *L. Lentulus consul senatu rei[que] publicae se non defuturum pollicetur, si audacter ac fortiter sententias dicere velint; sin Caesarem respiciant atque eius gratiam sequantur, ut superioribus fecerint temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum neque senatus auctoritati obtemperaturum: habere se quoque ad Caesaris gratiam atque amicitiam receptum. In eandem sententiam loquitur Scipio: Pompeio esse in animo rei publicae non deesse, si senatus sequatur; si cunctetur atque agat lenius, nequiquam eius auxilium, si postea velit, senatum imploraturum.*

Just like Vercingetorix's speech in *BG* 7.29 this speech is delivered by one of Caesar's enemies and meant to criticize Caesar, but it is cleverly constructed (from Caesar's point of view) to mention positive traits in connection to Caesar: *lenis*, *gratia* (twice) and *amicitia*.<sup>86</sup> The actions of the Pompeians on the other hand are introduced with negations: *non defuturum*, *neque...obtemperaturum*, *non deesse*.

1.2 *ut primo M. Marcellus, ingressus in eam orationem, non oportere ante de ea re ad senatum referri, quam dilectus tota Italia habiti et exercitus conscripti essent, quo praesidio tuto et libere senatus, quae vellet, discernere auderet; ut M. Calidius, qui censebat, ut Pompeius in suas provincias proficisceretur, ne qua esset armorum causa: timere Caesarem ereptis ab eo duabus legionibus, ne ad eius periculum reservare et retinere eas ad urbem Pompeius videretur.*

Caesar is no stranger to using emotive language in *BG*, in particular in books 1,5 and 7, but it seems as if he sharpens the tone in *BC*. An example of this can be found in this speech: Caesar expresses fear. Caesar is the subject of the verb *timere* 4 times in book 1 and 7 times in book 3. In the whole of *BG* this occurs only once (7.56). The senate is also described as fearful<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> For the inherent contradictions in Lentulus's speech, see Batstone & Damon, pp 44-45.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. also Batstone & Damon, 123-25 and 193, n.7



1.7 Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in re publica introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis votaretur atque opprimeretur, quae superioribus annis [sine] armis esset restituta. Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen intercessionem liberam reliquisse. Pompeium, qui amissa restituisse videatur bona etiam, quae ante habuerint, ademisse. Quotiescumque sit decretum, darent operam magistratus, ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet, qua voce et quo senatus consulto populus Romanus ad arma sit vocatus, factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia, in secessione populi templis locisque editoribus occupatis: atque haec superioris aetatis exempla expiata Saturnini atque Gracchorum casibus docet; quarum rerum illo tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem. nulla lex promulgata, non cum populo agi coeptum, nulla secessio facta. Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. Conclamant legionis XIII, quae aderat, milites – hanc enim initio tumultus evocaverat, reliquae nondum convenerant – sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere.

Caesar speaks to his soldiers. That he extols his own virtues and criticizes the Pompeians is hardly surprising, but it is worth noting how strongly he attacks Pompey; he is described as even worse than Sulla: *Sullam...tamen...Pompeium...etiam*. Pompey's actions are further emphasized by *annominatio*: *amissa...ademisse*. Contemporary readers would have been well aware of the implications of this, as the Sullan proscriptions still were fresh in many people's minds. Caesar here also introduces a dichotomy between old and new, where the Pompeians are described as introducing *novum exemplum* and Caesar puts himself forward as the protector of the old traditions. Worth noting is also that Caesar, for all his later talk of wanting nothing but peace, is coming across as quite belligerent here, although

of course clothed in the terms of defending his honour and righting the wrongs of the Pompeians. The word *pax* is for example not mentioned.

1.8 *habere se a Pompeio ad eum privati officii mandata demonstrat: velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea, quae rei publicae causa egerit, in suam contumeliam vertat. Semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis, ut, cum illis nocere se speret, rei publicae noceat. Pauca eiusdem generis addit cum excusatione Pompei coniuncta.*

1.9 *petit ab utroque, quoniam Pompei mandata ad se detulerint, ne graventur sua quoque ad eum postulata deferre, si parvo labore magnas controversias tollere atque omnem Italiam metu liberare possint. Sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaque potioem. Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur, ereptoque semenstri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset. Tamen hanc iacturam honoris sui rei publicae causa aequo animo tulisse; cum litteras ad senatum miserit, ut omnes ab exercitibus discederent, ne id quidem impetravisse. Tota Italia delectus haberi, retineri legiones II, quae ab se simulatione Parthici belli sint abductae, civitatem esse in armis. Quonam haec omnia nisi ad suam perniciem pertinere? Sed tamen ad omnia se descendere paratum atque omnia pati rei publicae causa. Proficiscatur Pompeius in suas provincias, ipsi exercitus dimittant, discedant in Italia omnes ab armis, metus e civitate tollatur, libera comitia atque omnis res publica senatui populoque Romano permittatur. Haec quo facilius certisque condicionibus fiant et iureiurando sanciantur, aut ipse propius accedat aut se patiat accedere: fore uti per colloquia omnes controversiae componantur.*

Pompey (through L. Caesar) and Caesar have a competition about who loves the republic more, where they both contrast their personal honour with what is best for the republic. Caesar wins and the fact that he says he will endure anything for the republic, but refuses to accept the terms of the Pompeians, ties in with his speech

to the soldiers in 1.7: Caesar's case here is that the Pompeians do not represent the republic, a theme he will expound on throughout the *BC*, where the Pompeians are described as a tiny minority (cf. 1.22, 1.35, 1.85, 2.21). The fear mentioned in 1.2 and alluded to in 1.7 is now made more explicit through the mention of *metus*, twice. As an aside, the phrase *nocere se speret* in 1.8 would probably have been pleasing to the ears of the Roman readers and listeners with its alliteration and assonance.

1.20 *inter se per tribunos militum centurionesque atque honestissimos sui generis colloquuntur: obsideri se a Caesare, opera munitionesque prope esse perfectas; ducem suum Domitium, cuius spe atque fiducia permanserint, proiectis omnibus fugae consilium capere: debere se suae salutis rationem habere.*

1.22 *Cum eo de salute sua [agit], orat atque obsecrat, ut sibi parcat, veteremque amicitiam commemorat Caesarisque in se beneficia exponit; quae erant maxima: quod per eum in collegium pontificum venerat, quod provinciam Hispaniam ex praetura habuerat, quod in petitione consulatus erat sublevatus. Cuius orationem Caesar interpellat: se non maleficii causa ex provincia egressum, sed uti se a contumeliis inimicorum defenderet, ut tribunos plebis in ea re ex civitate expulsos in suam dignitatem restitueret, et se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret. Cuius oratione confirmatus Lentulus, ut in oppidum reverti liceat, petit: quod de sua salute impetraverit, fore etiam reliquis ad suam spem solatio; adeo esse perterritos nonnullos, ut suae vitae durius consulere cogantur.*

In 1.20 Caesar is careful to exonerate the soldiers and put the blame on the Pompeian officers; the many are contrasted with the few, a pattern which will also recur in 1.35 and 1.85. Furthermore, both Lentulus in 1.22 and, to a certain extent, Ahenobarbus in 1.20 display the same selfishness as Vercingetorix in 7.61 – note the many occurrences of *se* and *suum*<sup>88</sup>. Lentulus plea for mercy constitutes another

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<sup>88</sup> Grillo, pp. 110-121 convincingly argues that Caesar gives the Pompeians traits which he had used in the *BG* to describe Gauls and Germans.

example of emotive language. It also comes across as very weak – Caesar cleverly uses it to show that he has already been extremely generous towards Lentulus and now he has the temerity to expect Caesar to repay the lack of gratitude by sparing him.

1.30 *Quibus rebus paene perfectis adventu Curionis cognito queritur in contione sese proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio, qui omnibus rebus imparatissimis non necessarium bellum suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset.*

Just like in 1.22 Caesar uses the words of his opponents to work in his favour. In this case, Curio's arrival in Sicily provides Caesar with the opportunity to show dissent in the enemy camp, given extra punch by the antitheton in *parata – imparatissimus*. Caesar's old arch-enemy Cato is portrayed as a coward (the chapters ends with the words *haec in contione questus ex provincia fugit*) and then, apart from a quick mention in 1.32, he disappears completely from the narrative<sup>89</sup>.

1.32 *Coacto senatu iniurias inimicorum commemorat. Docet se nullum extraordinarium honorem appetisse, sed exspectato legitimo tempore consulatus eo fuisse contentum, quod omnibus civibus pateret. Latum ab X tribunis plebis contradicentibus inimicis, Catone vero acerrime repugnante et pristina consuetudine dicendi mora dies extrahente, ut sui ratio absentis haberetur, ipso consule Pompeio; qui si improbasset, cur ferri passus esset? Si probasset, cur se uti populi beneficio prohibuisset? Patientiam proponit suam, cum de exercitibus dimittendis ultro postulavisset; in quo iacturam dignitatis atque honoris ipse facturus esset. Acerbitatem inimicorum docet, qui, quod ab altero postularent, in se recusarent, atque omnia permisceri mallent, quam imperium exercitusque dimittere. Iniuriam in eripiendis legionibus praedicat, crudelitatem et insolentiam in circumscribendis*

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<sup>89</sup> Grillo, pp. 43-45, calls this an attempt at *damnatio memoriae* of Cato on Caesar's part, an attempt which failed, as Cato became stuff of legends after his suicide.

*tribunis plebis; condiciones a se latas, expetita colloquia et denegata commemorat. Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat, ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum administrent. Sin timore defugiant, illis se oneri non futurum et per se rem publicam administraturum. Legatos ad Pompeium de compositione mitti oportere, neque se reformidare, quod in senatu Pompeius paulo ante dixisset, ad quos legati mitterentur, his auctoritatem attribui timoremque eorum, qui mitterent significari. Tenuis atque infirmi haec animi videri. Se vero, ut operibus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate velle superare.*

Caesar uses emotive language again and sets out his credentials as a *vir bonus* in possession of *patientia, dignitas, honor, iustitia* and *equitas*, in stark contrast to the *acerbitas, crudelitas* and *insolentia* of his enemies. Grillo (111-117) refer to this as “the barbarization of the enemy”. There are also some distinct echoes to Caesar’s speech in BG 1.40 where the traits ascribed to Caesar and the Romans are *virtus, diligentia, constantia* and *innocentia*. The use of the phrase *omnia permisceri*<sup>90</sup> and the criticism which follows can be seen as a reference to the *novum exemplum* in 1.7.

1.35 *Evocat ad se Caesar Massilia XV primos; cum his agit, ne initium inferendi belli a Massiliensibus oriatur: debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare. Reliqua, quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur, commemorat.*

The phrase *ne initium inferendi belli a Massiliensibus oriatur* is interesting because of its inaccuracy. In 1.16 Caesar’s soldiers fight with Domitius’s soldiers, so technically the war has already started. Furthermore, in 1.29 Caesar states *ita saepius rem frustra temptatam Caesar aliquando dimittendam sibi iudicat et de bello agendum*. Caesar seems to imply that the Massilians even considering supporting

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<sup>90</sup> Cf. Batstone & Damon, p. 55.

Pompey is mind-boggling and he hopes to set their minds right – *sanandas mentes*. Again the fact that his opponents are a small minority, in this case reduced to only one man, Pompey, is emphasized and contrasted with the whole of Italy.

1.64 *Totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum necessario longius duci; centuriones tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare, ut per eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen, qua traductus esset equitatus.*

In 1.7 Caesar's soldiers declare they are ready to defend Caesar's honour. Here they go one step further, just like in *BG* 7.17 and 7.19 where they state *nullam ignominiam acciperent* and *nullum pro sua laude periculum recusant*. At these two crucial stages in the narrative, before the siege of Avaricum in book 7 of the *BG*, where Caesar actually offer to withdraw if the soldiers find the task too arduous, and here before the first proper battle against Pompey's troop, Caesar is eager to show that it is the soldiery and not he that provides the impetus for the actions which follow.

1.67 *Disputatur in consilio a Petreio atque Afranio et tempus projectionis quaeritur. Plerique censebant, ut noctu iter facerent: posse prius ad angustias veniri, quam sentiretur. Alii, quod pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris, argumenti sumebant loco non posse clam exiri. Circumfundi noctu equitatum Caesaris atque omnia loca atque itinera obsidere; nocturnaue proelia esse vitanda, quod perterritus miles in civili dissensione timori magis quam religioni consulere consuerit. At lucem multum per se  pudorem omnium oculis, multum etiam tribunorum militum et centurionum praesentiam afferre; quibus rebus coerceri milites et in officio contineri soleant. Quare omni ratione esse interdium perrumpendum: etsi aliquo accepto detrimento, tamen summa exercitus salva locum, quem petant, capi posse. Haec vincit in consilio sententia, et prima luce postridie constituunt proficisci.*

Whereas Caesar have to reign in his soldiers who are eager for their commander to give the signal for battle, the Pompeians are struggling and talking about forcing their terrified soldiers to stick to their duties.

1.71 *Concurrebant legati, centuriones tribunique militum: ne dubitaret proelium committere; omnium esse militum paratissimos animos. Afranianos contra multis rebus summi timoris signa misisse: quod suis non subvenissent, quod de colle non decederent, quod vix equitum incursus sustinerent collatisque in unum locum signis conferti neque ordines neque signa servarent. Quod si iniquitatem loci timeret, datum iri tamen aliquo loco pugnandi facultatem, quod certe inde decedendum esset Afranio nec sine aqua permanere posset.*

This continues the theme from 1.64 and stands in stark contrast to Cato's complaint (*imparatissimis*) in 1.30 and the problems facing Afranius and Petreius in 1.67.

1.72 *milites vero palam inter se loquebantur, quoniam talis occasio victoriae dimitteretur, etiam cum vellet Caesar, sese non esse pugnatuos.*

1.74 *Quorum discessu liberam nacti milites colloquiorum facultatem vulgo procedunt, et quem quisque in [Caesaris] castris notum aut municipem habebat conquirat atque evocat. Primum agunt gratias omnes omnibus, quod sibi perterritis pridie pepercissent: eorum se beneficio vivere. Deinde imperatoris fide quaerunt, rectene se illi sint commissuri, et quod non ab initio fecerint armaque quod cum hominibus necessariis et consanguineis contulerint, queruntur. His provocati sermonibus fidem ab imperatore de Petreii atque Afranii vita petunt, ne quod in se scelus concepisse neu suos prodidisse videantur. Quibus confirmatis rebus se statim signa translatuos confirmant legatosque de pace primorum ordinum centuriones ad Caesarem mittunt.*

Caesar does not want to do battle, a strategy which in 1.72 is very unpopular with the soldiers. Whereas it makes perfect strategic sense in book 7 of the *BG* to encourage the soldiers' fighting spirit, Caesar's agenda is obviously different here

and his restraint pays off: In 1.74 the mood changes dramatically and amidst the general rejoicing they all thank each other; when the soldiers of Afranius and Petreius say *eorum se beneficio vivere*, the reader knows that it is thanks to Caesar and Caesar only that they are alive.

