

# Shedding light on the European Union's Development Cooperation after Lisbon Treaty

How the Lisbon Treaty changes, particularly participation of the EEAS in the development aid programming, have affected the achievement of the objectives of the EU's development cooperation?



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# Abstract

The concept of poverty as a development and a security issue has been fairly commonplace since the end of Cold War and poverty has been gaining importance in the security agenda of the EU throughout the years. Thus Lisbon Treaty has legally and instructionally enhanced the Union's capacities to ensure policy coherence and has given poverty reduction utmost importance among its development cooperation objectives. This study aims to investigate how the Lisbon Treaty changes, particularly participation of the EEAS in the development aid programming, has affected the achievement of the objectives of the EU's development cooperation. Lisbon Treaty has introduced two new bureaucratic bodies with different organizational cultures and missions which are responsible for the EU's development programming; namely EEAS and DEVCO. Considering the EEAS's leading position in the programming and its organizational values together with the introduced changes of the Lisbon Treaty, this thesis aims to scrutinize whether the Lisbon Process favored or hinder the EU's efforts to achieve development goals. The operationalization of the theory based stakeholder evaluation on the programming of the European Development Fund provided the necessary information on the actors' roles, values and missions in the programming phase. The discussions on the criticisms to the EU regarding politicization/securitization of aid may increase on reasonable grounds, but it is also the fact that checks and balances system has already been integrated in the development aid programming by having DEVCO and EEAS involved in the process. In order to achieve the ideal outcomes, regular participation of the DEVCO and coordination should be ensured without allowing any inter-institutional rivalries.

*Key words:* Lisbon Treaty, European Development Fund, development aid, security development nexus, poverty reduction, evaluation

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 The Objective of the Study and the Research Questions

The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, has brought about a number of novelties in the institutional structures of the EU in order to restructure the Union's "external action". The Treaty aimed to further efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to engender the coherence of the EU's actions abroad<sup>1</sup>. The Treaty also have implications in the fields of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance: With an aim to remodel the Union's external actions, the Lisbon Treaty also altered EU's relations with the developing world and established new structures to manage its relations with the countries in need of the foreign assistance.

First of all the Treaty has merged the former DG Development and DG EuropeAid into the newly established Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO). With a mission to alleviate poverty and achieve sustainable development DG DEVCO is responsible for i) the formulation of the European international cooperation and development policy in order to eradicate poverty worldwide and ii) "implementing the EU's external aid instruments"<sup>2</sup> throughout the world<sup>3</sup>.

The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been another novelty that Lisbon Treaty has introduced. The EEAS is tasked with managing the external policies of the EU which fall under the mandate of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereinafter will be referred to as the HR). Among the several motivations for the creation of the EEAS, one of them is strengthening the EU's gravitas in relation to the third countries, regions and international organizations.<sup>4</sup> The EEAS has also ensured the consistency and effectiveness of the EU's external policies and actions which were previously split among the EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission; thus guaranteed the functional indivisibility of the EU's external relations decision-making processes. Having united different strands of the Union's external action, the EEAS aimed to create a holistic

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<sup>1</sup> Best, 2008

<sup>2</sup> 'Mission statement - International Cooperation and Development - European Commission', 2013

<sup>3</sup> About International Cooperation and Development - DG DEVCO - International Cooperation and Development - European Commission',

<sup>4</sup> Furness, 2011, p. 4

institutional framework that will contribute to EU's presence in abroad and its effectiveness performing the Union's international objectives<sup>5</sup>.

Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) states that "the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries" which requires that the development cooperation to be conducted within the external actions content. Catherine Ashton, the EU's first High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Commission Vice President released her proposal for the new institutional set up and policy responsibilities of the new diplomatic institution EEAS, she stated her intention to combine the EU's external relations, development and foreign policy in a unified chain of command with a purpose for efficient utilization of multi-actor and multi-issue policy making process in a single institutional framework.<sup>6</sup> Consequently the EEAS has been granted participation in the programming and management cycle of the European Union's (EU) instruments for development cooperation together with the DG DEVCO.

What could be the impact of these changes on the EU's development policy? Having competence to conduct its own development cooperation policy, the EU has been well prepared legally and institutionally in order to achieve poverty reduction objectives. In addition, the EU has been striving hard to better coordinate its external policies and to create more coherent development, security and trade policies by extending Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) with the Lisbon Treaty through which the Union endeavors to consider broader goals of development that the EU has committed during policy-making in order to assist developing countries.

The concept of poverty as a development and a security issue has been fairly commonplace since the end of Cold War and poverty has been gaining importance in the security agenda of the Member States as well as the EU throughout the years. However the changes with the Lisbon Treaty have created an enabling environment "to transform development cooperation from an independent policy into a component of the EU's wider foreign policy toolbox".<sup>7</sup> The creation of a new agency to oversee the policy design in the spheres of development, diplomacy and defense for the sake of consistency of the external actions can pave the way towards the "politicization of development aid" as foreign policy concerns might skew the

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<sup>5</sup> Balfour, Bailes, and Kenna, 2012, p. 32

<sup>6</sup> Ashton, 2010

<sup>7</sup> Varrenti, 2010

decision making on aid allocations. An organization which has excellence in foreign policy making might allocate aid less on the basis of humanitarian needs and more on the basis of security concerns, and might turn a blind eye to the needs of the countries as long as it does not have a stake in it.

Moreover, such politicization does not occur exclusively due to actors' rationality. The organizational culture of different bureaucracies, and the background of individuals working in these organization constrains the decision making process because "where you sit is where you stand". There is considerable amount of literature on the possible shortcomings of these changes and critics on the possibility that the "poverty reduction" may not be well represented and opened to be politicized. Thus the focus area of this thesis is settled on the programming phase and the participation of the EEAS, considering that it is the most important part of the development policy as the development strategies, country and aid allocations are decided in this process. The implementation as well as the efficiency evaluation phases will not be examined within the scope of this thesis.

This thesis rather aims to scrutinize the Lisbon changes with regard to the EU's development aid policy and possible effects of these changes on the EU's efforts on achieving its development objectives. Therefore the core research question is *"How the Lisbon Treaty changes, particularly participation of the EEAS in the development aid programming, have affected the achievement of the objectives of the EU's development cooperation?"* This thesis aims to study the extent to which these reforms are likely to help (as proposed by the Lisbon Treaty) or hinder (as concerned by most of the development NGOs) the achievement of the EU's primary development objective: "poverty reduction". The sub questions that need to be investigated to bring clarity to the analysis are:

- A. How inter-institutional relations have affected the strategic programming process with regard to poverty reduction?
- B. What have been the key drivers of the programming process so far?
- C. How have DEVCO and the EEAS operated and co-operated in the process? Has the EEAS brought added value to the domain of development?
- D. What aspects of the programming procedure and structures need to be considered in the next phases of programming, and what can be improved in the context of the EEAS Review?

## **1.2 Research Method: Theory Based Evaluation**

Based on these available sources, I will use theory based evaluation as my methodology in order to evaluate the effects of the participation of EEAS in the development aid programming as it well presents and focuses on three components: the program activities or inputs, the intended outcomes or outputs, and the mechanisms through which the intended outcomes are achieved as well as it presents careful consideration to determine whether the program, and which aspects of the program, are central in affecting change and for whom. In my case it will aim to present the important assumptions on how poverty reduction objective will well be represented in the programming, a transparent and effective organizational structure with its tasks strictly defined, the checks and balances, availability of technical expertise. Based on the evaluation plan, data will be collected and will be presented, and will be analyzed in the next section.

The programming cycle of the development funding is defined at the Council documents bases the main empirical material of the discussion. Moreover, 11th EDF (2014-2020) has been jointly prepared by the EEAS and DEVCO which can be used as another empirical material, giving the chance that it can possible to be compared with the 10th EDF (2007-2013) which was prepared by the Commission with pre-Lisbon institutional set up and programming instructions.

## **1.3 Why study development cooperation in relation to the EEAS?**

In the development aid literature, most of the discussion revolves around the question of securitization of aid and the direction of the EU's development policy. Since the establishment of Lisbon Treaty, these discussions were even more speeded up and centered around the questions on Lisbon Treaty changes and how these changes are expected to affect the development aid policy.

According to the EU's commitments in Lisbon Treaty, the EU action should be in line with the principle of policy coherence for development principles, placing poverty reduction as main development objective, and aimed to be more coordinated, coherent, and efficient. The EEAS has the leading role to achieve these goals which has been subjected to appreciations by some while also have been criticized by more. Criticisms raised by some development NGOs that the development policy would lose its independent status due to the institutional

changes introduced by Lisbon Treaty, and the EU's development policy activities will be diluted with the help of newly introduced strategic changes. The development NGO's reactions and publications were such an amount that some called the recent post-Lisbon period as The NGO Rebellion.<sup>8</sup> The publications were numerous, and some NGOs and think tanks challenged the legality of the institutional changes<sup>9</sup>, and even threatened to sue. Main criticisms regarding the Lisbon Treaty with regard to development policy have been mostly on the securitization of aid and EEAS's mandate on development policy<sup>10</sup>. Indeed, some studies also explain the original rationale for coordinating different tools of foreign policy including aid to foster stability and therefore security in third countries, and/or the questions of inter-institutional rivalry and funding<sup>11</sup>. While following these discussions, questions rose as: If the adequate funding for development cooperation would be secured? How will the resources be allocated across countries and sectors? Will there be any prioritizations based on security, trade or strategic concerns instead of level of the poverty? What considerations will drive the EEAS to assess the country strategy papers of the recipient countries? Moreover, The Lisbon Treaty gives increased prominence to poverty eradication and now it is integrated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU as the primary objective of EU development cooperation. Poverty eradication has also become one of the objectives of EU external action. The security and development nexus discussion has already been interlinked with poverty level of the third countries as the poverty may most possibly create necessary conditions for a conflict or to trigger already existing conflictual conditions. Development aid is sum of all these discussions, where we can see how the development policy is conceptualized as well as how these discussions are rooted. By the Lisbon Treaty changes, EEAS is responsible for leading most of the aid programming cycle for most of the aid instruments of the EU, but more significantly and dominantly for EDF.

Motivated by these observations; the institutional changes, the sensitive status of poverty reduction as primary goal, as well as the policy coherence ambition of the Lisbon Treaty; this study aims to provide explanations for how these changes, particularly the EEAS would affect the EU's development aid policy or why would such an effect should be expected. This contribution aims to fill the research gap by tracing the development aid programming

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<sup>8</sup> Andersson & Williams, 2011, p. 3

<sup>9</sup> van Reisen, 2010

<sup>10</sup> Hadfield, A. 2007, p. 39-66; Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 423-436; Gibert, 2009, p. 789 – 814

<sup>11</sup> Andersson & Williams, 2011, p. 2

process, in depth analysis of the Lisbon Treaty legal and institutional changes with a particular focus on the EEAS's participation in the aid programming process.

It is also important to clarify what the study does not aim and cover. While the focus will be on the programming with a careful consideration to determine whether the program, and which aspects of the program, are central in affecting change and for whom, it does not aim to investigate whether the aid allocations become securitized or not. Since the EEAS institutional set up was established in 2010 and it has been functioning properly since 2012, the time and data are limited to conduct such a study. Therefore, the aim is rather to provide a detailed and systematic explanation over the EEAS's role and its perception in development aid programming, thus understand how this process would shed light on its way to achieving development objectives in the future.

#### **1.4 The Structure of the Chapters**

The thesis will start with explaining the Post-Lisbon Changes with a legal framework. In this part I will focus on three areas: a) the objectives of the EU Development Policy, b) the Principle of Coherence, and c) the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The discussion therein will also explain my motivation to narrow down my research question to “poverty reduction” and “the politicization of poverty reduction”. Following the discussion, I will review the current literature on the post Lisbon changes and their possible influence on the development aid policies. In the literature review I will mention both sides of the discussion: ones that appreciate the changes and expect better coherence, coordination, and efficiency though these changes in the institutional setting and legal framework; other side criticizing that the poverty reduction may not be well represented and other external interest may be prioritized over development concerns.

