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# Prospects and Pitfalls in the Pursuit of Peace

A Case Study of the On-Going Peace Process in Colombia

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis presented an in-depth qualitative case study of the peace process between the Colombian state and the FARC guerrilla from 2012 and onwards. The purpose of it was to problematize the peace process by investigating the prospects and pitfalls of negotiating peace within a neoliberal development model, by asking what reasons there are to believe that the process will lead to peace, contrasting past experiences. The analysis was made by applying Johan Galtung's understanding of peace combined with theories on how inequalities are connected to peace and conflict. Through interviews with actors involved in the peace process and by consulting several secondary sources a mixed picture of the prospects to gain peace became evident. On the one hand not discussing the development model could be one of the reasons for the negotiations to proceed while on the other hand experiences from other cases have shown that leaving out root causes to conflict might lead to the continuation of violence after a peace agreement is signed. The interviewed civil society actors lifted the same concerns. This study has shown the complexity of gaining peace and that ending the armed conflict cannot be the sole purpose of a peace process.

**Key words:** *peace process; conflict; development; inequality; Colombia; FARC; positive peace; Galtung*

## RESUMEN

Esta tesis presenta un estudio de caso del proceso de paz entre el Estado Colombiano y la guerrilla de las FARC desde el 2012 hasta la actualidad. El objetivo de la tesis es problematizar el proceso de paz a través de una exploración de las posibilidades y los desafíos de negociar la paz dentro un modelo de desarrollo neoliberal. Esta tesis se pregunta por las razones que existen para pensar que este proceso llevará a la paz a diferencia de experiencias pasadas de negociación en Colombia. El análisis se lleva a cabo aplicando el abordaje que Johan Galtung ha desarrollado sobre la paz combinándolo con teorías sobre cómo las desigualdades se relacionan con la paz y el conflicto. La exploración de la perspectiva de varios actores involucrados en el proceso de paz junto con la consulta de varias fuentes secundarias permitió poner en evidencia un panorama mixto sobre las posibilidades de conseguir paz en Colombia. Por una parte, el hecho de no discutir el modelo de desarrollo podría ser una de las razones por las que aún se negocia la paz, mientras que las experiencias de otros casos han demostrado que no abordar las causas estructurales del conflicto podría llevar a la continuación de la violencia después de que un acuerdo de paz sea firmado. Los actores de la sociedad civil entrevistados para esta tesis manifestaron las mismas preocupaciones. Este estudio ha demostrado la complejidad de obtener paz y que poner fin a un conflicto armado no puede ser el único objetivo de un proceso de paz.

**Palabras claves:** *proceso de paz; conflicto; desarrollo; desigualdad; Colombia; FARC; paz positivo; Galtung*

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AECID	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo <i>Spanish International Cooperation Agency</i>
APSCP	Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil para la Paz <i>Permanente Assembly of the Civil Society for Peace</i>
ELN	Ejército Liberación Nacional <i>National Liberation Army</i>
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación <i>Popular Liberation Army</i>
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo <i>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army</i>
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
HDI	Human Development Index
ILSA	Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativo <i>Latin American Institute for an Alternative Society and Rights</i>
MOVICE	Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado <i>National Movement for Victims of State Crimes</i>
NDP	National Development Plan
OACP	Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz <i>Office of the High Commissioner for Peace</i>
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UP	Unión Patriótica <i>Patriotic Union</i>

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*But is it impossible to desire the end without desiring the means. Those who deny liberation to Latin America also deny our only possible rebirth, and incidentally absolve the existing structures from blame. Our youth multiplies, rises, listens: what does the voice of system offer? The system speaks a surrealist language. In lands that are empty it proposes to avoid births; in countries where capital is plentiful but wasted it suggests that capital is lacking; it describes as “aid” the deforming orthopedics of loans and the draining of wealth that results from foreign investments; it calls upon big land-owners to carry out agrarian reforms and upon the oligarchy to practice social justice.*

*[---] Is everything forbidden us except to fold up our arms? Poverty is not written in the stars; underdevelopment is not one of God’s mysterious designs. Redemptive years of revolution pass; the ruling classes wait and meanwhile pronounce hellfire anathema on everybody. In a sense the right wing is correct in identifying itself with tranquility and order: it is an order of daily humiliation for the majority, but an order nonetheless; it is a tranquility in which injustice continues to be unjust and hunger to be hunger.*

*Eduardo Galeano (1940-2015)*

# 1. SETTING THE SCENE

## 1.1. Background and research problem

After more than a half century of internal armed conflict in Colombia, leaving behind more than 220 000 people dead and around 5 700 000 people – equal to around 15 per cent of the total population – internally displaced, the country today finds itself at the historical moment when ending the armed conflict to gain peace seems to be within reach (GMH, 2013: 31, 34). Since late 2012 the Colombian Government under President Juan Manuel Santos and the largest guerrilla – FARC-EP<sup>1</sup> (hereafter FARC) – are negotiating to find a sustainable solution to end the armed conflict. By this Colombia has, for the fourth time, entered a peace process and is at the verge to enter a post-conflict peacebuilding phase to transform the society to one where violence and conflict belongs to the past.

After three unsuccessful peace processes between the Colombian state and FARC between 1982 and 2002 and the former President Álvaro Uribe's failed attempt to crush the insurgencies with hard military power between 2002 and 2010, the on-going peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba could be the last chance for Colombia to end the armed conflict. Most people agree on that if the negotiations fail this time, it will be extremely difficult to ever find a peaceful and sustainable solution to end the armed conflict in Colombia (ICG, 2012). Therefore it is of importance that this peace process – including the peace negotiations and plans for the post-conflict phase – takes into account all the causes and conflictivities<sup>2</sup> that are related to the armed conflict and have added to the violence in the country. In the critical literature on peace processes and peacebuilding it has been shown that this is not usually the case (e.g. Paris, 2002a, Richmond, 2012; 2015 and Kurtenbach, 2013). These scholars have shown that the processes leading to peace often are

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<sup>1</sup> Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo. In English: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army.

<sup>2</sup> Adopted from the Spanish word *conflictividad*, *conflictivity* (*conflictivities in plural*) is used to refer to all possible tensions and lines of conflict that sustain and reproduce a conflict. The term is widely used in the peacebuilding discourse in Colombia to describe the factors that are seen as obstacles for building a peaceful society. It will be used throughout this thesis to capture how the dynamics of conflict is understood in Colombia.

elite driven, which leads to low ownership of the processes of the people actually affected by conflict and that rather than addressing the structural causes and conflictivities to conflict, the post-conflict peacebuilding ends up to simply be the implementation of a political and economic model mainly promoting economic growth with the hope that the benefits from such development will trickle-down to the people and transform war to peace.

As a point of departure for the negotiations with FARC, President Santos early insisted on that the development model<sup>3</sup> in Colombia is not subject to discussion (Gómez Giraldo, 2012). Contradictory to Santos' statement, many of those who have examined the Colombian armed conflict suggest that there are structural causes and conflictivities embedded in the development model, such as unequal distribution of land and wealth, weak and absent state institutions, and concentration of power, which have both sparked and prolonged the conflict (see e.g. Dobovšek & Odar, 2010 for a review of the causes to the Colombian conflict). Experiences from the similar peace processes and peacebuilding cases of El Salvador and Guatemala have further shown that, even if they are generally considered to be success stories in terms of ending the armed conflict by the signing of a peace agreement, many of the root causes and conflictivities were not addressed in neither the peace negotiations nor the following peacebuilding missions. In the 15 to 20 years after officially gaining peace both cases show worrying signs of rising violence and instability (Paris, 2002a; Kurtenbach, 2013).

Focusing on the peace process case of Colombia it seems to follow the same course as the two above-mentioned cases and how peace processes commonly are carried out. There is, to begin with, limited public participation in the peace process in general and in the negotiations in particular. Adding to this, and perhaps even more important for the prospects of building a sustainable peace, the decision to not negotiate the present development model with its inherent causes and conflictivities connected to the armed conflict could be problematic.

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<sup>3</sup> The development model is here – and onwards – referred to as the political and economic foundations of the Colombian society, which generally can be seen as a neoliberal market economy and democracy. This is discussed in more detail in chapter four.



## 1.2. Purpose and research questions

Drawing on the above introduction and problem formulation, Colombia is presenting an on-going peace process case at the same time as they are at the verge to enter the peacebuilding phase. It is an appropriate case to study to gain insight of the difficulties of reaching peace, especially since the causes to conflict are closely related to a specific development model and not, as in many other recent cases, such as Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, where the conflict has evolved around ethnical differences.

The purpose of this thesis is to problematize the on-going peace process in Colombia from 2012 and onwards. It is done from a critical perspective and is inspired by Johan Galtung's concept of positive peace combined with theories evolving around inequalities' relation to peace and conflict. As a point of departure this thesis take off in paradoxical notion of negotiating and building peace within a development model that is at the same time often made responsible for generating and sustaining the armed conflict and the continuing violence. By analysing the prospects and pitfalls of the on-going peace process in Colombia from 2012 and onwards, in relation to past peace processes in the country, the main research question guiding this thesis is:

- *What reasons are there to believe that the peace process in Colombia this time will lead to peace?*

To be able to answer this overarching research question, two sub-questions lead the analysis forward:

- *How can the causes to and the conflictivities prolonging the armed conflict in Colombia be understood, focusing on their relation to the past and present development models?*
- *How do representatives from the Colombian civil society perceive the peace process in terms of laying the foundation for peace in Colombia?*

### 1.3. Point of departure for analysis

For the purpose of this thesis I believe that it is important to be open with the grounds on which both the research problem and analysis are based on. This is important due to both transparency issues as well as setting the scientific boundaries for what is discussed. Further, this more abstract discussion leads in to how and why I choose the theories I do, as explained in more detail in the next chapter.

This thesis is written in the light of and inspired by what in theory of science is called *critical realism*; a scientific point of departure where it is suggested that a real and objective reality exists, but what we know about it depends on the concepts and theory we use to understand the studied social phenomena. An interesting implication of applying critical realism in a study of this kind is the perspective's view on whether structures or agents are the determining factor in society (Danermark, *et al.*, 2003: 127). In other theory of science positions this is seen as a dichotomy where the two cannot be combined, but in critical realism it is necessary to make a dual analysis because it sees both the structures' and agents' developments as two sides of the same process (*ibid.*: 155). The view offered by critical realism implies that when analysing a social phenomenon, such as a peace process, it is necessary to apply this dual way of looking at structures and agents. For example, inequality is a social structure that in many ways has an impact on the individuals in society, but this inequality can only be changed or reproduced by the social agents living within the structure (*ibid.*: 133). This perspective thus allows for an analysis where structures are seen as constructed and changeable by actors at the same time as they have a heavy impact on how actors act in society.