1.76 *Quibus rebus confectis flens Petreius manipulos circumit militesque appellat, neu se neu Pompeium, absentem imperatorem suum, adversariis ad supplicium tradant, obsecrat. [...] Postulat, ut iurent omnes se exercitum ducesque non deserturos neque prodituros neque sibi separatim a reliquis consilium capturos.*

1.84 *Audiente utroque exercitu loquitur Afranius: non esse aut ipsis aut militibus suscensendum, quod fidem erga imperatorem suum Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint. Sed satis iam fecisse officio satisque supplicii tulisse perpessos omnium rerum inopiam; nunc vero paene ut feras circummunitos prohiberi aqua, prohiberi ingressu, neque corpore dolorem neque animo ignominiam ferre posse. Itaque se victos confiteri; orare atque obsecrare, si qui locus misericordiae relinquatur, ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeat. Haec quam potest demississime et subiectissime exponit.*

Grillo (60-65) shows that the Pompeians breaking their oaths is a recurring theme, a trait they share with the Gauls (cf. BG 5.27). In this case, Afranius and Petreius, who in 1.76 force the soldiers to take an oath not to take any measures for their own safety, here ask for a *colloquium* with Caesar, if possible, in a place where the soldiers cannot hear them. Caesar of course refuses. It is also worth contrasting the pitiful appeal of Afranius with the fighting spirit of Caesar's soldiers in 3.49<sup>91</sup> where they say they will resort to eating the bark of the trees rather than letting Pompey get away.

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<sup>91</sup> *crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur, prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros.*



1.85 Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partis vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: [se] qui etiam bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, conflagrare noluerit, ut quam integerrima essent **ad pacem** omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservavit et texerit; illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partis in misericordia constituisse: ipsos duces **a pace** abhorruisse; eos neque colloqui neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse. Accidisse igitur his, quod plerumque hominum nimia **pertinacia** atque **arrogantia** accidere soleat, uti eo recurrant et id cupidissime petant, quod paulo ante contempserint. Neque nunc se illorum humilitate neque aliqua temporis opportunitate postulare, quibus rebus opes augeantur suae; sed eos exercitus, quos contra se multos iam annos aluerint, velle dimitti. Neque enim sex legiones alia de causa missas in Hispaniam septimamque ibi conscriptam neque tot tantasque classes paratas neque submissos duces rei militaris peritos. Nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil ad usum provinciae provisum, quae propter diuturnitatem pacis nullum auxilium desiderarit.

// Omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annis obtineat; in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur; in se aetatis excusationem nihil valere, quin superioribus bellis probati ad obtinendos exercitus evocentur; in se uno non servari, quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus, ut rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore aliquo aut certe sine ignominia domum revertantur exercitumque dimittant. Quae tamen omnia et se tulisse patienter et esse laturum; // neque nunc id agere, ut ab illis abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod tamen sibi difficile non sit, sed ne illi habeant, quo contra se uti possint. Proinde, ut esset dictum, provinciis excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se nociturum nemini. Hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem.

After Afranius and Petreius have finally surrendered Caesar delivers a speech full of emotive language. It is almost as if he is getting rid of pent up anger. The contrast between the many (Caesar, his soldiers, the soldiers from the other camp) and the few (Afranius and Petreius, the Pompeian commanders) is repeated from previous speeches, just like the complaint about *novi generis imperia*<sup>92</sup>. In the same sense the antitheton in *ad pacem* and *a pace* serves to further emphasize the differences between Caesar and his enemies. The many repetition of *nihil* and *neque* give the speech the character of a relentless attack on an enemy who has caused Caesar so much grief<sup>93</sup>. The fact that he still says he will spare them in the end obviously adds credence to his talks of clemency and leniency. Worth noticing is also that the speech consists of two parts (I have marked the digression with //).<sup>94</sup> Caesar changes the topic, from the current situation to a lament of the whole campaign against him, before he finishes his speech with his very reasonable conditions for peace.

### 6.2.2 Book 2

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no of words
<b>2.12</b>	<b>“the enemy” (the Massilians)</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>2.13</b>	<b>Caesar, via dispatch</b>	<b>20</b>
2.17	Varro	40
2.18	Varro	20
<b>2.21</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>35</b>
2.27	Two Marsic centurions from Curio’s camp who desert to Varus	20

<sup>92</sup> Cf. chapter 1.7

<sup>93</sup> Batstone & Damon (121) refer to this as the “rejected negative”.

<sup>94</sup> For more on this speech and Afranius’s speech in the preceding chapter, see Grillo 80-91 and 160-64.

2.28	Quintilius	55
<b>2.30</b>	<b>Participants in the council of war in Curio's camp</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>*2.31</b>	<b>Curio</b>	<b>200</b>
<b>*2.32</b>	<b>Curio</b>	<b>410</b>
<b>2.33</b>	<b>Curio's soldiers</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>*2.34</b>	<b>Rebilus</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>2.34</b>	<b>Curio</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>2.38</b>	<b>Deserters from the town of Utica</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>*2.39</b>	<b>Curio</b>	<b>35</b>
2.40	Saburra	20
2.42	Curio	15

Number of speeches: 17

Total number of words spoken: 1095

Total number of words in Book II: 6400

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 15-20

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 2

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 55

2.12 *Ubi hostes ad legatos exercitumque pervenerunt, universi se ad pedes proiciunt; orant, ut adventus Caesaris exspectetur: captam suam urbem videre: opera perfecta, turrim subrutam; itaque ab defensione desistere. Nullam exoriri moram posse, quominus, cum venisset, si imperata non facerent ad nutum, e vestigio diriperentur. Docent, si omnino turris concidisset, non posse milites contineri, quin spe praedae in urbem irrumperent urbemque delerent. Haec atque eiusdem generis complura ut ab hominibus doctis magna cum misericordia fletuque pronuntiantur.*

2.13 *Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat, ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui et diutino labore omnes puberes interficerent*

At this stage Caesar's clemency is so well-known that the mention of his name seems to be enough. Caesar is at pains to convey this image of himself and just as he does in 1.72 he shows that his decision makes him unpopular with his soldiers. In this case, his leniency will be abused by the Massilians who break the truce and thus cause his soldiers more grief, which goes some way to proving that Caesar is willing to back up his claim in 1.9: *omnia pati rei publicae causa*.

2.21 *Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus Romanis, quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere; Hispanis, quod praesidia expulissent; Gaditanis, quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque in libertatem vindicassent; tribunis militum centurionibusque, qui eo praesidii causa venerant, quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmassent.*

Caesar's emphasis on *omnis* continues. Just as in 1.22, 1.74 and 1.85 the reader is left with the impression that nearly everyone was on Caesar's side. Regarding the use of *virtus*, which in the above speech seems to extend from the military tribunes and the centurions to *omnes*, including the Spanish and the people of Gades: Gallo (54-55) interestingly points out that *virtus* is never ascribed to Romans fighting against Caesar in the BC, only to the Gauls allied with Pompey; in the BG Caesar sees no problems with describing the Gauls as having *virtus*.

2.30 *Quibus de causis consilio convocato de summa rerum deliberare incipit. Erant sententiae, quae conandum omnibus modis castraque Vari oppugnanda censerent, quod [in] huiusmodi militum consiliis otium maxime contrarium esse arbitrarentur; postremo praestare dicebant per virtutem in pugna belli fortunam experiri, quam desertos et circumventos ab suis gravissimum supplicium perpeti. Erant, qui censerent de tertia vigilia in castra Cornelia recedendum, ut maiore spatio temporis*

*interiecto militum mentes sanarentur, simul, si quid gravius accidisset, magna multitudine navium et tutius et facilius in Siciliam receptus daretur.*

In chapter 2.23 the “Curio section” starts, perhaps the most rhetorically dense part of all of the *BG* and the *BC*. Much has been written about the speeches and to Mutschler’s thorough analysis of this section there are only a few comments to add. On pp. 100-110 Mutschler shows how Caesar uses a register and vocabulary which “nicht durchgehend von dem Stilideal schlichter Sachlichkeit bestimmt ist” (110). This could be said to start with the very first sentence of this section: *et iam ab initio copias P. Atti Vari despiciens* (2.23). In 2.27 – 2.29 some soldiers desert Curio, which Varus, one of Pompey’s commanders, tries to exploit to entice more soldiers to follow suit. In 2.30 Curio summons a council to deal with the situation. In 1.35 Caesar uses the phrase *quae ad eorum sanandas mentes pertinere arbitrabatur* about the Massilians, but fails. The reader thus knows that it is highly unlikely that Curio will succeed where Caesar himself does not; although Curio’s speech to the soldiers in 2.32 does instill them with the will to fight, the reaction of the soldiers in chapter 2.33 (see below) is not overly positive.

2.31 *Curio utrumque improbens consilium, quantum alteri sententiae deesset animi, tantum alteri superesse dicebat: hos turpissimae fugae rationem habere, illos etiam iniquo loco dimicandum putare. "Qua enim," inquit, "fiducia et opere et natura loci munitissima castra expugnari posse confidimus? Aut vero quid proficimus, si accepto magno detrimento ab oppugnatione castrorum discedimus? Quasi non et felicitas rerum gestarum exercitus benevolentiam imperatoribus et res adversae odia concilient! Castrorum autem mutatio quid habet nisi turpem fugam et desperationem omnium et alienationem exercitus? Nam neque prudentes suspicari oportet sibi parum credi, neque improbos scire sese timeri, quod illis licentiam timor augeat noster, his [suspicio] studia deminuat. Quod si iam," inquit, "haec explorata habeamus, quae de exercitus alienatione dicuntur, quae quidem ego aut omnino falsa aut certe minora opinione esse confido, quanto haec dissimulari et occultari, quam per nos confirmari praestet? An non, uti corporis vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda sunt tegenda, ne spem*

*adversariis augeamus? At etiam, ut media nocte proficiscamur, addunt, quo maiorem, credo, licentiam habeant, qui peccare conentur. Namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur; quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Quare neque tanti sum animi, ut sine spe castra oppugnanda censeam, neque tanti timoris, uti spe deficiam, atque omnia prius experienda arbitror magnaue ex parte iam me una vobiscum de re iudicium facturum confido."*

Just like the Pompeians in 1.67, Curio expresses his worry about the detrimental effect darkness will have on the morale of the soldiers. This is clearly not a good sign<sup>95</sup>. Curio's comment about how the commander can win the confidence and goodwill of the soldiers echoes Caesar's comment in his big speech to the soldiers in 1.40<sup>96</sup>. The speech which Curio then delivers in 2.32 (see below) also show distinct similarities to Caesar's big speech: The purpose of both speeches is to boost the morale of the troops and the reaction of the soldiers after the speech is recorded in both instances. As we will see below, there are, however, also some important differences, which explain why Caesar succeeds and Curio ultimately fails.

*2.32 Dimisso consilio contionem advocat militum. Commemorat, quo sit eorum usus studio ad Corfinium Caesar, ut magnam partem Italiae beneficio atque auctoritate eorum suam fecerit. "Vos enim vestrumque factum omnia," inquit, "deinceps municipia sunt secuta, neque sine causa et Caesar amicissime de vobis et illi gravissime iudicaverunt. Pompeius enim nullo proelio pulsus vestri facti praeiudicio demotus Italia excessit; Caesar me, quem sibi carissimum habuit, provinciam Siciliam atque Africam, sine quibus urbem atque Italiam tueri non potest, vestrae fidei commisit. At sunt, qui vos hortentur, ut a nobis desciscatis. Quid enim est illis optatius, quam uno tempore et nos circumvenire et vos nefario scelere obstringere? aut quid irati gravius de vobis sentire possunt, quam ut eos prodatis, qui se vobis omnia debere iudicant,*

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<sup>95</sup> See Gallo 46-49 for a comparison of the two situations

<sup>96</sup> *scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam.*

in eorum potestatem veniatis, qui se per vos perisse existimant? An vero in Hispania res gestas Caesaris non audistis? duos pulsos exercitus, duos superatos duces, duas receptas provincias? haec acta diebus XL, quibus in conspectum adversariorum venerit Caesar? An, qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt, perditi resistant? vos autem incerta victoria Caesarem secuti **diiudicata iam belli fortuna** victum sequamini, cum vestri officii praemia percipere debeatis? Desertos enim se ac proditos a vobis dicunt et prioris sacramenti mentionem faciunt. Vosne vero L. Domitium, an vos Domitius deseruit? Nonne extremam pati fortunam paratos proiecit ille? nonne sibi clam vobis salutem fuga petivit? non proditi per illum Caesaris beneficio estis conservati? Sacramento quidem vos tenere qui potuit, cum proiectis fascibus et deposito imperio privatus et captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem? Relinquitur nova religio, ut eo neglecto sacramento, quo tenemini, respiciatis illud, quod deditione ducis et capitis deminutione sublatum est. At, credo, si Caesarem probatis, in me offenditis. Qui de meis in vos meritis praedicaturus non sum, quae sunt adhuc et mea voluntate et vestra exspectatione leviora; sed tamen sui laboris milites semper eventu belli praemia petiverunt, qui qualis sit futurus, ne vos quidem dubitatis: diligentiam quidem nostram aut, quem ad finem adhuc res processit, fortunam cur praeteream? An poenitet vos, quod salvum atque incolumem exercitum nulla omnino nave desiderata traduxerim? quod classem hostium primo impetu adveniens profligaverim? quod his per biduum equestri proelio superaverim? quod ex portu sinuque adversariorum CC naves oneratas abduxerim eoque illos compulerim, ut neque pedestri itinere neque navibus com meatu iuvare possint? Hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis Corfiniensem ignominiam, Italiae fugam, Hispaniarum deditionem, **Africi belli praeiudicia**, sequimini! Equidem me Caesaris militem dici volui, vos me imperatoris nomine appellavistis. Cuius si vos poenitet, vestrum vobis beneficium remitto, mih meum nomen restituite, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini."

