

# Responsibility to Protect in Libya and Syria

The R2P Discourse within the UN Security Council

André Chiesa

# Abstract

The past five years, Northern Africa and the Middle East have been characterized by revolutions and civil wars. Today, we can see two major civil wars raging in the region, one in Libya and another in Syria. In 2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolutions that would ultimately lead to a military intervention in Libya, with the purpose to protect civilians from the regime. This intervention was legitimized by invoking R2P (Responsibility to Protect) and since then, R2P has been a reoccurring subject within the UNSC. R2P has both theoretical and practical implications within the scope of international relations, the latter being demonstrated by the intervention in Libya. In this paper, I have analyzed the R2P discourse within the UNSC and how it differs between the issue of the Libyan civil war and the civil war in Syria. By analyzing meeting records from the UNSC, I will show that the discourse itself has changed, but that the lack of intervention in Syria, within the R2P paradigm, is mostly a result of a 'cold war' discourse between the Western member states on one side, and China and Russia on the other.

*Key words:* Discourse, Libya, R2P, Syria, UN Security Council

Words: 9435

# Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Method .....</b>	<b>2</b>
2.1	The Political Discourse .....	2
2.2	Sampling.....	4
<b>3</b>	<b>Theory .....</b>	<b>7</b>
3.1	Theoretical relevance .....	7
3.2	Empirical context .....	8
<b>4</b>	<b>The R2P discourse within the UNSC .....</b>	<b>11</b>
4.1	The case of Libya .....	11
4.1.1	R2P and call for intervention .....	11
4.1.2	Intervention and a halt in the R2P discourse.....	12
4.1.3	In hindsight: NATO withdrawal and continued fighting .....	14
4.2	The situation in Syria .....	17
4.2.1	Initial reactions and open conflict within the UNSC .....	17
4.2.2	A small step from the status quo .....	20
4.2.3	No end in sight .....	23
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>References.....</b>	<b>26</b>

# 1 Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is arguably one of the strongest international actors when it comes to shaping international norms regarding peace, security, sovereignty and the ‘rules’ of intervention. It is here some of the most powerful countries in the world can pass resolutions to implement certain actions towards a state. But how do they reach their conclusions before passing these resolutions? How is the preceding discourse conducted? In this paper, I seek to analyze how the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) discourse has changed within the UNSC since the 2011 intervention in Libya, and how the discourse is conducted in relation to another specific problem; the Syrian civil war. Is there a clear turning point within the discourse, or is there a less concrete transition wherein the discourse has slowly changed over time? Are there now, as it was in 2011, any calls for R2P within the UNSC, or has the idea fallen out of favor among the member states? I will conduct my research by analyzing the content of certain UNSC documents, where I will try to identify arguments, as well as counter arguments, made within the R2P paradigm. My research question is as follows:

- *How does the R2P discourse within the UN Security Council differ between the case of the Libyan civil war and the civil war in Syria?*

In my first part, I will present the method I have chosen to conduct my research. In the second part, I will present my theoretical framework and relevance, with focus on the concept of R2P. Here, I will also present the empirical context in which the R2P discourse is taking place.

In the third part, I will proceed with my analysis. Here, I will go through several UNSC documents that touches upon the issue of the Libyan civil, and the current issue of the Syrian civil war. In the fourth and last part, I will present my findings and conclude my analysis.

## 2 Method

### 2.1 The Political Discourse

In this paper, I have chosen to conduct a discourse analysis, focusing on numerous documents that captures certain discourses within the UNSC. The method of discourse analysis is often attributed to Michel Foucault and a discourse "... refers to groups of statements that structure the way a thing is thought, and the way we act on the basis of that thinking"<sup>1</sup>. It is, in many ways, a linguistic tool and in a political discourse analysis we can analyze the language used by politicians (or other public figures) in a certain political context, which creates an organization within our social reality<sup>2</sup>. In this specific study, the actors are representatives within the UNSC. It should also be noted that passivity in its essence can have the same implications as action; both action and restraint requires an actor to make a conscious decision and both stances has consequences.

Even though the method of discourse analysis was first seen as a tool to simply explain what is being said or written, the so called second generation of discourse analysis is more about the discourse as a social practice. This means that the discourse is not merely seen as a structure of language, but also a method where we look at the context, where social practice, institutions and situations are central<sup>3</sup>. In this specific case, the traditions and norms of the UNSC can be seen as the social practice within an institution, with the situation(s) being the two set of discourses I have chosen to analyze; that is, the civil wars in Libya and Syria.

A discourse analysis is the best approach because of what it encompasses. Just reading and repeating what is written is nothing more but a review, if not put within its context. Without a context the words become empty, and with empty words, the problem we seek to explain becomes trivial. Instead, the discourse is being seen in light of certain events, which gives us a clear context, both social and – in this case – political. There is however a risk that a discourse analysis falls into a pit of overanalyzing the provided content. Just as a shallow review does not really give us any answers to *how* or *why*, dwelling too deep into a discourse could leave us in a situation where we make an analysis with the assumption that a source of the text or speech has the same linguistic and rhetorical skills as those who analyze, which in turn makes us analyze something that might not be there.

---

<sup>1</sup> Rose, 2012, "Visual Methodologies, An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials", p190

<sup>2</sup> Berström och Boréus, 2008, "Textens mening och makt", p 305

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 307f

Some would argue that a discourse is in itself political<sup>4</sup>, making it hard to define “political discourse” as its own method of analysis. However, I would prefer that the term *politics*, at least in this case, is used in an old institutionalist approach, focusing on the formal institutions, politicians, government, and the discourses that arises within these areas. That being said, a political discourse analysis could also be conducted with the focus on media, as well as social interactions. However, then we might need to revisit the definition of *political*.

Analyzing political discourse can, as with any discourse analysis, be seen as a way to identify different kinds of manipulation<sup>5</sup>. It does not matter if the manipulator is a proponent of something that is considered “good” or “bad”; the *modus operandi* remains the same. It is these manipulative or, to put it a bit less cynical, persuasive arguments being put forth within the UNSC that I seek to analyze. Who is saying what, for what purpose, and what are the results?

Another central part of the discourse analysis is to focus on *power*<sup>6</sup>. In this case, power can be looked at in two ways. First of all, the UNSC is in itself an institution powerful enough to condone or condemn actions as a ‘global conscience’, implement sanctions and even legitimize military intervention. This is *external* power, which is used to exercise power over an outside actor (i.e. a state). Second, we can see *internal* power. This is the power certain actors (in this case, UNSC members) can exercise *within* a powerful institution. What actor uses its power for what purpose? This is, in short, exactly what my analysis will be about. How (and if) does one exercise its power within the UNSC and how does this exercise relate to the R2P paradigm? Is the power used to condone or do condemn the R2P concept and how does the discourse change over time?