Following the literature review I will discourse on the security-development nexus of the EU, and its relevance in the EU's development policy in the subsequent section. The poverty reduction links both security and development concern in most of the recipient countries, especially in African countries (previously called as the ACP region). Some countries are fragile or conflict-affected whereas some carries an increased/emerging conflict risk. African region is the one that receives most of the share from aid allocations, mainly through European Development Fund (EDF) and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) which are the two largest means of funding for development. These approaches to these changes can

be seen on the ground in upcoming years as the EEAS has nearly been functioning properly since 2011. When we reach to more materials, like strategy papers, multiannual financial frameworks and aid allocations, we may more materialize the changes after Lisbon. However, what is in the scope of this paper is that how the participation of the EEAS in the development programming can affect achieving the poverty reduction goal.

I unpack the Lisbon Treaty and the institutional structure of the EEAS in the context of its legal, international, and institutional settings. I narrow down my research on aid programming and role of EEAS considering this period is of vital importance since it is the period where the aid and country allocations are arranged based on the third country needs, assessments, and performance. I aim to evaluate the aid programming of one of the biggest funding instruments of the EU, namely European Development Fund (EDF). EDF falls under the scope of this thesis as its programming is mainly managed by the EEAS, and its ultimate aim is to eradicate poverty in the region of African Caribbean and Pacific (AFC). The findings of this research aim to be explanatory on the checks and balances in the programming part and EEAS's discourse on representing its interest in poverty reduction.

In this endeavor to crack open the EEAS structure and aid programming; I peered through the lenses of organizational cultures, values, and approaches of two main institutions, EEAS and DEVCO, and the place of poverty reduction in EU's external relations with the Lisbon Treaty changes.

## **2 Apparent Changes brought by Lisbon Treaty**

### **2.1 Legal Analysis of Objectives of EU Development Policy – Place of Poverty Reduction**

The Article 208(1) (2) TFEU provides the main objective of the EU in development policy: 'Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty'. As the provision explicitly implies that the activities aiming reduction of poverty were put at the heart of the development policy of the EU. Prior to Lisbon Treaty, Article 177(1) of the EC Treaty defines the main objectives of the EU development cooperation and has been had 3 main focuses;

- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them,
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy,
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.

Continued in the Article 177 (2) EC that these main focus areas shall be interchangeably contributive and supplementary with the general objectives of the EU, TEU Article 21 (2) 'developing and consolidating democracy and rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms'. In the Lisbon Treaty, in the first provision of Part Five on 'External Action by the Union' of the TFEU where the Development Cooperation falls under, provides that 'the Union's action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall be guided by the principles, purpose the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU' (TFEU Article 205). Based on these comparison on the legal and formal requirements in the before and post Lisbon, there has not been neither any changes in keeping the general principles and guidance nor a limitation in development cooperation. The prominent change is that the Lisbon Treaty puts the eradication of poverty as the primary objective of the development cooperation of the Union and makes a re-arrangement of the objectives which results with the changes in the ranking among the objectives. Broberg predicts that strengthening of the objectives with the coherence will be attained through these re-arrangements.<sup>12</sup>

## **2.2 Policy Coherence for Development**

Policy coherence was first appeared in EU fundamental law in 1992 and political commitment to Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is integrated in the European Consensus for Development (2006). The term further reinforced in the Lisbon Treaty and reaffirmed in the Agenda for Change (2011).

Another novelty regarding the Lisbon Treaty changes is the parts about the coherence. Article 7 of the TFEU provides that 'The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers'.

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<sup>12</sup> Broberg, 2011, p. 546

Lisbon Treaty extends PCD obligation to the whole EU and HR has a clear mandate to make sure that the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) take the objectives of the EU's external action into account which are poverty reduction, promotion of democracy and human rights and conflict prevention.<sup>13</sup>

### **2.3 Lisbon Treaty Institutional Changes**

The Lisbon Treaty sets and defines the creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is in charge of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the Union, and in addition to these it is in charge of chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. The High Representative is vice-president of the European Commission and responsible to make sure that the EU's external actions are in consistent. The High Representative tasked with these roles is assisted by the EEAS.

The EEAS is a diplomatic service which supports the High Representative and has a legal responsibility to make sure that its policies are consistent with other EU policies.<sup>14</sup> The Article 27.3 TEU sets the mandate for the establishment of EEAS:

"In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission."

Baroness Catherine Ashton was appointed as the first High Representative of the European Union when the Treat came into force. After Ashton, Federica Mogherini was appointed High Representative leaders of all 28 European Union Member States in August 2014.

The composition of the new institution, modes of cooperation, and the assignment of responsibilities were not specified in detail when the Treaty was established. Sooner, the

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<sup>13</sup>Kijzer, 2010, p. 24

<sup>14</sup>European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | Structure of the EEAS',

former High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs announced the new inter-service agreement and the details of the new arrangement<sup>15</sup>. The general service agreement was issued in July 2010 based on a proposal from the High Representative<sup>16</sup>, while DG RELEX and the geographical desks of the DG DEV and Council Secretariat staff together with the MS diplomats were recruited to the EEAS in January 2011. The remaining staff at the DG DEV and the DG Europeaid was merged under the new Commission body: DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO). The inter-service agreement on the modalities of cooperation between the EEAS and DEVCO was finally settled on 13 January 2012.<sup>17</sup>

Provided with the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 on the establishment, the EEAS fully came into being and 1643 officials were transferred to the new institution from Council and Commission.<sup>18</sup> Majority of the staff from DG External Relations (RELEX) and a number of staff from the DG Development (DEVCO) were appointed to the EEAS from the Commission together with the officers from the Council.<sup>19</sup> Currently the EEAS is composed of over 3200 staff as 1500 of them perform their work at the EEAS headquarters in Brussels and more than 1800 are at the EU Delegations.<sup>20</sup> Within the Commission, Directorate General Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid (DEVCO) which is a unification of the former DG Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States and DG EuropeAid continued its work on development policy and implementation since January 2011.

### **2.3.1 Development with the EEAS**

Article 208 TFEU sets the objectives of the development policy of the Union and the EEAS is requested to consider these objectives in the area of external assistance and development aid. In addition, the EEAS is also expected to promote the objectives of the European Consensus on Development and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Joint letter of Catherine Ashton, High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, and Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission, to Eva Joly, MEP', 2010

<sup>16</sup>'Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service', n.d.

<sup>17</sup>Signed on 13 January 2012 by the Secretary General of the Commission and the Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS, Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues, SEC(2012) 48, 10 January 2012

<sup>18</sup>'European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - A new step in the setting-up of the EEAS: Transfer of staff on 1 January 2011', n.d.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid

<sup>20</sup>Tannous, 2013, p. 337

<sup>21</sup>Ibid

In terms of development issues, the EEAS supports the High Representative at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) when the development issues are concerned and assist her at the Commission when development issues are discussed. In particular, the institution is responsible for preparing programming of the development aid and making sure that development and security policies are coherent. The horizontal unit within the EEAS tasked an essential work to ensure the coordination development policies so that EEAS's input at the country meetings with DEVCO would be coordinated. This unit and the work it provides are pivotal in the sense that "development" task of the EEAS is diverse due to composed of officials from different directorates within the institution and tasks have to be carried coordinated with the Commission. The scarce of officials at this unit is criticized by some organizations close to development cooperation and it was reasoned by them as no due weight has been given to the "development" part of the EEAS work.<sup>22</sup> In addition to this criticism, the main criticism is that poverty reduction is only one of the foreign policy objectives of the EEAS among the many others, and an inherent risk exists if the other affairs (political, security, economic, geostrategic etc.) may underwrite aid allocations.

### **2.3.2 The New Directorate General DEVCO**

The reorganization took place also in the Commission followed by the establishment of the EEAS in the Post-Lisbon phase.

Before Lisbon, EDF was programmed by DG DEV and DCI was programmed by DG Relex who historically has a better track at prioritizing conflict and peace issues.<sup>23</sup>

As DG Relex moved into the EEAS together with the number of officials related to the country and region positions, the new setting was formed at the Commission. The new DG Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid (DEVCO) was formed sooner; whose human resource was recruited from the remaining staff at the DG Dev, who has been regarded as less attached to EU affairs but more to development interest<sup>24</sup>, and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO). The new DEVCO is composed of five geographic directorates which are East and Southern Africa and ACP Coordination, West and Central Africa, Neighborhood, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific; three

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Gavvas & Koeb, 2010/16 April 2010, p. 6

<sup>24</sup> Holden, 2009, p. 133.

political and thematic directorates which are EU Development Policy, Human and Society Development and Sustainable Growth and Development; and an administrative directorate.<sup>25</sup>

The new form of the DEVCO altered the previous division of labor at the Commission structure with regard to development issues. In the previous form, development responsibilities were split into DG Dev and DG Relex which divides the countries as ACP and as the rest of the countries. Together with the 3,000 employees at the EU Delegations, approximately 1,400 officials at the DEVCO Headquarter in Brussels, DG DEVCO is run by over 4,200 staff capacity.<sup>26</sup>

### **2.3.3 The Funding Instruments and Programming**

The financial instruments of the EU external action are subjected to the EU budget under the heading 4 'The EU as a global actor' which has lion share of the budget expenditure. However, EDF is not part of the EU budget.

The Union's external action is mainly financed through the EU budget and the funding instruments divided into geographical and thematic focuses, then divided into different programmes as country specific, some region specific and some thematic. Thematic instruments are European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Instrument contribution to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). Geographical Instruments are Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), European Development Fund (EDF), and Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The EDF is the EU's oldest and largest development instrument funding 79 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions. Unlike the rest of the funding instruments, the EDF is not part of the EU budget and is subjected to an intergovernmental process by the EU MS.<sup>27</sup>

Article 9(4) EEAS Decision provides that "With regard to the EDF and the DCI, any proposals, including those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents referred to in paragraph 3, shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall be submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption

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<sup>25</sup> 'Organisational structure of DG DEVCO - International Cooperation and Development - European Commission', 2013

<sup>26</sup> Tonnous, 2013, p. 341

<sup>27</sup> 'Concordeurope: Guide to EuropeAid funding instruments 2014, p. 24

by the Commission." It was in question that, what specific roles and parts the EEAS would take in the preparations of aid allocations, Strategy Papers, and the Indicative Programs within the instruments for external assistance.

### **3 Bureaucratic Politics Model**

As the main research question revolves around how these changes, particularly the EEAS lead in the programming process, there is an argument for an expectation of a change or an 'effect' on the outcome of the process. Considering that the organizational cultures and relations between different bureaucracies matter, an institutional set up change at the decision making process probably lead to changes at the outcome. The bureaucratic politics model analyze beyond the decision making process and considers that the behavior, actions and preferences of the actors that are believed to have an effect on the decision making process.<sup>28</sup> As the decision making process is not fixed and determined with logical terms always, the bureaucratic bodies in the political system and their relations effect the decision at the end. Therefore, it is safe to say that we can expect a degree of change on the aid allocations as the bureaucratic bodies involved in the aid programming have changed. Similar to the other EU policy making areas, multiple bureaucratic bodies play role in the development aid allocation decision and different bureaucracies are assumed to "behave rationally and aim to maximize their powers and resources".<sup>29</sup> The literature on the bureaucratic politics model let us to recognize that differentiation between policy interests and organizational interests of the different bureaucracies on the decision making process exists.<sup>30</sup> It is also proposed that it's possible to have disputes between the bureaucracies on the execution of a particular function and it is mostly expected when the formal rules of the decision making process is not clear.<sup>31</sup> This is the case for the after Lisbon Treaty period, as the post Lisbon Treaty institutional set up is relatively recent, roles of the EEAS and DEVCO is not specified in detail which leaves actors ground for political interpretation of their tasks and power. Moreover, the EEAS is consists of personnel from the Commission, the Council and the MS which made the EEAS as "DG Relex Plus"<sup>32</sup> as the organizational culture and working routines are affected with the influx of personnel.