It seems to me that Curio in his speech makes three major mistakes. Firstly, where Caesar in his speeches and actions is striving towards unity, whether real or propagandistic, and repeatedly emphasizes that *omnes* are on his side, Curio here constructs a plethora of seemingly opposing forces, which is given extra emphasis

through the abundant use of pronouns, peaking in *vestrum vobis...mihi meum* in the last sentence. There are 24 variations of *vos* or *vester* but only 3 variations of *nos* and *noster*, seemingly creating a divide, where Curio should rather have striven for unity. Secondly, just like Petreius in 1.76, Curio introduces a *nova religio*. Adopting the strategy of an already vanquished enemy and in addition thereto Caesar's aversion towards all things *novae* does not bode well for Curio. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, Curio is guilty of hubris on two counts (see underlined and in bold). Unlike Caesar who never crosses the line from confidence to hubris, Curio talks as if victory is certain. Considering his less assertive stance in the previous chapter this rings hollow to the reader, and the soldiers response in 2.33 (see below) is less than rapturous. It should also be noted that Curio in this speech refers to news of Caesar's victories in Spain, news which will not reach the camp until 2.37.<sup>97</sup>

2.33 *Qua oratione permoti milites crebro etiam dicentem interpellabant, ut magno cum dolore infidelitatis suspicionem sustinere viderentur, discedentem vero ex contione universi cohortantur, magno sit animo, neubi dubitet proelium committere et suam fidem virtutemque experiri.*

Whereas Caesar's speech in BG 1.40 is greeted by the soldiers with *alacritas and cupiditas belli gerendi*, Curio's speech is received with heavy hearts. The phrase *magno sit animo, neubi dubitet* also sounds more like an attempt to comfort Curio than a unanimous battle cry. The premonition in this short speech is heavy, with words like *dolor, infidelitas, suspicio* and *dubito*.

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<sup>97</sup> This is apparently a slip-up on Caesar's part which, together with i.a. the references to the disaster at Curicta, which is not described in the BG (cf. chapter 3.10 and Batstone & Damon, p. 191, n.9) shows that Caesar left the BC in an unfinished state..



2.34 "perterritum," inquit, "hostem vides, Curio: quid dubitas uti temporis opportunitate?" Ille unum elocutus, ut memoria tenerent milites ea, quae pridie sibi confirmassent, sequi se iubet et praecurrit ante omnes.

Curio's rashness is encouraged by Rebilus and just like in 2.33 the word *dubito* is used. Curio does win this battle, but it only serves to increase his hubris.

2.38 *probatisque consiliis ex perfugis quibusdam oppidanis audit Iubam revocatum finitimo bello et controversiis Leptitanorum restitisse in regno et Saburram, eius praefectum, cum mediocribus copiis missum Uticae appropinquare.*

2.39 *e captivis quaerit, quis castris ad Bagradam praesit: respondent Saburram. Reliqua studio itineris conficiendi quaerere praetermittit proximaque respiciens signa, "videtisne," inquit, "milites, captivorum orationem cum perfugis convenire? abesse regem, exiguas esse copias missas, quae paucis equitibus pares esse non potuerint? Proinde ad praedam, ad gloriam properate, ut iam de praemiis vestris et de referenda gratia cogitare incipiamus."*

By this stage Curio's over-confidence knows no bounds. He only hears what he wants to hear, and foolishly listens to unreliable sources. Readers of the *BG* knows that no good will ever come of this (cf. *BG* 5.28). In less than two chapters Curio's fate will be sealed and he dies fighting, paying the ultimate price for his rashness and thus ends book 2.<sup>98</sup>

### 6.2.3 Book 3

Chapter	Speaker	Approx. no of words

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<sup>98</sup> See Grillo, 172, for an interesting theory on why Caesar chooses to end book 2 with Curio's death.

<b>3.6</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>3.6</b>	<b>Caesar's soldiers</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>3.10</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>180</b>
3.13	Labienus	10
<b>3.16</b>	<b>Libo</b>	<b>100</b>
3.17	Caesar	75
<b>*3.18</b>	<b>Pompeius</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>3.19</b>	<b>Caesar, through P. Vatinius</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>3.19</b>	<b>Aulus Varro</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>*3.19</b>	<b>Labienus</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>3.45</b>	<b>Pompeius</b>	<b>20</b>
3.49	Caesar's soldiers	10
3.53	Caesar	20
<b>3.57</b>	<b>Caesar (statement in a letter given to A. Clodius)</b>	<b>75</b>
3.60	Caesar	10
<b>*3.64</b>	<b>Eagle-bearer in Caesar's army</b>	<b>35</b>
3.71	Labienus	10
<b>3.73</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>150</b>
3.80	Caesar	30
<b>3.82</b>	<b>Pompey</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>3.82</b>	<b>Pompey's soldiers</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>3.82</b>	<b>Officers in Pompey's camp</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>3.83</b>	<b>L. Domitius</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>*3.85</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>*3.86</b>	<b>Pompey</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>*3.87</b>	<b>Labienus</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>3.89</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>3.90</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>*3.91</b>	<b>C. Crastinus, reservist in Caesar's army</b>	<b>40</b>

<b>*3.94</b>	<b>Pompey</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>3.96</b>	<b>Pompey</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>3.98</b>	<b>Caesar</b>	<b>20</b>
3.107	Caesar	25

Number of speeches: 31

Total number of words spoken: 1,355

Total number of words in Book III: 15,000

Percentage of the book which consists of speeches: 5-10

Speeches/utterances by Caesar: 14, of which 2 through legates/letter

Numbers of words spoken by Caesar: 740

3.6 *Caesar, ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus omnibus, imperaret, quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse facturos*

The first speech after the Curio disaster paints a picture of concord<sup>99</sup> and, unlike Curio, Caesar does not take victory for granted; the key word in the above speech is *sperarent*.

3.10 *Erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrumque pertinaciae finem facere et ab armis discedere neque amplius fortunam periclitari. Satis esse magna utrimque incommoda accepta, quae pro disciplina et praeceptis habere possent, ut reliquos casus timerent: illum Italia expulsum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis*

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<sup>99</sup> Cf. Grillo 133.

*et cohortibus [in] Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum centum atque XXX; [se] morte Curionis et detrimento Africani exercitus et Antoni militumque deditioe ad Curictam. Proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent, [cum] quantum in bello fortuna posset, iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent documento. Hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si vero alteri paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usurum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum confideret. Condiciones pacis, quoniam antea convenire non potuissent, Romae ab senatu et a populo peti debere. Interesse id rei publicae et ipsis placere oportere, si uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum. Depositis armis auxiliisque, quibus nunc confiderent, necessario populi senatusque iudicio fore utrumque contentum. Haec quo facilius Pompeio probari possent, omnes suas terrestres ubique copias dimissurum...[lacuna]*

Nordling (186, footnote) points out that it is believed that there is a lacuna between chapter 8 and 9 as Caesar does not elaborate on the disaster at Curicta, where Caesar's legate Gaius Antonius loses his fleet and is forced to surrender<sup>100</sup>. The last sentence is also corrupt so no far-reaching conclusions should be made here. Worth noting, however, is Caesar's reference to *fortuna*, although the set-backs he mentions on Pompey's side are caused either by Pompey's own incompetence or the masterful actions of Caesar, whereas Caesar's set-backs are lesser in extent and number (two as opposed to the four for Pompey) and incurred by Caesar's deputies. Caesar does not admit to any wrong-doings<sup>101</sup>.

3.16 *Prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum, quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas: ob eam causam colloquium vitasse, ne res maximae spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia*

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<sup>100</sup> Batstone & Damon, 30.

<sup>101</sup> A theme continued from BG – cf. 7.52. See also Nordling's discussion on the surrender of Sabinus, pp. 186-87.

*impedirentur. Suam [Pompeij] summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem, ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur, sed potestatem eius rei nullam habere, propterea quod de consilii sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint. Sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium, atque illum reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis. Interea manerent indutiae, dum ab illo rediri posset, neve alter alteri noceret. Huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque suis.*

Just as in *BG* 5.26 and below in 3.19, the use of the word *prodeo* does not bode well. This speech by Lido turns out to be an attempt to gain time, not unsimilar to the behaviour of the Germans in *BG* 4.9. Caesar concludes in the following chapter that there is no reason to indulge this behaviour. He returns his focus to the war effort: *Quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis periculi atque inopiae vitandae causa omnem orationem instituisse neque ullam spem aut condicionem pacis afferre, ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit.*

3.18 *Quem ingressum in sermonem Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit. "Quid mihi," inquit, "aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum, [lacuna] reductus existimabor bello perfecto."*

Although this speech contains a short lacuna, it still perfectly illustrates Pompey's foolish pride and hypocrisy. In 1.8 Pompey, using L. Caesar as his mouthpiece, tells Caesar that he (i.e. Pompey) has always put the interests of the republic before his own personal interests and that Caesar must do the same. Here Pompey clearly shows that these were just empty words. Considering what Labienus says in the very next speech (see below), Caesar probably wants to show that all bridges have been burnt and there can be no hope of a reconciliation. And the blame rests squarely with the Pompeians.

3.19 *Mittit P. Vatinius legatum ad ripam ipsam fluminis, qui ea, quae maxime ad pacem pertinere viderentur, ageret et crebro magna voce pronuntiaret, liceretne civibus ad cives [de pace duos] legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim cum id agerent, ne cives cum civibus armis decertarent? Multa suppliciter locutus est, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus. [...] Qua ex frequentia, Titus Labienus prodit, summissa oratione loqui de pace atque altercari cum Vatino incipit. Quorum mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa; quae ille obtectus armis militum vitavit; vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, centuriones militesque nonnulli. Tum Labienus: "desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest."*

Vatinius talks about peace, citizens and of course he mentions *omnes*, all in line with Caesar's propaganda. Labienus on the other hand appears on the scene, creates division and showcases his cruelty, of which there is no trace in the BG<sup>102</sup>. The spears thrown is strikingly similar to the scene in BG 1.46 – Before a decisive battle where Caesar might be seen as the aggressor, the enemy does something to shift the blame onto themselves. The fact that the incident occurs at this stage warrants suspicion - in both cases<sup>103</sup>.

3.45 *Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse: non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae.*

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<sup>102</sup> See also 3.71 for an example of how the portrayal of Labienus has changed; here Caesar refers to Labienus as a deserter (*perfuga*), who after insulting the Caesarian soldiers kills them *in omnium conspectu*.

<sup>103</sup> cf. Grillo 113 and Rasmussen 115-16.

Just like Labienus, Pompey is also shown to have a cruel streak. Grillo (112-13, 151-56) points out that there are allusions here both to barbarian/foreign<sup>104</sup> and Sullan cruelty: “[A]pparently, Pompey himself reminded everyone of his ties with the dictator: toward the beginning of the war he threatened Italian municipalities, saying in public *Sulla potuit; ego non potero?* (Att. 9.10.2). As one may expect, the BC uses this association between Sulla and Pompey for invective” (152).

3.57 *Huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum; quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc [effecisse; id] arbitrari vitio factum eorum, quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur. Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere quae probasset exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellare atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet. Quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii uni omnes acceptam relatueros.*

In spite of the continued and increasingly aggressive rebuffs from the Pompeians, Caesar makes one last attempt at achieving a peaceful solution. The focus on *omnes* who want peace is given further emphasis through its antithetical juxtaposition to *uni*.

3.64 *"hanc ego," inquit, "et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum deferte."*

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<sup>104</sup> The most obvious parallel is probably to Ariovistus, cf. the description of him in BG 1.31.

The battle of Dyrrachium was one of the greatest disasters to befall Caesar during the civil war campaigns. Nordling, referring to Caesar's statement in 3.73<sup>105</sup> says: "[S]o great were the set-backs at Dyrrachium, in fact, that Caesar was forced to alter his entire mode of campaign – as close as he ever comes to expressing a loss of confidence in himself" (205). In an effort to downplay the seriousness of the situation or perhaps one could even say, distract the reader's attention, Caesar focuses on the virtuous actions and words of one of his soldiers. The parallels to the description of the disaster at Gergovia, where Caesar quotes Petronius (BG 7.50), are unmistakable.

*3.73 contionem apud milites habuit hortatusque est, ne ea, quae accidissent, graviter ferrent neve his rebus terrerentur multisque secundis proeliis unum advesrum et id mediocre opponerent. Habendam fortunae gratiam, quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere cepissent, quod duas Hispanias bellicosissimorum hominum peritissimis atque exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in potestatem redegissent; denique recordari debere, qua felicitate inter medias hostium classes oppletis non solum portibus, sed etiam litoribus omnes incolumes essent transportati. Si non omnia caderent secunda, fortunam esse industria sublevandam. Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpae debere tribui. Locum se aequum ad dimicandum dedisse, potitum se esse hostium castris, expulisse ac superasse pugnantes. Sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam fortuna partam iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset, dandam omnibus operam, ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur. Quod si esset factum [lacuna] ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, uti ad Gergoviam contigisset, atque ei qui ante dimicare timuissent, ultro se proelio offerrent.*

There are certain echoes of Vercingetorix's speech in BG 7.29 and Caesar's own speech in 7.52 here. Both Caesar and Vercingetorix talk about not all battles being

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<sup>105</sup> Caesar ab superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit.



*secunda* and also that if they are looking for someone to blame, they should look elsewhere. Similar to his speech in *BG* 6.42, Caesar emphasizes the workings of *fortuna*, but whereas in 6.42 he probably refers to *fortuna* because he himself was not present during the battle, it is not clear to me why Caesar mentions it in this speech.

3.82 *contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes [...] si quando quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. [...] magnaue inter eos in consilio fuit controversia, oporteretne Lucili Hirri, quod is a Pompeio ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetorius absentis rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implorarent Pompei, praestaret, quod proficiscenti recepisset, ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur, reliqui, in labore pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet, recusarent.*

3.83 *Et L. Domitius in consilio dixit placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas dari ad iudicandum eis, qui ordinis essent senatorii belloque una cum ipsis interfuissent, sententiasque de singulis ferrent, qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent: unam fore tabellam, qui liberandos omni periculo censerent; alteram, qui capitis damnarent; tertiam, qui pecunia multarent.*

In the build-up to the final battle at Pharsalus, which starts in 3.92, there are no less than 10 speeches (although most of them are quite brief) which gives the reader an insight into both the Caesarian and the Pompeian camp. In 3.82 and 3.83 Pompey, his soldiers and his officers are talking, discussing and quarrelling. The guaranteed victory, sharing the spoils, and punishing those who did not participate are the main themes of discussion. The display of cruelty, hubris and greed is very similar to, or perhaps even worse than in the Gallic camps in book 7 of the *BG*. For the Pompeian soldiers' comment on their leader's slowness, see Grillo, 25.

