Nordic Defense Cooperation

Prospects for expanding the endeavor

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Abstract

The debate on Nordic defense cooperation has surged in the recent year as a result from a perceived shift in the security environment. The study focuses on the five Nordic states; all of them committed to different security communities and yet engaged in cooperative measures with each other.

With the question of exploring the prerequisites for a possible deepening of the Nordic defense cooperation, this study adopting the concepts security and identity, will utilize the theoretical ideas of Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett on security communities by performing a qualitative content analysis of the Nordic countries' defense policies.

The analysis is performed through a constructed coding scheme where eleven questions has been created and then applied onto the policies. The results show that the prerequisites for a deepening of the Nordic defense cooperation heavily rest on their commonalties in culture, views on democracy, rule of law and aspirations in the region concerning their security policies. All countries are committed to a future development but differ to some extent as to how such cooperation ought to take and in their perceptions on security-issues.

Keywords: *Security Communities, Identity, Security, Defense, Cooperation, Nordefco, Nordic cooperation, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland.*
Word count: 10010

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1 Introduction

The Nordic countries are in many ways similar although they differentiate significantly in terms of their military alignments. The states shares long history with each other and are to some extent fairly similar linguistically. All of them have also similar aspirations of democracy and they are all located in a region that is being regarded by scholars as a region of growing geostrategic importance (Mouritzen, 2001, p. 299).

Despite clear and existing similarities among the Nordic countries in general, defense is an area where one has to take into account that the Nordic nations also differ in their national defense postures. I am of course referring to each member state's relation to different *security communities*. Both Sweden and Finland are as EU-members involved in its Common Security and Defense policy (CSDP) and participants of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace-program. Denmark is the only country that holds membership of both EU and NATO (NATO, 2015) but is not participating in EU-operations. Norway has opted for NATO-membership (NATO, 2015) solely as have Iceland. Iceland also is absent of any national armed forces and relies therefore heavily on a bilateral defense agreement with the United States, as it's primary military guarantor (Defense of Iceland, 1951)

In the years of 2014 and 2015 the Nordic defense debate has surged significantly mainly due to the perceived changing security environment in the Baltic Sea region. More emphasis is now being given to the strengthening and preservation the territorial integrity of the Nordic countries partly as a result from increased Russian military activity in the region. The level of increased activity of the Russian Federation is particular taking shape in form of increased military flights around and close by the Nordic state's borders. In October 2013 Russian bombers simulated bombing runs towards Swedish targets although maintaining their presence within international airspace (SvD, 2014).
 In September, 2014 two Russian attack-bombers violated Swedish airspace entering it for a very short period time before turning back (SvD, 2014) and as late as in May 2015 two Swedish JAS-39 Gripens observed two Russian bombers within international air space heading towards the island of Öland which is located east of the Swedish mainland before turning away heading back east. In response to this the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, General Sverker Göransson said in an interview that he views the current Russian military reforms and above-mentioned flights as signs of a increased aggressive behavior than previously has been displayed by Russia in the region (SR, 2015).
 Further, the Russian Federation's conduct towards the Ukraine crisis and its annexation of the Crimean peninsula has contributed strongly to the defense debate where one consequence has been the ramping up of defense spending, particular in Sweden who announced in the year of 2014 that its expanding its defense budget (Försvarsmakten, 2014).

Evidence of increased military activity and incentives to uphold the territorial integrity and bolster military cooperation can be seen through the Nordic states' participation in multilateral exercises, some of them taking place in the beginning of this summer. BALTOPS 2015 is a large multilateral exercise held within the NATO's Partnership for Peace program.
 The Nordic militaries will be joining the exercise led by United States and NATO, partly held within Swedish territorial borders and aims to foster international cooperation, coordination and dealing with asymmetric threats (Försvarsmakten, 2015).

Cooperation among the Nordic states has been developing during the last half of the 20th century in a slow but steady pace and has increased significantly during the latter part of the first decade of the 21st century. The Nordic states have obvious different reaches and level of commitments regarding defense in the global context but they have yet greatly advanced the level of cooperation amongst each other. In 2009 the Nordic Defense Cooperation was established, an organization that aims at strengthening the countries national defenses and to improve the work towards common solutions (Nordefco, 2014, p. 3).

The overarching aim of this study is to explore the possibilities for deepened defense cooperation among the Nordic countries where I will be analyzing the defense policies of the Nordic countries. This will be done in a attempt to crystalize the countries' defense postures where eventual similarities and differences will be observed in order to reach a point where one can determine whether such a possibility exists or not.

1.1   Purpose and Research Question

I've decided to conduct a *theory-consuming* study about the possibilities for deepened defense cooperation among the Nordic countries. The existing defense debate has been revived amongst the Nordic policymakers and in media during the last year, which led me to gain interest for the subject.

The study primarily intended aims are to add to the existing academic debate and research in the area of defense and security studies, which constitutes the intra-scientific relevance. There has been much written on the subjects of cooperation, *security*, defense in the academic world. Surprisingly it appears to bee surprisingly little written about the field in the Nordic context, more specifically Nordic defense cooperation and its potentials. I therefore aim to fill the apparent research gap of Nordic defense cooperation and it's prospects (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 18).
 Furthermore, as mentioned above the defense debate has seen an increase in the last year and these questions are now something that the general public faces when going through the daily news. Therefore it is also my aim with the study to be able to contribute to the debate that spans across the society hoping that it will be of some use to the general public by conducting a study with such degree of external-relevance (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 18).

Against the background presented above where there are clear similarities among the analytical objects (the states), differences and yet significant achievements I then ask myself if it is possible to expand the cooperation even further given the countries current positions.