Discourse analyses focused on R2P have been conducted by many scholars since the concept was formally accepted in 2005. One such analysis was conducted by Aidan Hehir in 2011, in which he analyzed a 2009 R2P debate within the UN General Assembly<sup>7</sup>. Hehir conducted an in-depth analysis of what was said during this debate, in the same manner that I will now look at the past four years of debate within the UNSC. Hehir concluded that “R2P – in the form agreed in both 2005 and 2009 – lacks substance and is at most an emotive political rallying cry”<sup>8</sup>. Such a conclusion might be understandable, considering his focus on the General Assembly. However, since the real power lies within the UNSC, and especially with the permanent members, this analysis will show the immediate connection between discourse and (potentially paradigm shifting) decision making

---

<sup>4</sup> Wilson in ”The Handbook of Discourse Analysis”, eds. Schiffrin, Tannen and Hamilton, 2001, p 398

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p 399f

<sup>6</sup> Berström och Boréus, 2008, “Textens mening och makt”, p 328

<sup>7</sup> Aidan Hehir, 2011, “The responsibility to protect in international political discourse: encouraging statement of intent or illusory platitudes?”, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 15:8, 1331-1348, p. 1332

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 1342

In an article published 2013, Alex J Bellamy made an assessment of when R2P had been invoked by different actors, in relation to different conflicts around the world, including Libya and Syria. As part of his research, Bellamy analyzed a number of UNSC resolutions that had been brought forth as a result of the invoking of R2P. The core of his research was to see if the UNSC was more likely to act if R2P was invoked than when it was not, provided that the cases were similar<sup>9</sup>. Though my research bear some similarities to that of Bellamy's, there are some core differences. Firstly, his focus lies on cases that took place between 2006 and 2011, which excludes any in-depth findings with regards to the Libyan and Syrian crises. Second, he is only looking at R2P as a variable to decision making, and not at the specific arguments and counter-arguments preceding those decisions.

## 2.2 Sampling

The documents I have chosen concerns the subjects of 1) the UNSC stance towards the situation in Libya before and during the civil war and 2) the UNSC stance in regards to the Syrian civil war. Within these documents, I will be looking for arguments which in some way touches upon the subject of R2P and other forms of "just" arguments for – and against – intervention.

I chose to focus on the UNSC since this is the arena where the ultimate decision making regarding intervention is taking place. One could, as Bellamy did, choose to focus on the General Assembly to get even more pluralism in the discourse, but since I want to put the R2P discourse within the context of intervention and non-intervention, the UNSC makes for a better instance to analyze.

Since the start of the Libyan civil war in February 2011, the UN has published roughly 200 documents regarding the situation in Libya (before intervention, during intervention and post-intervention), as well as around 170 documents regarding the Syrian crisis<sup>10</sup>. These includes UNSC resolutions, UNSC presidential statements, Sanctions Committee documents and Human Rights Council documents. However, I have chosen to narrow down my sample to documents published under the label *Security Council Meeting Records*. The main reason for this is that these documents captures the discourses that have been taking place within the UNSC in a way that other documents does not.

---

<sup>9</sup> Bellamy, 2013, "The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot Air?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48:3, 333-357, p. 337ff

<sup>10</sup> As of April 8th, 2015

The documents provide me with the answer to how certain actions (or lack thereof) are being legitimized within the UNSC, whereas documents such as resolutions mostly contains short and concise reports on what is going to be done *as a result* of the discourse.

More importantly, resolutions are only adopted when there is a consensus (or at least absence of vetoes) between the five permanent members and at least four other (non-permanent) members<sup>11</sup>. It is a reasonable assumption that the pluralism within a discourse is clearer when there is *not* a consensus and since my ambition is to analyze the discourse, resolutions and other documents that are byproducts of aforementioned consensus can be excluded without undermining the validity of my research. The resolutions does not reflect how the discourse itself was conducted, just as a peace treaty does not reflect how a war was fought. That being said, I will still look at relevant resolutions as a mean to provide even more empirical context.

The Security Council Meeting Records that I have taken part of consists of a total of 80 documents, dating from February 25<sup>th</sup> 2011, until Marsh 27<sup>th</sup> 2015. Fifty of these documents are, more or less, about the situation in Libya, and thirty of them are about the situation in Syria.

I say “more or less”, since some of these documents are on the situation in the Middle East in general, and not specifically about Libya or Syria. However, most of these documents contain mainly, if not exclusively, discourses about my chosen cases. Having these documents will also help me to achieve the intertextuality that I need to get a good grip about the general discourse and its development<sup>12</sup>. It should also be noted that not all documents contain discourses that can be put within the R2P framework. Nonetheless, these documents do provide certain context.

When reading my sample documents, I have chosen to limit what themes that I will focus on in my analysis. R2P is inherently about the justification of intervention and therefore, arguments deviating from this discourse will be excluded. I will not simply look for certain words and make a list of how often these words are being used, and by whom. Looking at words such as *protection* or *security* does indeed tell me how common these types of discussions are, but it does not tell me anything about the context. Is security being discussed as something that should be improved in a certain area, perhaps through intervention, or is it discussed in the context of sovereignty and that the security problems within a certain country does *not* legitimize a breach of that nation’s sovereignty? Without the context, I cannot carry out a satisfying analysis.

---

<sup>11</sup> UN Charter, Chapter V, Article 27

<sup>12</sup> Rose, 2012, "Visual Methodologies, An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials", p191, 197ff

Instead, I will convey a more qualitative explanation of the general discourse. Simply showing if something is more or less common is not always preferable<sup>13</sup>.

In my analysis, I will try to capture arguments and context, as well as the general opinion of different actors within the UNSC. Naturally, there will be much focus on the permanent members, and perhaps mostly on the United States, Russia and China. Since discussions about R2P and intervention were central to the UN during in the beginning of the Libyan civil war, I have chosen to focus on these themes and see how the discourse differs in relation to the Libyan and Syrian crises.

Terms surrounding intervention, security and sovereignty are essential to the very structure of the UN, since the UN charter is based on a norm of non-intervention and state sovereignty, while peace and security is what the UN seeks to achieve. Such terms is not only theoretically relevant, but also empirically; the concept of R2P was, after all, shaped within (and in some aspects, as a criticism towards) previous norms within international relations.

In short, this can be said to be a mixed method approach. I have chosen a specific sample and made a framework not unlike the quantitative coding typical for a content analysis<sup>14</sup>, but the discourse analysis is still of essential importance for answering my question.

---

<sup>13</sup> Berström och Boréus, 2008, "Textens mening och makt", p 77

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 49

# 3 Theory

## 3.1 Theoretical relevance

Since the 2011 intervention in Libya, there have been numerous articles dealing with the subject of R2P. It is no coincidence that this debate flourished after the intervention in Libya, since it marked a new era within the R2P concept. Through resolution 1973, which was adopted March 17<sup>th</sup> 2011, the UNSC, with the support of ten member states, did not only urge the Libyan regime to protect its citizens but also affirmed that it:

“Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya...”<sup>15</sup>

With this in mind, there is no doubt that R2P was not only one of the arguments behind the justification of intervention, but rather essential to it. There are those, like Dunne and Gelber, who would even argue that it was “a ‘textbook’ case of how R2P was supposed to work”<sup>16</sup>. In another article, Mohammed Nuruzzaman notes that the R2P discourse has ‘stalled’ since the intervention in Libya and goes so far as to say that “If R2P had come of age in Libya, it has certainly seen a tragic death with the Security Council’s inability to initiate actions on Syria”<sup>17</sup>.