3.85 *Tum Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, "differendum est" inquit, "iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus; animo simus ad dimicandum parati: non facile occasionem postea reperiemus"*

This is "[t]he only passage of the *Commentarii* where Caesar himself speaks in *oratio recta*" (Nordling, 19, n.). It stands in stark contrast both to the preceding speeches in 3.82 and 3.83 and to Pompey's and Labienus's speeches in 3.86 and 3.87

3.86 *"scio me," inquit, "paene incredibilem rem polliceri; sed rationem consilii mei accipite, quo firmiore animo [ad] proelium prodeatis. Persuasi equitibus nostris, idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt, ut, cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggrederentur et circumventa ab tergo acie prius perturbatum exercitum pellerent, quam a nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. Ita sine periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. Id autem difficile non est, cum tantum equitatu valeamus." Simul denuntiavit, ut essent animo parati in posterum et, quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe rogitavissent, ne suam neu reliquorum opinionem fallerent.*

3.87 *Hunc Labienus excepit et, cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferret, "noli," inquit, "existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. Omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. Perexigua pars illius exercitus superest; magna pars deperiit, quod accidere tot proeliis fuit necesse, multos autumnus pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi domum discesserunt, multi sunt relictus in continenti. An non audistis ex eis, qui per causam valetudinis remanserunt, cohortes esse Brundisi factas? Hae copiae, quas videtis, ex dilectibus horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt refectae, et plerique sunt ex coloniis Transpadanis. Ac tamen quod fuit roboris duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis interiit." Haec cum dixisset, iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum reliquosque, ut idem facerent, hortatus est.*

Both Pompey and Labienus are given Gallic traits here. Most telling is Pompey's use of the phrase *id autem difficile non est* which is nearly identical to the words of the Gallic chiefs in 7.1 and Vercingetorix in 7.14, and similar to Orgetorix claim at the very beginning of the BG. Grillo (72-74) shows how little Pompey's and Labienus's oaths<sup>106</sup> are worth. In just a few chapters Pompey will return to the camp and then escape, only to meet his death in 3.98. To Grillo's list of cruelty, treachery and ignorance (see pp. 110-17) can also be added hubris – all traits displayed by the Gauls, particularly in book 7 – the Pompeians repeatedly talk about guaranteed victory. Just as Lentulus in 1.1 involuntarily sings Caesar's praises so does Labienus here. If Caesar himself had claimed to have conquered Gaul and Germany it would not have been credible, but when his most rabid opponent states this, the words are given greater credence. This is of course another example of Caesar's use of *sermocinatio*.

3.89 *quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare. Simul tertiae aciei totique exercitui imperavit, ne iniussu suo concurreret: se, cum id fieri vellet, vexillo signum daturum.*

3.90 *Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaque in eum perpetui temporis officia praedicaret, imprimis commemoravit: testibus se militibus uti posse, quanto studio pacem petisset; quae per Vatinium in colloquiis, quae per Aulum Clodium cum Scipione egisset, quibus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis legatis contendisset. Neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse.*

These are Caesar's last words before the battle. Although they are in OO, I would argue against Rasmussen's claim about the importance of Caesar's use of OR in

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<sup>106</sup> Cf. also Labienus's oath in 3.13 which he also does not keep: *perterrita etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset.*

3.85 and say that these two short speeches are more important and expound on his idealized leadership style and ambitions and ties in with his speech in *BG* 1.40.

3.91 *Hic signo dato, "sequimini me," inquit, "manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro imperatori quam constituistis operam date. Unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus." Simul respiciens Caesarem, "faciam," inquit, "hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas."*

This scene is reminiscent of the eagle-bearer in book 4 of the *BG*. It also serves the purpose of showing the unity of his army, who at times during the *BC* have been unhappy about Caesar's willingness to fight.

3.94 *et eis centurionibus, quos in statione ad praetoriam portam posuerat, clare, ut milites exaudirent, "tuemini," inquit, "castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius acciderit. Ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo."*

3.96 *saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse, ut, a quo genere hominum victoriam sperasset, ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur*

The oath Pompey took in 3.87 is now proven to be as worthless as any Gallic oath. Grillo describes it succinctly: "Pompey, who betrays everyone, laments that he has been betrayed, accusing his cavalry of fleeing in the middle of his own flight" (73).

3.98 *passisque palmis proiecti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt, consolatus consurgere iussit et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur, neu quid sui desiderarent.*

Caesar's victory over Pompey is completed and Caesar is given another chance to display his vaunted clemency.

### 6.3 Summary of the results of the analysis of the excerpts from *De Bello Civili* and a comparison with the results from *De Bello Gallico*

Here are the raw data for the *BC*:

Book	No. of speeches	Total no. of words spoken	Total no. of words in the book	% of the book which consists of speeches	No. of speeches by Caesar
1	37	2090	10900	15-20	10 <sup>107</sup>
2	17	1075	6400	15-20	2
3	29	1325	15000	5-10	14 <sup>108</sup>
Total	83	4490	32300	avg: 10-15	26

The differences between the books are less pronounced than in the *BG*, but it is still interesting to note that book 1 contains more speeches than book 3, both in absolute figures and expressed as a percentage. Even if the chapters after the battle of Pharasalus (chapters 3.99 – 3.112 (approx. 2200 words) where there is only one short speech) are excluded from the above figures, the speeches in book 3 would still only account for little over 10% of the book.

A search for the phrase *populus Romanus* and the word *senatus* prove less fruitful than in the *BG*:

Book	Occurrences of the phrase <i>populus Romanus</i> (or inflected variations thereof)	Occurrences of the word <i>senatus</i> (or inflected variations thereof)
1	5	30
2	0	1

<sup>107</sup> Two of which through legates/messengers

<sup>108</sup> Two of which through legates/messengers

3	5	7
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The high number for *senatus* in book 1 looks interesting, but unfortunately there is very little that can be deduced from this, apart from the fact that some of the chapters are set in the senate. The phrase *cives Romani*, which is not used in *BG*, appears once in book 1, 5 times in book 2 and 8 times in book 3. To argue that he is acting on behalf of the Roman people probably did not serve Caesar's purposes now that he had left Gaul and started a civil war.

A search for the words *ius* and *iniuria*, however, shows a similar pattern to the *BG*:

Book	Occurrences of the word <i>iniuria</i> (or inflections thereof)	Occurrences of the words <i>ius</i> , <i>iustus</i> , <i>iustitiae</i> (or inflections thereof)
1	8	7 <sup>109</sup>
2	0	0
3	1	2

All the occurrences of *iniuria* and most of the occurrences of *ius* in book 1 are connected to Caesar's complaints of Pompey's or his allies' wrong-doings against Caesar, and in a few cases, the citizens. It seems that once Caesar has established the clear boundaries between right (himself) and wrong (the Pompeians) he is happy to leave the matter to the side in the other two books.

If the words *populus Romanus* and *senatus* grabs the reader's attention in the *BG*, Caesar's use of *novus*, which is given distinctly negative connotations and ascribed

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<sup>109</sup> The perhaps strongest condemnation of the Pompeians can be found in 1.6: *omnia divina humanaque iura permiscetur*. Caesar makes a similar accusation in 1.32: *omnia permisceri mallent, quam imperium exercitusque dimittere*

to the Pompeians, in chapter 1.7 has a similar effect<sup>110</sup>. A search for the word *novus* in the two commentarii show that the word is not very frequently used, but when it is used it is often with a negative connotation. The Gauls look for *novae res*, *nova consilia* or *nova imperia* a total of 9 times (not counting *novissimum* in the meaning “last” or “rearguard”, variations of *novus* only occurs 20 times in the whole of *BG*, including book 8<sup>111</sup>). The contrast to Caesar’s *modus operandi* is distinct, compare for examples the opening speeches in book 1 of the *BG* where Caesar justifies his actions by referring to *more et exemplo populi Romani* (*BG* 1.8), i.e. he, unlike the Pompeians, is observing the customs and traditions of the Roman people. The perhaps most negative use of *novus* occurs in *BC* 3.60, when the two Allobrogian brothers desert to Pompey: *novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri constituerant*; Gallic treachery is combined with Pompeian cruelty, clearly a good match and it is difficult not to read at least a certain amount of irony into Caesar’s valedictory thoughts on the Gallic brothers. In a society where the belief that the Golden age was in the past, introducing new-fangled traditions would quite likely have been seen as severe criticism. In combination with the allusions to Sullan proscriptions<sup>112</sup> Caesar’s message will have been doubly explosive.

There are many similarities between the *BG* and the *BC*. Caesar seems to carry over some themes from the *BG* to the *BC* with good effect. I believe for example that Grillo is absolutely right when he argues that the Pompeians are given Gallic traits like greed, cruelty, hubris, treachery and ignorance and there are plenty of examples in the speeches of the *BC* to support this. I also believe that Mutschler is right when

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<sup>110</sup> See also 1.76 and 1.85. It should however be noted that in 1.34 the roles are reversed (*ab urbe discedens Pompeius erat adhortatus, ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent*) so one should be careful not to draw too far-reaching conclusions here.

<sup>111</sup> The figure for *BC* is the same, 20, of which most occurrences are referring to military matters, e.g. *novis dilectibus, novo generi belli*, i.e. phrases where the word *novus* is used to state facts and does not contain any positive or negative connotations.

<sup>112</sup> There is even an explicit mention of Sulla, made by Lentulus in chapter 1.4: *seque alterum fore Sullam intersuos gloriatur*

he argues that certain events causes Caesar to become “more rhetorical”, such as, in the *BG*, the need to justify the war (book 1), the Sabinus disaster (book 5) and the massive uprising in Gaul (book 7) and, in the *BC*, the justification of the war (again), the battle against Afranius/Petreibus, Curio’s disaster, the disaster at Dyrrachium and the final battle at Pharsalus. Similarly, just as Caesar in book 7 of the *BG* never speaks to Vercingetorix, he never speaks directly to Pompey in all of the *BC*, although in the latter case it is not for the lack of trying. In this respect Ariovistus stands out – Caesar speaks more to him than any other person in the whole of the commentarii.

There are a few differences as well, of course. As discussed in connection with the speeches in 1.2, 1.32, 1.85 and elsewhere, Caesar’s language seems to become more emotive in the *BC*, which is hardly surprising considering what is at stake. I am therefore, like Mutschler, somewhat reluctant to accept Konche’s statement that Caesar’s only interest is *docere* (see p.20). I would suggest that Caesar’s goal is not only *docere*, but also *movere*. It should also be noted that there are a few rare instances of *delectare* as well, e.g. *BG* 2.31.



## **7. Conclusions**


First and foremost I believe that De Witt's comment (see p.7) can safely be put to bed; although the rhetoric in the speeches in the *BG* and the *BC* is in many cases less pronounced than in Cicero's speeches, I believe the analysis show beyond a doubt that rhetorics form an intrinsic element to many of the speeches.

Rasmussen states that there are 21 direct speeches and 190 indirect speeches in *BG* and *BC*, but he does not account for how he has arrived at these figures. I have found a total of 255 speeches longer than approximately 10 words. The 21 direct speeches are undisputed, which leaves 234 indirect speeches, a discrepancy of 44 speeches compared to Rasmussen. Of the 255 speeches I have found, 172 occur in the *BG* and 83 in the *BC*. Caesar speaks a total of 75 times, 49 times in the *BG* and 26 times in the *BC*.


Of these 255 speeches, there are quite a few which do fit De Witt's description; I have consigned a total of 94 speeches (66 from the *BG* and 28 from the *BC*) to

Appendix 1, simply because I have not been able to find anything in these speeches worth commenting on. This however leaves 161 speeches, of which I would consider the following 23 significant: Caesar's, the Gallic chiefs' and Ariovistus's speeches in book 1 of the *BG* (1.13, 1.14, 1.18, 1.31, 1.35, 1.36, 1.40, 1.43, 1.44); Ambiorix's and Titurius's speeches in book 5 (5.27, 5.29); Caesar's, Vercingetorix's and Critognatus's speeches in book 7 (7.14, 7.20, 7.52-3, 7.66, 7.77). In the *BC* Caesar's four speeches in book 1 (1.7, 1.9, 1.32, 1.85); Curio's speeches in book 2 (2.31, 2.32) and Caesar's speeches in book 3 (3.10, 3.73) stand out. Admittedly the selection of these speeches is somewhat arbitrary; there are longer speeches (*BG* 2.4 and 8.7) but I feel the subject matter in these two speeches (reports on Gallic tribes) does not really justify describing them as significant.

The below diagramme shows what percentage of each book of the *BG* consists of speeches. Far from confirming Rasmussen's theory of a perfect curve, it shows that books 1 and 7, as stated in chapter 6.1.9, are the most prolix.



The result of a similar comparison of the *BC* is similarly inconclusive, at least as far as Rasmussen's theory is concerned:



It should of course be pointed out that just because there are a greater number of speeches in one book, does not mean they are “more rhetorical”, but it still seems to me that there is little to support Rasmussen’s theory of an “ansteigende Kurve”.

Similarly it seems that the differences between direct and indirect discourse are not as great as Rasmussen wants us to believe. Nordling (88) correctly points out: “direct discourse in Caesar does not in itself guarantee that this is *significant* discourse. Sometimes, according to Rasmussen (17-18), a direct speech merely indicates the volume of a raised voice”. Nordling continues: “Nor do the direct speeches of dying centurions or faithful aquilifers seem to serve much purpose beyond that of exemplary illustration or to convey the emotional intensity of the moment” (88)<sup>113</sup>. Perhaps this is why Caesar, with only one exception, uses *OO* in his own speeches: to appear more detached and unbiased. It does not befit Caesar, the commander, who is always on top of the situation, or at least has to portray himself as being on top of the situation, to let himself be governed by emotions, unlike Gauls (like Critognatus and Vercingetorix), the impulsive Curio or even Pompey, whose speech

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<sup>113</sup> Five of the 21 speeches in *OR* can be said to fall in this category: *BG* 4.25, 5.44, 7.50, *BC* 3.64, 3.91

in *OR* in *BC* 3.18 amounts to little more than an emotional outburst and a display of wounded pride.

If one focuses on Caesar own speeches, he displays a great range when reproducing them, from short commands and exhortations to the long “judicial” speeches against Ariovistus and the inspirational speech before his troops in *BG* 1.40. However, he is no stranger to giving that same rhetorical flair to his opponents or his legates when it suits him (best illustrated by Critognatus in *BG* 7.77 and Curio in *BC* 2.32) or, for that matter, the same brevity and/or lack of rhetorical dazzle. Therefore I am inclined to say that it is not possible to find anything that sets Caesar’s speeches apart from speeches delivered by other characters in the two works.