I have therefore constructed the following research question.
 • *What are the prerequisites for deepened defense cooperation among the Nordic countries?*

The nature of the question is that of a explanatory one, where I through imposing my theoretical framework onto my analytical objects (the national defense policies of the Nordic states) seek to arrive to a point where I will be able to explain whether the possibilities of a deepened cooperation is likely or not (Teorell & Svensson, p. 26) & (Bjereld, et al. 1999, p. 437).

1.2 Disposition

Chapter one; introduction, purpose and research question, research design and existing research field. Chapter two; Theory, theoretical definitions, Adler and Barnett's security communities. Chapter three; method, operationalization, source reflections and coding scheme. Chapter four; Empirical analysis through the five defense policies. Chapter five; concluding arguments, answer on research question and theory-connection.

1.3 Research Design

In this study where my aim is to explore the possibilities for deepened defense cooperation among the Nordic countries I will conduct an analysis on the defense policies of the Nordic countries. In doing so I will utilize the theoretical thoughts on *security communities* of Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett. The theoretical concepts that are to be used in this study are *Identity* and *Security* through which I've developed the hypothesis that a greater coherence between the Nordic states' views on *Identity* and *Security* provides a greater possibility for defense cooperation.

 The scholar's writings on *security communities* play a central role in understanding how these communities in their different stages can be understood. Through this theoretical framework I will then analyze the defense policies by performing a *qualitative content analysis*. The analysis itself will be carried out in the sense that I will, through a constructed coding scheme, ask eleven questions against the policies that aims to detail the countries postures in-dept. This will hopefully present me with the ability to draw any conclusions whether the prospects of deeper cooperation is a possibility or merely a far-fetched idea (Bjereld, et al. 2009, p. 102-103).

In order to answer the question, which specifically addresses the Nordic defense cooperation it was therefore natural to study the five Nordic countries. There were some initial thoughts of studying news articles concerning defense cooperation through which a *random selection* process could've been carried out (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 84).
 However I soon decided that I wanted to explore material that went as far as possible in depth of the countries postures which led me to make a *strategic selection* focusing on the Nordic Countries defense policies (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 83). I held the view that analyzing different policies spanning back more than 10 years in every country would not present me with what I aim to investigate. I therefore decided to limit the *analytical units* to the most recent versions of policies (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 82).
 By analyzing the most recent material, as a researcher, I will be presented with the most recent postures of the states not having to take possible different views, potentially found in previous released policies into account. Performing such a selection would be positive for my study due a lot of things can change in a state's view or the international environment as there are often four or five years in between each policy-release.

1.4 Existing research field

In this part I aim to outline and discuss the existing field of research concerning *security communities* and d*efense cooperation*. The section will begin initially with presenting the broader research, as defined by scholars, on *security communities* and then shift to a lesser-abstracted level where the research in defense cooperation will be presented. In the end I will present, as to where in the field of research, my study is intended to depart from.

Karl Deutsch, a well-known scholar with this field of research, initially coined the concept of *security communities* in 1957. After the Cold War the concept experienced a revival in the mainstream academic international relations literature (Tusicisny, 2007, p. 425) and has since then been taken up and expanded further by a number of scholars.
 In his works Deutsch argued that there's not any guarantees that political communities produces peace or prevents wars from happening within their subjected areas. However, as he points out, some forms of political communities do have these characteristics and it is around these communities that Deutsch evolves his work. A *community* is, in Deutsch's eyes, defined as a group of people that has underwent a form of integration (Deutsch, et al. 1957, p, 1-2). *Integration* comes into being when people within a group when it's experiencing a sense of commonality amongst each other, in some cases combined with capable institutions to create a notion of *peaceful change* where any problems amongst its people are resorted by institutionalized procedures and not physical force (Deutsch, et al. 1957, p. 2).
 Security communities thus provide the participants of a guaranteed assertion that physical means are not the methods of choice for finding solutions to any problems, which leads him to make the argument that if the entire world would be a integrated community, then there would not be such a thing as war (Deutsch, et al. 1957, p. 2).

Security is perhaps the most important in the sense that the pursuit of stable and secure environment, national and regional, appears to be one of the main incentives for states to engage in cooperative ventures. S*ecurity* one of the most central concepts of the realist tradition within international relations but figures also within the liberalist as well as the constructivist approaches, although not emphasized as much.

Defense cooperation is either one major part within a *security community* or not. This can depend on the structure and form of a certain *security community* and Deutsch here divides communities into two major camps.
Amalgamated security communities are groupings that historically have been subjected to imperial or hegemonic rule and collapsed. In that area the security community is often being constructed from within by a stronger state imposing its will on the weaker states (Deutsch et al, 1957, p. 2).
Pluralistic security communities are the second group. This group can be defined as more voluntarily based in the sense that the states still enjoys their independence and decision-making. Within such community the states themselves have agreed to cooperate based on their own willing with a common interest in keeping the peace they refrain from solving any political disputes with physical means (Deutsch et al, 1957, p. 2).

 On pluralistic security communities, Deutsch argued that three major conditions had to be fulfilled in order to bring such a community into existing. (1) Primary political values among the states has to be satisfied, (2) established networks of communication and (3) mutual predictability among the states (created by the interaction of the previous two conditions (Deutsch et al, 1957, p. 2).

Ole Weaver, in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's book *Security Communities*, builds upon Deutsch's writings on *security communities*, especially the *pluralistic communities*. In his chapter he expands on the concept, mainly focusing on the West-European community. Weaver describes the transition the West-European community has experienced from the 1940' and 50's. During this period of time it experienced a state of *insecurity* in terms of *securitization* to, in the 60's gain a sense of security. Thus this *security*, Weaver argues, disappeared when the community saw a period of *de-securitization* during the 70's and 80's (Weaver, 1998, p. 69). In the 1990's it would experience a period of *re-securitization* of the community where at this point military fear was still absent amongst the countries but a wide range of problems began to be framed in terms of security issues other than what has been traditionally regarded as *security issues*. This would create the demand of more action from the states and here Weaver differs or rather expands Deutsch thoughts, who defined *security communities as* communities absent of wars where he argues that the West-European Community was in fact a *non-war-community* as it did experienced *security problems* despite having an absence of war (Weaver, 1998, p. 69).