The question has also been addressed by Marie-Eve Loiselle, who in an article seeks to look at the status of R2P since the passing of resolutions 1970 and 1973. As others before her, she argues that these resolutions led to the first real practice of R2P and as such marked an important point in the development of the concept<sup>18</sup>. This is no doubt a reasonable conclusion, since R2P was invoked by several UNSC members in the events leading up to these resolutions.

In the same journal, Patrick Quinton-Brown published an article on the subject, in which he tries to identify what he calls *dissenter states*; that is, states that oppose the concept of R2P, or at least the implementation of it. He does this by looking at discussions within different organizations within the UN, as well as voting records which can be tied to the concept of R2P.

---

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/RES/1973

<sup>16</sup> Dunne & Gelber, 2014. “Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya, *Global Responsibility to Protect*, (6): 326-349, p. 327

<sup>17</sup> Nuruzzaman, 2013, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15. No. 2, 57-66, p. 58

<sup>18</sup> Loiselle, 2013, “The Normative Status of the Responsibility to Protect after Libya”, *Global Responsibility to Protect*, (5), 317-341, p. 326ff

He categorizes these dissenters as *cautious supporters* and *rejectionists*. He also puts forth several categories of criticism (“thematic objections”) that are commonly argued by these states<sup>19</sup>. Even though I will conduct a similar analysis, I do not have the intention to make generic categories, though my findings to some extent might be placed within such boundaries. It should also be noted that Quinton-Brown is offering an analysis on the general R2P discourse, and not the discourse within a specific context, which I will be doing. Furthermore, his analysis stretches from 2005 until 2013, while this analysis will focus on a four year period (2011-2015).

It is with this theoretical context that I conduct my research, and for which I seek to contribute with a more in-depth analysis concerning the UNSC discourse within the R2P paradigm. I do not seek to have a normative entry point, and will therefore not discuss how the discourse *should* be conducted, nor will I try to make any guidelines about how the future of R2P should be shaped and implemented.

The concept of R2P has been widely criticized, both by states and (perhaps foremost) by scholars. Some of these critics argue that R2P makes it easy to legitimize intervention and that it can be used as an excuse for neo-imperialism. Others critics argue that R2P has made no positive contribution to international politics<sup>20</sup>.

It is with this in mind that I approach my analysis. Is it possible to see if R2P, or at least the perception of its implementations, has lost its value within the UNSC? Can we understand the actions (or inactions) in relation to the Libyan and Syrian civil wars by analyzing the R2P discourse or is there perhaps some other variables that explains the decisions in these matters? Can R2P, and its value within the UNSC, provide us with an explanation or will we be able to exclude R2P as a variable entirely? Whatever the answer to these questions may be, it is clear that the conclusion of this analysis will, at the very least, show us what has happened with the R2P discourse during the past four years.

## 3.2 Empirical context

The intervention in Libya marked a new chapter within the rules (written or unwritten) of international relations, where the norm of non-intervention was ‘sidelined’ in an effort to legitimize an intervention. It also meant overriding one of the fundamental pillars in the international order; state sovereignty.

---

<sup>19</sup> Quinton-Brown, 2013, “Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and its State Critics”, *Global Responsibility to Protect*, (5): 260-282, p. 260ff

<sup>20</sup> Bellamy, 2013, “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot Air?”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48:3, 333-357, p. 334

The ideas of state sovereignty are based on a Westphalian order, where the status quo between sovereign states is essential and, in our modern era, central for global stability. This is not only a notion based on theory, but has also been well established within international law<sup>21</sup>. It was first, and foremost, established with the UN Charter, in article 33, which states that:

“1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means”<sup>22</sup>.

This norm of non-intervention was further established by the General Assembly, through resolution 2131, December 1965:

“No State has the right to intervene [...] in the internal or external affairs of any State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned”<sup>23</sup>.

There is one exception to this rule, which we find in the seventh chapter of the UN charter. This exception, however, is only permissible in cases where a state poses a severe threat to international peace<sup>24</sup>. In 2003, when there was an intensive discourse about an intervention in Iraq, the US invasion was, and has since been, highly criticized. However, the US justified their intervention by referring to (alleged) weapons of mass destruction in Iraqi possession, which in turn could be seen as a potential external threat.

Even though this was not the general position on the international arena (including the UN), a threat – real or not – was needed to legitimize a preemptive intervention.

This was not the case in Libya, nor is it the case in Syria. Neither the Libyan, nor the Syrian government, posed a threat to any other state and intervention is therefore hard to justify, if we consider the UN charter and resolution 2131.

It is in this context we need to look at the concept of R2P. It was in the document “*We the people – The role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*”, that then secretary general Kofi Annan addressed the ‘dilemma of intervention’. Published in 2000, the document was written after a decade of bloody civil wars, ethnic cleansing and genocide. It was with this in mind that Annan posed the following question:

---

<sup>21</sup> Amstutz, 2008. *International Ethics: concepts, theories and cases in global politics*, p. 114ff

<sup>22</sup> UN Charter, article 33, via <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, 1965, A/RES/20/2131

<sup>24</sup> Amstutz, 2008. *International Ethics: concepts, theories and cases in global politics*, p. 152f

“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?<sup>25</sup>”

One year later, *the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS) released their document entitled “*The Responsibility to Protect*”, where they revisited Annan’s ‘compelling pleas’, and listed one of the core principles of R2P being that “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself”<sup>26</sup>. Even though the ICISS is not part of the UN, the *ad hoc* commission did put heavy responsibility on the UN to uphold the principles of R2P. 2001 marked a rapid rise of the concept of R2P, and went from a concept to an affirmed principle within the UNSC<sup>27</sup>. Five years later, in the 2005 World Summit, the responsibility to protect was explicitly, and perhaps ambiguously, affirmed. Though it states that any measures taken should be taken in accordance with the UN Charter, it also states that “... we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner...”<sup>28</sup>.

As mentioned above, the sovereignty of the nation state is of adamant importance within the rules of international relations. This, and the UN’s traditional norm of non-intervention, makes it hard to legitimize intervention – even if the cause can be seen as a noble one. What R2P then seeks to do is to redefine state sovereignty. By redefining (or at least intertwine sovereignty and protection, as the ICISS report on R2P did) sovereignty as protection<sup>29</sup>, a state failing to protect its own citizens can be construed as forfeiting its sovereignty. This creates a loophole within the norm of non-intervention and a state no longer have a *carte blanche* when it comes to internal affairs<sup>30</sup>, nor does it have to pose an external threat for intervention to be just. If mass atrocities (such as genocide or ethnic cleansing) are being committed within the country, R2P can be invoked to justify intervention. This is what happened prior to the NATO-led intervention in Libya. In this specific case, the reported killings of thousands of civilians quickly sparked a debate within the UNSC, and it was decided that the Libyan regime, led by Muammar Al-Qadhafi, had failed its citizens and thus it became the obligation of the international community to protect Libyan civilians. Since then, the R2P debate has been both extensive and harsh within the UNSC.