Mikkelsen (2005: 135) follows in the same line of thinking and stresses that the critical realist researcher aims to identify structures in order to change them. For me, this position signifies that I as a researcher take on a normative standpoint by asking critical questions of the structures, in this case inequalities' relation to conflict and peace, with the purpose to problematize them and point at the necessity to address them to build a sustainable peace. Mikkelsen further argues that, contrasting the positivist's notion of the possibility to gain objective knowledge, the critical theories used by the critical realist are of interpretative

nature where social phenomena need to be understood in their historical context and where they are strongly defined by power-asymmetries and conflicting interests (*ibid.*: 136). This notion is appealing and leads me to relate the peace process case of Colombia to both its historical context as well as pointing at the need to understand the power dynamics that have affected the country throughout the history of the internal conflict.

#### **1.4. The critical literature on peace processes and peacebuilding**

Based on Jan Selby (2011), I acknowledge that it is necessary to make a distinction between the two concepts peace process and peacebuilding. According to him (2011: 12-13) peace processes are normally the processes for negotiating and nurturing peace, where peacebuilding makes up the overlapping last phase of it. Many of the scholars researching these processes do not make the same distinction, but treat them as being the two sides of the same coin. In this section I present some of the critical research that has focused on the two processes in one way or another. To take on a literature review covering all aspects of peace processes would, in terms of scope and aim of this thesis, be overwhelming and therefore focus here is on the researchers who have taken on a critical approach to see where my own study fits in relation to them.

Much research on peace processes and peacebuilding have focused on the ideas, interests and ideologies behind the implemented strategies and on how these affect the outcomes of the peace processes and peacebuilding missions (e.g. Paris, 2002b; Richmond, 2012; Schellhaas & Seegers, 2009; and Darby, 2009). These studies have often analysed the way international actors have been involved and steered the efforts for achieving peace. These international driven peace processes and peacebuilding missions have, ever since the introduction of the concept in the 1990s, been based on the consensus that democratisation; rule of law; free and globalised market economies; and human rights are the pillars that would create sustainable peace in conflict-affected states (Richmond, 2006: 292). The promotion of the said principles is often called *liberal peacebuilding* and has from academia as well as from practitioners been met with criticism for not delivering peace as it is supposed to, pointing at the weak results of peacebuilding in Central America, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq to name a few examples.

Roughly the research on these themes can be summed up in two main tracks where one side has examined the ideological foundation on which peace processes and peacebuilding is based while the other side has been more concerned with the faults of current models without necessarily question the ideological basis on which peace is being built. Representatives for the first view have found evidence and criticise international peacebuilding for being the expansion of empire (Schellhaas & Seegers, 2009); the revival of the *mission civilisatrice* (Paris, 2002b); the expression of the continuation of colonialism (Darby, 2009); or being one of the instruments to maintain the Western hegemonic power throughout the globe (Ludwig & Blanco, 2012). The second view has focused less on the ideas behind the processes, basing their critique on evidences around issues concerning ownership of and participation in peace processes. Scholars in this tradition have found that the weak results of peace processes and peacebuilding initiatives are connected to confusing *local* ownership with *national* ownership, where local refer to the people affected by conflict and national often is limited to the elites in the conflict country (Richmond, 2012); not having enough public or societal participation (Paffenholz, 2014); not including all the necessary peacebuilding actors in all stages of the peace process (Does, 2013); or not taking the agency and resistance within a society and among different actors seriously enough when promoting a liberal peace (Chandler, 2013).

Studies made on three peace processes and peacebuilding cases in Central America have examined the conventional approach to gain peace through negotiation. Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador all experienced armed conflict with various intensity throughout the 20th century. Similar to Colombia, the causes to the armed internal conflicts in these countries have been found in the historical inequality polarising the countries with a small rich oligarchic elite and a majority of poor and marginalised population (Kurtenbach, 2013; Paris, 2002a). During the 1990s all three countries succeeded to end armed conflict through the signing of peace agreements between the states and the guerrillas. However, since the signing both El Salvador and Guatemala have suffered from escalating violence while Nicaragua has not had the same negative development<sup>4</sup> (Kurtenbach 2013: 117).

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 1 for graph showing the violent development seen in homicides per 100.000 inhabitants.

In his study from 2002 Roland Paris examined the Central American peacebuilding cases and concluded that neither the peace agreements nor the politics after ending conflict sufficiently transformed the conflictivities reproducing conflict, instead focus was on reforms to have higher economic growth. He found that “[e]conomic growth is important, but [that] it is not enough, since unbalanced growth will not necessarily reduce the enormous disparities in wealth and well-being that have traditionally fuelled unrest in these countries” (Paris, 2002a: 61).

In her comparative study of the three cases, Sabine Kurtenbach (2013: 119) concluded that gaining peace by the signing of a peace agreement is not the same as ending violence and social conflict and that the reason for Nicaragua’s relative success is due to making relevant socio-economic and political reforms while both Guatemala and El Salvador have had economic and military elites who have maintained the *status quo* and not sufficiently transformed the structures fostering violence. Supporting these findings, Mo Hume (2008: 320-321) found that the peace agreement in El Salvador was limited to ending the armed conflict and did not take into account the need of addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. She further noted that the El Salvadorian government pushed for the implementation of a neoliberal economic model consisting of privatisation and the creation of an insecure labour market. This created a society with few opportunities for especially the youth, which in turn laid the foundation the growing of violence carried out by mainly youth gangs (Hume, 2008: 329-330). Following the same line, focusing on youth violence in Guatemala, Kurtenbach (2014) came to the conclusion that the traditional economic and political elite’s unwillingness to build a more inclusive and equal society after formally ending the armed conflict in the country is the reason to why youth have been excluded from participating in society and therefore sought out other, violent, activities.

Summarising the different findings, it is evident that not enough of what generates internal conflict and violence in wartime normally is addressed in post-conflict peacebuilding. Although analysing failure of peace processes from different perspectives, the above literature review, focusing on Central American experiences, demonstrates that economic

and political structures seems to be vital to change in societies where conflict is explained by political, social, historical and economic inequalities.

### **1.5. Positioning this thesis in the pool of previous research**

This thesis examines the on-going peace process in Colombia from a positive peace approach combined with the inequality, peace and conflict approach. While not being the first study in line with doing this, it seems to be as relevant to use today as in the past. As every peace process is bounded by its own context, this thesis is contributing with insights from the Colombian case to further build on the literature on positive peace and inequality, peace and conflict, thus also bridging two fields of study: development studies and peace and conflict studies. This thesis contributes to the literature and base its academic relevance by focusing on a case where the international presence is not as determining as in most other similar cases. Where most previous research is made on cases where the armed conflict has ended and formal peace has been achieved, this study contributes with insights from a case where the armed conflict yet is to end and peace is still far from being achieved.

### **1.6. Demarcations**

Although recognizing that the international community is an important actor involved in the on-going peace process in Colombia, they will due to the limited space and time of this thesis be left out of the analysis. This influences the results, but since Colombia is a case where, compared to many other similar cases, the processes that should lead to peace are mainly national driven and not decided from outside actors I believe that this is a reasonable demarcation. Another demarcation made in this thesis is where focus of the analysis is made. Throughout the thesis focus is on inequality and its influence on peace and conflict. Although acknowledging the complexity of any peace process and in the Colombian case in particular, taking all the aspects of the conflicts into account, such as the illegal drug issue or the victims of the conflict question and the importance of post-conflict reconciliation, these important aspects would not fit within the scope of this thesis. The focus on inequality is motivated by being one of the causes often referred to when

explaining the conflict and therefore I consider it as a reasonable point of departure for the analysis. A last demarcation important to highlight is the focus on only the on-going peace process between the Colombian state and FARC. While FARC is the biggest guerrilla active in Colombia there are others that are continuing their armed struggle where the most prominent is ELN<sup>5</sup>. Most people argue that a peace agreement with FARC is not sufficient to achieve peace in Colombia, as a peace process with ELN is yet to begin. However, since FARC is the biggest and most prominent guerrilla group I deem it as reasonable to not further problematize ELN noninvolvement in the peace process and how this affects the prospects for gaining peace, as much of the discussed in this thesis would hold true for a peace process with ELN as well.

### **1.7. Disposition**

The next chapter presents the theoretical framework used to analyse the case at hand. Chapter three continues with presenting the research design and the methods that I have used to collect and analyse the material. Chapter four begins the analysis of the Colombian case by providing the history of and the causes to the armed conflict, discussing the past peace processes and how the development model expresses itself, and presenting the views from the civil society in relation to the peace process. Chapter five continues the analysis by connecting the threads and gives answers to the main research question. The thesis ends with Chapter six, which provides some final conclusions and recommendations for future research.

## **2. THEORETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE**

Taking off in Danermark, *et al.*'s (2003: 51) notion of what role theories have in social sciences, I treat the theories guiding the analysis in this thesis as science's transitive objects, which means that they represent the dimension that connects the research with the studied reality. In this view theories represent the tools that – more or less trustworthy –

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<sup>5</sup> Ejército Liberación Nacional. In English: National Liberation Army.

give us the possibility to acquire knowledge about social structures and the generative mechanisms connected to them (*ibid.*: 27). Having said that, theories are not a reflection of the reality as the socially constructed language and concepts we use do not allow this, and being aware of this, it is of great importance to consider what the used concepts really mean and constitute (*ibid.*: 62).

Applicable for this thesis, this understanding of theories' role in science has two implications. Firstly, it means that the used concepts and words are bearers of meaning and must be used with care and transparency. Secondly, Danermark, *et al.*'s understanding of how theories can be used also say something about what expectations one can have on them. Theory in this thesis is used as the link between the reality that exist *out there*, which is not able to study objectively, and the research I conduct. Theory is thus the lens I put on to give the studied reality meaning. For the purpose of this thesis this means that the used theoretical framework should be seen as the abstract dimension giving meaning to the material I have collected in relation to the research problem presented in the beginning of the thesis.

In this thesis I choose to use two complementary theoretical approaches to analyse the case at hand; the first is based on Johan Galtung's concept of positive peace and the second is developed from theories on how inequality, peace and conflict are connected. These two approaches complement one another and provide a comprehensive framework for an analysis of the prospects and pitfalls of the peace process and building peace in Colombia.