Pointing to an example of an acknowledged *security community* Weaver brings up the Nordic states. Until the beginning of the 19th century the region experienced an enormous amount of conflicts between the Nordic states whereas wars in modern time between the Nordic states have come to be virtually non-thinkable. During the 19th century there were numerous conflicts in the region however all of them were in fact resolved in a peaceful manner. The Norwegian succession and the contest between Norway and Denmark on their claims for Greenland are just a couple of examples that were solved peacefully and all of these demonstrate the fundamental idea of a *security community* (Weaver, 1998, p. 72).
 The Nordic *security community* according to Weaver, was not intentional but rather happened unintentionally as it wasn't based on any economic incentives nor reflecting any societal transitions or contained strong institutions. With the low interest for geo-strategic aspirations, the rise of neutrality and the shared Christian-protestant culture, a way was paved for a new kind of Nordic identity which although its existence not overshadowed the existing nationalisms but rather became integrated in the idea of what it meant to be Danish, Swedish or Finish for example (Weaver, 1998, p. 72).

Tuomas Forsberg, in his article *The Rise of Nordic defence cooperation: a return to regionalism?* (2013), describes the nature of the Nordic defence cooperation as a project that has been regarded as a model for other European countries (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1161) & Weaver, 1998, p. 74). During the Cold War cooperation was existent between the Nordic countries but did in fact not include the area of defense. Significant changes have been taking place and as areas of possible cooperation were identified and the institutional organization Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was established in 2009. Same year, former defense and foreign minister of Norway, Thorvald Stoltenberg presented a rapport to the defense ministers of the Nordic countries where he detailed thirteen proposals of enhanced cooperation amongst the Nordic countries in the area of defense and security. One of the proposals was the joint surveillance of the Icelandic airspace, a proposal that has now become reality (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1162).
 There are also geopolitical reasons as to why the Nordic countries ought to work together. They all share borders with each other thus they are all active in the same areas with a similar geostrategic interest (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1162).

This study will be setting out with the intention of only treating Karl Deutsch's *pluralistic security communities*, leaving the *amalgamated communities* aside, where Emmanuel Adler and & Michael Barnett has developed thoughts on how these evolves and what specifically constitutes such a community in its different stages.

2   Theory

This part addresses the works of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. They have written extensively within this field and from these scholars I've been able to gather my theoretical concepts. The concepts are *identity and security*. *Security* as a theoretical concept tends to lean more to a realist-oriented approach whereas *identity* appears to be more constructivist in nature. It also provides a healthy alternate approach towards understanding my problem. The sections below details the theoretical definitions of the concepts followed by the theoretical bulk of the thesis.

2.2 Theoretical Definitions

Identity is being defined as the existence of common ideas, values and worldviews, but also interest attached in populations within a certain *community* that eventually leads to a "we-feeling" coming into being. The concept focuses on the social aspects of both politics and military and is regarded as vital for a *security community* to function well (Tusicisny, 2007, p. 430)

Security in this study is being defined as a perceived state of being within the areas of military, social, political and economic and encompasses both populations, states, and the international system by which gained government and policy attention is being attracted (Sheenan, 2005, p. 45).

2.3 Adler and Barnett's Security Communities

Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in their book *Security Communities* (1998) point to three different stages that a *pluralistic security community* can find itself in. Below are the three stages presented.

The first stage is a so-called *Nascent* as they call it or sprouting *security community* as being in its early stages. Such a community would usually be characterized as a community where the people living in the sovereign states within the region expect a peaceful change in a rather trustworthy manner. Often, in the initial stages the governments are not showing any clear intentions of creating a *security community* but rather looks on the possibilities for expanded mutual *security* though closer coordination and interaction between the countries involved (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p, 50).

The second stage is the *Ascendant*. This stage is typically characterized as community where the participants' networks slowly have become more tightly coupled by the establishment of new organizations working in favor of expanded military cooperation or coordination. Such

examples would be an integration of militaries and/or sharing of the intelligence between the nations. Furthermore, in such communities the imagined fear of the member that "the other" would constitute a threat has decreased by the establishment of norms or structures advocating a joint-vision and closer cooperation among the member states through working closely together. In other words, a slow but steady emergence of a *collective identity* (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 53).

The last stage a *security community* can posses according to Adler and Barnett is the *mature security community*. In such a community one would find, in comparison to the *nascent security community*, a system of post-sovereign character. Unlike the characteristics of the second stage where one could see an emergence of a *collective identity* this had now become a reality. Already now a sense of peaceful change has come into existence, something that was somewhat absent in the second stage.
When a security *community* reaches into this stage it can fall into two different types of communities within this stage: tightly and loosely coupled (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 55). The loose-type is to be considered in this study as features that would constitute such a community is that the sovereignty remains fairly unchanged. A multilateral community with unfortified borders, common visions on threats and challenges but also some changes with regard to the nations military planning (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 57).

3 Methodology

For this research a method of *qualitative content analysis* has been selected. I deem this method as the most suiting method of choice for my study as it abeles me to dive into the depth of the defense policies in order to interpret and crystalize what the text actually says (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 50). . I've developed a hypothesis that argues that a greater coherence between the states' postures concerning my independent variables X's (*security* and *identity),* would present a greater possibility for deepened *cooperation*, which is my dependent variable (Y) (Esaiasson, et al. 2012, p. 50).
 As my intention is to investigate and analyze the prerequisites for deepened defense cooperation through the study of the national defense policies it is the textual content that I am interested in. Also, the nature of my methodological choice has its ontological roots in realism and its epistemological in objectivism (Strömbom, 2015). I will continue with constructing eleven questions, based on my operationalization that will take the shape of my coding scheme. In the analysis I will then proceed with applying and posing the questions towards each policy document (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 74). My task is therefore not only to note and analyze the appearances of expressions, words arguments in the texts but also interpret how such arguments and in what way they are expressed (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p, 50).