---

<sup>25</sup> Annan, 2000, *We the people – The role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 48

<sup>26</sup> ICISS, 2001, *The Responsibility to Protect*, XI.

<sup>27</sup> Bellamy, 2013, “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot air?”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(3), p333-357, p. 334

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, 2005, A/RES/60/1

<sup>29</sup> Thakur & Weiss, 2009. “R2P: From Idea to Norm – Action”, *Global Responsibility to Protect*. (1): 22-53, p. 24

<sup>30</sup> Goldstein, 2011, *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict World-wide*, p. 323

# 4 The R2P discourse within the UNSC

## 4.1 The case of Libya

### 4.1.1 R2P and call for intervention

The discourse regarding the situation in Libya began on February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011, during the 6490<sup>th</sup> meeting in the UNSC, where Secretary General Ban Ki-moon shared his concerns about a situation where “... issues of peace and security are at stake”. At this time, it had already been reported that over a thousand people had been killed, and that the Libyan regime had threatened with mass killings<sup>31</sup>.

The Secretary General soon arrived to the R2P paradigm by arguing that “when a State manifestly fails to protect its population from serious international crimes, the international community has the responsibility to step in and take protective action in a collective, timely and decisive manner”. Concluding that the Libyan regime had failed to protect its citizens, he also affirmed that the challenge was now to provide “real protection” and to halt the ongoing violence<sup>32</sup>. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council, in the same day, called upon the Libyan government to “meet its responsibility to protect its population”<sup>33</sup>.

On February 26<sup>th</sup>, the debate produced the first resolution with regards to the violent situation in Libya. In resolution 1970, which was unanimously adopted by the UNSC<sup>34</sup>, the members once again turned to the concept of R2P, urging the Libyan regime to fulfil its responsibility to protect its population<sup>35</sup>.

About three weeks later, on March 17<sup>th</sup>, the R2P discourse reached one of its most defining moments. During the 6498<sup>th</sup> meeting the United Kingdom (UK), then represented by Mark Lyall Grant, claimed that Libya was a “violent and discredited regime that has lost all legitimacy”<sup>36</sup>. It was also during this meeting that resolution 1973 was passed<sup>37</sup>, which authorized member states to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians”. In practice, this resulted in a NATO led intervention in Libya. Even though there was a mandate to intervene in Libya was given, the resolution also established that there was to be no occupation or efforts to establish a new regime<sup>38</sup>.

---

<sup>31</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6490, p. 2

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p. 3

<sup>33</sup> United Nations, 2011, A/HRC/S-15/2, p. 2

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6491, p. 2

<sup>35</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/RES/1970, p. 2

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6498, p. 4

<sup>37</sup> No one voted against the resolution, although Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia abstained.

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/RES/1973, 1ff

Vitaly Churkin, representing Russia, abstained in the voting. Even though Churkin stated Russia is “consistent and firm advocates of the protection of the civilian population”, he stressed that the best solution would be a total ceasefire, and not outside intervention. He criticized the “passion of some Council members for methods involving force”, saying that it (the passing of the resolution) was “most unfortunate and regrettable”<sup>39</sup>.

Li Baodong, representing China and then acting president of the UNSC, shared this criticism and took an even more traditional stance, underlining the importance of state sovereignty and emphasized that China “is always against the use of force in international relations. He also referred to the UN Charter and the norms that governs international law”<sup>40</sup>.

At the same meeting, United States (US) representative Susan Rice recalled the 6490<sup>th</sup> meeting, stating that the Council had then (through resolution 1970) demanded the halt of violence in Libya and that this was done with respect to chapter VII of the UN Charter. She called resolution 1973 a response to the Libyan people’s cry for help, and that the US stands behind them in support of their (universal) rights<sup>41</sup>.

#### 4.1.2 Intervention and a halt in the R2P discourse

An intervention by a coalition force, led by the United States, Britain and France, was initiated on March 19<sup>th</sup>, with *Operation Odyssey Dawn*. This was a direct result of resolution 1973, which was passed only two days before. The operation involved targeting of Libyan government forces and was later taken over by NATO coalition forces<sup>42</sup>.

On April 4<sup>th</sup>, and again on May 3<sup>rd</sup>, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, was invited to brief the UNSC about the crisis in Libya. Although pointing out that the responsibility for a solution was with the Libyan people, he also expressed worries about the continued violence in the country and emphasized the important of humanitarian support<sup>43</sup>. For the next few months, the discourse within the UNSC mostly consisted of briefings and updates on the situation, focusing more on humanitarian aid and the military clashes with the Libyan regime, than the legitimacy of intervention.

---

<sup>39</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6498, p. 8

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 10

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 5

<sup>42</sup> Gertler, 2011, “Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, p. 1ff

<sup>43</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6509 & United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6527

However, China once again pointed out the importance of territorial sovereignty and commented that they “are not in favour of any arbitrary interpretation of the Council’s resolutions or any actions going beyond those mandated by the Council”<sup>44</sup>.

It was also during the second quarter of 2011 that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for, amongst others, Muammar Al-Qadhafi. During the 6566<sup>th</sup> meeting, Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, recalled resolutions 1970 and 1973 and once again affirmed that the UNSC has an obligation to protect the Libyan people<sup>45</sup>. On July 28<sup>th</sup>, during the 6595<sup>th</sup> meeting, South African ambassador Baso Sangqu, who voted in favor of resolution 1970 and 1973, expressed concerns about how these resolutions had been implemented. He noted that “taking sides in any internal conflict situation in an effort to institute regime change in Libya sets a dangerous precedent that will surely damage the credibility of the Council and its resolutions”<sup>46</sup>. This skepticism no doubt arose from the NATO support of opposition forces in Libya being carried out, despite the fact that the passed resolutions dictated that there be no efforts to change the Libyan regime.

Through resolution 2009, which was adopted on the 6620<sup>th</sup> meeting on September 16<sup>th</sup>, the UNSC unanimously encouraged the National Transitional Council (which had earlier the same year proclaimed itself the “sole representative all over Libya”<sup>47</sup>) to protect the Libyan population, as well as human rights<sup>48</sup>.

During this meeting, Russia, again represented by Vitaly Churkin, was yet again skeptical towards how the situation in Libya had been handled. He criticized the arbitrary violations of the no-fly zone, as well as ill-considered bombings that resulted in civilian casualties. He noted that the no-fly zone was created with the purpose of protection civilians, and that it now had become obsolete<sup>49</sup>.

China once again took a pragmatic stand. Unlike countries such as the UK, United States, Germany and France, China did not make any statements regarding a transition to democracy, but instead focused on territorial sovereignty and security<sup>50</sup>.

On September 26<sup>th</sup>, Mahmoud Jibril, chairman of the National Transitional Council executive office of Libya, appeared before the Security Council and thanked them for their support and the passing of resolution 1970 and 1973. He did, however, ask the UNSC to lift bans and the freezing of assets that was implemented through these resolutions. He stated that:

---

<sup>44</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6528, p. 10

<sup>45</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6566, p. 2f

<sup>46</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV/6595, p. 5

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.webcitation.org/5x0wuZ8r2>

<sup>48</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/RES/2009, p. 2f

<sup>49</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6620, p. 3

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 4

“...the circumstances that prevailed before the resolution was adopted no longer exist. It is therefore imperative to adopt a resolution that seeks to lift the freeze fully on those assets and funds so that the Libyan people can begin their reconstruction process”<sup>51</sup>.