Regarding the question who is allowed to speak, it seems that Caesar is quite generous and lets almost everyone have a say, from slaves, deserters and townspeople to the highest commanders, himself included. The only discernible pattern I have found is that when Caesar is present he is the only Roman voice, or in the case of the *BG*, the only pro-Caesarian voice. Unlike his legates who partake in discussions (e.g. Sabinus and Titurius in book 5 of the *BG* and Curio in book 2 of the *BC*) Caesar never shares the stage with anyone, with the rare exception of the common soldier who gives a short motivational speech in the same vein as Caesar. This is perhaps most evident in the lead-up to the battle at Pharsalus: we get the point of view of the Pompeian soldiers and officers and Pompey himself, of the Caesarian soldiers and Caesar. The only perspective missing is that of the Caesarian officers. Wiseman’s theory that Caesar is writing for the *populares* is interesting, but the evidence in favour of it is rather thin on the ground. It should also be pointed out that although Caesar in *BG* 1.39 does take a swipe at the nobility, in 1.40 he says he will march with the 10<sup>th</sup> legion only, if needed and thus he extends the criticisms to most of the soldiery as well. I am more inclined to believe Welch who states that the main reason why Caesar does not allow his officers to speak to any larger extent is: “With Caesar’s main aim in view, that is to publicise himself, omissions concerning legates are probably more often collateral damage than

determined policy” (102). I don’t think the data in the analysis can be said to produce any further clues as to Caesar’s intended audience.

As for rhetorical features, it is clear that Caesar knows “all the tricks in the book” and he sometimes deploys them. Most noteworthy is probably Caesar’s use of *sermocinatio* and *ratiocinatio*. To start with the latter, *ratiocinatio*, for obvious reasons, only occurs in the *BG*, and more specifically only in the first half of the book (in 1.3, 1.39, 2.4, 2.31 and 4.7). Perhaps Caesar feels that having defeated both Gallic and German adversaries, he no longer needs to aggrandize his own feats in this manner and in the *BC* it is not in Caesar’s best interest to try to make the Pompeian adversaries more impressive than they are. As discussed in chapter 6.1.9, the use of *sermocinatio* peaks in book 7 of the *BG*. Caesar clearly had less freedom putting words in the mouths of his enemies in the *BC*; none of his readers would have known (or perhaps even cared) what was said in a Gallic camp, but there were plenty of sources who could tell what went on in Pompey’s camp. This does however not mean that Caesar does not use *sermocinatio* in the *BC*, rather his use of it becomes more ingenious. Lentulus (1.1), Cato (1.30) and Labienus (3.87) are all unwittingly made to sing the praises of Caesar. Vercingetorix’s comment in *BG* 7.29 (*non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis*) can also be said to fall in this category; what is meant as a criticism is given a clever twist by Caesar the author and actually turns into praise, inadvertently on the speaker’s part, and because these words are spoken by characters portrayed as Caesar’s fiercest enemies, the actually carry more weight than if Caesar himself had said it.

In addition to the rhetorical features, there are also a number of recurring themes, either spanning across both the *BG* and the *BC* or within them. Here follows a summary of the most prominent themes:

The description of the Gauls, Caesar’s representation of the exchanges between himself and the Gauls, and the discussions among the Gauls themselves all follow

a strict pattern. As discussed in chapters 6.1.9 and 6.3 Caesar repeatedly shows that the Gauls are untrustworthy<sup>114</sup> and they are given traits like greed, cruelty and ignorance. In the exchanges between Caesar and the Gauls the structure is nearly always: Caesar defeats the Gauls, who then send legates asking for Caesar's mercy, which he grants, sometimes reluctantly<sup>115</sup>. Likewise, the discussions among the Gauls usually involve conspiracies, outbursts of rashness, promises to endure any hardship, yearnings for freedom given to them by their forefathers and the indignation felt because of the Roman enslavement. The Gauls also repeatedly mention how easy it will be to achieve their goals. This is particularly evident in book 7, where Caesar more than anywhere else lets the Gauls discuss among themselves. These descriptions and representations of the Gauls and their behaviour is then carried over to the Pompeians in the *BC* with good effect. As mentioned in chapter 6.3, I believe Grillo is absolutely right when he says that Caesar gives Gallic or even Germanic traits to the Pompeians, even down to the behaviour of interrupting peace talks by throwing spears (cf. *BG* 1.45 and *BC* 3.19).

There is a very prominent theme which only occurs at the beginning of the *BG*: Through the repeated use of the phrase *populus Romanus* and the word *iniuria* in book 1 of the *BG*, Caesar's makes strong attempts at what seems to me the justification of the attacks on the Gauls and the Germans. In 1.35 Caesar talks about a defensive war against Ariovistus, based on a decision by the senate: *si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Aeduorum iniurias non neglecturum*. Caesar's objectives change during the course of the *BG*; where in book 1 he is eager to find excuses for an attack, in book 7 he openly states that the target is *devicta Gallia*.

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<sup>114</sup> see also discussion on *BG* 1.30 on p. 34

<sup>115</sup> see the discussion of chapters 2.13-15 on p. 50

Similarly, there is a theme in the *BC* which does not appear in the *BG*: Because Caesar is no longer fighting an external enemy, but Roman citizens he needs to convince the readers not only that he is in the right, but also that he is supported by the vast majority of the people. Therefore we find in the *BC* a dichotomy between the many (who support Caesar) and the few (the Pompeians), which does not exist in the *BG*, for obvious reasons. There also seems to be, an, albeit less pronounced, dichotomy between old (which Caesar represents) and new (the Pompeians). Here it is possible to see a link between the Gauls who strive for *novae res* and the Pompeians who introduce *nova exempla* in their attempts to thwart Caesar.

Caesar's interactions with his soldiers form another recurring theme. In both the *BG* and the *BC*, Caesar uses rhetoric to good effect to strengthen the bond with his own soldiers<sup>116</sup>. The best example hereof is his speech in *BG* 1.40. Yet Caesar is not afraid to take a stand against his soldiers if they clamour for a course of action which Caesar does not approve of, most notably in *BC* 1.72, where Caesar refuses to give in to the soldiers' wish to do battle. There is a similar episode in *BG* 7.19<sup>117</sup>, both spurred on by Caesar's concern for the lives of Roman soldiers/citizens. Caesar also uses the strong connection with his soldiers as a convenient cover-up. Caesar does not admit to any mistakes and in situations where things do not go according to plan, Caesar sometimes changes the narrative focus from a broad overview of the situation to the heroic, but ultimately futile, actions of a single soldier, see *BG* 7.50 and *BC* 3.64. Curio's heroic death in *BC* 2.42<sup>118</sup> can perhaps also be said to belong in this category.

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<sup>116</sup> Nordling shows this in his analysis of the harangues – level E in his continuum, “Caesar as the inspirer of men” (192-201).

<sup>117</sup> *Indignantēs milites Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli exposcentes edocet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam*

<sup>118</sup> *At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quem a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur.*

To finish off the discussion on recurring themes, a few more words must be said about *BG* 1.40. I believe that Walsh is absolutely right in her claim that Caesar “claims many of the qualities outlined by Cicero in *De Imperio Cn. Pompei*” (104). I would suggest that Caesar, with Cicero’s speech in mind, goes one step further in the *BC* and makes sure to divest Pompey of all the characteristics he was given by Cicero in 66 BC. Here are the quotes from Cicero which I used in the discussion of *BG* 1.40: *in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere,—scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem* (28); *Neque enim illae sunt solae virtutes imperatoriae, quae volgo existimantur,—labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo* (29); *Ac primum, quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores? quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia? quanta fide? quanta facilitate? quanto ingenio? quanta humanitate?* (36). As Grillo shows, Caesar’s description of Pompey gives him Gallic traits, including cruelty, treachery and fickleness, thus disowning him of all claims to *innocentia*, *temperantia*, *fides* and *humanitas*. Compared to Cicero’s list in chapter 28 of the four traits a commander must have, we find that Caesar questions Pompey’s military skills (*BC* 3.92); by leaving the battle field and later fleeing from the camp (*BC* 3.94 and 3.96) Pompey’s claim to *virtus* is made null and void; his strange promise in chapter 3.86 (*persuasi equitibus nostris idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt, ut...*) seems to show that Pompey’s *auctoritas* is not worth much if he has to persuade rather than order the cavalry to do something; and as he loses the final battle and thus the war, in spite of having superior (at least in a numerical sense) forces at his command, he clearly lacks *felicitas*. Pompey’s behaviour, as described by Caesar, in the lead-up to and during the battle of Pharsalus disowns Pompey of all the traits outlined by Cicero in chapter 29 of his speech: *labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo* (29). In particular Pompey’s lack of *celeritas* is stressed: *si quando*

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*quid Pompeius tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent* (3.82). Caesar's purpose when writing the *BC* would thus have been to show that, just as in the *BG*, he is Rome's *summus imperator*, but also that Pompey could never even have qualified as a contender.

To finish off the study, it might be worthwhile to see if the data can provide any clues on the dates of production and publication. Welch (93-95) argues convincingly that the disparate portraits of Sabinus in books 3 and 5 is a clear sign that the books were written (but perhaps not published) close to the events they portray. The frequent mentions of the phrase *populus Romanus* and the word *senatus* in book 1 of the *BG*, which does not occur in the other books of the *BG* seems to suggest that Caesar wrote and published it very soon after the events and when he knew that his actions had been well-received in Rome he no longer felt the need to emphasize the links to *SPQR* to the same extent in the subsequent books. There are however arguments against a serial publication as well. For example, I find the textual link between books 1 and 2 very strong (*ita ut supra demonstravimus; quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus*) and there also seems to be a lingering "verbosity" from book 1 in the second book (see table on p. 123). Perhaps these two books were published as a unit? Then there is also the case of Caesar's use of emotive language in sections where he wants to make sure the reader does not stray from his side, in book 1, 5 and 7 of the *BG*, which gives the work a homogenous feel. In this context Hirtius does not provide any further clues; he dispenses with direct discourse and there are only five instances of indirect discourse in book 8 and thus there is not enough material to allow for a rewarding comparison. All in all, I don't think the data in this analysis present the opportunity for any far-reaching conclusions regarding the year of publication for either the *BG* or the *BC*, unfortunately.

The picture of Caesar painted in the two *commentarii* differ greatly from the picture emerging when reading, for example, Suetonius's chapter on *Divus Iulius*. It is important to keep in mind that this depends on what the authors choose to include,

and perhaps more importantly, choose not to include. The latter may be considered one of Caesar's hallmarks – by not mentioning captured booty, by covering up setbacks, completely ignoring personal issues and giving only the scantest regard to political and economical quandaries, he manages to portray himself in the best possible light. Caesar makes good use of his rhetorical education and skills to achieve this. So we arrive back at Conte's comment (see p. 5) about "the apparently objective, impassive tone of Caesar's narration". The key word here is of course "apparently". At times it felt as if I was trying to wring blood from a stone, but I hope to have shown that there is a lot more going on beneath the polished and seemingly simple and "objective" façade of Caesar's writings.

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## **Appendix 1. Segments not analysed**

### ***De Bello Gallico***

1.10 *Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia.*

1.16 *graviter eos accusat, quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit, tam necessario tempore, tam propinquis hostibus ab iis non sublevetur, praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum susceperit; multo etiam gravius quod sit destitutus queritur.*

1.19 *cum eo conloquitur; simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio Gallorum de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit. Petit atque hortatur ut sine eius offensione animi vel ipse de eo causa cognita statuatur vel civitatem statuere iubeat.*

1.20 *Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset; quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri. Quod si quid ei a Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, neminem existimaturum non sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se averterentur. [...]*

1.22 *Considius equo admisso ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse.*

1.26 *Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re iuvarent: qui si iuvisent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum.*

1.28 *Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, et, quod omnibus frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, restituere iussit.*

1.37 *Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse; Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedisse, qui Rhenum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres.*

1.41 *princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit. [...] se neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed imperatoris esse existimavisse.*

1.42 *Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse existimaret. [...] Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar adduceret: vereri se ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu veniret: alia ratione sese non esse venturum. [...] non inridicule quidam ex militibus decimae legionis dixit: plus quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum se in cohortis praetoriae loco X. legionem habiturum ad equum rescribere.*

1.47 *Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter eos egi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem*

*constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret. [...] conclamavit: Quid ad se venirent? An speculandi causa?*

*1.50 Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, hanc reperiebat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset ut matres familiae eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent utrum proelium committi ex usu esset necne; eas ita dicere: non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam lunam proelio contendissent.*

*1.53 Is se praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur an in aliud tempus reservaretur: sortium beneficio se esse incolumem.*

*2.4 Cum ab iis quaereret quae civitates quantaque in armis essent et quid in bello possent, sic reperiebat:*

*2.15 esse homines feroces magnaque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent; confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem pacis accepturos.*

*2.16 inveniebat ex captivis Sabim flumen a castris suis non amplius milibus passuum X abesse; trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedissee adventumque ibi Romanorum expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis (nam his utrisque persuaserant uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur); expectari etiam ab iis Atuaticorum copias atque esse in itinere; mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam inutiles viderentur in eum locum coniecisse quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non esset.*

*2.28 legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dediderunt; et in commemoranda civitatis calamitate ex DC ad tres senatores, ex hominum milibus LX vix ad D, qui arma ferre possent, sese redactos esse dixerunt. Quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus*

*atque oppidis uti iussit et finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque prohiberent.*

*2.32 Ad haec Caesar respondit: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent; sed deditiois nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis. Se id quod in Nerviiis fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam inferrent.*

*3.3 prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad salutem contenderent. Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere.*

*3.5 ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur. Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.*

*3.18 Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet, neque longius abesse quin proxima nocte Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa proficiscatur. Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene gerendi amittendam non esse: ad castra iri oportere.*

*4.11 qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progrediretur orabant. Cum id non impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos [equites] qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos pugna prohiberet, sibi que ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi; quorum si principes ac senatus sibi iure iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret. [...]*



*tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit: huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret. Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacerarent, et si ipsi lacerarentur, sustinerent quoad ipse cum exercitu propius accessisset.*

*4.19 haec ab iis cognovit: Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes qui arma ferre possent unum in locum convenirent. Hunc esse delectum medium fere regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi decertare constituisse.*

*4.21 Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire. [...] Quibus auditis, liberaliter pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent, eos domum remittit [...] Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet.*

*4.22 ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur.*

*4.27 in petenda pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt. Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit*

*4.34 Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt.*

5.2 *Collaudatis militibus atque eis qui negotio praefuerant, quid fieri velit ostendit atque omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet*

5.3 *se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit.*

5.20 *legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata facturos; petunt, ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in civitatem mittat, qui praesit imperiumque obtineat.*

5.26 *Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui posse sperarent.*

5.34 *Qua re animadversa Ambiorix pronuntiari iubet, ut procul tela coniciant neu propius accedant et, quam in partem Romani impetum fecerint, cedant (levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil eis noceri posse), rursus se ad signa recipientes insequantur.*

5.56 *His rebus confectis, in concilio pronuntiat arcessitum se a Senonibus et Carnutibus aliisque compluribus Galliae civitatibus; huc iturum per fines Remorum eorumque agros popula turum ac, priusquam id faciat, castra Labieni oppugnaturum. Quae fieri velit praecipit.*