3.1 Operationalization

Security-issues are defined as challenges framed in a way where extraordinary measures are required to handle them (Weaver, 1995, p. 405). It is my aim to investigate this and by

studying how challenges and issues, regional and international are being framed and expressed I gain the kind of deep insight in the document that I am seeking. Examples can be how the states are expressing themselves on matters such as operations, joint-exercises and patrols, sharing intelligence, and or establishment of joint-units (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 57). The level of abstraction on my theoretical concept *security* can at first sight be viewed as problematic I would agree that if I would be set out to identify a certain state of *security*, using the operational indicators I've selected could be subjected to some negative critique seeing as they are not suitable enough as tools to investigate a certain level of security (Bjereld, et al. 2009, p. 112-113).

But as my intention is analyze how every country relates to matters that are either subjects or factors of *security* and *identity* through studying the textual content I will hopefully able to identify any possible coherence or incoherence between the states policies without jeopardizing the study's validity (Esaiasson, et al. 2012, p. 58-59) & (Bjereld, et al. 2009, p. 111-112).

In order to identify any potential existence or absence of any form of a shared *identity* the textual content has to be studied carefully. The coding scheme provides me with the opportunity to analyze as to how the policy documents explicitly describes (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 51) the states views on themselves as well as the other states within the Nordic region. The intention is to seek if and how the documents express any notions of commonality and if similar values and goals can be identified (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 53).

Trough the concept of *security* I shall analyze if and how the Nordic states describe their efforts in shaping security both in a unilateral and multilateral context but also how the states view and frames *security issues* (Bjereld, et al. 2009, p. 111-112). The coding scheme also allows me here to be able to explore how the documents identify certain problems and challenges, and how it seeks to face them. (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 53)

3.2 Source reflections

Close to everything of my primary-sources is in English. I've made the decision to only touch the English versions except for the new Swedish proposition, which isn't available in the English language. One could thereby argue the possibility of me overlooking important ideas and phrases expressed in their native languages as a result of only limiting myself to a majority of English material. However, I would argue in this case that it does quite the opposite. In this way I have naturally guarded myself against any possible linguistic errors when performing the interpretation that could've been encountered had I used documents written in their native languages. As for the Swedish defense policy I hold the view that I should be capable of performing correct translations, avoiding any linguistic errors as Swedish is my native language.

I am fully aware that I will not be able to provide an exact depiction of the states' postures as they are today seeing the majority of them are a couple of years old. The most recent document is the Swedish proposition that was released in December 2014. The document pays attention to the situation in Ukraine something the other policies don't as they were released before the beginning of the crisis. While demonstrating awareness about this issue, by using the most recent versions available it is the aim of to reach a result that reflects the present-day postures to greatest possible extent.

3.3 Coding Scheme

Below is the coding scheme that has been constructed in a way where I have, based on my operationalization, constructed eleven questions. These questions will then be asked and applied onto the policy documents to find out in-depth the countries postures (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 74).

1 How do the documents describe their respective roles within the Nordic context?
2 How do the documents describe the views on the other Nordic states within the Nordic context?
3 What values are being described as important for the states in the documents?
4 How are any notions of expressed commonality within the Nordic context being described?
5 How are the roles of the states within the CSDP respectively the NATO context being expressed?
6 How are any opinions regarding related events in other countries being described as?
7 What challenges are being considered and expressed as important in the documents?
8 What goals are being presented in the documents concerning the countries defense policies?
9 How does the documents express their intentions of dealing with identified challenges within the Nordic context?
10 How are the views of the Russian Federation being expressed in the documents?
11 How are the views of the United States of America being expressed in the documents?

4 Empirical Analysis

4.1 Finish Security and Defence Policy 2012

The most important goals, as expressed by the finish defense policy, are mainly aiming towards preserving its core national interests. Right at the beginning of the document, which details its summary, it's clearly stated that the main goals for the security- and defense policy is to *"safeguard the* country's *independence and territorial sovereignty, guaranteeing the basic values, security and well-being of the population and maintaining a functioning society"* (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 10). Here one can notice the strong emphasis on the preservation of the basic fundamental values of the citizens as the main task for Finland's policy.

Concerning challenges, the document as such details a wide range of issues that have not traditionally been regarded as *security issues*. In long-term the most impacting factors for global security that one has to take into account is the growing population of the world along with the climate change. An increasingly urbanizing world, where the population has been growing three-fold since the middle of the 1940's, is being brought up as affecting the environment, the economic and social construction as well as the world's natural resources (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 10).

Further, the issues of water and food shortage are potential factors to further instability in the regions of Africa and the Middle East. These problems require enhanced common mechanisms and regulations for their usage in order to prevent the emergence of conflicts (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 10).

A reasonable interpretation of the portraying of these issues it that these are first of all very important issues that has to be considered when acting and forming new approaches as to how Finland and other states approached these areas of the world. A notion of increased collaboration among the states in these areas can here be identified as a mean of maintaining the security and to prevent further instability to grow over such problems.

Returning to the expressed goals of the policy, whose core interest was presented above, more concrete goals of the policy concerning the preservation of *security* are the continuation of the development of Finland's capabilities in crisis management. This is being carried out by its active role in exercising together with other countries both within the European Union, NATO and partner countries. A side from that it has a clear goal set to expand the existing cooperation among the Nordic countries (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 13).
 Finland as a military non-aligned country, its policy states very clearly that it does not depend of any foreign assistance in the event of an external aggression. On one hand it views the current *security climate* as stable but on the other it does not rule out that any changes is possible. It is therefore the main goal of the military to uphold a credible deterrence on it's own, relying solely on it's military to repel any aggressions towards the country. Although at the same time it recognizes the need for international cooperation to maintain its defense capability (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 14-16).