#### 4.1.3 In hindsight: NATO withdrawal and continued fighting

On October 27<sup>th</sup>, a draft resolution was put forth by several UNSC member states, including Russia and the US. In this draft, they expressed their strong support of Libyan sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The signatories also welcomed the “positive developments in Libya which will improve the prospects for a democratic, peaceful and prosperous future...”<sup>52</sup> It also included the termination of several paragraphs from resolution 1973 which, in practice, meant a complete withdrawal from Libya. The draft resolution passed unanimously as resolution 2016, on October 31<sup>st</sup><sup>53</sup>. This meant that Mahmoud Jibril, through this resolution, had his wishes fulfilled. It was now up to the people, and especially the new government, to take responsibility and ensure the protection of its own citizens<sup>54</sup>.

On November 2<sup>nd</sup>, the situation in Libya was once again on the agenda in the UNSC. It once again became a discourse about the support and encouragement of a democratic development in Libya. Several countries, including France, the UK, South Africa and Germany, recalled the early resolutions (1970 and 1973) and its importance regarding the responsibility to protect civilians<sup>55</sup>. Several countries also welcomed the (assumed) democratic and peaceful development in Libya.

Russia, this time represented by Sergey Karev, expressed great concern regarding all fighting factions in the civil war. Even though several representatives within the UNSC criticized the killing of Al-Qadhafi (who the UNSC would rather see stand trial), Russia was more condemning. Others within the UNSC were still mostly focused on crimes committed by the Libyan regime, while Karev not only went to criticize rebel groups, but even the NATO coalition forces<sup>56</sup>.

China, who had since the beginning of the conflict focused mainly on sovereignty and security issues, once again made a concise statement including their hopes about that Libya “... will safeguard national unity and integrity, take early steps to achieve social stability and begin political and economic reconstruction”<sup>57</sup>.

---

<sup>51</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6622, p. 7

<sup>52</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/2011/669

<sup>53</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6640

<sup>54</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/RES/2016

<sup>55</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6647

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 6

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 11

For the months to come, the discourse within the UNSC was mainly focused on the support of Libya and its reconstruction. On March 7<sup>th</sup> 2012, Russia, once again represented by Vitaly Churkin, turned the R2P framework against NATO and the Security Council, claiming that “civilian deaths were caused by actions that it had sanctioned, whereas they were intended to protect civilians”. He referred to International Commission of Inquiry of Libya, whose investigation “mentioned the deaths of dozens of civilians as a result of the airstrikes”. Churkin also criticized NATO’s silence in the matter, urging them to apologize and offer compensation for the civilian casualties. He further claimed that the Security Council and NATO should both take responsibility for such actions<sup>5859</sup>.

US representative Susan Rice dismissed these accusations, claiming that:

“NATO conducted operations in Libya to a standard exceeding what was required under international humanitarian law and in full accordance with the United Nations mandate to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas from attacks and the threat of attacks [...].The Commission found no violation of international law on the part of NATO<sup>60</sup>”

France stood behind Rice in the question and Germany stated that NATO acted “in full accordance with the United Nations mandate to protect civilians”<sup>61</sup>.

It was during this meeting that the criticism against the intervention in Libya became more explicit. Wang Min, representing China, expressed concern with the proliferations of weapons within Libya and said that “the Security Council should draw lessons from the way the Libyan issue was addressed”. He also seconded Churkin’s criticism regarding alleged civilian casualties caused by NATO airstrikes<sup>62</sup>.

On March 2012, another meeting was held in the UNSC and the R2P discourse was again brought to the table, this time by French representative Alain Juppé. He highlighted the formal change in 2005 when, during the World Summit, the UN had agreed that it was the responsibility of the council to provide protections to those who had been failed by their own governments. He proudly recalled resolution 1973, saying that it saved thousands of lives and led to the protection of the Libyan population. He also stated that the questioning the legitimacy of the resolution, and its implementation, was an “utter distortion of history”<sup>63</sup>.

---

<sup>58</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6731, p. 8

<sup>59</sup> This criticism and demand for accountability were to re-emerge several times during future meetings.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. p. 9

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. p. 9f

<sup>63</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6734, p. 5f

During a later meeting, on May 16<sup>th</sup>, representative of the UK also defended the NATO operations, saying that “All NATO airstrikes were meticulously planned, including using precision guided munitions and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance to strike legitimate military targets”<sup>64</sup>.

On November 7<sup>th</sup>, Russia once again criticized the intervening policies of those involved in the Libyan issue. Sergey Karev shared views in line with those of some R2P critics, and stated that:

“Attempts to impose alien models of State-development and State-building on Libyan society and to impose values that disregard local political and legal traditions and culture have resulted in a serious absence of stability and lack of viable Government institutions and of the rule of law in general.”<sup>65</sup>

Martin Briens, representing France, had a different standpoint, arguing that Libya should serve as an example to show that inaction is inexcusable and further said that “hesitation and silence on our part do not help to save lives”<sup>66</sup>.

During the second half of 2012, there were several reports of continued fighting within Libya. Despite elections and a new government, peace was not achieved. Both Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as other cities, were plagued by “bouts of fighting” and “serious security incidents”. Assassination attempts and car bombings directed at Libyan officials were also reported<sup>67</sup>. As of January 2013, The Security Council had been briefed several times by the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which made it clear that the situation in Libya remained problematic<sup>68</sup>. These briefings were continuous and it had become clear that Libya a weak and insecure state, in large part due to the proliferation of weapons, and distrust towards the state’s security forces<sup>69</sup>. Resolution 2095, which was adopted unanimously, expressed deep concerns regarding these issues, but was yet optimistic regarding the future of Libya<sup>70</sup>.

The defense of R2P made a brief return through Eugène-Richard Gasana, representative of Rwanda, on May 8<sup>th</sup>. He expressed Rwanda’s support of resolutions 1970 and 1973, expressing that:

“Rwanda, as co-Chair of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect, would like to stress that the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians targeted by their own Governments and a duty to ensure that the perpetrators of mass atrocities are brought to justice”<sup>71</sup>.

---

<sup>64</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6722, p. 10

<sup>65</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6855, p. 5

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. p. 9

<sup>67</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6857, p. 4

<sup>68</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6912

<sup>69</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6934, p. 4

<sup>70</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/RES/2095

<sup>71</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6962, p. 8

This defense could hardly be seen as unexpected since Rwanda, about 20 years earlier, suffered a genocide which was largely ignored by the international community, including the UNSC. Rwanda had seen that inaction could have dire consequences. The representative of Azerbaijan also argued within the R2P paradigm, saying that protection of civilians and the fight against impunity for atrocities is the responsibility of the international community<sup>72</sup>.

By May 2014, the growing instability in Libya had more and more come to dominate the agenda within the Security Council. The US was however still fairly optimistic about the development in Libya, and several member states still recalled the importance of resolution 1970.