## **2.1. Theory of positive and negative peace**

Peace as the absence of violence is the famous definition coined by Johan Galtung, the founder of modern peace studies (Galtung, 1969). To understand peace one must therefore understand violence. According to Galtung (1996: 197) violence is the “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to *life*, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible”. By this definition violence has three interlinked levels or dimensions. The first is *personal* violence, implying that there is an actor intentionally doing damage to another actor (*ibid.*: 2). The second is *structural* violence, which derives



from the social structure itself and takes the form of social injustices. This is the case when resources in society are unevenly distributed to the point where some groups enjoy high quality welfare while others are excluded and are by this taking damage (Galtung, 1969: 171; 1996: 2). According to Preti (2002: 100) the two major forms of structural violence are repression in politics and exploitation in economics. The third dimension is *cultural violence*, which is defined as the overarching structure legitimising personal and structural violence (Galtung, 1996: 2).

Understanding the different aspects of violence, one can start defining peace. According to Galtung (1969) peace can take two shapes; *negative* and *positive*, where the negative peace concept signifies the absence of personal violence, often understood as the ending of armed conflict in the peacebuilding praxis, and positive peace entails the absence of structural violence or when social justice prevails, often referred to as the goal of peacebuilding missions (Galtung, 1969: 183; UN, 1992; 2010). To reach sustainable peace it is vital to address all the different sides of violence, not only the direct forms but also the structural and cultural sides of the phenomenon (Galtung, 1996: 265). To do so, Galtung launched the peacebuilding concept as the process of identifying the structures and root causes to conflict and find alternatives to these to mitigate the occurrence of war and relapse into conflict (Galtung, 1976: 298). Since much of direct violence can be traced back to structural violence, such as exploitation and repression, and cultural violence being the legitimising force behind the structures, focus of peacebuilding should be to identify and transform these structures while also promoting a culture of peace (Galtung, 1996: 270-271). This has also been the guiding star for United Nations when developing their approach to promote peace (UN, 1992; 2010)

The perspective on peace and peacebuilding offered by Galtung is appealing, but also leaves room for questions. He speaks in broad terms and the definitions can be read in many different ways. This vagueness together with the lack of concrete strategies to achieve positive peace is a weakness of the approach. For this thesis Galtung's approach therefore needs some complementation. This is offered in the next sections, which aims to enrich the Galtungian way of understanding peace and conflict. Focusing on the structural

side of peace and conflict, the following section evolves around inequalities' relation to peace and conflict.

## **2.2. Theory of inequality, peace and conflict**

Oliver Richmond (2015), one of the most active scholars within peace research today, recently published an article where he reviewed the collected theoretical insight on inequality and its relationship with peace and development. In the article Richmond concluded that there is a problematic tension between the policies guiding peacebuilding efforts due to its predilection towards the promotion of the neoliberal forms of capitalism. A system that may function in a stable, late capitalist state might in a conflict-ridden society further generate conflictivities and violence or as Richmond (2015: 3) puts it: "Global flows of capital, primary resources, global governance and neoliberal states work against the democratic political interests of citizens and unsettle their habitus of legitimacy". The research on inequality's impact on society goes far back. Theoretical pieces from Marx and Engels in the 19th century to newer works by Harvey (2005), Pickett and Wilkinson (2009), and Piketty (2014) all have investigated from different perspectives how material inequalities influences the dynamics of society. Much focus has traditionally been on how economic inequality in a society creates and reproduces conflicts and the more equal a society is, the more stable and just it gets.

Christopher Cramer, when researched the connection between inequality and conflict, found that economic inequality is important to explaining civil conflict, but "only insofar as the economic is considered inseparable from the social, political, cultural and historical" (Cramer, 2003: 409). It is thus important to look at what *kind* of inequality that might influence conflict and how this looks like in the case one is studying. In line with Cramer, Nemanja Džuverović (2014) stressed the importance to acknowledge the multidimensional character of inequality. In her view inequality is not only an economic phenomena, but also a social one visible in how much access people have to different welfare provisions, such as education, health and social services (*ibid.*: 550).

The simplest understanding of how inequality generates conflict works through two general mechanisms. The first – the psychological mechanism – is understood as the process when inequality produces *relative deprivation*. On an individual level a person is relatively deprived when he is deprived of X, further explained as when “(i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X” (Bartusevičius, 2014: 38). The X can in this regard be economic assets as income or land, but also for example access to welfare provisions or political power. Further, the amount of deprivation influences the possibility that the deprivation leads to conflict or not, meaning that the relative deprivation “must be sufficiently large to result in frustration intense enough to predispose one to commit violence” (*ibid.*: 38-39). The second mechanism – the social mechanism – is the factor creating unity in a group around an issue related to the relative deprivation, e.g. social class, which is similar to how an ethnic or religious group unites around their identities (*ibid.*: 39). Although recognizing the importance of inequality on an individual level, so called vertical inequality, what Bartusevičius stressed, being supported by Arnim Langer and Frances Stewart (2013), is that horizontal inequality – inequality between groups – is the determining factor explaining how inequality is connected to conflicts.

While Džuverović (2014) and Bartusevičius (2014) discuss inequalities in economic terms and access to welfare provisions, Langer and Stewart explain horizontal inequalities to be either *economic* (e.g. ownership of assets, income or employment opportunities), *political* (e.g. distribution of political opportunities, power and capability to participate in decision-making), *social* (e.g. access to welfare provisions) or *cultural* (e.g. differences in recognition and hierarchal statuses of different groups’ cultural norms, customs and practices) (Langer & Stewart, 2013: 3). The different inequalities can also reinforce each other, for example: social inequality could be reinforced by economic inequality or the opportunity to influence political decisions could be determined by one’s educational level which in turn is determined by the person’s social and economic position.

To summarize, inequality and how it is connected to conflict needs to be understood as a multidimensional concept and in horizontal terms rather than vertical. Much research that has questioned inequality as an explaining factor to conflict has used measurements of vertical inequality to do so (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Researchers who have used a horizontal understanding of inequality when trying to explain civil wars have on the other hand shown a strong relationship between the two (see Langer & Stewart, 2013: 9-10 for a summary of the studies).

### **2.3. Towards an analytical framework**

Galtung's triple understanding of peace, where one side of it is the absence of direct violence – or armed conflict – and the other two imply a restructuring of the root causes that are producing and reproducing conflict and the promotion of a culture of peace, is well tuned to how other theorists understand how inequality is linked to conflict. Galtung himself wrote about how violence also is the structural violence expressed as social injustice, which can be interpreted as inequality when the resources exist but are in the hand of a few while the majority of people suffer. In this line of thinking it is necessary to redistribute resources to mitigate and resolve conflict at its core. Depending on the type of conflict this is also the purpose of peacebuilding where it is stressed that structures promoting conflict should be transformed into structures promoting peace in its positive meaning.

The two approaches presented above can thus complement one another in an analysis of how conflict and the transformation of conflict to peace can be understood. Inspired by Preti<sup>6</sup> (2002: 104), the below table shows the linkages and nuances of the two approaches.

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<sup>6</sup> In his study Preti (2002) combined the positive peace approach with a political economy approach to analyse the peacebuilding attempts in Guatemala.

**Table 1. Positive peace and inequality, peace and conflict approaches**

	<b>Characteristics of war violence</b>	<b>Focus of the analysis</b>	<b>Obstacles to peace</b>	<b>Strategies for peace</b>
<b>Positive peace approach</b>	Personal violence + structural violence + cultural violence	Root causes to war	Persistence of structural and cultural violence even if direct violence is controlled	Direct peace (peacemaking) + structural peace + cultural peace (peacebuilding)
<b>Inequality, peace and conflict approach</b>	Conflict driven by inequality understood in a multidimensional and horizontal way	Economic, social, political and cultural inequalities	Inequalities embedded in societal structures/development model	Redistribution of and allow access to resources for everyone

The two approaches complement each other in four aspects. The first is to describe the characteristics of conflict where the Galtungian approach works on three levels, but since it is a generic theory it does not present an exact analysis of *which* structures and *how* these spark and prolong conflict. The inequality, peace and conflict approach can offer one way of understanding this. However, there are many types of structures that could fit into Galtung's model and here I choose to use an approach that is suitable to the case I analyse. Secondly, the focus of analysis is similar in the two approaches. Where Galtung is vague, promoting an understanding of root causes to conflict, the inequality, peace and conflict approach offers specific dimensions to analyse. Thirdly, Galtung points at the need to not only end direct violence to gain peace, but offers few tools of how to transform the structural and cultural violence. Here the inequality, peace and conflict approach frames the inequalities embedded in society or in a specific development model as the main obstacles for gaining peace. It thus offers a more radical view and stresses the need to address the flaws in the structures upholding society. Forth and lastly, the same line of thinking is suitable to apply on what the necessary strategies for peace could be. Whereas the positive peace approach stresses the need of building peace to transform the structures and culture promoting violence, the inequality, peace and conflict approach is more far-reaching and calls for the need make changes in the economic and political development model which produces inequality. In concrete terms this means to redistribute assets and make different welfare provisions accessible for all people.

To summarise, my understanding of the two approaches is that whereas Galtung's positive peace approach gives a comprehensive understanding of the peace concept, the inequality, peace and conflict theory gives some tools for analysis to understand the causes and conflictivities that drives conflict, when this is applicable. The combination of the two approaches offers a bridge between development studies and peace and conflict studies by relating peace and conflict to how a certain development model expresses itself in a given society. This is a valuable insight for doing a comprehensive analysis of a peace process. In the coming analysis, in chapters four and five, this theoretical framework is used as a guide to first do a descriptive analysis of the Colombian case and answer the two sub-research questions before it is possible to give an answer to the overarching research question.

### **3. METHODOLOGY**

This chapter describes the methods I have used to find an answer to the posed research question and sub-questions. It is presented how I have, in a methodically manner, collected and analysed the material while also presenting the sources and discuss ethical issues when doing the research.

#### **3.1. Design of the study**

This thesis is a case study of the on-going Colombian peace process, featuring the peace negotiations between the Colombian state and FARC and the plans for how peace is going to be consolidated in a post-war phase. It is done from a qualitative standpoint and follows on Yin's (2014: 16-17) twofold definition of a case study, which in his understanding implies (1) investigating a contemporary phenomenon – the peace process – in depth and within its real world context and (2) focusing the study on one sole case while relying on multiple sources of evidence and drawing on previous developed theoretical propositions. However, and recognising Stake's (1994: 237-238) notion that researchers seldom fit neatly into only one definition of doing case studies, this study is also done to provide insight to the general research problem. The case of Colombia thus also serves as an example of peace processes not only to problematize the case at hand but also to problematize the

strategies behind peace processes in general to widen the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. Acknowledging that it is problematic to suggest that it is possible to generalise from one sole case, as the knowledge produced is bounded to a certain context, rather than talking about generalizable results I follow Flyvbjerg's (2006: 227) idea that a case study can add to "the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or society". This means that this thesis can provide valuable insights on the peace process phenomenon also in a wider sense than only understanding the case of Colombia. Having said that, it should be made clear that what is the focus and discussed in this thesis is the case of Colombia.