With the US pivot to Asia where it has re-located substantial parts of its armed forces (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 29) it is vital for Europe to maintain its role in the international- and security arena. Finland holds the opinion that the global political leadership of the United States will remain, despite global changes that are taking place. With that in mind it also stresses, in a positive manner, the importance of a clear U.S commitment to international law and cooperation as a necessity for a well-functioning international system (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 30).
 Finland regards that if Europe is to maintain a major role in the security arena, closer defense cooperation has to be established. Finland is cooperating both within the EU/NATO context but, as previously stated, is not military aligned. On a bilateral level, Finland cooperates with Sweden, United States and the Russian Federation.
 Between EU and U.S, the importance of further cooperation is encouraged as Finland views U.S as a contributor of stability and security in the region whereas concerning Russia the level of cooperation between the two countries (Finland and Russia) is primarily existing on a political level. Russia is Finland's largest trading partner and it is the will of the Finish government to see a stronger commitment of the Russian federation towards multilateral treaties and international cooperation (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 30). Finland also hopes to further positively expand its relationship with Russia and suggests that cooperation between EU and Russia could be expanded further concerning *foreign- and security policy* (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 81).

The document displays high regards for the Nordic countries. It considers them to be important in the sense that they all have similar views on the rule of law, gender equality and, perhaps most important, the promotion of the Nordic model (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 12). The text describes the countries in a very positive manner labeling them as a reference

group where Finland promotes both foreign, defense and security cooperation through which stability in the Nordic region is created (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 12).
NORDEFCO is a perfect example of a well-functioning regional collaborative arrangement (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 43) where states does not necessarily have to give up their neutrality and yet enjoy the opportunity to be active in areas of defense cooperation.
A highlighted project is the *Strategic Airlift Capability cooperation* where Sweden, Finland along with ten other countries shares the usage and operational costs of three C-17 military transport aircrafts (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 43) in order to minimize their national expenditures.

Finland views the Nordic countries as leading states on the creation of security and it is therefore natural to, in the name of solidarity, cooperate within this field. They're similar in operating cultures, tasks and goals of their military forces and thus a good base is created for defense cooperation, which ultimately provides common solutions for the countries' governments (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 68-69).
Concerning the other Nordic countries roles within the Nordic region and its cooperation, Finland regards Sweden as the key country. It views Sweden as a strong political actor that has been positively engaged in international crisis management naming its contributions to the NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya. The document also argues that Sweden can further increase its role with shaping the *security environment* in the Nordic region, something the country is prepared on a political level the document states (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 71).
Positive expressions are also made concerning the close relationship Finland has with Sweden on policy matters in the security field (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 71) and it becomes clear, from the text, that Finland aims at preserving and expanding this relationship.

Norway and Denmark's approach towards Nordic defense cooperation is not mentioned in the document. However, it expresses that the countries base *security* on their NATO membership. As for Denmark, the document states with a slight hint of a problematic notion, its choice not to participate in EU's military activities (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 72). However, in a rather positive manner it confirms the countries firm participation in NATO operations, defense planning and also as states that, despite declining defense forces, have been able to improve their militaries capabilities (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 72).
Iceland, at last, is mentioned briefly where a rather neutral depiction of its NATO membership and bilateral defense agreement with the United States is described. The surveillance of the Icelandic airspace is brought up here, which were administered by NATO, but brings up the so-called *Stoltenberg report* that called for Swedish and Finish participation along with Denmark and Norway as a Nordic project, something that Iceland also has been expressing as positive (Prime Ministers Office, 2012, p. 72). The interpretation I then make, seeing the fact that the document indeed do bring up the joint-surveillance is that it could be seen as a positive idea from a finish standpoint.

4.2 Defense proposition – Sweden's defense 2016-2020

The Swedish proposition for its security- and defense policy, agreed upon by a majority of the parliamentary parties, aims at upholding it's primary values of democracy, rule of law and the universal human rights (Regeringen, 2014, p. 7). The document, amounting to 119 pages, aims at establishing a renewed Swedish approach in its security- and defense policy where its fundamental focus will shift from focusing its capabilities to participate in conflicts around the world, to a defense operating with a increased national focus (Regeringen, 2014, p. 50).

The document is multiple times expressing a shift in the *security environment* and makes the argument that therefore the renewed Swedish defense should be capable to solve any threats or challenges emerging from such an environment (Regeringen, 2014, p. 50).

The stated challenges that can be observed in the document are primarily aimed at events and conflicts within Sweden's proximity but also within Europe. It acknowledges, although with no major emphasis, the poor financial state of the economy in a brief section (Regeringen, 2014, p. 22) to continue where the document expresses explicitly what constitutes other challenges, taking a firm standpoint concerning the reasons for their appearances. It primarily points to Russia as the reason for the *security environment* is changing referring to its annexation of the Crimean peninsula as illegal describing it as the largest challenge towards the European *security* order since its establishment by which a unpredictable *security environment* has been created (Regeringen, p. 22).
 Concerning issues in its immediate surrounding area the document describes an increasingly changing Russian behavior with more provocative features. It brings fourth the un-confirmed underwater-activity that was noted during the autumn of 2014 in a section where it also mentions an increase of Russian under-water activity in the region. To be clear, it does not make any links concerning the violation of the territorial waters and Russia but merely depicts it as unacceptable and as a clear example of the increased tensions in the region (Regeringen, 2014, p. 23.).

However it describes, in a rather vigilant manner, that the Russian leadership has demonstrated a certain willingness to utilize its military might in order to achieve its political goals, pointing towards Ukraine and Georgia as examples, viewing it as completely unacceptable (Regeringen, 2014, p. 28). Further the document continues to regard it as having an effect on *the security environment* both within the Nordic region as well as in Europe (Regeringen, 2014, p. 22).