6.1 *simul ab Gnaeo Pompeio proconsule petit, quoniam ipse ad urbem cum imperio rei publicae causa remaneret, quos ex Cisalpina Gallia consulis sacramento rogavisset, ad signa convenire et ad se proficisci iuberet*

6.9 *Ubi, qui ante obsides dederant atque in deditionem venerant, purgandi sui causa ad eum legatos mittunt, qui doceant neque auxilia ex sua civitate in Treveros missa neque ab se fidem laesam: petunt atque orant ut sibi parcat, ne communi odio Germanorum innocentes pro nocentibus poenas pendant; si amplius obsidum vellet, dare pollicentur.*

6.10 *ab Ubiis certior Suebos omnes in unum locum copias cogere atque eis nationibus quae sub eorum sint imperio denuntiare, ut auxilia peditatus equitatusque mittant.[...] Suebos omnes, posteaquam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint, cum omnibus suis sociorumque copiis, quas coegissent, penitus ad extremos fines se recepisse: silvam esse ibi infinita magnitudine, quae appellatur Bacenis; hanc longe introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro obiectam Cheruscos ab Suebis Suebosque ab Cheruscis iniuriis incursionibusque prohibere: ad eius initium silvae Suebos adventum Romanorum exspectare constituisse.*

6.32 *legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret: nihil se de bello cogitavisse, nulla Ambiorigi auxilia misisse. [...] si qui ad eos Eburones ex fuga convenissent, ad se ut reducerentur, imperavit; si ita fecissent, fines eorum se violaturum negavit.*

6.33 *Titum Labienum cum legionibus tribus ad Oceanum versus in eas partes quae Menapios attingunt proficisci iubet; Gaium Trebonium cum pari legionum numero ad eam regionem quae ad Aduatucos adiacet depopulandam mittit*

6.40 *Alii cuneo facto ut celeriter perrumpant censent, quoniam tam propinqua sint castra, et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt; alii, ut in iugo consistent atque eundem omnes ferant casum. Hoc veteres non probant milites*

6.41 *Sic omnino animos timor praeoccupaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent neque incolumi exercitu Germanos castra oppugnatuos fuisse contenderent.*

7.4 *Qua oblata potestate omnibus his civitatibus obsides imperat, certum numerum militum ad se celeriter adduci iubet, armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi quodque ante tempus efficiat constituit; in primis equitatu studet.*

7.9 *Brutum adolescentem his copiis praeficit; hunc monet, ut in omnes partes equites quam latissime pervagentur: daturum se operam, ne longius triduo ab castris absit.*

7.12 *legati ad eum venissent oratum ut sibi ignosceret suaeque vitae consuleret, ut celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus, arma conferri, equos produci, obsides dari iubet.*

7.27 *suosque languidius in opere versari iussit et quid fieri vellet ostendit. Legionibusque intra vineas in occulto expeditis, cohortatus ut aliquando pro tantis laboribus fructum victoriae perciperent, eis qui primi murum ascendissent praemia proposuit militibusque signum dedit.*

7.37 *Cum his praemium communicat hortaturque, ut se liberos et imperio natos meminerint. Vnam esse Aeduorum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam detineat; eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis in Gallia non fore. Esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum, sic tamen, ut iustissimam apud eum causam obtinuerit; sed plus communi libertati tribuere. Cur enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam Romani ad Aeduos veniant?*

7.39 *Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavici consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem defert; orat ne patiat civitatem pravis adolescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi*

*Romani deficere; quod futurum provideat, si se tot hominum milia cum hostibus coniunxerint, quorum salutem neque propinqui negligere, neque civitas levi momento aestimare posset.*

*7.41 Medio fere itinere equites a Fabio missi, quanto res in periculo fuerit, exponunt. Summis copiis castra oppugnata demonstrant, cum crebro integri defessis succederent nostrosque assiduo labore defatigarent, quibus propter magnitudinem castrorum perpetuo esset isdem in vallo permanendum. Multitudine sagittarum atque omnis generis telorum multos vulneratos; ad haec sustinenda magno usui fuisse tormenta. Fabium discessu eorum duabus relictis portis obstruere ceteras pluteosque vallo addere et se in posterum diem similemque casum apparare.*

*7.43 Interim nuntio allato omnes eorum milites in potestate Caesaris teneri, concurrunt ad Aristium, nihil publico factum consilio demonstrant; quaestionem de bonis direptis decernunt, Litavici patrumque bona publicant, legatos ad Caesarem sui purgandi gratia mittunt. [...] Quae tametsi Caesar intellegebat, tamen quam mitissime potest legatos appellat: nihil se propter inscientiam levitatemque vulgi gravius de civitate iudicare neque de sua in Aeduos benevolentia deminuere.*

*7.44 Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam, quorum magnus ad eum cotidie numerus confluebat. Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed hunc silvestrem et angustum, qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; huic loco vehementer illos timere nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur*

*7.45 Hac re cognita Caesar mittit complures equitum turmas; eis de media nocte imperat, ut paulo tumultuosius omnibus locis vagarentur. Prima luce magnum numerum impedimentorum ex castris mulorumque produci deque his stramenta detrahi milionesque cum cassidibus equitum specie ac simulatione collibus circumvehi iubet. [...] quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit ostendit: in*

*primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur; quid iniquitas loci habeat incommodi proponit: hoc una celeritate posse mutari; occasionis esse rem, non proeli.*

*7.54 Ibi a Viridomaro atque Eporedorige Aeduis appellatus discit cum omni equitatu Litavicum ad sollicitandos Aeduos profectum: opus esse ipsos antecedere ad confirmandam civitatem. [...] Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita exposuit, quos et quam humiles accepisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio, obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis, et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset, ut non solum in pristinum statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse viderentur. His datis mandatis eos ab se dimisit.*

*7.60 Sub vesperum consilio convocato cohortatus ut ea quae imperasset diligenter industrieque administrarent, naves, quas Metiosedo deduxerat, singulas equitibus Romanis attribuit, et prima confecta vigilia quattuor milia passuum secundo flumine silentio progredi ibique se exspectari iubet.*

*7.61 Uno fere tempore sub lucem hostibus nuntiatur in castris Romanorum praeter consuetudinem tumultuari et magnum ire agmen adverso flumine sonitumque remorum in eadem parte exaudiri et paulo infra milites navibus transportari.*

*7.75 Ex his Bellovaci suum numerum non compleverunt, quod se suo nomine atque arbitrio cum Romanis bellum gesturos dicebant neque cuiusquam imperio obtemperaturos*

## **De Bello Civili**

*1.3 Misso ad vesperum senatu omnes, qui sunt eius ordinis, a Pompeio evocantur. Laudat promptos Pompeius atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque*

*incitat. Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur*

*1.6 Pompeius eadem illa, quae per Scipionem ostenderat agit; senatus virtutem constantiamque collaudat; copias suas exponit; legiones habere sese paratas X; praeterea cognitum compertumque sibi alieno esse animo in Caesarem milites neque eis posse persuaderi, uti eum defendant aut sequantur.*

*1.10 Illi deliberata re respondent scriptaque ad eum mandata per eos remittunt; quorum haec erat summa: Caesar in Galliam reverteretur, Arimino excederet, exercitus dimitteret; quae si fecisset, Pompeium in Hispanias iturum. Interea, quoad fides esset data Caesarem facturum, quae polliceretur, non intermissuros consules Pompeiumque delectus.*

*1.13 decuriones Auximi ad Attium Varum frequentes conveniunt; docent sui iudicii rem non esse; neque se neque reliquos municipales pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi; proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui.*

*1.17 Re cognita Domitius ad Pompeium in Apuliam peritos regionum magno proposito praemio cum litteris mittit, qui petant atque orent, ut sibi subveniat: Caesarem duobus exercitibus et locorum angustiis facile intercludi posse frumentoque prohiberi. Quod nisi fecerit, se cohortesque amplius XXX magnumque numerum senatorum atque equitum Romanorum in periculum esse venturum.*

*1.19 Domitius dissimulans in consilio pronuntiat Pompeium celeriter subsidio venturum hortaturque eos, ne animo deficient quaeque usui ad defendendum oppidum sint parent. [...] Pompeius enim rescripserat: sese rem in summum periculum deducturum non esse, neque suo consilio aut voluntate Domitium se in oppidum Corfinium contulisse; proinde, si qua fuisset facultas, ad se cum omnibus copiis veniret.*

1.20 *legatosque ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: sese paratos esse portas aperire, quaeque imperaverit facere et L. Domitium vivum in eius potestati tradere.*

1.23 *pauca apud eos loquitur, [queritur] quod sibi a parte eorum gratia relata non sit pro suis in eos maximis beneficiis; dimittit omnes incolumes.*

1.24 *Quem Caesar ad eum remittit cum mandatis: quoniam ad id tempus facultas colloquendi non fuerit, atque ipse Brundisium sit venturus, interesse rei publicae et communis salutis se cum Pompeio colloqui; neque vero idem profici longo itineris spatio, cum per alios condiciones ferantur, ac si coram de omnibus condicionibus disceptetur.*

1.26 *Itaque Caninium Rebilum legatum, familiarem necessariumque Scriboni Libonis, mittit ad eum colloquii causa; mandat, ut Libonem de concilianda pace hortetur; imprimis, ut ipse cum Pompeio colloqueretur, postulat; magnopere sese confidere demonstrat, si eius rei sit potestas facta, fore, ut aequis condicionibus ab armis discedatur. Cuius rei magnam partem laudis atque existimationis ad Libonem perventuram, si illo auctore atque agente ab armis sit discessum.*

1.33 *Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco, qui Romae remansissent et qui in castris Caesaris fuissent*

1.35 *Cuius orationem legati domum referunt atque ex auctoritate haec Caesari renuntiant: intellegere se divisum esse populum Romanum in partes duas; neque sui iudicii neque suarum esse virium discernere, utra pars iustiore habeat causam. Principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem patronos civitatis; quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice iis concesserit, alter bello victos Sallyas attribuerit vectigaliaque auxerit. Quare paribus eorum beneficiis parem se quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare aut urbe aut portibus recipere.*



1.66 *Uterque idem suis renuntiat: V milia passuum proxima intercedere itineris campestris, inde excipere loca aspera et montuosa; qui prior has angustias occupaverit, ab hoc hostem prohiberi nihil esse negotii.*

1.87 *Caesar ex eo tempore, dum ad flumen Varum veniatur, se frumentum daturum pollicetur. Addit etiam, ut, quod quisque eorum in bello amiserit, quae sint penes milites suos, eis, qui amiserint, restituatur*

2.17 *M. Varro in ulteriore Hispania initio cognitis eis rebus, quae sunt in Italia gestae, diffidens Pompeianis rebus amicissime de Caesare loquebatur: praecoccupatum sese legatione ab Cn. Pompeio teneri obstrictum fide; necessitudinem quidem sibi nihilo minorem cum Caesare intercedere, neque se ignorare, quod esset officium legati, qui fiduciarium operam obtineret, quae vires suae, quae voluntas erga Caesarem totius provinciae.*

2.18 *Ipsa habuit graves in Caesarem contiones. Saepe ex tribunali praedicavit adversa Caesarem proelia fecisse, magnum numerum ab eo militum ad Afranium perfugisse: haec se certis nuntiis, certis auctoribus comperisse.*

2.27 *confirmant quidem certe totius exercitus animos alienos esse a Curione maximeque opus esse in conspectum exercitus venire et colloquendi dare facultatem.*

2.28 *Hanc nactus appellationis causam Quintilius circuire aciem Curionis atque obsecrare milites coepit, ne primam sacramenti, quod apud Domitium atque apud se quaestorem dixissent, memoriam deponerent, neu contra eos arma ferrent, qui eadem essent usi fortuna eademque in obsidione perpassi, neu pro his pugnarent, a quibus cum contumelia perfugae appellarentur. Huc pauca ad spem largitionis addidit, quae ab sua liberalitate, si se atque Attium secuti essent, exspectare deberent.*

2.40 *Susplicatus praemissis equitibus ipsum affore Curionem Saburra copias equitum peditumque instruit atque his imperat, ut simulatione timoris paulatim cedant ac pedem referant: sese, cum opus esset, signum proelii daturum et, quod rem postulare cognovisset, imperaturum.*

2.42 *At Curio numquam se amisso exercitu, quem a Caesare fidei commissum acceperit, in eius conspectum reversurum confirmat atque ita proelians interficitur.*

3.13 *perterrito etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset.*

3.17 *Postulabat Caesar, ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium sine periculo mittere liceret, idque ipsi fore reciperent aut acceptos per se ad eum perducerent. Quod ad indutias pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam, ut illi classe naves auxiliaque sua impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos prohiberet. Si hoc sibi remitti vellent, remitterent ipsi de maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent, se quoque id retenturum. Nihilominus tamen agi posse de compositione, ut haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi esse impedimento.*

3.19 *Aulum Varronem profiteri se altera die ad colloquium venturum atque una visurum, quemadmodum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent*

3.53 *Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritis et de re publica, donatum milibus CC collaudatumque ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit*

3.71 *At Labienus, cum ab eo impetravisset, ut sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes productos ostentationis, ut videbatur, causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit.*

3.80 *cohortatus milites docuit, quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, priusquam auxilia concurrerent.*

3.107 *ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram exercitus, quos haberent, dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.*

**Appendix II: Summary of the books of the *BG* and the *BC*.** The summary of *BG* from Edwards edition of the *BG*, Loeb Classical Library, 1917. The chronology of the *BC* from Luca Grillo's *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile*

# ANALYSIS OF THE BOOKS

## BOOK I. (58 B.C.)

### CHAPTERS

- 1 Description of Gaul—geography and inhabitants.
- 2-29 Campaign against the Helvetii.  
Their ambitions—their leader, Orgetorix; his death—Caesar takes steps to protect the Province—the Helvetii enter the country of the Aedui—battle of the Arar—negotiations: Liscus, Dumno-rix, and Diviciacus—battle near Bibracte; retreat and surrender of the Helvetii—their numbers.
- 30-53 Campaign against Ariovistus.  
General assembly of the Gauls; complaints against Ariovistus—Caesar's overtures to him re-buffed—a temporary panic in the Roman army quelled by Caesar—conference with Ariovistus—defeat of the Germans (near Mülhausen).

## BOOK II. (57 B.C.)

- 1-33 Campaign against the Belgae.  
Caesar crosses the Axona—relieves Bibrax—punishes the Bellovaci—defeats the Nervii—captures a stronghold of the Aduatuci.
- 34 P. Crassus reports the subjection of the maritime states of Gaul.
- 35 Fifteen days' thanksgiving in Rome for Caesar's achievements.