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<sup>28</sup>Delreux, 2013, p. 2

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>30</sup> Maurer, 2009, p. 3

<sup>31</sup> Delreux, 2013, p. 3

<sup>32</sup> Batora, 2013, p. 20

## **4 Two Sides of the Discussion on the Changes**

The changes that Lisbon Treaty introduced are discussed a lot by a number of development NGOs, mostly by The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the European Development Policy Management (ECPDM), the German Development Institute (GDI/DIE), and Concord whether the changes would have a significant impact on EU's development cooperation or potential threat for development objectives being overridden by short-term foreign policy projects.

### **4.1 Positive Sides**

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, European Consensus Statement reorganized the settings and understandings regarding the development policy. It defines development as a 'long term commitment' and aims providing better coordination, quality of aid delivery, and increased financial resources. The Consensus is an important text with regard to the EU's commitment to deliver more and effective aid, and clarify its vision of development. The commitments on Paris Aid Effectiveness is referred and also promises to improve the aspects on coordination and complementary between the Community and Member States are given. PCD is another main aspect of the Consensus Statement and it requires supporting poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in developing countries. According to the Consensus, the EU is commitment to provide "More Effective Aid" and it is dedicated 'to work with all development partners to improve the quality and impact of its aid'.

The Lisbon Treaty is ideally a natural candidate<sup>33</sup> for these objectives set before: a more comprehensive and enlarged European Consensus. The new institutional set up is aimed and expected to enhance coherence and consistency between the external policies. As it comprises external arms of the EU, it is a reform of external relations<sup>34</sup> rather than only being EU foreign policy center. The EEAS is put into the core of the external relations framework and the institutional functions of the HR is advanced by being the Vice President of the Commission and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and the tasks assigned to the position. By providing these functions and capacity, there has been high expectations and hopes attached to the new setting to advance the EU's external role.

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<sup>33</sup> Stochetti, 2013, p. 279

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*

DEVCO and EEAS's division of labor announcement as well as their settlement into their tasks is relatively recent and its effects and influences to the development policy processes has been analyzed by most of the think tanks and researchers. Stochetti sees the division of labor and the new institutional set up as availability of capacity to achieve and realize the development goals and says that "the development actors and their counterparts are ready to cooperate across the sectors and have sufficient resources to make an informed analysis, and the will to support these views from the development partnership perspective".

Ideally the new institutional structure will enable several fields to be combined and ease the way to achieve common objectives which will better allow having a more coherent EU external action.

In addition to the efforts to establish more coherent links among diverging actors, the EEAS is also an opportunity to add development to the 'tool box' of European foreign policy under a more comprehensive approach.<sup>35</sup>

As looking into the motivations of MS to decide move from the relatively loose coordination of the CFSP and into EEAS, a centralized structure, Klyth and Pilegaard argues that it has a functionalist character.<sup>36</sup> Piris uses the functionalist approach to explain the emergence of EEAS and states that "establishment of a single European External Service is expected to help ensure greater consistency in the EU's positions and actions in external policies. It was always strange, and for historical reasons only, that the services dealing with the EU's external relations were totally separate and not sufficiently coordinated. Therefore this merger [the EEAS, ed.] was absolutely unavoidable, albeit difficult. It will help to prepare and implement more coherent and efficient foreign policy actions and will allow the High Representative to exercise better his/her different functions"<sup>37</sup>

## **4.2 Negative sides**

The Lisbon Treaty changes and the new role of the EEAS created the shift of programming competences among the EU institutions with an aim to better achieve development objectives and better policy coherence.

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<sup>35</sup> Isabelle Tannous, p.333

<sup>36</sup>Klyth and Pilegaard p. 309

<sup>37</sup>Piris, 2010, p. 256

The case of development in regard to the policy coherence with the foreign policy is especially sensitive. Since the establishment of EEAS, most of the NGOs and think tanks openly raised their concerns that fundamental objective of the EU's development policy activities will be diluted with the help of newly introduced strategic changes. Some observers expressed their fear that the leading role of the EEAS which might lead to 'securitization of aid' which means that development funds may be facilitated to address foreign policy goals instead of pursuing poverty reduction.<sup>38</sup> The funding to African Peace Facility is criticized for its military dimension being financed by the EDF.

Some European Development NGOs tried to challenge the legality of the Ashton's plans for the EEAS.<sup>39</sup> In April 2010, a group of think tanks which are Concord, the umbrella group of all European development groups together with CIDSE, the alliance of European Catholic development charities, Aprodev, its Protestant counterpart, and Eurostep, the secular aid coalition, threatened to sue.

UK law firm, White & Case, argued against the legality of the institutional changes; "Development co-operation is outside the scope of the CFSP and therefore the EEAS has no capacity in respect of it"<sup>40</sup> Elise Ford, head of Oxfam International EU Office criticized the Ashton's institutional set up and the direction of how EU development money will be spent as 'bad news', and accuses her misconceptualizing the what effective development policy is.<sup>41</sup>

The extensive promotion of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in the Commission since 2005<sup>42</sup> has even more incorporated to the Lisbon Treaty as fundamentals of EU external action. The Article 210 TFEU states that the Union and the MS are obliged to 'coordinate their policies on development cooperation' and to 'consult each other on their aid programmes, and the legal basis for the PCD has been strengthened as the eradication global poverty becomes the Union's primary objective of external actions. Most of the development NGOs has feared regarding the possible negative outcomes from the promotion of PCD and the allocations at EU's external action budget. 'Development proofing' of the EEAS was

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<sup>38</sup> Strob, 2012, p. 28

<sup>39</sup> 'Lawyers say Ashton's EEAS proposal is contrary to Lisbon Treaty', n.d.

<sup>40</sup> Phillips, 2010

<sup>41</sup> 'The EU's new diplomatic service', 2010

<sup>42</sup> 'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions', 2009

questioned and concerned if the programming process would sufficiently be visible and safeguarded, which were announced as an open letter by European Think Thanks.<sup>43</sup>

Another concern by the development groups is that European Commission is less political than the MS, however, now as the development area is put under the EEAS management, MS might have better chances to interfere and subordinate poverty reduction considering foreign policy imperatives.<sup>44</sup> It is also defended at the same source that the need to assess development with the foreign policy view is unavoidable as the development depends on political factors.

## **5 Methodology**

There are many ways to approach evaluating the programmes, projects or policies. Therefore, I would like to clarify from the beginning how I understand evaluation for the purpose of my plan. I follow what Rossi et al approaches to the evaluations as she sees evaluation as inherently a theoretically informed approach, and promoted that its definition is tailored to the theory, approach, needs, purpose and methodology of the evaluation itself (2004)<sup>45</sup>

The central topic of my evaluations is poverty reduction as EU's primary development objective. My focus will be on the Lisbon Treaty changes on institutions and strategies as will be implemented in the new aid programming. Poverty reduction has been the primary goal of the EU and has a prominent position in Lisbon Treaty. As to achieve EU's development objectives, primarily poverty reduction in the short term and poverty eradication in the long term, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of changes and a new aid programming process by positioning the EEAS in a leading role for most of the aid instruments. In 2012, An Agenda for Change was introduced in order to further detail the strategies to achieve better impact of development policy, however the "impact" and "efficiency" concepts are not within the scope of this study, therefore the strategies in An Agenda for Change were not included into the evaluation plan.

Although the poverty reduction objective is the primary development objective of EU's external relations, there is also strong emphasis on security and development nexus, as already mentioned in the earlier sections, which is even more strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty

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<sup>43</sup>German Development Institute (GDI), 2010

<sup>44</sup>Phillips, 2010

<sup>45</sup>Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2003

changes with a bold emphasis on PCD. As already mentioned in previous chapters, these concerns have long been raised by most of the development NGOs and think tanks that the security concerns might be prioritized over development objectives which might most probably be reflected in aid allocations. Even though, the Lisbon Treaty sets the poverty reduction as the primary objective which is expected to be defended and promoted by all institutions, the EEAS's role as leading the aid programming, as an institution having a foreign policy and security mandate and organizational culture, has been one of the reason that these concerns have been raised. Therefore, the focus of the evaluation will be on the EEAS's participation in aid programming period.

As provided in the literature overview on the possible effects of Lisbon Treaty changes to the development aid policies, there may be possible happenings that the poverty reduction goal may not be well represented in the development aid programming process as the security concerns may become prioritized by the EEAS based on its strategic and leading role in the aid programming. It important to try to understand what extend this is likely to occur.

## **5.1 Purpose of the Evaluation**

From above, I can conclude that there may be a discrepancy between desire to achieve development objectives, poverty eradication in particular, and the proposed new programming set up to achieve those.

In my evaluation, I want to explain and analyze the possible ways and possible reasons why such a gap or understanding exists. I accept the conclusion that it is the institutions that plays vital role with their mandate, and in my case the focus will be on the EEAS's participation in the aid programming and its commitment to security and development nexus. DEVCO's participation will also be analyzed.

By the help of theory based evaluation, I would like to further understand the institutional context based on the relevant actors' perceptions and organizational values as there is an accusation that the EEAS's participation may open a road in "securitization of aid", and thus miscommitments to EU's poverty reduction. I deeply believe that institutions' commitment to the development values is important as much as for aid's efficiency, legitimacy, and visibility. Therefore, I think it is important to be able to comprehend the reasons or such possibilities that poverty reduction might become under-represented compared to other strategic concerns and interests. The findings of our evaluation research can eventually help the organizational

learning that the analysis of this study can give feedback to the actors and raise concern on several issues that may help redesign the programming in a way that further enhances ways to achieve development goals, coordination, and coherence.

## **5.2 Evaluation Model**

The aim of this evaluation is not to see the outcome of the programming period nor if there has been any securitization of aid since the Lisbon Treaty changes are recent. The last EDF programming has recently been practiced and there are rare sources and information on the performances.

The selected financial instrument will be European Development Fund (EDF) whose 11th programming has started after Lisbon Treaty changes. EDF is one of the biggest development budgets of the EU, whose budget is outside of the EU budget and financed through MS contributions, and its aid allocations are dedicated to poverty reduction, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. Due to the nature of our evaluation purpose, Program Theory Evaluation (PTE) will be the most helpful, therefore PTE is selected as the evaluation methodology. PTE consists of a holistic assessment of an object based on the conceptual framework of the program's theory, and aims to provide information on the performance of a program and on how and why the program achieves such a result<sup>46</sup> or not. In my case, I will focus on explaining "why" and "how" rather than exploring the performance of our evaluation object in development aid programming.

## **5.3 Theory Based Program Evaluation**

Central in PTE is the Program Theory, which consists of the set of beliefs that underlie the action<sup>47</sup> and explains why, how, and under what conditions the program effects occur, predicts the outcomes of the program, and specify the requirements necessary to bring about the desired program effects<sup>48</sup> It tries to find the answers on how the program should be organized and why the program is expected to work<sup>49</sup>The program's theory describes the

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<sup>46</sup> Chen, 2006, p. 416

<sup>47</sup> Weiss, 1998, p. 55

<sup>48</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p.72

<sup>49</sup> Chen, 2006, p. 416

object of the evaluation in terms of activities or inputs, intended outputs and interim outcomes, desired end results, and the mechanisms through which these are achieved<sup>50</sup>.