Russia expressed deep concern about the ‘rapid deterioration’ in Libya, and once again recalled reports about casualties caused by NATO airstrikes, saying that it “exceeded the parameters of permissible action under resolution 1973 and its objectives”<sup>73</sup>.

In November 2014, during the 7306<sup>th</sup> meeting, criticism towards the early resolutions passed in 2011 had spread further. Philippe Bertoux, representing France, was concerned about the violence and instability in Libya, claiming that resolution 1970<sup>74</sup> had not really solved anything<sup>75</sup>. The UK also expressed concerns about the situation in Libya, but did not go so far as to share any doubts about the early resolutions<sup>76</sup>.

During the first quarter of 2015, the proliferation of weapons and increased activity among groups such as ISIS has taken the discourse regarding the situation in Libya to be almost solely about counter-terrorism.

## 4.2 The situation in Syria

### 4.2.1 Initial reactions and open conflict within the UNSC

On April 27<sup>th</sup> 2012, during the 6524<sup>th</sup> meeting in the UNSC, Lynn Pascoe, under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, was invited to brief the council on the situation in Syria. It was in March the same year that demonstration within the country had started, as a result of the detention of several school children who had written anti-government graffiti.

---

<sup>72</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6962, p. 10

<sup>73</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7173, p. 10

<sup>74</sup> This is, even though not explicitly expressed, in extension also criticism towards resolution 1973

<sup>75</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7306, p. 7

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. p. 11

Demonstrations spread, and the demands for more freedom and political reforms increased and eventually, the protesters called for an end of the al-Assad regime<sup>77</sup>.

As a result of these protests, the violence against the protesters increased and in the end of April, reports had come in that over 100 people had been killed all across the country. The reports also reported military operations in the city of Dar'a, where artillery was being used against civilians. These reports sparked a debate within the council, and US representative Susan Rice called "on the international community to respond to this brutal crackdown and to hold accountable those who are perpetrating these gross human rights violations"<sup>78</sup>.

Mark Lyall Grant, representing the UK, responded with equal firmness, and affirmed that the Syrian government had a responsibility to protect peaceful protestors<sup>79</sup>.

Even though Russian representative Alexander Pankin expressed concern about the situation in Syria, he took a stance that was in line with the non-intervention norm within the UN. He pointed out that the situation in Syria did not pose any threat to international peace and security. He further stated that the real threat is rather outside intervention, "including attempts to promote ready-made solutions or to take sides"<sup>80</sup>. He warned that such actions only leads to escalating violence, also pointing out Syria as an important 'cornerstone' of Middle Eastern security architecture. China shared the Russian stance, hoping that any action from the international community taking place within the norms of the UN charter<sup>81</sup>.

Bashar Ja'afari, who was invited to the UNSC to represent Syria in the matter, was not content with assigning blame to the Syrian regime, but rather condemned 'extremist groups' for using violence as a tool to topple the Syrian government. While several members of the UNSC urged the Syrian government to take responsibility for its actions and protect Syrian citizens, Ja'afari responded that it was the primary responsibility of the Syrian government to protect its borders. He stated that Syrian authorities had stopped several arms shipments "that had been sent to groups attempting to undermine stability and security in the country"<sup>82</sup>. He went even further, saying that the situation in Syrian should not be an issue for the Security Council, claiming that such a discussion opened up for the insinuation that the Syrian regime does not protect its people. He strongly criticized the concept of R2P, saying that:

---

<sup>77</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6524, p. 2

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. p. 4

<sup>79</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6524, p. 5

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p. 7

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 7f

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. p. 11f

“... the age of colonialism has passed. All the peoples of the world are now aware of the new methods used by some States to interfere in the affairs of other States, be it in the framework of the so-called responsibility to protect or that of humanitarian intervention, which have been rejected by all developing countries, even as attempts are being made to ram them through international forums, including the United Nations. We have always feared that the use of such lofty concepts would undermine the unity, sovereignty and independence of the peoples of the developing countries”<sup>83</sup>.

Almost six months later, on October 4<sup>th</sup>, several council members put forth a draft resolution. This draft expressed deep concern about the situation in Syria, and affirmed that it is the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect its own citizens, and that the government should allow “unhindered and sustained access for humanitarian aid and humanitarian organizations”. It also urged the Syrian government to cooperate with the UN. In addition to this, it called for the accountability of those responsible for all violence and human rights violations. The draft also left open for a possibility to act within article 41 of the UN charter<sup>84</sup>, which may include economic sanctions and implementation of no-fly zones (as was done in Syria through resolution 1973)<sup>85</sup>.

However, the resolution did not pass, as both Russia and China made the choice to vote against the resolution, instead of abstaining as they did with resolution 1973. Vitaly Churkin referred to the principle of non-intervention, and reminded the council about the situation in Libya. He also expressed his criticism towards the concept of R2P, saying that:

“The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience. The international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect. It is easy to see that today’s “Unified Protector” model could happen in Syria<sup>86</sup>”.

China once again focused on the integrity and sovereignty of Syria but did not, at least not openly, share the more aggressive Russian tone towards the draft resolution and R2P.

The US (who voted in favor of aforementioned draft resolution), represented by Susan Rice, expressed outrage towards the council’s failure to address the Syrian crisis and went so far as to say that several members “have sought for weeks to weaken and strip bare any texts that would have defended the lives of innocent civilians from Assad’s brutality”.

---

<sup>83</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6524, p. 13

<sup>84</sup> Article 41 states that “the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.

<sup>85</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/2011/612

<sup>86</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6627, p. 4

She explicitly pointed at Russia and China, because of their vote against the resolution. She also stated that the council should assume its responsibilities toward the Syrian people, and that it was now made clear who were supporting the “yearning for liberty and universal human rights” among the Syrian people, and who was not<sup>87</sup>.

#### 4.2.2 A small step from the status quo

March 12<sup>th</sup>, 2012, the worrying situation in the Middle East (including Syria) was the main topic of discussion in the UNSC. French representative Alain Juppé told the council that it was their obligation to take responsibility, and that preventing them from assuming this responsibility is unacceptable. This view was shared by German representative Guido Westerwelle<sup>88</sup>.

Unlike the meetings in 2011, this meeting resulted in finding some common ground with regards to the Syrian conflict. Russia, who had earlier been less willing to criticize the Syrian government, now condemned the violence and expressed that there was ‘no doubt’ that the government should be held responsible for its actions, and wished to provide unhindered access to provide humanitarian help to the Syrian people. Russia did, however, once again stress the importance of non-intervention. China expressed their willingness to take responsibility and supported humanitarian relief, but remained cautious in regards to any form of intervention<sup>89</sup>. During a meeting on April 14<sup>th</sup>, resolution 2042 was unanimously passed in the UNSC, which condemned crimes committed by the Syrian regime, and authorized the UN to deploy an unarmed observation team to assess the situation in Syria<sup>90</sup>. One week later, another resolution was, once again unanimously, passed. It called for the cease-fire of *all* fighting parts in Syria, and authorized an increase of UN presence<sup>91</sup>.