To ensure the quality of the study I have followed the recommendations from Yin (2014: 45; 2011: 19-20). In the publication from 2014 he uses the concepts of validity and reliability, and these wordings are often associated with a strictly realist understanding of the world (Bryman, 2012: 390). However, Yin's advices are rather general and in Yin (2011: 19-20) he is instead referring to the three concepts: transparency, methodic-ness and adherence to guarantee the quality of a case study. In practical terms these imply, applicable to my own research, to (1) document the research process and make it available for anyone who like to inspect it, (2) carry out the research in a methodically manner, and (3) base the results on an explicit set of evidence (Yin, 2011: 19-20). In Yin (2014: 45) he stresses the same needs, adding the advice to be theory-driven when doing a single-case study such as mine. By following this recommendation, the study places itself in a certain field of research, which in turn also facilitate the intention of widening the research on peace processes in general terms as discussed above.

### **3.2. Material collection and analysis**

To gather the material needed for the analysis I have interviewed different actors involved in the peace process, collected a wide range of written documents and consulted various reports and articles. Since I partly have been interested in understanding how different actors involved in the peace process perceive the prospects and pitfalls of peace in Colombia, in-depth semi-structured interviews was deemed to be a suitable collection method to do so. It allowed deep and thorough questions and answers, which according to

Creswell (2009: 8) is a good way to capture how the interviewees think about a certain theme. I conducted the interviews in the manner Mikkelsen (2005: 169-172) labels *interview guide approach* where the topic was set in advance but left room for me as researcher to be flexible on how and when certain questions were asked. The weaknesses with this approach could however be to miss important aspects of the interviewees' knowledge and reducing the ability to compare different participants' answers (*ibid.*: 171). Since all participants in this study are representing their individual view, from the position of being part of an organisation, I have not focus so much on comparing their answers, but treated them as individual perceptions and understandings of the peace process in Colombia. All interviews were held in Spanish to allow the participants to speak as freely as possible. I am almost fluent in Spanish, which made the use of a translator superfluous, but since Spanish is my third language it has in some aspects limited the possibility to ask though through follow-up questions. However, all participants were very open with sharing their perceptions and experiences from taking part of the peace process, which as far as I understood the interviews gave a rich picture of the themes we discussed.

The research process started of in a deductive manner, where I consulted several theories on peace processes and peacebuilding to gain understanding of the problems that have been identified in the discourse and practice of it. As the fieldwork went along, the theoretical understanding was vital to guide the questions I asked the respondents, but also to find relevant secondary written sources. Theory was used to fuel questions and the different answers I got along the way added new insight and questioned theoretical assumptions, which in turn lead to new questions and thoughts. This working process helped me define what information was useful and throughout the fieldwork I could become more selective as I became more knowledgeable of the subject and context that I studied (Ragin & Amorso, 2011: 112). The process further helped me to revise and adopt new questions as the fieldwork went along, always keeping the theoretical point of departure in mind to not lose track of what I was investigating.

All interviews were recorded – after ensuring informed consent from the participants and guaranteeing their anonymity – and transcribed, leaving out only some parts in the final



transcription, including when they were talking about the work and history of the organisations and what role the participant has there. These parts were summarised and the content was described in the transcriptions records. In close connection to finishing the interviews I listened through the recordings and took notes with thoughts and important issues that the participants had mentioned. Throughout the fieldwork I kept a log on all contacts and interviews I held. At the same time as I transcribed the interviews, I started an inductive process where the interviewees' answers gave me the means to see how the research problem was expressed in Colombia. By having the general theoretical understanding of potential problems with peace processes and peacebuilding, it allowed me to see how the case of Colombia fitted within the bigger picture at the same time as the peculiarities of the case become visible. This way of working have since been an on-going process where theory have fuelled questions that have met the material I gathered, which in turn has lead to new questions. In line with how Yin (2014: 1) describes the art of doing case study research, the process has indeed been "linear but iterative".

Later in the research process all the collected material, interviews as well as written sources, were analysed from a qualitative content analysis standpoint, meaning that I searched for underlying themes in the texts (Bryman, 2012: 557). Since an interview, just as a written source, also is a form of text I found it reasonable to look for underlying themes in all the material. The themes were identified on basis of the research focus and theories used in this thesis, but also by categorising reoccurring themes in the collected material (*ibid.*: 580). Risking being ambiguous and only selecting themes that I though fitted with my preconceptions, I have tried to be as true to the material as possible and letting theory be the guide in arranging the themes.

### **3.3. Presentation of the sources**

Two types of sources constitute the basis for the analysis of this thesis. One part of the analysis is based on secondary material such as reports, plans, strategies and articles. Complementing these sources, a significant part of the material derives from interviews made with different actors and civil society members involved in the on-going peace process. The interviews have provided valuable first-hand insight on the peace process and

have also served as a guide to understand the society, culture, history and conflict in Colombia.

In more detail, I have interviewed representatives from eight organisations<sup>7</sup>, coming from the following entities: the Swedish Embassy and the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (AECID) representing two of the biggest bilateral donors in Colombia; the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) representing the state; and the National Movement for Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE), the Permanent Assembly of the Civil Society for Peace (APSCP), the Latin-American Institute for an Alternative Society and Rights (ILSA) and Dejusticia representing the some of the many organisations of the Colombian civil society involved in the peace process. Adding to this, one interview was made with a professor researching peacebuilding in Colombia at the University of the Andes in Bogotá. Of the eight interviews, the five interviews with the civil society and state representatives are the ones making up the interview material presented in this thesis. The three interviews with the Swedish Embassy, AECID and the professor at the University of the Andes were made mainly to provide context and description of the peace process from an outside perspective.

The participants of the study were sampled on the basis of being organisations involved in the Colombian peace process. In accordance with Bryman's (2012: 418) understanding of purposive sampling, my idea was to sample organisations having different approaches and coming from different perspectives to guarantee variety in the answers. It should, however, be mentioned that I initially had planned to arrange more interviews with state representatives, but when asked many of those who responded said that they could not participate, as they were not allowed to give any answers related to the topic I presented to them. I also found out that they often could not say much more than what already is expressed in written documentation. This made me shift focus to find relevant documents instead, which in the end I believe have given me equally profound material to work with.

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<sup>7</sup> Here mentioned in English but with their Spanish abbreviations. The original names are: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID); Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (OACP); Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado (MOVICE); Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz (APSCP); Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativo (ILSA). The full list of participants with more details is presented in Appendix 2.

The secondary written sources are made up of a variety of reports, strategies, plans and articles. They can be arranged in the following categories: Colombian publications of the armed conflict; plans and strategies from the Colombian state; World Bank and UNDP reports and indicators; international and national news articles; reports from civil society organisations; and both Colombian and foreign academic articles.

### **3.4. Criticism of sources**

Throughout the work with this thesis I have continuously applied a critical approach to all the sources used. Some general principles have been used to criticise the sources: Who is the author? In what purpose was the source created? Is the information recently made? Do other sources say the same? These questions have been posed to all sources. Taking the subject of the thesis into consideration, the most important issue have been to be conscious of what views and interest that the different sources are representing. In the case of the interviews I have deliberately sampled critical voices from civil society, representing a perspective critical to the government and political establishment in Colombia. When presenting their views I am aware of their positions, not taking them for being the *truth*, but perceptions to give a broad picture of the peace process as possible. The same line of thinking is applicable to the written sources, where I carefully have considered what and whom they represent. Acknowledging this *problematique*, I have also found that it is precisely the fact that most material represents something and someone that is making the material interesting and useful to use in this kind of thesis.

### **3.5. Ethical considerations**

There is an inherent problem when I, as a citizen of the Global North, go to a country in the Global South to study their reality, in a context totally unfamiliar to me. By being conscious about the fact that I was a guest in Colombia and that my authority on the subjects related to the peace process was limited compared to the people I met and interviewed I believe that I, at least partly, have succeeded in being sensitive in relation to this. Throughout the work with this thesis I have constantly challenged myself with the

question of how to avoid falling into easy categorisations of, for example, poor people, inequality and development (Mohanty, 1984: 338). Although not being an easy task, as I alike all people, am shaped by the social, cultural, historical and economic context in which I grew up I have tried to be conscious of this and to the greatest extent used wordings and definitions as stated by the participants or how they generally are used in Colombia (Creswell, 2009: 8; Mikkelsen, 2005: 326). As a final note, one should also be aware of how there could be issues of power relations between an interviewer and an interviewee. While on the one hand I have relied on the participating interviewees to share their stories, they also could see me as a way of getting their perspectives *out there* (Mikkelsen, 2005: 340). There could also have been a risk that the interviewed participants viewed me as a researcher coming to Colombia to make a study of them, meaning that there is a wide gap between them and me. While potentially being a problem in other settings I believe that this situation did not occur in my fieldwork as the people participating themselves all were well-educated and holding high positions in their organisations.

#### **4. THE PECULIAR CASE OF COLOMBIA**

In this chapter the peace process case of Colombia is explored and analysed. It is made to provide insight of the context of the country, looking back in history as well as presenting how the Colombian development model is taking shape today. It is also the chapter where the main findings from the fieldwork is presented, giving a foundation for the discussion of the case in the next chapter. I believe that it is important to have a profound understanding of the complexity of the case before giving an answer to the main research question. Therefore this chapter is guided by the sub-research questions: (1) *How can the causes to and the conflictivities prolonging the armed conflict in Colombia be understood, focusing on their relation to the past and present development models?* and (2) *How do representatives from the Colombian civil society perceive the peace process in terms of laying the foundation for peace in Colombia?*

#### **4.1. The history of a never-ending conflict**

Colombia, situated in the northwest corner of the South American continent has a history of violence. After declaring independence from Spain in 1810 a more than 200-year power struggle between conservatives and liberals endured, culminating with the period called *La Violencia* (The Violence) between 1946 and 1958. The period was marked by the persecution of agrarian movement members, workers and supporters of the liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán who was assassinated in 1948. *La Violencia* ended when moderate leaders from the conservative block gave amnesty to the liberals that had been fighting, while at the same time unifying the conservatives and liberals in *Frente Nacional* (the National Front) in the fight against communists in Colombia (GMH, 2013: 112-117). It was in this historical context, marked by the Cold War, that various leftist guerrillas were founded, where FARC and ELN were the most influential. Due to Colombia's complex geography of vast mountainous areas, remote regions and rainforest, the central state has never had complete control over all national territory, which has facilitated for the guerrillas to establish themselves in regions where the state has had no presence. The inequality in land distribution and high rural poverty further fuelled FARC and ELN's cases of fighting to change these conditions in favour of the deprived rural population (*ibid.*: 119).