The theory based evaluations can be used to develop outcome and intermediate goals of the program once the conceptual foundation has been established.<sup>51</sup> Although a program theory is often suggested to be developed prior to the commencement of the program<sup>52</sup>, for the sake of the expected outcomes, it can also be developed during the operation of the program.<sup>53</sup> A program theory provides the basis for the evaluation and specifies planners, staff members, and people responsible for obtaining funding<sup>54</sup> as well as clarifies the perspective of the program on which an evaluation of the program's quality can be based.<sup>55</sup> Once a program theory has been established, then the evaluation may take place.

The purpose of the program theory is to test the model hypothesized to explain the program and the mechanism utilized to reach the intended outcomes.<sup>56</sup> It is of important that the intended purpose of the findings and the level of complexity should be considered.<sup>57</sup>

The research design must define the relevant constructs and variables, outcomes that occur prior to treatment and those attributed to treatment must be explored, and the overall theory must be interpretable.<sup>58</sup> As the description of the program is one of the bases of the research, it is also explained that which aspects of the program is in the interest area and is found to be important in affecting the change.<sup>59</sup>

A particularity was highlighted in the relative literature: even though PTE models provide for a mixture of program theory and stakeholder model ideas “they fuse the program perceptions of the various stakeholder groups into one unitary program theory”<sup>60</sup> However, in our case we want to distinguish between the program theory guiding our evaluation object *per se*, and the different program theories, perceptions and ideas of the diverse stakeholder groups participating in the aid programming process. In other words, the program theories of the different stakeholders and the embedded institutionalized intervention itself are kept apart

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<sup>50</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p. 72; Weiss: 1998, p.62

<sup>51</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p.72

<sup>52</sup> Bickman, 1987; Prosovac & Carey, 1997, Rogers et al, 2000

<sup>53</sup> Rogers et al, 2000

<sup>54</sup> Prosovac & Carey, 1997; Weiss, 1997

<sup>55</sup> Bickman, 1987

<sup>56</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p.73, Rogers, 2000a; Rogers et al, 2000; Weiss, 1997

<sup>57</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p.73

<sup>58</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p. 73, Lipsey, 1993

<sup>59</sup> Sharpe, 2011, p. 73

<sup>60</sup> Hansen and Vedung, 2010, p. 295

from each other.<sup>61</sup> This novel approach suggested in the literature is called theory-based stakeholder evaluation [TSE], part of the aforementioned PTE model. The main implications of TSE are taken into consideration in the formulation of our evaluation plan. More specifically the authors suggest a sequential model of five steps when practicing such an evaluation<sup>62</sup>. These steps will be demonstrated in the following.

Step 1-The first step for a TSE is to reconstruct the object's raw program theory, or intervention theory as is called<sup>63</sup>. In our evaluation project, we take the background on the very first logic of the Lisbon Treaty changes: more coherent, efficient and visible EU in the world:

“The most important policy change is that the new Treaty formally enshrines reduction and eradication of poverty as the primary objective of development cooperation . Moreover, it gives a legal base to policy coherence for development, placing the obligation on the European Union to take account of development objectives in the other policies which it implements which affect developing countries. And Member States and the European Union are obliged to coordinate their development policies to promote complementarily and efficiency.”<sup>64</sup>

Thus, as the intervention theory, we take the background of Lisbon Treaty provided by the EU: institutional changes and new aid programming set up. As such, the intervention theory gives the intended outcome – that is Lisbon Treaty changes, in particular the creation of the EEAS, will better enable the EU to perform in its development cooperation, especially in eradication of poverty objective.

Most importantly, the intervention theory in our case sums the important assumptions on how poverty reduction objective will be well represented in the programming, which include among others a transparent and effective organizational structure with its tasks strictly defined, the checks and balances, available technical expertise, the conduct of European Development Consensus objectives. For our evaluation we take the aforementioned theoretical background on achieving development objectives, in particular poverty reduction

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid

<sup>62</sup> Hansen and Vedung, 2010, p. 301

<sup>63</sup> Hansen and Vedung, 2010, p. 300

<sup>64</sup> ‘European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon’, 2009

as establishing the program's theory. That is how the aid allocation should be done based on the commitment to the development objectives.

STEP -2 Searching for all possible relevant actors to be included in the evaluation project are the next two steps suggested in TSE. An actor is defined as being concerned with the intervention, its activities, implementation, outputs and outcomes<sup>65</sup>In our case study, as we are focusing on aid programming of the EU under Lisbon Treaty and the actors will be the different participants in the aid programming process which are EEAS, DEVCO, and EU Delegations in the third countries, but the beneficiaries will be excluded since the purpose of the evaluation does not aim to assess the efficiency on the ground. As EUDs also belong to the EEAS, I include only the main actors of the decision-making process in relation to aid programming which are EEAS and DEVCO since I would like to narrow down my scope and include only the main actors. We suppose from the beginning that these different actors are the ones responsible for the current aid programming cycle, and also that they are the drivers for any possible change as they can influence the aid programming cycle, therefore the well representation of the poverty reduction objective.

These actors have different roles and different positions and tasks in the decision-making process. (a) DEVCO - seen as a safeguard for prioritizing development objective and prevent the EU external policy interests to subordinate the development objectives. (b) EEAS- leads the programming cycle and it's feared that the EEAS might end up exercising control over the following levers of the aid regulations: objectives; percentage of ODA-eligible aid; proportion between geographic and thematic programmes; allocations between regions; criteria for country allocation. (c)the EU Delegations- involves to the cycle from the very beginning and accumulates the knowledge from the field at the third country.

STEP 3- The next steps of a TSE include the reconstruction of the program theories of the different participants and the comparison between these and the intervention theory of the evaluation object, as described above. This will be done by analyzing the actors' perceptions, values and understandings on the program theory. By defining these elements for each of the actor, I will be able to construct their program theories, all driving from the expectations for achieving development objectives, in particular poverty reduction. In our case; program theory will be reconstructed for EEAS and for DEVCO, by taking into account these actors' perceptions, values and understanding on the intervention theory.

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<sup>65</sup> Hansen and Vedung, 2010, p. 305

First, we want to explore the perceived level of institutionalization, because as we see in the assumptions and preconditions provided in the raw program theory, institutions play an important part. This was also demonstrated by Rubery when she talked about differences in the institutional settings as affecting the mainstreaming outcome in the national contexts.<sup>66</sup> The level of institutionalization has several dimensions, i.e. organization, internal coherence<sup>67</sup>. Another dimension of institutionalization is the value-infusion. This is related to the second element we want to explore with, the level of knowledge of the intervention theory and the different perceptions shared among the stakeholders related to that. There can be discourse analysis of policy statements and speeches related to the poverty reduction.

#### **5.4 Data Collection and Analysis Methods**

My methodology of data collection will be qualitative and based on primary sources; Lisbon Treaty, Council Decisions, EEAS and Commission Documents. Moreover, secondary literature discussing on Lisbon Treaty changes, security-development nexus, and reprogramming of development aid. First, I will describe how the EDF programming is done before Lisbon Treaty and after Lisbon Treaty changes. The information provided on the programming period will help to understand which parts of the programming period that is important in affecting the outcome, in particular which parts of the programming period that the EEAS is leading. In order to reconstruct the program theory for each of the selected actors; namely EEAS and DEVCO, the secondary literature will be utilized, and then will be analyzed with the use of context analysis and discourse analysis. Based on the information collected, I will compare them with the actual intervention theory.

As this can be the case for any other methodology chosen, the selected evaluation program has some advantages and disadvantages. As I already mentioned on the reasons and necessity to use this model, this model is the most helpful due to my research purpose. Although it allows me to accumulate the necessary knowledge in an order that I will be able to see if the programming period is likely to be encroached upon the objective of poverty reduction by the EEAS as well as if the actors' perceptions on achieving development objectives are complementary both to each other and to the intervention theory, there are some disadvantages of the TSE model. One of them presented in the literature is the possibility of determining the most significant lines of conflict related to differences in interests, values,

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<sup>66</sup> Rubery, 2002

<sup>67</sup> cf. Basedau and Stroh, 2008

perceptions, and experiences associated with the object. Still, the model is capable enough to accumulate the necessary knowledge to bring us to find answers to my research question.

## **6 Operationalization**

### **6.1 Programming of the EDF**

Compared to the rest of the financial instruments, EDF is run by EU member states and regulated by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which is an international agreement between the EU Member States and the ACP countries. The Member State contributions and aid allocations are regulated through multiannual frameworks. 10th EDF was for the period of 2008 to 2013 and 11th EDF will be running for the period of 2013 to 2018. The programming for 11th EDF has been carried according to the Lisbon Treaty changes and the EEAS has taken part in the process.

Based on Cotonou Agreement and Lisbon Treaty, the objective of reducing poverty and eradication in the long term in ACP countries is the main concern of the EDF, together with the objectives of sustainable development and their gradual integration to the world economy.<sup>68</sup> Despite the strong poverty reduction emphasis of the Cotonou Agreement, the scope of the EDF has been extended to fight against terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the agreement reviews in 2005 and 2010.<sup>69</sup> This extended scope and emphasis on facilitating the policy coherence can be supported by the EEAS with regard to its possible tendency to exert its political influence.

The development objectives are translated into the strategic cooperation throughout the programming process. Aid criteria are set in the aid regulations, and the aid allocations per country are decided within the programming cycle, thus can be considered as the most important stage.

According to the 2010 Council Decision on the Establishing the EEAS, the EEAS is tasked with leading to the country and regional strategy papers (CSPs, RSPs) in order to determine the country and regional aid allocations. The aid criteria are set for the EDF in Cotonou Agreement Annex IV. CSPs and RSPs are the strategic assessments of the each recipient

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<sup>68</sup>c Amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as', 2010

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

country regarding its political and economic conditions as well as the needs.<sup>70</sup> Prior to Lisbon Treaty settings, EDF Programming was managed by DG DEV. After, it is moved under the responsibility of EEAS together with the introduction of single geographic desks. The preparation of EDF programming prior-and after Lisbon Treaty are described below which will provide the knowledge that in which parts the EEAS has responsibility.

In addition, the funds are expected to be flexible in case of crisis situations, fragile contexts, economic shocks etc.<sup>71</sup> This flexibility and adaptability to the changes is ensured by the way that EDF funds are divided into two elements for each country: Envelope A and Envelope B. The former is designed to cover the regular support that the EC provide, the latter is reserved for the unforeseen needs and the transfer between the envelopes exists. The greater flexibility is desired to better deal with the crisis situations, but it is also be paid attention that the long term funding for development objectives is sustained. Moreover, the EC's Humanitarian Office (ECHO) is able to access %25 of each country's Envelope B. Therefore, in case of a crisis situation in a recipient country, the resource transfer between the envelopes is possible as well as ECHO's resource share from the Envelope B. The top billing aid allocations to the Horn of Africa and the Sahel due to anti-terrorism and security operations are the most criticized actions of the EEAS who is accused to giving little consideration to long term development objectives.<sup>72</sup>

### **6.1.1 Programming Prior to Lisbon**

It was the Commission who is fully in charge of five staged programming and implementing cycle of external assistance and development policy.

#### 1-Country/Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs/RSPs)

The Head of Delegation (HoD) and the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) have responsibility for preparing the draft CSP/RSPs for the programming in consultation with the geographical services at Headquarters. The process expects and gives importance to include the local authorities and non-state actor views, comments and contributions.

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<sup>70</sup>Gavas & Koeb, 2010/16 April 2010, p. 4

<sup>71</sup> Gavvas, 2013, p. 16

<sup>72</sup> Puglisi, 2012

Other Commission DGs and EIB are also involved to the process providing the necessary contribution to the analytical chapters relating to their competences. The joint preparation these analytical chapters are envisaged by the Member States. When the CSP/RSP draft is prepared, it is sent to the Director of the competent geographical service.