To face the emerging challenges, the document highlights the importance of working together with other countries. It advocates therefore strongly that *security* ought not to be shaped unilaterally but in conjunction with other nations (Regeringen, 2014, p. 7-8). It views its membership in the European Union as mean to take responsibility where it can act for increased European *security* and a peaceful democratic development (Regeringen, 2014, p. 7-8). The emphasis on multilateral cooperation is evident and brought up throughout several parts of the document which demonstrates a solid standpoint that it is in Sweden's best interest to work collectively to achieve the best possible situation in terms of *security* for the Nordic region as well as Europe (Regeringen, 2014, p. 8).
 It also stressed with importance that for Sweden to attain its *security objectives* on the national level it vital that its defense capability is able to protect and uphold the sovereignty and the territorial integrity (Regeringen, 2014, p. 7). A possible interpretation of such statement would be that, on behalf of the the government, the defense ministry and armed forces are willing to take extraordinary measures, be them political, economical or military, to protect and secure its territory

The document defines its neighboring countries, specifically the Nordic ones, as nations where it shares several postures in the area of *security policy*. It views cooperation among the countries as a vital provider of peace and stability, advocating a continued deepening of the cooperation among the Nordic countries (Regeringen, 2014, p. 23).
 While emphasizing the need for further Nordic cooperation the document also states that a existing cooperation is not to be regarded as a replacement of the alternative collective

arrangements that the Nordic countries have bound themselves to. Among the Nordic states there has been a *declaration of solidarity* issued. This declaration and the broader Nordic cooperative arena should therefore been seen as a complement to the countries involvement in the EU and NATO-frameworks (Regeringen, 2014, p. 21).

The document also mentions the unilateral Swedish *declaration of solidarity* and takes a very strong position stating that were any EU member state or Nordic state to be attacked the country has no intentions of remaining passive, thus expecting the same assistance in return (Regeringen, 2014, p. 21).
While acknowledging the geostrategic importance of the region describes the existing cooperative work within NORDEFCO as an important tool, which has contributed to the strengthening of the dialogue between the countries and is providing the countries with new opportunities to cooperate, exercise and educate (Regeringen, 2014, p. 23) personnel from the countries both within the civilian a military spheres. It is also expressed in the document that, in order to increase its military capabilities, it visions this kind of cooperation on a long-term basis and that both bi- and multilateral cooperation within the Nordic context strengthens the *security* of the region (Regeringen, 2014, p. 23).

Concerning the Nordic countries Finland is, as expressed by the document, regarded as the Nordic country, which with it has furthest developed cooperation with. It describes the finish defense policy to view the cooperation with United States and NATO as essential for the *security* and stability in Europe. Both Finland and Sweden appears to have similar aspirations in developing a close level of cooperation with both U.S & NATO (Regeringen, 2014, p. 24-26) demonstrating not only similarities in that regard but also in the general security policy.
 As the level of cooperation is already fairly developed between the two nations the Swedish government views the prospects for deepened cooperation with great potential in all general military areas. One example brought up is the possibility of bilateral planning and establishment of readiness, including both civilian and military resources, to act in various scenarios. However, such cooperation ought to merely constitute the capability to act together but not any formal obligations to do so (Regeringen, 2014, p. 24)

Denmark and Norway are described, in terms of the security- and defense postures, to depart from a standpoint where they primarily emphasizes their NATO membership and their bilateral relations with the United States (Regeringen, 2014, p. 25).
 The document describes a shift in Denmark's interest especially in the wake of the Ukraine crisis where it has gained an increased attention on traditional territorial defense, where prior it held a standpoint where this was not emphasized and mainly focused on a mobile defense with participation in international operations (Regeringen, 2014, p. 25). Denmark's views on its immediate surrounding is now slightly changing and, in reference to what was said above, the document appears to view this noticeable shift in focus as positive. The states view of the document is that Sweden want further a development of Danish-Swedish cooperation from where it is right now (Regeringen, 2014, p. 25). This positive notion is clearly visible although it is not described specifically how such development ought to be shaped.
As for the Norway the document depicts a different view, than of Denmark, where it describes the Norwegian defense policy's aim as one that is supposed to maintain the capability to face threats internationally but also within is surrounding area as it's defense it intended to constitute a military deterrence towards external aggressors (Regeringen, 2014, p. 25). Similar to the position towards Denmark, the document explicitly states that it whishes to deepen cooperation by expanding the scope of exchanges of military units to particular in the

northern parts of the countries to foster interoperability and education among the militaries (Regeringen, 2014, p. 25).

4.3 Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017

The agreement on the Danish defense, agreed upon by the Danish political parties the Social, Democrats, Social-Liberals, Socialist People's Party, Liberal party, the Liberal Alliance and the Conservatives (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 1), describes the primary purposes in very clear terms. The document states that its primary purposes are to guarantee the existence of the nation as well as its integrity and safety (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 1).

 It expresses, in terms of threats against Danish interest and security that such threats can present themselves anywhere in the world (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 1). It's quite an abstract statement to make but its being put into context mentioning cyber threats, state and non-state actors and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 2). Denmark has been, and still is, very active in participating in international operations around the world, the fact that its dependent on a stable flow of commerce and therefore it becomes clear what the document implies when speaking in such abstract terms.

 The melting of the Arctic ice-cap and is regarded as a increasing geographic accessibility that will result in the region being more active in terms of both commerce and other areas. Most importantly in regards to the Arctic region is that the document states that the changes in the region entails a growing awareness of rights to extract natural resources (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 2). From the document's description, a growing region of importance is here being portrayed. With regards to the question on rights to extract potential resources one could here interpret the text as framing this subject as a potential problem as many nations have made claims on that area.