## BOOK III. (57 AND 56 B.C.)

- 1-6 (57 B.C.) Servius Galba repulses an attack of the Seduni and Veragri upon his camp at Octodurus.
- 7-16 (56 B.C.) Campaign against the Veneti.  
The Roman fleet—the ships of the Veneti—a naval engagement: victory of the Romans.

## ANALYSIS OF THE BOOKS

### CHAPTERS

- 17-19 Operations of Titurius Sabinus against the Venelli.  
20-27 Operations of P. Crassus in Aquitania.  
28, 29 Operations of Caesar against the Morini and Menapii.

### BOOK IV. (55 B.C.)

- 1-4 Description of the Suebi, Ubii, Usipetes, and Tencteri.  
5-15 Operations of Caesar against the Usipetes and Tencteri.  
16 Caesar determines to cross the Rhine.  
17 His bridge over the Rhine.  
18, 19 Operations in Germany.  
20-36 First expedition to Britain.  
    A difficult landing—defeat of the British forces—a storm damages the Roman ships—the chariot-fighting of the Britons—second defeat of the Britons—Caesar returns to Gaul.  
37, 38 Defeat of the rebellious Morini—subjection of the Menapii.  
    Twenty days' thanksgiving in Rome for Caesar's achievements.

### BOOK V. (54 B.C.)

- 1-23 Second expedition to Britain.  
    Preparation of a fleet—(2-8. Caesar composes the factions of the Treveri: Cingetorix and Indutiomarus—the intrigues of Dumnorix)—landing unopposed—repulse of the Britons—Roman fleet damaged by a storm—description of Britain—Cassivellaunus subdued—Caesar crosses the Thames—returns to Gaul.  
26-58 Revolt of Belgic tribes.  
    Assassination of Tasgetius—Ambiorix and Catuvolcus—dispute between Titurius Sabinus and Cotta: their defeat and death, and destruction of their troops—Q. Cicero attacked by the Nervii: Caesar effects his relief—Indutiomarus attacks Labienus' camp, but is defeated.

## BOOK VI. (53 B.C.)

### CHAPTERS

- 1-8 Further revolt in Gaul.  
Caesar's operations against the Nervii, Senones,  
Carnutes, Menapii—Labienus defeats the Treveri.
- 9, 10 Caesar crosses the Rhine—retirement of the Suebi.
- 11-20 Description of the Gauls.  
Rivalry of Aedui and Sequani—the three estates :  
Druids, knights, commons—religious rites.
- 21-28 Description of the Germans.  
Religion—customs—warfare—animals in the  
Hercynian forest.
- 29-44 Caesar returns to Gaul—operations against Ambiorix  
and the Eburones—the Sugambri attack Caesar's  
camp, but are repulsed—Ambiorix escapes—  
execution of Acco.

## BOOK VII. (52 B.C.)

- 1-7 General conspiracy of the Gauls—Vercingetorix  
chosen as leader.
- 8-14 Caesar moves suddenly against the Arverni—succours  
the Boii—takes Vellaunodunum, Cenabum, Novio-  
dunum.
- 15-31 Siege, defence, and capture of Avaricum.
- 34-52 Siege of Gergovia—abandoned, after severe repulse.
- 53-57 Caesar moves against the Aedui.
- 58-62 Labienus, successful against the Parisii, joins him.
- 63-74 General revolt of the Gauls under Vercingetorix—  
they attack Caesar, but are defeated, and retire to  
Alesia.
- 75-89 Siege of Alesia—the Gauls make an unsuccessful  
attempt to relieve it—surrender of the town, and  
of Vercingetorix.
- 90 Submission of the Aedui and the Arverni.  
Twenty days' thanksgiving in Rome for Caesar's  
achievements.

BOOK VIII. (51 AND 50 B.C.)

CHAPTERS

1-48 (51 B.C.) End of the revolt in Gaul.

Bituriges reduced, Carnutes dispersed, Bellovaci defeated—Dumnacus besieges Lemonum, but without success—Armoric states subdued—Drappes captured—Uxellodunum besieged, and taken by Caesar—Labienus' successful operations against the Treveri—Commius subdued.

49-55 (50 B.C.) Caesar and the Senate.

His triumphal reception by cities and colonies—he returns to the army in Gaul—his opponents in the Senate—he returns to Italy.



APPENDIX I

*Chronology of the civil war (pre-Julian calendar)  
and narrative structure of the BC*

Chronological sequence of the events	Caesar's narrative in the <i>BC</i>
<b>49 BC:</b>	
January 1–7: Discussion in the senate	Book One (1.1–4) Beginning of Book One and of the <i>BC</i>
January 8–February 21: Caesar's march from Ravenna to Corfinium	Book One (1.5–24)
January 10: Caesar crosses the Rubicon	Not mentioned in the <i>BC</i> (cf. 1.8)
February 25: Pompey at Brundisium	Book One (1.24)
March 4: The consuls at Dyrrachium	Book One (1.25)
March 9: Caesar at Brundisium	Book One (1.25)
March 17: Pompey leaves	Book One (1.28)
March 31: Caesar in Rome	Book One (1.32)
April 7: Caesar leaves for Spain	Book One (1.33)
April 19: Caesar at Massilia	Book One (1.34)
April 22: Caesar dispatches Curio	Book One (1.30)
May 4: Siege of Massilia	Book One (1.36)
June 5–26: Caesar in Spain	Book One (1.36–55)
June 27: First naval battle at Massilia	Book One (1.56–8)
July 26–9: Operations at Ilerda	Book One (1.60–83)
July 31: Second naval battle at Massilia	Book Two (2.1–7) Beginning of Book Two
August 2: Capitulation at Ilerda	Book One (1.84–6) Conclusion of Book One
August 11: Curio in Africa	Book Two (2.23–32)
August 16: Battle of Utica	Book Two (2.33)
August 20: Battle of Bagradas	Book Two (2.39–42) Conclusion of Book Two
July–August: Caesarian defeat at Curicta	Not covered in the <i>BC</i> (cf. <i>BC</i> 3.10.5)
September 7–30: Caesar in Spain	Book Two (2.21)
October 25: Caesar returns to Massilia	Book Two (2.21)

(cont.)

Chronological sequence of the events	Caesar's narrative in the <i>BC</i>
December 2–12: Caesar in Rome	Book Three (3.1)
End of December: Caesar at Brundisium	Beginning of Book Three Book Three (3.2–5)
<b>48 BC:</b>	
January 4–5: Caesar at Palaeste	Book Three (3.6)
January 6–7: Caesar besieges Oricum and Apollonia	Book Three (3.11–12)
January 9: Pompey toward Dyrrachium	Book Three (3.13)
Mid-January: Caesar and Pompey at the Apsus river	Book Three (3.19)
January–March: Rufus and the turmoil at Rome	Book Three (3.20–2)
March 27: Antony at Nymphaeum	Book Three (3.26)
April 3: Antony and Caesar join forces	Book Three (3.30)
April 8: Battle of Oricum	Book Three (3.40)
April 12–mid-July: Engagements around Dyrrachium	Book Three (3.42–71)
Mid-July: Caesar at Apollonia	Book Three (3.78)
July 24 and 26: Domitius and Caesar join forces and take Gomphi	Book Three (3.79–80)
July 27–9: Caesar's triumphal march through Thessaly	Book Three (3.81)
August 1: Pompey reaches Thessaly and joins forces with Scipio	Book Three (3.82)
August 9: Battle of Pharsalus	Book Three (3.88–99)
August 10: Caesar at Larisa	Book Three (3.98)
August 12–16: Pompey at Amphipolis and Mytilene	Book Three (3.102)
September 19: Caesar reaches Asia	Book Three (3.105)
September 28: Achilles and L. Septimius kill Pompey	Book Three (3.104)
October 3: Beginning of the civil war at Alexandria	Book Three (3.106–12)
November 17: Pothinus put to death by Caesar	Book Three (3.112)
	Conclusion of Book Three and of the <i>BC</i>

## Appendix III: Nordling's appendix:

### APPENDIX

#### Level C: Legations

Most legations correspond to one of two formulaic modes, designated as such in the fourth column from the left:

F<sup>1</sup> = Subject + *mittit/misit/miserat* + *legatos* + Purpose and/or ACI;

F<sup>2</sup> = *Legati* + *veniunt/veniebant/venerant* + Purpose and/or ACI

The sub-categories (Ultimatum, Submission, Parley, *mandata*, etc.) into which this level of discourse may be subdivided are defined and more fully discussed in chapter three. There is no direct discourse (D) at this level of the continuum.

Citation	Speaker	Recipient	Formula	Sub-category
<i>BG</i> 1.3.4-6	Orgetorix	Casticus + Dumnorix	-	-
1.7.3	Helvetian deputies	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	-
1.8.3	Caesar	Helvetian deputies	-	Reply
1.11.2-3	Aedui	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	-
1.13.3-7	Divico	Caesar	-	Ultimatum
1.14.1-6	Caesar	Divico	-	Reply
1.14.7	Divico	Caesar	-	Reply
1.27.1-2	Helvetii	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
1.27.3	Caesar	Helvetii	-	Reply
1.34.1	Caesar	Ariovistus	F <sup>1</sup>	Parley (requested)
1.34.2-4	Ariovistus	Caesar's envoys	-	Reply
1.35.2-4	Caesar	Ariovistus	F <sup>1</sup>	-
1.36.1-7	Ariovistus	Caesar	-	Reply, Ultimatum
1.37.2-3	Aedui + Treveri	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	-
1.42.1	Ariovistus	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	-
1.43.4-9	Caesar	Ariovistus	-	Parley
1.44.1-13	Ariovistus	Caesar	-	Reply

1.45.1-3	Caesar	Ariovistus	-	Reply
1.47.1	Ariovistus	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	-
<i>BG</i> 2.3.2-5	Remii	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
2.12.5	Suessiones	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
2.28.2	Nervii	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
2.31.2-5	Aduatuci	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
2.32.1-2	Caesar	Aduatuci	-	Reply
<i>BG</i> 3.8.5	Veneti, et. al.	P. Crassus	-	-
3.21.3	Aquitani	P. Crassus	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
3.23.2	Vocates + Tarusates	"in every direction"	-	-
3.27.1	maxima pars Aquitaniae	P. Crassus	-	Submission
<i>BG</i> 4.7.2-5	Usipeti + Tencteri	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	Ultimatum
4.8.1-3	Caesar	Usipeti + Tencteri	-	Reply
4.9.1	Usipeti + Tencteri	Caesar	-	Reply
4.9.2	Caesar	Usipeti + Tencteri	-	Reply
4.11.1-3	Usipeti + Tencteri	Caesar	-	-
4.11.4-5	Caesar	Usipeti + Tencteri	-	Reply
4.16.5-7	Ubi	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
4.18.3	trans-Rhine Germans	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	Submission
4.18.3	Caesar	trans-Rhine Germans	-	Reply
4.21.5	Britanni	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	Submission
4.21.6	Caesar	Britanni	-	Reply
4.22.1	Morini	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	Submission
4.27.1	Britanni	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
4.27.5	Caesar	Britanni	-	Reply

4.36.1	Britanni	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	Submission
4.36.2	Caesar	Britanni	-	Reply
<i>BG</i> 5.1.7	Pirustae	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
5.1.8	Caesar	Pirustae	-	Reply
5.3.3	Cingetorix	Caesar	-	Submission
5.3.6-7	Indutiomarus	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
5.4.2	Caesar	Indutiomarus	-	Reply
5.20.1-2	Trinobantes	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
5.20.3	Caesar	Trinobantes	-	Reply
5.21.1	British tribes (named)	Caesar	-	Submission
5.22.3	Cassivellaunus	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
5.22.4	Caesar	Cassivellaunus	-	Reply
5.26.4	Treveri	besieged Romans	-	Parley (requested)
5.27.2-10	Ambiorix	C. Arpineius + Q. Iunius	-	Parley
5.41.2-6	Nervii	Q. Cicero	-	Parley
5.41.7-8	Q. Cicero	Nervii	-	Reply, Ultimatum
5.55.1	Treveri + Induriomarus	trans-Rhine Germans	F <sup>1</sup>	-
5.55.2	trans-Rhine Germans	Treveri	-	Reply
<i>BG</i> 6.4.2	Senones	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
6.4.3	Caesar	Senones	-	Reply
6.6.2	Menapii	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
6.6.3	Caesar	Menapii	-	Reply, Ultimatum
6.9.6-7	Ubi	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
6.32.1	Segni + Condrusi	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
6.32.2	Caesar	Segni + Condrusi	-	Reply

<i>BG</i> 7.5.2	Bituriges	Aedui	F <sup>1</sup>	-
7.12.3	Bituriges	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	-
7.12.3	Caesar	Bituriges	-	Reply
7.13.2	Bituriges	Caesar	-	Submission
7.32.3-6	Aedui	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	-
7.43.2	Aeduan envoys	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
7.43.4	Caesar	Aeduan envoys	-	Reply
7.89.3	defeated Gauls	Caesar	-	Submission
7.89.4	Caesar	defeated Gauls	-	Reply
7.90.2	Arverni	Caesar	-	Submission
7.90.2	Caesar	Arverni	-	Reply
<i>BC</i> 1.8.3	Pompeius, via envoy	Caesar	-	<i>mandata</i>
1.9.2-6	Caesar, via envoy	Pompeius	-	Reply, <i>mandata</i>
1.10.3-4	Pompeius, via envoy	Caesar	-	Reply, <i>mandata</i>
1.15.2	envoys from Cingulum	Caesar	F <sup>2</sup>	Submission
1.17.1-2	L. Domitius	Pompeius	F <sup>1</sup>	-
1.20.5	Domitius' soldiers	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
1.24.5-6	Caesar, via envoy	Pompeius	-	<i>mandata</i>
1.26.3-4	Caesar	Pompeius, via messengers	-	Parley (requested)
1.26.5	Pompeius	Caesar, via messengers	-	Reply
1.35.1-2	Caesar	15 leaders of Massilia	-	-
1.35.3-5	Massilian Senate, via envoys	Caesar	-	Reply
1.60.1	Oscenses et al.	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
1.60.3	Caesar	Oscenses et al.	-	Reply
1.74.2-3	Afranian + Caesarian soldiers	one another	-	Parley

1.84.1	defeated Afranians	Caesar	-	Parley (requested)
<i>BC</i> 2.12.2-4	Massilienses	C. Trebonius et al.	-	Submission
2.20.7	M. Terentius Varro	Caesar	-	Submission
2.44.1	Curio's defeated forces	P. Attius Varus	-	Submission
<i>BC</i> 3.9.5	envoys of Saloniae	Caesar	-	Submission
3.10.3-11	Caesar, via envoy	Pompeius	-	<i>mandata</i>
3.12.3-4	Appoloniates, et al.	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
3.15.6	L. Libo + M. Bibulus	M' Acilius + St. Murcus.	-	Parley (requested)
3.16.3-5	L. Libo	Caesar	-	Parley
3.17.2-4	Caesar	L. Libo	-	Reply
3.19.6	T. Labienus	P. Vatinius	-	Parley
3.34.2	Thessalians, et al.	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
3.80.1	Gomphi	Caesar	F <sup>1</sup>	Submission
3.80.3	Androsthene	Q. Scipio + Pompeius	F <sup>1</sup>	-
3.97.5	defeated Pompeians	Caesar	-	Submission
3.98.2	defeated Pompeians	Caesar	-	Submission
3.98.2	Caesar	defeated Pompeians	-	Reply

## Level D: Council Speeches

Passages distinguished from the narrative substructure by such formal indicators as *legatis tribunisque...convocatis, in concilio dixit, consilio convocato*, etc. are designated below by the asterisk (\*) in the fourth column from the left; passages in which direct discourse (D) occurs are indicated in the same column. The different types of councils (listed in the column on the far right) are defined and discussed in chapter three.