## 2-Preparation of the Programming Appraisal Sheet

Once the CSP/RSP is received by the geographical units, the unit prepares a governance performance appraisal grid. The appraisal grid presents the current government performance, the government reform commitment and targets for the programming period.

## 3-Country/Region Team Meeting

The CTM/RTM is aimed to ensure coherence of community actions in the recipient country and a common Community position in terms of strategy and needs/performance assessment. The geographical services of the DG DEV organizes the Country/Region Team Meetings (CTM/RTM). The concerned units within the DG DEV, AIDCO, DG RELEX and EIB are invited to the meetings based on the Programming Appraisal Sheet and CSP/RSP. These invited units may attend the meeting according to their wishes, however their involvement to the process is much appreciated and the participation of the AIDCO is of importance.

The first task of the meeting is that CSP/RSP documents are commented and suggestions are given for an improvement. The second task is that Programming Appraisal Sheets are assessed and discussed if the financial allocation should maintain or increased by an incentive tranche.

Once the meeting is finalized, the comments and suggestions are sent to the HoD for a consultation with NAO/RAO in case of any further amendments is needed.

## 4-Consultation between NAO and HoD

HoD receives the comments and suggestions for CSP/RSP together with the performance appraisal sheet, and shares the information with NAO/RAO and MS and participating donors (in case of joint programming). However, it's important that the CTM/RTM recommendation concerning the level of the financial allocation is not shared with NAOs for confidentiality reasons. These actors discuss and consult each other in case of any further amendments are

needed to the CSP/RSP. If any further amendment is needed, HoD can send the revised version to the Commission.

#### 5-IQSG (Interservice Quality Support Group)

The finalized version of CSP/RSP is sent to the IQSG Secretariat to be screened and make sure that it is consistent and qualified enough with regard to the Common framework for CSPs/RSPs. At the IQSG meetings, CSPs from all countries/regions are discussed if any improvements are needed or not to the CSPs/RCPs. In case of a need for improvement, follow up sheet (fiche contradictoire) is issued and it is sent the related geographical service to be integrated into the CSPs/RCPs.

#### 6-Commissioner's Validation of the Strategy and Financial Allocation

After completing the IQSG screening, the geographical services in cooperation with HoD and DG AIDCO works on the consolidated proposal that presents strategies, monitoring procedure, and the management tasks. Finalized document is sent to the Commissioner.

#### 7-Consultation Head of Delegation and National Regional Authorizing Officer

If the proposed strategy and financial allocations are validated by the Commissioner, it again open to HoD, NAO/RAO, MS and other participating donors to be jointly finalized.

#### 8-Inter service consultation (ISC)

As a procedure, the finalized document is subjected to the ISC in order to be adopted by the Commission Decision

#### 9- The EDF Committee

The MS may give their opinion on the CSP/RSP including financial allocation.

#### 10-Commission Decision

After CSP/RSP have had completed these stages, its adoption is subjected to the decision of the College.

### **6.1.2 Programming After Lisbon**

The programming has two phases. At the first phase, the analysis of the national/regional development plan and the definition of the proposal for the overall lines of the EU response take place. At the second phase, the submitted proposals are ensured if they are in line with the EU's overall external relation priorities, regional and thematic EU policy orientations, and the selection of priority sectors become finalized.

I will consider the programming cycle on the basis of bilateral assistance of the EU, specifically EDF. Other possible types of other than bilateral assistance of the EU stays outside of the scope of this study, therefore those parts are not mentioned on purpose.

## **First Phase**

### **1- The national/Regional Development Plan and the overall lines of the EU Response**

EU Delegations (EUDs) in partner countries and regions prepares an analysis of the existing national/regional development plan, and prepares the overall lines of the EU response.

The EU Delegations has the responsibility to analyze national development plan or strategy of the partner country and accumulates the knowledge on whether it can provide the basis for the programming of EU aid.<sup>73</sup> The assessment is proposed to be carried out jointly with EU MS and other key development partners in the field. The analysis concerns whether the national/regional development plan poses sufficient conditions for the programming of EU assistance. However, it is also made available that for the countries, particularly ACP countries treated under the Cotonou Agreement, who are not agree to use/make available the national/regional development plans are subjected to the preparation of the CSPs/RSPs. Once the plan is found to be sufficient as the basis for the EU programming, the EUD starts to work on the proposal for the overall lines of the EU response.<sup>74</sup>

-In case of a need to support more areas/sectors than the national/regional development plans propose, the EUD provides the information, by facilitating the local ownership, about the need to support such areas.

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<sup>73</sup>This is owing to Articles 2 and 8, Annex IV, of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. For the DCI, EUDs need not consult the partner country on whether to write a CSP or not.

<sup>74</sup> European Commission, 2014

-In case of countries at risk of conflict or disaster, the EUD adds the information regarding these concerns and expected to include the ECHO field officers in this cycle of the programming process.

-In case of countries where the national/regional development plan is not considered a sufficient basis, EUD reports the EEAS and DEVCO on their performance and progress that needs to be achieved to be eligible.

EUD submits the NDP/RDP and the proposal for the overall lines of the EU response to the EEAS and DEVCO to examine if the proposals are compatible with EU objectives, priorities and policies. In this process, EEAS is responsible to coordinate the relevant units of DEVCO, all relevant Commission services as well as EIB to be included into the process and organize CTMs/RTMs. The instructions derived from the CTMs/RTMs are delivered to the EUDs to be reviewed and proceed into preparing of Multiannual Indicative Programmes.

### **Second Phase of Programming Process: Multi Annual Indicative Programme**

Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) is the pivotal document to the newly introduced programming cycle and prepared by the EUDs.

MIPs are part of the cycle in cases of bilateral assistance. In case of smaller countries with similar conditions where they are allocated financial allocations, those can be subjected to a multi-country MIP. The first section of the MIP clarifies and motivates the sector or thematic analysis for the chosen sector where the aid allocated. The Programme then continues to provide information on: the indicative amount allocated to each sector; the overall and specific objectives for each sector; the main expected results for each sector, the main indicators and targets for each sector; and the possible amount to be kept un-programmed in order to specific needs of post-crisis/fragile situations. The MIP has to be detailed in the sense that providing summary on partner country's sector policies, cross cutting sector consideration, and financial commitments.

Once the MIPs are sent to EEAS and DEVCO, CTMs/RTMs are organized, ensured that the all relevant Commission units and EIB are involved, in order to examine the document. Then, the EEAS in agreement with DEVCO forwards the instructions to the relevant EUDs to be finalized and send back to the Commission in order to process into the formal decision making.

According to Council Decision, the EEAS is tasked to help prepare "decisions of the Commission regarding the strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle". Thus, the EEAS has a central role in preparing the political and strategic aspects of the EU's external assistance instruments, and the Commission has the final policy responsibility.

## **7 Program Theory Reconstructing for EEAS**

Based on the Lisbon Treaty changes, the EEAS will have a dominant role with regard to the European development policy based on three main changes. First, the EEAS will be leading the aid programming cycle for EDF and DCI. Secondly through the geographical desks moved into the EEAS, and lastly through the former Commission delegations which are now become EU Delegations run by EEAS personnel.

### **7.1 Security and Development Nexus - Conceptualization**

The EEAS Decision establishes the new Service with competences in development cooperation (Article 9) and CFSP (Article 2 (1)) and introduces staff division by setting up the Service with the officers incorporated from the Commission, the Council, and the MS with security and development portfolios (Article 6 (2))<sup>75</sup>. Given these conditions, it is implied that the development and security nexus is strengthened and it is notable. Therefore, it is important to what security and development means for the EU and how it has been conceptualized throughout Lisbon Treaty.

The EU's institutional and policy adjustments upon the interaction between security and development issues requires to understand how has the security and development nexus concept developed and what the policy implications are derived from nexus.

The central argument to the notion is that there can be no development without security and no security without development. As to uncover the historical formulation of how concept of a nexus between security and development has been developed, G. W. van Dijk identifies three historical periods that the concepts content has been changed. These are; the end of the second WW to the end of Cold War, the second the end of the Cold War to the start of the War on Terror, and the third period stretching from the start of the War on Terror up until now.<sup>76</sup> In the first period, the US aid has been used in order to prevent the European states

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<sup>75</sup> ('Council Decision Establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU)', 2010)

<sup>76</sup> van Dijk, 2011, p 11

from sliding into the Soviet camp. In the second period, the concept has evolved through more people-focused as the development aid has been used for former Soviet-aligned states in order to prevent eruption of civil wars which are identified as a danger for development. In the last period, underdevelopment is defined as a danger to national and international security after 9/11 attacks. Based on these historical developments, it is safe to say that security and development issues are interlinked and the development is one aspect of increasing security at the same time secure environment is needed to foster development.

This proposed linkage between the security and development has been conceptualized as security-development nexus and supports the linkage. Therefore, there can be different steps taken on many different levels in order to provide a close coordination and integration of external action which may reflect on policy design or operations.<sup>77</sup> Although the linkage is certainly "not a fundamentally new conceptual link"<sup>78</sup>, it is difficult to operationalize in the field since it brings many different reference points together such as conflict prevention, crisis management, post conflict stabilization, state failure, peace building.

Over the past decade, the EU has adopted its lexicon in order to address the linkage. The holistic approach concerning security and development has been expressed in numerous policy documents.

### **7.1.1 Prior to Lisbon Treaty Rhetoric on Security and Development Nexus**

Del Biondo, Oltch and Orbie argues that the security and development linkage was mentioned in the EU policy declarations, which, thus results eventually with institutional reforms and identify four key documents with regard to adoption of the security and development nexus from the perspective of development assistance. Starting with the European Consensus of Development in 2005, it says that "Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur" and " more stable, peaceful, prosperous, and equitable world", committed the European Commission to develop a "comprehensive approach to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises"; and called for "integrated transition strategies" in post-crisis situations.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> van Dijk, 2011, p 29

<sup>78</sup>Klingebliel, 2006, p. 1

<sup>79</sup>'Communication From The Commission To The Council, The European Parliament And The European Economic And Social Committee', 2005, para 21

2010 Cotonou Agreement Review makes an explicit reference to the security and development nexus. This trend continued with Policy Coherence for Development in 2005 and 2009 where the security and development concept was defined as one of the five priorities of the coherence purposes.

Joint Africa Europe Strategy signed in 2007 says "peace and security lie at the foundation of progress and sustainable development"<sup>80</sup>

The European Security Strategy paper refers to the security and development nexus and states that "The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development."<sup>81</sup> From one point of view, utilizing civilian and military capacities together is ideally desired in order to comprehensively tackle with the development problems, however the explicit reference to the security as a condition of development can be interpreted as a given legitimacy to the decision making actors to use more funding for military purposes.

### **7.1.2 Institutionalization Prior to Lisbon Treaty**

Selznick explains the institutionalization as "the process whereby an organization – and the officials who operate therein – develops its own identity or culture by (a) defining its mission (goals, norms) and methods (instruments, types of public action, ways of working and so on); b) inserting these missions and methods into a social structure through recruitment, socialization processes and a specific power structure; c) legitimizing this mission and methods within a specific context, that is, adapting them to the changing external environment and making them acceptable to the main constituency of the institution and d) granting the institution a certain autonomy from its stakeholders, here the Member States."<sup>82</sup>

Despite the often rhetoric references to the security and development nexus, the organizational structure was an obstacle for the smooth coordination of the policies as the policy areas fall under two different pillars. Development falls under the supranational policy field and the security policies were conducted in an inter-governmental manner. The pillar

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<sup>80</sup>The Africa-Eu Strategic Partnership A Joint Africa-Eu Strategy', 2007, p. 32

<sup>81</sup> ESS, 2003, p.13

<sup>82</sup> Selznick, 1984

cooperation and coordination were tried to be enhanced through a set of committees in which the Political and Security Committee was the most important one among the others such as Civ-Mil cell, Policy Unit are among the ones that are most important. With regard to external relations, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy is the one that representing the interests of all MS, and institutionally supported by Policy Units which are composed of representatives of MS as well as Commission and Council officials.