However, the tone between certain member states remained harsh. US representative Susan Rice once again criticized members (implicitly referring to Russia and China) of the council for obstructing the UNSC responsibilities to take action, calling it ‘reprehensible’<sup>92</sup>.

---

<sup>87</sup> United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6627, p. 8

<sup>88</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6734, p. 7, 14

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. p. 9f, 19f

<sup>90</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/RES/2042

<sup>91</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/RES/2043

<sup>92</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6826, p. 23

Several representatives, including those from Turkey, Morocco, the UK, Colombia and the US, affirmed that it was the primary responsibility of the Syrian government to protect its citizens and that the failure in doing so calls for action. However, the members threaded lightly when talking about intervention, but instead focused on providing aid and protection for those who were fleeing the country<sup>93</sup>.

On September 26<sup>th</sup>, another meeting took place, with the main focus on peace and security in the Middle East. As with the earlier meetings in 2012, it involved the condemnation of the escalating violence in Syria and the failure of the Syrian government to protect civilians, but any decisions could not be made with the support that was needed. The representative of France, Laurent Fabius, criticized the council's inability to act, but also warned about the uncertainties surrounding the conflict. He noted that the continued reign of al-Assad is indeed a problem, but that his ousting could leave Syria in a fragile situation, which could generate even more chaos<sup>94</sup>.

In April 2013, humanitarian aid and the protection of those who had fled the country remained a common topic among the members. Leila Zerrougui, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, highlighted the lack of responsibility taken by parties involved in the conflict, and expressed worries about the ever-shrinking possibilities for the UNSC to provide humanitarian assistance<sup>95</sup>. Just as two years earlier, Syrian representative Bashar Ja'afari took a firm stance against those who might be in favor of any sort of intervention, further explaining that:

“The people of [...] Syria oppose occupation and reject dominance and subjugation [...] the people of Syria, who have thousands of years of history, will not allow anyone — however great or mighty, working openly or covertly, old or new, near or far — to threaten their sovereignty, dignity, political independence and national unity. Although there are some differences in the way Syrian citizens love their homeland, they are all determined to stand united in the face of any attempt to undermine Syria's dignity, its political independence and its well-established national principles<sup>96</sup>”.

He went on to criticize the ‘aggressive propaganda’ of some governments, claiming that they seek to justify an intervention in Syria under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention and R2P<sup>97</sup>.

---

<sup>93</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6826, p. 7f, 16, 17f, 19, 21ff

<sup>94</sup> United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6841, p. 9

<sup>95</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6949, p. 9

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. p. 11

In July, Ja'afari once again defended the Syrian government, claiming that they did everything they could to tackle their responsibility towards the Syrian people, in spite of "... arbitrary unilateral economic measures that have been imposed against the Syrian people by some States Members of this international Organization"<sup>98</sup>.

Despite earlier disagreements and criticism from Syrian authorities, the UNSC managed to unanimously adopt resolution 2118, on September 27<sup>th</sup>, 2013. The resolution was passed in the light of recent events, including reports of the Syrian government deploying chemical weapons. In addition to condemn the use of chemical weapons, the council also determined that such use was not only a violation of several resolutions, but that it also constituted a threat to international peace and security<sup>99</sup>.

During the same meeting where this resolution was passed, Rwandan representative Eugène-Richard Gasana once again brought up the paradigm of R2P, conveying a message from the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, who wanted to inform the council that it was his conviction that the responsibility to protect is the primary mission of the UNSC<sup>100</sup>. Seeing similarities between the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in Syria, he expressed his concerns, saying that:

"As in 1994, when the Security Council was prevented from intervening in Rwanda because of an unwarranted realpolitik prevailing in the Council, mostly among permanent members, the Council was once again unable to save more than 100,000 people in Syria because of ever-present divisions among veto-wielding members"<sup>101</sup>.

Other than the notions made by Gasana, the concept of R2P was not presented within the discourse surrounding the resolution. Instead, the main focus were on the use of chemical weapons and the continued violence taking place within the Syrian borders.

February 22<sup>nd</sup> 2014, yet another resolution was again unanimously adopted. Resolution 2139 stressed that the primary responsibility to protect its citizens lies with the Syrian government<sup>102</sup>. The purpose of the resolution was clear; drastic measures would be needed to improve the situation in Syria. However, there were no calls for intervention, even though some, like Argentinian representative, María Perceval, emphasized the importance of the responsibility to protect civilians<sup>103</sup>. Raimonda Murmokaitė, representative of Lithuania, also affirmed the Syrian authorities' responsibility to protect the population<sup>104</sup>.

---

<sup>98</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.7000, p. 7

<sup>99</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/RES/2118, p. 2ff

<sup>100</sup> United Nations, 2013, S/PV.7038, p. 14

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. p. 13f

<sup>102</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/RES/2139, p. 4

<sup>103</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7116, p. 9

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p. 14

### 4.2.3 No end in sight

On May 22<sup>nd</sup>, a draft resolution was put forth, signed by members both within and outside the UNSC, including France, the US, the UK and Libya. In the resolution, the signatories determined that the situation in Syria was a threat to international peace and security, thus opening up for actions in accordance to chapter VII of the UN charter<sup>105</sup>.

French representative Gérard Araud appealed to the council, saying that the passing of the draft resolution would be a chance for them to restore their honor, and that it is not a political gesture, but rather a moral act. He further stated that a veto would “cover up all crimes” committed by the Syrian regime<sup>106</sup>. Samantha Power, who voted in favor of the resolution, stated that it was the council’s responsibility to stop atrocities and to ensure that those accountable be brought to justice. She criticized Russia, who voted against the draft resolution, saying that they are backing the Syrian regime, no matter what it does<sup>107</sup>. Mark Lyall Grant also criticized those who stopped the resolution from passing, saying that Russia and China should be ashamed and that their vetoes were disgraceful<sup>108</sup>.

Vitaly Churkin responded by questioning France’s motives with the resolution, wondering why they would undermine the unity between the permanent members (P5), knowing that the resolution would not pass. He also referred to the actions taken during the Libyan conflict, saying that resolution 1970 did not solve anything, but rather escalated the conflict. He also encouraged the Western member states to stop with their “futile, dead-end policy of endlessly escalating the Syrian crisis”<sup>109</sup>.

Six months after resolution 2139 was passed, another meeting was held, focusing on the situation in Syria. The situation in Syria had worsened and several terrorist organizations, including ISIL and the al-Nusra Front, were now plaguing the civilian population through kidnappings, beheading and crucifixion<sup>110</sup>. Another month later, in September, the advancement of aforementioned terrorist organizations was on the top of the agenda. The increasing violence not only put civilians between the crossfire of several fighting factions, but also made it harder to provide humanitarian aid to those in need<sup>111</sup>.

In February 2015, the responsibility to protect was once again raised, this time by Spanish representative Juan Manuel González de Linares Palo.

---

<sup>105</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/2014/348, p. 2

<sup>106</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7180, p. 3f

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. p. 4f

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 7

<sup>109</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7180, p. 12f

<sup>110</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7252, p. 2f

<sup>111</sup> United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7273, p. 2f

He shared his concern regarding the continued failing to respect the responsibility to protect, but also stressed that the solution should be political, and not military. Lithuania went further, saying that al-Assad was deliberately refusing protection<sup>112</sup>.