Over the years, the intensity of the armed conflict has varied and roughly it can be divided in five periods (GMH, 2013:111). The first (1958-1982) was characterised by a marginalisation of the armed violence and conflict at the same time as popular social mobilisation gained strength. The second period (1982-1996) was distinguished by the territorial expansion and military growth of the guerrillas, rising of right-wing paramilitary groups, crisis and partial collapse of the Colombian state, consolidation of the illegal drug issue and the first failed peace processes. The third period (1996-2005) was defined by an increase of both guerrilla and paramilitary activity, the restructuring of the state in the midst of armed conflict and a growing popular support for a military solution of the conflict. Adding to this, the international fight against drug trafficking together with the internal conflict's integration with the war on terrorism further added to the violence. The fourth period (2005-2012) marked a shift of the armed conflict. A military offensive led by the

Colombian state weakened, but did not defeat the guerrillas. The paramilitary groups were officially disarmed, but many of the former belligerents rearranged themselves in different criminal groups continuing their illegal activities. With the on-going peace process and negotiations between the Colombian state and FARC one could say that the country has entered a fifth period (2012 and onwards) marked by a renewed focus on peaceful resolution of the armed conflict, but also by polarisation of the Colombian society where the division can be found in being either in favour of or contra the peace negotiations (Blanco, 2014).

#### **4.2. Causes and conflictivities of the Colombian armed conflict**

First and foremost, it should be noted that it is not possible to find one answer to the question what has caused and prolonged the Colombian internal conflict. The answer depends on who is answering and from what perspective and ideology that individual is coming from. As part of the on-going peace negotiations in Havana a special commission<sup>8</sup> was founded, consisting of 14 experts and scholars from different schools of thoughts, to bring to the table of negotiations a report with different answers and perspectives on the armed conflict. The report, named *Contribution to understand the armed conflict in Colombia*, is 809 pages long and presents a wide range of explanations, causes and effects related to the armed conflict and is used by the negotiating parts to understand the complexity of the different perspectives that describes the conflict (CHCV, 2015).

To summarise, the results from the Commission's report point at the agrarian question as the main cause of igniting and prolonging the conflict, but also at the different conflictivities connected to the illegal drug issue, poverty, inequality, lack of opportunities, corruption, and persecution of political leaders and activists (Pizarro Leongómez, 2015). According to Jairo Estrada Álvarez (2015: 6), one of the contributors to the report, the introduction of modern capitalism in the 1920s and the consolidation of the *coffee economy*

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<sup>8</sup> The *Historic commission of the conflict and its victims* (in Spanish: *Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas*) was created, consisting of twelve experts and two special rapporteurs, to investigate the origins and causes of the armed conflict and the reasons and conditions that have prolonged it. The final report, which in Spanish is called *Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia*, was published in February 2015.

as the principal engine of growth are central to understand the cause of the armed conflict, but also to understand its prolongation. Geographically, these processes have always had its centre in the central parts of the country. They also contributed to the concentration of ownership of lands to a few *latifundistas* (big land owners) and excluded the majority of the rural workers from owning the lands they were cultivating (*ibid.*: 7). Estrada Álvarez concludes that it was this early formation of a capitalist economic development model that sat the boundaries for a regime – “based on blood and fire” – protected by the juridical order, which in turn has consolidated a system of exploitation and inequality still influencing the social dynamics in Colombia (*ibid.*: 7). Moncayo Cruz (2015), in the same publication, is supporting this view by stressing how the early formation of the capitalist development model created a society with unequal land ownership and exploitation of the rural poor.

The development model has transformed since the 1920s, but as Dobovšek and Odar (2010: 36-39) found, many of the indicators measuring inequality, state presence and differences between rural and urban areas are the same, or worse, since the outbreak of the conflict over 50 years ago and affect how the democracy in the country functions today. When a large portion of the society became excluded from the benefits that a smaller portion was enjoying, the hotbed for conflict was created. According to Dobovšek and Odar (*ibid.*: 43) the inequality in Colombia has led to low trust in the political system and in turned this has increased the legitimacy of the reasons behind the different guerrillas’ and paramilitaries’ armed struggles.

### **4.3. Previous peace processes between the Colombian state and FARC**

To understand the on-going peace process in Colombia and the prospects and pitfalls for peace that goes with it, it is necessary to also understand the previous peace processes. During the 20 years between 1982 and 2002 three attempts to negotiate peace between the Colombian state and FARC took place in Colombia. The first (1982-1987) was initiated by the former President Belisario Betancur who begun a process to negotiate peace through the creation of a Peace Commission to lead the talks with FARC’s Central Command (González Posso, 2004: 46; GMH, 2013: 135). The talks resulted in the Uribe Accords in

1984, which included initial agreements on all the issues FARC had stressed, including modernisation of the political institutions; agrarian reform; and the strengthening of the health, labour, housing and education policies (González Posso, 2004: 46). In the wake of the negotiations FARC launched *Unión Patriótica* (Patriotic Union – UP) as its political wing. Although looking promising, the peace process met resistance from the economic elites, military and national police and resulted in a weak agreement that could not be implemented in reality (GMH, 2013: 135). In June 1987 the peace process fell apart after a FARC ambush killing both military personnel and one civilian (González Posso, 2004: 47). As a result of the collapsed negotiations some 3000 of UP's members became the victims of a systematic campaign of persecution by paramilitaries and death squads, which in turn increased FARC's scepticism of politics and negotiations as an alternative to the armed struggle (Gomez-Suarez & Newman, 2013: 825).

The second round of negotiations (1991-1992) issued by former President César Gaviria were held in the context of the end of the Cold War and the on-going peace negotiations in Guatemala and El Salvador (González Posso, 2004: 48). The three guerrillas FARC, ELN and EPL developed a mutual standing point for negotiations, which included the questions of state, democracy and conditions for political activity; justice and impunity; human rights; national sovereignty and natural resources; and socio-economic democratisation (*ibid*: 48). Particularly FARC had preoccupations to negotiate due to the absence of political guaranties for their political branch UP (GMH, 2013: 154) and the negotiations fell apart when EPL murdered a former Minister and one of FARC's diplomatic emissaries was killed (González Posso, 2004: 48).

The third, and most recent round of peace negotiations, (1998-2002) initiated by former President Andrés Pastrana were, as Johnson & Jonsson (2013:71) note, “doomed from their inception”. The negotiations took place in Caguán in southern Colombia where a demilitarised zone was set up to facilitate the process, at the same time as the conflict continued in the rest of the country (González Posso, 2004: 49). In terms of negotiation model, it differed from the previous attempts and González Posso (*ibid*.: 49) call it “an agreement on reforms for a new state” where “political, economic and social change [...]



would create a consensus for the construction of a new state founded on social justice, conserving national unity”. However, the demilitarised zone was used by FARC to expand coca cultivation, recruit new soldiers, plan new attacks and conduct military training (Johnson & Jonsson, 2013: 71). At the same time the Government under Pastrana negotiated with the United States on Plan Colombia, providing the Colombian state with resources to combat the illegal drugs and guerrillas (*ibid.*: 72). Adding to this, the slow progress of the negotiations made Pastrana lose popular support. This, together with resistance from the Colombian economic elite and the labelling of FARC as “the most dangerous terrorist group in the hemisphere” by the United State finally made the negotiations collapse in 2002 with FARC’s hijacking of a plane carrying a Colombian Senator (González Posso, 2004: 49-51).

Summarising these previous experiences there are some reoccurring themes that have made negotiations difficult and ultimately leading to their collapse. One issue evolves around the actual political will of both FARC and the governments to reach a peace agreement. This issue is connected with the support from the society where the public as well as the economic elites and military have turned their backs to the negotiations and without sound support from all sectors of society any political project will have difficulties in materialise itself. Another issue is connected to the global context. In the second round it was an allowing environment to negotiate, with the end of the Cold War and other on-going peace processes in the region. In the third round the *war on terror*-discourse and pressure from the United States made it difficult for the Colombian government to commit itself completely to negotiation. The wide-ranging points of negotiations have, further, stalled and complicated the negotiations making it difficult to find an agreement. The expectations of the outcomes of the negotiations have been set high and when there have only been limited results from them this have made people lose interest and their hopes to ever find a solution to the war. Lastly, the difficulties for FARC to reorganise themselves in a political movement, seen in the many persecutions of UP members, have made it difficult to find a stable ground for negotiating.

#### 4.4. The Colombian democracy and development model

Colombia is often considered to be Latin America's oldest and most stable democracy and presents a high human development according to UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), although the figure drops when adjusting for income equality (UNDP, 2014a). Even though the World Bank (2015a) classifies Colombia as an upper middle-income country a great part of the population lives in poverty<sup>9</sup> (UNDP, 2014a) due to the unequal distribution of the wealth seen in the GINI coefficient<sup>10</sup>, which measured 53.5 in 2012 (World Bank, 2015b). Adding to this, and central to the understanding the conflict in Colombia, the country is one of the most unequal when it comes to land distributing and land ownership. The unequal land distribution is partly seen in how 14 per cent of the landowners own around 80 per cent of the lands (Oxfam, 2013: 7). Further, the national land ownership GINI coefficient for Colombia was 87.4 in 2012, which is an increase from the figure in 1960 (IGAC, 2012: 95). In Freedom House's last measurement of the status of the democracy Colombia is considered to be *partly free* as they score low on issues such as political pluralism and participation, associational and organisational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2015). Other democracy measures, such as the ones presented by Variety of Democracy indices<sup>11</sup>, show a dip of the functionality of democracy during the first decade of the 21st century, when the military offensive against the guerrillas took place, to then rise again from 2009 and onwards (V-Dem, 2015).

Following the military offensive issued by former President Uribe during the first ten years of the 21st century and the relative stability that has followed; the Colombian economy has developed rapidly. The Colombian Embassy in Washington describes the country as one who "has undergone a remarkable transformation" and points at the steady economic growth that has characterised the development in the recent years (Embassy of Colombia,

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<sup>9</sup> In 2010 8.16 per cent of the population live on less than USD 1.25 a day and 32.7 per cent lived below the national poverty line (UNDP, 2014).

<sup>10</sup> GINI index is a measurement to what extent the distribution of income or property. It is measured between 0 and 100 where 0 implies perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. With the score of 53.5 Colombia is placed among the top ten most unequal countries in the world (Kiersz, 2014). The same scale is used to read the national land ownership GINI coefficient.