For Denmark to face any potential challenges concerning its security- or defense policy it holds the opinion of a strong existence of international law but also views multilateral cooperation as priority in areas where it serves Danish interests (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 25). The documents describes clearly that Danish participation within NATO constitutes an essential pillar in the Danish security- and defense policy, especially Article 5 that implies a collective defense within the organization (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 2). It also views NATO as a framework for Danish participation in overseas missions and aims to continue to work in a way where it remains a core member of the organization (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 2). It becomes clear that Denmark values its membership in NATO heavily through the way it is being described.

 Returning to the Artic region, the document details the potential for closer cooperation with what it labels as the Artic nations. The established relations with the Nordic countries are viewed as a point of departure but also seek cooperation with Canada, United States and Russia on this matter. Closely related, to foster Danish overview in the region, maritime and areal surveillance in conjunction with other nations are specific areas the document identifies as possible co-ventures and suggests an active participation in the Nordic cooperative context (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 7 & 43).

 In relation to NATO and Russia, it is the expressed intentions of the document that the work of the NATO missile defense capabilities are including close and honest cooperation with the Russian Federation (Forsvarsministeriet, 2012, p 16).

4.4 Norwegian Security and Defence Policy 2013

Issued by the Norwegian government the Security and Defence Policy of 2013 describes its primary purposes, which are to uphold and protect the political freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 2). Emphasis is also put on the objectives to guard the society against aggressions and attacks towards the Norwegian state from state and non-state actors where the armed forces makes up for one of the most vital instruments. Under the UN authority, the armed forces together with allied nations play a critical role in the contribution to peace and stability (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 2).
 Concerning the armed forces it is also the intention of the Norwegian government to maintain capabilities to fulfill the task of safeguarding its territory, thus upholding its credible deterrence. Allies it should also be able to strengthen the Norwegian territory and, equally important, Norway aims towards continuing contribution to the defense of its allies in accordance to the NATO framework (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 2). It becomes clear that the defense policy both aims at the capability of acting alone as well as in conjunction with other nations in defending Norwegian territory and allied interest through demonstrating such an internationalist view on its own defense capabilities.

In the document there are several factors that has been identified as *security issues*. The most severe potential threats that are being highlighted and framed as challenges that have raised the awareness in the Norwegian society are the proliferation of WMD's and international terrorism (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 11). The document implies the significance of these threats and also mentions that emergency planning, a part from the problems stated above, should also take into account the issues of dangerous diseases, natural catastrophes (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 11).
 No specifics has been details in the document as to how it plans to tackle these challenges but as far as the document is concerned, various tasks has been delegated to appropriate authorities that deals with these issues on a day-to-day basis.

 As a member of NATO, Norway is heavily invested in its framework. This becomes further evident from the emphasis on its importance especially in its active operations in East Africa, Mediterranean, and Somalia (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 8). The organization's military capability is highlighted further where the opinion of the document is that it will eventually be reduced in the future. As a result from declining defense budgets among the member states the document details, in a positive manner, a few initiatives that have been undertaken among the NATO members. *Smart Defence* and *Connected Forces Initiative* are aimed at increased defense cooperation and joint-acquirement of key capabilities but also highlight the importance of collective exercises in order to bolster interoperability among the member states' forces.

Although Norway evolves a substantial part of its defense around its NATO membership, not being a EU member, the document expressed a very positive attitude towards EU and its *Common Security and Defense Policy*. It describes the European Union, as having apparent aspirations for the bolstering the CSDP and to develop its capabilities to engage in both civil-and military crisis operations (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 9). The document views this as positive and clearly states that Norway has, based on a vested interest, positioned itself close to the European foreign and security policy. Despite the fact that it is not a member of EU and therefore has limited influence with EU (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 9) the Norwegian policy is showing clear willingness to cooperate with the members of the European Union.

In general the document describes Norway's participation, within the EU framework on matters stated above, as one of the most engaged non-EU members. This is also demonstrated further by its positive approach to cooperate with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and supports future developed cooperation (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 9).

A part from its participation within the EU-framework it regards the Nordic cooperation as highly important. Despite the Nordic countries different relations with EU and NATO it regards NORDEFCO as working exceedingly well among the countries. Reason as to why the work within NORDEFCO and Nordic cooperation in general is going well, especially in the area of policy assessment and security interests, is the fact that a great level of commonality exists between the nations.

Not acting unilaterally but in terms collective Nordic action is regarded by the document as providing significant contribution towards peace support operations and brings up the Norwegian, Swedish and Finish participation in a joint Nordic Battle Group together with Estonia and Ireland in 2011 as a positive step (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 11).

The emphasis and apparent endorsement of the cooperation among the Nordic countries is here very much evident. It is further detailed that Norway regards the development of research and studies within the Nordic Defense research agencies, one of many identified areas of future cooperation, in clear way (Regjeringen, 2013, p. 11.)

4.5 Iceland's security policy

Absent of any armed forces or defense policy, but a member of NATO, the shaping *security* is highly emphasized throughout the Icelandic documents. With NATO membership since 1949 and signing of the bilateral defense agreement with the United States, Iceland regards the two steps as the fundamental parts of its *security policy* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The signing of the defense agreement gave United States, on behalf of NATO, the right to administer the defense of Iceland placing U.S troops on Icelandic soil (Defence of Iceland, 1951). However, it signed a *joint understanding memorandum* in 2006 acknowledging the withdrawal of U.S troops whilst retaining the defense of its security in the hands on U.S and NATO (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

The documents detail its aims to maintain and develop cooperation between the two states, especially within the fields on *global security* and in the North Atlantic region. Furthermore, agreeing on U.S initiatives to hold annual NATO exercises within its airspace, to share information and continue discussions on security problems (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006) & (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015) Iceland demonstrates, by agreeing upon such matters, it is both continuously committed and required to work bilaterally in order to strengthen its *security*.