On March 27<sup>th</sup>, in a meeting lasting roughly eight hours, the UNSC and non-council states discussed the increased violence against ethnic and religious minorities taking place in the Middle East. The violence in Syria, especially crimes committed by terrorist organizations, was a recurrent topic. The issues regarding the failure to take responsibility for the protection of civilians were raised countless times, with several countries stressing the states central obligation to protect its citizens<sup>113</sup>. Others, such as the Netherlands, empathized that it is not only the state's responsibility to protect, but also the responsibility of the international community<sup>114</sup>.

As of May 2015, the situation in Syria is still looking grim, and the UNSC has not yet been able to take any action like those taken four years earlier in Libya. The discourse remain vibrant, but despite resolutions and condemnations, there is no intervention on the horizon, humanitarian or otherwise.

---

<sup>112</sup> United Nations, 2015, S/PV.7394, p 8f, 17

<sup>113</sup> United Nations, 2015, S/PV.7419, p. 10, 46, 61, 71f, 74f

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 68

## 5 Conclusions

The R2P discourse within the UNSC has undoubtedly changed since the 2011 intervention in Libya. That a state has a responsibility to protect its citizens is still a reoccurring theme among the majority of member states, and a principle that almost everyone agree to be reasonable. China is the most notable exception, as they focus more on sovereignty and security than the well-being of the citizens. The other four permanent members all agree that the main responsibility lies with the state, and three of them are still, perhaps mostly implicitly, calling for decisive action. Russia remains a strong proponent of non-intervention, but at the same time expresses great concern about the deterioration in Syria. The R2P discourse has not gone away but rather lost its edge, and even though there is no ‘rallying call’, several states (including the UK, the US and France) are frustrated about having their hands tied, due to the vetoes of China and Russia. The tone between member states has grown harsher and some non-permanent members, such as Rwanda, are hopelessly calling for the permanent members to act to prevent crimes against humanity and potential genocide.

China and Russia have used the situation in Libya against those who joined the coalition forces during the intervention. Even though none of them voted against resolution 1973, they have used the deterioration in Libya as an argument against NATO and those in the UNSC that actively supported the intervention. Going so far as to blame the intervention itself for the escalating chaos, China and Russia now has a go-to response when others call for an intervention in Syria.

As the R2P argument has lost its edge, other arguments are being put forth that might make it easier to legitimize an intervention in Syria. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, and the general security issues surrounding the proliferation of weapons in the region, can according to some be seen as a threat to international peace and security. Since some argue that R2P is open for arbitrary interpretation that can create a slippery slope away from the norm of non-intervention, consolidating the idea that the situation in Syria poses an external threat could open up for intervention in accordance with the UN charter.

Using intervention as a mean to protect civilians might not have fallen out of favor on a normative level and R2P is still considered preferable to inaction according to some, but when it comes to *realpolitik*, the criticism is ever-growing. The R2P discourse within the UNSC can be summarized as a fight between a new norm of responsibility and an old norm of non-intervention. As of now, the fight has reached a standstill and if a change were to occur, it is unlikely that it will strengthen the concept of R2P. As long as China and Russia stands firm on the subject, it is more likely that the inaction of the UNSC decreases the credibility of R2P as a viable concept.

## 6 References

### Literature

- Amstutz, Mark R, 2008, *International Ethics. Concepts, Theories and Cases in Global Politics*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Annan, Kofi A, 2000, "We the peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", via [http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We\\_The\\_Peoples.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18
- Bellamy, Alex J, 2013, "The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot Air?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48:3, 333-357
- Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina (red.), 2008, *Textens mening och makt: Metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys*. Narayana Press.
- Dunne & Gelber, 2014. "Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, (6): 326-349
- Goldstein, Joshua, 2011. *Winning the War on War. The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide*. New York: Penguin Group.
- Gertler, Jeremiah, 2011, "Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress", *Congressional Research Service* 7-5700
- Hehir, Aidan, 2011, "The responsibility to protect in international political discourse: encouraging statement of intent or illusory platitudes?", *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 15:8, 1331-1348
- Loiselle, 2013, "The Normative Status of the Responsibility to Protect after Libya", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, (5), 317-341
- Nuruzzaman, Mohammed, 2013, "The 'Responsibility to Protect' Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15. No. 2, p. 57-66
- Quinton-Brown, Patrick, 2013, "Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and its State Critics", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, (5): 260-282
- Rose, Gillian, 2012, *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials*. Sage Publications
- Thakur, Ramesh & Weiss, Thomas G, 2009. "R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?", *Global Responsibility to Protect*. (1): 22-53

Wilson, John, "Political Discourse" in Schiffrin, Deborah, Tannen, Deborah and Hamilton, Heidi E, 2001, The Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Blackwell Publishers. p. 398-415

## **United Nations Documents**

### **Libya:**

#### **Human Rights Council Documents**

A/HRC/S-15/2, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20A%20HRC%20S%2015%202.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

#### **Security Council Meeting Records**

S/PV.6490, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206490.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6491, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206491.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6498, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6509, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206509.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6527, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206527.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6528, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206528.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6566, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206566.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV/6595, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206595.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6620, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206620.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6622, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206622.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6640, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206640.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6647, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6647.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6647.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6722, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20S%20PV%206722.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6731, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206731.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6734, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S%20PV%206734.pdf>, 2015-05-18

S/PV.6855, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6855.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6855.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6857, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6857.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6857.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6912, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6912.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6912.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6934, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6934.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6934.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6962, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S\\_PV\\_6962.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_PV_6962.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7173, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7173.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7173.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7306, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7306.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7306.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

## **Resolutions and Draft Resolutions**

S/2011/669, via <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/567/04/PDF/N1156704.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/1970, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20RES%201970.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/1973, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20RES%201973.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2009, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20RES%202009.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2016, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20RES%202016.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2095, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_res\\_2095.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2095.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

## **Syria:**

### **Security Council Meeting Records**

S/PV.6524, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S%20PV%206524.pdf>,

S/PV.6627, via, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Golan%20Heights%20S%20PV%206627.pdf>

S/PV.6734, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S%20PV%206734.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6826, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6826.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6826.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6841, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6841.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6841.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.6949, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_6949.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6949.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7000, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7000.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7000.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7038, via [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7038](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7038), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7116, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7116.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7116.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7180, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7180.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7180.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7252, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7252.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7252.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7273, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7273.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7273.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7394, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7394.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7394.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/PV.7419, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7419.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7419.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

### **Resolutions and Draft Resolutions**

S/2011/612, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/2014/348, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2014\\_348.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2042, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20SRES%202042.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2043, via <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20SRES%202043.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2118, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_res\\_2118.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

S/RES/2139, via [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_res\\_2139.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2139.pdf), accessed 2015-05-18

### **Electronic sources**

Founding statement of the Interim Transitional National Council, via <http://www.webcitation.org/5x0wuZ8r2>, accessed 2015-05-18

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, “The Responsibility to Protect”, via <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, accessed 2015-05-18

UN Charter, via <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>, accessed 2015-05-18