<sup>11</sup> Here looking at the indices for *Liberal Democracy* and *Electoral Democracy*.

2012). Since 2000 foreign direct investments (FDI) have increased almost sevenfold<sup>12</sup> (World Bank, 2015c) and economic growth has been steady over the last 15 years (World Bank, 2015d). The Colombian state has actively sought to sign free trade treaties with the United States and the European Union to attract international businesses and investments to further add to the economic development (Ministry of Commerce, 2011). The progress has also attracted attention by international media. In an article from The Telegraph the development is described as one “from failed state to Latin American power house” (Ping Chan, 2015). Not everyone is as positive and as one blogger on The Guardian expressed it: “Development can be carried out with justice, respect and dignity for the poor. Or with violence, displacement and the suppression of human rights” pointing on how he believes Colombia has done it (Glennie, 2011).

When examining the Colombian democracy and how the development model expresses itself a mixed picture is presented. While on the one hand one picture of the development the last 15 years shows remarkable figures in terms of economic development another side of the coin has been growing concerns over human rights issues where murders of trade unionists and high impunity of such crimes together with murders committed by the Colombian Army – so called *falsos positivos* (false positives) – have defiled the success story (HRW, 2012: 4-5). While successfully having a growing economy and middle class, the measurements of different inequalities and access to welfare provisions for many of the poor are not following the same positive development (e.g. Dejusticia, 2013).

Considering how the Colombian development model is expressed in economic and political terms it can be suggested that they today follow what is often referred to the neoliberal<sup>13</sup> development model. It can be said because they actively strive to promote economic growth, FDI and pushing for signing free trade agreements. The drivers of development were in the National Development Plan (NDP) for 2010-2014 expressed as being based on

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<sup>12</sup> From USD 2.436 millions in 2000 to USD 16.198 millions in 2014

<sup>13</sup> This categorization should be used with care since it has been used, often negatively, in a political and ideological discourse rather than in an analytical meaning. A common understanding of neoliberalism in economic theory is the importance of a free market economy and limited state interference of the economic sphere of society. Additionally, in today’s understanding of neoliberalism there is often added a global dimension where global free trade has an important role to play. It is this understanding that I refer to when using the concept.

five *locomotives*: the agricultural sector, the housing sector, the infrastructure sector, new innovative sectors, and the mining and energy sector (NDP, 2010: 65). In the newly determined NDP for 2014-2018 the language has been tuned down, but the same sectors are still deemed as the most important ones for continuing the development of the economy. In short, the focus signifies that Colombia strives to attract foreign capital and investments to exploit the soils of the country. According to some studies around 40 per cent of Colombian territory “is under some type of contract with, or is being solicited by, multinational corporations to develop mineral and crude oil mining projects” (Oxfam, 2013: 7). An enriching example of the optimism of further grow the economy is expressed in the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo (2015) where they present the results from a study showing that 85 per cent of the business sector in Bogotá believes that the FDIs will increase even more with the signing of a peace agreement.

Both the present and previous NDPs have been criticised from various sources for cementing the inequality in the country and damaging the climate while serving the interests of the elites and global businesses (e.g. Castilla, 2015; Betancur Betancur, 2012; and Londoño Calle, 2013;). In the NDP for 2014-2018 inequalities are seen as an obstacle to development, but only insofar that it is considered to be tentatively connected to violence and poverty. To build peace, gain equity and improve education – the three main goals expressed in the NDP – it is stated that the plan “is developed in the spirit that only true economic growth is what can translate itself into well-being for the regions and the citizens inhabiting them” [Spanish in original, translated to English by me] (NDP, 2014b: 6). The plan thus follows on the classical logic that benefits from economic growth will *trickle-down* and eventually reach all people, demonstrating how Colombia seems to follow on the same path as both El Salvador and Guatemala in terms of formulating strategies to build a foundation for peace.

#### **4.5. Present day Colombia: on-going peace process and peacebuilding**

The present day Colombia presents itself as a polarised country, not only by the division of rich and poor, but also in terms of where the state has actual presence and control. If one were to look at a map over Colombia where the state’s control over the territory was

highlighted one would see that vast areas are left out blank. Throughout the internal conflict Colombia has developed into a unique form of state, where on the one hand some regions have had a more or less peaceful development over the years whereas other regions have, due to guerrillas controlling some areas and the remoteness of other areas, been left out in the statebuilding project.

Since late 2012 the Colombian state and FARC have been negotiating to find a sustainable solution to the armed conflict. The peace negotiations evolve around six points as expressed in the *General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Sustainable and Durable Peace*<sup>14</sup>: (1) Politics of integrated agrarian development, (2) Political participation, (3) Ending the conflict, (4) Solution the illegal drugs issue, (5) Victims of the conflict, and (6) Implementation, verification and referendum (General Agreement, 2012). These broad themes are generally considered to capture the dynamics of the armed conflict and relevant to find solutions to (Gomez-Suarez & Newman, 2013). Since the negotiations begun in 2012 three of the discussed themes have been resolved: the agrarian issue, the issue of political participation and the solution to the illegal drugs issue, even though President Santos early proclaimed, “nothing is settled before everything is settled” (OACP, 2014). According to Gomez-Suarez and Newman (2013: 827), Colombia has learned the lessons from the past negotiations by not rushing in a bilateral ceasefire, only allowing small teams of negotiation, keeping the negotiations abroad and keeping the points of negotiations to a minimum.

If, or when, a signing of a final peace agreement is succeeded Colombia will enter a new phase of history; they will begin what they themselves and UNDP (2014b) demark as a peacebuilding phase to transform the conflictivities in the society. In spatial terms this means to push the borders of the existing model of development to the former conflict ridden regions. In political terms this process implies the expansion of the central state’s control over the national territory, which in economic terms means the incorporation of new areas to the economic development model. In social terms it further suggests that the people

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<sup>14</sup> In Spanish: Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera

living in the affected regions will take part of the society, i.e. getting improved access to education, health and other services. For the state, military and police it also entails the expansion of the violence monopoly to regions where they before were seen as counterparts in the conflict. Lastly, for both national and multinational companies and industries it entails new opportunities for investments as formally dangerous areas could be accessed more easily.

#### **4.6. Perspectives on the peace process**

Above, I have discussed the Colombian peace process case by presenting various secondary sources to understand the context, history and present day Colombia. This section presents the views expressed in the interviews I have conducted with some of the actors involved in the peace process. These are presented under two sub-headings: (1) *Development model and reproduction of conflict* and (2) *Development model and negative or positive peace*, according to the themes which I have found to capture the collected views as well as they follow on the research's aim and theory. The views are presented straightforward and in the next chapter everything is tied together in an analysis driven by the theoretical framework presented in chapter four. When referring to a specific interview I refer to the organisation that the person represent and what position the person holds there, though it should be noted that it is the individual view of the person interviewed and not necessarily the official view of the organisations s/he is representing. When using quotes, below presented in italics, they have been translated by me from Spanish to English and for the original version please see endnotes in Appendix 3.

##### *4.6.1. Development model and reproduction of conflict*

Among the four civil society organisations ILSA, MOVICE, Dejusticia and APSCP there is a common understanding that there are faults in the current development model and democracy in Colombia, which has had impact on both the causes and conflictivities for conflict as well as it influences the prospects for building a sustainable peace. Contrary to President Santos, these civil society actors believe that it is necessary to include discussions of the development model in the peace process. Breaking down what is the different parts

of the development model, the participants highlighted different aspects of it connected to how it impact peace and conflict in Colombia. Especially two sides of the model were lifted: how the modes of production and inequality are connected and influence the prospects and pitfalls of peace.

When the researcher from Dejusticia described what he believes will happen if a peace agreement is signed he said:

*What I think? That the conflictivity associated with the exploitation of natural resources will decrease with the demobilisation of FARC, I do not think so, it will increase.<sup>i</sup>*

The spokesperson from MOVICE agreed with this view, pointing especially on how the mining locomotive of economy is destructive and creates social conflicts:

*...the mining locomotive [...] is aggressive politics that goes against the regions, communities, sovereignty and in a post accord phase this is a theme that will provoke social conflicts.<sup>ii</sup>*

The representative from ILSA spoke in similar terms, but took the argument further when bringing up the need for a more comprehensive land reform than the one agreed upon in the peace negotiations between the state and FARC. In his opinion a land reform needs to go hand in hand with a political reform to make a real difference in building a more inclusive development model where:

*...dismantling the economic power, which is based on land also means to dismantle the political and institutional power that they [the local and regional elites] hold.<sup>iii</sup>*

The two spokespersons from APSCP also had worries with the way the peace process is heading, as they believed that:

*...they will not destroy the production model, they will not fight the capitalist model of production, they will not attack the extractivist politics of this government, which are very harmful for the [people].<sup>iv</sup>*

From these citations and by analysing the interviews, these actors expressed concerns with how the peace process is proceeding. They did not consider that the negotiations sufficiently take into account the problems created by the development model, which in their eyes are connected to, not only the armed conflict, but to societal conflicts in general. The interviewee from ILSA suggested that there are political, social and economic causes and conflictivities to the conflict and these can only be addressed through changes in the development model.<sup>v</sup> The representative from MOVICE highlighted in the same line of thinking the need of changing the economic politics in Colombia as they are now *building a bomb* with the implementation of a politic increasing inequality, which will only lead to *new conflicts that will not guarantee peace.*<sup>vi</sup>

Interesting to note is how the interviewees connected the development model and current global economic crisis to give an explanation to why the peace negotiations this time is looking prosperous. The researcher from Dejusticia explained:

*I believe that it is the big model that generates much conflict, will generate conflict in the future, but at the same time it is paradoxical because it is somehow the development of the model that has allowed for the negotiations to advance.<sup>vii</sup>*

He continued to clarify what this means. With the shift from an economy based mainly on coffee exportation, which has been localised in the central parts of the country, to an economy based on natural resource exploitation localised in more peripheral areas requires a pacification and incorporation of these areas to the existing state controlled regions. He thus believed that the search for new grounds to exploit has given the economic elites motivation to support the peace process because they do not profit on war anymore.<sup>viii</sup> Both the representative from ILSA and the spokesperson from MOVICE shared the same idea. MOVICE also stressed the global economic crisis as a factor allowing for the peace



negotiations. Where war once was profitable, there is now a pressure from the global economy to stabilise Colombia so that the natural resources can be exploited with more profitability.<sup>ix</sup>

A final issue that the interviewees brought up was how negotiating peace within the current development makes it more believable to sign a peace agreement. However, the conflictivities in society do not disappear with this, but as one of the two spokespersons from APSCP – although not being too optimistic – brought up, a signing of a peace agreement could allow for a peaceful struggle to change society.<sup>x</sup> The interviewed desk officer at OACP, representing the state, shared this line of thinking. He meant that the signing of a peace agreement is not the same as gaining instant peace, but it allows for the state on the one hand to expand and take control over all the Colombian territory as well as it allows for a shift from armed struggle to political struggle, exemplifying with Uruguay and Brazil where former guerrilla members successfully been elected presidents.<sup>xi</sup>

Summarising these different views, there is a double understanding of the prospects and pitfalls of the on-going peace process. On the one hand there is an expressed concern that the peace negotiations do not address the development model, which is seen as both causing and prolonging conflicts in Colombia. On the other hand it is the same development model that is allowing the negotiations to take place and could also in the future open up for the possibility to continue the struggle to change the model, but with peaceful means.