### **7.1.3 After Lisbon Treaty Rhetoric on Security and Development Nexus**

The ratification of Lisbon Treaty can be perceived as creating plain for greater coherence between different policy fields and commitment to working on the closer linkage between security and development. The rhetoric in the Lisbon Treaty and the post Lisbon publications confirmed the commitment.

In the Lisbon Treaty, the connection and necessary cooperation between the policy fields are implied as it says "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security,...., foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty" and thus "The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies." (TEU Art 21:3).

In the Cotonou Agreement Review 2010, it is stated that "The parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development." (Cotonou Art 11). Baroness Ashton's first policy paper confirms the rhetoric in the Lisbon Treaty and give signs on how the future direction of the EU external relations will be like. Ashton had made clear that she regards foreign policy and development aid as an integral part of the toolbox of the EU and located "in the heart of the EU's external action"<sup>83</sup> However, statements made by Ashton focusing the actions on fragile states and paralleling the priorities with US and UK governments raised concerns over "the risks diminishing the EU's established development work, for example in Sub-Saharan Africa."<sup>84</sup>

The security and development nexus was also referred in the European Commission Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 and it is stated at the formal

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<sup>83</sup>Ashton, 2010

<sup>84</sup>Vegro, 2010

document that "Since many security issues contain a short-term security dimension and a long-term development purpose, they can be addressed both by Common Security and Defense Policy tools as well as by development and cooperation instruments, depending on the main objective of each project. In this context, it is of utmost importance to ensure coherence between all available EU instruments, as well as to foster possible synergies leading to the overall reduction of violence and the establishment of the right conditions for development." (EC(2010:40) SEC(2010)421)".

In line with the attitude, another Commission document Green Paper on Development in 2010 states that " consistent and comprehensive political strategies linking early warning and preventive diplomacy to short term, crisis response measures (humanitarian, diplomatic, civilian and military crisis management) and to longer term instruments and policies (on development cooperation, trade, environment and adaptation to climate change to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters, migration, etc.)."<sup>85</sup>

In addition to the policy paper, I will also refer to the speeches done by the prominent actors who have been taking part in the development cooperation area after Lisbon Treaty. Discourse analysis of these speeches led us to better understand the EU's commitment to work on the security development nexus what the texts imply on this.

Lisbon Treaty aims and changes are in line with the rhetoric of Catherine Ashton, as she expressed her devotion to the security and development nexus in a speech to the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee on March 2010 (right before her proposal for an EEAS Decision submitted) "a once-in a generation opportunity to build something that finally brings together all the instruments of our engagement - economic and political instruments, development and crisis management tools - in support of a single political strategy"<sup>86</sup>. She added that "the EU needs "a system that promotes comprehensive strategies and joined-up action – not where, as today, we try to work comprehensively despite our system".<sup>87</sup>

Federica Mogherini's, the current HR, expressions are in line with Ashton's security and development. In her speech at the European Year for Development launch in Madrid on February 2015 states that " the bloc's development policy was neither charity nor a luxury but

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<sup>85</sup> GREEN PAPER EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development Increasing the impact of EU development policy', 2010, p. 8-9

<sup>86</sup> Catherine, 2010

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

an “investment for peace and stability..”, “.. In all crises, development plays an essential role” referring to the conflicts like those in Syria, Ukraine or Libya. The rhetoric is strong enough to imply that the poor development of the countries is the main source of the crisis and conflict so the development has a direct link for the peace and stability of the countries. This linkage between development and the crisis requires better cooperation and coordination between the security and development issues during the policy making process.

An interview with Fokion Fotiadis in 2011, former DG DEV chief and after he held the position of the head of the EuropeAid Development and Cooperation Directorate General, is important empirical material to get the hints of the Commission's perceptions on security and development nexus and the new institutional set up on aid programming. According to the interview, he stated that “We have a collective responsibility to do everything in our power to make it [the EEAS] succeed, not least because of the contribution which it can make to development. Indeed, one of the things the external service will have to do is to better deliver on the security aspects in volatile countries. Without a better security environment, you cannot have development. [...] We will have to work with the external service on the nexus between security and development. One cannot work without the other. So, this is not about politicizing development, but, rather, how to better deliver on security in order to better deliver on development.”<sup>88</sup>

The same attitude was on the webpage of the DEVCO, confirming the need for the closer cooperation: “Addressing causes of conflicts (poverty, disease, lack of governance and rule of law) is an essential first step for the EU to help promote peace and development. EU development work uses non-military means to support the peaceful resolution/prevention of armed conflict through negotiations, demobilization, demilitarization, etc.”.

Based on these statements, the discourse on the need for a closer cooperation between the institutions and more integrate the security and development issues in order to better address today's development challenges is clear. The different actors from different institutional backgrounds confirm each other and give consistent statements on a need for a closer security and development cooperation. The policy documents as well as the speeches by different bureaucracies are in the same attitude with the objectives set by the Lisbon Treaty on the ways to achieve development objectives.

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<sup>88</sup>Pasquini, 2011

#### **7.1.4 Institutionalization After Lisbon Treaty**

The rhetoric of the Lisbon Treaty integration security and development nexus into the EU's external relations is complemented by the set of institutional changes aiming to more coordination and coherence between policies; establishment of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS, DG DEVCO, and formalization of EUDs. The institutional changes have already analysed in the previous sections and can be safely interpreted that the EU has explicitly confirmed its commitment to the security and development nexus.

#### **7.1.5 Value Infusion on Poverty Reduction**

Value infusion is another dimension of institutionalization. As our main concept is poverty reduction, its needed to be understood how poverty reduction has been presented with its relations to the security and development nexus in the Lisbon Treaty and the policy papers after Lisbon Treaty. Value infusion reveals the level of knowledge of intervention theory and the different perceptions shared among the stakeholders related to that, which is in our case is the understanding of poverty reduction. Common knowledge and understanding to the intervention theory allows the actors to create a stronger institutional context where the change can better be promoted at the end.

We already accepted that there are many factors that influence the outcome or the decision, and the ideas embedded into institutions can be one of the most important features of those. The idea-infused institutions are expected to survive and thrive in a world of bureaucratic politics.<sup>89</sup> So the way that an institution infuses a value or an idea is determinant on the institution's way to approach the projects and the policies in the process of making them.

Rethinking of development assistance together with security concerns has been relevant in the foreign aid literature since 1990s. The Cold War times prioritized geostrategic affairs of the donors, but later the much focus paid on human security.<sup>90</sup> The link between poverty, security and development was recognized and started to be regarded as 'poverty is both cause and an effect of human insecurity in developing countries' said by UK development minister in 90.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Drezner, 2000, p.1

<sup>90</sup> 'Human Development Report 2002', 2002, ch.4

<sup>91</sup> Benn, 2004

Poverty is perceived in a sense that is broader than just looking to the levels of income. The European Consensus on Development (adopted in Dec. 2005) recognizes the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty eradication. The multidimensionality of poverty can be addressed in different ways; such as from economic, political, social and environmental aspects, spatial and temporal aspects, vulnerability, isolation, powerlessness.<sup>92</sup> Duffield advancing this proposition in his article "Achieving security in the border-lands, and hence international stability, is now seen as lying in activities designed to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic self-sufficiency, create representative civil institutions, encourage thrift, promote human rights, gender awareness, and so on: the name of this new security framework is development."<sup>93</sup>

Strong provisions in regard to poverty reduction have been part of the EU policy documents and the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty promotes poverty eradication as the primary goal of its external action and the EU development cooperation. These are:

- Article 3.5 TEU on overall values of the EU

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustain development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

- Article 21.2 TEU on EU external action

The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

[...] (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of **eradicating poverty**;

- Article 208 TFEU on development cooperation

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<sup>92</sup>Pedersen & Ravnborg, 2010, p.12

<sup>93</sup>Duffield, 2002, p.1064

[...] Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. [...]

## **7.2 Discussion over Security and Development Nexus**

According to Christian Bueger and Pascal Vennesson, there are three major frameworks that the linkage between security and development can be operationalized.<sup>94</sup> These three mentioned frameworks are Peace Building, Human Security, and the War on Terror. How these concepts are applied is different in the answer that it depends on the question that whose security is concerned and whether the operationalization is done through coordinating or integrating security and development policy.

Although security and development nexus proposes better coherence and better coherence, it is most possible that it can result in the opposite way. Waddell claims that supposed link between security and development is difficult to operationalize and may create a clear danger of security interests trumping development incentives.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, Klingebiel and Roehder argues that "not all "development-military interfaces are fundamentally problematic in nature" and it is possible to distinguish "four sensitive areas", especially from the development policy perspective to which attention should be paid to secure developmental objectives.<sup>96</sup> These four sensitive areas are;

1. Subordination of development policy to a military logic.
2. Implementation by the military of measures with a development character.
3. Development policy as a source of funding for military missions.
4. Development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military.

However, still this linkage "remains an uneasy mix of mutually enhancing connections" as all concerns derived from the possibility that development goals might be undermined by

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<sup>95</sup>Waddell, 2006, p. 538

<sup>96</sup>Klingebiel and Roehder, 2003, p.22-23

security interest. It can result in different forms; either in terms of conflicting objectives<sup>97</sup>, differing timelines<sup>98</sup>, or diverting aid away from poverty reduction focuses.<sup>99</sup>

In particular for Africa, where the EDF fund is used, its strategic importance, from foreign policy aspects, has been increasing given the facts that prospect of rapid economic growth over upcoming years, China's increased involvement in the area, and the US's strategic interaction with the African countries. Given this competitive environment between donor actors, the geo-economic and commercial interest matters as aid can strategically be used to create trade relations with the aid recipient country. The negotiations between the ACP countries and the EU on Economic and Partnership Agreement (EPA) are seen as an example of this concern.<sup>100</sup>

The post-colonial poverty reduction perception of the donors has now been turned to strategic partnerships and diplomatic engagements where the beyond-aid strategies are engaged. Looking at the EU aid allocations to its partner countries, it is spread evenly compared to US and other donors, the geographical proximity and colonial links still play important role as the MS pursue different interests in different regions.

The security concerns are two folded; providing security and development to the African countries' citizens and at the same issues threatening the EU citizens' security directly or indirectly, such as drug trafficking, illegal migration, piracy, etc.

Turning into the policy implications on the ground with regard to security and development nexus, EU's Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and Horn of Africa are significant materials for this discussion. Two strategic frameworks were developed by the EEAS in 2011, and since then strategy papers have been criticized due to over emphasis on security concerns. Sahel region has long been raising security concerns for Europe caused by increased activities on organized crime and kidnappings due to weak state control over desert areas. The Strategy paper touches upon four key points; security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated; closer regional cooperation is necessity; all states in the region would benefit from capacity building in areas of core government activity; and the role of EU is vital in the area to provide assistance for economic development and secure environment.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>97</sup>Peter & Lowilla, 2008, p.19

<sup>98</sup>Grimm, 2009, p. 1

<sup>99</sup>Vegro, 2010

<sup>100</sup>Stocchetti, 2013

<sup>101</sup> 'European Union External Action Service Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel', 2011

Similarly, Horn of Africa has had security and development concerns, and coupled with its geo-strategic importance, EEAS prepared the Strategy in order to address security and development challenges. Five areas are emphasized; building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth and supporting regional economic cooperation as well as specific goals included tackling piracy and supporting stabilization in Somalia and peaceful transition in Sudan.<sup>102</sup> All these priority areas reveal that the comprehensive approach to the EU external relations is practically on the ground.