Citation	Speaker	Recipient	Formal Indic./	
			Dir. Disc.	Subcategory
<i>BG</i> 1.2.1-3	Orgetorix	Helvetii	-	-
1.3.1-3	Helvetii	assembled council	-	Reply
1.16.5-6	Caesar	Aeduan leaders	*	-
1.17.1-6	Liscus	Caesar	-	Reply
1.30.1-4	leaders of Gaul	Caesar	*	-
1.31.3-16	Diviciacus the Aeduan	Caesar	*	-
1.32.3-5	Diviciacus the Aeduan	Caesar	-	-
1.33.1	Caesar	Diviciacus + despairing Gauls	-	Reply
1.40.1-15	Caesar	officers + centurions	*	Officer Council
1.41.2-3	tribunes + centurions	Caesar	*	Reply
<i>BG</i> 2.5.1-3	Caesar	Remian Senate + Diviciacus	*	-
2.10.4	defeated Belgae	assembled council	*	War Council
<i>BG</i> 3.3.2-3	Galba's officer council	assembled council	*	Officer Council
3.5.3	Ser. Sulpicius Galba	centurions	*	Officer Council
3.8.4	Veneti	neighboring states	-	-
3.18.3-4	bogus deserter	Venelli	-	War Council
3.18.5-6	Venelli	assembled council	-	Reply
3.24.2-3	leaders of Aquitani	assembled council	-	War Council
<i>BG</i> 4.6.5	Caesar	leaders of Gaul	*	-
4.23.5	Caesar	lieutenants + tribunes	*	Officer Council
<i>BG</i> 5.6.2	Dumnorix the Aeduan	council of the Aedui	*	-



5.28.2-7	L. Aurunculeius Cotta	assembled council	*	Officer Council
5.29.1-7	Titurius Sabinus	Cotta, et al.	-	Reply
5.30.1	Cotta et. al.	Sabinus, et al.	-	Reply
5.30.1-3	Sabinus	Cotta + <i>militēs</i>	D	Reply
5.31.1-2	council members	Cotta + Sabinus	-	Reply
5.38.2-4	Ambiorix	Nervii	*	War Council
5.54.1	Caesar	leaders of Gaul	*	-
5.56.3-4	Indutiomarus	unspecified Gauls	*	War Council
BG 6.7.6	T. Labienus	assembled council	*	"Open Council"
6.7.8	T. Labienus	tribunes + centurions	*	Officer Council
6.40.2-4	besieged Roman soldiers	each other	-	-
BG 7.1.3-8	leaders of Gaul	each other	*	War Council
7.2.1-2	Carnutes	assembled council	-	Reply
7.4.1, 4	Vercingetorix	<i>clientes</i> + countrymen	*	-
7.14.2-10	Vercingetorix	assembled council	*	War Council
7.15.3-5	Bituriges	"all the Gauls," line 4	*	-
7.20.1-2	unnamed prosecutors	Vercingetorix	-	-
7.20.3-8, 12	Vercingetorix	assembled council	D	Reply
7.20.10-11	Roman slaves	assembled council	-	Narrative Intrusion
7.21.1-3	"the whole host"	assembled council	-	Reply
7.29.1-7	Vercingetorix	assembled council	*	-
7.34.1	Caesar	Aedui	*	-
7.37.2-5	Convictolitavis	Aeduan <i>adulescentes</i>	-	-
7.38.2-3, 7-8	Litaviccus the Aeduan	Aeduan soldiers	*, D	-
7.38.4-5	those coached in what to say	Aeduan soldiers	-	Narrative Intrusion

7.38.6	Aeduan soldiers	Litaviccus	-	Reply
7.45.8-9	Caesar	<i>legati</i> (i.e., lieutenants)	-	Officer Council
7.60.1	T. Labienus	unspecified	*	Officer Council
7.66.3-6	Vercingetorix	cavalry commanders	*	War Council
7.66.7	cavalry commanders	Vercingetorix	-	Reply
7.75.1	leaders of Gaul	unspecified	*	-
7.77.3-16	Critognatus, Arvernian	besieged at Alesia	*, D	War Council
7.78.1-2	besieged at Alesia	assembled council	-	War Council
7.89.1-2	Vercingetorix	defeated Gauls	*	-
BC 1.1.2-3	L. Lentulus, consul	Roman Senate	*	Senate
1.1.4	Q. Caecilius Scipio	Roman Senate	-	Senate
1.2.2	M. Marcellus	Roman Senate	-	Senate
1.2.3	M. Calpurnius + M. Rufus	Roman Senate	-	Senate
1.2.5	L. Lentulus, consul	Roman Senate	-	Senate
1.3.1	Pompeius	Roman Senate	*	Senate
1.3.6	L. Piso + L. Roscius	Roman Senate	-	Senate
1.6.1-2	Pompeius	Roman Senate	*	Senate
1.13.1	decurions of Auximum	P. Attius Varus	*	-
1.19.1	L. Domitius Ahenobarbus	assembled council	*	Officer Council
1.20.1-2	Domitius' soldiers	assembled council	-	-
1.21.4	Caesar	tribunes + <i>praefecti</i>	-	Officer Council
1.30.5	M. Porcius Cato	Roman citizens in Sicily	*	Senate?
1.32.2-9	Caesar	Roman Senate	*	Senate
1.33.1	Roman Senate	Caesar	-	Reply
1.33.2	Pompeius	Roman Senate	*	Senate
1.67.1-5	Afranians	assembled council	*	Officer Council

<i>BC</i> 2.3.3	L. Nasidius	L. Domitius Ahen. + Massilians	-	-
2.17.1-3	M. Terentius Varro	citizens of Gades	-	-
2.18.3	M. Terentius Varro	citizens of Gades	*	-
2.21.1	Caesar	citizens of Gades	*	-
2.30.2-3	Curio's officers	assembled council	*	Officer Council
2.31.1-8	Curio	assembled council	D	Reply
2.36.2	citizens of Utica	council + P. Varus Attius	-	-
<i>BC</i> 3.12.2	Apolloniates	L. Staberius	-	-
3.19.2	P. Vatinius	armies of Caesar + Pompeius	-	-
3.19.4	"the [Pompeian] side"	Caesar's army	-	Reply
3.45.6	Pompeius	unspecified	D	Officer Council?
3.83.1-3	L. Domitius Ahenobarbus	assembled council	*	Officer Council
3.86.2-5	Pompeius	assembled council	*, D	Officer Council
3.87.1-5	T. Atius Labienus	assembled council	D	Officer Council
3.87.6	Pompeius, et al.	assembled council	-	Reply

#### Level E: Exhortations and Harangues

The stage of battle (Pre-, Mid-, Post-) at which this level of discourse occurs is indicated in the right-hand column; "-" in the same column signifies that the discourse occurred apart from the narrative setting of battle. Direct discourse (D) is indicated in the fourth column from left.

<u>Citation</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	<u>Dir. Disc.</u>	<u>Stage of Battle</u>
<i>BG</i> 1.25.1	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
<i>BG</i> 2.21.1-2	Caesar	10th legion	-	Pre-
2.25.2	Caesar	12th legion	-	Mid-
<i>BG</i> 3.19.2	Q. Titurius Sabinus	soliders	-	Pre-

3.24.5	P. Licinius Crassus	soldiers	-	Pre-
<i>BG</i> 4.25.3	<i>aquilifer</i> of 10th legion	soldiers	D	Pre-
4.25.5	"our" soldiers	each other	-	Reply
<i>BG</i> 5.34.1	barbarian leaders	"all along the <i>acies</i> "	-	Pre-
5.48.9	Q. Tullius Cicero	soldiers	-	-
5.49.4	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
5.52.4	Caesar	Q. Cicero, et. al.	-	Post-
5.52.5-6	Caesar	soldiers	-	Post-
<i>BG</i> 6.8.1	Gauls [Treveri]	each other	-	Pre-
6.8.4	T. Atius Labienus	soldiers	D	Pre-
6.42.1-2	Caesar	soldiers	-	Post-
<i>BG</i> 7.17.4	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
7.17.4-7	soldiers	Caesar	-	Reply
7.19.4-5	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
7.24.2	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
7.27.2	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
7.40.4	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
7.52.1-4	Caesar	soldiers	-	Post-
7.62.2	T. Atius Labienus	soldiers	-	Pre-
7.62.5	Camulogenus	unspecified Gauls	-	Mid-
7.86.3	Caesar	soldiers	-	Mid-
<i>BC</i> 1.7.1-7	Caesar	13th legion	-	-
1.7.8	13th legion	Caesar	-	Reply
1.17.3-4	L. Domitius Ahenobarbus	soldiers	-	-
1.45.1	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
1.76.1-3	M. Petreius	soldiers	-	-

1.84.3-4	L. Afranius	soldiers	-	Post-
1.85.1-12	Caesar	soldiers	-	Reply
<i>BC</i> 2.5.2	D. Iunius Brutus	soldiers	-	-
2.28.2-3	Sex. Quintilius Varus	Curio's soldiers	-	-
2.32.2-14	C. Scribonius Curio	soldiers	D	Pre-
2.33.1	soldiers	Curio	-	Reply
2.34.5	Curio	soldiers	-	Pre-
2.39.2-3	Curio	soldiers	D	Pre-
2.41.2	Saburra	barbarian troops	-	Pre-
2.41.3	Curio	soldiers	-	Mid-
2.43.1	Marcus Rufus	soldiers	-	-
2.43.1	soldiers	Marcus Rufus	-	Reply
<i>BC</i> 3.6.1	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
3.41.5	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
3.46.4	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
3.73.2-6	Caesar	soldiers	-	Post-
3.80.6	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
3.82.1	Pompeius	soldiers	-	Pre-
3.85.4	Caesar	soldiers	D	Pre-
3.89.4	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
3.90.1-2	Caesar	soldiers	-	Pre-
3.94.5	Pompeius	soldiers	-	Mid-
3.95.1	Caesar	soldiers	-	-
3.97.1, 4	Caesar	soldiers	-	-

## Miscellaneous

The miscellaneous discourse of the *commentarii* may be subdivided into the following sub-categories: Self-Reflection (SR), Private Audience (PA), Rumors and Gossip (RG), and Challenge and Insults (CI); each is defined and more fully discussed in chapter three. Direct discourse (D) is indicated in the fourth column from left.

Citation	Speaker/Thinker	Recipient	Dir. Disc.	Subcategory
<i>BG</i> 1.7.4	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.11.6	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.18.2-9	Caesar	Liscus, et al.	-	PA
1.20.2-4	Diviciacus	Caesar	-	PA
1.20.5	Caesar	Diviciacus	-	Reply
1.20.6	Caesar	Dumnorix	-	PA
1.28.4	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.33.2-4	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.37.4	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.39.1	Gauls + traders	Roman soldiers	-	RG
1.42.2-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.47.2-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
<i>BG</i> 2.1.1	-	Caesar	-	RG
2.14.1-5	Diviciacus	Caesar	-	PA
2.15.1	Caesar	Diviciacus	-	Reply
2.30.3-4	Belgae	Roman soldiers	-	CI
<i>BG</i> 3.1.2	Caesar	-	-	SR
3.7.1	Caesar	-	-	SR
3.10.1-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
3.17.7	Q. Titurius Sabinus	-	-	SR
<i>BG</i> 4.9.3	Caesar	-	-	SR

4.11.4	Caesar	-	-	SR
4.13.1-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
4.16.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
4.17.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
4.19.4	Caesar	-	-	SR
4.20.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
<i>BG</i> 5.4.2	Caesar	Indutiomarus	-	PA
5.4.3	Caesar	-	-	SR
5.6.1	Caesar	-	-	SR
5.7.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
5.44.3	T. Pullo	L. Vorenius	D	CI
5.58.2	Treveri	Roman soliders	-	CI
<i>BG</i> 6.1.1-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
6.2.3	Caesar	-	-	SR
6.9.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
6.32.5	Caesar	-	-	SR
6.35.4	Germans	each other	-	RG
6.36.1-2	Q. Tullius Cicero	-	-	SR
6.37.7-8	Roman garrison	each other	-	RG
6.41.3	survivors of Aduatuca	-	-	RG
<i>BG</i> 7.6.2-4	Caesar	-	-	SR
7.10.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
7.33.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
7.43.5	Caesar	-	-	SR
7.47.3	disobedient soldiers	-	-	SR

7.54.2	Caesar	-	-	SR
7.54.3-4	Caesar	Viridomarus + Eoredorix	-	PA
7.56.1-2	Caesar	-	-	SR
7.59.1	Gauls	each other	-	RG
7.59.3-4	T. Atius Labienus	-	-	SR
7.85.2-3	Gauls + Romans	-	-	SR
<i>BC</i> 1.11.1-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.22.3	Lentulus Spinther	Caesar	-	PA
1.22.5	Caesar	Lentulus Spinther	-	Reply
1.25.4	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.26.6	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.71.1	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.72.1-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
1.74.6	Afranius' son	Caesar	-	PA
1.82.2-3	Caesar	-	-	SR
2.29.3	Roman garrison	each other	-	RG
2.34.4	C. Caninius Rebilus	C. Scribonius Curio	D	CI
2.43.2-3	defeated Roman soldiers	each other	-	RG
<i>BC</i> 3.11.1	L. Vibullius Rufus	-	-	SR
3.15.8	M' Acilius + L. Staius Murcus	-	-	SR
3.17.1	Caesar	-	-	SR
3.43.3	Caesar	-	-	SR
3.48.2	Pompeians	Caesarians	-	CI
3.60.1	Caesar	Roucillus + Egus	-	PA
3.71.4	T. Atius Labienus	captured Caesarians	-	CI
3.74.3	Caesar	-	-	SR



3.78.3	Caesar	-	-	SR
3.78.5	Pompeius	-	-	SR
3.79.4	Pompeius	the provinces, etc.	-	RG
3.85.2	Caesar	-	-	SR