#### *4.6.2. Development model and negative or positive peace*

Closely related to the issue of not including the development model in the peace processes and peace negotiations, the interviewed civil society actors expressed different views of how this relates to what type of peace they see is possible to achieve.

The spokesperson from MOVICE expressed in colourful wordings how he thought that the Colombian government has:

*...fooled, tricked and put a spell on us, making us believe that there is peace as soon as a peace agreement is signed between FARC and the government. Other sectors in the society believe [...] that signing of an agreement ends one cycle and starts a new, which is the construction of a Colombian society in peace.*<sup>xii</sup>

The researcher from Dejusticia related the positive and negative peace debate to the forms that the Colombian society has been allowed to participate in the peace process. In his view the process is too much elite driven, because the negotiating parts want to sign a peace agreement as fast as possible. By doing this, they forget that gaining peace include so much more than this. Therefore there is a need to make the peace process less elite driven; adding that peacebuilding – made from the regions and locally driven – should have started before. He continued with questioning the presumption that building peace within the current development model is not possible, at least when talking about achieving negative peace:

*To say that peace cannot exist within the model that exists is exaggerated at least when talking about negative peace and not considering whether organisations could take up arms later.*<sup>xiii</sup>

The spokespersons from APSCP agreed with these views, adding a time dimension to the peace process. The signing of a peace agreement is in their view not the same as achieving peace; it is rather a process taking at least one generation to consolidate and only possible if:

*...a much more equal, or at least less unequal, economic system is consolidated. Therefore it is needed make economic and political changes. There must also be a change of mentality of everyone.*<sup>xiv</sup>

From the state's side, expressed by the desk officer from OACP, there is also an understanding that peace is not achieved by signing an agreement, but that the state has a responsibility to take control over all the Colombian territory:

*It is not just to sign some papers to end violence, but we need to take advantage of the moment as an opportunity to make many changes where one important change that we need to do is to strengthen the state's capacities.<sup>xv</sup>*

However, in the interview with OACP the changes are limited to strengthening the state's capacities and not, as suggested by the civil society representatives, to change the economic, social and political rules of the game. The spokesperson from MOVICE added to this argument:

*It will be difficult to make the political and economic elites and government in particular aware of the obstacle to peace is not reduced to having a guerrilla.<sup>xvi</sup>*

Contrasting the view of the desk officer from OACP, and also the views expressed in the NDPs, the spokesperson from MOVICE stressed that, to gain peace, it will be:

*...necessary to make transformation in the economic, political and social order.<sup>xvii</sup>*

The discrepancy in the views between how the state, seen in the interview with OACP but also in the NDPs and in President Santos reluctance to discuss the development model, and how the civil society representatives presented here understand what positive peace entails is important to highlight. Whereas there seems to be a consensus that negative peace is achievable with the signing of a peace agreement and the demobilisation of FARC, there are different perspectives on how to build a positive peace.

## **5. THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF PEACE**

After presenting and analysing the findings related to the sub-research questions it is now time to connect the threads and answer the main research question of this thesis, which, to refresh the memory, reads: *What reasons are there to believe that the peace process in Colombia this time will lead to peace?*

From the description and analysis of the peculiar case of Colombia and the manner the on-going peace process is advancing it is evident that the past and present development model has influenced and still influences the prospects of gaining peace in Colombia. Following the path of other peace processes, in this thesis exemplified with the similar cases of Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua and previous attempts in Colombia, the on-going peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba between the Colombian state and FARC seems to be mostly concerned with ending the armed conflict. Even though one of the root causes to the conflict – the agrarian question – has been discussed and resolved in the way Galtung has proposed, since the reform is made within the development model there are expressed worries that it is not a big enough reform to find an end to how unequal land distribution and ownership have influenced the conflict. By not addressing other causes and conflictivities connected to inequality profoundly enough, which have been identified to exist within the past and current development model, there is a risk that the Colombian peace process ends with a signed peace agreement with only prospects to reach a negative peace. These are concerns supported by previous research as well as perceived and expressed by civil society actors involved in the peace process.

By using the theoretical framework presented in this thesis as the dimension to give the collected material meaning, the way the Colombian development model is designed has in its different shapes throughout the history contributed to inequalities, both in economical terms as well as in access to welfare provisions and opportunities to participate in the political decision-making. With the understanding of inequality as a structure leading to violence, and following Galtung's line of thinking, any comprehensive peace process should be concerned with trying to find ways to lower inequalities in order to mitigate the conflictivities connected to them. In the case of Colombia this does not entirely seem to be the case. However, and this is important to note, in the three previous attempts to negotiate peace discussions on changing the development model have formed part of the agenda and all of these attempts failed. To include thorough reforms in a final peace agreement could thus be difficult when stepping out of theoretical reasoning. Accepting a discussion of the development model would further mean, as expressed by the representative from ILSA<sup>xviii</sup>, that the Colombian state recognises that the guerrillas have had legit reasons for their

struggles. It is indeed a complicated issue. Where theory is straightforward, the Colombian reality is convoluted to say the least.

One troublesome insight from the development model as it is expressed in the NDPs is the way the Colombian state actively strives to exploit natural resources around the country, often situated in regions where the armed conflict has been most prominent. Since the land issue is one of the root causes and one of the conflictivities that has prolonged the conflict for more than 50 years, the focus of attracting FDIs to boost economic growth on the basis of exploiting the soil could be problematic. The Colombian development model has historically failed to level out inequalities, and in some cases even worsened it, which makes the focus to further develop the same economic politics problematic as they have lead to and prolonged the armed conflict. It could be understood, as the civil society representatives mentioned, as the conscious creation of future social conflicts.

Interestingly, the same development model could in its present design and in this specific historical moment be the key to end the armed conflict and gain negative peace. Adding together the different interests involved in the peace processes in Colombia, the economic elites have always been very important for determining their outcomes. In the three past attempts the resistance from prominent economic actors stalled the negotiations. In the on-going negotiations there are two factors that could have turned this resistance into acceptance. One is that the economic development model is not discussed, meaning that the economic interests of the elites are not threatened directly by the negotiations. The second factor refers to the notion that there has been a shift away from basing the economic growth on mainly growing coffee in the central parts of the country to an economy based on exploiting the natural resources in more peripheral and conflict-ridden regions. This could have provided incentives for the elites to support a negotiated ending of the armed conflict. It is also an explanation shared by some of the interviewees from civil society. There is, however, a theoretical problem to this logic. If the peace process ends with the signing of a peace agreement that does not include the foundation for profound reforms, the building of a positive peace could be affected. Building a positive peace in Colombia would mean a restructuration of the structures promoting violence, which by the applied theoretical

framework would entail decreasing the inequalities in society. And within this the core of the problem prevails. The development model in Colombia has in this thesis been shown to be the system reproducing the inequalities and to decrease them would mean to make changes in the model. It is, however, not up for discussion in the on-going peace process. What is a prospect for negative peace and allowing the peace negotiations to proceed could at the same time be seen as a pitfall for building positive peace.

Looking at the peace processes and post-conflict experiences from Central America, leaving out the root causes and conflictivities in the peace agreement and peacebuilding has led to increasing violence due to not taking the structures – such as inequality – enough into account when negotiating and building peace. While it is understandable that ending the armed conflict is a goal in itself, it is a questionable goal if one considers the findings presented in this thesis. As both the more descriptive analysis of the peace process and the insight offered from the interviewed civil society actors have shown, there are worries that the conflict and violence will continue, although perhaps not in the form of guerrilla warfare. The state representative from OACP expressed hope that the post-conflict phase will let the Colombian state strengthen its capacities and take over the control over all the national territory and by this be able to build the foundations to positive peace. This sentiment is supported by the NDP for 2014-2018 where an ineffective state is seen as the main obstacle to reach the full potential of development. To strengthen the capacities of the state is by no means negative or a potential pitfall of peace, but if it is not followed up with politics to change the economic, political and social reality for most people it might, as the interviewed civil society actors mentioned, lead to new conflicts.

Another side of this is the possibilities for political struggle that could open up with the signing of a peace agreement and the negative peace that follows. The view expressed by the interviewed desk officer from OACP was that the post-war period could facilitate for other political alternatives, exemplifying with the developments in Uruguay and Brazil. This line of thinking was to some extent also expressed in the interviews with the civil society representatives, but looking in a historical perspective, recognising the persecutions, murders and threats that UP and other political and human rights activists have

experienced, one can understand that this is no easy transformation. It is however a prospect for a long-term diminishing of the conflictivity connected to the weaknesses in political opportunities on Colombia. If political participation can be guaranteed a step towards positive peace and peaceful resolutions of economic, social and political conflicts is taken.

## **6. CONCLUSION**

The purpose with this thesis has been to problematize the on-going peace process between the Colombian state and FARC. By asking the question what reasons there are to believe that this process will lead to peace when past attempts have failed, a multifaceted picture was revealed of the prospects and pitfalls in the pursuit of peace in Colombia. While there exists good reasons to believe that peace is within reach one could question what kind of peace that is possible to achieve in the peace process. The form of peace that the analysis in this thesis has identified as possible is one that can be interpreted as negative peace or the absence of armed conflict following on Galtung's definition of peace. Having the economic, social, political and cultural inequalities in mind, the prospects of consolidating a positive defined peace are fewer. However, as this is an on-going process it is not possible to say with certainty what will be the final result of the process, but what one can do is to raise a warning of what can happen if not the vast inequality in Colombia is decreased.