### **7.3 Managing the Security Development Nexus in relation to EDF**

#### **7.3.1 Scope and Objectives of the EDF**

Based on Cotonou Agreement and Lisbon Treaty, the objective of reducing poverty and eradication in the long term in ACP countries is the main concern of the EDF, together with the objectives of sustainable development and their gradual integration to the world economy.<sup>103</sup> Despite the strong poverty reduction emphasis of the Cotonou Agreement, the scope of the EDF has been extended fight against terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the agreement reviews in 2005 and 2010.<sup>104</sup> This extended scope and emphasis on facilitating the policy coherence can be supported by the EEAS with regard to its possible tendency to exert its political influence.

The development objectives are translated into the strategic cooperation throughout the programming process. Aid criteria are set in the aid regulations, and the aid allocations per country are decided within the programming cycle, thus can be considered as the most important stage.

According to the 2010 Council Decision on the Establishing the EEAS, the EEAS is tasked with leading to the country and regional strategy papers (CSPs, RSPs) in order to determine the country and regional aid allocations. The aid criteria are set for the EDF in Cotonou Agreement Annex IV. CSPs and RSPs are the strategic assessments of the each recipient

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<sup>102</sup> Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa', 2011

<sup>103</sup> 'Amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as', 2010

<sup>104</sup> Ibid

country regarding its political and economic conditions as well as the needs.<sup>105</sup> Prior to Lisbon Treaty settings, EDF Programming was managed by DG DEV. After, it is moved under the responsibility of EEAS together with the introduction of single geographic desks. The preparation of EDF programming prior-and after Lisbon Treaty are described below which will provide the knowledge that in which parts the EEAS has responsibility.

### **7.3.2 Assessing the EDF**

The strategic objectives are translated into the aid allocations through aid programming. The EDF is the main financial instrument that facilitates the security and development nexus.

For the 10th EDF which is the period between 2008 and 2013, the ESDP SSR project in Guinea Bissau, the former Portuguese colony, was financed through EDF Funds. Although the OECD criteria recognized that SSR programs are eligible for ODA spending, without allocating additional funds available for development would implies that it sometimes can be possible to reallocate development funds towards security policy. It should be recognized by the policy-makers as Klingebel noted in previous chapter. The three primary objects of assistance where: conflict prevention in fragile states, water and energy, and general budget support. The EU support was aimed to contribute to conflict prevention and strengthening state structures. Same case is valid for Somalia that it is one of the top ranking aid receivers from the EU, receiving both humanitarian aid and development aid. The development aid is expected to support governance and security, social sectors and agriculture, yet additional development funding was provided through African Peace Facility (APF) funded from EDF. The APF was established in 2003 for predictable funds in order to support peace and security in Africa. As the EU Treaties do not allow the EU budget to finance activities with military or defense implication, the APF is financed from the EDF. Thus, it can be interpreted that the "securitization of aid" can be the case as the development aid is diverted to fund peacekeeping operations.<sup>106</sup> Securitization refers to the allocation of development funds for security projects such as crisis management, conflict prevention, or counter terrorism.

Provided the security and development nexus of the EU and the widen scope of development with the Lisbon Treaty with regard to European Development Fund, these examples are valuable to understand the funds being used to pay for activities which are not among the traditional development activities, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR).

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<sup>105</sup> Gavas & Koeb, 2010/16 April 2010, p. 4

<sup>106</sup> Del Biondo, K., Oltsch, S., & Orbie, J., 2012

## 8 Reconstruction of the Program Theory for DEVCO

DG DEVCO was created in 2011 by merging the DG DEV and DG EuropeAid. By the influx of these experienced staff into DEVCO, it is safe to say that it is composed of experienced officials who have long institutional memory on EU development cooperation. As to keep this institutional memory to provide the continuation of the development expertise, the staffs are divided into the two new institutional forms related to their field of expertise. Compared to DG Relex, DG DEV was regarded as less attached to the EU foreign policy interests<sup>107</sup> and now working in the DEVCO assumed to continue its close attachment to development objectives. DG DEV was regarded as "As the guardian of the European project, acting in the Community interest, the European Commission was to be responsible for the supervision of common policies, the regulation of the common market and the management of a small number of programmes, such as external aid (the European Development Fund/EDF)." by Dimier.<sup>108</sup> DG's identity including mission, instruments and group of norms was built over a time and its interaction with African political elite<sup>109</sup> and as well as the specific balance of power between senior diplomats and MS coalitions.<sup>110</sup> The colonial ties and the relations with the African elite weighting more among the other factors for the financial decisions of the EDF projects before 1970s. Such methods based on political criteria may easily lead to arbitrariness and result in favorable treatment for some countries. Aid allocation to Gabon and Burundi 1962 is one of the examples of this discrepancy between the level of poverty and aid allocation is on Gabon and Burundi in 1962 : 'Gabon, for instance, with a 1970 per capita GNP of US\$630 received per capita 50.73 units of account under EDF II, whereas Burundi with a per capita GNP of US\$60 received per capita aid of only 6.34 units of account.'<sup>111</sup>

Following the 70s, the institution paved way to more bureaucratization whose standards lie on the norms and trying to avoid politicized influence.<sup>112</sup> The enlargement and the shift of power among coalitions brought this awareness on colonial attachments for the aid distribution, and 90s brought the "efficiency" and "performance" linkage to the aid allocations. This rationalization of the EDF management by DG DEV<sup>113</sup> translated the objective criteria of fund allocations into 'conditions' and 'evaluations' which was later carried

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<sup>107</sup> Holden, 2009, P.113

<sup>108</sup> Dimier, 2014, p.2

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, p.2

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, p.5

<sup>111</sup> Lister, 1988, p.50

<sup>112</sup> Dimier, 2014, p.6

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, p. 8

out by a new commission service EuropeAid. The development policy of the EU included the general objectives of the Union such as consolidating democracy, respecting fundamental principles and rule of law, and these principles attached into the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 including further measures for sanctions, conditions and political dialogue. The introduction of political conditions constitutes a big step towards the DG's rationalization and the 'pursuit of objectivity' because conditions aim to regulate the needs and the performances from distance and "replace personal trust as a means of control, with trust in numbers".<sup>114</sup> The aid allocation will be merit based and will translated into numbers: need was defined based on GNP, population size, country's debt conditions; performance on the other hand evaluated based on the country's performance on achieving development objectives and poverty eradication, reforming performance, regular implementation of the projects and sector-level policies and conformity with the partnership obligations.<sup>115</sup> The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) confirmed the objectivity and efficiency factors as well. Throughout these developments, the DG DEV ideally relied on increasingly on measurement tools and evaluation of the performances of those recipient countries achieving the set of objectives. As the technification of the aid allocations are improved, the administrative staff profile formed more result oriented with the figures and the need for staff capacity to politically deal with the recipient countries were not needed much as it was in the past.

The 2011 decision moved the geographical desk officials from DG DEV and led the political analysis capacity moved in the EEAS too. Meanwhile, together with the new tasks defined by Lisbon Treaty and the new form of an institution, DEVCO has taken the measuring impacts, evaluation of performances, achieving targets, and policy outcomes into the central work of its agenda. We can interpret that efficiency and evaluation, which considers trust in numbers, rather than personal ties, compromise with the recipient country, or any other political affairs constitutes the mode of legitimacy and the identity of the DEVCO.

## **9 Staffing in the EEAS**

As the EEAS has a leading role particularly in the initial phases of the programming programme where the allocation strategies are defined and proposed, role of EEAS is of importance to identify and highlight that which aspects of the programming period is crucial for the outcome since the changes were meant to produce a change in the outcome that is

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<sup>114</sup> Porter, 1995, p. 74

<sup>115</sup> Dimier, 2014, p.172

"more coherent and more coordinated". As this is the ultimate aim to achieve by these institutional changes, some considers it as "the awkward split concerning development policy" reasoning that "The EuropeAid Development and Cooperation DG looks after the development policy and establishes thematic programs. The service, on the other hand, is supposed to allocate money and look at regional strategies"<sup>116</sup> The recruitment process of the EEAS and the EUDs are given importance in this section as staff background is one of the factor that influences the expected outcome.

The EEAS recruited its staff from the Commission, General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), and MS diplomatic services and the composition of staff is supposed to be on equal share; each category should has an equal share at AD (Administrator) level.<sup>117</sup> Based on 2011 staffing proportions, the MS diplomats are 174 (or 19%) in number, GSC officials occupy 313 (34%) and 432 (47%) were recruited from the Commission Services.<sup>118</sup> From the Commission, DG Relex (including all EU Delegations abroad) and DG DEV geographic directorates are moved into EEAS. From the GSC, the CFSP/CSDP implementing bodies (Policy Unit, CMPD, CPCC, EUMS and SitCen) and officials of the GSC on secondment to EU Special Representatives and CSDP mission are recruited.<sup>119</sup> Merket interprets the proposed staff composition as a notable step towards a more unified approach to the security-development nexus as the former division of security and development into different entities now has been removed.<sup>120</sup>

Moreover, the EEAS serves as a common source of support for the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission in addition to its main task assisting the High Representative.<sup>121</sup> Not only coordinating and cooperating with these institutions, but also tasked to work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of MS as well as the Parliament.<sup>122</sup> The model of network<sup>123</sup>, which the EEAS is positioned strategically as an inter-institutional policy hub, provides a channel for cooperation between the actors involved in security and development policy making.

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<sup>116</sup>Mahony, 2011

<sup>117</sup>Article 6(9) EEAS Decision states that, when the EEAS reaches full capacity, the Member States staff 'should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level' and Commission and Council officials should together account for 'at least 60%'.

<sup>118</sup>House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, EU Enlargement and Foreign Policy', 2011

<sup>119</sup> Merket, H. ,2012, p. 638

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

<sup>121</sup>Article 2(2) EEAS Decision

<sup>122</sup>Article 3 (4) EEAS Decision

<sup>123</sup> Merket, H. ,2012, p. 639

As the EEAS recruited transferred and seconded staff, it is important to keep their loyalty to the newly established service and its tasks rather than their former institutions. With regard to EU Delegations abroad, they consist of EEAS, DEVCO and other EC staff. The EUDs are diplomatic representations of the EU in third countries and tasked with programming and implementing development assistance as well as expected to facilitate coordination among MS. The Delegations are of utmost importance to the programming cycle; at the first stage they prepare and propose EU response strategy for the recipient country based on an overall assessment of the political situation to be sent to the EEAS in cooperation with DEVCO in order to be checked against the EU objectives. At the second stage, EUDs prepares the draft Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) based on the feedback and reviews of the EEAS and DEVCO, and this document is the basis for the identification and implementation of concrete interventions (programmes and projects) by DEVCO. Thus we can say that EUDs are pivotal as they provide the essential linkage between the programming cycle and political dialogue. Prior to the Lisbon changes, the CSPs/RSPs were prepared by the DG in the Commission with the relevant geographical desk in DG Relex or DG Dev, and then to be implemented by DG EuropeAid. Compared with the previous system, the old system hinders the adoption of holistic approaches to the recipient countries or regions which could link the different aspects of EU policy such as security, environment, development and such. For the current setting, despite its advantages to being able to provide coordination and coherency, it is important point that how the EEAS and DEVCO will review the draft EU response strategies based on EU objectives, as the hierarchy of objectives not always clarified anywhere. Formally and manifestly, the development objectives are based on Agenda for Change, the Cotonou Agreement, and the DCI's objectives in which the poverty reduction is the primary one.