The absence of armed forces prohibits Iceland from projecting power militarily within the NATO-framework but demonstrates its commitment through financial support and civilian personnel placing a high focus on proliferation issues, arms control and disarmament (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This commitment implies Iceland's continued focus on critical *security* issues and willingness to approaching these through non-military means.

Iceland is active on a political level concerning Nordic cooperation and highlights the importance of its continuance. It positively describes Nordic cooperation as unique in terms of solidarity, pointing to its commonality in their history, culture and shared values of an open dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

Iceland's commitment to the Nordic region can be seen through its politically participation within the Nordic council of Ministers, an official inter-governmental body aimed at promoting cooperation among the countries as a mean to benefit the people of the region. It also sends positive implications to improve the commonality by suggesting research projects in areas of culture, education and efforts to promote freedom of movement among the countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

Finally, Iceland recognizes the need, concerning the Nordic countries in their cooperative ventures, to work together with other nations within the Northern region of Europe. The main reasons are being describes as attracting foreign investment and generally increase interest of cooperation in the nations involved. It therefore aims at including the Baltic states as well as Russia to be including as they are all regarded as important by which a closer relationship would serve all nations well on the global market (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

5 Conclusion

Through the analysis multiple areas has been identified where the Nordic states correspond in terms of their views on their *identity* and some extent *security*. However, I want to highlight that the results shows that differences do exists between the states as to how future cooperation ought to take place.

The question; *What are the prerequisites for deepened defense cooperation among the Nordic countries?* The fundamental prerequisites are the existing commonalities that are described by all states' documents. Along with shared interest in deepening defense cooperation, the result shows a clear existence of a common Nordic *identity* with a shared history, culture and similar values on rule of law and democracy. Adding to that commonality is also evident in terms of their aspirations in security- and defense policy within the Nordic region, which all together constitutes the promotion of the Nordic model.

This would to some extent support Adler and Barnett's theory on their definition of a *mature security community* in the *loose* category. They partly describe one as containing an established collective identity. In this case I would argue, as has been brought up earlier in this study, that such a collective identity do exists here being the Nordic *identity*. The *identity* is, as far as this study is concerned, not emerging but is and has been established for a good period of time. What is also important is that it deviates to a small extent from Adler and Barnett's theory. The Nordic identity, although very much existent, has not eroded the national identities that still exists. In that sense I would argue the existence of six primary identities as being present within the Nordic region in this case the five the national and the common identity being the Nordic one.

High correlation between the countries is displayed as to how they view each other and views the importance of Nordic cooperation. But underlying differences as to how such cooperation ought to be shape appears to exist between the nations.
 All five countries aim to continue the deepening and promotion of Nordic defense cooperation. Iceland and Denmark are the two countries that express least views on its role and prospects, but what is being expressed is framed as important and positive. Denmark shows intentions too cooperate on a general basis where it fits its interest and identifies the Arctic region as a good place where common work can be based on the existing Nordic

cooperation along with other major powers. Other forms of expanded cooperation from a Danish perspective are maritime and areal surveillance, which is supported by both Finland and Sweden. For Iceland's part it is especially important to strengthen the work within the Nordic Council of Ministers in order to further promote cooperation among the countries.

Sweden remains open to all forms of Nordic cooperation concerning all military areas. It also views the existing cooperative work within NORDEFCO as an important tool, which has contributed to the strengthening of the dialogue between the countries and is providing the countries with new opportunities to cooperate, exercise and educate together.
 Norway, while advocating continuation of the Nordic cooperation, points towards a potential development in both research and education among the Nordic Defense research agencies supported by both Sweden and Iceland, all of them concur that the continuance of Nordic cooperation is important.

While every state holds the view that collective action is to prefer and despite common interests to deepen Nordic defense cooperation, they differ in their views on what's being regarded as a *security issue*. Finland identifies very globally oriented challenges acknowledging water and food scarcity and a rising population as affecting the global financial system. Sweden also briefly mentions the global economy as being in a poor shape but does places any major weight on that issue although a sense of commonality can be seen here.
 As for the three NATO countries, a more common set of identified challenges is portrayed acknowledging the dangers with proliferation of WMD's, the need for arms control and international terrorism makes up these common views on perceived *security issues* among the three states.

Further, Sweden is practically alone in brining up Russian activity in the Baltic Sea and the its involvement in Ukraine crisis viewing this as clear sign of a shifting *security environment*. In finding an explanation to why this happens to be the case, one has to be aware that Sweden is the only country that has released a defense policy since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine. It is therefore highly possible that the views of the remaining Nordic states have shifted towards a similar posture but this cannot be determined on that basis.
 As far as the documents are concerned, Iceland Finland and Denmark both holds the view that cooperation with Russia is positive and they all expressed intention to see a more internationally committed Russia and to include it in discussion on foreign- and security policies viewing it as beneficial for all parties involved.

Adler and Barnett's description of *mature security communities* is here weakened concerning the states' correlation with the concept of *security*. Despite existing institutions as the Nordic Council of Ministers and NORDEFCO the nature of the Nordic *security community* is not to be characterized as a post-sovereign one, as all states ultimately decide how and when they want to engage in cooperative measures. A common vision exist to expand Nordic defense cooperation but, in relation to the theory, a fulfilled development of a joint-vision on how *security issues* are framed and how *security* is to be sought through cooperation remains not entirely evident as demonstrated above.

According to this result I therefore confirm my hypothesis, that a greater coherence between the state's postures concerning my variables *security* and *identity* do present the Nordic states with a greater prospect of deepened cooperation.

Further research into the area of the states' different intentions to engage in the context of Nordic defense cooperation is encouraged, as it remains unknown if they can identify additional areas of cooperation or collectively work towards fulfilling the differing ones presented above. Such a study should preferably include the future defense policies of Norway, Finland.

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