As both previous research on similar cases has shown and as implied by this study not addressing structural inequalities in a peace process might lead to increasing violence even when an armed conflict ends with a peace agreement. On the other hand the progression of the Colombian peace process could be the result of not discussing the flaws in the development model. While this is a prospect of peace it is also limiting the potential of the peace process. Looking at the previous attempts to negotiate peace in Colombia, leaving out the development model from the discussions might be the key to end the armed conflict and by this providing the basis for political struggle rather than one fought with weapons. There are, however many obstacles that the Colombian society will need to address and

overcome before that becomes the reality. A final conclusion is that consolidating peace is a process that takes time and must be allowed to take time, maybe even more than a generation as suggested by one of the civil society actors interviewed for this thesis. Given that the Colombian internal conflict in its present form has been going on for over 50 years and in other forms before that, seeing an end to the armed conflict is an achievement and one can only hope that the future allows the people of Colombia to find a way to consolidate a positive peace as well.

One important implication of this thesis is the way one can connect development studies with peace and conflict studies. When contrasting the possibility of ending conflict to gain peace with the question of how a certain development model influences this prospect, one can note that the two questions cannot be separated. Future studies should therefore continue to merge development studies and peace and conflict studies to find better and more sustainable approaches to build and promote peace. Other studies should also continue to follow how the peace process in Colombia develops. More research is further needed to test inequality's influence on internal conflicts, especially scrutinising how horizontal inequality provides – or not – the hotbed for internal conflicts. Another way of addressing this is to do qualitative analyses of cases where inequality has been a cause to conflict but where it has been addressed in the peace process to see how this affects the prospects of achieving peace after internal conflict.



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
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# APPENDIX 1. HOMICIDE RATE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

POSTWAR HOMICIDE RATE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 1998 – 2010



Graph taken from: Kurtenbach, (2013: 117).

## APPENDIX 2. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Organisation	Representative	Where	Time & date	Comments
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)	Two desk officers	Swedish Embassy, Bogotá	January 9, 2015 between 9-9.30 a.m.	Only information, not to cite in thesis
La Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (OACP)	Desk officer	La Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Bogotá	January 16, 2015 between 3-4 p.m.	Wanted to stay anonymous but can use information in thesis. Could record interview.
Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado (MOVICE)	Spokesperson of the organisation	The office of la Asociación Nacional de Ayudas Solidarias (ANDAS), Bogotá	January 21, 2015 between 10-11 a.m.	Can use name and organisation. Could record interview.
Universidad de los Andes	Professor	Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá	January 22, 2015 between 11.45-12.15 a.m.	Of informative kind. Could record interview.
Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz	Two spokespersons	The office of la Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz, Bogotá	January 22, 2015 between 3-4.15 p.m.	Will not be mentioned by name but OK to use organisation's name. Could record interview.
Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativo	Analyst at the organisation	The office of ILSA, Bogotá	January 29, 2015 between 10-11 a.m.	OK to record and use interview.
Dejusticia	Researcher at the organisation	Skype (video), Malmö	February 10, 2015 between 1-2 p.m. (Swedish time)	Will not be mentioned by name but OK to use organisation's name. Could record interview.
Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)	Desk officer	Skype (no video), Malmö	February 17, 2015 between 4.15-4.45 p.m. (Swedish time)	Not mention name and only OK to use AECID if I sent to them the draft thesis. Use as informative interview



## APPENDIX 3. CITATIONS IN SPANISH

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- <sup>i</sup> “¿Qué creo yo? Que la conflictividad asociada a la explotación de los recursos naturales va a bajar con
- <sup>ii</sup> “Por ejemplo, la locomotora minero-energética, eso es una política agresiva contra los territorios, contra las comunidades, contra la soberanía, luego entonces en la etapa de pos-acuerdo eso será un tema que va a provocar conflictos sociales” (MOVICE, 2015: 3).
- <sup>iii</sup> “Entonces, desmontar el poder económico que está basado en la tierra significa desmontar también el poder político y el poder institucional que tienen” (ILSA, 2015: 8).
- <sup>iv</sup> “Ellos no son los adalides, no van a destruir el modelo de producción, no van a combatir el modelo capitalista de producción, ni van a atacar las políticas extractivistas de este gobierno que son súper nociva para los campesinos, para los indígenas, para los negros que justamente están en estos territorios que están afectando el medio ambiente, a las poblaciones mas pobres, la producción de agua etcétera” (APSCP, 2015: 9).
- <sup>v</sup> “Especialmente por que algunos sostenemos que el conflicto armado tiene unas raíces y unos factores, unas causas que son sociales, políticas que tienen que ver con la situación colombiana, social, política, económica” (ILSA, 2015: 2).
- <sup>vi</sup> “Tiene que cambiar la política económica en el sentido de que un país como Colombia figura en el ranking de inequidad como de los mas inequitativo del mundo. Los organismos multilaterales tienen que hacer la entender a las clases dominantes colombianas, que eso tiene que cambiar por que si no (UNHEARABLE) cocinando una bomba de tiempo para nuevos conflictos que no van a garantizar una paz” (MOVICE, 2015: 4).
- <sup>vii</sup> “Creo que de gran del modelo es lo que genera muchos conflictos, que va a generar conflictos en el futuro y que a su vez tiene la paradójica, es paradójico por que alguna manera la explotación de este modelo económico creo yo que lo (UNHEARABLE) la permitió en alguna manera que se avance la negociación” (Dejusticia, 2015: 4).
- <sup>viii</sup> “Creo que la sociedad colombiana y las elites colombianas han explotado el país durante muchos años. Fueron unas elites muy centralistas en donde la producción fundamental de Colombia era centralista, que fue la economía basada en café, en el monocultivo de café durante todo el siglo pasado, que se centraba generalmente sobre las montañas centrales de Colombia y es que es donde generalmente llegaba el estado y donde generalmente mas control existía. Obviamente hubo un momento en que el conflicto y los grupos armados ya permearon todo esto pero si son las áreas mas controladas. El modelo de explotación mas orientado hacia el extractivismo con la sustitución por completo de la economía de café por la economía de sustraer petróleo o minerales y otros tipos de cosas de la tierra que generalmente están ubicadas en sectores mas periféricos y en donde las elites nunca se han preocupado pero hoy en día está el tema económico. Esos sectores son periféricos, son peligrosos en donde están insurgencia. Yo creo que eso ha sido un factor de motivación para pensar en que pueden hacer concisiones en con tal de dejar la guerra y poder una explotación de esos lugares. En parte las negociaciones de paz ha avanzado como han avanzado en Colombia en esta ocasión, como nunca habían avanzado, es por que hay un conjunto de intereses que son diversos pero que perca algunas maneras sin cuentan y es elite de las elites por explotar esas áreas en donde están las guerrillas por que ya la guerra no es un negocio y pierden dinero haciendo esta guerra” (Dejusticia, 2015: 4).
- <sup>ix</sup> “La decisión del gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos de cambiar la estrategia, de abrir la posibilidad de sentarse, dialogar con las guerrilla tiene que ver un poco con la realidad económica del mundo. El mundo, el neoliberalismo, el capitalismo mejor, atraviesan por una crisis económica muy profunda, muy hondo y eso ha

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obligado a un sector de esos capitalistas de esos intereses neoliberales a plantearse la posibilidad en Colombia” (MOVICE, 2015: 6).

<sup>x</sup> “No siento que esto es un gobierno realmente democrático, siempre va a crear, manipular los procesos, ¿no? Pero creo que el hecho de que hay una desmovilización, una cesación del conflicto armado, va a posibilitar que más tranquilamente toda la gente que trabaja por la paz, y ahora te voy a mencionar por que en estos días estamos todos con los pelos de punta que estamos hablando con la compañera” (APSCP, 2015: 7).

<sup>xi</sup> “Y el otro tema que nos hemos mencionado en varios espacios es que, el sentido doble de oportunidad que tiene este proceso de paz. La oportunidad por que lo que, la realidad que ya ha mostrado otros países, incluso este mismo país, con actores que le han apostado a la lucha armada y digamos en como los casos de Brasil o Uruguay, hoy mandan en sus países y han logrado algunas resultados impresionantes, o sea lo que ha hecho Brasil y lo que ha hecho Uruguay, se han vuelto referentes, incluso mundiales en algunos temas, nada más para los temas, por ejemplo de la política frente a las drogas en Uruguay es un referente en todo el mundo. Y la política social de Brasil también es un referente importante en buena parte del mundo. Y eso se han logrado por la vía democrática, entonces en ese sentido esos son mensajes importantes para los líderes de las FARC, para los de ELN que en este momento es importante para abandonar la lucha armada y adaptar la lucha bajo los mecanismos democráticos” (OACP, 2015: 12).

<sup>xii</sup> “Nos tienen gatusados, embelesados, embobados, emburujados, a todos pensando que la paz se logra cuando las FARC y el gobierno firmen un acuerdo. Otros sectores sociales, el movimiento de los derechos humanos y de víctimas piensan que con la firma de los acuerdos para la terminación del conflicto se culmina un ciclo y comienza uno nuevo que es de construcción de la sociedad colombiana de esa paz que todos anilamos” (MOVICE, 2015: 4).

<sup>xiii</sup> “Pero creo que decir que no podría existir paz dentro de este modelo que existe es arriesgada al menos si uno habla de paz negativa y no proporciona luego en rearme de estas organizaciones” (Dejusticia, 2015: 4).

<sup>xiv</sup> “Tiene que haber un, se consolidar, un sistema económico mucho más igualitario por lo pondría en otra forma, menos desigual por lo menos para que los conflictos... para que la gente puedan vivir tranquila, bien, alegre, con todo”. “Entonces tiene que haber cambios económicos. Tiene que haber cambios políticos. Tiene que haber cambios de la mentalidad de todos, de nosotros, de los demás, del gobierno, del elite, de los pobres, de los ricos, de la mitad - todos tengamos que cambiar de nuestra forma de mirarnos uno a otro mirar el mundo” (APSCP, 2015: 11).

<sup>xv</sup> “No es simplemente firmamos unos papeles para que haya una cese de la violencia, si no aprovechamos este momento como una oportunidad para hacer muchos cambios, y un cambio importante que tenemos que hacer es fortalecer al estado” (OACP, 2015: 6).

<sup>xvi</sup> “Un segundo desafío es hacer comprender especial y particularmente al gobierno, y aquí en esa han tenido el poder político y económico de este país que los problemas para la paz no son solamente resumen en que hay una guerrilla” (MOVICE, 2015: 9).

<sup>xvii</sup> “Aquí es necesario que hayan transformaciones del orden económico, político, social y el desafío pasa por que los que determinen el poder político y económico comprenden y aboquen esas transformaciones” (MOVICE, 2015: 9).

<sup>xviii</sup> “Eso te da una explicación y es que para un estado, para el gobierno, el tema, aceptar la discusión de su modelo económico y es aceptar que hay unas razones profundas de levantamiento armada. Es decir que es en realidad una insurgencia revolucionaria y el gobierno no está dispuesto de aceptarlo” (ILSA, 2015: 3).