The power balance within the EUDs with regard to division of labor is also another major issue. In case of the larger staff from EEAS, it is feared that instrumentalisation would take place in the service of a diplomatic agenda while the Commission would lose influence.<sup>124</sup> Another possible case is that member state diplomats as being the Head of Delegations proposing the EU response strategies to the EEAS and the putting the DG DEV into a secondary role during the CTM/RTMs<sup>125</sup>. In lack of development expertise at the EUDs can result with a short term focus on crisis management and security policy which would

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<sup>124</sup>Koeb, 2008, p.11

<sup>125</sup> Mahony, 2010

eventually reflect to the EU response strategy papers.<sup>126</sup> With such a draft strategy paper, it is in possible cases that resources destined to eradicate poverty can be channel to the other areas where the necessity is needed such as fighting against terrorism, fighting with piracy or such.

The appointments of the HoDs are announced publicly, however the extent to which MS, the MS and the EC bargain for specific post is found unclear which poses concerns on whether MS would seek for "spheres of influence" in specific countries or regions.<sup>127</sup> Provided in the IR literature that the ex-colonial ties matter to pursue interest or credibility in the partner country. As such, ECPDM discussion paper presents the information based on the interviews that it is likely Eastern European Ambassadors are posted in ex-Soviet republics; Spanish Ambassadors to Latin America; and the French and British to their former colonies.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, according to the interviews conducted by ECPDM that the background and attitude of HoDs are the key determinants in the way Delegations function.<sup>129</sup> The interviewees reveals that the institutional background is apparent when they conduct their programme management procedures in the field, and it is stated that " A HoD with an EC/DEVCO background appear to be more at ease with EC programme management procedures than national seconded diplomats, who in some cases may even feel alienated by technical and administrative tasks, or show a limited interest in development cooperation altogether.."<sup>130</sup>

## 10 Analysis

### 10.1 Analysis Part on Programming

Although programming of EDF is managed by both the EEAS and DEVCO, it is the EEAS who leads most of the process. According to the EEAS Review<sup>131</sup>, the new tasks are carried without any problem thanks to the close working relations between the actors. As the programming period is recently experienced, the briefing and analysis resources are in scarce and ECPDM briefing is one of those rare analyses.<sup>132</sup> According to the briefing note, DEVCO's performance is appreciated due to its determination to translate the Agenda for Change into practice. On the other hand, EEAS is criticized with its capacity constraints, disinterest in development issues and lack of knowledge of EC procedures. Although the

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<sup>126</sup>Koeb, 2008, p.11

<sup>127</sup>Helly, Herrero, Knoll, Galeazzi, & Sherriff, 2014, p.4

<sup>128</sup>Ibid

<sup>129</sup>Ibid, p.5

<sup>130</sup>Ibid

<sup>131</sup>European External Actions Service Review, 2013

<sup>132</sup>Herrero, Galeazzi, & Krätke, 2013, p.

process was expected to be more participatory, the lack of EEAS's leadership in the development cooperation was observed.

The EEAS is tasked with being the leading actor in the programming process. The analysis of the existing national/regional development plan is vital and determinant for the programming outcome and it is prepared by the EUDs. This work defines needs, performances, and sector-specific objectives of the recipient country to be further discussed at Brussels. EUDs are ideally expected to align with partner country's poverty reduction strategies and concerns. This draft analysis prepared by the EUDs is examined by the EEAS and DEVCO together with the all relevant actors including EIB. Organization and coordination skills of the EEAS are important at this stage in order to ensure policy coherence. Moreover, what is discussed and agreed at this stage is also important since all relevant actors are included in the meetings and as each of them may possess different expectations based on their organizational priorities. DEVCO's presence at these meetings can be regarded as a 'development check' to the draft.

Secondly, Multinational Indicative Programme is another important stage of the programming, where the aid is allocated to the ACP countries through Country Team Meetings. Ideally, having included variety of actors from different institutions creates the opportunity for more policy coherence and to check in case of any security ambitions subordinating development objectives. It is the EEAS's task to organize and coordinate these meetings with the relevant officials, however there is not enough evidence published yet from NGOs or in the media if the meetings were coordinated regularly or conducted without given importance to transparency. In the ideal process, the given competences to the DEVCO is considered as 'development checks' of the programming period and expected to ensure the well representation of development concerns. TSE analysis illustrated that the development values are embedded in DEVCO's institutional memories and its experienced staff have been working on development cooperation in more rational and technical way. In its historical evolution, DG DEV (former DEVCO) has technified and quantified its aid management and the development of the evaluation tasks enhanced its attempts for objectivity. DEVCO still keep its quantitative tasks and its attachment to development objectives. There is competence given to DEVCO on key stages of the programming, but the staff capacity as well as the political will should be ensured to achieve the expected outcomes.

Another development check of the process should be ensured when deciding on the fund allocation to Envelope A and Envelope B of each recipient country. Analysis proves the

security and development nexus but it should be secured to not make arbitrary allocations to the Envelope B of the recipient countries. Prioritizing the crisis situations for some countries, can be chosen from geo strategically important countries proposed by rationalist foreign policy assumptions, may take the share of development funds.

## **10.2 Assessments on EDF in regard to Security and Development Nexus**

The need for a closer linkage between the security and development is needed due to need for a better policy response to the emerging challenges in the world. Regardless of the questions on whose security for whom, the basic assumption that the underdevelopment may result in security problems as the security is also needed to foster development. The linkage takes place in the activities of Peace Building, Human Security, and the War on Terror, as proposed by Christian Bueger and Pascal Vennesson.<sup>133</sup> However, the operationalization of two policies can be problematic in the nature that of security interests might trump development incentives, thus resulted in the aid allocations to countries such as Guinea Bissau and Somalia for the period of 10th EDF. These countries received additional funds for SSR, and it funded from EDF in addition to humanitarian and development aid. It is important to see that a third country receives aid for reasons of non-traditional development activities from the development budget, namely EDF. Moreover, it should be given attention that allocating development funds towards the security policy without making additional funds to development necessitates creates the danger that money can be allocated to other security issues rather than development projects. These examples can be valuable indicators the upcoming aid allocations that will be programmed by the EEAS and DEVCO considering that better conditions for more coordinated and coherent security and development policy implications were now provided by the Lisbon Treaty.

Based on these facts, we observe that the close interaction between the security and development has already been recognized by the Union. The Union's rhetoric is clear on agreeing upon the nexus and institutional initiatives have followed this rhetoric over the years. Importantly, the definition of development has started to be perceived in a broader sense which reflected into practice by including the non-traditional security issues into the ODA projects such as Security Sector Reforms that are funded from the EDF. It is safe to say that

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<sup>133</sup> Bueger, C., & Vennesson, P., 2009

there have been increased inter-policy arrangements coordinating security and development policies.

The Lisbon Treaty brought fundamental transforms to the security and development policies. The Treaty presents the EU's commitment to policy coherence and its commitment to work for a closer linkage between security and development. Institutional settings were reorganized aiming to provide necessary conditions to produce more coordinated policies with a comprehensive approach between the sec and development policies. The EEAS is the pivotal in the sense to realize the stated objectives in the Lisbon Treaty; more coordinated, more coherent, therefore stronger EU representation in the world which would bring efficient development policy outcomes in the third countries. When we look at the security and development nexus within the concept of EEAS, it is apparent that security attained more important place in the organization of the EU compared to how it was before Lisbon. The functioning of the EEAS in the EU and the field is quite recent to carry some observations on its activities in order to see its performance on security and development issues. However, still there are some evidences about this approach. The Strategy papers on Sahel and Horn of Africa are of importance due to being only regional strategy papers with regard to development and security nexus since Lisbon Treaty. The strategy papers reveal the very fact that the EU is practically implementing the comprehensive approach in its external relations. Both policy papers have made a bold emphasis on that security and development issues cannot be separated. However the examples can be seen as an indicator of a growing trend of the securitization of development, because the relations are covered within the Cotonou Agreement and the funding is spread through EDF which is not supposed to fund the security projects.

### **10.3 Analysis on the Reconstruction of Intervention Theories**

Based on the security and development literature and the recent developments in the EU, the primary objective of the EU development policy has become poverty reduction, and in the long term eradication. Poverty reduction is also root causes of insecurity and conflict and needed to be tackled to provide peace and security in the region. The Agenda for Change (2011) and the 2012 Council Conclusions addressed these challenges as the Lisbon Treaty changes and the new institutional set up has equipped the EU to better address these challenges. The Treaty changes and the Council conclusions has made it clear the need for

strengthening the security and development linkages in its actions as it led the EU to maximize the effectiveness of its external action.

Among the other funding instruments of the EU, EDF has fallen in the scope of this research since its primary objective is poverty reduction in the AFC, where the challenges of poverty related development and the security is evident. The programming of the EDF has fallen under the responsibility of the EEAS and DEVCO where the former is tasked with leading the process and coordinating the relevant actors. The evaluation methodology helped us to understand the organizational settings, cultures and the embedded values to the both institutions. We grasped the knowledge that, EEAS with its main task to manage the EU's external relations is more foreign policy oriented, favoring security and development nexus track and promoting reinforcing this linkage with its discourse as well as its practices so far. Policy papers on Sahel Region and Horn of Africa are the explicit examples of this approach and can be seen as a referent points for future assumptions on EU's development aid policy. EU's repeated commitment to the nexus is not only solely based upon a rhetorical pledge but also practically on the ground.

The security and development nexus also has military dimension notably proposed by Klingebiel and Roehder. African Peace Facility (APF) is an example of this problematic nature of development and military relation. APF is financed from EDF because the military operations are not permitted to be financed by EU budget. Combined with the MS's strategic interests in long term peace and stability in Africa, channeling funding to APF from the EDF may lead to underwrite the funding which should have been devoted to other third countries based on their bad poverty records. DEVCO's awareness is important to see these possibilities. Having the evaluation results and other quantifiable datas would enable the DEVCO staff to notice if any arbitrary or much allocation moved to APF. Moreover, in order to avoid from such a possibility, the APF can be combined with other foreign policy instrument such as IfS funded from the EU budget.

Although the division of labor on aid programming was formed by the former HR Ashton<sup>134</sup>, some observations from the development NGOs states that there are still blurred lines on division of labor. Proposed by bureaucratic politics model, existence of blurred lines most possibly leave door to the actors to extend their power over those areas. Although this may

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<sup>134</sup> Council Decision 2010/4217/EU Establishing the Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service

lead to inter institutional war between the EEAS and DEVCO staff, or its also probable that EEAS can potentially play dominant role. Thanks to the pooled staff in its headquarters and abroad (EUDs and Special Representatives) and its delegated acts, it has the potential to become a policy entrepreneur that conducts the EU's development cooperation in the direction of its long standing security and development promises.

## **11 Conclusion**

Based on these facts, EU has equipped legally and institutionally to better tackle with today's conditions and problems. Being striven hard to become a more coherent, efficient and a visible EU in the world, the establishment of the EEAS together with the other changes are determinative on the direction of the EU's external relations.

Unpacking the EDF programming has revealed that EEAS is the leading actor with its delegated acts and the staff capacity both in the Brussels and the third countries. The theory based stakeholder methodology helped to understand differentiated organizational culture and the mission of these two institutions. This differentiation both has opportunities and challenges to achieve the expected outcome.

The attained mandate and its staffing has brought the embedded security oriented approach to the EEAS and also it is the fact that security and development nexus has become one of the most important component of the EU's external relation. Owed to its past experiences, DEVCO has qualified staff on development cooperation and its staff works more rationalized and numerical terms. Therefore, presence of DEVCO in the EDF programming period can be regarded as a safeguard to any politicization or securitization attempts. Moreover, having included all relevant actors in the process likely to hinder any possible arbitrary aid allocation on security or military operations, and also provides exchange of views and opinions which makes the aid allocation more transparent.

As poverty has gained more importance in the security agenda, the cases on Sahel and Horn of Africa can be the important indicators of how the EU will enhance its security and development nexus approach for the future aid allocations.

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